The Primacy of Christ:

A Theological Foundation

A thesis submitted to the faculty of the

Athenaeum of Ohio/Mount St. Mary’s Seminary of the West
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
Master of Arts in Theology

By
Eric Wood

Cincinnati, Ohio
April, 2015
 Abstract

One of the questions that Catholic theologians have debated for centuries pertains

to the true meaning behind St. Paul’s statement, “that in all things, he [Christ] may have

the first place [primacy]” (Colossians 1:18). The beginning stages of the debate presented

it as a counter-factual claim concerning whether the God-man would have come had

Adam and Eve not sinned. One position suggested that the Incarnation was directed

toward redemption and gave a negative answer; the opposing position stated that Christ’s

primacy spoken of by St. Paul was not dependent on anything outside of God’s will, and

gave a positive answer.

This thesis seeks to examine the work of the major contributors to both sides of

the debate, starting with St. Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo and closing with the work of Bl.

John Duns Scotus. In doing this, it will examine in what ways the question developed

throughout the Church’s history, what the major contributors to the question truly sought

to answer in engaging the question, and why it became such a central and foundational

question for the major theologians involved in the debate. What will be seen through this

method is that, though the question began as a hypothetical concerning an alternate

economy of salvation, theologians like St. Bonaventure and Bl. John Duns Scotus moved

it beyond its hypothetical formulation by recognizing that it actually concerned two

opposing theological viewpoints on the Incarnation and created universe. The conclusions

of this thesis will further show how, at this point, the hypothetical can only obscure the

true nature of the question since it does not recognize how fundamentally it affects our

understanding of the economy of salvation. It will also show that method has played a

role in how the question is approached and answered throughout the Church’s history.
This thesis by Eric Wood fulfills the thesis requirement for the master’s degree in
Theology and is approved by Rev. Anthony R. Brausch Ph.L., as Thesis Advisor, and by
Fr. John R. Jack S.T.L., and Dr. Tobias J. Nathe S.T.D., as Readers.

iii
Table of Contents
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: Origins of the Question ..................................................................................... 4
St. Anselm ....................................................................................................................... 4
Rupert of Deutz ............................................................................................................. 12
Chapter 2: Development of the Christocentric Position ................................................... 21
Robert Grosseteste ........................................................................................................ 21
Alexander of Hales ....................................................................................................... 26
St. Bonaventure ............................................................................................................. 28
St. Thomas Aquinas ...................................................................................................... 38
Chapter 3: Blessed John Duns Scotus ............................................................................... 44
Love as the starting point .............................................................................................. 45
Freedom: the relationship between the intellect and the will ....................................... 48
Creation's contingency: ................................................................................................. 52
Conclusions of the Scotistic formulation: ..................................................................... 62
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 66

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 Introduction

The Hebrew Scriptures teach that God has always sought to live in an intimate

relationship with the human race. This began with God's creative act, became explicit

through his call to Abraham and the nation of Israel, and Christians believe the fullness of

God's revelation has been received in the person of Jesus Christ. Yet, “even if revelation

is already complete, it has not been made completely explicit; it remains for Christian

faith to grasp its full significance over the course of the centuries.”1

The Church's attempts to grasp the full significance of God's revelation gave rise

to a question concerning the relationship between the Incarnation and God's creative act.

In his letter to the Colossians, St. Paul proclaims Christ as the “image of the invisible

God, the firstborn of all creation. For in him were created all things in the heavens and on

the earth, things visible and invisible. . . All things have been created through him and for

him . . . that in all things he himself might be preeminent” (Col 1:15-20). A

complementary statement is found in his letter to the Ephesians, where he says we were

“chosen in Christ before the foundations of the world” (Eph 1:4). What these two verses

suggest is that Christ, the Incarnate God, exercises a primacy in God's creative act. This

means that the second person of the Trinity acted not only as the alpha and omega of

creation, but was always intended to be its center point as well. While this truth seems

simple enough to accept, its meaning and place in Catholic thought has been debated for

centuries.

The debate began early on as an issue concerning the necessity of the Incarnation

and passion of Christ, and it was commonly expressed from the perspective of a

hypothetical question, “If man had not sinned, would God have become incarnate?”
1
Catechism of The Catholic Church, 2nd ed., sec. 65-66.

1
While many attribute the origins of this debate to St. Anselm, the counter-factual claim is

often attributed to his contemporary Rupert of Deutz, though this may be disputed as St.

Augustine used a similar expression before Rupert.2 Many thinkers found little value in

proving a counter-factual claim because it concerned an alternate economy of salvation.

They felt more comfortable dealing with the reality of sin in the present economy of

salvation, and found it much easier to accept the Anselmian position that the Incarnation

was primarily directed toward man's salvation. This opinion will evolve into the

Thomistic thesis because of how ardently it is defended by Thomists. The opposing

school following Rupert, who applies an absolute primacy to Christ in that he would have

become Incarnate with or without the first sin, will evolve into the Franciscan thesis as it

was mostly defended and developed through the work of the Franciscan Order.3

I will argue that an analysis of the historical development of Catholic thought on

this question reveals that the contributions of many theologians throughout the centuries,

but especially St. Bonaventure and Bl. John Duns Scotus, reveal that something much

more fundamental is at stake than a hypothetical question. To reduce it to the perspective

of a counter-factual claim obscures the full meaning of the debate. If follows from this

that the question provides an essential theological foundation for our understanding of

God and the created universe. These men did not seek to understand what would have

been in an alternate economy of salvation, but to defend a worldview that is foundational

2
Rupert of Deutz, De Gloria et honore Filii homini Super Mattheum 13 (CCCM 29: 415); cf.
Daniel P. Horan, OFM, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation? Reconsidering the History of the
Absolute Predestination of Christ in Light of Robert Grosseteste,” Heythrop Journal 52, no. 3 (May 2011):
375; cf. Augustine, The Works of St. Augustine: Sermons, “Sermon 174, 2,” ed. John E. Rotelle, O.S.A., and
trans. Edmund Hill, O.P. (New Rochelle, NY: New City Press, 1992), 258.
3
Fr. Maximilian Mary Dean, FI, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ: Blessed John Duns
Scotus and the Franciscan thesis (Bedford, MA: Franciscans of the Immaculate, 2006) 9-10; Horan, “How
Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 374.

2
for the whole of theology within the present economy of salvation. The significance of

the Incarnation within the context of a freely created universe constitutes both the center-

point of revelation and the beginning for further theological investigation for many of

these men.

To demonstrate this I will first give a description of the origins and logic behind

the two opposing schools and how they initially developed along the lines of the

hypothetical. Next, I will attempt to show its development through the work of the

Franciscans, and why St. Bonaventure, in light of his overall theological system, felt it

more profitable to affirm Anselm's school as opposed to that originating with Rupert of

Deutz. Through this, the significance of St. Bonaventure's shift away from the

hypothetical will come to light. The brief work of St. Thomas Aquinas will be seen as an

affirmation for these Bonaventurian contributions. Third, I will show the principles

behind Scotus' opposition toward the school following Anselm, and how his work on the

question would affect his entire theological system. What will be accomplished through

this process is an understanding of why the question should not be passed over as a

medieval hypothetical thought experiment. It is the claim of this study that the question

of the primacy of Christ is not superficial but touches upon fundamental principles

surrounding God's freedom, the world's contingency, and, as will be shown, the

significant role methodology plays in any theological investigation. It will also be clear

how this debate concerns two opposing worldview's foundational for Christian theology

and the understanding of the Incarnation's significance in God's eternal plan.

3
 Chapter 1: Origins of the Question

St. Anselm (ca. 1033-1109)

St. Anselm was not the first to approach the question concerning Christ's primacy

or the necessity of the Incarnation. The earliest indications of any theological

perspectives relating to this Christological issue can be found in the thought of many

Church Fathers. St. Maximus the Confessor provides a particularly clear example:

This is the great and hidden mystery, at once the blessed end [teleos] for
which all things are ordained. It is the divine purpose conceived before the
beginning of created beings. In defining it we would say that this mystery
is the preconceived goal for which everything exists, but which itself
exists on account of nothing. With a clear view to this end, God created
the essences of created beings, and such is, properly speaking, the
terminus of his providence and of the things under his providential care.
Inasmuch as it leads to God, it is the recapitulation of the things he has
created. It is the mystery which circumscribes all the ages, and which
reveals the grand plan of God (c.f. Ephesians 1:10-11), a super-infinite
plan infinitely preexisting the ages. . . Because of Christ-or rather, the
whole mystery of Christ-all the ages of time and the beings within those
ages have received their beginning and end in Christ . . . This union has
been made manifest in Christ at the end of time, and in itself brings God's
foreknowledge to fulfillment. . .4.

Here Christ, the Incarnate Word, is said to be the end which God had in mind when he

created all creatures. It is explicitly stated that Christ was foreknown (thus predestined) to

be the beginning and fulfillment of all things created. All of this is evidence that

Maximus anticipated many elements of the arguments used by Rupert of Deutz, Robert

Grosseteste, Bonaventure, and John Duns Scotus in support of their position on the

primacy of Christ.
4
Maximus the Confessor, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ: Selected Writings from St.
Maximus The Confessor, “Ad Thalassium 60,” trans. Paul M. Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken
(Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003), 124-125. In any quote concerning this issue, Christ
is taken to be a reference to the Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity. Any reference to the Word
is taken to mean the second person of the Trinity apart from the Incarnation, unless it explicitly specified
otherwise.

4
 Earlier than Maximus, St. Augustine too anticipated the debate that will originate

in the work of St. Anselm and Rupert of Deutz. Though St. Augustine is commonly noted

as affirming the position that Christ would not have come if man had not sinned, he

considered the Incarnation to be a fitting means for the whole human person, body and

soul, to achieve beatitude apart from sin.5

With St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, the necessity and fittingness of the

Incarnation became explicitly a topic of debate. Anselm understood the Incarnation

within a specific context that will become foundational for the further development of

theological thought in the West. This is one of the reasons he has become the most

notable starting point for any discussion of Christ's primacy in Western theology. 6

Directed toward critics of the Christian faith, Cur Deus Homo sought to provide a

rational explanation for the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and death on the Cross

without compromising attributes of God's nature. As Boso, Anselm's dialogue partner,

states in Book I, Chapter 4 of Cur Deus Homo:

All these things are beautiful [the truths of our faith that show us how
fitting it was for God to redeem us through the God-man] and they have to
be treated like pictures. But if there is nothing sturdy underneath them,
unbelievers do not think they provide a sufficient explanation for why we
ought to believe that God willed to undergo the things we say he
underwent. . . One must first demonstrate the rational solidity of the truth:
that is, the necessity that proves that God should or could have humbled
Himself to the things that we proclaim about Him. Only then should we

5
Corey L. Barnes, “Necessary, Fitting, or Possible: The Shape of Scholastic Christology,” Nova Et
Vetera (English ed.) 10, no. 3 (Summer 2012): 657-688; cf. Francis Xavier Pancheri, O.F.M. Conv., S.T.D.,
The Universal Primacy of Christ, trans. Juniper B. Carol O.F.M., S.T.D. (Front Royal, VA: Christendom
Publications, 1984), 13, 18, 122. Pancheri lists St. Irenaeus, St. Athanasius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and St.
Cyril of Alexandra as examples of Fathers who defended what he calls the “physical theory’ of the
Incarnation”—a point he states “paved the way to an open statement on the theology of Christ’s primacy.”
He also lists St. Augustine and St. Bernard as suggesting the Incarnation was fitting apart from sin.

6
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 374.

5
 expound on considerations of fittingness as pictures of this truth.7

In the upcoming chapters, especially Chapter 6, Anselm elaborates upon the criticisms

that unbelievers are presenting that concern the way in which God redeemed man. These

criticisms mimic Anselm's belief that previous accounts of atonement do not adequately

explain the necessity of Christ's death on the Cross, because they compromise God's

essential attributes of omnipotence, wisdom, love and goodness.8 Such confusion is seen

in Boso's line of questioning at the very beginning of the theological work. “I am asking

you to explain something to me that, as you know, many others are asking along with me:

given that God is omnipotent, by what necessity and reason did he assume the lowliness

and weakness of human nature in order to restore human nature?” 9 Boso goes on to

explain that present accounts of atonement seem to violate the divine attributes, such as

His omnipotence, since He could have accomplished human redemption simply through

His word. They are counter to His wisdom since a great person would not do with great

assertion what can be done with little. They seem to call into question His love as human

redemption could have been achieved in a less painful way. And not least, they call into

question His goodness, for God condemned the innocent Christ in order to save the guilty

sinner.10

To Anselm, the purpose God had in creating the human person with a rational

nature is so humanity may know and enjoy Him [God] the summum Bonum the greatest

7
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, “Cur Deus Homo,” ed. and trans. Thomas
Williams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 250.
8
M. A. McIntyre, B.D., St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo
(London, England: Oliver and Boyd: Tweedale Court, 1954), 60.
9
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 245.
10
McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, 59; Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 250.

6
Good. As M.A. McIntyre observers, “St. Anselm uses the strongest terms possible to

emphasize the fact that man was endowed with rationality for the purpose of

remembering, understanding and loving the summum Bonum. His devotion to the highest

Good, which is also the supreme reality, is a pursuit which is for him [man] unending and

it fills the whole of his living.” 11 Man is also regarded as being created upright or

inherently moral; for part of being rational is the ability to discern what is good and evil,

right and wrong, and between the lesser good and the greater good. Thus, McIntyre

further explains that “rational nature has been created for the purpose of discerning,

desiring, and following the good, so that the person may come to enjoy God.” 12 It is

morally imperative for man to subordinate his rational nature to the will of the Creator

who endowed him with such a nature for a specific reason. To not do so, is an affront to

God because it is a failure to fulfill his purpose, thus doing God a dishonor. Sin for

Anselm is the failure of “man to subordinate the whole of his rational will or heart to

God, his Creator. . .”.13

Through his disobedience in the Garden of Eden, man fell out of favor with God,

and incurred a debt which humanity had to pay. McIntyre characterizes Anselm's position

thus: “it is clear that St. Anselm has taken up the idea that God expects moral obedience

as a debt due to Him by His creatures, and that failure to obey puts the sinner in a state of

debt.”14 Anselm believes that in order to undo this dishonor, man must not only pay to

God the honor or obedience which is due to Him, but he must also give something

11
Ibid.
12
Ibid., 63.
13
Ibid., 66.
14
Ibid., 87.

7
additional to amend the dishonor he had shown God.

If someone injures another's health, it is not enough for him to restore the
other person's health unless he also makes recompense for the damage he
inflicted by causing pain. In the same way, if someone violates another's
honor, it is not enough for him to pay back that honor if he does not also
offer something satisfactorily to the one he has dishonored, as a
compensation for the harm he caused by dishonoring him.15

The debt of paying God further honor for the injury done requires that the creature give

something greater than what is contained in creation, which can only be God Himself.

For man already owes to God all that he has as a debt apart from sin and thus cannot give

anything of himself or that he possesses as a further payment to amend the honor due to

God.16

In an effort to understand the context for this theory of atonement and satisfaction,

scholars suggest that the practice of private law in Anselm's day could be a possible basis.

They point specifically to the feudal model of satisfaction operative at that time.17 Under

feudal law, if a person harms or injures the health of another person, they are then

required to not only restore such a person to full health, but to provide a gift or additional

action to amend the harm which was done. Such a gift or action must be proportionate to

the injury, and the nature of the gift depends upon the person harmed. 18 In the case of

man's sin against God, not only must the human race pay the debt which is owed, i.e., full

subordination to the will of God, but humanity must pay an additional honor to amend or

make satisfaction for the offense committed in disobeying God's command.

15
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 262.
16
Ibid., 279-284.
17
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 374.
18
McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, 76.

8
 The problem Anselm foresees in all this, and which he sets out to overcome, is the

inability of any man to make satisfaction for so grave an offense as one committed

against God. It is God's nature as infinite that brings this inability clearly into focus.

Since God is infinite, the gravity of any offense against His personal honor, no matter

how small, is magnified to such a degree that Anselm believes it would be better for a

person to allow the whole universe to be destroyed than to commit the smallest sin

against God.19 As McIntyre states, “The reason could be found conceivably in the legal

standards of St. Anselm's day, according to which the gravity of the crime varied in direct

proportion to the dignity of the person injured. So great is the dignity of God that any sin

is exceedingly great.”20 In this case, where the honor of God is harmed, the gravity of the

offense is infinite. Nevertheless, satisfaction must still be made by a member of the

human race.

Before moving forward, Anselm realizes he must give an explanation as to why it

is not appropriate for God to simply forgive the debt incurred by man's sin. As Boso

points out, such a statement would make sense considering God commands man to

forgive one another and He is said to be so kind that nothing kinder could be imagined.21

Despite these claims, Anselm holds very firmly that God cannot simply forgive sin and

let the unrighteous go free without punishment. Man must make satisfaction for the

dishonor that he has caused God. If this obligation is not fulfilled, then God is forced to

punish man's sin so as not to compromise His justice. Either man makes satisfaction for

19
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 281-282.
20
McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, 78.
21
Ibid., 98.

9
his sin, which man cannot do, or God punishes man for sinning. If none of this happens,

the sinful and the sinless would receive the exact same treatment from God which is

incompatible with justice. Furthermore, to not punish one who has violated the moral

order which God has purposely placed in creation is an additional injustice unto God

since it disregards His moral law.22 God must see to it that man either makes satisfaction

for sin, or punishes the human race in order to safeguard His perfect justice. As McIntyre

explains, “St. Anselm concludes that since it is impossible for God to exercise His liberty,

His Will, His kindness except within the limits of what is just and right. He cannot

forgive the sinner without punishing him. . . In short, it is the fact that non-punishment or

forgiveness of sins is intolerable in a morally ordered universe that forms the ground for

its rejection.”23

A final aspect of Anselm's premise for why God became man to save the human

race is the necessity for God to save the human race, though he is clearly uncomfortable

with using the term “necessary” in describing any of God's actions.24 Whatever God does

by necessity, as Anselm will explain, He does so in order to maintain His own integrity. It

is a necessity imposed upon Him by His own nature and attributes; it is imposed from

within Himself, and so is itself an attribute of God. God must bring about the salvation of

man because it is in His nature to perfect His creation; and He must see to it that the

purpose for which He has created the universe is not disrupted by human sin.25

22
Ibid., 96-114.
23
Ibid., 99.
24
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 292-293. Anselm uses the Latin “necessitas,
necessitatis” for necessity in this context.
25
McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, 118.

10
 After establishing all this, Anselm believes he has provided an adequate premise

for explaining why it was necessary for the second person of the Trinity to take upon

Himself human flesh and die upon the Cross for our sins. The God-man [Deus Homo]

was necessary to make satisfaction for the offense committed against the honor of God

through sin.26 It was necessary because in no other way could a member of the human

race make an adequate offering to God which would satisfy the dishonor caused by his

disobedience. Since Christ is God, his offering is the offering of an infinite person; but

since he was truly a man, Christ was able to offer himself in the name of the human race.

As McIntyre puts it, “St. Anselm suggests that the argument of Book I has proved not

only the impossibility of man's saving himself but also the necessity of salvation by Jesus

Christ.”27 The remainder of Book II is devoted to demonstrating this latter claim, that

human redemption can only be accomplished by Jesus Christ. As St. Anselm will say,

Christ's “death is proportionate to his person,” making the value of Christ's offering

infinitely greater than all that exists apart from God. This is a necessary aspect of the

satisfaction that must be made to God, and the reason why redemption could not be

achieved through any other member of the human race.28

Cur Deus Homo's explanation for the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and act of

redemption is unique for its time, but it is Christ's atonement and not the Incarnation that

is of direct concern for Anselm. That is why Anselm's treatment of the Incarnation is

naturally conditioned by human sinfulness. This position, which reduces the purpose of

26
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 264-265. Anselm uses the Latin “aufert,” a form
of the verb “aufero” which means to take, withdraw, or steal away.
27
McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics, 115.
28
Ibid., 116, 121; Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 293-294.

11
Christ's Incarnation to redemption, became known in theology as hamartiocentrism. 29

Francis Xavier Pancheri believes that “St. Anselm imprinted here a precise and rigorous

direction. The 'Father of Scholasticism' was truly the notable starting point for the

doctrine of the primacy in Latin theology and conditioned it profoundly. . . . The

hamartiocentric mentality was, then, the clue to understanding every theological

problem, including that of Christ's primacy.”30 By failing to supply any reason for the

Incarnation besides human sinfulness, Anselm's Cur Deus Homo provides a foundational

aspect for Christology and sets a precedent for future thought in Catholic theology. His

Cur Deus Homo becomes the theological basis for what is later known as the Thomistic

thesis.

Rupert of Deutz (ca. 1075-1135)

Writing in the late 11th, early 12th Centuries, Rupert of Deutz is considered an

original thinker much like St. Anselm. However, while the influence of Anselm is

noteworthy, the work of Rupert has gotten little attention even among those who defend

his position on the primacy of Christ.31 Part of the reason for the lack of attention that he

gets is the method he utilizes. Joseph Ratzinger discusses this point in his book The

Theology of History in St. Bonaventure. “As a thinker, Rupert has received too little

attention in the past. In a way that is somewhat foreign to the academic science of his

own time, he attempted to penetrate to the spirit of the Scriptures by way of meditation

29
Ibid., 56-116; Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 14.
30
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 14.
31
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 377.

12
rather than by way of the Scholastic methodology.” 32 This approach had a significant

influence on Rupert's conclusions and his refusal to accept St. Anselm's hamartiocentric

understanding of the Incarnation. Rupert's work, though perhaps the first to oppose

Anselm's thesis, was not widely disseminated in the years that followed his death.

However, his formulation and argumentation gives good indication of the prominence the

question had in the theological world at that time.

Around the year 1127, toward the end of Rupert's life, Rudolph of Trond made a

request to Rupert to address disputed questions concerning the Trinity and the necessity

of the Incarnation. Rudolph's commission was the motivation behind Rupert's decision to

devote the last book of his De gloria et honore Filii hominis Super Mattheum to these

considerations. It is here that he develops his opinions on the issue of Christ's primacy.33

One of the primary motivations behind Rudolf's request was the Jewish denial of the

Incarnation. Both Rudolf and Rupert had contact with Jewish scholars and were familiar

with their arguments. Their claim was that the Christian position concerning the necessity

of the Incarnation violated the immutability of God's will. As John Van Engen explains

concerning Rupert's adversaries, “The Jews . . . directed their sharpest attacks against any

notion that God had become flesh and suffered death. As St. Paul said long before (1 Cor

1:23), this was a 'scandal' to them: The Jews charged in particular that this 'new covenant'

with its 'new plan of salvation' represented a change of mind and therefore fickleness or

unreliability in the will of a supposedly immutable God.”34 Thus these Jews thought that

32
Joseph Ratzinger, The Theology of History In St. Bonaventure, trans. Zachary Hayes (Chicago,
IL: Franciscan Herald Press, 1971), 97.
33
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?”, 377.
34
John H. Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1983),
353-354.

13
the Incarnation was unnecessary because God had already established a covenant with his

people to which He would remain reliably faithful.

In response to these Jewish scholars, Rupert expressed his frustration and

annoyance at certain Churchmen who thought it was necessary to have God will evil in

order to show the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and passion.35 The problem with this

for Rupert, as Van Engen informs us, is: “if God did not will evil and set the whole plan

in motion, then Christ's Incarnation represented a 'new plan' (nouum concilium), a change

of untold magnitude in the divine operation. . .” 36 God's foreknowledge also played a

significant role in Rupert's explanation of the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and

passion. He believed that God foreknew of man's fall into sin and of His ultimate

intervention through the Incarnation and passion of His only begotten Son. However,

Rupert makes an important distinction in that the fall of man God “foreknew and

permitted,” but the Incarnation He “foreknew and foreordained.”37

Van Engen believes there are two specific problems with earlier expositions on

this issue which Rupert sought to correct. “The first problem with earlier expositions was

many authorities believed that to demonstrate the necessity of the Incarnation one

inevitably concludes that God must have willed evil.”38 This was a very serious issue for

Rupert, who found himself in the midst of a major controversy with two French masters

35
Rupert of Deutz, Corpus Christianourm Continuatio Mediaevalis XXIX: Ruperti Tuitiensis, De
gloria et honore Filii hominis super Mattheum, ed. Hrabanum Haacke O.S.B. (Turnholth: Typographi
Brepols Editores Pontificii, 1979), 412.
36
Ibid., 355.
37
Rupert of Deutz, Corpus Christianourm Continuatio Mediaevalis XXIX, 415; cf. Rupert of
Deutz, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Rupertus Abbas Monasterii S. Heribierti Tuitiensis Opera Omnia,
Vol. IV (Parisii: J.P. Migne editorem, 1854), 153-156.
38
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 378.

14
around the year 1116 AD. The controversy arose when one of Rupert's brethren at St.

Lawrence acknowledged that Master Anselm of Laon held a view on the will of God

which Rupert found to be unacceptable and led to his writing of De voluntate Dei.39 In

this treatise, Rupert publicly challenged not just Master Anselm of Laon but also Bishop

William of Champeaux, two luminaries of France, for he believed that both of these men

attributed evil to the will of God for the sake of a greater good. 40 Specifically, Rupert

attacked their distinction between God's “approving” will and His “permitting” will,

claiming that it violated the truth of Scripture and accuses God of “permitting” and thus

“willing” evil for the sake of a greater good.41 Hence Rupert remains unconvinced that

saying God “permits” evil in His plan for the sake of a greater good is different than

saying God “approves” evil in His plan, because in both cases he believes God wills an

evil.42

Rupert argued that whenever Scripture teaches on the “permission of God” it

refers to God's patience to allow the sinner to repent.43 He would go on to address further

questions in this dispute, one pertaining to why God, if He did not will evil, did not create

man unchangeable or incontrovertible so that man could not fall into sin. Also included is

the question which Rupert saw as the heart of the dispute, if God foreknew Adam and

Eve's descent into sin why did he warn them against eating from the tree of the

knowledge of good and evil in the first place. His answers to these questions are

39
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 196.
40
Rupert of Deutz, Patrologiae Cursus Completus I: 437
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 440.

15
complicated but are summed up by Van Engen in the following statement: “God

accomplished what He willed for man, but He had to do it Himself through Christ's

Incarnation and passion, since only a God-man could do perfectly what God had

willed.”44

The second problem Rupert saw in previous explanations on the necessity of the

Incarnation and passion of Christ was “if God did not will evil, then the Incarnation

represented something of a 'plan B' (nouum concilium), which seemingly contradicts the

nature of an omnipotent and immutable God.”45 To counter this, Rupert taught that God

had planned the Incarnation not because of the Fall but despite the Fall. It is in dealing

with this problem that Rupert poses the question in the form of a hypothetical, a

perspective which some believe began with him.46 Van Engen observes, “Rupert held in

response that God intended all along to have the second person of the Trinity assume a

concrete, earthly role in the divine plan for His chosen people. Indeed, Christ was meant

from all eternity to reign as the King of creation and of his elect, a view expounded by

way of Ephesians 3:8-11 and Hebrews 2: 9-10 (used earlier for his Christology).”47 That

many scholars claimed the central points of the epic story of salvation were the result of

contingencies in the choice of Adam and Eve was an offense against God's immutable

plan. It is here that Rupert removes Christ's Incarnation from the context of man's sin,

44
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 199, 353-354; Rupert of Deutz, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, I:
447-448.
45
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 355.
46
Rupert of Deutz, Corpus Christianourm Continuatio Mediaevalis XXIX, 415. “Hic primum illud
quaerere libet utrum iste Filius Dei, de quo hic sermo est, etiam si peccatum, propter quod omnes morimur,
non intercessisset, homo fieret, an non.”
47
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 256.

16
allowing him to overcome the difficulties he had found in previous works concerning the

necessity of the Incarnation.48

Rupert's main argument, that God had foreordained the Incarnation, was based on

Proverbs 8:23ff which spoke of the wisdom of God. Rupert understood the Wisdom of

God spoken of in the passage as a reference to Christ. For this reason he believed the

passage foretold of God's dwelling amongst His people as their Incarnate King. Whatever

was to be considered “new” in God's plan was to be attributed to sinful humanity and the

Devil. Thus only after original sin was the sacrificial death of the Incarnate God required;

but the Incarnation of the Son was always a part of God's plan, despite original sin.49

Humanity's fall into sin only served to increase the glory and honor of the Incarnate Son,

but it was not willed by God in order to make necessary the Incarnation as many of

Rupert's contemporaries believed. Such a distinction can be found in De gloria et honore

Filii hominis super Mattheum 13 which he puts as if Christ were saying it: “I would not

have been crowned with such glory and honor as I now have were it not for my sacrificial

intercession.”50 In this Rupert managed to combine two things which he found essential

to his devotion and theology: Christ's Incarnation as the absolute focal point in God's plan

and Christ's passion and death as the source now of his glory and honor.51

Rupert's opinion struck a sensitive cord in theology at that time. It contradicted

what was then the prevailing Gregorian view that man was created specifically to replace

48
Ibid., 359.
49
Rupert of Deutz, Corpus Christianourm Continuatio Mediaevalis XXIX, 408-416; cf. Van
Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 356.
50
Rupert of Deutz, Corpus Christianourm Continuatio Mediaevalis XXIX, 417; translation from
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 357.
51
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 353.

17
the fallen angels in heaven. St. Anselm, Hugh of St. Victor, and Peter Lombard all held to

this view which resonated with spirituality at that time and served as the source for seeing

the monastic life as a prefigurement of man's ultimate 'angelic' state. 52 According to Van

Engen, Rupert is the first to challenge this view, for he contended that the Angels did not

fall from their burning love of God, but that “after their testing . . . the angels were fixed

as a reward and by grace in the nine orders mentioned in Scripture.” Men also were

created in a comparable nine orders and were equal to the Angels (and could even be said

to have owed more to God since they are given a chance for repentance). 53 For Rupert it

was childish to believe that God did not plan to create the human race until after the fall

of the angels, and it made much more sense that God had “created the angels because of

the One Man for whom and through whom all things were created, and that men too were

created as a part of the predestined plan which had the Incarnate King as its center,” as

Van Engen relates.54

Rupert's path was indeed much different than Anselm, but a lot of this has to do

with the way each of them approached the question. Anselm wrote his Cur Deus Homo as

an attempt to give a rational explanation to non-believers of the necessity of Christ's

atoning sacrifice; the Incarnation was seen as part of this overall plan of atonement. It is

important to note that Anselm accepted all that was taught by faith to be true, and

expressed a deep and holy love for these truths. However, he believed it necessary to

52
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 267-276 (Book I, Chapters 16-18); cf. Hugh of
St. Victor, De Sacramentis I. 5. 31-34; Peter Lombard, Sentences 2.9.6-7; Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 358.
53
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 356, 359; cf. Rupert of Deutz, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, III:
69.
54
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 359; cf. Rupert of Deutz, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, III: 72-
73; R. Haacke, “Rupert von Deutz zur Frage: Cur Deus Homo?” Corona Gratiarum: Festschrift E. Dekkers
Band 2 (Brugge, 1975): 143-159.

18
provide a rational foundation for the sake of unbelievers by utilizing dialectical and

philosophical concepts. This is precisely why he sought a rational explanation in Cur

Deus Homo, and his arguments reflect a skilled use of philosophical notions.55

On the other hand, Rupert approached the question exclusively through Scripture

and not through the scholastic methodology. This can be clearly seen in the controversial

debate Rupert found himself in with the disciples of Master Anselm of Laon and Bishop

William of Champeaux in Liege. Van Engen speaks of how Rupert was often accused and

reproached in this debate for his “irremediable ignorance because, as a monk since

childhood, he had never traveled to study with their distant and famous masters. . . These

teachers and students of dialectic, on the other hand, touted the power of the logical arts

to resolve all theological problems, and disdained this monk for not being properly

schooled in them.”56 Rupert had been placed by his parents at an early age in the Abbey

of St. Lawrence just outside of Liege where he stayed for roughly forty of his fifty-five

years. Thus, while these other disciples and masters had traveled far and wide to learn the

arts of philosophy and only to later come to Holy Scripture, Rupert had discovered the

Holy Scriptures early. For this reason, Rupert saw himself as the defender of Holy

Scripture against dialectics not received from tradition.57

Rupert's foundation may be the key to understanding his insistence on his

explanation of the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and passion. He was formed by the

concepts and images of his society as found in the monastic life and, more importantly,

55
Anselm of Canterbury, Anselm: Basic Writings, 245-248.
56
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 202.
57
Ibid., 11, 202.

19
the divine office. The celebration of the central events of salvation became the apex of his

life through the celebration of the Church's rites. As Van Engen explains, “Such worship

had so shaped his life and thought as to make it practically inconceivable that the events

celebrated were not themselves predetermined from all eternity for both Christ and

mankind. Only the blindness of Jews and the foolishness of new theologians could fail to

grasp such a glorious vision of God's plan.”58 Though Rupert found himself at odds with

certain theological movements, which later became significant in the Latin West, he was

clearly in conversation with the received tradition of the Church. Even if he gets little

credit for his part in the developmental history of the primacy of Christ, it is remarkable

how closely his answers resemble that of John Duns Scotus and other members of the

Franciscan school. For example, his method, which leads many to categorize him as a

mystical thinker, has a strong resemblance to the method of St. Bonaventure.59 Rupert

becomes the first example of a position opposing St. Anselm and the one to whom many

attribute the hypothetical statement attached to the primacy of Christ.60

58
Ibid., 360.
59
Ibid., 8; cf. M. Grabmann, DIE Geschichte der scholastischen Methode (1909-11) 2. (8-104)
and L. Ott, Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Fruscholastik (BGPT 34, Munster 1037),
73-80.
60
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 375.

20
 Chapter 2: Development of the Christocentric position

Robert Grosseteste (ca. 1175-1253)

The debate over the primacy of Christ began in Anselm and Rupert as a

discussion concerning the necessity of Christ's Incarnation and passion. The issue

continued to be developed for the most part through the work of theologians within the

Franciscan Order who tended to affirm the position of Rupert, though not universally.

The non-universality of the thesis within the Order notwithstanding, Rupert's position

nevertheless became known as the Franciscan thesis.61 One of the first who influenced

the Order, to begin dealing with the issue was Robert Grosseteste. Grosseteste was the

chancellor of the University of Oxford, bishop of Lincoln, and the first instructor of the

friars in England. Like Rupert he looked at the issue as a question concerning the

necessity of the Incarnation, and as a counter-factual claim which he believed could help

us understand certain aspects of the present economy of salvation. Though Grosseteste is

not given enough credit for the part he plays, there are indications that he had an

influence on other Franciscan thinkers, including the two main luminaries, Bonaventure

and Scotus.62

Grosseteste employed a very similar method as Rupert, though there is little

61
Ibid., 378.
62
Ibid., 375.

21
evidence he knew much of what Rupert had to say on the question. For in the areas of his

theological teaching, Grosseteste, as a “magister in sacra pagina”, was known for his

adherence to the Scriptures. It makes sense, observes Daniel Horan, that the Scriptures

would be a “starting point for Grosseteste's exploration of the necessity of the

Incarnation.” 63 However, it should also be noted that, according James Ginther,

Grosseteste believed it was the “responsibility of the speculative theologian to provide a

rational account of what was gained from the study of Scripture.” 64 This is what led

Grosseteste to operate not just as a scriptural exegete but also as a speculative theologian

in his study of the question concerning the necessity of the Incarnation. 65 Due to his turn

to more speculative or philosophical explanations, Grosseteste becomes very hesitant to

push forward his opinion as the authentic teaching of the Church. Only those aspects

which he definitively takes from the Scriptures does he present with any authority.

Nevertheless, he is the first to use speculative/theological explanations in favor of the

Franciscan school of thought, and can be seen as a bridge between Rupert and later

defenders of the position.

Grosseteste takes up the question of the necessity of Christ's Incarnation mainly in

De Cessatione Legalium, Exiit Edictum (a Christmas homily), and Hexaemeron. His

arguments from Scripture deal specifically with Old Testament themes in which he

attempts to present Christ, the God-man, as the only possible fulfillment of Old

63
Ibid.
64
James Ginther, “Robert Grosseteste and the Theologian's task,” in Robert Grosseteste and the
Beginnings of a British Theological Tradition, ed. M. O'Carroll (Rome: Istituto Storico dei Cappuccini,
2003), 252.
65
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 382-383, 386; James Ginther, Master
of the sacred page: A study of the theology of Robert Grosseteste, ca. 1229/30-1235 (Aldershot, Haats,
England: Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2004), 123-124.

22
Testament prophecies and blessings.66 While it may seem from this that his motivation

was to counter Jewish attacks against the faith, James Ginther believes there is very little

evidence to support this statement. Rather, he suggests Grosseteste's motivation was

simply to understand the place of the Old law within the context of Christ and the New

law.67

Greater importance is attributed to Grosseteste's arguments of a more speculative

nature, for it is here that he employs the hypothetical statement in question. Though

Grosseteste acknowledges that Fathers such as St. Gregory, St. Augustine, and St. Anselm

all declared that the human race could only be saved through the God-man, he does not

believe it had occurred to these men to ask whether or not the Incarnation would have

taken place had the human race not sinned (though there is evidence to suggest

otherwise). 68 While it may seem odd that such medieval thinkers would put so much

effort into a counter-factual claim, James Ginther offers an explanation as to why

Grosseteste believed it was important to consider. First of all, Grosseteste uses the

hypothetical in order to “highlight specific true conditions of the world as it is now.”69

Secondly, he is using the hypothetical to prove a greater thesis; to show how sin cannot

be the direct cause of the Incarnation, so as to establish “reasons for the Incarnation that

not only function in a world as it is now, but also in a world devoid of all sin.

66
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church: Robert Grosseteste, On the Cessation of the
Laws, p. 1, c. 2, .s. 2, trans. by Stephan m. Hildebrand (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
America, 2012), 109-110.
67
James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page 122; Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the
Incarnation?,” 378.
68
James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 128.
69
Ibid., 129.

23
Grosseteste's aim is not to separate the Incarnation from Christ's saving work, but rather

to elucidate its twofold role.”70

In this effort Grosseteste offers five different arguments all supported by a

theology rooted in Pseudo-Dionysius and the Neo-platonic tradition.71 The first is based

upon the goodness of God and makes use of St. Anselm's definition of God as a “greater

Good than can even be thought.”72 The argument also draws upon the Pseudo-Dionysian

concept of the good being self-diffusive. God created the world in such a way that it

would be capable of receiving God's goodness in the highest possible way. As Grosseteste

states, “supreme goodness [God] pours in as great a good as it is capable of. But the

universe is capable of this good, namely, that it have a part of itself as the God-man.

There is nothing that can exist in the universe if the universe is incapable of containing it;

and the universe already has this good. Therefore, it is capable of this good, and was not

made capable of this good by the fall of man.”73 The fact that God is the supreme good

and the universe is capable of the God-man leads him to say that the God-man would

have come despite the fall. Thus the world would have been created in such a way so as

to receive the greatest good, which Grosseteste says can only be the Incarnate God.74

The second argument is based upon the idea that the hypostatic union of the Word

of God was achieved primarily through the “intellectum” or “intellect,” a position he

70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid., 130; cf. Anselm of Canterbury, Proslogion, in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works,
ed. Brian Davies and G. R. Evans (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 82-104.
73
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church, 156.
74
Ibid. Cf. Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” fn. 64, 389.

24
takes from Peter Lombard and John Damascene. From this, Grosseteste will say that the

human flesh was equally assumable, if not more, considering the weakening of the

intellect due to sin, prior to the fall as it was after man had sinned. “Either the assumption

of the flesh by the Word through the mediation of the soul [intellect] was more possible

when man was in Paradise [prior to the fall] than it would be now [after the fall], or at

least it was as possible as it would be now.”75 At this point Grosseteste returns to his first

argument by stating it makes sense to say that God would have become incarnate,

considering it would have been just as possible if not more, even if we had not sinned

because the whole of creation is better “than it could in any way be without this good [the

God-man]. . . Either, then one must say that God would have become man even if man

had not fallen, or that the whole of creation is now inestimably better than it would have

been if man had not fallen.” 76 The third argument is based upon a distinction which

Grosseteste makes in his understanding of justice and sanctification. Put simply, he

argues that the human race, even apart from the fall, is in need of the Incarnation for the

sake of sanctification (though not justice). For only in the God-man can the human race

be sanctified and lifted up as children of the most high God. In this, Grosseteste does not

believe being sanctified is the same as being justified.77

The fourth argument arises from Grosseteste's reading of Ephesians 1:22 and 5:23.

According to these passages Christ is meant to be head of the Church apart from any act

of sin on humanity’s part. That such a holy institution as the Church should be dependent

75
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church, 157; cf. James Ginther, Master of the Sacred
Page, 130.
76
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church, 158.
77
Ibid, 159-161; James Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 136.

25
on the sin of the human race makes no sense to Grosseteste for this very reason. Thus, he

concludes that the Incarnation was always intended because Christ was predestined to a

nuptial relationship with the Church. “Before he fell, Adam prophesied the marriage of

Christ and the Church. . .”.78 In many ways, the fifth and final explanation brings us to

the heart of Grosseteste's theology and what is characteristic of the Franciscan mindset.

The argument is based upon the understanding of the universe as a unified creation, with

Christ (the Incarnate God) as the unifying principle. Such a principle could not be

accomplished in man alone (apart from his union with the Word of God). The unifying

principle, according to Grosseteste, must be more worthy than all other creatures, and

thus it can only be the God-man.79 As Horan describes it, “The Incarnation was necessary

to unify all parts of creation and to complete the capacity for fulfillment God intended for

the universe.”80

Despite his hesitancy to enter into the area of speculative thought, Grosseteste's

use of Pseudo-Dionysius to support a christocentric view of creation breaks new ground

in the development of the Church's understanding of the primacy of Christ. Ginther

argues, “The question [the hypothetical] had been posed before, but Grosseteste is the

first to address the problem with such intensity that it created a new topic for scholastic

theologians to examine for the rest of the century.”81 Because his arguments in favor of

Rupert's thesis were speculative and theological, Grosseteste influenced a list of other

78
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church, 163; cf. Robert Grosseteste, On the Six Days of
Creation, p. I, c. 9, s. 1, trans. by C.F.J. Martin (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1996), 60-61;
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 381-382.
79
Robert Grosseteste, The Fathers of the Church, 176-169.
80
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 382.
81
Ginther, Master of the Sacred Page, 128.

26
theologians including Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and Bl. John Duns Scotus, all
82
of whom express very similar christocentric theological systems. These men,

specifically the latter two, will become the great thinkers of the Middle Ages who will

provide the most profound developments in our understanding of Christ's primacy.

Alexander of Hales (ca. 1170-1245)

Alexander of Hales favored the position which held that the Incarnation was

willed by God independent of the fall, and is thus in the school of Rupert and Grosseteste.

His main argument for this position, found in his Summa Theologica, is very reminiscent

of Grosseteste's first argument which utilizes the Pseudo-Dionysian principle of the Good

being diffusive of Itself. Like Grosseteste, Alexander is firmly within the Pseudo-

Dionysian/Neo-platonic school of thought, and bases his arguments upon such principles.

Since God is what he calls the summum Bonum, the highest Good, it is most fitting that

such Goodness be diffused in the highest way. 83 This takes place primarily ad intra,

within the inner life of the Trinity. Yet God is also capable of doing this ad extra through

His creation, and Alexander believes God's nature, and the nature of the created order,

demands that God diffuse His Goodness ad extra in the highest possible way.84 In order

to achieve the highest diffusion ad extra, God Himself must become a part of creation

and take upon Himself our human nature.85 All of this is summed up in the following

82
Ibid.
83
Alexander of Hales, Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri De Hales Ordinis Minorum Summa
Theologica, Vol. 4, lib. III, tr. 1, q. 2, tit. 2 (Florentiae: Ad Claras Aquas, 1930), 41.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.

27
statement from Alexander's Summa:

If therefore the highest diffusion ought to belong to Him, since He is the

highest Good, it is more appropriate that He should diffuse Himself into
creatures. But this diffusion cannot be understood to be the highest unless
He Himself be united to the creature. Therefore, it is fitting that God
should be united to a creature, and especially to man, as has been shown.
Therefore, supposing that man were not fallen, the highest Good would
still be united to him.86

Pancheri observes that such arguments are clearly a priori, based upon the nature

of God and creation. For this reason, there is a sense that God had to create ad extra and

that God's nature demands that the Incarnation be part of His creation. While Alexander's

primary argument is expressive of early Franciscan thought on the subject, it will

ultimately be rejected by both Bonaventure and Scotus; it will become one of main

reasons for Bonaventure's affirmation of Anselm's hamartiocentric position.

St. Bonaventure (ca. 1221-1274)

Of all the medieval scholars other than Scotus, St. Bonaventure is the most

renowned for his contribution to the development of the primacy of Christ. Though he

will be the exception of the Franciscan theologians and affirm the position of Anselm's

Cur Deus Homo, his christological work pushed forward the Church's understanding of

the primacy of Christ in many significant ways. A student of Alexander of Hales,

Bonaventure can be placed theologically within the school of Pseudo-Dionysius and the

Neo-Platonic tradition; his overall work strongly resembles the christocentrism of

Grosseteste. Much of this goes back to Bonaventure's belief that St. Francis of Assisi was

the model theologian, a truth he sees confirmed by the stigmata Francis received on

86
Ibid., trans. from Pancheri, The Univeral Primacy of Christ, 122.

28
Mount La Verna. This event, for Bonaventure, marked the holiness of Francis' life due to

his imitation of Christ the God-man.87 Bonaventure viewed this “imitation” as the most

essential aspect of any theological pursuit.88

Bonaventure has often been described as a mystical theologian because his

thought is characterized by the lack of distinction he places between the sciences of

theology and philosophy. This approach has led many to view him as anti-philosophical

and anti-Aristotelian; but this critique is unfounded since he very competently operates at

the philosophical level. 89 As Zachary Hayes claims, “It would not be fair to describe

Bonaventure as either anti-Aristotelian or as anti-philosophical. He clearly knew and

respected the great lights of antiquity, including Plato and Aristotle.”90 It is also important

to avoid neglecting the central role such a methodology plays in his overall theological

vision. As Joseph Ratzinger discusses in The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, the

lack of distinction that Bonaventure places between philosophy and theology goes back

to his understanding of Christ as the center of history. “For Bonaventure, history consists

of two corresponding movements from the very beginning- eggressus and regressus.

Christ stands as the turning point of these movements and as the center who both divides

and unites.”91 For this reason, Ratzinger argues that Bonaventure is not so much anti-

87
Zachary Hayes, The History of Franciscan Theology, “Bonaventure: Mystery of the Triune
God,” ed. Kenan B. Osborne (St. Bonaventure, NY: St. Bonaventure University, 2007), 45.
88
St. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deus, “Prologue”, trans. Ewert Cousins (New York, NY:
Paulist Press, 1978), 55-53-116; cf. Ilia Delio, “Theology, Spirituality and Christ the Center: Bonaventure's
Synthesis” in A Companion to Bonaventure, ed. Jay Hammond, J.A. Wayne Helllmann, and Jarred Goff
(Boston, MA: Brill, 2014).
89
Hayes, “Bonaventure: Mystery of the Triune God,” 47-48; cf. Ratzinger, The Theology of
History In St. Bonaventure, 119.
90
Ibid.
91
Ratzinger, The Theology of History In St. Bonaventure, 142.

29
philosophical or anti-Aristotelian as he simply does not believe these sciences can stand

on their own apart from what has been revealed through Christian revelation. All of this

strongly resembles Grosseteste's final argument in favor of Christ's primacy that the

Incarnate God serves as the unifying principle for God's whole act of creation.92

The christocentrism of St. Bonaventure goes much deeper than placing Christ at

the center of the history of creation. Bonaventure, not unlike other contemporary

Franciscans, built his whole theological system upon an anthropology taken from the

Book of Genesis. It is here that Revelation tells us God created the human race in “His

own image and likeness” (Genesis 1:26-27). Such a truth has profound implications for

anthropology because it means God created us in a way that is expressive of the Holy

Trinity. Furthermore, Bonaventure believes this is true not just of the human race but of

the whole created cosmos, which is ordered so that humanity is placed at the center of the

cosmic hierarchy.93 For the human person is a hylomorphic being, embracing both the

spiritual (transcendent) and material aspects of God's cosmic creation on account of the

unifying of these two principles in their essence. Humanity is “the peak,” according to

Bonaventure, because it alone of material creation can give a response to love.94 Such a

biblical anthropology expresses our capacity to participate in the divine being, a truth

essential to Bonaventure's theology of the Incarnation since it leads to the perception that

God created the material cosmos in a way that was open to the God-man. The Incarnation

92
Ibid., 133-134, 119-159.
93
Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae: Opera Theologica Selecta, I Sentences, d.
43, a. u., q. 3, resp., (I, 772) (Floritiae: Ad Claras Aquas, 1938), 612; cf. Hayes, The History of Franciscan
Theology, 67.
94
Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. 2, c. 4., trans. by Erwin Esser Nemmers, A.M. Mus.M , LL. (St.
Louis, MO: B. Herder Brook Company, 1947), 55-57.

30
becomes the completion and fulfillment of the created universe.

Despite the christocentrism of his theological vision, Bonaventure does not share

the opinion of Grosseteste on the primacy of Christ. Rather, he affirms the opinion in line

with St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. He takes up the question in his Commentary on the

Sentences where he mentions two opinions common at that time, both of which he

considered probable. The first opinion follows the christocentric line of thought of

Grosseteste, and makes a distinction between the Incarnation's substance and its passable

modality as seen through its execution. In speaking of the substance of the Incarnation,

Bonaventure is referring to it as it exists in the mind of God regardless of the moral

condition of man. To speak of its passable modality, he is referring to how the Incarnation

is seen through God's execution of the Incarnation in history. This aspect is affected by

man's sinful condition.

According to Bonaventure, the claim of this christocentric opinion is that the

“ratio praecipua” for the substance of the Incarnation is the perfection of God's work
95
(creation). Pancheri argues that this language is essential in understanding

Bonaventure's argumentation, because it establishes a fundamental distinction in his

thought. “Ratio” here means reason and “praecipua” means particular, especial, or

specific. Thus Bonaventure speaks of a particular or especial reason for the Incarnation

rather than a motivation or cause so as to imply that we are searching for reasons that lie

within the mind of God Himself. Since God's actions in the world, ad extra, are not

determined by anything outside of Himself, we cannot speak of a motivation but a “ratio

praecipua.” As Pancheri describes this point, “St. Bonaventure does not inquire into the

95
Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae: III Sentences, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, 19.

31
motive of the Incarnation, but rather into its ratio. The former term designates something

which moves someone from the outside, and God cannot be “moved” by anything or

anyone but Himself. On the contrary, 'ratio' specifies the interior meaning, the intrinsic

principle of intelligibility, i.e., that which primarily determines all other components.”96

The substance of the Incarnation brings the cosmos to its perfection, and this

perfection is not dependent upon humanities descent into sin.97 What is affected by sin is

the way in which God executes His plan in salvation history. Since man did fall into sin,

the Incarnate God now takes upon himself a passable human nature, one capable of

suffering, so as to be able to endure the passion and death on the Cross to redeem man.

Thus according to Bonaventure, the claim of the christocentric position is that the

substance of the Incarnation, and thus its position in salvation history, remains unaffected

by original sin. Sin affects only the way in which the Incarnation is carried out. 98 The

second opinion follows St. Anselm's hamartiocentric understanding of the Incarnation,

and does not make a distinction between its substance and modality. The “ratio

praecipua” in both its substance and modality is the redemption and restoration of the

human race. Thus it is willed by God 'after' the fall of man.99

The clarity of his distinction between the substance and modality (or execution) of

the Incarnation in his explanation for the christocentric position is one of the significant

contributions Bonaventure makes to the development of this question. For it shows how it

is logically possible for the proponents of this position to believe that original sin affects

96
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 20.
97
Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae: III Sentences, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp., 19-20.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.

32
the Incarnation; and at that same time not be occasioned by it. This resembles the opinion

of Rupert, who believed the sin of Adam was foreknown and permitted and only served

to bring Christ more glory and honor; whereas the Incarnation was foreknown and

foreordained.100

Before stating specifically which position he holds, Bonaventure explains:

“Which of these two opinions is more true is known to Him Who designed to become

Incarnate for us. But it is difficult to see which of these should be preferred, since both

are in accordance with Catholic belief, and both are held by Catholics.”101 Though both

are regarded as being in conformity with Catholic belief, Bonaventure is not ignorant of

the tension that exists between the two positions. The first regards the Incarnation as

central or foundational in God's creative act, making the universe christocentric in nature.

The God-man is much more than just the remedy for sin, but the reason and purpose

behind all that is created. Bonaventure is attached to this christocentric viewpoint as his

whole theological and philosophical system has its basis in the Book of Genesis, as was

previously shown. The second opinion regards the Incarnation as hamartiocentric, or

willed for the sake of redemption, which Bonaventure will also accept. However, to say

that the Incarnation is hamartiocentric implies that God's creation is not christocentric,

because the Incarnation was occasioned by sin under this view and thus not the center of

God's creative act.

The deciding factor for Bonaventure is the position which he regards as more

conducive to faith and piety. Though he does admit that “both opinions also, according to

100
Van Engen, Rupert of Deutz, 356.
101
Ibid.

33
different considerations, are conducive to devotion,” he accepts the second opinion as

more conducive for a couple of reasons.102 According to Bonaventure, what is more in

conformity with piety and faith must be grounded in the Scriptures and the Fathers, and

should avoid those arguments that begin from a priori grounds. It must be grounded in

the Scriptures and the Fathers because Bonaventure considers God's revelation as the

basis for any knowledge concerning God, and this is given through God's acts in

salvation history. Bonaventure also insists that God does everything outside of Himself

(ad extra) in perfect freedom. God acts ad extra solely because He wills to do so, not

because He has to by any demand of His nature. This is why Bonaventure rejects

argumentation that begins from a priori grounds, such as the argument of Alexander of

Hales and Grosseteste, which was based on Pseudo-Dionysius' concept of the self-

diffusiveness of the supreme goodness of God.

From the Scriptures he specifically cites Matthew 18 and Galatians 4:45, two

passages which make direct reference to the redemptive purposes of the Incarnation.

From the Fathers, Pancheri believes it is specifically St. Augustine and St. Bernard whom

Bonaventure has in mind. Both of these scholars speak in favor of the hamartiocentric

position, but believe that the christocentric position is also most fitting.103 Bonaventure

simply went with the opinion he perceived to be more explicitly expressed by Scripture

and most strongly supported by the Church. This makes sense considering Bonaventure's

methodology that starts with revelation and moves into speculative theology. Faith is an

essential starting point for Bonaventure, and something which set for him the limitations

102
Ibid.; c.f. Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, fn 30, 123.
103
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, fn 30, 123.

34
to any theological investigation. Thus there is some logic for why Bonaventure would

choose the opinion he perceived to be ex pietate. As Pancheri explains, “this is a

necessary sequel of the very concept of theology as understood by the Doctor. The 'pietas'

toward God has here a fundamental function to fulfill; it is faith lived.”104 This is the

logical conclusion of a theology which believes the world was created so as to reveal the

Godhead.

Bonaventure's emphasis on the will of God in the creation of the world shapes his

perspective and moves him to utilize a posteriori arguments. God's will is His mode of

operation in the universe since we cannot say God does anything ad extra necessarily.

Nor is there anything in creation that can determine the way in which God must act, but

every action is done in complete and perfect freedom. 105 This critique of a priori

arguments constitutes Bonaventure's most significant contribution to the development of

Catholic thought on the primacy of Christ, because it is the reason why he shifts the

question away from the counter-factual claim. For Bonaventure, the issue centers on the

will and intention of God for the Incarnation in the present economy of salvation. So,

even if hypothetical questions occur, something much more foundational is at stake in his

mind than simply dealing with a question about an alternate economy of salvation. 106

After Bonaventure, the hypothetical must be regarded as a superficial perspective on the

question of Christ's primacy because Bonaventure specifies exactly how the question

concerns the present salvific order in the distinction between christocentric and

104
Ibid., 25.
105
Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae: II Sentences, d. 1, p. II, a 2, q. 1, 35-36.
106
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 20.

35
hamartiocentric viewpoints.

Bonaventure affirms the Anselmian hamartiocentric viewpoint of the Incarnation

because an alternate economy of salvation doesn't promote devotion and piety in the

faithful. However, he also remains attached to the christocentrism of his theological

system. He even acknowledges that the christocentric viewpoint is more “subtle” and

“logical” in its distinction between substance and modality.107 This puts Bonaventure in a

difficult position, as he must now explain how it is possible to maintain both the

christocentrism of creation and the hamartiocentrism of the Incarnation. To answer this

tension, he will ultimately make a distinction between two different world orders. The

first, prior to the fall, had the Word of God directly as its head. The second was

established after the fall, and had the Incarnate Word of God as its head.

Bonaventure will explain this distinction between the two orders of salvation,

which he believes solves the apparent contradiction between his christocentric worldview

and his hamartiocentric understanding of the Incarnation, in his response to several

objections.108 The objections of specific concern extend from the christocentric nature of

Franciscan thought. Thus they are founded upon a different line of argumentation than the

aprioristic arguments, and rely heavily on a point which Bonaventure willingly accepts

and ardently defends. 109 He will even place humanity at the center of creation's

hierarchical structure (between pure spiritual beings as the angels and pure material

beings such as the animals and plants) precisely because it is through the human race that

107
Ibid., 25.
108
Bonaventure, Doctoris Seraphici S. Bonaventurae: III Sentences, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2, resp., 19-20.
109
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 22-23.

36
all of creation remains open to receiving the God-man. As the Word of God made flesh,

the Incarnation provides God with the greatest glory and the greatest revelation of

Himself ad extra, making it the most fitting way for God to reveal Himself.110 As was

already seen, such a theology seemingly contradicts the hamartiocentric understanding of

the Incarnation which Bonaventure has also chosen to affirm.

However, he believes that he has provided a suitable explanation for these

objections by citing the possibility that there may have been two separate orders of

salvation which God had in mind; and the present order of salvation was determined by

the fall of man. This explanation is taken specifically when he deals with objections that

pertain to Christ as head of the Church. Such objections state that if Christ is head of the

universal Church, then the Church must also be occasioned by sin since it could not have

Christ as her head apart from sin. To answer this, Bonaventure suggests that two orders of

salvation exists, as explained earlier. But such an explanation is completely unsatisfactory

for many proponents of the first opinion. A radical change in the head implies a

substantial change in the creature, and it eliminates any possibility that the unfallen

angels could be members of the Church since they would have remained under the first

order of salvation.111

Such argumentation extends into another objection concerning matrimony as a

sign of Christ's union with the Church and at the same time instituted prior to the fall. If

there are two orders of salvation as Bonaventure proposes, it is not possible to have such

an obvious sign of the Incarnate God contained within the first order of creation. This

110
Bonaventure, Breviloquium, p. 2, c. 4, 55-56.
111
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 22-23.

37
suggests God created the universe with one order of salvation in mind; and it is clear that

Christ the God-man was the head of this creation. Not only does Bonaventure's

christocentric theological system suggest this, but the Scriptures strongly favor it as well.

Furthermore, if the “ratio praecipua” of the Incarnation is redemption as the

hamartiocentric opinion proposes, then the Incarnation must be considered an occasioned

work of God. This is absurd to proponents of the christocentric position since it is not

logical to say that a greater good is occasioned by a lesser good. More importantly, it

would violate the whole understanding of Christ's central place in God's creative act.

Christ could not be the center and unifying principle to the whole universe if he is

occasioned by something that happened within the universe.

However, Bonaventure disagrees that Christ is predestined occasionaliter within

the harmartiocentric opinion since he was willed freely after the prevision of sin. Put

differently, God freely willed Christ after He foresaw humanity's descent into sin. Though

God's original plan may not have included sin (thus having the Word directly as its

Head), God's foreknowledge of sin allows Him to make previsions in his original act of

creation. This seemingly allows for both a christocentric understanding of the universe,

and a hamartiocentric understanding of the Incarnation. The issue is essentially shifted

from the order of execution to the order of intention in the mind of God. Yet, as Pancheri

argues, this simply does not answer the problem. What is being determined is whether in

the present economy of salvation, Christ's predestination is dependent upon sin in the

order of God's intention, and thus occasioned by it. If God foresees man's sin and then

wills the Incarnation as a remedy for it as St. Bonaventure claims, then the Incarnation is

still willed, figuratively speaking, “after” sin within God's intention; and thus occasioned

38
by it.112 To claim that God's foreknowledge of sin allows him to create with Christ as the

head without losing the hamartiocentric nature of the Incarnation does not take into

account Bonaventure's most profound contribution in moving the question beyond the

hypothetical. This is precisely why proponents of the christocentric opinion can rightfully

find these responses unsatisfactory.

St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-1274)

The work of St. Thomas Aquinas only serves to affirm these conclusions. Thomas

himself treated the problem, “not so much under the aspect of Christ's primacy as that of

the Incarnation's relationship to the redemption along the well-known Anselmian

lines.”113 Given that St. Thomas operated under Anselmian lines, it is very clear that he is

going to favor the hamartiocentric position which would later follow in his name sake as

the Thomistic thesis. Unlike St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas' perspective on the question

took the form of the well-known hypothetical. According to Pancheri, this “reveals a

complete dependence on St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo.”114 To be fair to Aquinas, it is

clear that he did not mean to examine the issue as a pure hypothetical, but to elucidate a

factual reality. It is also very likely that Aquinas adopted this perspective as a way of

summing up the work of some of the Fathers, like Augustine whom Thomas quotes as

saying, “if man had not fallen, the Son of Man would not have come.” Nevertheless, “it

was precisely the owing to the authority of St. Thomas that the hypothetical formulation

112
Ibid., 23.
113
Ibid., 25.
114
Ibid.

39
of the question prevailed everywhere.”115

Pancheri further argues that Aquinas borrowed the motivations for this solution

from St. Bonaventure, but affirms this position more cautiously and with greater

hesitation than his Franciscan counterpart. As he explains in the Summa Theologica, he

believes that those issues which are beyond the ability of reason should be left to

revelation. Since the Scriptures always speak of the Incarnation in terms of the

redemption of man, it is fitting to say that the Incarnation was ordained as a remedy for

sin and thus would not have happened had man not fallen. St. Thomas says this

concerning the present order of salvation and concedes that it is not unfitting to say the

Word could have become Incarnate even without the fall.116

Pancheri will also make the claim that certain aspects of Thomas' theology should

have led him to affirm the first position over the second, just as we saw in Bonaventure.

Specifically, Thomas believed that the grace given to the angels and innocent Adam

depended essentially, not just accidentally upon Christ since both angels and men belong

to the Mystical Body of Christ. This should have naturally led him to the conclusion that

Christ was predestined prior to the fall of Adam, which would make the hamartiocentric

position untenable. But Thomas also thinks God could change the end or final cause of a

creature without changing their nature. Scotus will later deny this, allowing him to use

the argument from Christ's predestination in favor of the christocentric position.117

In regards to the christocentric opinion, Thomas states in his Commentary on the

115
Augustine, The Works of St. Augustine: Sermons, “Sermon 174, 2,” 258. “Si homo non perisset,
Filius hominis non venisset.”
116
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, III, q. 1, a. 3, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican
Province (New York: Benzinger Brothers, 1948), 4:2022.
117
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 28.

40
Sentences: “Others indeed say that since through the Incarnation of the Son of God is

accomplished not only the liberation from sin, but also the exaltation of human nature

and perfection of the whole universe, the Incarnation would have come about because of

these reasons even if there were no sin; and this can be sustained as probable.”118 St.

Augustine held to a very similar position, though he also can be said to have operated on

what would later become known as the hamartiocentric understanding to the Incarnation.

What God willed apart from sin is not an area he wished to go into in any depth, and thus

he did not give the question much weight for further discussion in Christology. 119 Much

of this had to do with his hypothetical perspective of the question, and this is part of the

reason Bonaventure is able to make more significant contributions to the questions

development.

In fact, what Thomas does contribute, though it is likely he does so unconsciously,

is an affirmation that the question provides a significant theological foundation in our

understanding of this present economy of salvation- a point which makes the hypothetical

perspective superficial at best. Bonaventure recognized this, and his unsatisfactory

attempts to hold to both a christocentric universe and hamartiocentric Incarnation only

served as a further affirmation of this point. As was already seen, Thomas did not view it

as an important question because it is hypothetical. Despite this fact, Pancheri has

suggested that Thomas structured his Summa Theologica on the Anselmian

hamartiocentric principle.

118
Thomas Aquinas, Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia: Commentary on the Sentences III, d. 1, a.
3, Respondo dicendum (Parisiis: Imprierie Pierre Larousse, 1873), 13; translation from Pancheri, The
Universal Primacy of Christ, 124. “Alii vero dicunt, quod cum per incarnationem Filii Dei non solum
liberatio a peccato, sed etiam humanae naturae exaltatio, et totius universi consummatio facta sit; etiam
peccato non existente, propter has causas incarnatio fuisset: et hoc etiam probabiliter sustineri potest.”
119
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 27.

41
 Reflecting upon the work of Marie-Dominque Chenu (1895-1990), Yves Congar

(1904-1995), and Etienne Gilson (1884-1978), Pancheri explains that the Summa was

built upon the Aristotelian concept of science. For Aristotle, philosophy is an

understanding of reality through the highest cause of things (per altissimas causes) and is

seen through the fourfold aspect of causality: efficient, final, material, and formal. Within

this Aristotelian framework, St. Thomas introduces the Neo-platonic notion of exitus and

reditus in relation to God. However, Pancheri further explains that “the difficulty with

this systematization concerns precisely the peculiar character of salvation history which,

being a contingent, gratuitous and free work of God, lacks all necessity. In effect, St.

Thomas introduces Christ at the end of his work (Tertia Pars), after the entire

theology . . . has already been constructed.”120 According to this plan, after treating God

Himself as the efficient final cause, he moves into creation (natural order), and grace

(supernatural order), and finally Christ as the via or way for the reditus in Deum. Thus the

Incarnation emerges as the means to bring about the reditus which man had found

impossible to achieve due to Adam's sin. Thus, according to Pancheri, “what we have

here is actually a succession of three plans: the universal one of creation; the particular

one of grace which presupposes the first; and finally, the hypostatic order which

presupposes both. . . Christ is projected then as a concrete modality of the creature's

reditus in Deum.”121

As Pancheri will go on to observe, in basing his plan of the Summa on Aristotelian

120
Ibid., 29.
121
Ibid.; c.f. Marie-Dominique Chenu, O.P., St. Thomas d”Aquin et la theologie (np: Paris),
Editions du Seuil [1963]; Andre, Hayen O.P., St Thomas d”Aquin et la vie de L'Eglise, (Louvain:
Publications universitaires, 1952); Per Erik Persson, Le plan de la Somme Theologique et le rapport,
“Ratio-Revelatio,” in RPL 56 (1958): 545-572;E. Gilson, in BT 8 (1953): 10; Y. Congar, O.P., La foi et la
theologie (Tournay, 1962): 203-205.

42
philosophical notions, St. Thomas is presenting a theology of creation which does not

resemble the christocentrism of Grosseteste or Bonaventure. In the original plan of God,

Christ is not the Head of all creation or the one in whom God has predestined us before

the foundations of the world as St. Paul states in Ephesians (Eph 1:4). Christ is the means

of our reditus to God; but he is not our exitus a Deo.122 Thus St. Thomas could not accept

the christocentric position because, unlike St. Bonaventure, his theological system

presented in the Summa would not allow it. This is why Thomas' disciples worked so

hard to defend his position after Scotus. They understood that the Franciscan thesis

contradicted the whole plan of the Summa. This point alone affirms St. Bonaventure's

recognition that the hypothetical lens obscures what is truly being sought in answering

this question. The issue then becomes whether or not limiting our view of the Incarnation

to a redemptive lens obscures the truth about creation, and ultimately anthropology.

Bonaventure and Thomas did not think so, but John Duns Scotus disagrees.

122
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 30.

43
 Chapter 3: Blessed John Duns Scotus (ca. 1266-1308)

Many scholars believe Catholic thought on the primacy of Christ reaches its

pinnacle in the work of Blessed John Duns Scotus. Even those who object to his position

find it difficult to ignore the depth of his arguments. This does not mean there is no

connection in Scotus' work to earlier theologians, and it is important that we recognize

and acknowledge these influences in order to fully grasp the depth of Scotus' thought.123

We can start with his method. Though Scotus utilizes highly philosophical concepts, his

method is best understood in the context of his Franciscan background because divine

love forms the basis and principle of intelligibility for his whole theological work. This

simple fact follows from his belief that the world cannot be understood apart from God's

perfectly free, and thus loving, decision to create all things ad extra.

From this Scotus will say the created world is a contingent reality, reliant

completely on the will of God to create. Such an understanding of creation will lead

123
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 383.

44
Scotus to pursue arguments based on predestination, which he sees as a gratuitous (free)

unmerited gift that God bestows upon a creature, in favor of the christocentric position.

He will specifically apply an important distinction to his understanding of freedom and

the relationship between the will and intellect that will set him apart from previous

thinkers. For Scotus does not understand the perfection of the will, as the rational faculty

of the soul, to be the mindless and disordered pursuit of what is perceived to be

beneficial; but rather the capability to firmly grasp the objective, ordered good apart from

what is beneficial. This distinction allows Scotus to affirm the christocentric position

precisely because he sees the Incarnation as the greatest good, and the creature to which

all of creation is ordered.

Love as the starting point

Recognizing that Scotus is grounded in the spirit of the St. Francis of Assisi, Pope

Paul VI describes him as having held “virtue of greater value than learning” and to have

confirmed the “pre-eminence of love over knowledge.”124 In speaking of Scotus' work on

the primacy, Beraud De Saint-Maurice suggests that one must first understand the love

which Scotus had toward the soul of Christ to understand the secret behind his teachings

concerning him. “'When I speak praise of Christ, I should prefer to speak in excess rather

124
Pope Paul VI, Alma Parans, July 14, 1966, in Franciscan Studies 27, no. 1 (January 1967), 7.
“Beside the principal and magnificent temple, which of St. Thomas Aquinas, there are others, among
which, although differing from it in style and size, is that splendid temple which John Duns Scotus, with his
ardent and contemplative genius, based on solid foundations and built up with daring pinnacles pointing
towards heaven. Following the wake of more than fifty Franciscan Scholastics . . . he assimilated and
perfected their teachings and excelled them all, becoming the principal standard-bearer of the Franciscan
School. . . St. Francis of Assisi's most beautiful ideal of perfection and the ardour of the Seraphic Spirit are
embedded in the work of Scotus and inflame it, for he ever holds virtue of greater value than learning.
Teaching as he does the pre-eminence of love over knowledge, the universal primacy of Christ, who is the
greatest of God's works. . . he develops to its full height every point of the revealed Gospel truth which
Saint John the Evangelist and Saint Paul understood to be preeminent in the divine plan of salvation.”

45
than be deficient...' This bold exclamation, flooding up from John Duns Scotus' heart

aflame with love, betrays the secret of his intuitions regarding Jesus Christ. In this it is

understood why our theologian was able to grasp in all its vastness the plan of God in a

harmonious and perfect whole, ordered by love.” 125 St. Bonaventure believed that

theology was an “affective science,” whereas for other thinkers like St. Thomas it was a

“speculative science.” 126 John Duns Scotus certainly follows in the tradition of his

Franciscan predecessor.

There is a profound connection in this to the Franciscan understanding of

theology which led St. Bonaventure, Grosseteste (though not a Franciscan himself),

Alexander of Hales, and all the Franciscan theologians who preferred the christocentric

theological path. This is why it is interesting that Horan will cite Scotus' pro-

philosophical method as one major distinction between him and the work of previous

christocentric thinkers (especially Grosseteste). “It is through natural reason, not

revelation that Scotus believes we are able to delve into the question of the Incarnation

and it is with reason that he makes his case.”127

It is true that Scotus operates very well philosophically and he does go beyond

most of his predecessors, besides St. Bonaventure, in this aspect of his thought. However,

to say that Scotus' method relies heavily upon the implications of reason rather than

revelation does not seem to paint a fully accurate picture of Scotus’ method. As we have

125
John Duns Scotus, Oxon., 3, d. 13, q. 4, n. 9 (14, 463) quoted in Beraud De Saint-Maurice,
John Duns Scotus: A Teacher For Our Times, trans. Columban Duffy, O.F.M. (St. Bonaventure, NY:
Franciscan Institute, 1955), 239. “In commendando enim Christum, malo excedere quam deficere a laude
sibi debita, si propter ignorantiam oporteat in alterutrum incidere.”
126
Ibid.
127
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?”, 385.

46
just seen in the previous quote from Saint-Maurice, faith and devotion, not reason,

provides the motivation for Scotus’ thought; and his opinion has its foundation in the

Scriptures whereby he is shown to defend a biblical, rather than a merely philosophical,

conception of God and man. As Pancheri observes, in regards to the philosophical nature

of Duns Scotus' arguments: “We are not dealing with a purely philosophical conception

elaborated by analyzing human experience, but an eminently theological one inasmuch as

Scotus knew how to emphasize the biblical notion of God and of man in contradistinction

to the anaturalistic and physicist concepts peculiar to the Greco-Aristotelians.”128

Though Scotus did present highly philosophical concepts in his arguments, faith,

devotion, and the perspective of love provide the most accurate way of approaching his

work. But the significance of Scotus' emphasis on love goes far beyond his method. It

provides us the key to understanding his whole argumentation on this issue. The work of

Duns Scotus on the primacy of Christ can be described as a synthesis of the two great

New Testament evangelists, St. John and St. Paul. The most logical starting point is with

the words of St. John, “Deus Caritas est!,” “God is love” (1 John 4:16). “This diminutive

exposition forms the keystone of the Franciscan Doctor's whole philosophical,

theological, ascetic, and mystical system. Duns Scotus does not believe he can escape by

means of any science the body of knowledge under which God willed to re-capitulate all

knowledge and all love.”129

Since God is love, love is the only principle by which we can truly understand His

work ad extra. According to Scotus, love becomes the point of view that allows us to

128
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 32.
129
Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus: A Teacher For Our Times, 254.

47
fully comprehend God’s creation. The importance of love in Scotus’ thought means that a

proper understanding of freedom is essential in order to fully appreciate the depth of his

arguments on the primacy of Christ. This, though deeply philosophical in nature, will

help us grasp precisely why Scotus so adamantly promoted the Franciscan position on the

primacy of Christ.

The doctrine of Christ's primacy represents the very center and essence of
the salvation mystery, the very substance of the 'historia salutis,' and
therefore the primacy will show forth in a dominant way that freedom is at
the root of that history. This explains why one will never grasp the depth,
originality and intrinsic motivations of Scotus' solution without an
adequate knowledge of his teaching on freedom. It is precisely in freedom
and love that the person expresses itself in its highest and strictest value.
The 'historia salutis' is simply unintelligible if we do not find in it the
concrete actuation of the love-freedom factor.130

Freedom: the relationship between the intellect and the will

Any discussion of freedom naturally leads philosophical minds to questions

concerning the will. Catholic thinkers during Scotus' time often debated over the

relationship that exists between the two main faculties of the human soul, the will and the

intellect. These discussions actually bring to light something very significant for our

understanding of what Scotus will have to say on the primacy of Christ. It is widely

accepted that a person cannot consciously will any action unless they have some

knowledge of what they are choosing. Also widely accepted is the understanding that a

person has some sort of control over the reasoning process of the intellect. Beyond these,

philosophers for the most part disagree on how exactly the will and intellect relate to one

another. Some emphasize the intellect over the will, and others the will over the intellect.

In our own day, many Catholics tend to follow the opinion of St. Thomas Aquinas

130
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 32.

48
and say that the will has a natural inclination to self-fulfillment or happiness. In this

system of thought, the will has a rather passive role to play in regards to the intellect,

since it always chooses that which the intellect presents to it as most conducive to its

happiness or fulfillment.131 The problem is that quite often the intellect is wrong (since it

has been darkened by original sin), and inaccurately presents such things to the will. This

causes the will to choose wrongly and thus fall into sin. Moral uprightness within this line

of thought essentially consists in the intellect's correct understanding of what is

conducive to happiness as proposed by Richard Cross in the following statement:

“Presupposed in Aquinas' view is the belief that a correct understanding of the nature of

happiness will entail acting morally.”132

Though popular in many Catholic circles, this will not be Scotus' view on the

matter and Cross identifies two specific reasons why this is the case. The first, he claims,

is that it does not do adequate justice to human freedom. Secondly, it does not take into

account the nature of a natural power.133 Primary within the Thomistic tradition, which

follows a very Aristotelian model of freedom, is the intellect. Scotus on the other hand,

will stand more firmly within tradition following Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure

and place the will as primary.134 Scotus believes it is self-evident from experience that the

human person is free in the fullest sense. He also believes a distinction must be made

between a free power and a natural power to prove this statement. Nature is defined as:

131
Richard Cross, Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 84.
132
Ibid.
133
Ibid., 85.
134
Thomas A. Shannon, The Ethical Theory of John Duns Scotus (Qunicy, IL: Franciscan
Press/Quincy University, 1995), 30.

49
“the potency of itself is determined to act, so that so far as itself is concerned, it cannot

fail to act when not impeded from without . . . a nature has not the power to determine

itself in any other way.”135

A free power, such as the will, is, “not determined, but can perform either this act

or its opposite, or can either act or not act at all.”136 Thus the will has the power to act in

opposite ways, and, as Shannon will explain, this means that the cause of such actions

cannot be found in anything but the will itself.137 Such in-determinism, as Cross puts it, in

an agent that is free is what Scotus refers to as contingency or the fact that A could have

been B. In a system like Aquinas', such contingency arises in the intellect since no one

can predict how the intellect's decision will turn out. In Scotus' mind, contingency arises

in the will. He believes this to be self-evident because every time we make a decision we

experience ourselves as having the ability to have made a different decision, or to have

followed a different path. Thus the will is capable of choosing opposites.138

None of this is to say that Scotus rejects the inclination that the will has towards

its own fulfillment, which he will call the affectio commodi (the affection for what is

beneficial or advantageous). 139 However, according to Scotus, the will must possess

another affection which modifies this inclination and gives the person the ability to act

135
John Duns Scotus, Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum: Opera Omnia, Vol.
7, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam IX, q. 15, a. 2, (Parisiis: Apud L. Vives, 1894), 610; translation from
Shannon, The Ethical Theory of John Duns Scotus, 35.
136
Ibid.
137
Shannon, The Ethical Theory of John Duns Scotus, 35.
138
Ibid.
139
John Duns Scotus, Bl. Joannis Duns Scoti: Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani: Opera Omnia, Vol. 10,
Ordinatio III, d. 26, nn. 17-18, (Civitas Vaticana: Typis Vaticanis 2007), 34-37; translation from Cross,
Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus, 87.

50
freely. Such an affection he calls the affectio justitiae (the affection for justice), and is

drawn directly from both Augustine and Anselm.140 This prevents the will from acting as

a pure nature, and allows it to will that which is right or just over what it perceives to be

advantageous. Otherwise, situations in which the intellect presents the will with the

choice to act for the beneficial or the just, the will would determinately choose that which

is beneficial since it could not act contrary to its nature. As Shannon explains:

The affectio justitiae is the means by which we can transcend nature-the

affectio commodi- and go beyond ourselves and our narrowly construed
good. By means of the affectio justitiae we are able to seek the intrinsic
value of an entity. . . Such an understanding of will as affectio justitiae
frees the will from the constraints of nature but does not subject it to rule
by whim. . . Rather, in keeping with his mentors, Augustine and Anselm,
Scotus views freedom as 'a positive bias or inclination to love things
objectively or as right reason dictates.'141

Due to his understanding of the affectio justitiae, Scotus avoids falling into

voluntarism since the will has its perfection in following the internal or ordered good of

the other as seen through right reason. Nevertheless, within this Scotistic understanding

of freedom, it is the will and not the intellect which is considered rational since the

intellect is not able to choose to know, but simply knows by its nature; whereas the will is

able to discern or rationalize between different actions. As Mary Beth Ingram explains:

“The intellect cannot refrain from knowing; it is by nature, i.e. necessarily, directed

toward cognition. The will, by contrast, is different: the will can not only will something

(velle) or not will it (nolle), it can beyond this also not will (non velle).142

140
Ibid.
141
John Duns Scotus, Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum, Vol. 23, Reportatio
Parisiensis II, d. 6, q. 2, n. 9, 621-622; translation from Shannon, The Ethical Theory of John Duns Scotus,
37, 38.
142
Mary Beth Ingram, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns Scotus: An Introduction
(Washington D.C., MA: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 95; Cross, Great Medieval

51
 In applying all this to God, Scotus will have the task of explaining how it is

possible for the divine will to act in a way that is both free and necessary. Such an issue is

beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus it will suffice to say that his answer to this difficulty

in regards to the divine will is found within a doctrine he calls firmitas or steadfastness. It

refers to the divine will's ability to reach its perfection, or to adhere to what consists in its

perfection. Such a theme is again taken from Augustine and Anselm, and basically states

that though the divine will is capable of opposite intentional objects, the only adequate

object of love for an infinite will is another infinite being (the divine being). To quote

William Frank: “To be possessed of the fullness of perfection is to be necessary and to be

possessed of the fullness of perfection volition must have firmitas. Since God's self-love

is possessed of the fullness of perfection, the same act is both free and necessary.”143

Creation's contingency:

In holding to all this, Scotus naturally believes the created world must be

considered a contingent reality precisely because it depends upon the divine will for its

existence. To say that something is contingent is to say that it may not exist at all, or it

may exist in a way other than it exists at this moment. Ingram explains this point in the

following statement: “The divine being is the ultimate cause without which nothing at all

would exist. God's existence becomes, then, logically necessary, the sine qua non for the

existence of anything.”144

Thinkers: Duns Scotus, 87; Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M, Duns Scotus on the Will & Morality, trans. William A.
Frank (MA thesis, The Catholic University of America, 1997), 35-37.
143
William A. Frank, “Duns Scotus' concept of willing freely: what divine freedom beyond choice
teaches us,” Franciscan Studies 42 (1982): 81.
144
Mary Beth Ingram, Scotus for Dunces: An Introduction to the Subtle Doctor (St. Bonaventure,

52
 Creation's reliance upon the divine being, or the divine will, for existence, and its

openness to exist in a way other than it exists now, makes the world contingent. But

Ingram also explains elsewhere that within this contingent creation there is also a certain

necessity, because God creates with a certain order in mind. Thus within this order of

creation, there are certain things that will necessarily cause something else. However,

such necessity is not the same necessity that is found in the divine being, which is the

only thing that is strictly necessary since it is completely independent of anything else for

its existence. All possibilities are actualized in the divine being and thus God could not

exist in any other way; hence, He is perfect. The necessity found in creation Scotus calls

[large loquendo] and it is not understood in the strict sense. This he calls [stricte

loquendo] and it is understood to be found in the divine being precisely because the order

and existence of creation depends upon God.145

The contingency of the created world is an important principle to keep in mind in

order to understand the nature of Scotus' arguments in regards to the primacy of Christ.

Even though he will ultimately affirm the christocentric position, there are certain

arguments in support of this position that Scotus will outright reject. Specifically, he will

reject the aprioristic argument of Grosseteste and Alexander of Hales, or the idea that

God as the summe Bonum will necessarily diffuse His goodness to the highest extent ad

extra. Scotus is uncomfortable with such argumentation because it is based upon the

demands of divine nature and its attributes. This is unacceptable for Scotus because we

are dealing with a reality, the created universe, that depends solely on the free and

NY: St. Bonaventure University, 2003), 41.

145
Ibid., 135; John Duns Scotus, Bl. Joannis Duns Scoti: Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani, Vol. 10,
Ordinatio III, d. 37, q. un., n. 5, 279-284.

53
ordered will of God.146 Such a critique is made in conformity with both St. Bonaventure

and St. Thomas, because they all recognize that God acts ad extra in complete freedom.

This makes the created order dependent upon the will of God, and any aprioristic

arguments in regards to God's action in creation inappropriate.

Predestination:

From this it is clear that Scotus is not going to operate along the same lines as

Alexander of Hales to support his position on the primacy of Christ. Instead, he turns to

the other great New Testament evangelist, St. Paul, for his argument from predestination.

In the first chapter of Ephesians, St. Paul makes the following statement: “Blessed be the

God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing

on high in Christ. Even as He chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we

should be holy and without blemish in his sight in love. He predestined us to be adopted

through Jesus Christ as His sons, according to the purpose of His will. . .” (Ephesians 1:

3-5). In his letter to the Romans, St. Paul again mentions our predestination: “For those

whom He has foreknown He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His

son, that he [Christ] should be the firstborn among many brethren” (Romans 8:29). From

this, we can say with certainty that we are predestined through Christ, implying that

Christ himself is also predestined.

Putting the question within the context of predestination, specifically of Christ, is

reminiscent of Rupert of Deutz. But Scotus will take the argument to its most complete

potential through his understanding of love and freedom. This is expressed by Pancheri in

146
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 18.

54
the following statement: “In its most general and fundamental meaning, the idea of

predestination tells us in the first place that in carrying out the plan of salvation, God's

will is in no way conditioned by creatures but is essentially sovereign and free. God's

freedom (i.e. His love) is the beginning of all things; it is the ultimate explanation of the

order of salvation which embraces both nature and grace.”147

Scotus speaks of the issue of Christ's primacy in his Ordinatio and in his

Commentary on the Sentences, and introduces the problem with his definition of

predestination: “Predestination is the foreordaining of some being principally to glory,

and to other things insofar as they are ordered to glory.”148 Grace, merit, and the will's

cooperation are a means to the glory which a created being is predestined. In this there is

agreement between Scotus and Thomas, as it will be Thomas' disciples who will later be

the greatest adversaries to Scotus' position. Both will also say predestination is absolutely

gratuitous, a gift from God. Where they will eventually differ is in how it relates to the

will of God. 149 Since predestination, and he is specifically speaking of Christ's

predestination, is gratuitous, then it must be prior to the fall of Adam and cannot be

conditioned by it in any way. To say that Christ's predestination is conditioned is to say

that it is no longer a gratuitous gift of God apart from anything in creatures. As Pancheri

explains, “If predestination is a gratuitous gift of God which in no way depends on the

creature . . . it precedes the prevision of sin which is a defect and a privation. It cannot be

147
Ibid., 33.
148
Scotus, Ordinaito III, d. 3, q. 3 quoted in Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 33.
“Praedestinatio alicujus ad gloriam principaliter et ad alia in ordine ad gloriam.”
149
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 33.

55
conditioned by anything positive-and much less negative-on the part of creatures.”150

At this point, Scotus will relate Christ's predestination to the predestination of all

other creatures in order to show the exact logic of his argument.

For, universally, he who wills in an orderly manner seems to will first that
which is more proximate to the end. Thus, just as [God] first wills that
someone should receive glory before [He will that he should receive]
grace, so also among the predestined, to whom He wills glory, He seems
ordinately to will first the glory of him whom He wills to be proximate to
the end, and thus He wills the glory of this soul [of Christ] before that of
some other soul, and He wills the glory and grace of anyone before He
foresees the things that are opposed to these habits.151

Recall that the will is the rational aspect of the soul, according to Scotus, precisely

because it is self-determining. It is not an indifferent potency, but is self-determining

toward a foreknown good.152 At the level of the affectio justitiae, the will is able to go

beyond itself and its own fulfillment to choose what is good or right for the other. All of

this is done in conformity to what reason reveals to it as true. The perfection of the will

lies at this level, and not as it is commonly held in society as through the ability to

choose. What this means is that the more perfect the will the more it is able to choose the

objective good.

For Scotus, the will intends something in an orderly way. The divine will, being

the most perfect, must also be the most ordered of wills. God would not create something

in a way that is inordinate. This means that God would not will a greater good for the

sake of a lesser good because such a reality is disordered. To translate this into the issue

of Christ's primacy, the Incarnate God could not have been willed or occasioned by the

150
Ibid.
151
Scotus, Ordinaito III, d. 3, q. 3 quoted in Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 34.
152
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 34.

56
sin of Adam. To say this, one must essentially believe that God willed the greatest good

of all creation, the physical body of Christ, merely for the sake of a lesser good,

humanity. Thus it overturns the scale of “values being good.”153 To put it simply, the

principle by which we hold that the divine will is the most ordered, ordinatissime volens,

prevents the possibility that the Incarnation was occasioned by anything outside of the

will of God. The Incarnation is the greatest good of all creatures. There is nothing which

God created which could be greater and more precious than the flesh of Christ. To say

that the body of Christ was willed only in order to redeem sinful humanity is to say God

wills in a disorderly manner.

The same principle must be applied to the predestination of Christ. As Pancheri

puts it, “God willed Christ as the archetype, the cause, the end, the mediator of all the

predestined. And since every predestination 'precedes' the prevision of the fall and is

independent of it, a fortiori the predestination of Christ cannot depend on it either.”154

Christ then becomes the center of God's actions ad extra, not an afterthought to remedy

fallen humanity. Christ is first in the mind of God, figuratively speaking, before all other

creatures because he is the summum opus Dei, the “masterpiece of God.” It is through

Christ that God willed to communicate Himself in the most sublime of ways and

introduce all his creatures to the truth of the blessed Trinity. All of this is expressed in a

famous text from Scotus:

God first loves Himself; secondly He loves Himself for others, and this is
an ordered love; thirdly, He wishes to be loved by the One who can love
Him in the highest way-speaking of the love of someone who is extrinsic
to Him; and fourthly, He foresees the union of that nature which must love

153
Ibid., 35.
154
Ibid.

57
 Him with the greatest love even if no one had fallen.155

Thus we once again return to the principle which Scotus took from St. John the

Evangelist, “Deus Caritas est.” God's act of creation is the result of the perfectly free and

gratuitous love of God and its end lies in the creation of one capable of returning to God a

perfect love; and thus, all of creation returns to God only through the God-man capable of

a perfect love.156

Many have confused what Scotus states about Christ being the end, the purpose

and final cause of the created universe with Alexander of Hale's aprioristic arguments. In

Scotus' thought, Christ can be understood as the greatest of God's works (the masterpeice

of God), precisely because the God-man is the only creature that is able to return to God a

most perfect love. However, as Pancheri claims, this means something different for

Scotus than it does in Alexander's arguments. For him, “Christ is not the 'crown' and the

'zenith' of the universe, but rather its root, its end, its raison d'etre; and this -note well-

not because of any aprioristic exigency on the part of the world, but exclusively because

God freely and gratuitously willed all things to have their center and foundation in

Christo Jesu.”157 Scotus' arguments for the christocentric position are of a completely

different nature than previous ones which have their foundation in the necessity on God's

part, by his perfect nature, to bring His creation to its most perfect end. Scotus argues

from perspective of St. Paul which concerns Christ's predestination, and our

predestination in him. As St. Paul states: “He [Christ] is the image of the invisible God,

155
John Duns Scotus, Opus Pariensis III, d. 7, q. 4 L ed. Balic, nn. 13-15; excerpt from Dean, A
Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, Appendix, 129.
156
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 35.
157
Ibid, 35, 37.

58
the firstborn of every creature. For in him were created all things in the heavens and on

earth, things visible and invisible, whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or

Powers. All things have been created through him and unto him, and he is before all

creatures, and in him all things hold together” (Col 1:15-17).

Fr. Maximilian Mary Dean will elaborate upon this Scotistic understanding of

predestination as being characterized by two activities, one eternal and the other

temporal. The first activity is what Fr. Dean will call intention or ordo intentionis and it

describes the eternal activity of God. This activity, since it is eternal, takes place outside

of time, and determines the end, purpose, the final cause of all God's actions ad extra. In

speaking of the intention of God, we speak of the very reasons why God chose to act ad

extra in the first place. The second activity Fr. Dean describes as the execution, or ordo

executionis, of this eternal decree or intention of God, and it describes what takes place in

time. The second activity is the gradual process by which God carries out his plan, the

ongoing process of accomplishing His intentions ad extra.158

Thus, subtly contained within Scotus' understanding of Christ's predestination is

an understanding of two divine activities within the one divine plan. The first, intention,

always precedes the second, execution. Though we can learn something of the intention

through our observance of its execution, we could not know the fullness of God's

intention until it was completed in Christ. To further demonstrate this point, Fr. Dean will

use the analogy of a sculptor who first intends to build a statue of the Sacred Heart, and

then executes this plan by taking chunks away from the wood, until he has created a

158
Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, 28.

59
statue of the Sacred Heart.159 Of course, all of this is to be understood in a figurative

manner, as we are speaking of an eternal decree of the will of God which takes place

outside of time. Thus describing God's plan using temporal language does not fully

capture what is happening, but it is the only way for us, in our temporal existence, to

comprehend what is primary in the mind of God.160

This distinction between the intention and the execution, which Pancheri will also

recognize and refer to, allows Scotus to explain how the Incarnation relates to redemption

since he does not believe the latter is a condition for the former. Recall that this

distinction was also made by St. Bonaventure, who acknowledged that it is a very subtle

way of explaining the relationship between the Incarnation and redemption within the

Franciscan framework. But Pancheri explains that“[I]t emerges clearly that Scotus

regards the redemption as being one aspect of the Incarnation. Hence, contrary to the

view of St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas, the Incarnation is not for the sake of the

redemption, but vice versa.”161 For Scotus the Incarnation is primarily directed for the

achievement of man's divine sonship, or as the East puts it, for man's divination in Christ.

Redemption is considered an aspect of this overall plan that becomes necessary only after

the fall. God is able to redeem man through the Incarnation should man be in need of it,

but this is not the same as saying that the Incarnation is primarily directed toward

redemption. Rather, the Incarnation is directed primarily to raise man up to divine

sonship with Christ.

159
Ibid.
160
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 40.
161
Ibid., 44.

60
 This claim affirms that God did become Incarnate “for us men and for our

salvation” as so many previous authorities have claimed. The distinction that Scotus

would like to make is that this is not the same thing as saying God became Incarnate only

“for us men and for our salvation,” nor even primarily for this reason. It follows from this

that what St. Bonaventure referred to as the substance of the Incarnation, equivalent to

the ordo intentionis, was willed prior to sin. The substance of the Incarnation is what is

intended in the will of God prior to anything else, and is completely and fully unaffected

by anything that takes place ad extra. This includes the fall of Adam, since Christ is

predestined before all creatures. What is affected by sin, as St. Bonaventure has already

explained, is the modality of the Incarnation, which is equivalent to the ordo executionis.

Once God foresaw man's fall into sin, He chose to utilize the potential of the Incarnation

to redeem man through the death of His only begotten Son. Thus in the ordo executionis

the Incarnation takes on a passible nature, one capable of suffering for the sake of man's

redemption.162

None of this is to say that it is inconsistent with the nature of the Incarnation to

believe it could have been passible had man not sinned; but, as with everything else

within the Scotistic framework, one could not say this is what God would have done

necessarily. This is true even after the fall, because God acts in complete freedom and

love, not by necessity. In the words of Scotus: “It was principally in order to attract us to

His Love, as I believe, that this came about [Christ's act of redemption], and because God

willed that men should be more fully drawn to Him.” 163 Nevertheless, even if the

162
Ibid., 46-47.
163
Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 7, q. 3 quoted in Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 47. “Ad
alliciendum nos ad amorem suum, ut credo hoc praecipue fuit, et quia voluit hominem amplius teneri Deo.”

61
Incarnation would have been executed with a passible nature apart from sin, Scotus will

say that Christ would not have come as a redeemer. “All authorities can be explained as

meaning Christ would not have come as redeemer unless man had fallen, nor perhaps as

passible.”164

This allows him to overcome arguments many now pose as a critique of the

Scotistic position. Such arguments attempt to say that if we are to remain consistent with

the liturgical principle of lex orandi, lex credendi (the law of prayer is the law of belief),

how do we justify Scotus' position with the exultet that calls the fall a “happy fault which

gave us so great a redeemer.” The Scotistic answer to this objection is simple. As Fr.

Dean explains, the exultet does not say there would not have been an Incarnation without

sin, only that there would not have been a redeemer, and this is a true statement even

within the Scotistic framework, as we have just seen. 165 Pancheri will object to this

opinion stating that it gives too much credence to the Thomistic thesis, but this objection

is not well-founded in the minds of many within the Scotistic position.166

Conclusions of the Scotistic formulation:

Scotus’ position goes back to the order of love, and can be seen as a direct critique

of the nature of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo. We know this to be true because Scotus will

directly speak of the thought of Anselm and synthesize it as such: “First we must see that

164
Ibid quoted in Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 46. “Omnes autem auctoritates
possunt exponi sic, scilicet quod Christus non venisset ut redemptor, nisi homo cecidisset, nec forte ut
passibilis.”
165
Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, 64-66.
166
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 113-120.

62
according to Anselm, it was necessary for man to be redeemed. Second, that he could not

be redeemed without satisfaction. Third, that the satisfaction was to be accomplished by

the God-man. Fourth, that the more fitting mode was this, namely through Christ's

passion.” 167 Scotus affirms love as the principle of intelligibility ad extra, what he

specifically rejects in Anselm are statements of necessity. As he explains: “All these

things which were accomplished by Christ concerning our redemption were not

necessary except on the presupposition that the divine ordination ordained that it should

come about in this way, and then it was only necessary by consequent necessity that

Christ should suffer; but nevertheless the whole was, simply speaking, contingent, both

the antecedent and the consequent.” 168 Here we see Scotus' understanding of the

contingency of the created world, with the only necessity coming from the firmitas of the

divine will (which again is only a result of the perfection of the divine will, or its

steadfastness in choosing the good according the order of love).

This also means that God's actions ad extra are in no way dictated by sin and

satisfaction as Anselm claims, for there is no tension between the order of love and the

order of justice. The latter is simply an aspect of the former. Pancheri puts it as such:

“There is no justice that necessarily demands a satisfaction through the death of the God-

man. All the concrete modalities of the Incarnation, including the Passion and death on

the Cross, are but different manifestations of the ordo amoris.”169 To Duns Scotus, the

167
Scotus, Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum: III Sentences, Volume 14, d.
20, q. unica, 733; translation from Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 127. “Primo videndum est,
secundum Anselmum, quod necessarium fuit hominem redimi. Secundo, quod non portuit redimi sine
satisfactione. Tertio, quod facienda erat satisfactio a Deo-Homine. Qurarto, quod convenientior modus fuit
hic, scilicet per passionem Christi.”
168
Ibid., 737.
169
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 45.

63
Incarnation could not have been simply a remedy for the fall of Adam and Eve. Rather, it

is the highest expression of the glory and love God receives from his creatures.

All of this is why Scotus also rejects any notion that there could have been a

'motive' for the Incarnation. Such language implies something outside of the divine will

was its cause. Like St. Bonaventure, Scotus prefers to speak only of reasons for the

Incarnation, because he believes that all things ad extra are the result of God's gratuitous,

free, and loving will. But Scotus will openly reject the idea that the Incarnation was only

for the sake of man's reditus ad Deum (return to God). Rather, he firmly believes it was

also the beginning of our exitus a Deo (departure from the mind of God). Thus, while he

does operate through an alternative set of arguments, his thought is firmly within the

christocentric framework of his Franciscan predecessors, including St. Bonaventure.

However, unlike St. Bonaventure, Scotus will also affirm that God is completely and

fully faithful to His original intention. Thus there is no room in Scotus' argument for

Bonaventure's hypothesis that there were two orders of salvation, one prior to the fall

with God the Word directly as its head and one after the fall which had the Incarnate God

as its head.

In reading Scotus on this question, one gets a further sense that he was more

firmly rooted in the christocentrism of the Franciscan order than any of his predecessors;

this may be the reason the question of Christ's primacy comes to a high point in him. As

he will state, the only way to save Anselm is to “proceed upon the presupposition of

divine ordination which has ordained that man should be redeemed in this way.”170 One

170
Scotus, Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum: III Sentences, Volume 14, d.
20, q. un., 738; translation from Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 127-128.

64
must completely abandon Anselm's hamartiocentrism and any sense of necesstarianism

for the sake of the order of love. The problem is, as Pancheri points out, if you do this:

“What remains of Cur Deus Homo? At any rate, Scotus rejects the Anselmian thesis

because it is incompatible with the absolute primacy of Jesus Christ and the biblical

concept of freedom.”171 Prior to Scotus, both sides of the discussion were willing to admit

the opposing position was at the very least fitting in terms of the Catholic faith. The only

exception to this may have been Rupert of Deutz. It is difficult, if not impossible, to

reconcile the opposing opinion as compatible with the faith within the Scotistic

framework; for it absolutely necessary to completely abandon the hamartiocentric view

of the Incarnation and to proceed with the christocentric view to have an accurate

understanding of the created order. He believes this is the consistent teaching of the

Scriptures, as we see in St. Paul and St. John, and in complete conformity with the

Fathers of the Church, especially those of the East.

Likewise, Scotus will have an equally critical opinion in regards to those who

approach Christ's primacy from the perspective of the hypothetical. Daniel Horan cites

this as one of the major differences that exists between the work of Robert Grosseteste

and John Duns Scotus. “Scotus does not begin his effort, nor is he primarily concerned,

with an alternative or hypothetical order. Rather, Scotus' approach begins with the

Incarnation as a factual premise. This is not to suggest that Scotus' position bears no

impact on a hypothetical reformulation of the question, but this is not his intention.”172

Both Dean and Pancheri will observe the very same point in Scotus. Pancheri will even

171
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 46.
172
Horan, “How Original was Scotus on the Incarnation?,” 385.

65
suggest how “obsolete” such a formulation has become under Scotus. 173 It is not a

question of understanding what would have been in an alternate economy of salvation

had Adam not sinned, but of understanding this economy of salvation at its most

fundamental and deepest level; that is, from God's point of view or ad mentem Dei.174

One could even say that Scotus' formulation clearly demonstrates why approaching the

issue specifically from the hypothetical obscures the whole question. It simply leads to a

mistaken understanding of what the question actually seeks to answer. All of this is why,

under Scotus, the question of Christ's primacy becomes not just another theological

question, but “the essential and all-encompassing theological datum.”175

Conclusion

With the work of Duns Scotus completed, the disciples of St. Thomas found

themselves in the midst of some difficulties they sought to overcome. Through various

stages of development, the Thomistic thesis was enhanced in confronting Scotus'

argumentation, though they were never able to completely reject it even if some, like

Thomassin, tried. 176 Pancheri explains that thinkers including Cardinal Cajetan, the

Salmanticenses (the Carmelite monks of the University of Salamanca), and Francisco

Suarez all sought to either completely overcome Scotus' argumentation or incorporate

173
Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, 9; Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of
Christ, 43.
174
Dean, A Primer on the Absolute Primacy of Christ, 27.
175
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 31.
176
Ibid., 61-62; cf. Louis Thomassin, Dogmata Theologica, III: De Incarnatione, lib. 2, cc. 4-11
(ed. Parisiis, 1866), 189-249. Thomassin believed an Incarnation within man's innocent state was an offense
against God since it distracted him from a pure or direct vision of the face of God. Thus he took an extreme
and untenable position against Scotus by saying that the Incarnation could only be understood within the
context of redemption, because only God's mercy could lead to such a degradation.

66
some of what Scotus had to say into the position of Thomas, so as to salvage what would

be lost of the Thomistic system if they were to accept the arguments of Scotus. Some,

such as the Dominican Ambrose Catarino, dissented from the Thomistic school and were

very critical of this effort; Suarez is even cited in his De Angelis as eventually

acknowledging the undeniable authenticity of Scotus' work, admitting that he could never

convince himself of the Thomistic position, as hard as he had tried.177

Such efforts of the Thomistic school bring to light the central point of this thesis.

Although the question of Christ's primacy originally began as a hypothetical, its

development demonstrates how much this perspective on the question can obscure its true

nature. St. Bonaventure was the first to begin to see that the question has little to with

what would have happened in an alternate economy of salvation, and everything to do

with properly understanding this present one. His attempts to justify maintaining both a

christocentric view of the world and a hamartiocentric view of the Incarnation provide

proof that the question cannot be passed over as a hypothetical thought experiment, for it

fundamentally involves two irreconcilable viewpoints on the reality behind the created

universe. Scotus even more forcefully promoted this idea. Though many after Scotus

tried to reconcile these two positions, none have been able to do so satisfactorily. What

this reveals is that such an inquiry provides foundational perspectives on God and the

universe for further theological thought. That is why, no matter which position one holds,

it is a fundamental and insurmountable mistake to understand the question from the

177
Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of Christ, 52-82; cf. Cardinal Cajetan, Commentary on the
Sentences in III Partem Summae Theologicae, q. 1, a. 3 published in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opera Omnia
(ed. Leonina, Romae, 1803) XI, 15-16; C.f. Salmanticenses, Cursus Theologicus , tomus IX, tractatus XXI:
De Incarnatione, disp. II, dub. I, n. 8; ed. (Paris, 1879), 270; C.f. Francisco Suarez, S.J., De Incarnatione,
disp. V, sectio 1, n. 3; Opera omnia (Parisiis, 1860) XVI, 198 and De Angelis, lib. VII, c. 13; ed. Vives
(Parisiis, 1856), II: 880-891.

67
perspective of its hypothetical formulation.

Evaluating the work already done on the primacy of Christ by these Catholic

theologians brings to light several aspects of the question which need further exploration.

This thesis has revealed that the theological methodology of each thinker may actually

have a role in determining how each theologian evaluated the issues at hand. Bonaventure

and the Franciscan mindset provides us with an interesting perspective upon the

relationship between the sciences of theology and philosophy, which seems to enforce the

idea that theology, as an affective science, is best understood when it is lived out in the

lives of believers. This strongly suggests that theological perspectives are not so isolated

from the everyday lives of the people of God. Further exploration into how our

theological perspective on the primacy of Christ affects the practical and pastoral lives of

the people of God is needed. Such an inquiry is capable of furthering our understanding

of the work of evangelization and the spreading of Gospel values.

Another interesting point open for further consideration is seen in that Western

theology has for the most part accepted Anselm's hamartiocentric perspective of the

Incarnation. The theological perspective of the East has developed in a way that it seems

to be more favorable to the christocentric viewpoint. Even statements of the early Church

Fathers favorable to the christocentric position mostly come from the Greek Fathers;

whereas the Western Fathers, while remaining open to the christocentric viewpoint, tend

to favor what will become the Anselmian perspective. Thus further studies could explore

how exactly the christocentric viewpoint has affected, if at all, the development of

theology in the East, and then how a greater acceptance of the Scotistic position would

affect the unity between Eastern and Western theological traditions.

68
69
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