Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion in Finance
Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion in Finance
1 Introduction
Advanced Financial Theory Overview
• The objective of this course is to familiarise students with advanced concepts in decision making under uncertainty and
the relationship between risk based decisions and financial valuation.
• The module presents the standard results in risk based valuation and how they relate to the underpinning notions of risk
aversion and temporal (time) consistency.
• The module will look at state contingency and future outcomes and provide students with the tools needed to support
concepts taught across a range of topics across your degree.
• Most importantly, this module underpins the basic knowledge needed to understand how the financial system works, how
securities are valued and why some puzzles in finance, which might at first seem obvious, have complex underpinnings.
Portfolio
Analysis
Corporate
Econometrics
Finance
Advanced
Financial
Theory
Financial Risk
Derivatives
Management
Module Structure
1. Measuring Risk and Risk Aversion
2. Financial Risks and Optimality
3. Theory of Insurance
4. Static Portfolios
5. Linear Pricing
6. Consumption and Saving
7. Dynamic Portfolios
8. Risk and Information
9. Portfolio Optimisation
This is a table of common notation, it can be helpful to keep this separately to help you.
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Table 1: Common Notation
Symbol Meaning
w Wealth (initial or current wealth level)
x Payoff (outcome of a gamble, portfolio, or asset)
x̃ Random variable payoff (uncertain outcome)
p Probability of a particular outcome
{xi , pi } Discrete lottery: outcome xi with probability pi
F (x) Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of payoff
f (x) Probability density function (PDF) of payoff
E[ · ] Expectation operator (mean value)
E[x̃] Expected payoff
Var(x̃) Variance of the payoff (risk measure)
Symbol Meaning
U (w) or u(w) Utility of wealth w
U ′ (w) or u′ (w) Marginal utility of wealth
U ′′ (w) or u′′ (w) Second derivative (concavity: U ′′ (w) < 0 for risk aversion)
E[U (x̃)] Expected utility of a random payoff
CE Certainty equivalent: certain payoff yielding same utility as a lottery
RP Risk premium: E[x̃] − CE
U ′′ (w)
A(w) = − ′ Arrow–Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion
U (w)
U ′′ (w)
R(w) = −w ′ Arrow–Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
U (w)
Hence: While the likelihood of an outcome may remain unchanged, decisions can and will most likely vary on the
size of a loss that might be incurred.
Measuring Risk
• Typically people behave as if they are averse to uncertain situations. Evidence for this comes from the large and
ubiquitous demand for insurance, and a burgeoning collection of experimental results and other results.
• To take into account uncertainty in the decision making, the Expected Utility framework is used.
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Comparing Risks
Consider the following choices A and B
1. (A) Receive certain $0.10 or (B) $0.20 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
2. (A) Receive certain $1 or (B) $2 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
3. (A) Receive certain $10 or (B) $20 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
4. (A) Receive certain $100 or (B) $200 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
5. (A) Receive certain $1,000 or (B) $2,000 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
6. (A) Receive certain $10,000 or (B) $20,000 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
7. (A) Receive certain $100,000 or (B) $200,000 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
8. (A) Receive certain $1,000,000 or (B) $2,000,000 with a 50% probability or nothing with a 50%.
In each case the expected payoff is the same, but would you evaluate each lottery with the same perspective?
Intuition:
• Risk-averse individuals dislike variability in outcomes.
• They are willing to pay a premium to avoid risk.
Example:
• Lottery: 50% chance to win $100, 50% chance to win $0.
• Expected value = $50.
• A risk-averse person may prefer a guaranteed $45 instead.
Expected Utility
1 1
E[ex ] ≡ × 4000 + × 12000 = 8000 ducats (1)
2 2
1 1 1
E[ey ] = × 4000 + × 8000 + × 12000 = 8000 ducats (2)
4 2 4
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Concave Risk Aversion and Utility
A utility function connects measurable wealth to an abstract notion of well being.
It is normally denoted by u(w).
In financial economics we assume that individuals are ‘non-satiable’, hence more is always better, as such the utility is
always increasing, hence the first derivative, u′ (w), is always positive.
The concept of concavity means that the second derivative u′′ (w), is always negative.
An example of a function with these properties is the square root function, or:
√ 1
u(w) = w = w2
√
u(w) = w
3
Utility u(w)
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wealth w
3.5
√
u(w) = w
3 u(w) = ln(w)
u(w) = w0.3
2.5 u(w) = 1 − e−0.5w
Utility u(w)
1.5
0.5
0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wealth w
By contrast if a utility function is convex, then the behaviour described by this function is risk seeking, that is an individual
would reject a certain outcome with the same expected payoff to a risky lottery.
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Utility u(w)
10
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Wealth w
Sempronius’ problem
Whilst risk seeking behaviour can exist, it is not a commonly assumed property when dealing with meaningful financial
choices. Furthermore, the implications of risk aversion are quite profound.
√
In order to illustrate this point, let us consider a specific example of a utility function, such as u(x) = x. Using these
preferences in Sempronius’ problem, we can determine the expectation of u(x):
Expected Utility
1√ 1√
E[u(ex )] = 4000 + 12000 = 86.4 (3)
2 2
Expected Utility
1√ 1√ 1√
E[u(ey )] = 4000 + 8000 + 12000 = 87.9 (4)
4 2 4
Because lottery ey generates a larger expected utility than lottery ex , the former is preferred by Sempronius.
Decision Rules
Each probability unit transferred yields a reduction in expected utility equaling to u(12000) − u(8000). But the concavity
of u implies that:
Expected Utility
i.e., that the positive effect of these combined mean-preserving transfers must dominate the negative effect. This is why all
investors with a concave utility would support Sempronius’ strategy to diversify risks.
As such, u transforms the objective expected value of wealth w, say, from a lottery, into the subjective and preference
specific utility u(w).
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Definition and characterization of risk aversion
Final wealth comes from initial wealth w plus the outcome of any risk borne during the period. Observe that any lottery
z̃ with a non-zero expected payoff can be decomposed into its expected payoff E[z̃] and a zero-mean lottery z̃ − E[z̃].
Thus, from our definition, a risk-averse agent always prefers receiving the expected outcome of a lottery with certainty,
rather than the lottery itself. For an expected-utility maximizer with a utility function u, this implies that, for any lottery z̃
and for any initial wealth w.
Expected Utility Theory
1 1
u(12000) + u(4000) ≤ u(8000). (7)
2 2
If Sempronius could find an insurance company that would offer full insurance at an actuarially fair price of E[z] = 4000
ducats, Sempronius would be better off by purchasing the insurance policy.
or, equivalently, if the certainty equivalent e of z̃ is positive. In the following, we examine how this decision is affected by
a change in the utility function.
then we have
Expected Utility Theory
E[u(w + z̃)] = E[a + b(w + z̃)] = a + b(w + E[z̃)] = u(w + E[z̃]) (9)
which implies that the decision maker ranks lotteries according to their expected outcome. The behavior of this individual
is called risk-neutral.
Proof: The proof of sufficiency is based on a second-order Taylor expansion of u(w + z) around w + E[ez ]. For any z, this
yields:
Expected Utility Theory
u(w + z) = u(w + E[ez ]) + (z − E[ez ])u′ (w + E[ez ]) + 0.5(z − E[ez ])2 u′′ (ξ(z)) (10)
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Definition and characterization of risk aversion
for some ξ(z) in between z and E[ez ]. Because this must be true for all z, it follows that the expectation of u(w + ez ) is
equal to:
E[u(w + ez )] = u(w + E[ez ]) + u′ (w + E[ez ])E(ez − E[ez ]) + 0.5E[(ez − E[ez ])2 u′′ (ξ(ez ))] (11)
Because ξ(eε ) has a support that is contained in [w − δ, w + δ] where u is locally convex, u′′ (ξ(eε )) is positive for all
realizations of eε .
Consequently, it follows that E e2ε u′′ (ξ(eε )) is positive, and E[u(w+eε )] is larger than u(w). Thus, accepting the zero-mean
lottery eε raises welfare and the decision maker is not risk-averse. This is a contradiction.
That is, Π is the cost of risk. For an agent with utility function u and initial wealth w, the risk premium must satisfy
the following condition:
Certainty Equivalent
• When z̃ has a zero mean, comparing equations implies that the certainty equivalent e of z̃ equals minus its its risk
premium Π.
Certainty Equivalent
e = Ez̃ − Π (15)
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Risk Premium and Certainty Equivalent
The lottery outcome is characterized by E[z̃] = 0 and σ 2 = E[z̃ 2 ] which is the variance of the outcome of the lottery.
1 2
π′ = σ A(w) (20)
2
−u′′ (w)
A(w) = (21)
u′ (w)
Under risk aversion, function A is positive. It would be zero or negative respectively for a risk-neutral or risk-loving agent.
A(·) is hereafter referred to as the degree of absolute risk aversion of the agent.
3.5
Utility u(w)
u(w)
3
1.5
0.5
Π = E[w] − CE
Wealth w
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
u′ (w − π) − E[u′ (w + ez )]
π ′ (w) = (24)
u′ (w − π)
Thus, the risk premium is decreasing with wealth if and only if:
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
−wu′′ (w)
R(w) = = wA(w) (28)
u′ (w)
Π(wz̃)
Analogously, a unit-free relative risk premium for absolute risk can be expressed as Π̂(z̃) = w ⋍ 21 σ 2 R(w) to analyse
the share of wealth agents are willing to pay to insure against risk with a more risk-averse agent paying a higher risk premium
and to establish acceptable degrees of risk aversion.
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Example Relative Risk Aversion Formulation
As an example, let us take the following function
1−γ
w −1
1−γ
, γ ̸= 1
u(w) =
ln(w), γ=1
What will be the form of the coefficient of relative risk aversion for this function?
d w1−γ − 1
u′ (w) = = w−γ , u′′ (w) = −γw−γ−1
dw 1 − γ
w (−γw−γ−1 )
R(w) = − =γ
w−γ
Step 3: Interpretation: γ is constant; hence the CRRA utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion.
γ = 0 (risk-neutral)
4 γ = 0.5
γ=1
γ=2
Utility U (w)
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Wealth w
or, equivalently, if the certainty equivalent e of ez is positive. In the following, we examine how this decision is affected by
a change in the utility function.
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Degree of risk aversion
This must be true independent of the common initial wealth level w of the two agents. If this definition were restricted to
small risks, we know from the above analysis that this would be equivalent to requiring that:
Degree of risk aversion
for all w. If limited to small risks, v is more risk-averse than u if function Av is uniformly larger than Au . We say in this
case that v is more concave than u in the sense of Arrow-Pratt.
and
1√ 1√ √
4000 + 12000 = 86.395 = 7464.1 (35)
2 2
Alternatively, suppose that Sempronius’ utility function is v(w) = ln(w), which is also increasing and concave. It is easy to
check that v is more concave than u in the sense of Arrow-Pratt.
1 2
u(w) = aw − w , for a ⩾ w (36)
2
however a flaw of Quadratic Utility Functions is that they require u to be non-decreasing, only true if w is smaller than
a. It also exhibits unlikely increasing absolute risk aversion.
exp(−aw)
u(w) = − (37)
a
are exponential functions where a is some positive scalar. These functions exhibit CARA with A(w) = a for all w. When
u is exponential and w is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ 2 , the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact
and Π = 12 σ 2 A(w).
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Some standard results for utility functions
The distinguishing feature of these utility functions is that they exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, with A(w) = a for
all w. It can be shown that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact when u is exponential and ew is normally distributed with
mean µ and variance σ 2 . Indeed, we can take expectations to see that:
Utility Functions
(w − µ)2
Z
1
E[u(ew )] = − √ exp(−aw) exp − dw (38)
σa 2π 2σ 2
(w − (µ − 0.5aσ 2 ))2
Z
1 1
= − exp(−a(µ − 0.5aσ 2 )) √ exp − dw (39)
a σ 2π 2σ 2
1
= − exp(−a(µ − 0.5aσ 2 )) = u(µ − 0.5aσ 2 ). (40)
a
The obvious application is insurance. We buy insurance specifically because we are risk averse and this will be a famous
result we will come back to later in the module.
However, most countries do now require investment advisors to understand the degree of risk aversion a client investor will
exhibit.
On the next slide is an example of a series of lotteries designed to elicit risk preferences, this is taken from: Risk Aversion
and Incentive Effects by Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury, 2002. American Economic Review, 92 (5): 1644-1655.
In each row, participants choose between Option A and B. p is the probability of the high payoff; the low payoff occurs with
probability 1 − p.
A risk-neutral chooser would switch from A to B when p ≈ 0.45 (between rows 4 and 5). Later switching indicates risk aversion;
earlier switching indicates risk seeking.
Summary
In this lecture we have looked at the following concepts:
• Understanding risky choices and uncertain outcomes.
• The concept of risk aversion.
• How risk aversion is characterised in a mathematical framework.
• Some common results on risk aversion:
– Concavity and Expected Utility
– Risk premia and certainty equivalence
– Constant Relative Risk Aversion
– Absolute Risk Aversion
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