100

Landmark
Judgment in
Constitutional
Law

Judgments that have evolved the

Constitution as we know it
 Published By
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copyright © 2021 Into Legal World Publication
100 Landmark Judgment in Constitutional Law
(1st Edition) 2021
Author- Amaresh Patel
Researcher: Prince Verma
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Preamble of the Constitution
 Contents
Preamble ............................................................................................. 1
Topic: Preamble As Part Of The Constitution ................................. 1
Part I The Union and its Territory (Article 1 – 4) .......................... 3
Topic: Reorganisation Of States ( Article 3) ................................... 3
Topic: Does The Power Of Parliament To Diminish The Area Of
State (Under Article 3) Include Also The Power To Cede Indian
Territory To A Foreign Country? .................................................... 4
Part II Citizenship (Article 5 – 11) ................................................... 6
Topic: Citizenship By Domicile. (Article 5) ................................... 6
Part III Fundamental Rights (Article 12 – 35) ................................ 8
Topic: Development Of The Concept Of State Under Article 12 ... 8
Topic: Personal Law (Article 13) .................................................. 10
Topic: Doctrine Of Eclipse ............................................................ 10
Topic: Doctrine Of Severability .................................................... 11
Topic: Doctrine Of Waiver ............................................................ 13
Topic: Evolution Of Concept Of Equality (Article 14) ................. 14
Topic: Equality Before Law And Equal Protection Of Law (Article
14) .................................................................................................. 15
Topic: Administrative Discretion And Article 14 ......................... 15
Topic: Right Of Hearing And Article 14 ....................................... 16
Topic: Comparative Scope Of Article 15(4) And Article 16(4) .... 17
Topic: Socially And Educationally Backward Classes Under
Article 15 (4).................................................................................. 18
Topic: Equal Pay For Equal Work Under Article 16..................... 21
Topic: The Indra Sawhney Case Popularly Known As The Mandal
Commission Case [ Article 16 (4) ] ............................................... 22
Topic: Reasonable Restriction On Fundamental Right Guaranteed
By Article 19 (1) (A) To (G) ......................................................... 27
Topic: Right To Receive Information Under Article 19 (1) (A) ... 29
Topic: Limitation On Freedom Of Press ....................................... 30
Topic: The Extent Of Protection Of Advertisements Under Article
19 (1) (A) ....................................................................................... 32
Topic: Freedom To Assemble And Reasonable Limitation Under
Article 19 (1) (B) And 19 (3) ......................................................... 33
Topic: Freedom To Form Association And Reasonable Restriction
Under Article 19 (1) (C) And 19 (4) .............................................. 34
Topic: Police Surveillance, Freedom Of Movement And Residence
Under Article 19 (1) (D) And 19 (5) ............................................. 35
Topic: The Concept Of Reasonable Restriction Under Article 19
(6) ................................................................................................... 37
Topic: Street Hawkers: Freedom To Trade And Commerce And
Reasonable Restriction Under Article 19(1)(G) And 19 (6) ......... 38
Topic: Ex-Post-Facto Law Under Article 20 ................................. 40
Topic: Autrefois Acquit Under Article 20 (2) ............................... 40
Topic: Prosecution Under Article 20 (2) ....................................... 41
Topic: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Article 20 (3) 43
Topic: Development Of The Concept Of Due Procedure Of Law:
From Gopalan To Maneka Gandhi ................................................ 44
Topic: Constitutionality Of Death Penalty .................................... 48
Topic: Quality Of Life Under Article 21 ....................................... 50
Topic: Right Against Sexual Harassment Under Article 21 .......... 51
Topic: Right To Die, Passive Euthanasia Under Article 21 .......... 52
Topic: Right To Education Under Article 21 ................................ 55
Topic: Right To Consult A Lawyer Under Article 22 ................... 57
Topic: The Communication Of Grounds Of Arrest To The Detenu
Under Article 21 ............................................................................ 58
Topic: Standard Consideration Laid Down By Supreme Court For
Using Power Of Preventive Detention Under Article 22 .............. 59
 Topic: Wages Lower Than That Of Minimum Wages Act Even
During The Pandemic Attracts Article 23 ..................................... 61
Topic: Secularism Under Article 25 And 26 ................................. 64
Topic: What Is Religion? ............................................................... 65
Topic: Religious Freedom Subject To The Right Of Others Under
Article 25 ....................................................................................... 66
Topic: Acquisition Of Religious Place By The State .................... 67
Topic: Restriction On Religious Instruction In Educational
Institution Under Article 28 (1) ..................................................... 69
Topic: Protection Of The Interest Of Minorities Under Article 2970
Topic: Rules For Determining Religious Or Linguistic Minority
Under Article 29 And 30 ............................................................... 71
Topic: The Land Reform, Abolition Of Zamindari And Right To
Property Under Article 31 A (Old Concept) .................................. 73
Topic: The True Nature Of Proceeding Under Article 32 ............. 74
Part IV ............................................................................................... 78
Topic: Inter-Relationship Between Fundamental Right S And
Directive Principles ....................................................................... 78
Topic: The Balance Between Fundamental Right S And DPSP Is
An Essentials Feature Of The Basic Structure Of The Constitution
....................................................................................................... 79
Topic: No Distinction Can Be Made Between Frs And Dpsps ..... 80
Topic: Right To Health, Medical Aid While In Service Or Post
Retirement Is A Fundamental Right .............................................. 80
Topic: Equal Pay For Equal Work Under Article 39 (D) .............. 81
Topic: Free-Legal Aid Under Article 39A .................................... 82
Topic: Pension Under Article 41 And 43 ...................................... 83
Topic: Ban On The Slaughter Of The Progeny Of A Cow Under
Article 48 ....................................................................................... 85
Topic: Doctrine Of Absolute Liability .......................................... 85
Topic: International Law Under Article 51 ................................... 87
 Topic: Nature Of Fundamental Duties Under Article 51A ........... 89
Part V The Union ............................................................................. 90
Chapter I The Executive Article 52 To 78 .................................... 90
Topic: Appointment Of Prime Minister Under Article 74(1) ........ 90
Topic: Non- Justiciability Of Cabinet Advice Under Article 74(2)
....................................................................................................... 92
Topic: The British System Of Parliamentary Democracy In Indian
Constitution.................................................................................... 93
Topic: Collective Responsibility Under Article 75(3)................... 94
Union Parliament Article 79 - 122 ................................................. 95
Topic: Disqualify Members Of Parliament Of Office Of Profit
Under The Government ................................................................. 95
Topic: Constitutionality Anti-Defection Law ................................ 97
Topic: Limiting Power Of Speaker Under Anti - Defection Law . 98
Topic: Ordinance Making Power Of President Under Article 123 99
Topic: Parliamentary Privileges Under Article 105 .................... 100
Topic: Parliamentary Privileges And Fundamental Right ........... 103
Part V The Union Judiciary Article 124 to 147 ........................... 108
Topic: Appointment Of Supreme Court Judges And Judicial
Autonomy (Three Judge Case) .................................................... 108
Topic: Ingredients That Constitute Contempt Of Court .............. 114
Topic: Nature Of Original Jurisdiction Of Supreme Court Under
Article 131 ................................................................................... 115
Topic: Nature Of Special Leave Petition Under Article 136 ....... 119
Topic: Law Declared By Supreme Court To Be Binding On All
Court ............................................................................................ 119
Topic: Power Of Supreme Court To Do Complete Justice Under
Article 142 ................................................................................... 120
PART VI THE STATE .................................................................. 122
The Executive Article 153 To 167 & 213 .................................. 122
 Topic: Tenure Of Governor Under Article 156 (1) ..................... 122
Topic: Whether Office Of Governor Is An Employment Under The
Government Of India ................................................................... 122
Topic: Whether A Person Who Is Disqualified To Be A Member
Of State Legislature Could Be Appointed As A Minister Or The
Chief Minister Under Article 164(4)? ......................................... 124
Topic: Conduct Of Government Business Under Article 154 And
166 ............................................................................................... 125
Topic: Power Of Governor Under Article 167 ............................ 127
State Legislature Article 168 To 212 .......................................... 128
Topic: Meeting Of State Legislature And Power Of Summoning
Under Article 188 ........................................................................ 128
Topic: The Governors Power Of Prorogation Under Article 174 129
Topic: Internal Autonomy To The State Legislature Under Article
212 ............................................................................................... 130
State Judiciary Article 214 To 231 ............................................. 131
Topic: Qualifications For A High Court Judge Under Article 217
..................................................................................................... 131
Topic: Transfer Of High Court Judges Under Article 222 .......... 133
Topic: The Court Of Record And Power To Punish For Its
Contempt Under Article 215 ....................................................... 134
Topic: Nature Of Writ Petition Under Article 226 ...................... 135
Topic: Nature Of The Power Of High Court Under Article 227 . 136
Topic: Appointment Of District Judges Under Article 233......... 136
Topic: Betterment Of The Condition Of Services Of The Members
Of Subordinate Judiciary ............................................................. 139
Part VIII The Union Territories Article 239 to 241 ................... 143
Topic: Jurisdiction And Competence Of The Government Of NCT
Of Delhi And The Government Of India Under Article 239 AA
And 239 AA (4) ........................................................................... 143
Part IX The Panchayats Article 243 - 243O ............................... 147
Topic: Panchayat Is A Permanent Constitutional Body .............. 147
 Topic: Extending The Provisions Of State Legislation On
Panchayats To Union Territories ................................................. 147
Part IX-A The Municipalities ...................................................... 148
Topic: Conversion Of A Municipal Council To A Corporation .. 148
Topic: Challenging Election Of Members To A Gram Panchayat
And A Municipal Committee ...................................................... 149
Part XI Relation Between the Union and State Article 245 - 263
.......................................................................................................... 151
Chapter I Legislative Relations Article 245 - 255 ...................... 151
Topic: Principles Of Interpretation Of List ................................. 151
Topic: Principle Of Harmonious Interpretation Under Article 246
..................................................................................................... 152
Topic: Rule Of Pith And Substance............................................. 153
Topic: Doctrine Of Colourable Legislation ................................. 154
Topic: Repugnancy Between A Central And State Law Under
Article 254(1)............................................................................... 155
Topic: Exception To The General Rule Of Repugnancy Under
Article 254(2)............................................................................... 156
Chapter II Administrative Relations Article 256 - 263 .............. 158
Topic: Distribution Of Executive Power Between Centre And State
Under Article 256 ........................................................................ 158
Topic: Centre And State Administrative Coordination Under
Article 258 ................................................................................... 159
Part XII Finance, Property, Contract and Suits Article 264 - 300A
.......................................................................................................... 162
Chapter I Finance Article 264 - 290a ......................................... 162
The 101 Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016 ........................... 166
Chapter III Property, Contracts, Rights, Liabilities, Obligations
And Suits Article 294 - 300 ......................................................... 167
Topic: Trade Or Business And Their Relationship With Centre
And State Between Article 73 (A) And 298 And Also Article 258
(B) And 298 ................................................................................. 167
 Chapter IV Right To Property Article 300A .............................. 169
Topic: Acquisition Of Property By The State Involves Payment Of
Some Money ................................................................................ 169
Part XIII Trade, Commerce And Intercourse Within The
Territory Of India Article 301 - 307 ............................................. 172
Topic: Motivation And Aspirations Of The Framers Of The
Constitution In Drafting Article 301 – 305.................................. 172
Topic: Inter-Relation Between Article 19(1) (G) And 301 ......... 174
Topic: Exceptions To Freedom Of Trade And Commerce.......... 175
Part XIV Services Under the Union and the State Article 308 -
323 .................................................................................................... 177
Chapter I Services Article 308 - 314 .......................................... 177
Topic: Doctrine Of Pleasure Under Article 309 .......................... 177
Topic: Removal Of Government Officer From Government
Services ........................................................................................ 178
Topic: Removal Of A Sub-Judge ................................................ 179
Chapter II Public Services Commission Article 315 - 323......... 179
Topic: Removal Of A Member Under Article 316 ...................... 179
Topic: Action Taken By Government Against His Servant In
Consultation With The Commission: Mandatory Or Not [Article
320 (3) (C)] .................................................................................. 180
Topic: Consultation With Commission For Taking Disciplinary
Action Against Civil Servant Is Mandatory For The Government
..................................................................................................... 182
Part XIV A Tribunals (Article 323-B) ......................................... 183
Topic: Jurisdiction Of High Court Can Be Taken Away By
Tribunal........................................................................................ 183
Part XV Election Article 324 - 329 .............................................. 185
Topic: Right To Elect Is Not A Fundamental Right .................... 185
Topic: Composition Of Election Commission ............................ 186
Topic: Directions To Candidate To File An Affidavit Detailing
Information About Themselves Under Article 324 ..................... 188
 Topic: Interpreting Article 329 .................................................... 188
Part XVI Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes Article
330 - 342 .......................................................................................... 190
Topic: Claims Of Schedule Caste And Schedule Tribe To The
Services And Posts Under Article 335 ........................................ 190
Topic: Power Of President Under Article 341............................. 190
Topic: A Person Belonging To OBC In One State Cannot
Automatically Claim OBC In Another State ............................... 192
Part XVII Official Language......................................................... 194
The Language Of Supreme Court, High Court, Etc Article 348 -
349 ............................................................................................... 194
Part XVIII Emergency Provisions Article 352 – 360 ................. 195
Topic: Judicial Review On The Discretion Of The President To
Declare Or Not To Declare Emergency ....................................... 195
Topic: Enquiry Into Complaints Against The Chief Minister ..... 196
Topic: Justiciability Of The Proclamation Under Article 356 ..... 197
Part XIX Miscellaneous Article 361 - 367 ................................... 202
Topic: “Sale For Purchase Of Goods” ......................................... 202
PART XX Amendment of the Constitution Article 368 ........... 203
Topic: The Court’s Interpretation On Amendability Of The
Constitution.................................................................................. 203
Part XXI Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions Article
369 - 378A........................................................................................ 212
Constitutional Amendments .......................................................... 215
 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Preamble
Topic: Preamble As Part Of The Constitution
Name of the Case: Berubari Union Case, AIR 1960 SC 845

Bench: Justice B. Sinha, Justice A.S. Shah, Justice K.

Dasgupta, Justice K.S. Rao, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice P.
Gajendragadkar, Justice S Das
Fact of the case: In the Berubari Union Case, the President
consulted with the Supreme Court of India regarding the
Nehru-Noon Agreement that was signed between the Prime
Minister of India and the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The case
concerned the disputed territory of Berubari, which was located
on the border between India and Pakistan. The dispute was that
the West Bengal State Government did not want to give any
territory of Berubari to Pakistan.
Ratio: The Supreme Court said that the preamble shows the
general purposes behind several provisions in the Constitution,
and is thus a key to the minds of the maker of the Constitution.
Further, where the term used in any Article are ambiguous or
capable of more than one meaning, some assistance at
interpretation may be taken from objectives enshrined in the
preamble. Despite this recognition of the significance of the
preamble, the Supreme Court specifically opined that the
preamble is not a part of the Constitution.
Second Case Developed: Kesavananda Bharati V. State of
Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461
Bench (Majority) Chief Justice Sikri, Justice Hedge, Justice
Mukherjea, Justice Shelat, Justice Grover, Justice Jagmohan
Reddy, Justice Khanna

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Into Legal World
(Dissent) Justice Ray, Justice Palekar, Justice Mathew, Justice
Beg, Justice Dwivedi, Justice Chandrachud
Fact of the case: The Parliament reacted to the Supreme Court
judgement in Golak Nath Case (1967) by enacting the 24th
Amendment act 1971. This Act amended Article 13 and Article
368. It stated that the Parliament has power to address or take
away any part of the Fundamental Right as per Article 368 and
such an act will not be a law under the meaning of Article 13.
Ratio: The Supreme Court rejected the earlier opinion and held
that preamble is a part of Constitution. It observed that the
preamble is of extreme importance and the Constitution should
be read and interpreted in the light of the grand and noble
vision expressed in the preamble.
The ratio was strengthened in LIC of India case (1995)
wherein the Supreme Court again held that preamble is an
integral part of the Constitution.
Topic (derived from Berubari and Kesavanand Bharti
Case) : Whether preamble can be amended under Article
368 of the Constitution?
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that since preamble is a part of
Constitution, the court stated that the opinion tendered by it in
the Beru Bari Union (1960) in this regard was wrong, and held
that preamble can be amended, subject to the condition that no
amendment is done to the ‘basic structure of the Constitution’.
In other words, the court held that the basic element or the
fundamental feature of the Constitution as content in the
preamble cannot be altered by an amendment under Article
368.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Part I
The Union and its Territory (Article 1 – 4)

Topic: Reorganisation Of States ( Article 3)

Name of the case: Babu Lal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR
1960 SC 51
Bench: Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice SK Das, Justice
AK Sarkar, Justice KN Wanchoo, Justice M Hidayatullah
Ratio: The exercise of power by Parliament under Article 3 is
subject to following condition:
1. A bill for any such purpose cannot be introduced in a house
of Parliament except on the recommendation of the
President.
2. If the bill affects the area, name or boundaries of a state,
then before recommending its consideration to the
Parliament, the president has to refer the same to the state
legislature concerned for expressing its view on it within
such time as he may fix.
The term stated in Article 3 includes a Union Territory, but in
the case of Union Territory, no reference need to be made to the
concerned legislature to ascertain its view and Parliament
cannot take any action in the like manner.
The purpose of the provision is to give an opportunity to the
state legislature concerned to express its view on the proposal
contained in the bill. Parliament is in no way bound by these
views.
All that is contemplated is that Parliament should have before it
the view of the State Legislature affected by the proposal
contained in the bill, but the Parliament is free to deal with the
matter in any manner it thinks fit and accept or reject what state

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Into Legal World
legislature says. Parliament is not bound to accept or act upon
the views of the state legislature.
If the state legislature fails to express his views within the
stipulated time, Parliament is free to proceed with the matter as
it likes. If once a bill has been referred to the state legislature it
can later be amended by Parliament and no fresh reference to
the state legislature is required to ascertain its view on the
proposed amendments.

Topic: Does The Power Of Parliament To Diminish

The Area Of State (Under Article 3) Include Also The
Power To Cede Indian Territory To A Foreign
Country?
Reference to Beru Bari case (1960)
Judgment: It was held that the power of Parliament to
diminish the area of a state under Article 3 does not cover
cessation of Indian Territory to a foreign country. Hence,
Indian territory can be ceded to a foreign state only by
amending the Constitution under Article 368.
Ratio altered: Maganbhai v. UOI, AIR 1969 SC 783
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that Article 3, broadly stated,
deals with the internal adjustment of the territories of
constituent states of India and Union. The act of the Parliament
to diminish any area of any state if it concerns to taking out a
part of the area of state and adding it to another state; the area
diminished from one state must continue to be the part of India
and it does not contemplate cessation of national Territory in
favour of foreign country. Thus, the territory can be ceded to a
foreign country only by enacting a formal amendment of the

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Constitution under Article 368 to alter the first schedule to the
Constitution.
It was further held that a constitutional amendment is necessary
in a case where the de jure and de facto Indian Territory is
ceded to a foreign country. But settlement of a boundary
dispute between India and other country stands on a different
footing. The settlement of a boundary dispute cannot be held to
a cessation of territory. This subject matter exclusively falls
under the domain of executive.
___________________________________________________

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Into Legal World

Part II
Citizenship (Article 5 – 11)

Topic: Citizenship By Domicile. (Article 5)

Name of the Case: Pradeep Jain v. UOI, 1984 AIR SC 1420
Issue: Whether admission to a medical college or any other
institution of higher learning situated in a state could be
confined to those who had their domicile within the State or
who were resident within the state for a specified number of
years or can any reservation in admission can be made for them
so as to give them precedence over those who does not possess
domicile within the state?
Bench: Justice PN Bhagwati, Justice Amarendra Nath Sen and
Justice Rangnath Mishra
Ratio: The Supreme Court discarded the idea of State domicile.
The court has asserted that there is only one domicile, namely
domicile in India. Article 5 recognizes only one domicile, that
is, domicile in the territory of India. The legal system which
prevails throughout the territory of India is one single
individual system.
It would be absurd to suggest that the legal system varies from
state to state or that the legal system of the state is different
from the legal system of Union of India, merely because with
respect to the subjects within their legislative competence, the
state have power to make laws. The concept of domicile has no
relevance to the applicability of municipal law, whether made
by Union of India or by the States. It would not, therefore, be
right to say that a citizen of India is domiciled in one state or
another, forming part of Union of India.
When a person who is permanently resident in one state goes to
another state with intention to reside there permanently

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
indefinitely, his domicile does not undergo any changes: he
does not acquire a new domicile of choice. His domicile remain
the same, namely Indian domicile. The court held that to think
in the term of state domicile will be highly detrimental to the
concept of unity and integrity of India.

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Into Legal World

Part III
Fundamental Rights (Article 12 – 35)

Topic: Development of The Concept Of State Under

Article 12
Name of the case: Rajasthan State Electricity Board versus
Mohanlal, AIR 1967 SC 1857
Bench: CJI K. Subba Rao, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice J.M.
Shelat, Justice Vashistha Bhargava, Justice G.K. Mitter
Issue:
Whether The Electricity Board be considered under the
definition of “State” under Article 12 of the Indian
Constitution?
Ratio: The term “other authorities” is broad enough to embrace
any authority established by legislation and operating inside
India’s territory or under the supervision of the Indian
government. There was no need to limit this interpretation in
the context of Article 12 of the Constitution when the words
“other authorities” are used. Hence, the Board was clearly an
authority under the definition of ‘State’ in Article 12 of the
Indian Constitution.
Name of the Case: Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981
SC 487
Bench: CJI Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice
V.R. Krishna Iyer, Justice Syed Murtuza Fazal Ali, Justice A.D.
Kaushal
Ratio: The Supreme Court laid down following test to judge
whether a body is an instrumentality of the government or not:

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
a) If the government owns the entire share capital of the
body, it strongly suggests that the body is an instrument
of the government.
b) When the government provides financial aid that
covers nearly all of the body’s expenses, it may imply
that the body possesses a governmental character.
c) It’s a relevant factor if the body has a monopoly status
granted or protected by the state.
d) The presence of profound and widespread state control
may indicate that the body is a state instrument.
e) If the body’s functions are of public importance and
closely connected to governmental functions, it is a
relevant factor to consider the body as an
instrumentality of the government.

Mere regulatory control whether under schedule or otherwise

would not serve to make a body a part of the state.
Concept developed with Rupa Ashok Hurra vs. Ashok
Hurra, W.P. (c) 509 of 1997
Bench: Chief Justice of India S.P. Bharucha, Justice S.S.M.
Quadri, Justice U.C. Banerjee, Justice S.N. Variava, Justice
S.V. Patil
Facts:
The facts of the case involve a matrimonial discord between a
husband and a wife who have already been separated from each
other for years. Later, the woman withdrew her consent which
was given through divorce with mutual consent, which resulted
in the case going to the Supreme Court.
Issue:

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Into Legal World
Whether an aggrieved person, after the dismissal of a review
petition, possesses entitlement to relief against a final judgment
either under Article 32 of the Constitution or through
alternative means?
Ratio: The Supreme Court in its decision agreed that it could
check its own decisions under a curative petition if there were
obvious mistakes. They said that the power to review decisions
was really important, and it was following Article 137 of the
Indian Constitution.

Topic: Personal Law (Article 13)

Name of the case: P.E. Mathew v. Union of India, AIR 1999
Ker 345
Issue: weather personal law falls under the scope of Article 13
of the Constitution?
Bench Justice A Lakshmanan and Justice KN Kurup (Kerala
High Court)
Fact of the Case: Section 17 of the Indian Divorce Act, a
central pre-constitutional law, was challenged as arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14.
Ratio: It was held that the present laws are outside the scope of
Article 13 (1) as they are not defined in Article 13 (3) (b).
The judgement of Kerala High Court was based on the
judgement of Supreme Court in Ahmedabad Women Action
Group v. Union of India.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Doctrine Of Eclipse

Name of the Case: Bhikaji v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1955 SC 781

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Bench: Justice S.R. Das, Justice N.H. Bhagwati, Justice T.L.
Aiyar, Justice Imam Venkatarama, Justice Jaffer Sayeed,
Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar
Ratio: The Doctrine of Eclipse is a legal principle in India that
deals with the relationship between fundamental rights and
existing laws that may be inconsistent with them. The Doctrine
of Eclipse is addressed in Article 13(1) of the Indian
Constitution.
According to the doctrine of the eclipse, if a law conflicts with
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, it
does not automatically become null and void. Instead, it is
considered in a state of eclipse or overshadowed by
fundamental rights.
If a statute is inconsistent with the provisions of Part III, it shall
be deemed void. However, this does not render the entire law
null and void under this doctrine; only the portion inconsistent
with Part III of the Indian Constitution becomes void. The law
is not abolished entirely but remains dormant, subject to the
discretion of the Parliament.

Topic: Doctrine Of Severability

Name of the case: RMDC v. UOI, AIR 1957 SC 628
Bench: CJI Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice T.L. Aiyyar, Justice
Venkatarama, Justice P. Bhuvneshwar, Justice S. K. Das,
Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
Ratio: The Supreme Court has explained the doctrine as
follows;
“When a legislature whose authority subject to limitations
aforesaid enacts a law which is wholly in excess of its powers,

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Into Legal World
it is in tiredly void and must be completely ignored. But where
the legislation falls in part within the area allotted to it and in
part outside it, it is undoubtedly void as to the latter; but does it
on account become necessarily void in its entirety? The answer
to this question must depend on whether what is valid could be
separated from what is invalid, and that is a question which has
to be decided by court on a consideration of the provision of
the act.”
Further, based on the said judgement, the Supreme Court in
Motor General Traders Case 1984, laid down following
provisions as regard to the doctrine of severability:
a. The intention of the legislature is the determining factor in
determining whether the valid parts of the statute are
separable from the invalid parts. The test is whether the
legislature would have enacted the valid parts had it known
the rest of the parts are invalid.
b. If the valid and invalid provisions are so inextricably mixed
up that they cannot be separated from one another,
invalidity of a part must result in the invalidity of the act in
its entirety.
c. On the other hand, if there are some distinct and separate
part after removing what is invalid, what survives can stand
independently and is workable, the portion of which
remains is in itself a complete code independent of the rest,
then it will be upheld notwithstanding that the rest had
become unenforceable.
d. Even when the valid provisions are distinct and separate
from the invalid provisions, but if they form part of a single
statue which is intended to operate as a whole, then
invalidity of a part will result in the failure of the whole.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
e. Likewise, though the valid and invalid parts of the statute
are independent and may not form part of the scheme, but
what is left after omitting the invalid person is so thin and
truncated as to be in substance different from what it was
when it emerged out of the legislature, then also it will be
rejected in its entirety.
f. If after the invalid part is expunged from the statute, what
remains cannot be enforced without making alteration and
modifications therein, then the whole of it must be struck
down as void.
g. The severability of the valid and invalid provisions of a
statute does not depend on whether the provisions are in the
same section or different sections; it is not the form, but the
substance of the matter that is material, and that has to be
ascertained on the examination of act as a whole.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Doctrine Of Waiver

Name of the case: Basheshwar Nath v. IT Commissioner,
AIR 1959 SC 149
Bench: Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice N.H. Bhagwati,
Justice S.K. Das, Justice J.L. Kapur and Justice K. Subbarao
Fact of the Case: The petitioner's case was referred to income
tax investigation commissioner under Section 5 (1) of the act,
after the commission had decided upon the amount of disputed
income, the petitioner on 19 May 1954, agreed as a settlement
to pay in monthly installments over three lakhs by the way of
tax and penalty.
In 1955, the Supreme Court declared Section 5 (1) ultra vires
Article 14. The petitioner thereupon challenged the settlement
between him and the commissioner.

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Ratio:
Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das emphasized that under Article 14 of
the Indian Constitution, no individual or state has the authority
to waive any breach of the State's obligations.
The SC deemed Section 5 of the act discriminatory and
unenforceable. Justice N.H. Bhagwati noted the distinction
between statutory, constitutional, and fundamental rights.
While constitutional rights may be waived by citizens as
they are granted by the Constitution, fundamental rights
are inherently different and immune from legislative
interference, thus cannot be waived by citizens.

Topic: Evolution Of Concept Of Equality (Article 14)

Name of the case: E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu,
AIR 1974 SC 555
Bench: Justice Bhagwati, Justice Chandrachud, Justice Krishna
Iyer
Facts of the Case: The petitioner filed a petition under Article
32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of his transfer
from the post of Chief Secretary, first to the post of deputy
Chairman State Planning Commission and then to the post of
Officer on Special Duty. The petition was filed on the ground
that the said order was made in mala fide exercise of power, not
on account of exigencies of administration or public service,
but because the second respondent was annoyed with the
petitioner on the account of various incidents referred to in the
petition and wanted him out of the way.
Ratio: Equality is a dynamic concept, it cannot be cribbed,
cabined and confined within traditional doctrinaire limits. From

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
positive point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness.
Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal
both according to political logic and constitutional law and is,
therefore, violative of Article 14.

Topic: Equality Before Law And Equal Protection Of

Law (Article 14)
Name of the Case: Siri Srinivasa Theatre v. Government of
Tamil Nadu, AIR 1992 SC
Bench: Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Justice M.N.
Venkatachelliah
Ratio: The Supreme Court has explained that the expression
equality before law and equal protection of law do not mean the
same thing even if there may be much in common between
them.
Equality before law is a dynamic concept having many facets.
One facet is that there shall be no privileged person or class and
that none shall be above the law. Another facet is the obligation
upon the state to bring about, through the machinery of law,
more equal society. For, “equality before law can be predicted
meaningfully only in equal society.”

Topic: Administrative Discretion And Article 14

Name of the case: BB Rajwanshi v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1988 SC 1089
Bench: Justice ES Venkataramiah
Fact of the Case: Section 6 (4) of the UP Industrial Dispute
Act 1947, authorized the State Government to remit an order of

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a labour tribunal for reconsideration of adjudicating authority
and that authority was to submit the award to the government.
The Supreme Court noted that the section did not require
government to hear the parties before remitting the award to the
concerned adjudicating authority; The government was not
required to give reason for remitting the award and was not
required to inform 30 days prior to the date on which it was to
reconsider the award.
Ratio: The Supreme Court declared the said provision under
UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as unconstitutional under
Article 14 of the Constitution. It was observed that the
provision cannot be in the absence of necessary statutory
guidelines and that the proceedings before the labour court or
the industrial tribunal is in the nature of quasi-judicial
proceeding where parties have adequate opportunity to state
their respective cases, to lead evidence and make all their
submission.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Right Of Hearing And Article 14

Name of the case: State of Maharashtra v. Kamal, AIR
1985 SC 119
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice Syed Murtuza
Fazalali, Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar, Justice O. Chinnappa
Reddy, justice A. Varadarajan
Fact of the case: The Maharashtra Legislature elected an act to
provide for summary eviction of persons unauthorized and
occupying vacant lands in urban areas. The act gave power to
an authorized authority to order vacation of any land by its
occupier.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Ratio: The Supreme Court declared the Act invalid under
Article 14 on the ground that it laid down new guidelines to
control the exercise of discretion by the concerned authority.
The Act prescribed no procedure for concerned authority to
follow before declaring any land as ‘vacant land’ for the
purpose of the act. The Supreme Court emphasized that the act
conferred ‘uncontrolled and arbitrary power’ on the authority
and, therefore, in the matter covered by the act, a hearing
procedure was of essence of the matter.

Topic: Comparative Scope Of Article 15(4) And

Article 16(4)
Name of the case: EV Chinnaiyan v. State of AP, (2005) 1
SCC 394
Bench: Justice N. Santosh Hedge, Justice S.N. Variava, Justice
B.P. Singh, Justice H.K. Sema, Justice S.B. Sinha
Fact of the case: The validity of Andhra Pradesh Schedule
Caste (Rationalisation of Reservation) Act, 2000 was
challenged before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh which was
dismissed by majority of five judge bench.
The State of Andhra Pradesh appointed a commission headed
by Justice Ramachandra Raju to identify the group among the
Schedule Caste found in the list prepared under Article 341 of
the Constitution of India by the President, who had failed to
secure the benefit of education provided for Schedule Caste in
the state in admission to professional colleges and
appointments to services in the state.
Ratio: The scope of Article 15 (4) is wider than Article 16 (4).
Article 15 (4) covers within eight several kinds of positive
action program in addition to reservation. However, reservation

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of posts and appointments must be within reasonable limits,
which is the maximum of 50%. The same limit applies to
Article 15 (3). Reservation to a backward class is not a
constitutional mandate, but a prerogative of the state.
The provisions for Article 330 (1) (b) and (c) shows that the
Constitution has treated Scheduled Tribes in the autonomous
district of Assam as a separate category distinct from all other
scheduled tribes. This clearly indicates that when the
Constitution makers wanted to make a sub-classification of
scheduled Tribes, they have themselves made it in the text of
the Constitution itself and have not empowered any legislature
or government to make such a sub-classification.
It was also observed that Article 341 indicates that there can be
only one list of Schedule Caste in regard to a state and that list
should include all specified castes, races or tribes or part or
groups notified in that presidential list. In the entire
Constitution whenever reference has been made to “Schedule
Castes” it refers only to the list prepared by President under
Article 341 and there is no reference to any sub-classification
or division in the state list except, maybe, for the limited
purpose of Article 330. Therefore, it is clear that the
Constitution intended all the castes including the subcastes,
races and tribes mentioned in the list to be a member of one
group for the purpose of Constitution and in this group cannot
be subdivided for any purpose. The Constitution intended that
all the castes included in the schedule under Article 341 would
be deemed to be one class of persons.

Topic: Socially And Educationally Backward Classes

Under Article 15 (4)
Name of the case: Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC
649

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Bench: Chief Justice Bhuvneshwar Sinha, Justice PB
Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice K.C. Gupta,
Justice J.C. Shah
Fact of the Case: After the enactment of First Constitutional
Amendment 1951, Balaji was the first case which came up
before Supreme Court.
And order of the Mysore Government issued under Article 15
(4) reserve seats for admission to the state medical and
engineering colleges for backward class and more backward
classes. This was in addition to the reservation of seats for the
Schedule Castes (15%) and for the Scheduled Tribe (3%).
Backward and more backward classes were designated on the
basis of ‘caste’ and ‘communities’.
Ratio: The Supreme Court invalidated the order based on
following grounds:
1. The first facet in the Mysore order was that it was based
solely on caste without regard to other relevant factors and
this was not permissible under Article 15 (4). Though caste
in relation to Hindu could be a relevant factor to consider in
determining the social backwardness of a class of citizens,
it must not be made the sole and dominant test in that
behalf. Christians, Jains and Muslims do not believe in the
caste system and, therefore, the test of the caste could not
be applied to them. In as much as identification of all
backward classes under the impugned order had been made
solely on the basis of caste, the order was bad.
2. Secondly, the test adopted by the state to measure
educational backwardness was the basis of the average of
student population in the last three highest school classes of
all higher schools in the state in relation to thousands
citizen of that community. This average for the whole state
was 6.9 per thousand. The court stated that for women the

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test applied was rational and permissible to judge
educational backwardness, it was not validly applied. Only
community falling below the state average could properly
be regarded as backward, but not a community which came
near the average.
3. Thirdly, the court declared that Article 15 (4) does not
envisage classification between backward and more
backward classes as was made by the Mysore order. Article
15 (4) authorizes a special provision being made for
backward classes and not for such classes as were less
advanced in the most Advanced classes in the state. By
dropping the techniques of classifying communities into
backward and more backward classes, 90% of the total
population had been treated as backward. The order, in
effect, sought to divide the state population into the most
advanced and rest, but put the later into two categories -
backward and more backward- and the classification of two
categories is not envisaged by Article 15 (4).
“The interests of weaker Sections of society which are a
first charge on the state and the Centre have to be adjusted
with interest of community as a whole. The adjustment of
these computing claims is undoubtedly difficult matter, but
if under the guise of making a special provision, state
reserves practically all the seats available in the college,
that clearly would be subverting the object of Article 15
(4).” The state had “to approach its task objectively and in
a rational manner”.
The court further drew distinction between caste and class.
An attempt at finding a new basis for asserting social and
educational backwardness in a place of caste is reflected in the
Balaji decision.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Further, the court also ruled that reservation under Article 15
(4) should be reasonable. It should not be such as to defeat or
nullify the main rule of equality instrument in Article 15 (1).
While it would not be possible to predicate, it was observed
that the permissible percentage of reservation ought to be less
than 50%, “how much less than 50% would depend upon the
relevant prevailing circumstances in each case”. Also, a
provision under Article 15 (4) need not be in the form of law, it
could as well be made by an executive order.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Equal Pay For Equal Work Under Article 16

Name of the Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Pramod
Bhartia, AIR 1986 SC 1571
Bench: Justice K Singh, Justice N Kasliwal and Justice BJ
Reddy
Fact of the Case: The lecturers were working in higher
secondary school in Madhya Pradesh claimed parity in pay with
lecturers working in technical schools. The qualification
prescribed for, and the service condition of, both group of
lecturers is the same but the function and responsibility of both
the categories of lecturer were qualitatively speaking similar.
Ratio: The Supreme Court has explained the doctrine of equal
pay for equal work is implicit in the doctrine of equality in
enshrined in Article 14, and flows from it. The rule is as much a
part of Article 14 as it is of Article 16 (1). The doctrine is also
stated in Article 30 (1), a directive principle, which advises the
state to direct its policy towards securing equal pay for equal
work for both men and women.
The doctrine of equal pay for equal work would apply on the
premises of similar work but it does not mean that there should

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be complete identity of all respects. If the two classes of person
do some work under some employer, with some responsibility,
under similar working conditions, the doctrine of equal pay for
equal work would apply and it would not be open to the state to
discriminate one class with other in paying salary.
However, the court still refused to concede to the lecturer in
higher secondary schools the same pay as the lecturer in
technical school. Since the plea of equal pay for equal work has
to be explained with reference to Article 14, the onus is upon
the petitioner who established their right to equal pay, or the
plea of discrimination, as the case maybe. In the instant case,
the petitioner failed to discharge this onus.
___________________________________________________

Topic: The Indra Sawhney Case Popularly Known As

The Mandal Commission Case [ Article 16 (4) ]
Name of the Case: Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR
1993 SC 477
Bench: Justice M Kania, Justice M Venkatachaliah, Justice S
Pandian, Justice T Ahmadi, Justice K Singh, Justice P Sawant,
Justice R Sahai, Justice BJ Reddy
Fact up the Case: The Mandal commission was appointed by
the Government of India in terms of Article 340 of the
Constitution in 1979 to investigate the condition of Socially and
Educationally Backward Classes. One of the major
recommendations by the commission was that, beside the
Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribe, for Other Backward
Classes which constitute nearly 52% component of the
population, 27% jobs must be reserved so that the total
reservation for all, Schedule Castes, scheduled Tribes and other
backward classes amounts to 50%.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
No action was taken on the basis of Mandal report for long
after it was submitted, except that it was discussed in the House
of Parliament twice, once in 1982 and again in 1983. On
August 1990, the VP Singh government at the Centre issued an
official memorandum accepting the Mandal commission
recommendation and announcing 27% reservation for Socially
and Educationally Backward Classes in vacancies in civil force
and services under government of India.
The constitutional validity of the said memorandum was
questioned through several writ petition.
Ratio: The Supreme Court after referring to various of its
previous decisions under Article 15 and 16 of the Constitution
of India and also taking notes from the decision of Supreme
Court on racial discrimination, made following observations:
1. The nature contemplated by Article 16 (4) can be provided
not only by Parliament or legislature but also by executive
to administrative instruction in respect of central and state
services and by the local bodies and other authority as
contemplated by Article 12, in respect of their services.
2. The provision made by executive order under Article 16 (4)
becomes effective and enforceable by itself without being
elected into law by the legislature.
3. The court has reiterated the view, expressed by it in
Thomas case, that Article 16 (1) permits classification for
attainment of equality of opportunity as sought by Article
16 (1) itself. Article 16 (1) is a facet of Article 14. Article
14 permits reasonable classification so does Article 16 (1).
A classification may involve reservation of seats or
vacancies, as the case maybe. In other words, under Article
16 (1), appointments and/or post can be reserved in favour
of a class. Further, Article 16 (4) is not an exception to
Article 16 (1), but only instance of classification implicit

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and permitted by Article 16 (1). Even without Article 16
(4), the state could have classified backward class of
citizens in a separate category for special treatment in the
nature of reservation of post and appointments in
government services. Article 16 (4) merely puts the matter
beyond any shadow of doubt in specific terms.
4. Article 16 (4) permits reservation in favour of any
“backward classes of citizens”. Backward classes having
been classified by the Constitution itself as a class
deserving special treatment and the Constitution having
itself specified the nature of special treatment, it should be
presumed that no further classification or special treatment
is permissible in favour of apart from or outside Article 16
(4).
5. Even under Article 16 (1), reservation cannot be made on
the basis of economic criterion alone.
6. What is the meaning of expression backward class of
citizens used in Article 16 (4)? What does the expression
signify and how should such class be identified? The assent
of Article 16 (4) is on social backwardness. From a review
of the previous case law in the area, the court has
concluded that the judicial opinion emphasise the integral
connection between caste, occupation, poverty and social
backwardness. Social, educational and economic
backwardness closely intertwined in the Indian context. As
regards identification or backward classes, caste may be
used as a criterion because caste often is a social class in
India. But caste cannot be the sole criterion for reservation.
Reservation is not being made under Article 16 (4) in
favour of a caste but a backward class. Once a caste satisfy
the criterion of backwardness, it becomes a backward class
for purpose of Article 16 (4). Besides caste there may be

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
other communities, groups, classes and denomination
which may qualify as backward class of citizens.
7. Backwardness under Article 16 (4) need not be social as
well as educational as in the case under Article 15 (4).
8. The court has left the task of actually identifying backward
classes to the commission to be appointed by government,
this body would evolve a proper and relevant criteria and
test the several groups, caste, classes and section of people
against that criteria.
9. A very important recommendation made by the court is that
the “creamy layer”, the socially advanced member of a
backward class, should be excluded from the benefit of
reservation. Such exclusion would benefit the truly
backward people and thus, more appropriately serve the
purpose of Article 16 (4). But the real difficulty is how and
where to draw the line? For, while drawing the line, it
should be ensured that it does not result in taking away
with one hand what is given by other.
10. Not only pseudo-class be a backward class for merit in
reservation, it should also be in adequately presented in the
services under the state. This matter lies within subjective
satisfaction of state under Article 16(4).
11. The total reservation cannot exceed 50% in any one year.
12. Further, if a member belonging to, say, Scheduled Caste get
selected in open competition on the basis of his own merit,
he will not be counted against the quota reserved for
schedule caste, he will be treated as open competition
candidates.
13. The court has divided the total reservation of 50% into
vertical and horizontal reservation. The reservation in
favour of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Other

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Backward Classes under Article 16 (4) may be called
vertical reservation where is the service in favor of
physically handicapped under Article 16 (1) can be referred
to as horizontal reservation. Horizontal reservation cut
across the vertical reservation and is called interlocking
reservation.
14. While 50% shall be the rule, it is necessary not to put out of
consideration certain extraordinary situations inherit in the
great diversity of this country and the people. It might
happen that in far-flung and remote areas the population
inhabiting those areas might, on account of their being out
of the mainstream of national life and in view of condition
peculiar to and characteristical to them, need to be treated
in a different way, some relaxation in this strict rule may
become imperative. In doing so, extreme caution is to be
exercised and special case made out.
15. A year is to be taken as a unit for the purpose of applying
the 50% rule.
16. A significant point made by the court is not to apply the
rule of reservation to promotion.
17. For the reserved category in-service, minimum standard
can be prescribed.
18. For certain services and certain posts, it may not be
advisable to apply the rule of reservation.
19. It is open to the government to notify which class among
the several designated OBC are more backward, are
appropriate of reserved job vacancies or posts among
backward and more backward.
20. The court has rejected the reservation or 10% post in favour
of other economically backward section of people who are
not covered by any existing scheme of reservation.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
21. The court has directed that there ought to be established a
permanent body- Commission or tribunal, both at the
Centre and in the state, which can look into complaints of
wrong inclusion or wrong non-inclusion of groups, classes
and sections in the list of OBCs.
22. There should be a periodic revision of list of OBCs such as
to exclude those who have ceased to be backward or to
include new classes.

Topic: Reasonable Restriction On Fundamental Right

Guaranteed By Article 19 (1) (A) To (G)
Name of the Case: Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura
Coats Limited, AIR 1995 SC 2200
Bench: Justice GN Ray and Justice BL Hansaria
Ratio: The Supreme Court has stated that the following
principles and guidelines should be kept in view while
considering the constitutionality of a statutory provision
imposing restriction on our Fundamental Right guaranteed by
Article 19 (1) (a) to (g) when challenged on the ground of
unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by it:
1. The restriction must not be arbitrary or of an excessive
nature so as to go beyond the requirement of felt need of
the society and object sought to be achieved.
2. There must be a direct and proximity access of a reasonable
connection between restriction imposed and object sought
to be achieved.
3. No abstract or fixed principle can be laid down which may
have universal application in all cases. Such consideration

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on the question of qualify of reasonableness, therefore, is
expected to vary from cases to cases.
4. To protect constitutional provision, the court should be
alive to the felt needs of society and complex issues facing
the people which the legislature intends to solve through
effective legislation.
5. In appreciating such problems and felt need of society
judicial approach must necessarily be dynamic, pragmatic
and elastic.
6. It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of
restriction imposed by a statute, the court should examine
whether the social control as envisaged in Article 19 is
being effectuated by restriction imposed on the
Fundamental Right.
7. The rights granted to a citizen by Article 19 do not confer
any absolute or unconditional right. Each right is subject to
reasonable restriction which the legislature may impose in
public interest. It is therefore necessary to examine whether
such restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying
the need of prevailing social values.
8. The reasonableness has got to be tested both from the
procedural and substantive aspect. It should not be bound
by procedural perniciousness or jurisprudence of remedies.
9. How restriction imposed on Fundamental Right s
guaranteed by Article 19 must not be arbitrary, unbridled,
and uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably
discriminatory.
10. In judging reasonableness of restriction imposed under
Article 19 (6), the court has to bear in mind directive
principle of state policy.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
11. Ordinarily, any restrictions or imposed which has the effect
of promoting effectuating a directive principle can be
presumed to be reasonable restriction in public interest.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Right To Receive Information Under Article 19

(1) (A)
Name of the Case: People’s Union of civil liberties v. UOI,
AIR 2003 SC 2363
Bench: Justice K.G. Balakrishnan and Justice P. Venkatarama
Reddi
Fact of the Case: The Parliament inserted Section 33 B under
the Representation of People (3rd amendment) Act, 2002,
which imposes blanket ban on dissemination of information
other than that spelt out in a net meant irrespective of the need
of hour and the future exigencies and expedients.
Ratio: The Supreme Court dealt freedom of speech and
expression provided under Article 19 (1) (a) in a broad expect.
The right of citizens to obtain information on matter relating to
public acts flow from Fundamental Right enshrined in Article
19 (1) (a). Securing information on the basis of details
concerning the candidates contesting for election to Parliament
or the state legislature promotes freedom of speech and
expression and therefore right to information forms an integral
part of Article 19 (1) (a). This right to information is, however,
qualitatively different from the right to get information about
public affair or the right to receive information through the
press and electronic media, though, to a certain extent there
may be overlapping.

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Therefore, Section 33 be inserted by the Representation of
People (3rd Amendment) Act, 2002, does not pass the test of
constitutionality:
firstly for the reason that it imposes blanket ban on
dissemination of information other than that is spelt out in the
enactment irrespective of the need of the hour and the future
exigencies and expedients and
secondly for the reason that the ban operate despite the fact that
the disclosure of information now provided for is deficient and
inadequate.

Topic: Limitation On Freedom Of Press

Name of the Case: Bennett Coleman & Company v. UOI,
AIR 1973 SC 106
Bench: Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, Justice A.N. Ray, Justice P.
Jagmohan Reddy, Justice K.K. Mathew, Justice M.H. Beg
Background: India faces a shortage of indigenous newspaper.
Therefore, newsprint has to be imported from foreign countries.
Because of the shortage of foreign exchange, quality of
newsprint import it was not adequate to meet all requirements.
Some restriction, therefore, became necessary on consumption
of newspaper. Accordingly, a system of newsprint quota for
newspaper was evolved. The actual consumption of newsprint
by a newspaper during the year 1970-71 or 1971-72, which
ever was less, was taken as the base. For dailies with a
circulation up to 10000 copies, 10% increase in the basis
entitlement was to be granted, but the newspaper with larger
circulation, the increase was to be only 3%. The newspaper
with less than 10 pages daily could raise the number of pages

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
by 20% subject to ceiling of 10. A few more restriction was
imposed on the user of newsprint.
The dominant direction of the policy was to curtail the growth
of newspapers which could not increase the number of pages,
which areas or periodicity by reducing circulation to meet their
requirements even within their admissible quota of newsprint.
Therefore, the newsprint policy was challenged in the Supreme
Court.
Ratio: The Supreme Court declared the policy unconstitutional.
While the government could evolve a policy of allotting
newsprint on a fair and equitable basis, keeping in view the
interest of small, medium and big newspapers, the government
could not, in the attempt of regulating distribution of newsprint,
control the growth and circulation of newspapers. In fact, here
the newsprint policy became the newspaper control policy.
While newsprint quota could be fixed on original basis, post-
quota restriction could not be imposed. The newspapers should
be left free to determine their pages, circulation and new
editions within their fixed quota. The policy of limiting all
papers whether a small or large, in English or an Indian
language, to 10 pages was held to be discriminatory as it treated
unequals as equals. The restriction imposed cut at the very root
of guaranteed freedom.
The court stated that the effect and consequence of the
impugned policy upon the newspaper is directly controlling the
growth and circulation of newspapers. The direct effect is the
restriction upon circulation of newspapers. The direct effect is
upon the growth of newspapers through pages. The direct effect
is that the newspapers are deprived of their area of
advertisement. The direct effect is that they are exposed to
financial loss and their freedom of speech and expression is
infringed.

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The court maintained that the freedom of press embodies the
rights of people to speak and express. The freedom of speech
and expression is not only in the value of circulation but also in
the volume of news and views. The press has right to free
publication and their circulation without any obvious restraint
on publication. In the word of the Supreme Court, freedom of
Press is both qualitative and quantitative. Freedom lies in both
circulation and in the content.

Topic: The Extent Of Protection Of Advertisements

Under Article 19 (1) (A)
Name of the Case: Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India,
AIR 1960 SC 554
Bench: Chief Justice Bhuvaneswar P Sinha, Justice Syed Zafar
Imam, Justice KN Wanchoo, Justice KC Dasgupta
Background: Parliament elected an act with a view to control
advertisements of drug in certain cases. The act was challenged
on the ground that restriction on advertisements was a direct
abridgement of the freedom of speech and expression. The
court ruled that the predominant object of act was not merely
look up advertisement offering against decency and morality,
but also to prevent self-medication which might be used to
advocate and spread the evil.
Ratio: The Supreme Court stated that an advertisement, no
doubt, is a form of speech, but nature it is to be determined by
the object which it seeks to promote. It may amount to an
expression of ideas and propagation of human thought and,
thus, would fall within the scope of Article 19 (1) (a). But a
commercial advertisement having an element of trade and
commerce and promoting business as an element of trade and
commerce, and it no longer falls within the concept of freedom
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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
of speech for its object is not to propagate any ideas— social,
political or economic or to further literature or human thought.
And, advertisement promoting drugs and commodities, the sale
of which is not in public interest, could not be regarded as
propagating any idea and, as such, could not claim the
protection of Article 19 (1) (a).

Topic: Freedom To Assemble And Reasonable

Limitation Under Article 19 (1) (B) And 19 (3)
Name of the Case: Himmat Lal v. Police Commissioner,
AIR 1973 SC 87
Bench: Chief Justice SM Sikri, Justice AN Ray, Justice P
Jagmohan Reddy, Justice KK Mathew, Justice M Hameedullah
Beg
Fact of the Case: The applicant’s application for permission to
hold a public meeting on public street was rejected. The
applicant filed a writ petition under Article 226 before the High
Court Bombay. The High Court felt that the organisation, of
which the applicant was an office bearer, had to organise a
meeting on the number of occasions and every time the
question of applying for permission would arise. However,
unsatisfied with the order of High Court, applicant approached
Supreme Court.
Ratio: It was held that to confer uncontrolled discretion on
administrative officer to regulate freedom of assembly is
invalid. Rule of banning holding of public meeting on public
street without police permission has been held bad.
In India, citizens had right to hold meeting on public street
before the Constitution, subject to control of authority
regarding the time and place of the meeting and consideration

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of a public order. The rule in question gave no guidance as to
the circumstances in which permission to hold meeting could
be refused and, therefore, gave arbitrary power.

Topic: Freedom To Form Association And Reasonable

Restriction Under Article 19 (1) (C) And 19 (4)
Name of the case: State of Madras v. VG Row, AIR 1952
SC 196
Bench: Chief Justice M Patanjali Sastri, Justice MC Mahajan,
Justice BK Mukherjea, Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice
Chandrashekhar
Background: The State Government power to declare an
association unlawful on the ground that such association
constituted a danger to public peace, or inferred with
maintenance of public order, or the administration of the law.
The government notification had to specify the grounds for
making the order and fix a reasonable period to make a
representation against the order. The State Government was,
however, not authorised to disclose any facts which it regarded
as being against public interest. The government had to place
the notification and representation against it before an advisory
board. If the board, after considering the material, found that
there was no sufficient cause of declaring the Association
unlawful, the government was bound to cancel the order.
Ratio: The Supreme Court declared the provision to be
unconstitutional, for the test to declare an association unlawful
was ‘subjective’ and the factual existence of the ground was not
justiciable. The court emphasised that curtailing the right to
form Association was fraught with serious potential reaction in
religion, political and economic fields. Therefore, the vesting of
power in the government to impose restriction on this right
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without having the grounds, therefore calls for a judicial
enquiry. The existence of one-sided review by an advisory
board was no substitute for judicial inquiry.

Topic: Police Surveillance, Freedom Of Movement

And Residence Under Article 19 (1) (D) And 19 (5)
Name of the Case: Kharak Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1963 SC 1295
Bench: Chief Justice Bhubaneswar P Sinha, Justice NR
Ayyangar, Justice Syed Jafar Imam, Justice K Subbarao, Justice
JC Shah, Justice JR Madholkar
Background: There have been instances of police surveillance
of activities of person suspected of criminal habits or
tendencies. This includes secret picketing of the house,
domiciliary visit at night, and showing the movements of the
suspects. The purpose of police evidence is prevention of
commission of crime by such person.
The petitioner was charged in a dacoit’s case but was released
as there was no evidence against him. The police opened a
history sheet against him. He was put under surveillance under
regulation 236 of UP Police Regulations.
Ratio: The Supreme Court observed that no aspect of police
surveillance falls within the scope of Article 19 (1) (d). The
purpose of the street picketing was necessary to identify the
visitor to suspect so that police might have some idea of
activities and this did not affect his right of movement in any
material form. Against the validity of showing of the suspects
moment, it was argued that if a person suspected that his
movements was being watched by police, it would induce him
in a psychological inhibition against movement and this would

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infringe Article 19 (1) (d) which should be interpreted as
postulating freedom not only from physical, but even
psychological, restraints on a person’s moment. Rejecting this
augment which advocated two broad view of the scope of
safeguards granted by Article 19 (1) (d), The court ruled that
Article 19 (1) (d) guarantees freedom from physical, direct and
tangible restraints; it has no reference to ‘mere personal
sensitiveness’, or ‘the imponderable effect on the mind of
person which might guide his action in the matter of his
moment or locomotion’.
It was further held that domiciliary visit were also held to fall
outside the scope of Article 19 (1) (d) as a knock at the door, or
rousing a man from his sleep, does not impede or prejudice his
locomotion in any manner.
The minority view was that all acts of surveillance result in a
close observation of suspect’s movement which infringes
Article 19 (1) (d). If a man is shadowed, his movement is
constricted.
The flaw in the majority view of Kharak Singh that if there was
no physical restraint on a person’s movement, then
reasonableness of police surveillance could not be scrutinized
under Article 19 (1) (d).
The flaw in the judgement of Kharak Singh was removed by
Supreme Court in Govind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR
1975 SC 1378. The court has now held that police surveillance
will have to be restricted to such person only against whom the
reasonable materials exist to induce the opinion that they show
a determination to lead a life of crime. Similarly domiciliary
visit and secret picketing by the police would be restricted to
the clearest case of danger to community security and should
not be restored as a routine follow-up at the end of conviction
or release from prison or at the whim of a police officer. The

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court gave a warning that these old regulation ‘ill-accord with
the essence of personal freedom’, verge ‘perilously near
unconstitutionality’ and, therefore, need to be revised.
___________________________________________________

Topic: The Concept Of Reasonable Restriction Under

Article 19 (6)
Name of the case: Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of India, AIR
1997 SC 128
Bench: Justice S.N. Ray and Justice BL Hansaria
Fact of the case: The constitutional validity of circular issued
by government of Kerala directing that distribution of
pamphlets under comprehensive Coconut development program
and similar schemes of the agriculture department and in order
to streamline implementation of the scheme specify specific
roles and responsibility of different agency involved.
It was provided in the circular that pump sets and accessories of
farmers toys alone should be supplied and after sales service
facility should be provided by suppliers and dealers. It was also
indicated that the cost of pump sets and accessories would be
supplied at a lesser price than fixed by government.
It was also stated in the circular that RAIDCO was the only
cooperative in the State under cooperative department, having a
network of branches for distribution of all sorts of pump sets
etc.
Ratio: The Supreme Court explained the concept of
reasonableness that the reasonableness or restriction is to be
determined in an objective manner and from standpoint of the
interest of general public and not from distant point of interest
of a person upon whom the restrictions are imposed or upon
abstract consideration. A restriction cannot be said to be

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unreasonable merely because it is in a given case, it operates
harshly. In determining the infringement of the right guaranteed
under Article 19 (1) (g), the nature of right alleged to have been
infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the
extent and urgency of evil sought to be remedied thereby, the
disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the
time all needs to be determined accordingly.
Thus, restriction to be reasonable must not be arbitrary or
excessive in nature so as to go beyond the interest of general
public. This formulation involves a balancing of private vis-a-
vis public interest. In this process, the courts have learnt
towards the consumer interest. Thus, while far-reaching
restrictions are imposed on trade and commerce, only rarely
will a restriction be held unreasonable.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Street Hawkers: Freedom To Trade And

Commerce And Reasonable Restriction Under Article
19(1)(G) And 19 (6)
Name of the Case: Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipality,
AIR 1989 SC 1988 (First Case)
Bench: Chief Justice ES Venkataramiah, Justice S Natarajan,
Justice LM Sharma, Justice ND Ojha, Justice Kuldip Singh
Facts of the Case: The petitioner claimed the right to engage in
trading business on the pavements of the road of the city of
Delhi. The special leave petitions are against the judgment of
Delhi High Court dismissing their claim.
Ratio: The Supreme Court considered the question how far the
hawkers have a right to ply their trade on the pavement meant
for pedestrians? In the instant case, the court has come to the
conclusion that the right to carry on trade or business

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
mentioned in Article 19 (1) (g) on the street pavements, if
properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground that the
state payments are meant exclusively for pedestrian and cannot
be put to any other use. The proper regulation is, however, a
necessary condition, for otherwise the very object of laying
road would be defeated.
The state holds all public roads and street in the country as a
trustee on the behalf of public and a member of the public are
entitled as beneficiaries to use them for trading as a matter of
right subject to the right of other including pedestrian. The right
of hawkers is subject to reasonable restriction under Article 19
(6).
Therefore, the petitioners do have a Fundamental Right to carry
on a trade or business of their choice but not to do so at a
particular place. The court conceded to the hawkers the right to
do business while going from place to place subject to proper
regulation in the interest of general convenience of the public.
Second Case in the Row: Sodan Singh v. NDMC, (II) AIR
1992 SC 1153
Ratio: The court has said that every citizen has a right to the
use of public street vested in the state as a beneficiary but this
right is subject to reasonable restriction as the state may choose
to impose. Trading albeit a Fundamental Right under Article 19
(1) (g) of the Constitution but it is subject to reasonable
restriction imposed by the virtue of Article 19 (6). This does
not include a citizen occupying or squatting on any specific
place of his choice on the pavement, regardless of the rights of
other, including the pedestrian, to use the pavements. The court
has emphasised in this connection: “proper regulation is,
however, a necessary condition, for otherwise the very object of
laying road would be defeated.”
___________________________________________________

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Topic: Ex-Post-Facto Law Under Article 20
Name of the Case: Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965
SC 1194
Bench: Justice K. Subba Rao, Justice KC Dasgupta, Justice
Raghubar Dayal
Fact of the case: A boy of 16 years of age was found guilty of
an offence and was ordered a rigourous imprisonment of six
months and also imposed a fine on 31 May 1962. His appeal
was dismissed by session judge on 22 September 1962 and by
the High Court on 27 September 1962. The Probation of
Offenders Act came into force on 1 September 1962. No plea
was taken before High Court that the boy should be given the
benefit of the Act. Later, he filed an appeal in Supreme Court
by special leave and it was argued that he should be given the
benefit of the Act. The government argued, on the other hand,
that the Act is not retrospective and offence was committed
much before the Act came into force.
Ratio: The Supreme Court while setting aside the order of
government observed that an ex-post facto law which only
mollifies the rigour of a criminal law does not fall within the
said prohibition under Article 20 (1). If a particular law makes
a provision to that effect, the retrospective in operation, it will
be valid.
The court, therefore, ruled that the rule of beneficial
construction required that even an ex-post facto law ought to be
applied to reduce the punishment of the young offender.

Topic: Autrefois Acquit Under Article 20 (2)

Meaning: When a person has been convicted for an offence by
a competent court, the conviction serves as a bar to any further
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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
proceeding against him for the same offence. The idea is that
no one ought to be punished twice for one and the same
offence. If a person is indicated again for the same offence in a
court, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former acquittal
or conviction, or, as it is technically expressed, he can make
plea of Autrefois Acquit.
Name of the case: State of Bombay v. SL Apte, AIR 1961
SC 578
Bench: Justice N Rajagopala Ayyangar, Justice SK Das,
Justice AK Sarkar, Justice JR Madholkar
Facts of the Case: A person was convicted under Section 409,
IPC, for criminal breach of trust. Later, he was prosecuted
under same fact but for different offence under Section 105 of
the Insurance Act.
Ratio: The Supreme Court while explaining the legal provision
of Article 20 (2) observed that to operate as a bad the second
prosecution and the consequent punishment thereunder, must
be for the same offence. The crucial requirements for attracting
the Article are that the offence is the same, i.e, they should be
identical.
If, however, the two offences are distinct, then notwithstanding
that the allegation of the fact in the two complaints might be
substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked.
It is, therefore, necessary to analyze and compare not the
allegation into complaint but the ingredient of two offences and
see whether their identity is made out.

Topic: Prosecution Under Article 20 (2)

Name of the case: Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay,
AIR 1953 SC 325

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Into Legal World
Bench: Chief Justice M Patanjali Sastri, Justice BK Mukherjea,
Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice Ghulam Hassan, Justice NH
Bhagwati
Fact of the Case: A person arrived at an Indian airport from
abroad. He was found in possession of gold which was against
the law at the time. Action was taken against him by the
customs authorities and the gold was confiscated. Later, he was
prosecuted before the criminal court under Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act. The question was whether the plea of Autrefois
acquit could be raised under Article 20(2).
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the proceeding before the
custom authority do not constitute prosecution of the appellant,
and the penalty imposed on him did not constitute a punishment
by the judicial tribunal. In the circumstances, the trial of the
prisoner before the criminal court was not barred. The court
observed that it is clear that in order that the protection of
Article 20 (2) be evoked by a citizen there must have been a
prosecution and punishment in respect of the same offence
before a court of law or a tribunal not before the tribunal which
entertains audit department or administrative enquiry.
The wording of Article 20 is “convicted”, “commission of the
act charged as an offence”, “ accused of any offence“, and
indicates that the proceeding there contemplated is in the order
of nature of criminal proceedings before court of law or a
judicial tribunal and the prosecution in this context would mean
an initiation for starting of proceedings of a criminal nature
before a court of law or a judicial tribunal in the cordons with
the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the
offence and regulates the procedure.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Topic: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under
Article 20 (3)
Name of the Case: State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad,
AIR 1961 SC 1808
Bench: Chief Justice Bhubaneswar P Sinha, Justice AK Sarkar,
Justice K Subbarao, Justice KN Wanchoo, Justice KC
Dasgupta, Justice Raghubar Dayal, Justice N Rajagopala
Ayyangar, Justice JR Mudholkar
Issue: Whether Article 20 (3) violated when the accused is
directed to give his specimen handwriting, or signature, or the
impression of his palm and finger?
Fact of the Case: Specimen handwritings of the accused had
been taken during investigation while the accused was in police
custody. This has been excluded from the consideration by
court below on the ground that the obtaining of such signature
offended Article 20 (3).
Ratio: The court ruled that Article 20 (3) is not violated in any
of the above situations. The court stated that “self-incrimination
must mean conveying information based on the personal
knowledge of the person giving information and covers only
personal testimony which must depend upon his violation.”
The court stated that to be a witness may be equivalent to
furnishing evidence in the sense of making oral or written
statement, but not in the larger sense of expression as to include
giving thumbs impression or impression of palm or foot or
finger or specimen writing or exposing a part of body by an
accused person for the purposes of identification.
The court emphasised that it is as much necessary to protect an
accused person against being compelled to incriminate himself,
as to arm the agent of law and the lower courts with legitimate
powers of bringing offenders to justice. The court stated

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regarding production of documents in the possession of the
accused, that if it is a document which is not his statement
conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge
against him, he may be called upon by the court to produce that
document.
Several types of evidence are excluded from the purview of
Article 20 (3). This is done with a view to draw a balance
between the exigencies of investigation of crimes and need to
safeguard the individual from being subjected to 3rd degree
methods.

Topic: Development Of The Concept Of Due

Procedure Of Law: From Gopalan To Maneka Gandhi
Name of the Case: AK Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR
1950 SC 27
Bench: Chief Justice Hiralal Kania, Justice Syed Faisal Ali,
Justice M Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice
SR Das, Justice BK Mukherjea
Issue: There were several issues raised in this case including
whether the Prevention and Detention Act 1950 violated
Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Indian constitution. Secondly is
there any connection between Article 19 and 21 of the
constitution?
Background: Just after the Constitution of India came into
force, the question of interpretation Article 21 came into
picture. The petitioner was detained under the Preventive
Detention Act
He applied under Article 32 of the Constitution for the writ of
habeas corpus and for his release from detention, on the ground
that the said act contravened the provision of Article 14, 19 and

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
22 of the Constitution of India and consequently ultra vire
Article 21.
Ratio: The Supreme Court analyzed the arguments of the
parties and held that there is no connection between Article 21
and 19 of the constitution. The court further held that the
principles of natural justice were not violated in this case. The
court finally dismissed the writ petition filed by Mr Gopalan.
The A K Gopalan and the State of Madras is a landmark case in
Indian legal history. It is one of the important cases in which
the apex court of India interpreted the provisions of the Indian
constitution. The case set the precedent for how the Indian
courts would interpret and apply the provisions of the Indian
constitution in future cases.
It is also significant because it was among the first cases in
which the principles of natural justice were applied in India.
The case is also important because it established the principle
that the Indian constitution is a living document and that it can
be interpreted in light of changing times and circumstances.
The judicial approach means that a preventive detention law
would be valid, and be within the terms of Article 21, so long
as it conformed with Article 22, and it would not be required to
meet the challenge of Article 19.
However, the Supreme Court rejected the said contention based
on following reasons:
1. The word ‘due’ was absent in Article 21.
2. The draft constitution had contained the words ‘due process
of law’ but these words were later dropped and the present
phraseology adopted instead.
Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the expression
“Procedure established by law” meant the procedure as laid
down in the law and enacted by the Legislature and nothing

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more. A person could thus be deprived of his “life” or
“personal liberty” in accordance with the procedure laid
down in the relevant law.
Another case on the said issue: Maneka Gandhi v. UOI,
AIR 1978 SC 597
Fact of the case: The petitioner Maneka Gandhi’s passport was
issued on 1st June 1976 as per the Passport Act of 1967. On
2nd July 1977, the Regional Passport Office (New Delhi)
ordered her to surrender her passport. The petitioner was also
not given any reason for this arbitrary and unilateral decision of
the External Affairs Ministry, citing public interest.
The petitioner approached the Supreme Court by invoking its
writ jurisdiction and contending that the State’s act of
impounding her passport was a direct assault on her Right of
Personal Liberty as guaranteed by Article 21. It is pertinent to
mention that the Supreme Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney v.
Ramarathnam held that right to travel abroad is well within the
ambit of Article 21, although the extent to which the Passport
Act diluted this particular right was unclear.
Issues Before the Court:
1. Are the provisions under Articles 21, 14 and 19
connected with each other or are they mutually
exclusive?
2. Should the procedure established by law be tested for
reasonability which in this case was the procedure laid
down by the Passport Act of 1967?
3. If the right to travel outside the country is a part of
Article 21 or not?
4. Is a legislative law that snatches away the right to life
reasonable?

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Ratio: The Supreme Court laid down following propositions

seeking to make Article 21 much more meaningful:
1. The court retaliated the proposition that Article 14, 19 and
21 are not mutually exclusive. A nexus has been
established between these three Articles. The theme of
mutual relationship of Article 21 and 19 has already been
discussed in several cases. This means that a law
prescribing or procedure for depriving a person of personal
liberty has to meet the requirement of Article 19. Also, the
procedure established by law in Article 21 must answer
requirement of Article 14 as well.
2. The expression personal liberty in Article 21 was given an
expensive interpretation. The court emphasised that the
expression personal liberty is of the widest amplitude
covering a variety of rights which go to constitute the
personal liberty of man. Some of these attributes have been
raised to the status of distinct Fundamental Rights and give
additional protection under Article 19.
3. The most significant and creative aspect of Maneka
Gandhi, is the re-interpretation by the court of the
expression procedure established by law and used in Article
21. The court gave following orientation to this expression:
a. Article 21 would no longer mean that law would
prescribe some semblance of procedure, however arbitrary or
fanciful, to the private person of his personal liberty. It now
means that procedure must satisfy certain requisite in the sense
of being fair and reasonable. The procedure cannot be arbitrary,
unfair or unreasonable. The concept of reasonableness must be
projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21. The
Court has now assumed the power to adjust the fairness and
justice of procedure established by law to deprive a person of

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his personal liberty. The Court had reached this conclusion by
holding that Article 21, 19 and 14 are mutually inclusive and
interlinked.
b. The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must
answer the test of reasonableness in order to conform with
Article 14 for, in the word of Justice Bhagwati: “The principle
of reasonableness which legally as well as philosophically is in
a sensual element of equality or non-arbitrariness permits
Article 21 like a brooding omnipresence.” Thus, the procedure
in Article 21, must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive, otherwise, it would be no procedure at
all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.
c. According to Justice Iyer the procedure in Article 21
means fairness, not formal, procedure; ‘law’ is reasonable law
and not any enacted piece. This makes the word procedure
established by law by and large synonymous with the
procedural due process in the USA. This makes the right of
hearing a component part of natural justice.
d. As the right to travel abroad falls under Article 21,
natural justice mode must be applied while exercising the
power of impounding of passport under the passport act.
Although the passport act does not expressly provide for the
requirement of hearing before a passport is impounded, yet the
same has to be implied therein.

Topic: Constitutionality Of Death Penalty

Name of the case: Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR
1980 SC 898
Bench: Justice Y Chandrachud, Justice A Gupta, Justice N
Untwalia, Justice P Bhagwati, Justice R Sarkaria

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Theme question before court: reasonableness of death penalty
and analysis of view expressed in Jag Mohan and Rajendra case
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the provision of death
penalty, as alternative punishment for murder in Section 302,
IPC, is not unreasonable and is in public interest. This Article
clearly brings out the implication that the founding father
recognised right of the state to deprive a person of his life or
personal liberty in accordance with the fair, just and reasonable
procedure established by valid law. The procedure provided in
the Criminal Procedure Code for imposing capital punishment
for murder cannot be said to be unfair, unreasonable and unjust.
The court, however, emphasised that the death penalty is an
exception rather than the rule and it ought to be imposed only
in the ‘gravest of the cases’ of extreme culpability or in the
rarest of the rare cases when the alternative option is
unquestionably foreclosed.
Development in the concept
Name of the case: Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR
1989 SC 947
Bench: Justice MP Thakkar, Justice Syed Murtuza Fazalali Ali,
Justice A Varadaranjan
Ratio: The Supreme Court has emphasised that death penalty
need not be inflicted except in ‘gravest of the cases’ of extreme
culpability and that life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence is an exception. The court has emphasised that death
sentence is to be imposed only when life imprisonment appears
to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to
circumstances of crime, and provided that the option to impose
sentence of life imprisonment cannot be conscientiously
exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
crime and all the relevant circumstances.

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Further, the Supreme Court has formulated broad guidelines for
determining the ‘rarest of the rare’ cases in which murderers
should be awarded the death penalty instead of life
imprisonment. The judges must ask them these two questions
for deciding whether a murder case falls in the category of
rarest of the rare cases:
1. Whether there is something uncommon about the crime
which renders a life imprisonment sentence inadequate and
calls for a death sentence?
2. Whether the nature of the crime are such that there is no
alternative but to impose the death sentence even after
recording maximum weightage to the mitigating
submissions which speaks in favour of the offender?

Topic: Quality Of Life Under Article 21

Name of the Case: Francis Coralie v. Administrator, Union
Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 746
Bench: Justice PN Bhagwati and Justice Syed Murtuza Fazalali
Issue: Whether the right to life is limited only to protection of
limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace something
more?
Fact of the case: The detenu was denied his right of detenu
under Conservation of Forest Exchange and Prevention of the
Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, to have interview with lawyers
and the members of his family.
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that the ‘right to life’ includes
‘right to live with human dignity’ and all that goes along with
it, viz, the bare necessities of life such as education, nutrition,
clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading,

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
writing and expressing oneself in diverse form, freely moving
about and missing and mingling with fellow human beings.
Of course, the magnitude and content of components of this
right would depend upon the extent of economic development
of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, include
the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to
carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare
minimum expression of the human self. Therefore, any form of
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would be
offensive to human dignity and constitute an inroad into this
right to leave and it would, on this view, be provided by Article
21 unless it is in accordance with the procedure established by
law, but new law which authorizes and no procedure which
leads to such torture or cruelty, inhumane or degrading
treatment can even stand the test of reasonableness and non-
arbitrariness. It would plainly be unconstitutional and void as
being violative of Article 21 and Article 14.

Topic: Right Against Sexual Harassment Under

Article 21
Name of the case: Visakha and Anr v. State of Rajasthan
Bench: Chief Justice J.S. Verma, Justice Sujata Manohar,
Justice BN Kirpal
Facts of the Case: During 1990, Bhanvari Devi who was
employed to the Rajasthan State Government was raped by
landlords of Gujjar community in attempt to prevent child
marriage. The rape survivor did not get justice from Rajasthan
High Court and the rapist were allowed to go free. This case
was brought to the attention of Supreme Court in the absence of
domestic law to deal with sexual harassment of working
women at all workplace.

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Ratio: The Supreme Court has declared sexual harassment of
working woman at her work amounting to violation of right of
gender equality and right to life and liberty which is a clear
violation of Article 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution.
Sexual harassment also violates victims Fundamental Right
under Article 19 (1) (g) “to practise any profession or to carry
out any occupation trade or business”.
Further, the court has accepted the proposition that international
conventions and norms are to be read into Fundamental Rights
where there is no inconsistency between them and there is a
void in the domestic law. According to the court, “it is now in
accepted rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to
international conventions and norms for construing domestic
law when there is no inconsistency between them and there is
void in the domestic law.”
This landmark judgement led to the foundation of the sexual
harassment of women at workplace prevention, Prohibition and
redressal act 2013 by the government of India.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Right To Die, Passive Euthanasia Under Article

21
Name of the case: Common Cause (A Registered Society) v.
UOI, W.P. (C) No. 215 of 2005
Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.K. Sikri, Justice
A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice Ashok
Bhushan
Background: The First Case: P. Rathinam v. Union of India,
AIR 1994 SC 1844, wherein the court held that right to life
embodied in Article 21 also embodied in it ‘right not to live’ a
forced life, to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. The

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
view constituted an authority for the proposition that an
individual has right to do as he pleases with his life and to end
it if he pleases.
The view expressed in P. Rathinam could not last for long and
overruled by a constitutional bench of Supreme Court in Gian
Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1996 SC 946.
Issue in Gian Kaur: If attempt to commit suicide is not
recorded as penal then what happens to someone who abets
suicide which is punishable under Section 306, IPC?
Factual matrix in Gian Kaur: Gian Kaur and her husband
were convicted under Section 306, IPC, for abetting the
commission of suicide by Kulwant, their daughter in law.
Ratio in Gian Kaur: The Constitutional Bench of Supreme
Court ruled that Article 21 is a provision guaranteeing
protection of life and personal liberty and by no stretch of
imagination can ‘extinction of life’ be read to include
‘protection of life’.
Accordingly, the court has ruled that Article 309, IPC, is not
unconstitutional. Therefore Section 306, IPC, has also been
held constitutional.
However, the Supreme Court has distinguished between
euthanasia and attempt to commit suicide. Euthanasia is
termination of life of a person who is terminally ill, or in a
persistent vegetative state. In such a case, death is due to
termination of life is certain and imminent. The process of
natural death has commenced, it is only reducing the process of
suffering due to natural death. This is not a case of
extinguishing life but only accelerating conclusion of the
process of natural death which has already begun. This may fall
within the concept of right to live with human dignity up to the
end of natural life. This may include the right of a dying person

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to die with dignity when his life is ebbing out. But this cannot
be equated with the right to die unnatural death curtailing the
natural span of life.
Ratio in present case: The five-judge bench of Supreme Court
recognised and gave sanction to passive euthanasia and living
will/advance directive. The implication of this is that from now
‘right to die with dignity’ is a Fundamental Right.
The Supreme Court has clarified that the judgement in Gian
Kaur case cannot be understood to have stated that passive
euthanasia will be introduced through legislation. It further held
that the word ‘life’ in Article 21 has been construed as life with
dignity and it takes within the ambit the ‘right to die with
dignity’ big part of the ‘right to live in dignity’. The sequitur of
this exposition is that a dying man who is terminally ill or in a
persistent vegetative state can make a choice of premature
extension of his life as being facet of Article 21 of the
Constitution. If that choice is guaranteed under part of Article
21, there is no necessity of any legislation for effective waiting
that Fundamental Right and more so his personal human rights.
Indeed, that tried cannot be an absolute right but subject to
regulatory measure to be prescribed by a suitable legislation
which, however, must be reasonable restriction and in the
interest of general public. Thus, the court has clarified that
Article 21 covers within its ambit only passive euthanasia and
not active euthanasia.
In the present case, the Supreme Court has clarified that the
‘right to live with dignity’ also includes the smoothening of the
process of dying in case of terminally ill patient or a person in
permanent vegetative state with no hope of recovery and that is
why it also recognises advance directive akin to a living well
through which person of sound mind and in a position to
communicate can indicate the decision relating to the
circumstances in which withholding or withdrawal of medical

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treatment can be restored to. Elaborate procedure and
safeguards for executing such advanced directive has been
provided in the judgement with essential in gradient being that
the treating physician of a terminally ill or patient undergoing
prolonged medical treatment shall refer the matter to a medical
board consisting of head of the treating department and at least
three experts from the field of general medicine, cardiology,
neurology, nephrology, psychiatry or oncology with experience
in critical care and with overall standing in the medical
profession. The decision of the medical board shall be
communicated to the jurisdictional collector who shall
constitute a medical board comprising the Chief District
Medical Officer of the concerned district as the chairman and
three expert doctor in the same field mentioned above.
The chairman of the medical board sale after taking consent of
the executor of advance directive or the guardian name therein,
shall communicate his decision to the jurisdictional judicial
magistrate first class, who shall than authorise the
implementation of the decision of the medical board. The court
has also laid down the procedure of altering the advance
directive and for the cases where there are no directives. Thus,
the Supreme Court has finally ruled that the interest of the
patient cell override the interest of the state in protecting the
life of a citizen and that the right to live with dignity attaches
throughout the life of the individual.

Topic: Right To Education Under Article 21

Name of the case: Unnikrishnan, JP v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178

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Bench: Chief Justice L.M. Sharma, Justice S.R. Pandian,
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Justice S. Mohan, Justice S.P.
Bharucha
Ratio: The Supreme Court implied the ‘right to education’
from the ‘right to life and personal liberty’ guaranteed by
Article 21. As the Fundamental Rights and directive principles
are complimentary to each other, the content and parameters of
this right or deduced in the light of Article 41, 45 and 46.
Therefore, the ‘right to education’ in the context of this
Directive Principle means: (a) every child has a right to free
education up to the age of 14 years; (b) thereafter, his right to
education is circumscribed by the limits of the economic
capacity of the states and its development.
The court has emphasised that child has Fundamental Right to
free education upto the age of 14 years. This obligation can be
discharged by the state either through governmental school, or
private schools run by non-governmental bodies, aided and
recognised by the state. The court further ruled that a citizen
has a right to call upon the state to provide educational facilities
within the limits of its economic capacity and development.
The court has however cautioned that because it has relied upon
some of the directive principles to locate the parameters of the
‘right to education’ implicit in Article 21, it does not follow
automatically that each and every obligation referred to it in the
Directive Principle gets automatically included with a preview
of Article 21. It held that the ‘right to education’ to be implicit
in the ‘right to life’ because it his inherent fundamental
importance. As a matter of fact, “the court has referred to
Article 41, 45, and 46 merely to determine the parameters of
the said rights.”
Importance of the judgement delivered in Unnikrishnan:

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Subsequent to the decision in Unnikrishnan, the Constitution
86th Amendment Act, 2002 was introduced Article 20A which
makes the ‘right to education’ a Fundamental Right.

Topic: Right To Consult A Lawyer Under Article 22

Name of the case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shobhaaram,
AIR 1966 SC 1910
Bench: Chief Justice AK Sarkar, Justice M Hidayatullah,
Justice JR Mudholkar, Justice RS Bachhawat, Justice JM Shelat
Fact of the case: The Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act, 1949,
Section 63 was challenged.
The respondents were arrested by the police for the offence of
trespass and were released on bail. They were tried and
sentenced to pay a fine by Nayay Panchayat,“ established under
the Madhya Bharat Panchayat Act, 1949, with power to impose
only a sentence of fine. The conviction was set aside by High
Court on the ground that Section 63 of the Act, which provides
that no legal practitioner shall appear on behalf of any party in
the proceedings before the Nayay Panchayat, violated Article
21 of the Constitution and therefore void. The case was brought
to Supreme Court.
Ratio: The Supreme Court held that a person arrested on
accusation of a crime becomes entitled to be defended by
counsel at the trial and his right is not lost even if he’s released
on bail, or is tried by a court which has no power to impose a
sentence of imprisonment. Thus, a provision banning a lawyer
from appearing before Nayay Panchayat could be void to the
extent it denies a person arrested the ‘right to be defended by a
lawyer’ for the crime for which he has been arrested.
___________________________________________________

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Topic: The Communication Of Grounds Of Arrest To
The Detenu Under Article 21
Name of the Case: Khudi Ram Das v. State of West Bengal,
AIR 1975 SC 550
Bench: Justice PN Bhagwati, Justice Jagmohan Reddy, Justice
PK Goswami, Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria
Fact of the Case: The District Magistrate had before him
detenu’s history-sheet at the time of making the details order,
but none of the facts contained therein was communicated to
him. The detenu argued that the Magistrate was influenced in
making the order by the material in the history-sheet which was
not communicated to him and thus, his right under Article 22(5)
was infringed. The magistrate asserted in an affidavit that
beyond the grounds communicated, he did not take any
material from the history - sheet into account in passing order.
The State asserted that the court should accept the affidavit of
the magistrate and should not probe into the nature of material
before the District Magistrate or whether or not he was
influenced by it in making the detention order.
Ratio: The Supreme Court rejected the argument of the State
and declared that as the custodian of citizen Fundamental
Right, it was his duty to satisfy itself whether there were other
materials which could have influenced the District Magistrate
in arriving at his objective satisfaction but which he did not
communicate to the detenu. Whether the other materials on the
record had or had not any effect on his mind could not be
decided on the basis of magistrate’s ipse dixit (a dogmatic and
unproven statement).
Article 22(5) insists that all basic facts and particulars which
influence the detaining authority in arriving at his satisfaction
must be communicated to the detenu. It is, therefore, the duty

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of Court to examine what were the basic facts and materials
which actually weighed with the District Magistrate in reaching
his satisfaction and, to this end, the Court can enquire him to
produce before it the entire record of the case which was before
him.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Standard Consideration Laid Down By

Supreme Court For Using Power Of Preventive
Detention Under Article 22
Name of the case: AK Roy v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 710
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N.
Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice V.D. Tulzapurkar,
Justice D.A. Desai
Facts of the Case: The procedure laid down in Section 10 and
11 of the National Security Act 1980, was challenged as being
not in consonance with natural justice on at least three grounds;
1. The detenu has not been given the ‘right to cross-examine’
the detaining authority and the person on whose statement
the order of detention is founded;
2. The Act does not give the detenu ‘right to present’ before
advisory board, oral and documentary evidence, in rebuttal
of the allegations made against him;
3. The Act does not furnish to the detenu the ‘right to be
presented by a lawyer’ before the advisory board.
Ratio: The Supreme Court upheld the Act on all these grounds.
The Court did recognize the importance of these three rights.
They constitute the core of just causes because without them, it
is difficult for any person to disprove the allegation made

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against him and to establish the truth. But two important
consideration must be borne in mind in this regard:
1. There is no prescribed standard of reasonableness and,
therefore, what kind of procedural rights ‘should be made
available’ to a person depends upon the nature of the
proceeding in relation to which the rights are claimed,
2. The question as to what kind of rights are visible to the
detenu in the proceeding before the advisory board has to be
decided in the light of constitutional provisions, and statutory
provisions to the extent they do not offend the Constitution.
The court ruled that a detenu should not claim the ‘right of
cross examination’ of witness in the proceeding before the
advisory board. The rules of natural justice are not rigid norms
of unchanging content. The ambit of those rules must vary
according to the context and they have to be tailored to suit the
nature of proceedings in relation to which the particular right is
claimed as a component of natural justice.
Cross-examination may be necessary in the proceeding in
which witness examined or documents are adduced in evidence
in order to prove a point. Cross examination is a powerful
weapon to expose the untruthfulness of such evidence. But the
question of consideration of the advisory board is not whether
the detainee is guilty of any charge but whether there is a recent
cause for the detention.
The detention is based not on the fact proved either by applying
the test of preponderance of probabilities or of reasonable
doubt, but on the subjective satisfaction of detaining authority.
The proceeding of the advisory board has, therefore, to be
structured differently from the proceeding of judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals. In case of preventive detention, witness is
either unwilling to come forward, or the source of information
of the detaining authority cannot be disclosed without detriment

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to the public interest. Therefore, in the very nature of things, it
is not possible to give to the detenu the right of cross-
examination of witness.
Further, the court said that there is no objection in granting to
the detenu right to lead evidence in rebuttal before the advisory
board. There is no provision in the Constitution or the National
Security Act denying to the detenu the right to present his own
evidence but to rebut the allegation made against him. As the
board is to complete its proceeding within a limited period, it
can regulate its own procedure within the limits of Constitution
and the statute and limit the time within which the detenu must
complete the evidence.

Topic: Wages Lower Than That Of Minimum Wages

Act Even During The Pandemic Attracts Article 23
Name of the Case: Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
1983 SC 328
Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati and Justice R.S. Pathak
Fact of the Case: Because of famine conditions in the
countryside, the Public Work Department of the State of
Rajasthan started a road project as a famine relief measure and
a large number of workers were employed on this project.
The State was paying to this worker less than the minimum
wages fixed for unskilled workers in the State. The State
claimed that this was authorised by the Rajasthan Famine
Relief Work Employees Exception from Labour Laws Act,
1964. The State argued that because of the exception act, the
minimum wages act was not applicable to employees engaged
on a famine relief work.

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The State argued that what it was doing was to provide relief to
the person affected by drought and famine, and that its potential
to help people would be very much reduced, and it would not
be able to render help to maximum number of sufferers, if it
were to give minimum wages to the workers.
Ratio: The Supreme Court invalidated the payment by State of
wages lower than the minimum wages to the person employed
on the mild relief work under Article 23. Rejecting the
arguments, the Supreme Court ruled that even those persons
who are employed on the relief work should be paid the legal
minimum wages and not less than that as that would be invalid
under Article 23.
In other words of Justice Bhagwati, “where a person provides
labour or services to another for remuneration which is less
than the minimum wages, the level of service provided by him
clearly falls within the meaning of word forced labour and
address the condemnation of Article 23.”
Whenever any labour or service is taken by the State from any
person, even if the person is affected by drought and/or scarcity
condition or not, the state must pay, at least, minimum wages to
him/her to save violation of Article 23.
Rejecting the argument of the State that it was providing relief
to person affected by drought and famine, the Supreme Court
held that though the plea of State might seem possible but it
was unsustainable.
The State is not giving dole or bounty to the affected persons,
the work done by them is not worthless or useless to the society
as to do so would be sheer waste of human labour and
resources which could be usefully devoted to fruitful and
productive channels leading to community welfare and creation
of national wealth or asset. Therefore, if persons are employed

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in doing useful work, there can be no justification for the state
not to pay the minimum wages.
Justice Bhagwati observed on this point as follows;
“The State cannot be permitted to take advantage of helpless
condition of the affected persons and extract labour or services
from them on payment of less than the minimum wages. No
work of utility and value can be allowed to be constructed on
the blood and sweat of persons who are reduced to a state of
helplessness on account of drought and scarcity conditions.
The State cannot under the use of helping these affected
persons extract work of utility and value from them without
paying them minimum wages. Whenever any labour or services
is taken by the state from any person, whether he be affected by
brought, scarcity conditions or not, the state must pay, at least,
minimum wages to such persons insofar as any exception
provided by statute excludes the applicability of the Minimum
Wages Act, 1948 to workman employed on famine relief work
and permits payment of less than minimum wages to such
workmen, must be held to be invalid as offending the provisions
of Article 23.”
The expression forced labour in Article 23 is of the widest
amplitude and on its true interpretation, it covers very possible
form of forced labour, begar or otherwise, and it makes no
difference whether the person is forced to give his labour or
services to another is remunerated or not.
Justice Bhagwati emphasise that Article 23 “is intended to
eradicate the pernicious practice of forced labour and to wipe it
out altogether from the national scene.” Therefore, the
exception act which warranted payment of less than minimum
wages on the five main relief work was held to be
unconstitutional. The court therefore directed the state to pay to
those workers the minimum uses and also to pay them the

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difference between the minimum wages and the actual wage
paid for the past services.

Topic: Secularism Under Article 25 And 26

Name of the Case: S.R. Bommai v. UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1918
Bench: Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice P.B. Sawant, Justice K.
Ramasamy, Justice S.C. Agarwal, Justice Yogeshwar Dayal,
Justice S.R. Pandian, Justice A.M. Ahmadi
Ratio: The nine-judge bench of Supreme Court referred to the
concept of secularism in the Indian context. The concept of
secularism is not merely a passive attitude of religious
tolerance. It is also a positive concept of equal treatment of all
religions.
In the world of Justice Sawant:
“religious tolerance and equal treatment of all religious groups
and protection of their life and property and of the places of
their worship are essential part of secularism enshrined in our
Constitution.”
In the world of Justice BP Jeevan Reddy:
“.....while the citizen of this country are free to profess,
practice and propagate such religion, faith or believe as they
choose, so far as the state is concerned, that is, from the point
of view of the state, the religion, the faith or belief of a person
is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all are entitled to be
treated equally.” The concept of secularism was not expressly
incorporated in the Constitution at the stage of its making.
However, its operation was visible in the Fundamental Rights
and directive principles. The concept of secularism, is not

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
expressly stated in the Constitution, was, nevertheless deeply
embedded in the constitutional philosophy.”
In 1976, though the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, the
concept of secularism was made explicit by amending the
preamble. By this amendment, the word secularism would
introduce the preamble of the Constitution and thus, what was
hitherto implicit was explicit.
To underline the great significance of secularism, the Supreme
Court declared it as the basic feature of the Constitution. Any
step inconsistent with the constitutional policy is, in the plain
words, unconstitutional. And, further, the Supreme Court has
gone to the extent of ruling that any State Government which
has even separate policies or/and secular course of action if acts
contrary to the constitutional mandate and renders its self-
amenable to the action under Article 356.

Topic: What Is Religion?

Name of the case: Commr. HRE, Madras v. Sri
Lakshmindra, AIR 1954 SC 282
Bench: Chief Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K.
Mukherjea, Justice S.R. Das, Justice Vivian Bose, Justice
Ghulam Hassan, Justice N.H. Bhagwati, Justice T.L.
Venkatarama Iyer
Fact of the case: Section 21, 30 (2), 31, 55, 56 and 63 to 69 of
the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act
1951 was challenged.
Ratio: The Supreme Court has explained the meaning of
religion in the constitutional context as follows:

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“religion is certainly a matter of faith with individual or
communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well-
known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do
not believe in God or in any intelligent first cause.”
The guarantee under Article 25, subject to the exception
mentioned, confers a Fundamental Right on every person not
merely—
I. To entertain such religious beliefs as are allowed to him by
judgement or conscience, but also
II. To exhibit his beliefs and ideas in search over outward acts
and practises as are sanctioned and enjoined by his religion,
and further,
III. To propagate and disseminate his religious beliefs, ideas
and views for the benefit and edification of others.
It was further stated that the guarantee under the Constitution of
India, not only protects the freedom of religious opinion, but it
protects also acts done in pursuance of religion. Religious
practises are reflective of matters concerning religion and if
religion is to be venerated, then the practises annexed thereto
are equally respectable and have to be compiled with.

Topic: Religious Freedom Subject To The Right Of

Others Under Article 25
Name of the Case: Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 908
Bench: Chief Justice A.N. Ray, Justice M. Hameedullah Beg,
Justice R.S. Sarkaria, Justice P.N. Singhal, Justice Jaswant
Singh

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Fact of the case: The constitutional validity of Madhya
Pradesh Dharma Swatantra Adhiniyam, 1968, was challenged
in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh and the constitutional
validity of the Orissa Freedom of Religious Act, 1967 was
challenged in the High Court of Orissa. The two Acts prohibit
forcible conversion and make offences punishable. The
Madhya Pradesh court upheld the validity of the Act. The
Orissa High Court held that Article 25(2) of the Constitution
guarantees propagation of religion and conversion is a part of
Christian religion, that the State Legislature has no power to
enact the impugned legislation which in it pith and substance is
a law related to religion and that Entry 97 of List 1 would
apply.
Ratio: The Supreme Court while referring to the word
propagate in Article 25(1), says that what Article 25(1) grants is
not the right to convert another person to one’s own religion but
to transmit or spread one’s religion by an exposition of its
tenants. Article 25 guarantees ‘freedom of conscience’ to every
citizen and not to the followers of any one particular religion.
That means that there is no Fundamental Right to convert
another person to one’s own religion because if a person
purposely undertakes to convert another person to his religion,
as distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets
of his religion, that would impinge on the freedom of
conscience guaranteed to all the citizen in the country alike.

Topic: Acquisition Of Religious Place By The State

Name of the case: Dr. M Ismail Faruqui v. UOI, AIR 1995
SC 605
Bench: Justice M.V. Verma, Justice G. Ray, Justice S.
Bharucha

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Facts of the case: The constitutional validity of Acquisition of
Certain Area at Ayodhya and the Maintainability of the Special
Reference Number 1 of 1993 made by the President of India
under Article 143 (1) of the Constitution of India are
challenged.
Ratio: The Supreme Court while considering the question of
acquisition of religious place by the state held that a temple,
church or a mosque etc are essentially immovable properties
and subject to protection under Article 25 and 26. Every
immovable property is liable to be acquired. While offer of
prayer or worship is a religious practice, its offering at every
location where such prayers can be offered would not be
integral part of such religious practises unless the place has a
particular significance for that religion so as to form an
essential or integral part thereof.
Places of worship of any religion having particular significance
for that religion, to make it an essential or integral part of the
religion, stand on a different footing and have to be treated
differently and more reverently. Nevertheless, decoration of
any religious place is to be made only in unusual and
extraordinary situation for a larger national purpose keeping in
view that such acquisition should not result in extension of the
right to practise that religion, if the significance of that place be
such. Subject to this condition, the power of acquisition is
available for a mosque like any other place of worship of any
religion. The right to worship is not at any and every place, so
as long as it can be practiced effectively, unless the right to
worship at a particular place is itself an integral part of that
right.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Topic: Restriction On Religious Instruction In
Educational Institution Under Article 28 (1)
Name of the case: Aruna Roy v. UOI, AIR 2002 SC 3176
Bench: Justice M.B. Shah, Justice D.M. Dharmadhikari and
Justice H.K. Sema
Fact of the case: Public Interest Litigation filed under Article
32 of the Constitution of India. It has been contended that
National Curriculum Framework of School Education
(NCERT) published by National Council of Educational
Research and Training (NCERT) is against the constitutional
mandate, anti-secular, and without consultation with Central
Advisory Board of Education (CBSE) and therefore requires to
be set aside.
Ratio: The Supreme Court has ruled that Article 28 does not
ban a study of religion. The whole emphasis of Article 28 is
against imparting religious instruction. There is no provision on
study of religious philosophy and culture, particularly for
having value-based social life in a society which is
degenerating for power, cost for property.
The Supreme Court stated that the concept of secularism is not
endangered if the basic tenets of religions all over the world are
studied and learnt. Value-based education will help the nation
to fight against fanaticism, ill-will, violence, dishonesty and
corruption. These values can be inculcated if the basic tenets of
all religions are learnt.
In the words of Justice Dharmadhikari: “Study of religion,
therefore, in school education cannot be held to be an attempt
against the secular philosophy of the Constitution.”
___________________________________________________

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Topic: Protection of The Interest Of Minorities Under
Article 29
Name of the Case: State of Bombay v. Bombay education
Society, AIR 1954 SC 561
Bench: Chief Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice S.R. Das,
Justice Ghulam Hassan, Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice
B. Junannandhadas
Fact of the case: An order issued by the Bombay government
banning admission of those whose language was not English to
school using English as a medium of instruction. The order was
challenged before Supreme Court of India. The government
argued that the order did not debar citizens from admission into
English medium school only on the ground of religion, race,
caste, language, but on the ground that such denial would
promote the advancement of national language.
Ratio: The Supreme Court while rejecting the argument of
government of Bombay pointed out that the argument
overlooked the distinction between the object underlying the
impugned order and the mode and manner adopted therein to
achieve the object. The object underlying the order was
laudable but even than its validity has to be judged by the
method of its operation and its effect on the Fundamental Right
guaranteed by Article 29 (2). The immediate ground for
denying admission in English school to pupils whose mother
tongue was not English was only language and so the order
could not be upheld. Thus, discrimination in matter of
admission on the basis of language was invalidated by Supreme
Court under Article 29 (2).
___________________________________________________

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Topic: Rules For Determining Religious Or Linguistic
Minority Under Article 29 And 30
Name of the Case: TMA PAI Foundation v. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 355
Bench: Justice S.S.M. Quadri, Justice Ruma Pal, Justice S.N.
Variava, Justice K.G. Balakrishnan, Justice P.V. Reddi, Justice
Ashok Bhan, Justice Arijit Pasayat
Issue: Whether in order to determine the existence of a
religious or linguistic minority in relation to Article 30, the
State or the country as a whole is to be taken as a unit?
Judgment: Of the 11 judges constituting the bench, Chief
Justice of India Kirpal deliver judgement for six of the judges.
There were three concurring and two dissenting judgements on
the issue. The majority view was that the language being the
basis for the establishment of different states, for the purpose of
Article 30, holding victim and nobody will have to be
determined in relation to the state in which the educational
institution is sought to be established. The position with regard
to the religious minority is similar, since both religious and
linguistic minorities have been put on a par in Article 30.
Therefore, the test for determining who are linguistic or
religious minorities within the meaning of Article 30 would be
one and the same either in relation to a state legislation or
central législation.
The minority view was that the question of minority status must
be judged in relation to the offending pieces of legislation or
executive order. If the source of the infringing action is the
state, then the protection must be given against the state and
this status of the individual or group claiming the protection
must be determined with reference to the territorial limits of the
State. When the entire nation is sought to be affected by Union

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legislation, the question of minority status must be determined
with reference to the country as a whole. Thus, Parliament itself
describe Hindi as the compulsory medium of instruction in all
educational institution throughout the length and breadth of the
country, if the minority status is to be determined only with
respect to the territorial limits of a state, non-Hindi speaking
person who are in majority in their own state but in a minority
in relation to the rest of the country, would not be able to
impinge the legislation on the ground that it interferes with the
right to preserve distinct language and script. Such examples
can be multiplied. The Supreme Court in TMA Pai was
unanimously of the view that the right to establish and
administer an institution in Article 30 of the Constitution,
comprises the rights:
a. To admit students,
b. To set up reasonable fee structure,
c. To constitute a governing body,
d. To appoint staff (teaching and non- teaching),
e. To take action if there is dereliction of duty on the part of any
of the employees.
However, the court in TMA Pai did not decide about the
authority competent to decide the minority status under Article
30.
Further Constitutional development:
The National Commission For Minority Educational
Institution Act, 2004, was enacted which enables the
commission set up under the act to decide all the questions
relating to the status of any institution as a Minority
Educational Institution and declare its status as such.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
Topic: The Land Reform, Abolition Of Zamindari
And Right To Property Under Article 31 A (Old
Concept)
Name of the case: Godavari Sugar Mills v. SB Kamble, AIR
1975 SC 1193
Bench: Justice Hans Raj Khanna, Justice P.N. Bhagwati and
Justice P.K. Goswami
Fact of the case: Law was passed to impose ceiling on land.
The surplus land acquired from landlords was to be distributed
among landless person and poor peasants. However, the surplus
land acquired from industrial undertakings being used by them
to produce raw materials for manufacture of goods was to be
allotted to the State Farming Corporation for production of raw
materials. The scheme, it was argued, was not for agrarian
reform insofar as the land was vested in the state corporation. It
was stressed that allotment of land to the landless for the poor
agriculturist was an essential attribute of agricultural reform but
not allotment of land to a State Corporation.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while rejecting the contention
held that the main purpose of the act was to prevent
concentration of agricultural land in the hands of a few. It
sought to remove economic imbalance by taking surplus land
from the holders in excess of the ceiling.
The bulk of the land has acquired was being distributed to the
landless persons. Retaining a few blocks of land for cultivation
of raw materials for industrial undertaking was meant to avoid
fragmentation of this land and also to ensure that manufacturers
were not starved of raw materials. This provision could not be
detached from the rest of the act, the general scheme of which
was to bring about agrarian reform. It was true that acquisition
simpliciter of land by the state to augment its resources and

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without specifying the purpose of which it was to be used for
acquisition would not get the protection of Article 31A. But
vesting of some land in the State would not militate against the
object of agrarian reform if it is a part of the general scheme of
the agrarian reform and there was no oblique deviation from the
avowed purpose. It was necessary to look at the general scheme
of the act acquiring land, object of acquisition, reasons for
retaining land with the state and not distributing it among the
poor peasants.
The court said that the concept of agrarian reform was not
static. With the change of times under the impact of fresh ideas
and in the context of fresh situation, the concept of agrarian
reform is bound to acquire the new dimensions. A major which
has the effect of improving the ruler economy and promoting
ruler welfare would be a part of agrarian reform.
The 44th Constitutional Amendment
The 44th Constitutional Amendment, 1978 transformed the
‘right to property’ from the category of Fundamental Right by
repealing Article 31, and converted it into an ordinary
constitutional right by electing Article 300A instead. Article
300A merely says, “no person shall deprive off property saved
by authority of law.”
Right to Constitutional Remedies

Topic: The True Nature Of Proceeding Under Article

32
Name of the case: Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. UOI, AIR
1984 SC 802
Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice R.S. Pathak and Justice
Amarendra Nath Singh

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Fact of the case: The petitioner, and organisation dedicated to
the cause of release of bonded labourers in the country,
addressed a letter to Justice P.N. Bhagwati alleging:
1. That there were large number of labourers from different
parts of the country who are working in the some of the
stone quarries situated in the district Faizabad, state of
Haryana under “inhumane and intolerable condition ."
2. That a large number of them were bonded labourers;
3. That the provision of the Constitution and various social
welfare laws passed for the benefit of the said workmen
were not being implemented in regard to these labourers.
The petitioner also mentioned in the letter the names of the
stone quarries and particulars of labourers who are working as
bonded labourers and create that a writ be sued for proper
implementation of the various provisions of the social welfare
litigation.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has clarified that procedurally,
under Article 32, it is not bound to follow the ordinary advisory
procedure and made of such procedure as may be effective for
the enforcement of Fundamental Rights. When writ petition
was moved on behalf of some workmen that they were being
held in bondage, the Court appointed two persons as
commissioner to make report on petitioners condition.
It was argued that the report had no evidentiary value since
what was stated therein was based only on ex-party evidence,
which had not been tested by cross examination. The Court
held that argument not well founded and rejected it, as it was
based on a total misconception of the true nature of proceeding
under Article 32.
Article 32 does not say by what proceeding the Supreme Court
may be moved for enforcement of the Fundamental Right s.

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The only limitation is that the proceeding must be appropriate
for the enforcement of Fundamental Right. The Constitution
make a deliberately did not lay down any particular form a
proceeding for enforcement of Fundamental Right not be they
stipulate that such proceedings should conform to any rigid
pattern or a straight jacket formula. The reason being that they
realise that the people were poor and illiterate and insistence on
any rigid formula would be self-defeating.
Article 32 (2) confers power on the Court in its widest terms. It
is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs, but it is
much wider and includes within its matrix power to issue any
direction, order, writs which may be appropriate for
enforcement of Fundamental Right in question.
The Constitution is silent as to the procedure to be followed by
the court in exercising its power under Article 32 (2) because
the Constitution makers were anxious not to allow any
procedural technicalities to stand in the way of enforcement of
Fundamental Rights. The apex Court is bound by no procedure
to do complete justice under Article 141 of the Constitution of
India.
Whatever procedure is necessary to fulfil the purpose is
permissible to the court. It is not at all obligate tree for Court to
follow adversarial procedure. No such restriction ought to be
imposed on the court. In such a system of poor person is always
at disadvantage against rich person. When a poor person come
to the court for enforcement of their Fundamental Right, it is
necessary to depart from the adversarial procedure and evolve a
new procedure so as to enable such person to bring the
necessary material before the court so as to a secure
enforcement of their right.
In the words of Justice Bhagwati:

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“ we have therefore to abandon the laissez faire approach in
the judicial process particularly where it involves a question of
enforcement of Fundamental Right s and forge new tools,
devise new methods and adopt new stages for purpose of
making Fundamental Right s meaningful for the large masses
of people. If we want the Fundamental Right s to become a
living reality and the Supreme Court to become a real sentinel
on the qui vive (on the alert or lookout), we must free ourselves
from the cycles of outdated and outmoded assumptions and
bring to bear on the subject fresh outlook and original
unconventional thinking.”
Accordingly, the court has accepted even a letter addressed to
the court as an appropriate proceeding and has taken
cognizance in the matter raised therein.
Achievement of the judgement
The said judgement led the foundation of Public Interest
Litigation which alone is responsible for bringing justice to the
ignored and poorer Section of society.

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Part IV
Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)
[Article 36 – 51]

Topic: Inter-Relationship Between Fundamental Right

S And Directive Principles
Name of the Case: State of Madras v. Champakam
Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226
Bench: Chief Justice Harilal J Kania, Justice Fazal Ali, Justice
M Patanjali Sastri, Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan, Justice B.K.
Mukherjea, Justice SR Das, Justice Vivian Bose
Judgment: The Supreme Court while rejecting the argument of
Government of India observed that while Fundamental Right
was enforceable, DPSPs were not, and so the law made to
implement the DPSPs could not take away Fundamental Rights.
The DPSPs should confirm, and run as subsidiary, to the
Fundamental Rights. The Court observed that the DPSPs,
which by Article 37 are expressly made unenforceable by a
Court cannot override the provision found in Part III,
Fundamental Right, which, notwithstanding, other provisions
are expressly made enforcible by appropriate writs, orders or
directions under Article 32. The chapter on Fundamental Right
is sacrosanct and not liable to be abridged by any legislative or
executive act or order, except to the extent provided in the
appropriate Article in Part III of the Constitution. The DPSPs
have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the chapters on
Fundamental Rights.
Maturity in the concept of DPSP and Fundamental Right

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Topic: The Balance Between Fundamental Rights
And DPSPs Is An Essentials Feature Of The Basic
Structure Of The Constitution
Name of the case: Minerva Mills v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N.
Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice
P.S. Kailasam
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that Fundamental Rights
are not an end in themselves but are the means to an end. The
end is specified in the directive principles. It was further
observed in the same case that Fundamental Rights and
directive principles together constitute the core of commitment
to social revolution and it together, are the conscience of the
Constitution. The Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock
of the balance between the two. To give absolute primacy to
one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution.
This harmony and balance between Fundamental Rights and
directive principles is a sensual feature of the basic structure of
the Constitution.
The goals set out in directive principles are to be achieved
without aggregating the Fundamental Rights. It is in the sense
that Fundamental Rights and directive principles together
constitute the core of our Constitution and combine to form its
conscience. Anything that destroys the balance between the two
part will ipso facto (by that very fact or act) will destroy the
essential element of the basic feature of Constitution.
The concept of DPSPs also developed in Olga Tellis v. Bombay
municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 194, wherein the Court
held that the directive principles are fundamental in the
governance of the country, they must, therefore, be regarded as

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equally fundamental to the understanding and interpretation of
the meaning and content of Fundamental Rights.

Topic: No Distinction Can Be Made Between Frs And

Dpsps
Name of the Case: Ashok Kumar Thakur v. UOI, (2008) 6
SCC 771
Bench: Justice Dr. Arijit Pasayat and Justice C.K. Thakker
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that no distinction can be
made between the two set of rights. The Fundamental Rights
represent the civil and political rights and directive principles
embody social and economic rights. Merely because the
directive principles are non-justifiable by the judicial process
does not mean that they are of subordinate importance.
The directive principle and Fundamental Rights are now
regarded as one. They are regarded as supplementary and
complimentary to each other.

Topic: Right To Health, Medical Aid While In Service

Or Post Retirement Is A Fundamental Right
Name of the case: Consumer education and research Centre
v. UOI, AIR 1995 SC 923
Bench: Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Justice K. Ramasamy,
Justice M.M. Punchhi
Fact of the case: The petitioner seeks to fill in the airing gaps
and remedial measures for the protection of health of the
workers engaged in mines and asbestos industries with

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adequate mechanisms for diagnosis and control of the silent
killer disease ‘asbestosis’.
It appears from the record that in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh
and Rajasthan, there exist about 30 mines and the workmen
employed there in about 106. There are about 74 asbestos
industries in nine states, namely, Haryana, Delhi, Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Kerala, Gujarat
and Madhya Pradesh which employs about 11,000 workmen.
Judgment: Reading Articles 21, 38, 42, 43, 46 and 40A
together, the Supreme Court has concluded that ‘right to
health’, medical aid to protect the health and vigour of a worker
while in service or post retirement is a Fundamental Right to
make the life of the workmen meaningful and purposeful with
dignity of person.
Social justice is the arch of the Constitution, which ensures life
to be meaningful and livable with human dignity. Social justice,
equality and dignity of the person are cornerstone of social
democracy. Social justice is a dynamic device to mitigate the
suffering of the poor, weak, dalits, tribals and deprived section
of the society and to elevate them to the level of equality to live
a life with dignity of the person. The aim of social justice is to
attain substantial degree of social, economic and political
equality.

Topic: Equal Pay For Equal Work Under Article 39

(D)
Name of the case: Grih Kalyan Kendra v. UOI, AIR 1991
SC 1173
Bench: Justice K.N. Singh and Justice N.D. Ojha

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Fact of the case: The workers Union of the Kendra has filed
the writ petition for a declaration that Kendra wherein the
workers are employed is a ‘state’ within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution and such it is prayed by them that writ of
mandamus be issued directing the respondents to pay regular
pay scale on par with another employee.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has held that Equal Pay For
Equal Work is not expressly declared by the Constitution as a
Fundamental Right but in the view of Directive Principle Of
State Policy as contained in Article 39 (d) the Constitution,
Equal Pay For Equal Work has assumed the status of
Fundamental Right in service jurisprudence having regard to
the constitutional mandate of equality in Article 14 and 16 of
the Constitution.
The principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work properly be applied
to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or
irrational classification though those drawing different scales of
pay do identical work under same employer.

Topic: Free-Legal Aid Under Article 39A

Name of the case: Cardamom marketing Corporation v.
State of Kerala, (2017) 5 SCC 255
Bench: Chief Justice H.L. Dattu and Justice A.K. Basheer
Fact of the case: The Government of Kerala, in exercise of
power under Article Section 76 (1) of Kerala Court Fees and
Suit Valuation Act, 1959, authorised the tribunal and the
appellate authority is to levy additional court fee in respect of
each appeal or revision and the amount so collected was to be
credited to the Kerala Aligarh benefit fund.

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Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the purpose for which
the fund was to be utilized, was for providing efficient legal
services for the people of the State, which amounts to quid pro
quo (a favour or advantage granted in return for something);
with advocates playing an important role in the administration
of justice and discharging duty of the highest utility. Therefore,
the Court was of the opinion that the additional court fee
imposed had a direct nexus to the object it sought to be
achieved in relation to the service available to the appellant or
others, who approach the courts or tribunals for redressal of
their grievance. Thus, the validity of the notification was
upheld.

Topic: Pension Under Article 41 And 43

Name of the case: DS Nakara v. UOI, AIR 1983 SC 130
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice V.D.
Tulzapurkar, Justice D.A. Desai, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy,
Justice Baharul Islam
Facts of the case: The petitioner contends that all pensioners
entitled to receive pension under the relevant rules from a class
irrespective of the dates of their retirement and there cannot be
a mini classification within this class, that the differential
treatment accorded to those who had retired prior to the
specified date is violative of Article 14.
Judgment: The constitutional bench of Supreme Court held
that pension is not only compensation for loyal service rendered
in the past, but also by the broader significance it is a social
welfare measure rendering socio-economic justice by providing
security in the fall of life in physical and mental prowess is
ebbing corresponding to the ageing process and, therefore,
when it required to fall back upon savings.

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Why scheme of pension making liberate provisions for those
retiring after a specified date was held to be discriminatory vis-
a-vis those residing earlier then the date? The Supreme Court
invoked Article 14, 38(1), 39(d) and (e), 41 and 43(3), and even
the word socialist in the preamble to the Constitution to reach
this result. Since the advent of the Constitution, the state action
is being directed towards attaining the goal of directive
principles assure to set up a welfare state in India.
According to the court, the principal aim of a socialist state is to
eliminate inequality in income, status and standard of life. The
basic framework of socialism is to provide a decent standard of
life to the working people and, is basically, to provide security
from cradle to grave. This, among others on the economic side,
envisages economic equality and equitable distribution of
income. In the old age, socialism aim at providing an economic
security to those who have rendered onto society what they
were capable of doing when they were fully equipped with their
mental and physical prowess.
Article 41 enjoys the state to ensure a reasonably decent
standard of life, medical aid, freedom from want, freedom from
fear and enjoyable leisure, relieving the boredom and the
humility of dependence in the old age. The court applied the
liberal formula to all pensioners irrespective of the date of
retirement, as distinction among business with reference
specified date was held to be discriminatory.
Describing the nature of pension given to a government servant
on retirement, the court emphasised on three features thereof:
(1) Pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending
upon the sweet will of employer and it creates a vested right:
(2) Pension is not an ex grutia (by virtue of grace) payment but
it is a payment for the past service rendered; and

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(3) it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic
justice to those who in the heyday of their life ceaselessly work
for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they
would not be left in lurch.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Ban On The Slaughter Of The Progeny Of A

Cow Under Article 48
Name of the case: State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti
Kureshi Kasab Jamaat, AIR 2006 SC 212
Bench: Justice AK Mathur
Fact of the case: The Bombay Animal Prevention (Gujarat
Amendment) Act, 1994 was challenged. By this amendment the
age of the bull and bullock which was existed at the time that is
the bull below the age of 16 years and bullock below the age of
16 years cannot be slaughtered was deleted. By this amendment
the age restriction was totally taken away and that means that
no bull and bullock respective of the age shall be slaughtered.
Judgment: The Supreme Court upheld a total ban on the
slaughter of the progeny of a cow. The word “calves and other
drought cattle” were construed as a matter of description of
species and not with regard to age or person and only so as to
distinguish such cattle from other cattle.

Topic: Doctrine Of Absolute Liability

Name of the case: MC Mehta v. UOI, AIR 1987 SC 1086
Bench: Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice Ranganath Misra,
Justice GL Oza, Justice M.M. Dutt, Justice K.N. Singh

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Fact of the case: At 4th and 6th December, 1985 leakage of
Oleum Gas from one of the unit of Shriram foods and
Fertilisers Industries in Delhi, belonging to Delhi Cloth Mill
Ltd. In this leakage one advocate practising in Hazari Court had
died and several other affected.
A writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was brought
by the way of Public Interest Litigation.
Judgment: The Supreme Court took a hard and bold decision
holding that it was not bound to follow the 19th century rule of
English law, and it could evolve a rule which is suitable to
prevail in the Indians of social and economic at the present day.
It evolved the rule of ‘absolute ability’ as a part of Indian law in
preference to the rule of strict liability laid down in Ryland vs
Fletcher. In the words of Chief Justice Bhagwati;
“this, rule (Ryland v. Fletcher) evolved in the 19 century at a
time when all these developments of science and technology has
not taken place cannot afford any guidance in evolving in a
standard of liability that is consistent with the constitutional
norms and the need of present-day economy and social
structure. We do not feel inhibited by The Sun which was
evolved in the context of a totally different kind of economy.
Law has to grow in order to satisfy the need of the fast-
changing society and keep abreast with the economic
developments, taking place in this country. As a new situation
arise the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of
such new situations. Law cannot allow our judicial taking to be
constrained by reference of the law as it prevails in in England
or for that matter that in other foreign legal order. We in India
cannot hold our hands back and venture to evolve a new
principle of liability which English courts have not done.”
So, the Supreme Court evolved a new rule creating absolute
liability for harm caused by dangerous substance. The

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following statement of Chief Justice Bhagwati which lays
down the new principle may be noted:
“we are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in
hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which poses a
potential threat to the health and safety of person working in
the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an
absolute and non-degradable duty to the community to ensure
that no harm results to anyone on the account of hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity which it has undertaken.
The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to
provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in
which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest
standards of safety and if any harm results on the account of
such activities the enterprise must be absolutely liable to
compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to
enterprise to say that it has taken all reasonable care and that
the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.”
The court also led down the measure of compensation payable
within the capacity of enterprise, so that the same can have the
different effect. The court held that “we would also like to point
out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases
referred to must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of
the enterprise because such compensation must have a different
effect. The large and more prosperous enterprise, greater must
be the amount of compensation payable by it for the harm
caused on account of accident in carrying on hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity by the enterprise.”

Topic: International Law Under Article 51

Name of the case: State of West Bengal v. Kesoram
Industries Ltd, AIR 2005 SC 1646

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Into Legal World
Bench: Chief Justice V.N. Khare, Justice R.C. Lahoti, Justice
B.N. Agarwal, Justice S.B. Sinha, Justice A.R. Lakshmanan
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that as Article 253
contains a non-obstinate clause, it operates notwithstanding
anything contained in Article 245 and Article 246. Article 246
confers power in Parliament to enact laws with respect to
matters eliminated in list one of the 7th schedule to the
Constitution. Entries 10 to 21 of List 1 of the 7th schedule
pertain to international law. In making any law under any of
these entries, Parliament is required to keep Article 51 in mind.
Further Related Concept
Name of the Case: People’s Union for civil liberties v. UOI,
AIR 1997 SC 568
Bench: Justice K. Singh and Justice S.S. Ahmad
Judgment: The Supreme Court referred to Article 17 of the
International Convent on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948,
so as to derive from Article 21 Right to Privacy in India. The
court observed in this connection as under:
“International law today is not confined to regulating the
relation between the states. Scope continues to extend. Today
matters of social concerns, such as, health education and
economic apart from the human rights fall within the ambit of
international regulations. International law is more than ever
aimed at individuals. It is almost accepted proposition of law
that the rule of customary international law which are not
contrary to the municipal law shall be deemed to be
incorporated in the domestic law.”

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Part IV – A
Fundamental Duties

Topic: Nature Of Fundamental Duties Under Article

51A
Name of the case: AIIMS Students Union v. AIIMS, AIR
2001 SC 3262
Bench: Chief Justice RC Lahoti and Justice Shivraj V Patil
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that though Article
51 (1) (A) does not expressly cast any Fundamental Duty on the
state, the duty of every citizen of India is to collective duty of
the state its de facto (in fact, whether by right or not)
enforceability in the sense that Article 51A is a yardstick
against which the action of the state may be assessed. Thus, in
deciding the issue of reasonable percentage of reservation in
educational institutions it was held that one of the factors to be
taken into consideration would be whether the character and
quantum of reservation would stall or accelerate achieving the
ultimate goal of excellence enabling the nation to rise to higher
level as prescribed under Article 51A-j.

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Part V
The Union

Chapter I
The Executive
Article 52 To 78

Topic: Appointment Of Prime Minister Under Article

74(1)
Name of the Case: Madan Murari v. Chaudhury Charan
Singh, AIR 1980 Cal 95
Bench: Justice S Mukherjee
Fact of the case: The petitioner in this application is a citizen
of India. In this application filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution on 3 September 1979 he has asked for a rule nisi
(unless) to show cause under what authority the respondent 1
and his colleagues resolved to advise the President to dissolve
the Lok Sabha on 20 August 1979 and also rule nisi upon the
respondent to show cause why writ or order or direction in the
nature of Quo Warranto should not be instituted calling upon
Chaudhary Charan Singh to show cause why he should not be
removed from the office of Prime Minister. The petitioner also
press for an ad interim (for an intervening or temporary period
of time) order of injunction restraining the respondent 1 from
functioning as Prime Minister of India till the disposal of the
petition.
Judgment: The Court observed that despite the 42nd
Amendment, the present act has its own discretion in choosing
the Prime Minister. In making this assessment as to who as the
Prime Minister will enjoy the confidence of Lok Sabha it is not
fettered in his choice except by his own assessment. It was an

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unprecedented situation that such a government should give
advice to the President which would be binding who could not
sit in judgement on the political assessment of the present.
Whether it was politically justified or not in appointing the
Prime Minister is not a matter of Court to determine.
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the President
was legally and constitutionally justified in calling upon Charan
Singh to form the ministry. Once the ministry was formed it
was competent constitutionally to function and aid and advise
the President in terms of Article 74 (1) until the Cabinet
resigned on 20 August 1979.
It was further observed that it was constitutionally within the
discretion of President to accept the Cabinet advice to dissolve
the Lok Sabha. The President was not bound to accept the
advice, he was free to accept or not to accept that advice. The
President did not act unconditionally in accepting that advice.
After the Prime Minister and the Council of Minister tender his
resignation, their continuance in office until alternative
arrangements would be made as directed by the President was
mandatory and imperative obligation for them as they held their
office during President pleasure.
The court however expressed the view that the government
should not function only as caretaker government and carry out
day to day administration and defer all policy questions which
could await disposal by Council of Ministers responsible to Lok
Sabha. This was so because the government had never proved
its responsibility to Parliament, it resigned before facing a vote
of confidence.

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Topic: Non- Justiciability Of Cabinet Advice Under
Article 74(2)
Name of the Case: S.R. Bommai v. UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1918
Bench: Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice P.B. Sawant, Justice S.C.
Agrawal, Justice K Ramasamy, Justice Yogeshwar Dayal,
Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Justice S.R. Pandian, Justice A.M.
Ahmadi
Judgment: The Supreme Court while interpreting the
implications of Article 74(2) held that no court is concerned
with what advice was rendered by the ministers to the
President. The court is only concerned with the validity of the
order and not with what happened in the inner councils of the
president and the minister. An order cannot be challenged on
the ground that it is not in accordance with the advice tendered
by the minister or that it was based on no advice. If, in a given
case, the President acts without, or contrary to, the advice
tendered to him, it may be a case warranting his impeachment,
but so far as the court is concerned, it is the act of President.
Article 74(2) protects and features the secrecy of the
deliberations between the President and his Council of
ministers. It’s scope is limited. Article 74(2) cannot override
the basic provisions of Constitution relating to judicial review.
When any action taken by the President in excise office
function is challenged, it is for Council of Ministers to justify
the same, since the President acts under Article 74(1).
Article 74(2) does not mean that the government need not
justify the act of the President taken in excise office his
functions. When act or order of President is questioned in the
court, it is for the Council of ministers to justify the same by
disclosing the material which formed the basis of Act/order.

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Topic: The British System Of Parliamentary
Democracy In Indian Constitution
Name of the case: Ram Jawaya v. State of Punjab, AIR
1955 SC 549
Bench: Chief Justice Mukherjea, Justice V. Bose, Justice
Jagannadhadas, Justice V. Ayyar, Justice Imam
Fact of the case: The petition is filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution wherein the petitioner purports to carry on
business of preparing, printing, publishing and selling test book
for different classes in the school of Punjab, particularly for the
primary and middle classes, under the name and style Uttar
Chand Kapoor & Sons. The Government of Punjab issued a
notification wherein the business of printing, publication and
sale of text book were to be nationalised under so called policy
of nationalisation of textbooks. It was argued that no restriction
could be imposed upon the petitioner right to carry on trade
which is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g).
Judgment: Chief Justice of India Mukherjea speaking on
behalf of Supreme Court stated that our Constitution has
adopted the British system of Parliamentary executive, the
President is only a formal or constitutional head of the
executive and that the real executive powers are vested in the
ministers or the Cabinet. It was further observed that our
Constitution is modelled on the British Parliamentary system
where the executive is deemed to have the Parliament
responsibility for the formulation of governmental policy and
its transmission into law though the condition precedent to the
size of this responsibility is retaining the confidence of the
legislative branch of the state. In the Indian constitution,
therefore, we have the same system of Parliamentary executive
as in England and Council of ministers consisting, as it does, all
the member of legislature, like the British cabinet, ‘a hyphen

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which joins, a buckle with fastens’, The legislative part of the
State to the executive part. The Cabinet enjoying, as it does, a
majority in the legislature concentrates in itself the virtual
control of both legislative and executive function.
The petitioner right to carry on trade and business under Article
19(1)(g) were curtailed based on the ground that government
has power to issue such notification and such undertaking does
not fall under the meaning of Article 31(2).

Topic: Collective Responsibility Under Article 75(3)

Name of the Case: SP Anand, Indore v. HD Deve Gowda,
AIR 1997 SC 272
Bench: Chief Justice AM Ahmadi and Justice Sujata V
Manohar
Fact of the case: According to petitioner, Siri H.D. Deve
Gonda, the then Prime Minister of India, not being a member of
either house of Parliament was, under the constitutional not
eligible to be appointed as the Prime Minister of India. The
petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
Issue: Can a person who is not a member of either house of
Parliament be sworn in as the Prime Minister of India?
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that the principle of
collective responsibility is both salutary and necessary. It was
held that even though Prime Minister is not a member of either
house of Parliament, once he is appointed, he becomes
answerable to the house and the principle of collective
responsibility the governs the democratic process. On other
condition, can a council of minister work as a team and carry
on the government of the country. It is the Prime Minister who
forces collective responsibility among the ministers through his

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ultimate power to dismiss a minister. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the principle of collective responsibility is in full
operation so long as the Lok Sabha is not dissolved.

___________________________________________

Union Parliament
Article 79 - 122

Topic: Disqualify Members Of Parliament Of Office

Of Profit Under The Government
Name of the case: Madhukar v. Jaswant, AIR 1976 SC 2283
Bench: Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer and Justice N.L. Untawalia
Fact of the case: The appellant, who was a private medical
practitioner and whose name was included in the panel of
doctors maintained by the corporation and the respondent, were
contestants in an election for the Presidentship of a medical
Council.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has replaced the approach to
disqualify members of Parliament upon holding office of profit.
The court says, “after all, all law is a means to an end. What is
the legislative and here in disqualifying holders of office of
profit under government? Obviously, to avoid a conflict
between duty and interest, to cut out the massive job of sale
position to advance private benefit and to avoid the likelihood
of influence in government to promote personal advantage. So,
this is the mischief to be suppressed. At the sametime we have
to bear in mind that our Constitution mandates the state to
undertake multiform public welfare and social economic
activities involving technical persons, welfare workers, and lay
people on a massive scale so that participatory government may

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prove a progressive reality. In such an expending situation, can
we keep out from elective post at various levels many doctors,
lawyers, engineers and scientists, not to speak of any army of
the other non-official who are wanted in various fields, not as
full-time government servants but as part-time participant in
People’s project sponsored by government?
For instance, if a National Legal Service Authority funded
largely by state comes into being, a large segment of the legal
profession may be employed in ennobling occupation of legal
aid to the poor. Doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists and other
experts may have to be invited into local bodies, legislature and
like political administrative organ based on election if these
vital limbs of reference government are to be the monopoly of
populist politician or lay members but is sprinkled with
technician in an age which belong to technology. So, an
interpretation of ‘office of profit’ or cast the net so wide that
our citizen with specialities and know-how are inhibited from
entering elected organs of public administration and offering
voluntary services in para official, statutory or like projects run
or directed by government or cooperation controlled by the
state may be detrimental to the democracy itself. Even athletes
may hesitate to come into Sports Councils if some fee for
services is paid and that prove their funeral if elected to
Panchayat! A balanced view, even if it invokes ‘judicial
irreverence’ to vintage precedents, is the wiser desideratum.
Further development
The Supreme Court in Jaya Bachchan v. Union of India, AIR
2006 SC 2119, held that payment of honorarium in addition to
daily allowance in the nature of compensatory allowance, rent
free accommodation and chauffeur driven car at State expense,
are clearly in the nature of remuneration and a source of
pecuniary gain and hence construed profit.

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For the purpose of disqualification, the office in question must
be under the government. If the office is not under the
government, no disqualification will arise. To determine
whether a person holds an office under government, several
tests which are ordinary applied are:
1. Whether the government makes the appointment;
2. Whether the government has right to remove or dismiss the
holder of the office;
3. Whether the government pays the renumeration;
4. Whether the functions performed by the holder are carried
by him for the government and
5. Whether the government has control over the duties and
function of the holder
__________________________________________________

Topic: Constitutionality of Anti-Defection Law

Name of the case: Kihota Hollohon v. Zachilhu, AIR 1993
SC 412
Bench: Justice L.M. Sharma, Justice M.V. Verma, Justice K.G.
Reddy, Justice S. Agarwal
Fact of the case: The petitioner challenges 10th Schedule of
the Constitution introduced by Constitution (52nd Amendment)
Act, 1985 also known as anti-defection law.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while upholding the
constitutional validity anti-defection law observed that the
speaker’s order under the law disqualifying a member of
legislature on the ground of defection is subject to judicial
review.

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The majority has upheld the validity of para two of the 52nd
Amendment. This provides for disqualification on defection of
members from one political party to another. These provisions
do not violate any rights or freedoms guaranteed to the
legislature under Article 105 and 194 of the Constitution.
While rejecting the contention that the entire 10th Schedule,
even after exclusion of Para 7, would be volitive of the basic
structure of Constitution insofar as the provision in this
schedule affect the democratic rights of elected members of the
legislature and, therefore, of the principle of Parliamentary
democracy, the majority judge has ruled that the Speaker acts
as a tribunal adjudicating upon rights and obligations and his
decision in a defection case would thus be open to judicial
review under Article 136, 226 and 227, and that the penalty
clause in para six of the schedule does not exclude adjudication
of the course under these Articles of the Constitution. However,
judicial review would not cover any stage prior to making of
the decision by speaker. The only exception for any
interlocutory interference being case of interlocutory
disqualification or suspensions which may have grave,
immediate and irreversible repercussion and consequences.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Limiting Power Of Speaker Under Anti -

Defection Law
Name of the case: Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR
2007 SC 590
Bench: Chief Justice C.K. Thakker & Justice P.K.
Balasubramanyan
Issue: Whether the power to disqualify a member on the
ground of defection should continue to vest in the Speaker, or

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should it be vested in some independent body outside the
House?
Fact of the case: Petitioner challenges the decision of the
Speaker to disqualify a member for defection without
complying with the principles of natural justice in as much as
the member was not granted sufficient time to file a reply to
meet the case against him was repealed.
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that proceedings in
respect to disqualification of a member are comparable neither
to a trial in a court of law nor departmental proceedings for
disciplinary action.
The high ethical standard which was set up by the majority
Judges in Kihota Hollohon is seldom reached by the Speakers
in India. The confidence placed by the majority Judges in the
“high tradition” of the “high office of the speaker” have, in
practice, been found to be misplaced.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Ordinance Making Power Of President Under

Article 123
Name of the Case: Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar,
(2017) 3 SCC 1
Bench: Justice T.S. Thakur, Justice Madan B. Lokur, Justice
S.A. Bobde, Justice A.K. Goel, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud,
Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice Uday Umesh Lalit
Fact of the Case: The Government of Bihar promulgated as
many as eight ordinances in exercise of his legislative power
under Article 213 (1) of the Constitution. None of this
ordinance was laid before the legislative assembly or the
legislative Council.

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Judgment: The Supreme Court held that if the President or
Governor, act on the aid and advice of executive, promulgates
an ordinance in misuse or abuse of this power, the legislature
cannot only pass a resolution disapproving the ordinance but
can also pass a vote of no-confidence in the executive. There is
no requirement of approval of an ordinance by legislature for it
to operate validly.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Parliamentary Privileges Under Article 105

Name of the case: PV Narsimha Rao v. State, AIR 1998 SC
2120
Bench: Justice S.C. Agarwal and Justice A.S. Anand
Fact of the case: The Narsimha Rao government at the Centre
did not enjoy majority in Lok Sabha in 1993. Vote of no-
confidence was moved against the government by the
opposition parties. To avert defeat on the floor of house, certain
member of the ruling party gave large sum of money to a few
members of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) to vote
against the motion on the floor of the house. Consequently, no-
confidence motion was defeated in the house with 251 four and
265 against. This led to two important questions as under:
Issue:
a. Whether by the virtue of Article 105(1) and 105(2), a
member of Parliament can claim immunity from
prosecution before a criminal court on a charge of bribery
in relation to the proceedings in Parliament?
b. Whether a member of Parliament is a public servant under
the prevention of corruption act, 1988?
Judgment: The five-judge bench of Supreme Court divided
opinion into two.
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On the first point, the majority view is that ordinary law does
not apply to acceptance of bribery by a member of Parliament
in relation to proceeding in Parliament. The court gave a very
broad interpretation of Article 105(2). On behalf of the
majority, Justice Bharucha, has stated as under:
“broadly interpreted, as we think it should be, Article 105(2)
protects a member of Parliament against proceeding in court
that relate to, or concern, or have a connection or nexus with
anything said, or a vote given, by him in Parliament.”
The majority has ruled that while the bribe givers can claim no
immunity under Article 105, the bribe takers stand on a
different footing. The alleged bribe takers are set to have
received monies as a motive or reward for defeating the no-
confidence motion and, thus, the nexus between the bribe and a
no-confidence motion is explicit. The majority judges have
insisted that to enable members to participate fearlessly in
Parliamentary debates, members need the wider protection of
immunity against all civil and criminal proceeding that beer and
access to their speech or vote.
The reason for such a broad view is that otherwise a member
who makes a speech or cast her vote that is not to the liking of
powers that may be troubled by a prosecution alleging that he
has been paid a bribe for the purpose. But a member who is
alleged to have accepted bribe but has not voted cannot enjoy
immunity under Article 105(2). Also, the members of the house
who have given the bribe do not enjoy any immunity from
prosecution. On this view, the majority held that four JMM
members who had taken the money and put it against the
motion were not guilty of corruption. But one member, Ajit
Singh, who has taken the money but did not vote was held
liable to be prosecuted.

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But the majority judges expressed the view, narrowly
interpreting Article 105(2), that the immunity under Article
which can be claimed is the liability that has arisen as a
consequence of the speech that has been made for the vote that
has been given in the Parliament.
The minority judges have argued that the criminal liability
incurred by a member of Parliament who has a accepted the
bribe for speaking or giving his vote in Parliament in particular
manner arises independently of the making of the speech or
giving of vote by member and such liability cannot be regarded
as the liability in respect of anything said or any vote given in
the Parliament.
On the second question mentioned above, all the judges are
agreed that a member of Parliament or a State Legislature is a
public servant under Section 2 (c) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988, because he holds an office and he is
required and authorised to carry out a public duty, viz,
effectively and fearlessly representing his constituency.
Under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 a
public servant cannot be prosecuted for certain offences
without the sanction of competent authority, i.e, The authority
competent to remove him from office. In the case of a member
of Parliament or state legislature, there exists no such
competent authority capable of removing him. Therefore, the
majority view is that a member can be prosecuted for such
offences, but after obtaining the permission of chairman or
speaker as the case maybe of the concerned house.
__________________________________________________

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Topic: Parliamentary Privileges And Fundamental
Right
Name of the Case: Keshav Singh v. Speaker, legislative
assembly, AIR 1965 SC 349
Bench : Justice J. Takru & Justice G. Mathur
Issue:
1. Whether any other Fundamental Rights would apply to
legislative privileges as it was not pertinent to the issue in
hand?
2. Whether a particular privilege claimed by a house exists or
not on the basis whether the house of commons had
enjoyed the same on January 26, 1950?
3. Whether the power of house to commit for its contempt can
be accepted in India in the view of the fact that, unlike
England, India had a written constitution containing
Fundamental Right, and the doctrine of judicial review of
legislative action forms a part of country’s constitutional
jurisprudence?
Fact of the Case: Keshav Singh printed and published a
pamphlet against a member of State Legislative Assembly. The
house adjudged him guilty of committing its contempt and
sentenced him to be reprimanded. On 16 March 1964, when the
speaker administered a reprimand to him, he behaved in the
house in an objectionable manner. Accordingly, the House
directed that he be imprisoned for seven days for committing
contempt of House by his conduct in the house at the time of
being reprimanded by the Speaker. On 19 March 1964,
advocate Solomon presented a petition under Article 226 to the
Allahabad High Court for a writ of habeas corpus (to bring a
party before a Court or a Judge) on behalf of Keshav Singh
alleging that his detention was illegal as the house had no

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authority to do so; he had not been given an opportunity to
defend himself and that his detention was mala fide (carried out
in bad faith) and against natural justice. The court passed an
interim bail order releasing cases in pending a full hearing of
the petition on merits. Instead of filing a return to Keshav Singh
petition, the house resolved pre-emptorily (to take action in
order to prevent happening) that Keshav Singh, advocate
Solomon and two judges of High Court who had passed the
interim bail order, had committed contempt of the house and
that they be brought before it in custody.
The judge moved petition under Article 226 in the High Court
asserting that the dissolution of the house was wholly
unconstitutional and violated the provision of Article 211
[Article 121 in case of Parliament]; that in ordering release of
Keshav Singh on the habeas corpus petition, The judges were
exercising their jurisdiction and authority vested in them as
judges of the High Court under Article 226. A full bench
consisting of all the 28 judges of High Court ordered stay of the
implementation of the resolution of the House till the disposal
of the said petition.
Thereafter, the house then passed a clarificatory resolution
saying that its earlier resolution had given rise to misgiving that
the concerned person would be deprived of an opportunity of
explanation; that it was not so and the question of contempt
would be decided only after giving an opportunity to explain to
the judges. The warrant of arrest against two judges were
withdrawn, but they were placed under an obligation to appear
before house and explain why the house should not proceed
against them for its contempt. The High Court again granted a
stay order against the implementation of this resolution. Thus,
there emerged a complete legislative judicial deadlock.

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At this stage, the President of India referred the matter to the
Supreme Court for its advisory opinion under Article 143 of the
Constitution of India.
The Supreme Court held that the two judges had not committed
contempt of the legislature by issuing the bail order. The judges
had jurisdiction and competence to entertain cases since
petition and to pass the order as they did. The assembly was not
competent to direct the custody and production before itself of
the advocates and the judges. It was further held that the three
wings of democratic state, viz, legislature, executive and the
judiciary. The court emphasised that these three organs must
function not in antimony, nor in a spirit of hostility, but
rationally harmoniously.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while considering the question
of mutual relationship between Fundamental Rights and
legislative privilege held that Article 21 would apply to
Parliamentary privileges and a person would be free to come to
the court for a rate of habeas corpus on the ground that he had
been deprived of his personal liberty not in accordance with the
law but for capricious or malafide reasons.
The Supreme Court in concerned to the first issue mentioned
herewith held that the position appears to be that it is wrong to
suppose that no Fundamental Right applies to the area of
legislative privileges. Some Fundamental Rights, like Article
19(1)(a), do not apply. Perhaps, Article 19(1)(a) to Article
19(1)(g) would not apply. On the other hand, some
Fundamental Rights, example, Article 21 do apply, while the
position with regard to others, example, Article 22(1) and
Article 22(2), is not clear.
The Supreme Court in regard to issue number 2 mentioned
herewith, the court retaliated to the judgement pronounced in
MSM Sharma v. Sinha (I), AIR 1959 SC 395, wherein, on the

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one hand, the court decided the general question whether a
breach of privilege occurs when a newspaper print a report
including the portion ordered to be expunged by the Speaker.
The court answered the question in the affirmative. But, on the
other hand, when the question arose whether the expunged
person had been printed by the newspaper or not, the court
refused to express any opinion on this controversy saying that it
must be left to the house itself to determine whether there has,
in fact, been any breach of its privilege. Of course, when once it
is held that a particular privilege exists, then it is for the house
to judge the occasion and a manner of its exercise and the court
would not sit in judgement over the way of the house has
exercised its privilege. Each house of parliament in India has
the power to commit a person for its contempt, but the position
remains vague on the question whether such contempt is
immune from judicial security or not.
The Supreme Court pointed out that Article 211 [Article 121 in
case of Parliament] debars the State Legislature from
discussing the conduct of a High Court judge. Therefore, on a
party of reasoning, one House, a part of the Legislature, cannot
take any action against a High Court for anything done in the
discharge of his duties. The existence of a fearless and
independent judiciary being the basic foundation of the
constitutional structure in India, no legislature has power to
take action under Article 194 (3) or 105 (3) against a Judge for
its contempt alleged to have been committed by a judge in the
discharge of his duties. The court also held that right of the
citizens to move the judicature and the right of the advocate to
assist that process must remain and controlled by Article 105
(3) and Article 194 (3). It is necessary to do so for enforcing the
Fundamental Rights and for sustaining the rule of law in the
country. Therefore, a house could not pass a resolution for
committing a High Court judge for contempt. The court

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rejected the contention of assembly that it had absolute power
to commit a person for its contempt and a general warrant
issued by it would be conclusive and free from judicial
scrutiny. The court declared that House of Commons enjoyed
the privilege to commit a person for contempt by non-
justiciable general warrant, as a superior Court of record in the
land and not the legislature. Therefore, Parliament and the state
legislature in India, which have never been courts, cannot claim
such a privilege.

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Part V
The Union Judiciary
Article 124 to 147

Topic: Appointment Of Supreme Court Judges And

Judicial Autonomy (Three Judge Case)
First of 3-Judge Case: S.P Gupta v. UOI, AIR 1982 SC 149
Bench: Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice Syed
Murtuza Fazal Ali, Justice V.D. Tulzapukar, Justice D.H.
Desai, Justice R.S. Pathak, and Justice E.S. Venkataramiah
Fact of the Case: The relevant part of the case concerns
disclosure of certain document between the Ministry of Justice,
the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court, and the Chief Justice of
India, as well as the relevant note made in connection with non-
election of judge over the time and appeal of High Court judge.
The appellant, together with one of the judges in the question,
sought disclosure of these documents.
Judgment: The seven-judge bench of Supreme Court stab list
precedence for the collegium system of Supreme Court and
High Court of India.
Power of appointment of judges
Justice is Venkata Ramaiah, in his verdict, wrote that under the
scheme of Article 217 the power to appoint a Judge of the High
Court is vested in the President. However, if there are
conflicting opinion the President has to weigh them after giving
due consideration to each of them and take decision on the
question. He mentioned that while he is bound to consult
authority is mentioned therein and to take into consideration
their opinions, he is not bound by their opinion. Ordinarily, one
does not expect the President to make an appointment by

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ignoring all the adverse opinions expressed by the functionaries
mentioned in Article 217.
Chief Justice of India not being entitled to primacy in case of
difference of opinion.
Justice PN Bhagwati mentioned in this regard that the opinion
of each of these three constitutional functionaries is entitled to
equal weight and is not possible to say that the opinion of Chief
Justice of India must have primacy over the opinions of other to
constitutional functionaries. If primacy were to be given to the
opinion of Chief Justice of India, it would, in substance,
amount to concurrence, because giving primacy would mean
that his opinion must prevail over that of the Chief Justice of
the High Court and the Governor of the State, which means that
Central Government must accept his opinion.
Consultation
Justice Desai mentioned in this regard that the consultation has
to be meaningful, purposeful, result oriented and of
substance.... All the parties involved in the process of
consultation must put all the material at its command relevant
to the subject under discussion before all other authority is to be
consulted. Nothing can be kept back. Nothing can be withheld.
Nothing can be left for the eyes of any particular constitutional
functionaries. It was, however, clarified that the President will
have the right to differ from other constitutional functionaries,
i.e, Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice of concerned High
Court and Governor of the State, for cogent reason and take a
contrary view.
Collegium System for Appointment of Judges
This was the first case to introduce the concept of collegium
system. Justice PN Bhagwati writes as under:

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“we would rather suggest that there must be a collegium to
make a recommendation to the President in regard to
appointment of a Supreme Court or High Court Judge. The
recommending authority should be more broad-based and there
should be consultation with wider interests. If the collegium is
composed of persons who are expected to have knowledge of
the persons who may be fit for appointment on the bench and of
quality is required for appointment and this last requirement is
absolutely essential— it would go a long way towards securing
the right kind of judges, who would be truly independent in the
sense we have indicated above and who would invest the
judicial process with significance and meaning for the deprived
and exploited section of humanity.”
Second Judge Case: Supreme Court advocates on record
Association v. UOI, AIR 1994 SC 268
Bench: Justice S.R. Pandian, Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Justice J.
Verma, Justice J.S. Punchhi, Justice M.M. Yogeshwar Dayal
Ray, Justice Dr. A.S. Anand and Justice S.P. Bharucha
Fact of the Case: A Public Interest Litigation was filed in
Supreme Court by lawyers association rising several crucial
issues concerning the judges of Supreme Court and High
Courts. The petition was considered by a bench of nine judges.
Judgment: The court considered the question of the primacy of
the opinion of Chief Justice of India in regard to the
appointment of the Supreme Court Judges. The Court
emphasised that the question has to be considered in the context
of achieving the constitutional purpose of selecting the best
suitable for composition of the Supreme Court so essential to
ensure the independence of judiciary, and, thereby, to preserve
democracy.
Referring to the consultative process envisaged in Article
124(2) for appointment of Supreme Court judges, the Court

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emphasised that this procedure indicates the government does
not enjoy primacy for ‘absolute discretion’ in the matter of
appointment of Supreme Court judges.
The court has pointed out that the provision for consultation
with the Chief Justice was introduced because of the realisation
that the Chief Justice is best equipped to know and assess the
worth of the candidate and his suitability for appointment as a
Supreme Court judge, and it was also necessary to eliminate
political influence.
The Court has also emphasise that the phraseology used in
Article 124(2) indicates that it was not considered desirable to
wish absolute discretion or power of veto in the Chief Justice as
an individual in the matter of appointments so that there should
remain some power with executive to be exercised as a check,
whenever necessary. Accordingly, the Court observed as under;
“The indication is that in the choice of a candidate suitable for
appointment, the opinion of Chief Justice of India should have
the greatest weight, the selection should be made as a result of
a participatory consultative process in which the executive
should have a power to act as a mere check on the exercise of
power of Chief Justice of India, to achieve the constitutional
purpose. Thus, the executive element in the appointment
process reduced to the minimum and any political influence is
eliminated. It was for this reason that the word ‘consultation’
instead of ‘concurrence’ was used, but that was done merrily to
indicate that absolute discretion was not given to anyone, not
even to Chief Justice of India as an individual.”
Thus, in the matter of appointment of a Supreme Court judge,
the primary aim is to reach an exit decision taking into account
the view of all the consultancies giving the greatest weight to
the opinion of Chief Justice. When decision is reached by
consensus, no question of primacy arises. Only when

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conflicting opinion emerged at the end of the process, the
question of giving primacy to the opinion of Chief Justice
arises, unless for a very good reason known to the executive
and is disclosed to the chief Justice of India, the appointment is
not considered to be suitable.
The 3rd Judge Case: Re Special Reference, AIR 1999 SC 1
Background: Clarify certain points arising out of above
judgement, the Supreme Court has delivered an advisory
opinion on reference made by President under Article 143. In
this opinion, the court has laid down the following proposition
in regard to the appointment of Supreme Court judges:
Observation:
1. In making his recommendation for appointment to the
Supreme Court, the chief Justice of India ought to consult
four senior most puisne Judges of the Supreme Court.
Thus, the collegium to make recommendations for
appointment should consist of the Chief Justice and four
senior most puisne Judges.
2. The opinion of all the members of collegium in respect of
each decision should be in writing.
3. The views of senior most Supreme Court judge who has
from the High Court from where the person recommended
comes must be obtained in writing from consideration of
collegium.
4. If the majority of the collegium is against the appointment
of a particular person, that person shall be appointed. The
course he is gone on to say that “if even two of the judges
forming the collegium expresses strong view, for good
reason, that are adverse to the appointment of a particular
person, the chief Justice of India would not press for such
appointment.”

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5. The following exception have not been engrafted on the
rule of seniority among the High Court judges for
appointment to the Supreme Court:
a. High Court judge of outstanding merit can be
appointed as a Supreme Court judge regardless of his standing
in the seniority list. All that needs to be recorded when
recommending him for appointment is that he has outstanding
merit.
b. A High Court judge may be appointed as a Supreme
Court judge for good reason from amongst several judges of
equal merit, as for example, the particular region of the country
in which his parents High Court is situated is not represented on
Supreme Court bench.
Thus, the responsibility to make recommendation for
appointment as Supreme Court judges has been taken away
from Central executive and has not been placed on collegium
consisting of the chief Justice of India and four senior most
puisne judges. The sphere of consultation has thus been
broadened. Before this opinion was delivered, this collegium
consisted of chief Justice and two senior most judges. The court
has not specifically stated that an opinion formed by the chief
Justice of India in any manner other than that indicated has no
primacy in the matter of appointments to the supreme Court
and the government is not obliged to act thereon.
The 99th Constitutional Amendment Act of 2014 and the
National Judicial Appointments Commission Act of 2014 have
replaced the collegium system of appointing judges to the
Supreme Court and high courts with a new body called national
judicial appointment commission NJAC. However, in 2015, the
Supreme Court has declared on the 99th Constitutional
amendment act as well as the NJAC act as unconstitutional and
void. Consequently, the earlier collegium system became

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operative again. The verdict was delivered by the Supreme
Court in fourth Judges case, 2015 [The Supreme Court
advocates on record Association v. UOI, W.P. (C) No. 13 of
2015].

Topic: Ingredients That Constitute Contempt Of

Court
Name of the case: Hira Lal Dixit v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 1954 SC 743
Bench: Justice M.C. Mahajan, Justice Mukherjea, Justice S.
Das, Justice V. Bose, Justice G. Hassan
Fact of the Case: The appellant urges that the passage
complained of could not possibly be capable of any derogatory
meaning or application and could not be regarded as
constituting a contempt of court. However, the respondent
argued that the passage in question was perfectly innocuous and
only expressed laudatory sentiment toward the court and that
such flattery could not possibly have the slightest derogatory
words against the judges.
Judgment: Following factors have been laid down by Supreme
Court that constitute contempt of court. They are as under;
1. Institution derogatory to the dignity of which are calculated
to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of
judges.
2. An attempt by one party to prejudice the Court against the
other party to the action.
3. To stir up public feelings on the question pending for
decision before the court and to try to impress the judges in
favour of himself.

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4. An attempt to affect the mind of judges and to deflect them
from performing their duty by flattery or veiled threat.
5. An act for publication which is scandalises the court
attributing dishonesty to a judge in the discharge of his
functions.
6. Willful disobedience or non-compliance of the court’s
order.

Topic: Nature Of Original Jurisdiction Of Supreme

Court Under Article 131
Name of the Case: State of Rajasthan v. UOI, AIR 1977 SC
1361
Bench: Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice P.K. Goswami,
Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia and Justice Syed
Murtaza Fazalali
Fact of the Case: There were general elections in the country
for Lok Sabha in 1977 in which the Congress party was badly
defeated. At this time, there were Congress ministries in several
state. The Home Ministries, Government of India, through a
communication advise the Chief Minister of the state to advise
their governors to dissolve the state assemblies under Article
174 (2) (b) of the Constitution, and seek a fresh mandate from
the people.
The State Government filed suits in the Supreme Court against
the Central Government under Article 131 seeking injunctions
against dissolution of state legislative assemblies under Article
356 and holding fresh elections in the states because the ruling
party had been defeated in the elections for the Lok Sabha in
these states.

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The Central Government raised several preliminary objections
to the maintainability of the suit, viz;
1. Article 131 covers disputes only between the Government
of India and a ‘State’. There is a distinction between a State
and a “State Government”;
2. Article 131 covers special kinds of disputes in which
States, as such, may be interested and not merely
Government of a State which may come and go;
3. There was no denial of any constitutional right to any State.
4. There was no legal point involved in the case which was
based purely on political factors.
5. The disputes related to the question whether the State
Assemblies should be dissolved which did not involve any
question on which the existence or extent of a legal right
depended.
Judgment: The Supreme Court rejecting all these contentions
held that the matter fell within Article 131. The Court refused
to give a restrictive meaning to Article 131. It ruled that Article
131 includes a dispute between central and State Government
involving a legal right. In the words of Justice Chandrachud,
“the true construction of Article 131(a), true in substance and
true pragmatically, is that a dispute must arise between the
UOI and a state.”
The dispute between the UOI and a State cannot be a dispute
which arises out of the difference between the Government in
Office at Centre and the Government in Office in a State. It is
not necessary for attracting Article 131 that the plaintiff must
assert a legal right in itself. Article 131 contains no such
restriction. It is sufficient for attracting Article 131 that the
plaintiff questions the legal or constitutional right asserted by
the defendant, be it the Government of India or any other State.

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Such a challenge brings the suit within the term of Article 131
for, the questions for decision of the Court is not whether this
or that particular legislative assembly is in title to continue in
office but whether the government of India which asserts the
Constitution drive to dissolve the assembly on the grounds
alleged, possesses any such right.
The State has the locus and interest to contest and seek an
adjudication of the claim set up by the Union Government. In a
Federation, the state is vitally interested in defining the powers
of the Central Government, on the one hand, and their own, on
the other.
Case Second: State of Karnataka v. UOI, AIR 1978 SC 68
Bench Chief Justice M Hameedullah Beg, Justice Y.V.
Chandrachud, Justice Bhagwati, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice
P.N. Singhal, Justice Jaswant Singh and Justice P.S. Kailasam
Fact of the Case: The Government of India appointed a
commission of enquiry under Commission of Enquiry Act, to
inquire into certain allegations of corruption and misuse of
power by the Chief Minister and a few other ministers. The
State Government brought a suit against the Centre under
Article 131 for issue of a declaration that the notification
appointing the commission was illegal and ultra vires.
The main contention of the state was that the Commission of
Enquiry Act does not authorise the Central Government to
constitute a commission of enquiry in regard to matters falling
exclusively within the state legislative and executive power.
The crucial question arises was, whether the Central
Government could appoint a commission to inquire into the
contract of Chief Minister and other ministers of a state in the
discharge of their governmental function.

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Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that the suit under Article
131 by the State was competent and maintainable. The majority
Judges were not prepared to take too restrictive the view of
Article 131. They were not prepared to distinguish between the
‘State’ and its ‘Government’. The majority view was that there
exists an integral relationship between the state and its
government and what affects the government or the ministers in
their capacity as Ministers raises a matter in which the state
would be concerned. In the words of Justice Chandrachud:
“The object of Article 131 is to provide a high-powered
machinery for ensuring that the Central Government and the
State Government act within their respective spheres of their
authority and do not trespass upon each other constitutional
functions or powers.”
It was also clarified that under Article 131, it is not necessary
that the plaintiff should have some legal right of its own to
enforce, before it can file a suit. What is necessary is that the
dispute must be one involving any question “on which the
existence or extent of legal right” depends. The plaintive can
bring the suit so long as it has interest in raising the dispute
because it is affected by it, even if no legal right of it is
infringed provided, of course, The dispute is relatable to the
existence or extent of legal right.
Therefore, a challenge by the State Government or the authority
of the Central Government to appoint a commission of inquiry
or to inquire into the allegation against the state ministers as
regards the discharge of their concerns in the state clearly
involved to question on which the existence of extent of the
legal right of the Central Government to appoint such
commission depended and that was enough to sustain the
proceedings brought by the State under Article 131.
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Topic: Nature Of Special Leave Petition Under Article
136
Name of the Case: Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development
Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036
Bench Justice R.C. Lahoti and Justice B.N. Agrawal
Judgment: The Supreme Court has described the nature of its
power under Article 136 are as under:
“The exercise of judicial conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution on this court is discretionary. It does not confer a
right to appeal on a party to litigation, it only confers a
discretionary power of widest amplitude on this Court to be
exercised for satisfying the demands of justice. On one hand, it
is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly, with caution
and care and to remedy extraordinary situations or situations
occasioning gross failure of justice; On the other hand, it is an
overriding power whereunder the court may generously step in
to impart justice and remedy in justice.”
___________________________________________________

Topic: Law Declared By Supreme Court To Be

Binding On All Court
Name of the Case: Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sun
Engineering Works (P) Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 43
Bench: Justice Y. Dayal and Justice A. Anand
Judgment: The Supreme Court in regard to Article 141 of the
Constitution held that what is binding is the ratio of the
decision and not any findings on facts, or the opinion of the
Court on any question which was not required to be decided in
a particular case, it is the principle found out upon a reading of

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the judgement as a whole in the light of questions before the
court, and not particular words or sentences.
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Topic: Power Of Supreme Court To Do Complete

Justice Under Article 142
Name of the Case: Mohd Anis v. UOI, 1994 Supp (1) SCC
145
Bench: Justice A.M. Ahmadi and Justice N. Venkatachala
Fact of the Case: Under Section 25 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI)
cannot investigate a cognizable offence committed within a
state without the consent of the concerned State Government.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has ruled that it can under
Article 142(1) direct CBI to investigate such an offence within
a state without consent of the concerned State Government. The
Court has asserted that under exercise of its power under
Article 142(1) is not conditioned by any statutory power,
because statutory provisions cannot override constitutional
provisions. Article 142(1) being a constitutional power cannot
be limited or conditioned by any statutory provision. The Court
has explained the scope of Article 142 in following words:
“The constitutional plenitude of the power of Apex Court is to
ensure due and proper administration of justice and is intended
to be coextensive in each case and to meeting any exigency.
Very wide power has been conferred on this court for due and
proper administration of justice and whenever Court sees that
the demand of justice warrants exercise of such power, it will
reach out to ensure that justice is done by restoring to this
extraordinary power conferred to meet precisely such
situation.”

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The power under Article 142(1) cannot be diluted merely
because the act in question stipulates that the State Government
permission will be necessary if the CBI is to investigate any
offences committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a State
Government. That maybe actually obligation governing the
relation between the Central Government and State
Government but it cannot control Supreme Court power under
Article 142(1). The statute does not forfeit investigation by CBI
but only requires certain formalities to be completed which has
no relevance when the apex court makes an order in excise
office power under Article 142(1).

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PART VI
THE STATE

The Executive
Article 153 To 167 & 213

Topic: Tenure Of Governor Under Article 156 (1)

Name of the Case: Om Narain Agarwal v. Nagar Palika,
Shahjahanpur, AIR 1993 SC 1440
Bench: Justice N.M. Kasliwal and Justice Yogeshwar Dayal
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that while there exist
provisions in the Constitution for impeachment of President, no
such provisions exist concerning the Governor. The reason
being that as he holds his office during the pleasure of the
President, the Central Government can always recall him if the
instances so require. A governor is a political appointee, and
appointed is by the government on political considerations, it
can also be terminated on political considerations.

Topic: Whether Office Of Governor Is An

Employment Under The Government Of India
Name of the case: Hargovind Pant v. Raghukul Tilak, AIR
1979 SC 1109
Bench Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N. Bhagwati,
Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice Syed Murtuza Faizalai, Justice
R.S. Pathak
Fact of the Case: The first respondent, who was a member of
Rajasthan State Public Service Commission during the years
1958 to 1959, was later appointed as Governor of the State of

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Rajasthan. The petitioner contended that by the virtue of Article
319 (d) of the Constitution the respondent was ineligible to be
appointed as Governor of State because he was a member of the
State Public Service Commission.
Issue: Whether, by reason of Article 319(d) the respondent was
ineligible for employment either under the Government of India
or under the Government of State and whether the office of
governor was an employment under the Government of India?
Judgment: The Supreme Court has ruled that the office of
governor is not an employment under the Government of India,
and so it does not fall within the provision of Article 319(d).
Therefore, a member of the State Public Service Commission
can be appointed as Governor. The court adduced the following
reason for this view: unemployment can be said to be under the
Central Government if the holder or the incumbent is under the
control of Central Government vis-a-vis such employment. The
office of Governor does not fall under this description. The
office of Governor is not an employment under the Government
of India; The Governor occupies a high constitutional office
with important constitutional function and duties; he is not an
employee of the Government of India; he is not subordinate or
subservient or under the control of Government of India, nor is
he amenable to its directions, nor is he accountable to it for the
manner in which he carries his functions and duties. Governor
is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to
control of Government of India.
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Topic: Whether A Person Who Is Disqualified To Be A
Member Of State Legislature Could Be Appointed As
A Minister Or The Chief Minister Under Article
164(4)?
Name of the Case: B.R. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu,
(2001) 7 SCC 231
Bench Justice G.B. Pattanaik, Justice S.P. Bharucha, Justice
Brijesh Kumar, Justice Y.K. Sabharwal and Justice Ruma Pal
Fact of the Case: The nomination paper of Jayalalithaa for
election to the state legislative assembly was rejected. She had
been convicted for certain offences under the Prevention of
Corruption Act and the Indian penal Code and sentenced to 3
years rigorous imprisonment. She had appealed to the High
Court against her conviction; The High Court suspended her
sentence but not her conviction pending decision on her appeal.
Accordingly, she was disqualified to contest an election to the
house. As a result of the election, her party AIDMK all by a big
majority and elected her as a leader the governor of Tamil Nadu
appointed her as the chief minister under Article 164(4) as she
was not a member of the state legislature at this time. Her
appointment as the chief minister was challenged in Supreme
Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that it would be
“unreasonable and anomalous to conclude that a minister who
is a member of legislature is required to meet the constitutional
standards of qualification and disqualification but that a
minister who is not a member of legislature need not.
Logically, the standard expected of a minister who is not a
member should be the same as, if not greater then, those
required of a member.”

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However, if the Governor appoints a disqualified person to a
constitutional office, the discretion of the Governor may not be
challengeable because of Article 361, but that does not confer
any immunity on the appointee himself. The qualification of the
appointee to hold office can be challenged in proceeding for
quo warranto (a writ or legal action requiring a person to show
by what warrant an office or franchise is held, claimed, or
exercised). If the appointment is contrary to any constitutional
provision, it can be quashed by the court.

Topic: Conduct Of Government Business Under

Article 154 And 166
Name of the Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Yashwant
Trimbak, AIR 1996 SC 765
Bench: Justice J.B. Patnaik and Justice S.C. Agrawal
Fact of the Case: According to the pension rules, the
departmental proceeding against a retired employee could not
be instituted without the “Section of the Governor”. The
learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised two
contentions assailing the legality of the order of the Tribunal:
1) The order initiating the departmental enquiry proceeding
which was served on the respondent having been passed in the
name and by order of the Governor in terms of Article 166(2)
of the Constitution of India, the validity of the order cannot be
called in question on the ground that it is not an order executed
by the Governor and Tribunal, therefore, committed gross error
of law in quashing the departmental proceedings on a finding
that there has been no sanction of the Governor.
2) The power to accord sanction under Rule 9(2)(b)(i) of the
Pension Rules being an executive power of the State

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Government and the Governor having allocated the Business of
the State Government to be transacted by the different
Ministers under the Rule of Business made under sub-Article
(3) of Article 166 of the Constitution and admittedly the
Council of Ministers having accorded sanction, there is no
infirmity with the same and further the sanction of the
Governor himself is not necessary.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the order could not be
questioned in any court on the ground that it was not made or
executed by the Governor. The bar to judicial inquiry with
regard to the validity of such order engrafted in Article 166(2)
would be attracted. “The signature of the concerned secretary
or under-secretary who is authorised under the authentication
rule to sign the document signifies the consent of the Governor
as well as the acceptance of the advice rendered by the
concerned minister.”
The court mentioned that the order of sanction for prosecution
of a retired government servant is executive act of the
government. Under Article 166(3), the Governor may frame
rules of business and allocate all his functions to different
ministers except those which the Governor is required by the
Constitution to exercise his own discretion. The expression
“business of the government of the state” in Article 166 (3),
comprises of functions which the Governor is to exercise with
the aid and advice of the Council of ministers including the
functions which the governor has to exercise in his own
subjective satisfaction as well as statutory function of the State
Government. Therefore, accepting the matter to be discharged
by the Governor in his discretion, “the personal satisfaction of
the Governor is not required and any funds may be allocated to
ministers”. Therefore, the decision taken by council of
ministers to sanction prosecution of the retired government
servant is valid and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

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___________________________________________________

Topic: Power Of Governor Under Article 167

Name of the Case: J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR
2003 SC 1405
Bench: Justice Shivraj V. Patil and Justice Arijit Pasayat
Fact of the Case: The appellant was appointed as judicial
member of the tribunal issued by Finance Department of the
Government of Rajasthan. He prays for issuing a writ of
mandamus to the State of Rajasthan to pay compensation on
cessation of functioning as Chairman of the abolished
Rajasthan Taxation and Tribunal having been turned down by
the learned single judge and the division bench of Rajasthan
High Court the appeal was referred to Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that the Constitution
requires that action must be taken by the authority concerned in
the name of the Governor. It is not till this formality is observed
that the action can be regarded as that of the State.
Constitutionally speaking the Council of Minister or advisor
and as the head of state, the Governor is to act with the aid and
advice of Council of Ministers. Therefore, till the advice is a
given by the Governor, the council of minister does not get
legalized into the action of the state.
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State Legislature
Article 168 To 212

Topic: Meeting Of State Legislature And Power Of

Summoning Under Article 188
Name of the Case: Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of
India, AIR 2006 SC 980
Bench: Chief Justice Y.K. Sabharwal, Justice K.G.
Balakrishnan, Justice B.N. Agrawal, Justice Ashok Bhan,
Justice Arijit Pasayat
Fact of the case: Petitioner challenges the constitutional
validity of notification which orders dissolution of the
legislative assembly of the State of Bihar. It is a unique case.
Earlier cases that come up before Supreme Court those where
the dissolution of assemblies was ordered on the ground that
the parties in the power had lost the confidence of the house.
The present case is of its own kind where before even the first
meeting of legislative assemblies, its dissolution has been
ordered on the ground that attempts to crumble majority by
illegal means and lay claim to form the government in the state
and if these attempts continue, it would amount to tampering
with Constitutional provisions.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the constitution of
any Assembly can only be under Section 73 of the
Representation of People Act, 1951 and the requirement of
Article 188 of the Constitution suggests that the Assembly
comes into existence even before its first sitting commences.
Normally, the government is formed by the party commanding
the required majority in the State. However, the issue has
become more complex with a number of political parties in the
fray. If a political party with the support of other political

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parties or other MLAs stake claim to form a Government and
satisfies the Governor about its majority to form a stable
Government, the Governor cannot refuse formation of the
Government and override the majority claim because of his
subjective assessment that the majority was cobble together by
illegal and unethical means.
The Governor summons house to meet at such times and places
as he thinks fit. It is now a well-settled convention that the
Governor summons the house not of his own accord but only
with advised to do so by Council of ministers.
It is the Council of Minister which provides business for a
session of the legislature, and, therefore, it follows that for the
Governor to act otherwise in accordance with such advice in
the matter of summoning House of legislature would be without
purpose.
Six months should not intervene between the last sitting in one
session of the house and date for his first meeting in the next
session under Article 174 (1).
___________________________________________________

Topic: The Governors Power Of Prorogation Under

Article 174
Name of the case: State of Punjab v. Sat Pal Dang, AIR
1969 SC 903
Bench: Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.C. Shah,
Justice V Ramasamy, Justice G.K. Mitter, Justice A.N. Grover
Fact of the Case: On the eve of the adoption of the State
budget and passing of the Appropriation Bill, the Speaker
adjourned the House for two months on the plea that there was
disorder in the House. It was however suspected that the
Speaker had done this to thwart a move to pass a vote of no

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confidence against him. The adjournment led to a crisis because
in the absence of the appropriation being made by the
legislature, the State Government could not withdraw any
money from the Consolidated Fund of State, and there was thus
a danger of the government machinery coming to a standstill.
To set matter right, the Governor had to intervene. He
prorogued the house and summon it to meet a week later.
The action of the Governor in proroguing and summoning the
house was challenged in the Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court pointed out that “Article
174(2) (a) which enables the governor to prorogue the
Legislature does not indicate any restriction on this power”.
The power is “untrammeled” by the Constitution, and that the
Governor had exercised his power to get rid of the speakers and
adjournment order and to put back the constitutional machinery
of the State into life. Governor’s action was perfectly
understandable as an emergency had arisen. There was no
abuse of power by him and no mala fide (abuse of power) on
his part.
Implicit, however, in this remark of the Court is the suggestion
that the Governor does not enjoy an absolute discretion to
prorogue the house and there may be circumstances when
prorogation may be questioned on the ground that of want of
good faith and abuse by him of his constitutional powers.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Internal Autonomy To The State Legislature

Under Article 212
Name of the Case: Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works v. State
of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 589

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Bench: Justice J.L. Kapur, Justice S.K. Das, Justice A.K.
Sarkar, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice Raghubar Dayal
Fact of the Case: The Constitution validity of Indian Coinage
(Amendment Act), 1955 was challenged.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the validity of a
taxing measure cannot be challenged on the ground that it
offends Article 197 to 199. And, the procedure laid down in
Article 202 of the Constitution as Article 212 prohibits the
validity of any proceeding in the state legislature called in
question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure.
No officer or member of the State Legislature in whom the
powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating
procedure, or the conduct of the business, or for maintaining
order in the legislature, is to be subject to the jurisdiction of any
court in respect of the excise by him of the power under Article
212.

State Judiciary
Article 214 To 231

Topic: Qualifications For A High Court Judge Under

Article 217
Name of the Case: Kumar Padma Prasad v. UOI, AIR 1992
SC 1213
Bench: Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice P.B. Sawant and Justice
N.M. Kasliwal
Fact of the Case: Siri K.N. Srivastava, Secretary to Law and
Justice, Mizoram Government, was appointed as High Court
Judge. The appointment was challenged by petitioner through
the writ petition in Gauhati High Court. The Gauhati High

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Court granted a stay on the warrant of appointment. Shri
Srivastava then moved the Supreme Court against the High
Court order from High Court to the Supreme Court.
Judgment: Referring to Article 217, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the question was whether Shri Srivastava had
held a judicial office for 10 years. The term judicial office has
not been defined in the Constitution, according to the Court,
holder of the judicial office under Article 217 means a person
who exercises only judicial function and renders decisions in a
judicial capacity. He must belong to a judicial service which in
a class is free from executive control and is disciplined to hold
the dignity, integrity and independence of judiciary.
The Supreme Court ruled that Shri Srivastava was not qualified
to be appointed as High Court judge as he had held no judicial
office in the judicial service. The court ruled that the office of
Legal Remembrancer-cum-Secretary (Law and Judicial) of the
State Government headed by him was a non-judicial office
under the control of executive. All other offices held by him
was neither judicial nor part of any judicial service. He also did
not complete 10 years as a member of the state judicial service.
Thus, the Supreme Court made it clear that ordinarily the
domain in such matters play wholly with the constitutional
authorities like the present, where the incumbent did not fulfil
the qualification prescribed for the office, it became the court’s
duty to see that no ineligible or unqualified person was
appointed to a high constitutional office of High Court judges.
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Topic: Transfer Of High Court Judges Under Article
222
Name of the Case: Re Presidential Reference, AIR 1999 SC
1(final case on the issue) [check three judge case on
Appointment of Judges]
Bench: Justice S. Bharucha, Justice M Mukherjee, Justice S.
Majmudar, Justice S.V. Manohar, Justice G. Nanavati, Justice
S.S. Ahmad, Justice K. Venkataswami, Justice B. Kirpal and
Justice G. Pattanaik
Judgment: The Supreme Court has further elucidated its
ruling in Supreme Court advocates on the transfer of a High
Court judge. The court has stated that before recommending the
transfer of a judge from one High Court to another as a judge,
Chief Justice of India must consult a plurality of judges. He
must take into account the views Chief Justice of the High
Court from which the judges are to be transferred, any judge of
Supreme Court whose opinion may have significance in the
case, the Chief Justice of High Court the transfer is to be
affected.
All these views are to be expressed in writing and should be
considered by a collegium consisting of the Chief Justice and
four senior most puisne judges of the Supreme Court. The
collegium should consider the response of the judges to be
transferred. This view and those of the four senior most judges
should be conveyed to the Government of India along with the
proposal for transfer. Unless the decision to transfer has been
taken in manner aforesaid, it is not decisive and does not bind
the Government of India.
Because of all the safeguards mentioned above, judicial review
in case of transfer of High Court judges, according to the court,
would be limited to a case where transfer of judges has been

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made or recommended without obtaining the view and reaching
the decision in the manner aforesaid.
___________________________________________________

Topic: The Court Of Record And Power To Punish

For Its Contempt Under Article 215
Name of the Case: State of Bihar v. Subhash Singh, AIR
1997 SC 1390
Bench: Justice K. Ramasawamy and Justice G.T. Nanavati
Fact of the Case: While disposing of a writ petition, the High
Court directed the concerned officer to consider the case and
dispose it off within two months. When this did not happen, the
High Court imposed the cost on the officer personally for non-
compliance of its order. The appeal was filed before Supreme
Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has emphasised that the head
of department or designated officer is ultimately accountable to
the court for the result of the action or decision taken.
Executive is entrusted to comply with the orders passed by the
Court in exercise of judicial review. The Court exercises its
power of judicial review to ensure that the executive discharges
its power “truly, objectively, expeditiously for the purpose of
which substantive, act/result are intended.” Executive actions of
the state or its official must be carried out subject to the
Constitution and within the limits set by the law. “Judicial
review of administrative action is, therefore, an essential part
of the rule of law.”
When the court directs an officer to discharge his duties
expeditiously and if it is not done, the officer concerned is
required to explain to the court as to the circumstances in which
he could not comply with the direction issued by the court. If

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there was any unavoidable delay, he should have sought further
time for compliance. In the instant case, the concerned officer
took no such step. The Supreme Court also impressed on the
High Court to be circumspect in imposing cost personally
against official and keep at the back of his mind that fact in
each case.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Nature Of Writ Petition Under Article 226

Name of the Case: L. Chandra Kumar v, UOI, (1997) 3
SCC 261
Bench: Chief Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Justice M.M. Punchhi,
Justice K. Ramasamy, Justice S.P. Bharucha, Justice S. Saghir
Issue:
1. Whether the tribunal, constituted under Article 323A and
under Article 323B of the Constitution, possess the
competence to test the constitutional validity of the
provision?
Fact of the Case: Several Special Leave Petition, civil appeals,
writ petitions were clubbed together to form the concern
petition before Supreme Court of India on the said issue.
Judgment: The seven-judge bench of Supreme Court held that
the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the
Constitution is the basic feature of the Constitution. Having
held so, the Court at the same held that a litigant cannot straight
away invoke the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction at the
first instance but must approach the Administrative Tribunal
first.
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Topic: Nature Of The Power Of High Court Under
Article 227
Name of the Case: State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC
641
Bench: Justice S.N. Variava and Justice Brijesh Kumar
Judgment: Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the
High Court the power of superintendence overall courts and
Tribunal throughout the territory in relation to which it
exercises its jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or
fettered by any act of the state legislature. The supervisory
jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate tribunal within
the limit of their authority. The powers under Article 227 are
vide and can be used, to meet the end of justice. They can be
used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However, the
power under Article 227 is discretionary power and it is
difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source
of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purports
to exercise any discretionary power. It is settled law that this
power of judicial superintendence must be exercised sparingly
and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors.
Further, where the statute bar exercise of revisional power, it
would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant
interference in Article 227 since the power of superintendence
was not meant to circumvent statutory law.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Appointment Of District Judges Under Article

233
Name of the Case: State of Kerala v. A Lakshmikutty, AIR
1987 SC 331

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Bench: Justice A.P. Sen and Justice B.C. Ray
Issue: Whether the High Court could issue a writ of mandamus
to the governor of state directing him to act as per the
recommendation of High Court to fill up the vacancies in the
post of district judge reserved for directorship meant from the
practicing member of the bar under Article 233 (1) of the
Constitution of India?
Fact of the case: Judicial review of the acts of governor not to
appoint candidates of district judges post as recommended by
the High Court and not to communicate on this matter with the
concerned High Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has greatly discussed the
respective roles of government and the High Court in the matter
of appointment of district judges. This matter is governed by
Article 233(1) of the Constitution according to which the
appointment of district judges is to be made by the State
Governor in consultation with the High Court under Article
233(1). A person not being in service of the state or of the
Centre can be appointed only when recommended by High
Court under Article 233(2). Some of the salient point which
emerges from the court’s opinion are as under;
1. The power of State Government to appoint district judges is
not absolute and unfettered but is hedged in with
restrictions. The power is conditioned by the requirement
of consultation with the High Court.
2. The power of appointment is an executive function of the
government.
3. The eligibility for appointment as a district judge by
director depends entirely on the High Court‘s
recommendation. The State Government cannot appoint

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anyone from outside the panel of names forwarded by the
High Court.
4. Conversation between the High Court and the State
Government, as envisaged by Article 233(1), must be “real,
full and effective”. This means that there must be an
interchange of views between the High Court and the State
Government. On this point, the court has emphasised as
under; “if the State Government were simply to give lip
service to the principle of consultation and depart from the
advice of the High Court in making judicial appointments
without referring back to the High Court, the difficulties
which prevent the government from accepting its advice,
the consultation would not be effective and any
appointment of a person as a district judge under Article
233(1) would be invalid.”
5. Normally, as a matter of rule, the recommendation of the
High Court for appointment of district judge should be
accepted by State Government. If, in any particular case,
the State Government for “good and valid reasons” find it
difficult to accept the recommendations of the High Court,
the government should communicate its view to the High
Court.”
In the instant case, the High Court forwarded to the State
Government, a panel of names for appointment as district
judges. For some reason, the State Government did not want to
accept the final list but it did not communicate its view to the
High Court in the matter. The Supreme Court ruled that before
rejecting the panel forwarded by the High Court, the
government should have conveyed its view to the High Court to
elicit its opinion. The government should have taken the High
Court into confidence. Accordingly, a mandamus was issued to
the State Government requiring it to communicate its view to
the High Court to elicit its opinion.

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Topic: Betterment Of The Condition Of Services Of

The Members Of Subordinate Judiciary
Name of the Case: All India Judges Association v. UOI,
AIR 1992 SC 165
Bench: Chief Justice Ranganath Misra, Justice A.M. Ahmadi,
Justice P.B. Sawant
Fact of the Case: Petition was filed by All India Judges
Association under Article 32 seeking direction for setting up an
All India Judicial Services and for bringing about uniform
condition of services for members of the subordinate judiciary
throughout the country. The Court referred to work the law
commission had shared in its 14 Report in the year 1958 from
the portion of setting up of All India Judicial Services and
observed:
“there is considerable force in the view expressed by the Law
Commission. An All India Judicial Services essentially for
manning the higher services in the subordinate judge receive is
very much necessary. The reason advanced by the Law
Commission for recommending the setting up of All India
Judicial Services appeal to us.”
The court has thus directed the Central Government and other
authority concerned to take appropriate steps to set up and All
India Judicial Services, and bring about uniformity in
designation of judicial services. This requires action be taken
under Article 312.
In addition, the Supreme Court also directed various
improvements being effectuated in the condition of service of
the subordinate judiciary, example, raising the retirement age of
60 years, examination of the pay structure of judicial services,

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provisions for admissions for purchase of law books and
journals for a residential library for every judicial officers,
provision for residential accommodation, etc.
Justifying the higher retirement age for judicial officer then the
executive officer, the court has said that the work of a judge
involves more of a mental activity than physical. In case of a
judge court experience is an indispensable factor and subject to
the basic physical fitness with growing age experiences.
The court emphasised that “dispensation of justice is evitable
feature of any civilised society”. The court also pointed out that
income from “fee is more than the expenditure on the
administration of justice. The court, therefore, suggested that
“what is collected as Court-fee at least be spent on
administration of justice instead of being utilised as a source of
general revenue of the State”. The court has also suggested that
provision must be made for in-service training of judicial
officers.

Second Case: All India Judges Association v. UOI, AIR

1993 SC 2493
Bench: Justice M.V. Ahmadi and Justice P. Sawant
Background: The review petition was filed by several State
Government and Central Government against the decision in
All India Judges Association v UOI, 1992. They raised several
objection to the direction given by Supreme Court in the
abovementioned case. The main objection on their behalf were
as under:
1. It falls within the exclusive purview of each State to
regulate service conditions for subordinate judiciary. When
the Supreme Court gives direction for this purpose, it
encroaches upon the state power;

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2. Implementation of the direction given by Supreme Court
would impose a heavy financial burden on the state.
Judgment: The Supreme Court, after considering the
objections, it rejected the same and reiterated its earlier
direction in All India Judges Association Case 1992. The court
asserted that it made recommendations to improve the system
of justice and thereby to improve the content and quality of
justice administered by the courts.
Commenting on various objections raised by the various
government to the direction issued by the court to improve the
working condition of subordinate judiciary, the court stated that
this was because of lack of realisation that judicial service is
different from executive service. In this connection the court
stated:
“The judicial service is not service in the sense of employment.
The judges are not employees. As a member of judiciary, the
excise the sovereign judicial power of the state.”
The Supreme Court had prescribed the qualification of
minimum of three years legal practice for recruitment in the
lowest rung of judicial officers.
The court also recommended that the service condition of
judicial officer should be laid and reviewed by time to time by
an independent commission exclusively constituted for the
purpose.

The third case: All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002)

4 SCC 247
Bench: Justice V. Kirpal, Justice G. Patnaik and Justice V.
Khare

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Judgment: The Supreme Court considered such questions
pertaining to district and subordinate judges as pay scale,
sufficiency of judicial strength, qualifications and equipment of
judges. The court had suitable direction as regards these
matters.
The court has also answered the objection that by making the
directions, the court was encroaching upon the powers of the
State conferred by Article 309. The court has observed in this
connection:
“but the mere fact that Article 309 gives power to the executive
and the legislature to prescribe the service condition of
judiciary does not mean that judiciary should have no say in
the matter. It would be against the spirit of the Constitution to
deny any role of judiciary in that we have, for critically it
would not be impossible for the executive or the legislature to
turn and twist the tail of the judiciary by using the said power.
Such a consequence would be against one of the seminal
mandates of the Constitution, namely, to maintain
independence of judiciary.”
Because of these reasons, the Supreme Court has reiterated
what it said in its 1992 judgement for effectuating various
improvements in the service conditions of the district and
subordinate judges. The court has however modified somewhat
this direction to raise the age of judgement to 60 years. The
benefit of this extension in retiring age would not a cure
automatically to all judicial officer irrespective of their past
record of service and evidence of their continued utility to the
judicial system in future. The benefit would be available only to
those whom the High Court “have a potential for continued
useful service.”

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Part VIII
The Union Territories
Article 239 to 241

Topic: Jurisdiction And Competence Of The

Government Of NCT Of Delhi And The Government
Of India Under Article 239 AA And 239 AA (4)
Name of the Case: Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of
India, (2018) 8 SCC 501
Bench: Chief Justice Dipak Misra, Justice A.K. Sikri, Justice
A.M. Khanwilkar, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, and Justice
Ashok Bhushan
Fact of the Case: The Parliament of India enacted Delhi
Administration Act 1966, which formed Delhi Metro Political
Council with a provision of 56 directly elected members and
five members nominated by newly created position of
Lieutenant Governor. The council had only advisory power
regard to the legislative proposals, budget proposals and other
matter referred to it by Lieutenant Governor. The Lieutenant
Governor succeeded the Chief Commissioner as administrator
of Delhi.
After huge demand for legislative assembly, the government of
India came up with constitution 69th Amendment Act, 1991
which formed Government of National Capital Territory Act,
1991 where in Delhi Legislative Assembly was introduced with
Chief Minister and Council of Minister replacing the then Chief
Executive Councilor and Executive councilors.
Conflict between Government of Delhi and Government of
India was seen when the Delhi Lieutenant Governor General
Najeeb Jung denied sending files related with the affairs of
police, public order and land. The decision of Najeeb Jung was

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backed by Home Ministry. Through the said notification it was
notified that Delhi Anti-Corruption Branch could not
investigate Central Government Employee’s because they have
no jurisdiction to do so.
Similarly, in 2015 when the Government of Delhi formed
enquiry commission for investigating into CNG Fitness
Scheme, the same was opposed by Lieutenant Governor Najeeb
Jung, who referred the matter to Home Ministry. The Home
Ministry ruled that the Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi was not the competent authority to set up an
enquiry commission, thus holding that the Delhi Government
order was legally invalid and void ab initio.
A petition based on such issues was filed before Delhi High
Court. The Delhi High Court ruled that Lt Governor had
complete control of all the matters regarding National Capital
Territory of Delhi. Not satisfied with the High Court decision,
the Government of Delhi appealed before Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while setting aside the
judgement of Delhi High Court ruled that the Delhi Lieutenant
Governor had no independent decision-making power under
Article 239AA and had to follow the aid and advice of the
Chief Minister led Council of Minister of the Government of
Delhi on the matter Delhi Legislative Assembly could legislate.
The judgement was held under following sub-heads:
Status of Delhi under Constitution
* Administration of Union Territory under Article 239 (1) is
different from Article 239AA which provides for an elected
legislature.
* Parliament can legislate for Delhi on any matter in the state
list and the concurrent list but the executive power in
relation to Delhi except the police, land and public order

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vests only in the State Government headed by Chief
Minister.
* It also held that the executive power of the Union does not
extend to any of the matters which come within the
jurisdiction of Delhi Assembly.
LG to act on ‘aid and advice’ of Council of Ministers
* For establishing a democratic and representative form of
government for NCT of Delhi, Government of Delhi enjoys
the confidence of people of Delhi should have the
functional autonomy to legislate for the NCT of Delhi.
* The law in regard to aid and advice of the Council of
Ministers by affirming that LG is bound to act on aid and
advice except in respect of land, public order and the
police.
LG cannot refer every matter to the President
* Article 239AA (4) says that in the case of difference of
opinion between the LG and his ministers on any matter,
the LG shall refer it to the President for final decision and
act according to it.
* However, the court inferred that the words ‘any’ matter
employed in the proviso to Article 239AA (4) cannot be
inferred to mean ‘every matter’.
* The power of Lt Governor under the said proviso
represents the exception and not the general rule which has
to be exercised in exceptional circumstances by LJ.
Limited References to be Made to the President
* LG does not refer to the President normal administrative
matters that disturb the concept of constitutional
governance, principles of collaborative federalism and the
standard of constitutional morality.

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* The court also held that the President is the highest
constitutional authority and his decision should be sought
only on constitutionally important issues.

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Part IX
The Panchayats
Article 243 - 243O

Topic: Panchayat Is A Permanent Constitutional Body

Name of the Case: Lakshmappa Kallappa v. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2000 Kant 61
Bench: Justice P.W. Shetty
Fact of the case: The constitutional validity of Section 159 (2)
and Section 179 (3) of the Karnataka Panchayati Raj Act, 1993
was challenged. The said Section do not permit the non-elected
members of Zila Panchayat to participate and vote in the
meeting convened for the purpose of considering the no-
confidence motion moved against the Adhayaksha and
Upadhyaksha of Panchayat.
Judgment: Article 243 to Article 243 O provides for the
constitution of panchayats, the terms of the member of
panchayats, reservation to be made in the Panchayat. Any law
made by the state legislature which runs counter to the said
constitutional provisions, requires to be declared as
unconstitutional.

Topic: Extending The Provisions Of State Legislation

On Panchayats To Union Territories
Name of the case: UT Chandigarh v. Avtar Singh, (2002) 10
SCC 432
Bench: Justice Mahesh Grover

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Judgment: The notable feature of this constitutional provisions
is that these are in the nature of basic provisions which need to
be supplemented by law made by the respective State
Legislature. The reason is that local government including the
self-governing institution for the ruler areas, is exclusively state
subject under Article Entry 5, List II. Parliament does not have
legislative power to enact any law relating to village Panchayat.
However, it is open to the center, if statutorily authorised, to
extend the provisions of the state legislation on Panchayats to
Union territories.
___________________________________________________

Part IX-A
The Municipalities

Topic: Conversion Of A Municipal Council To A

Corporation
Name of the Case: Municipal Board, Hapur v. Jassi Singh,
AIR 1997 SC 2689
Bench: Justice K. Ramasamy and Justice Faizan Uddin
Issue: Whether the municipality has power to levy the
fee/taxes?
Judgment: Article 243-W authorises the State Legislature to
confer such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable
the municipalities to function as institutions of self-
government. The municipalities maybe authorised to prepare
plans for economic development and social justice. Under
Article 243 - X, the State Legislature may by law authorise a
municipalities “to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes,
duties, tolls and fees” as may be specified in law. This
provision makes it clear that even under the new scheme,
municipalities have not been assigned any independent powers

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of taxation. The concerned state legislature has to pass a law to
confer taxing powers on the municipalities.
Under Article 240-Y, the State Government is to appoint a
financial commission to review the financial position of
municipalities and make suitable recommendations to
strengthen municipal finance. The commission may
recommend distribution of taxing power between the state and
the municipalities, giving of grant-in-aid by the state to the
municipalities, and other measures needed to improve the
financial position of municipalities.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Challenging Election Of Members To A Gram

Panchayat And A Municipal Committee
Name of the Case: Lal Chand v. State of Haryana, AIR
1999 P&H 1 (FB)
Bench: Justice S. Ahmed and Justice R. Sethi
Fact of the Case: The petitioner contends that in addition to
the benefit which was made available to him at the time of
retirement, he is also entitled to the benefit of employment
being provided to one of his sons in government services in
terms of the policy in question.
Judgment: A full bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court
entertain writ petition challenging election of members to a
Gram Panchayat and a Municipal Committee. The High Court’s
judicial review is a fundamental and basic structure of the
Constitution which cannot be taken away even by a
constitutional amendment. Therefore, Article 243 and Article
243 would have to be read subject to Articles 226 - O and 227 -
ZG of the Constitution. This means that the High Court would
have a power to entertain her petition with regard to challenge

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to election to any Panchayat and Municipality in spite of the
ban imposed by two constitutional provisions in question. The
High Court may, however, keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of the case, regulate the petitioner to the remedy
available before the election tribunal.
___________________________________________________

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Part XI
Relation Between the Union and State
Article 245 - 263

Chapter I
Legislative Relations
Article 245 - 255

Topic: Principles Of Interpretation Of List

Name of the case: State of Kerala v. People’s Union of Civil
Liberties, Kerala State Unit, (2009) 8 SCC 46
Bench: Justice S.B. Sinha and Justice Mukundakam Sharma
Fact of the Case: The State Government of Kerala enacted
Kerala Schedule Tribe (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and
Distribution of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 with the object of
providing restriction on transfer of lands by member of
scheduled Tribes in the State of Kerala and for restoration of
possession of land alienated by such members and for matters
connected therewith.
However, restoration of their lands never happened, therefore
the scheduled Tribe of Kerala filed an application before the
Court. Even after order of the High Court the restoration of
land did not took place in the actual manner. The government
of Kerala tried to amend the Act but consent of the President
was denied.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has expressed that the right
question test which has been applied in many cases as a test to
find out whether an administrative agency has validly exercised
its power, namely, whether it has posed to itself the right
question should be applicable to find out whether the courts
have exercised their jurisdiction properly or not when the

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validity of the statute is under attack went on to observe what
would be the right question in such cases viz whether the
statute has been enacted to achieve the constitutional course set
out not only in Part III of the Constitution but also in Part IV
and Part IV-A. If the question is answered in the affirmative in
the fact instances of the case, then the statute is safe.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Principle Of Harmonious Interpretation Under

Article 246
Name of the Case: Godfrey Philllips India Limited v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2005 SC 1103
Bench: Chief Justice Ruma pal, Justice Arun Kumarg, Justice
P. Mathur and Justice C.K. Thakkar
Fact of the case: The appellants are manufacturer of tobacco
and tobacco products. They have challenged the imposition and
levy of all luxury tax on tobacco and tobacco products by
treating them as luxuries within the meaning of word in Entry
62 of List II.
Principle of harmonious interpretation
The three lists are very detailed and Constitution makers have
made an attempt to make the increase in one list exclusive for
those in the other list. But, as no drafting can be perfect, at
times, some conflict or overlapping between an entry in one list
and an entry in the other list comes to surface. This gives rise to
the question of determining inter- relationship between such
entries.
Some of the entries in the different list may overlap and appears
to be in direct conflict with each other. In such a situation, the
principle of supremacy of the Union List over the State List, as
enunciated above, is not to be applied automatically or

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mechanically as soon as some conflict of legislative judicial
becomes apparent. The non-obstinate clause is the ultimate rule
which is to be invoked only as a last resort, in case of inevitable
or irreconcilable conflict between the entries in different lists.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that before applying the
abovementioned rule the court should make an attempt to
reasonably and practically construed the interest so as to
reconcile the conflict and avoid overlapping. This is the rule of
harmonious interpretation of various entries. An effort is to be
made by the court to reconcile all concerned and relevant
interest. To harmonise and reconcile conflicting entries in the
list, it may be necessary to read and interpret the relevant
entries together, and, where necessary, restrict the ambit of the
broader entry in favour of narrower entry so that it is not eaten
up by the former. It may be necessary to construe a broad entry
in a somewhat restricted sense that it theoretically capable of. If
one entry is general, and the other limited or specific, then the
former maybe restricted to give sense and efficacy to the letter
which may be treated as particularised and something in the
nature of an exception to the general entry. It has been held that
the scope of List II Entry 54 was widened by insertion of
Article 366 (29-A) powers of the States to levy such tax as
subjected to a corresponding restriction as a consequence of
constitutional limit imposed on sale tax under Article 286 (3)
and Section 3 and schedule 2 proviso.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Rule Of Pith And Substance

Name of the Case: Premchand Jain v. RK Chhabra, AIR
1984 SC 981
Bench: Justice Ranganath Misra, Justice Syed Murtuza Fazalali
and Justice A Varadarajan

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Fact of the Case: The appellant was prosecuted under Section

22 and 23 of University Commission Act, 1956. Section 22 of
UCA, 1956 empowers right to confer degree and Section 23
imposes prohibition of the word ‘University’ used by any
ineligible person/Organisation. The appellant has lost the case
in High Court and appeal before Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has enunciated the principle of
pith and substance as follows;
“as long as the legislation is within the permissible field in pith
and substance, objection would not be entertained merely on
the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been
made for a matter which though germane for the purpose for
which competent legislation is made, it covers and expect
beyond it. In a series of decisions this court has opined that if
an enactment substantially falls within the power expressly
conferred by Constitution upon the legislation enacting it, it
cannot be held invalid merely because it accidentally
encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature.”
Thus, it was held that definition of ‘university’ given in Section
2 or the provision in Section 23 of the Act, 1956, are not ultra
vires the Parliament on the ground that such provisions are
beyond its legislative competence.
__________________________________________________

Topic: Doctrine Of Colourable Legislation

Name of the case: KC Gajapati Narayana Deo v. State of
Orissa, AIR 1953 SC 375
Bench: Justice Jagannadhadas and Justice Narasimham
Fact of the Case: Several applications were filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India for issuing a direction by the
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court under mandamus for restraining State of Orissa against
issuing any notification or taking any other step under Orissa
Estate Abolition Act, 1952. The said act abolishes Zamindari in
the state of Orissa.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has explained doctrine of
colourable legislation as follows:
“If The constitution of a state distributes the legislative power
amounts different bodies, which have to act within their
respective spheres mode off by specific legislative entries....
question do arise as to whether the legislature in particular
case has or has not, in respect to the subject matter of the
statute or in the method of ejecting it, transgressed the limits of
its constitutional power. Such transgression maybe be patent,
manifest or direct, but it may also be disguised, covert or
indirect, and it is this letter class of case that the expression
colourable legislation has been applied.... The idea conveyed
by the expression is that although apparently legislature in
passing a statute purported to act within the limits of its
powers, yet, in substance and in reality it’s transgressed these
powers, the translation being veiled by what appears, on
Proper examination, to be mere pretence or disguise.”
___________________________________________________

Topic: Repugnancy Between A Central And State Law

Under Article 254(1)
Name of the Case: Kanaka Gurha Nirmana Sahakara
Sangha v. Narayanamma, AIR 2002 SC 3659
Bench: Justice M. Shah and Justice D. Dharmadhikari
Background: Supreme Court was approached to interpret
Article 254(1) of the Constitution. When an imposed statute
appears to touch two different entries in two lists, then the rule

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of pith and substance helps in characterising the law as
belonging to this or that entry. But, under Article 254(1),
questions of a different nature arises. The question before court
was not whether a statute fall under this entry or that, but
whether state law comes into conflict with a central law or not.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has observed that for
application of Article 254(1), firstly, there must be repugnancy
between the State and the law made by Parliament. Secondly, if
there is repugnancy, the state legislation would be void only to
the extent of repugnancy. If there is no repugnancy between the
two laws, there is no question of application of Article 254(1)
and both the Acts would operate. Repugnancy between two
statutes maybe ascertained by considering whether parliament
intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the
subject matter replacing the Act of State Legislature. Where the
paramount legislation does not work out to be exhaustive or
unqualified there is no inconsistency and it cannot be said that
any qualification or restriction introduced by another law is
repugnant to the provision in the main or paramount law.
Before coming to the conclusion that there is a repeal by
implication, the court must be satisfied that the two enactments
are so inconsistent that it becomes impossible for them to stand
together.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Exception To The General Rule Of

Repugnancy Under Article 254(2)
Name of the Case: Zaverbhai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954
SC 752
Bench: Chief Justice M.C. Mahajan, Justice B.K. Mukherjea,
Justice B.K Jagannadhadas, Justice V. Bose Justice T.L.
Venkata Rama Aiyyar

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Background: The Central Legislature enacted the Essential
Supplies Act, 1946, conferring power on the Central
Government to issue orders to regulate production, supply and
distribution of essential commodities. Under Article 7(1), or
contravention of any of the order was to be punishable with
imprisonment up to 3 years or fine or with both. Considering
these punishments inadequate, the Bombay legislature enacted
Bombay Act, 1947, and enhanced the punishments provided
under the central law. Both laws were preferable to the
concurrent list. As there was repugnancy between the Central
and the Bombay laws, the Bombay law received the assent of
the Centre and become operative in Bombay. In 1950,
Parliament modified its Act of 1946 and enhanced the
punishments.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the Bombay Act of
1947 and Central Act of 1950 dealt with the same subject of
enhanced punishment, and that under the proviso of Article
254(2), the State law become void because it was repugnant to
the later Central law.
The Supreme Court stated that under the proviso to Article 254,
Parliament to repeal a state law. But where Parliament does not
expressly do so, even then, the state law will become void
under that provision if it conflicts with the later law “with
respect to the same matter” that may be enacted by Parliament.
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Chapter II
Administrative Relations
Article 256 - 263

Topic: Distribution Of Executive Power Between

Centre And State Under Article 256
Name of the Case: Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 33
Bench: Justice A.P. Sen and Justice Baharul Islam
Fact of the Case: The petitioner in support of the writ petition
contends under the following heads;
1. There was nothing to prevent the State Government for
making a law placing reasonable restriction on the freedom
to carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed
under Article 19 (1) (g) read with Article 19 (6) of the
Constitution, or the freedom of trade, commerce and
intercourse, throughout the territory of India, guaranteed
under Article 301 of the Constitution but the restriction
must be by “law” or by an “order having the force of law”
and not by the recourse to the executive authority of the
state under Article 162 of the Constitution;
2. The seizure of the consignment of the wheat, while they
were in transit in the course of interstate trade and
commerce from Delhi and State of Punjab and Haryana to
various destinations in the state of Maharashtra and
Madhya Pradesh, was without the “authority of law” and in
violation of Article 300A of the Constitution.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has held that the State
Legislature is competent to enact a law on the subject covered
by Entry 33, List III, regulating trade and commerce, and the
production, and supply and distribution of “foodstuffs” under

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Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The Act, 1955, was elected
by Parliament in exercise of concurrent jurisdiction under Entry
73 List 2, of the 7th Schedule to the Constitution as amended by
Constitution (3rd Amendment) Act, 1954. The exercise of such
concurrent jurisdiction would not deprive the State Legislature
of its jurisdiction thereunder. The executive power of state
which is coextensive with legislative power is subject to the
limitation contained in Article 162 which directs that in any
matter with respect to which the legislature of a State and
Parliament power to make laws, the executive power of the
state shall be subject to, and limited by, the executive power
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by
Parliament upon the Union of authorities thereof.
In the concurrent field, therefore, ordinarily the authority to
execute law rests with the State even when the law is passed by
the Centre. In exceptional cases, however, Parliament may
describe that the execution of a central law shall be with the
Centre alone, or with both the Centre and the States. In this
field, even after Centre claims executive power under its law,
the residuary executive power under the entry may still rest
with the states.
___________________________________________________

Topic: Centre And State Administrative Coordination

Under Article 258
Name of the Case: Jayantilal Amrat Lal v. FN Rana, AIR
1964 SC 648
Bench: Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K. Subba Rao,
Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice Raghubar
Dayal
Fact of the Case: Under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the
Central Government is competent to acquire land for the

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purpose of Union. The Centre Government by a notification
under Article 258 entrusted this power to the commissioner in
the State of Bombay who were to exercise the power subject to
the control of the State Government. Thereafter, the state of
Gujarat was carved out of Bombay state, and a commissioner in
Gujarat, acting under the original entrustment of power, took
proceedings to acquire certain lands for the Union purpose.
Section 87 of the State Reorganisation Act kept alive all laws
prevailing in the State before reorganisation. When the
commissioner power to acquire land was challenged, he filed a
petition in Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court developed the view that the
Presidential notification under Article 258 (1) had the force of
law and so was kept alive by Section 87 of Land Acquisition
Act. The commissioner in Gujarat could, thus, exercise the
function of Central Government under the Land Acquisition
Act without a fresh notification having been issued.
A distinction has been drawn between the functions entrusted
and exercisable by President as under:
1. Functions vested in the Union and exercisable by the
President on behalf of Union;
2. Functions interested to the President by express provision
of the Constitution.
Only the former functions, but not the latter, can be interested
to the state under Article 258(1).
In the latter category all such functions as the power to
promulgate ordinance (Article 123), to suspend the provisions
of Article 268 - 279 during an emergency (Article 354), to
declare and emergency under Article 352, to declare failure of
constitutional machinery of state under Article 356, to declare
financial emergency under Article 360, to make rules for

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recruitment to and condition of service a person appointed to
post and services in central services (Article 309), to appoint
judges (Article 124 & 217), to appoint a Commission of
Backward Class (Article 340), to appoint a special officer for
the Scheduled Caste (Article 338) and President’s pleasure
regarding Union Servant (Article 310).
Secondly, what can be delegated under Article 258(1) is a
function to which the executive power of Union extends. A
question, therefore, arises whether under Article 258 (1) only
an executive function can be interested to the State or even that
is characterised as quasi-judicial or delegated legislation as
well. The balance of judicial opinion so far is that only
executive, and no other functions, can be delegated under
Article 258(1). The majority in the Rana case left the question
open as the function involved in the case was only
administrative. It could thus mean that the power of delegated
legislation and quasi-judicial nature, can be delegated by Centre
to the state only if there is a statutory provision warranting the
same and not under Article 258(1).
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Part XII
Finance, Property, Contract and Suits
Article 264 - 300A

Chapter I
Finance
Article 264 - 290a
Central and State Taxes
List Entries 82 - 92B
Central Taxes
Entry List 82 - 92-B & 96, 97
* Taxes on income other than agricultural income - 82
* Duties of customs including export duties - 83
* Duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured
or produced in India except— (a) alcoholic liquor’s for
human consumption; (b) opium, Indian hemp and other
narcotics drugs and narcotics, but including medicinal and
toilet preparation containing alcohol or any substance
included in sub - paragraph (b) of this Entry - 84
* Corporation Tax - 85
* Taxes on capital values of assets exclusive of agricultural
land, of individuals and companies; taxes on the capital of
companies - 86
* Estate duty in respect of property other than agricultural
land - 87
* Duties in respect of succession of property other than
agricultural land - 88
* Terminal taxes on goods or passenger carried by railway,
sea or air; taxes on railway fares and freights - 89

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* Taxes other than stamp duties on transactions in stock
exchanges and futures markets- 90
* Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange,
cheques, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of credit,
policies of insurance, transfer of share, debentures, proxies
and receipts- 91
* Taxes on the sales or purchase of newspapers and on
advertisements published therein- 92
* Taxes on the sales or purchase of goods other than
newspapers where such sale or purchase takes place in the
course of inter-state trade or commerce - 92-A
* Taxes on the consignment of goods (whether the
consignment is to the person making it or to any other
person) where such consignment takes place in the course
of inter-state trade or commerce - 92-B
* Fees in respect of any of the matters in the Union List, but
not including fees taken in any Court, except the Supreme
Court - 96
* Any other tax not enumerated in List II and III - 97
State taxes
Entries List 45 - 63 & 66
* Land revenue including its assessment and collection - 45
* Taxes on agricultural income- 46
* Duties in respect of succession to agriculture land - 47
* Estate duty in respect of agriculture land - 48
* Taxes on lands and buildings - 49
* Taxes on mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed
by Parliament by law relating to mineral department - 50

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* Duties of exercise on the following goods manufactured or
produced in the state and countervailing duties at the same
or lower rates on similar goods manufactured or produced
elsewhere in India: (a) alcoholic liquor for human
consumption, (b) Opium, Indian hemp, and other narcotic
drugs and narcotics, but not including medicinal and toilet
preparations containing alcohol or any substance included
in such paragraph (b) of this entry - 51
* Taxes on the entry of goods into a local area for
consumption, use or sale therein – 52 (Repealed by 101st
Amendment Act, 2016)
* Taxes on consumption or sale of electricity - 53
* Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than
newspapers, subject to the provisions of entry 92-A of list I
- 54
* Texas on advertisements other than those published in
newspaper- 55 (Repealed by 101st Amendment Act, 2016)
* Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland
waterways - 56
* Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not,
suitable for use on roads, including tramcars subject to the
provisions of entry 35, List III – 57 (concurrent list)
* Taxes on animals and boats - 58
* Tolls - 59
* Texas phone professions, trades, callings and employment-
60
* Capitation tax - 61
* Taxes on luxuries including taxes on entertainments,
amusements, betting and gambling- 62

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* Rates of stamp duty in respect of documents other than
those specified in the provisions of List 1 with regard to
rates of stamp duty - 63
* Fees in respect of any of the matters in the list, but not
including fees taken in any court - 66
Concurrent List
Entry List 35, 44, & 47
* Principles on which taxes on mechanically propelled
vehicles are to be levied - 35
* Stamp duties other than duties or fee collected by means of
judicial stamps, but not including rates of stamp duty - 44
* Fees in respect of any of the matters in the list, but not
including fees taken in any court - 47

Residuary Taxes
97
* Any other matter not eliminated in List I and List III
including any tax not mentioned in either of those List

NOTE: There are more than hundred landmark judgement in

the financial relations and taxing structure. Landmark
judgements under financial relation between Centre and state
are not important unless you are preparing for CA, CS, or
Income Tax Officer or any other examinations in similar
category.

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The 101 Constitutional Amendment Act, 2016
GST
The Parliament of India in enacted goods and services tax GST
which replaced number of indirect taxes levied by Union and
the State Government to weed out just kidding effect of taxes
and provide a common national platform for goods and
services.
Following central indirect taxes were submerged
* Central excise duty
* Additional excise duties
* Exercise duties leave it under medical and toilet
preparations exercise duties act, 1955
* Additional custom duty also known as countervailing duty
* Special additional duty of custom
* Central surcharge and cesses so far as they relate to supply
of goods and services
Following state indirect taxes were submerged
* State value added taxes/Sale Tax
* Entertainment tax
* Central sales tax (levied by Centre and collected by local
bodies)
* Octroi and Entry Tax
* Purchase tax
* Luxury tax
* Taxes on lottery, betting and gambling

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* State surcharge and cesses in so far as they relate to the
supply of goods and services.
After 101 Constitutional amendment, the current taxing
position between Centre and state are as follows:
* Taxes levied by the Centre but collected and appropriated
by the State - 268
* Texas levied and collected by the Centre but assigned to the
states - 269
* Levy and collection of goods and services in course of
interstate trade or commerce - 269-A
* Taxes leave it and collected by the Centre but distributed
between the Centre and the states. - 270
* Surcharge on certain taxes and duties for the purpose of the
Centre. 271
* Taxes leave it and collected by and retained by the State.

Chapter III
Property, Contracts, Rights, Liabilities, Obligations
And Suits
Article 294 - 300

Topic: Trade Or Business And Their Relationship

With Centre And State Between Article 73 (A) And
298 And Also Article 258 (B) And 298
Name of the Case: H. Araj v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
1984 SC 781
Bench: Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, Justice E.S.
Venkataramaiah, Justice R.B. Mishra

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Fact of the Case: The petitioners who were agents for the sale
of tickets for lotteries conducted by various State Governments
other than the State of Maharashtra contended writ petition, that
the aforesaid ban that was sought to be imposed had no legal
authority. Under the Constitution, lotteries organised by
Government of India or the Government of the State was a
subject which was within the exclusive legislative competence
of Parliament and that it was not open to the government of any
state purporting to act in exercise of its executive power to
impose such ban. On the behalf of the State Government, the
respondent, it was contended that the Union government’s
executive power was coextensive with the power to make laws,
that the President in exercise of his power under Article 258 (1)
had entrusted to the State Government that executive power of
Union through a Presidential order in respect of lotteries run by
the State, and therefore it was competent for the State
Government to impose the ban.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that the Government of
Maharashtra cannot purport to ban the sale of lottery ticket of
other states by the virtue of the entrustment of power under
Article 258 (1) of the Constitution.
It was observed that Article 73 extends the execute the power
of Union to the matters with respect to which Parliament has
power to make laws. But the executive power of Union, by the
way the opening words of Article 73 is “subject to the
provisions of Constitution“. Therefore, it follows that executive
power of Union with respect to lotteries organised by the
Government of State has necessarily to be exercised subject to
the provision of Constitution including Article 298, which
expressly extends the executive power of the state to the
carrying on of any trade or business subject only to legislation
by Parliament if the trade or business subject only to which the
state legislature may make laws.

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Reading and considering Article 73 and 298 together, it is clear
that the executive power of a State in the matter of carrying on
any trade or business with respect to which the state legislature
may not make laws is subject to legislation by Parliament but is
not subject to executive power of the Union. The Government
of State is not required to obtain the permission of the Union
Government in order to organise its lotteries, in the absence of
Parliamentary legislation. Even assuming that such permission
is necessary, a condition imposed by such permission that
lottery tickets of one state may not be sold in another state
cannot be enforced by the other state. The other state has no
power to make any laws in regard to lotteries organised by the
first state. The other state has no power to make law in regard
to lotteries organised by first state. Its executive power, by the
virtue of Article 298, extends to lotteries organised by itself but
not to lotteries organised by other state.
If a state Acts in breach of the conditions imposed by President
while investing the power under Article 258 it is open to the
President to revoke the permission or to take such further or
other action as may be constitutionally permissible but it cannot
possibly enable the government of other state to do anything
about it except to complain perhaps to the Union government.
___________________________________________________

Chapter IV
Right To Property
Article 300A

Topic: Acquisition Of Property By The State Involves

Payment Of Some Money
Name of the Case: Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of
Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 142

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Bench: Justice K. Ramasamy and Justice N. Venkatachala
Fact of the Case: The appellant content that, under Entry 54,
of List 1 of the 7th schedule to the Constitution, since
Regulation of Mining and Mineral Development Act, 1957
occupies the field of mines and minerals covered under Section
69 A of the Amendment Act, it is void and it is ultra vires of
the Constitution.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has stated that the word ‘law’
used in Article 300-A, must be an Act of parliament or of state
legislature, a rule or statutory order having the force of law.
The deprivation of property shall be only by authority of law,
be it an Act of Parliament or state legislature, but not by an
executive fiat. The provision of property is by acquisition or
requisition or taken possession of for a public purpose. The
Court has also ruled that the law may fix an amount for which
may be determined in accordance with such principles as
maybe laid therein and given in such manner as may be
specified in such law. However, such law shall not be
questioned on the ground that the amounts of fixed or amounts
determined is not adequate. The amount fixed must not be
illusionary. The principal led to determine the amount must be
relevant to the determination of amount. The court has further
observed that it would, thus, be clear that acquisition of the
property by law laid in furtherance of the Directive Principle of
State Policy was to distribute the material resources of the
community including acquisition and taking possession of
private property for public purpose. It does not require payment
of just compensation or indemnification to the owner of the
property expropriated. It is very negation of the effectuating the
public purpose. Payment of market value in lieu of acquired
property is not sine qua non for acquisition. Acquisition and
payment of amount are part of this scheme and they cannot be
dissected. However, fixation of the amount or specification of

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the principles and the manner in which amount is to be
determined must be relevant to the fixation of amount. The
amount determined need not bear reasonable relationship. In
other words, it is not illusory. The adequate advocacy of the
resultant amount cannot be questioned in a court of law.
However, the validity of irrelevant principles is amenable to
social security.
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Part XIII
Trade, Commerce And Intercourse Within
The Territory Of India
Article 301 - 307

Topic: Motivation And Aspirations Of The Framers

Of The Constitution In Drafting Article 301 – 305
Name of the Case: Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam,
AIR 1961 SC 232
Bench: Justice B.S. Shah, Justice K. Dasgupta, Justice K.
Wanchoo and Justice B. Gajendragadkar
Fact of the Case: The State of Assam in acted Assam Taxation
(on Goods Carried by Road or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954.
The purpose of the Act is to levy taxes on certain goods carried
by road or inland waterway in the State of Assam. The
appellant challenged the validity of the Act mainly on the
ground that (1) the Act, rules and the notification under the act
were ultra vires the Constitution, because the Act was
repugnant to the provisions of Article 301 of the Constitution as
the tax on carriage of tea through the State of Assam had the
effect of interfering with the freedom of trade, commerce and
intercourse; (2) that tea being a controlled industry under the
provision of the Tea Act, 1953, the Union Government alone
had the power to regulate the manufacture, production,
distribution or transport of tea and jurisdiction of Assam
Legislature was thus completely ousted; (3) that the tax under
the act was nothing but a duty of excise, in substance, do not
form, and was thus an encroachment to the central legislative
field within the meaning of Entry 84 of the Union List. The
impugned Act was also challenged on the ground that it was
discriminatory and void under Article 14 of the Constitution.

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The competence of the Assam legislature to legislate on subject
was also questioned.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has explained in detail the
motivations and aspirations of the framers of the Constitution in
drafting Article 301 - 305 in following words:
In drafting the relevant Articles 301 - 305 the makers of the
Constitution were fully conscious that economic unity was
absolutely essential for the stability and progress of the federal
polity which had been adopted by the Constitution for the
governance of the country. Political freedom had been won, and
political unity had been accomplished by the Constitution, had
to be sustained and strengthened by the bond of economic
unity. It was realised that in the course of time different
political parties believing in different economic theories or
ideologies may come in power in the several constituent units
of the Union and that mean conceivably give rise to local and
regional pulls and pressures in economic matters. Local or
regional fears or apprehensions raised by local or regional
problems may persuade the state legislature to adopt remedial
measures intended solely for the protection of regional interest
without due regard to their effect on economic of the nation as
a whole. The object of Article 301 to 305 was to avoid such
possibility. Free movement and exchange of goods throughout
the territory of India is essential for the economics of the nation
and for sustaining and improving living standard of the country.
Commenting on Article 301, the Supreme Court has observed
that Article 301 “is not a declaration of mere platitude, or the
expression of pious hope of a declaratory character; it is not
also a mere statement of Directive Principle of State Policy; it
embodies and enshrines a principle of paramount importance
that they economic unity of the country will provide the means
sustaining force for the stability and progress of the political
and cultural unity of the country.”

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Topic: Inter-Relation Between Article 19(1) (G) And
301
Name of the Case: Dist. Collector, Hyderabad v. Ibrahim,
AIR 1970 SC 1275
Bench: Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.C. Shah,
Justice K.S. Hegde, Justice A.N. Grover, Justice A.N. Ray,
Justice I.D. Dua
Fact of the Case: The respondents are dealer in sugar and other
commodities and carry on business in city of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad. The State Government allocated quota for sugar
received from Central Government for distribution in different
areas and nominated licenses or dealers to take delivery of the
allotted quotas from the factories.
In December 1964, the State Government ordered that the sugar
quota allocated to “the twin city’s of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad” be given in its entirety to the Greater Hyderabad
Consumer Central Co-operative Store, Hyderabad. On the
account the respondent who held the license under the Andhra
Pradesh sugar licensing order for distribution of sugar and were
also recognised dealer under the Sugar Control Order, 1963,
whereby an executive fiat prevented from carrying on their
business in sugar.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has observed that while Article
19 (1) (g) deals with the rights of individual, Article 301
provides safeguards for caring the trade as a whole is
distinguished from an individual’s right to do the same. This
view, however, is hardly tenable. Article 301 is based on
Section 92 of the Australian constitution which has been held to
comprise right of individual as well, and the same should be the
position in India. In the actual practice, this view has never
been enforced and individuals have challenged legislation on

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the ground of its effect on their right to carry on trade and
commerce. The Supreme Court has denounced the theory that
Article 301 guarantees freedom “in the abstract and not of the
individuals”.

Topic: Exceptions To Freedom Of Trade And

Commerce
Name of the Case: State of Madras v. Nataraja Mudaliar,
AIR 1969 SC 147
Bench: Justice J.C. Shah, Justice R.S. Bachhawat, Justice G.K.
Mitter, Justice C.A. Vidyaingam, Justice K.S. Hegde
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that Article 301 does
not merely protect inter-state trade or operate against inter-state
barriers, all trade is protected whether it is inter-state or intra-
state by the prohibition imposed by Article 301. Accordingly,
under Article 302, Parliament can impose a restriction on both
inter-state as well as intra-state commerce. Inter-state and intra-
state trade activities often have intimate inter - relationship.
It was further observed that limitation introduced in Article
303(1) cannot circumscribe the scope of Article 301.
Thus, the rigours of the limitation imposed on Parliament by
Article 303(1) are relaxed somewhat by Article 303(2). Under
Article 303 (2), Parliament may prefer one state over another,
or discriminate between the states, if it is declared by law made
by Parliament that it is necessary to do so for the purpose of
dealing with a situation arising from scarcity of goods in any
part of India. In other words, when Parliament is faced with the
task of meeting an emergency created by the scarcity of goods
in any particular part of India, Parliament may enact a law-
making discrimination, or giving preference, in favour of the

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part, thus, affected. Such a declaration by Parliament would be
conclusive and not justiciable.
The word ‘preference to one state over another’ and
‘discrimination between one state and another’ in Article 303
occur as well in Section 51 (II) and 99 of the Australian
Constitution.
It was further held that an Act enacted for the “purpose of
imposing tax which is to be collected and retained by the state”
does not amount to a law giving any preference to one state
over another, or making any discrimination between one state
and another, merely because of varying rates of text prevailing
in different states.

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Part XIV
Services Under the Union and the State
Article 308 - 323

Chapter I
Services
Article 308 - 314

Topic: Doctrine Of Pleasure Under Article 309

Name of the case: UOI v. SP Sharma, (2014) 6 SCC 351
Bench: Justice B.S. Chauhan, Justice J. Chelameswar and
Justice M.Y. Eqbal
Fact of the Case: The present appeals arise out of the order
passed way back in 1980 terminating the services of the
respondents herein which was brought invoking the ‘Doctrine
of Pleasure’ as enshrined under Article 310 of the Constitution
of India coupled with the power to be exercised and under
Section 18 of the Army Act. Initially, the order of dismissal
was passed on 1980, which were assailed in writ petitions that
were dismissed by High Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that in a
Constitutional set up, when an office is held during the
‘pleasure of the President’, it means that the officer can be
removed by the authority on whose pleasure he holds the office,
without assigning any reason. The authority is not obliged to
assign any reason or disclose any cause for the removal.
Article 309 of the Constitution empowers the appropriate
legislature or executive to make any law, rules or regulations
with regard to the condition of service without impinging upon
the overriding power recognised under Article 310. Article 309
is expressly made subject to the provisions of Article 318.

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Thus, The Army act, 1950 cannot in any way override the
constitutional provisions contained in Article 309.

Topic: Removal Of Government Officer From

Government Services
Name of the Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul
Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108
Bench: Justice J. Shah and Justice K. Hegde
Fact of the Case: A departmental enquiry was initiated against
a sub-Inspector of police by the Superintendent of Police. After
holding an enquiry, he sent his report to the Inspector General
of Police who ultimately dismissed the sub-inspectors from
service. The order of dismissal was on the ground of its being
inconsistent with Article 311(1). It was argued that the enquiry
led by the Superintendent of Police infringed the mandate of
Article 311 (1) as the sub-Inspector was appointed by the
Inspector General of Police.
Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that Article 311(1) “does
not in terms require that the authority empowered under that
provision to dismiss or remove an official should itself intimate
or conduct the inquiry proceedings the dismissal or removal of
the officer, or even that inquiry should be done at his instance”.
The only right guaranteed to a civil servant under Article 311
(1) is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an authority
subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

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Topic: Removal Of A Sub-Judge
Name of the case: Baldev Raj v. Punjab and Haryana High
Court, AIR 1976 SC 2490
Bench: Justice P.K. Goswami, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud and
Justice P.N. Singhal
Fact of the case: The High Court after enquiry recommended
removal of a sub-judge. The Government referred the matter to
State Public Service Commission for advice and, on its advice,
the sub-judge was reinstated.
Judgment: The Supreme Court quashed the said order and
observed that the sole and exclusive disciplinary control over
subordinate judiciary is vested in the High Court and its
recommendation is binding on the government. The
government does not have to consult any other body except the
High Court in this area, not even the Public Service
Commission.

Chapter II
Public Services Commission
Article 315 - 323

Topic: Removal Of A Member Under Article 316

Name of the Case: Ref No 1 of 2006, decided on 8 July 2009,
(2009) 8 SCC 41: Chhattisgarh Public Service commission
Background: In a reference made by the President under
Article 317 of the Constitution, the question relating to
misbehavior by the Chairman of the Chhattisgarh Service
Commission came up for consideration before the Supreme
Court. On facts, the court found that the evidence did not

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warrant any conclusion of misbehavior. But in the course of the
judgement, the court expressed certain views regarding the
object behind the provisions of Article 315 and 317 of the
Constitution.
Judgment: In relation to Article 315, the Court held that the
object of the Article is to ensure that the commission should be
independent and impartial body as indicated by their salary etc.
being charged on the consolidated fund of the state and the
removal by following the procedure laid down in the
Constitution, i.e, their offices were constitutionally protected.
The court also noted that misbehavior is not defined in Article
317 but what constitute misbehavior in these words:
“The chairman of the Public Service Commission expected to
show absolute integrity and impartiality in exercising the
powers and duties a chairman. His actions shall be transparent
and he shall discharge his functions with utmost sincerity and
integrity. If there is any failure on his part, or he commits any
act which is not befitting the honour and prestige as a
chairman of the Public Service Commission, it would amount to
miss behaviour as contemplated under the Constitution. If it is
proved that he has shown any favour to the candidate during
the selection process, that would certainly be an act of
misbehaviour.”

Topic: Action Taken By Government Against His

Servant In Consultation With The Commission:
Mandatory Or Not [Article 320 (3) (C)]
Name of the Case: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan
Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912

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Bench: Chief Justice S.R. Das, Justice Bhubaneswar Sinha,
Justice T.L. Venkatarama Aiyyar, Justice J.L. Kapur, Justice
A.K. Sarkar
Background: The Government of Uttar Pradesh reduced an
officer in rank. The officer alleged that there was irregularity in
the consultation of the state commission by the government.
Issue: Whether irregularity in, do not complete absence of,
consideration with the State Public Service Commission would
enable the officer concerned to challenge the order passed by
the government?
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that Article 320(3)(c) does
not confer any right on a public servant so that the absence of,
or any irregularity in, consultation would not offered him a
cause of action in a court of law. The main reason for this view
are:
1. The opinion of the commission has not been made binding
on the government. In the absence of such a binding
character, it is difficult to see how non-compliance with
this provision could have the effect of nullifying the final
order passed by government. If the opinion of the
commission were binding on the government, it could have
been argued with some force that non-compliance with the
rule for consultation would have been fatal to the validity
of the order proposed to be passed against a public servant.
2. The constitution does not provide for contingency as to
what is to happen in the event of non-compliance with this
provision. It does not either expressly or impliedly provide
that non-compliance will invalidate the final order of the
government.
3. The proviso to Article 320 itself indicates that in certain
cases or classes of cases, the commission need not be

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consulted. The President may make regulation to take away
the protection of Article 320 (3) (c) in certain cases or
classes of cases.
The concept was evolved with time. It was in Dinkar Case that
the consultation was made mandatory.

Topic: Consultation With Commission For Taking

Disciplinary Action Against Civil Servant Is
Mandatory For The Government
Name of the Case: Dinakar Anna Patil v. State of
Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 354
Bench: Justice G.T. Nanavati and Justice S.P. Kurdukar
Background: A rule made by Government of Maharashtra said
that the government “may, in consultation with the Maharashtra
Public Service Commission” make appointments in relaxation
of percentage fixed for promotees and directly appointed
person.
Issue: Whether under the said rule of ‘consultation’ with the
commission was “directory“ or “mandatory“?
Judgment: The Court made no reference to the precedent of
Manbodhan case and rejected the argument that “may” used in
the rule is “directory”, the court observe that to give such a
meaning would render the very object of consultation with
Maharashtra Public Service Commission whenever necessary.
It would give unbridled power to the government to dispense
with the ‘consultation’ with Maharashtra Public Service
Commission which may result into arbitrary exercise of power
by the authority”.

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Part XIV A
Tribunals (Article 323-B)

Topic: Jurisdiction Of High Court Can Be Taken

Away By Tribunal
Name of the Case: S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India,
AIR 1987 SC 386
Bench: Chief Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice Ranganath Misra,
Justice Khalid, Justice G.L. Oza, Justice M.M. Dutt
Fact of the Case: Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunal
Act, 1985 originally in acted within the ambit of Article 323 A,
provided for exclusion of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Article 32. The act was amended by the Administrative
Tribunal (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, now save the
jurisdiction of Supreme Court both under Article 32 in respect
of original proceedings and also under Article 136 for
entertaining appeals. However, the Act 1985, excludes the
jurisdiction of High Court.
The petitioners in this writ petitions and transfer petitions
challenged the vires of the 1985, Act. It was contended that the
exclusion of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226
and 227 in the service matter specified in Section 28 of the Act
was unconstitutional and void, and that the composition of the
tribunal and the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice-
Chairman and Members was outside the scope of the power
conferred on Parliament under Article 323 A.
Judgment: The Administrative Tribunal act, 1985 is a
legislation in term of Article 323A. By setting up a tribunal
under the Act, for the resolution of service disputes, the
jurisdiction of the High Court in regard to such matters is

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intended to be taken away and is intended to be vested in the
tribunal.

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Part XV
Election
Article 324 - 329

Topic: Right To Elect Is Not A Fundamental Right

Name of the Case: Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC
983
Bench: Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy and Justice R.S. Pathak
Fact of the Case: The appellant contends that the concept of
proper party was not relevant in election law and that only these
person could be impleaded as party who are expressly directed
to be so impleaded by the Representation of People Act, 1951.
The first appellant in the appeal is the Chief Minister and other
two appellant State Minister. They had been impleaded by the
first respondent as parties to an election petition filed by him in
the High Court questioning the election of second responded to
the House of People. It was averred in the election petition that
the Chief Minister and State Ministers who are impleaded as
parties to the election petition had colluded and conspired with
the returned candidates to commit various alleged corrupt
practices.
Judgment: Right to elect, fundamental though it is to
democracy, each, anomalously enough, neither a Fundamental
Right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory
right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute and
election. Outside of the statute, there is no right to elect,
creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation.

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Topic: Composition Of Election Commission
Name of the Case: S.S. Dhanoa v. UOI, AIR 1991 SC 1745
Bench: Justice P.B. Sawant and Justice M.H. Kania
Background: Until 1989, the Election Commission consisted
of only the Chief Election Commissioner. In 1989, the Central
Government changed track and sought to appoint Election
Commissioners. The underlying purpose of this move seems to
be to grab the powers of the Chief Election Commissioner who
was single handily exercising the power of the Election
Commission. In 1989, by notification issued under Article 324
(2), was fixed at two. By another notification, the President
appointed the petitioner and one other person as Election
Commissioners as such. The rules made by the President under
Article 324 (5) fixed the tenure of these commissioners at five
years, or until reaching the age of 65 years, whichever was
earlier.
Hitherto, the election commission had consisted of only one
member, viz, The Chief Election Commissioner. With the
addition of two more members, the smooth working of
commission was adversely affected. Accordingly, on 1 January
1990, the President issued two notifications under Article
324(2) rescinding the 1989 notifications creating the two post
of Election Commissioners and appointing two persons to these
posts. In this way, from 1990, the election commission again
reverted to a one-man body. The question arose whether the
notification was constitutionally valid?
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that when an
institution like the election commission is entrusted with the
vital functions, and is armed with exclusive and uncontrolled
powers to execute them, it is both necessary and desirable that
the power not exercised by one individual. However, as wise as
he maybe, “it will-conforms to the tenant of democratic rule.”
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When most powers are exercised by an institution which is
accountable to none, it is politic to entrust it’s a fair or more
hands then one. It helps to assure judiciousness and want of
arbitrariness.
After release of the provisions of Article 324, and review of the
debates held in constitute assembly on the matter at issue, the
court laid down the proposition that under Article 324 (1), The
status of election commissioner is not pari passu (side by side)
with that of the Chief Election Commissioner.
The Chief Election Commissioner has been given protection in
that his conditions of service cannot be varied to his
disadvantage after his appointment, and he cannot be removed
from his office except in like manner and only grounds as a
judge of Supreme Court. These protections are not available to
the election commissioners. Their conditions of service can be
varied even to their disadvantage after their appointment and
they can be removed on the recommendation of chief election
Commissioner. These provisions indicate that the Chief
Election Commissioner is not primus inter pares, i.e, first
among the equals, but is intended to be placed in a drastically
higher position than the Election Commissioners.
In this context, the court held both the 1990 notifications as
valid. Article 324 (2) leaves it to the President to fix and
appoint such member of Election Commissioner as he may
from time to time determined. The power to create the post is
unfettered. So, also is the power to reduce or abolish them. If
the President decide to abolish both the post of Election
Commissioner either because there was no work for them, or
that the election commission could not function, there could be
nothing wrong with it.

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Topic: Directions To Candidate To File An Affidavit
Detailing Information About Themselves Under
Article 324
Name of the case: UOI v. Association for Democratic
Reforms, AIR 2002 SC 2112
Bench: Justice M.B. Shah, Justice Basheshwar Prasad Singh
and Justice H.K. Sema
Judgment: The Supreme Court directed the election
commission to issue certain direction to candidates to file an
affidavit detailing information about themselves under certain
specific heads. This was done to stop criminalisation of politics.
People have a right to know about the candidate for whom they
are being urged to vote. The right to know flows from Article
19 (1) (a). When law is silent Article 324 is a reservoir of
power to act for the avowed purpose of having free and fair
elections. The court has further observed in the following
wording:
“The Constitution has taken care of leaving scope for exercise
of residuary power by the commission in its own right as a
creature of the Constitution in the infinite variety of situations
that may emerge from time to time in a large democracy, as
every contingency could not be foreseen or anticipated by the
elected laws or rules by issuing necessary direction, the
commission can fill the vacuum till there is legislation on the
subject.”

Topic: Interpreting Article 329

Name of the case: Election Commission of India v. Ashok
Kumar, AIR 2000 SC 2979

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Bench: Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti and Justice K.G.
Balakrishnan
Fact of the Case: The 12th Lok Sabha having been dissolved
by the President of India in 1999, the Election Commission of
India announced the program for the general election to
constitute the 13th Lok Sabha.
Writ petitions were filed by the respondents to challenge the
validity of notification issued by Election Commission after
13th Lok Sabha election. The challenge was made on the
ground of booth capturing taken place in the Lok Sabha
election.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while interpreting Article 329
of the Constitution held that anything done towards completing
or in furtherance of the election proceeding cannot be described
as questioning the election. Without interrupting, obstruction or
delaying the progress of election proceedings, judicial
intervention is available if the assistance of the court has been
sought merely to correct or smoothen the promise of the
election proceeding, to remove the obstacles therein, to
preserve a vital piece of evidence if the same would be lost or
destroyed or rendered irretrievable by the time the results are
declared and the stage is set for invoking the jurisdiction of the
court.
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Part XVI
Special Provisions Relating to Certain Classes
Article 330 - 342

Topic: Claims Of Schedule Caste And Schedule Tribe

To The Services And Posts Under Article 335
Name of the Case: Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan,
(2002) 4 SCC 34
Bench: Justice Ruma pal and Justice Dr. A.R. Lakshmanan
Judgment: The Supreme Court has observed that Article 335
stipulates the claims of the member of Schedule Caste and
Schedule Tribes shall be taken into consideration, consistent
with the maintenance of efficiency of administration, in making
the appointments to services and posts in connection with the
Union or the state. It is thus, obvious that even in the matter of
reservation in the favour of Schedule Caste and Schedule
Tribes the founding father of the Constitution did make a
provision relating to maintenance of if efficiency of
administration. In this view of the matter if any issue the
provision provides for recruitment of a candidate without
bearing in mind the maintenance of efficiency of administration
and such a provision cannot be sustained, and such provisions
are against the constitutional mandate.

Topic: Power Of President Under Article 341

Name of the Case: Bhaiyalal v. Harikrishna Singh, AIR
1965 SC 1557

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Bench: Chief Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Justice K.N.
Wanchoo, Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice
S.M. Sikri
Fact of the Case: The appellant election was challenged inter
alia, on the ground that he belonged to the Dohar caste which
was not recognised as a Schedule Caste for the district in
question and saw his declaration that he belonged to the
Chamar caste which was a Schedule Caste was in properly and
illegally accepted by the returning officer. The election tribunal
declared the election invalid. The finding was confirmed by
High Court and the appellant has filed the appeal before
Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has observed as regard to the
power of President under Article 341 as under
“it is obvious that in specifying caste, race or tribe, the
President has been expressly authorised to limit the notification
to parts of all groups within the caste, races or tribes and that
must mean that after examining the educational and social
backwardness of a caste, race or tribe, the President may well
come to the conclusion that not the whole caste, race or tribe,
but the part of or groups within them would be a specified.
Similarly, the President can specify caste, race or tribe or part
thereof in relation not only to entire state, but in relation to
parts of the state where he is satisfied that the examination of
social and educational backwardness of the race, caste or tribe
justifies such specifications. In fact, it is well-known that before
a notification is issued under Article 341(1), an elaborate
enquiry is made and it is as a result of this enquiry that social
justice is sought to be done to the caste, race or tribe as may
appear to be necessary, and in doing justice, it would obviously
be expedient not only to specify parts for groups of caste, race
or tribes, but to make the said specification by reference to
different areas in the State. Educational and social

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backwardness regard to this caste, race or tribe may not be
uniform or of the same intensity in the whole of the state, if may
vary in degree or in kind in different areas and may justify the
division of the state into convenient and suitable areas for the
purpose of issuing the public notification in question.”

Topic: A Person Belonging To OBC In One State

Cannot Automatically Claim OBC In Another State
Name of the Case: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v.
Veena, AIR 2001 SC 2749
Bench: Justice Doraiswamy Raju and Justice S.R. Babu
Fact of the Case: The appellant claim to belong to OBCs on
the basis of certificate issued in the state other than the
government of National Capital Territory of Delhi. The
application filed by the respondent candidate stood rejected.
The respondent filed writ petition before the High Court and
the High Court by a common order dated 1998 held that the
advertisement issued by Municipal Corporation of Delhi did
not indicate the form in which the OBC certificate have to be
filled in respect of post arising in the National Capital Territory
of Delhi and, therefore, there was no obligation on the
respondent to produce the certificate from the prescribed
authorities in Delhi, that the obligation to produce the
certificate from the authority in Delhi could not be fulfilled by
candidate coming from outside Delhi and, therefore, what is
possible could not be expected to be fulfilled by respondent and
on that basis, the High Court directed to treat the application
filed by respondent to be in order and proceed to make
selection. The order was challenged before the Supreme Court.
Judgment: The Supreme Court has mentioned that a person
belonging to OBC in one state cannot automatic automatically
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claim the same status in another state. Each state has its own
list of OBCs. The court observed that caste or groups are
specified in relation to a given State or Union Territory, which
obviously means that such caste would include caste belonging
to an OBC group in relation to that State or Union Territory for
which it is specified. The matters that are to be taken into
consideration for specifying a particular caste in a particular
group belonging to OBCs would depend on the nature and
extent of disadvantages and social handicaps suffered by that
caste or group in that state. However, it may not be so in
another state to which a person belongs thereto goes by
migration.
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Part XVII
Official Language

The Language Of Supreme Court, High Court, Etc

Article 348 - 349
Title: Language of the Supreme Court
Name of the case: Madhu Limye v. Ved Murti, AIR 1971
SC 2608
Bench: Chief Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.M. Shelat,
Justice Vashishtha Bhargava, Justice G.K. Miter, Justice C.A.
Vidyalingam, Justice A.N. Ray, Justice I.D. Dua
Fact of the Case: Raj Narain, an intervener, insisted on
arguing in Hindi before the 7-judge bench Supreme Court in
1970. The court heard the order meant of Raj Narain but
deferred the next day.
Judgment: The Supreme Court observed that Article 348
provides that the language of the Supreme Court’s English. As
Raj Narain was not amenable to these suggestions, the court
was construed to cancel his intervention.
Further, Article 348 (1) (b) provides that authority text of all
orders, rules, regulations and by-laws is issued under
Constitution or laws and all the Acts, bills, ordinances
promulgated by the President or Governor shall be in English
language for the purpose of proceedings before the Supreme
Court and High Court.
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Part XVIII
Emergency Provisions
Article 352 – 360

Topic: Judicial Review On The Discretion Of The

President To Declare Or Not To Declare Emergency
Name of the Case: Minerva Mills v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1789
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N.
Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice
P.S. Kailasam
Fact of the Case: Section 4 and 55 of the Constitution (42nd
Amendment) Act, 1976 was challenged on the ratio of the
majority judgement in Kesavan Bharati case, namely, though
by Article 368 of the Constitution, Parliament is given the
power to amend the Constitution, the power cannot be
exercised so as to damage the basic structure of Constitution or
so as to destroy its basic structure.
Judgment: Justice Bhagwati mentioned that whether the
president in proclaiming the emergency under Article 352 has
applied his mind, or whether he acted outside his power, or
acted mala fide in proclaiming the emergency, could not be
excluded from the scope of judicial review.
The Supreme Court observed that 38th Amendment which
seeks to protect the satisfaction of President from being called
into question in a court could be declared unconstitutional as
being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.
Further, after the Supreme Court decision in S.R. Bommai, in
which the Supreme Court did go into validity of a proclamation
issued by the President under Article 356, it can now be safely

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asserted that a proclamation of emergency under Article 352 is
reviewable by the court on the ground mentioned by Justice PN
Bhagwati as under:
The Court to control the exercise of power to proclaim an
emergency in two ways:
1. The President must act on the advice of the Central Cabinet
and not in his own subjective satisfaction and also not on
the advice of Prime Minister alone. Thus, the power to
declare an emergency lies with the Cabinet.
2. The democratic control over the executive power in respect
of proclaiming an emergency has been strengthened in so
far as Parliamentary approval is necessary for the
proclamation immediately after it is made and, then, after
every six months.

Topic: Enquiry Into Complaints Against The Chief

Minister
Name of the Case: M Karunanidhi v. UOI, AIR 1979 SC
898
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N.
Bhagwati, Justice P.N. Untwalia, Justice Syed Murtuza
Fazalali, Justice R.S. Pathak
Background: In 1973, a centrally appointed commission,
consisting of a judge of the Supreme Court, was appointed to
inquire into some complaints against the member of the
Karunanidhi ministry in Tamil Nadu which was dismissed by
the President under Article 356. The Chief Minister had earlier
asserted on the floor of the state legislature that, under the
Constitution, the Centre had no right to interfere in the power
conferred on the State List. The state cabinet was responsible

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only to the state assembly which was supreme in so far as the
affairs of the state were concerned.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while upholding the
constitutionality of the enquiry commission observed that on
several occasions, the State Government have appointed
enquiry commission to probe into allegations of corruption and
misuse of power against their ex-minister and ex-chief
ministers. The legality and constitutionality of appointing such
commissions has been judicially upheld in several cases. But
nothing concrete appears to have been achieved by such an
exercise as no conviction has even resulted as a result of reports
of this commission.
It was observed that the scheme of Constitution is a scientific
and equitable distribution of legislative power between the
Parliament and the state legislature. First, regarding the matters
contained in List 1, i.e, The Union list to the seventh schedule,
Parliament alone has power to legislate and state legislature
have no authority to make any law in respect of the entries
content in List 1. Secondly, so far as the concurrent list is
concerned, both the Parliament and the state legislature are in
title to legislate in regard to any of the entries appearing
therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article
254 (1). Thirdly, so far as the matter in List II, i.e, the state lists
are concerned, the state legislature are competent to legislate on
them and only under certain conditions Parliament can do so.

Topic: Justiciability Of The Proclamation Under

Article 356
Name of the Case: SR Bommai v. UOI, AIR 1994 SC 1918
Bench: Justice Kuldip Singh, Justice P.B. Sawant, Justice K.
Ramasamy, Justice S.C. Agarwal, Justice Yogeshwar Dayal,
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Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Justice S.R. Pandian, Justice A.M.
Ahmadi
Background: In 1989, the Janta Dal Ministry headed by Shri
SR Bommai was in office in Karnataka. A number of members
defected from the party and there arose a question mark on the
majority support in the house of the Bommmai’s ministry. The
Chief Minister proposed to the Governor that the assembly
session be called to test the strength of the ministry on the floor
of the house. But the Governor ignored this suggestion. He also
did not explore the possibility of an alternative government but
reported to the President that as Bommai had lost the majority
support in the house, and as no other party was in a position to
form the government, action be taken under Article 356 (1).
Accordingly, the President issued the proclamation under in
April, 1989.
Bommai challenged the validity of the proclamation before the
Karnataka High Court through a writ petition on various
grounds. The High Court ruled that the proclamation issued
under Article 356(1) is not wholly outside the scope of judicial
scrutiny; The satisfaction of the President under Article 356 (1)
which is a condition precedent for the issue of the proclamation
ought to be real and genuine satisfaction based on relevant facts
and circumstances. The scope of judicial scrutiny is therefore
confined to an examination within the disclosed regions where
any regional access to the action proposed for proclamation
issued. The court may examine as to whether the proclamation
was based on satisfaction which was mala fide for any reason,
or based on wholly extraneous and irrelevant grounds. In such a
situation, the stated satisfaction of the President would not be a
satisfaction in a constitutional sense under Article 356. In the
end, however, the High Court dismissed the petition holding
that effect stated in the Governors report could not be held to be
irrelevant. Governors bona fides were not questioned and his

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satisfaction was based on reasonable assessment of all facts.
The court also ruled that recourse to floor test was neither
compulsory nor obligatory and was not a breeding visit to the
sending of the report to the President. S.R. Bommai appealed
the decision of High Court before Supreme Court.
Besides, there were three more proclamations before the
Supreme Court for the review— those made in Madhya
Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan in 1992 in the wake
of the demolition of the disputed Babri structure in Ayodhya.
Judgment: Supreme Court in its judgement by majority
declared that Karnataka, Meghalaya and Nagaland
proclamations as unconstitutional but the proclamations in
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh as valid.
A bench of nine-judge was constituted in Bommai to consider
the various issues arising in several cases, and several opinion
were rendered. On the basis of consensus among the judges, the
following propositions can be enunciated in relation to Article
356 (1) and the scope of judicial review thereunder;
1. The President exercises his power under Article 356 (1) on
the advice of the Council of Ministers which, in effect, the
power really belongs maybe formally vested in the
President.
2. The question whether the incumbent state Chief Minister
has lost his majority support in the assembly has to be
decided not in the Governor’s chamber but on the floor of
the house. There should be test of strength between the
government and other on the floor of the house before
recommending imposition of President’s rule in the state.
3. The governor should explore the possibility of installing an
alternative ministry, when the erstwhile ministry loses
support in the house.

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4. The validity of the proclamation issued under Article 356,
justiciable on such grounds as: whether it was issued on the
basis of any material at all, or whether the material was
relevant, or whether the proclamation was issued in the
malafide exercise of the power, or was based only on
extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds.
5. There should be material before the President indicating
that the Government of the state cannot be carried on in
accordance with the Constitution. The material in question
before the President should be as would induce a
reasonable man to come to the conclusion in question.
6. When a prima facie (based on the first impression) is made
out against the validity of the proclamation, it is for the
Central Government to prove that the relevant material did
in fact exist. Search material maybe the report of the
Governor or any other material.
7. The dissolution of the legislative assembly in the state is
not an automatic consequence of the issuance of the
proclamation. The dissolution of assembly is also not a
must in every case. It should be done only when it is found
to be necessary for achieving the purpose of the
proclamation.
8. The provisions in Article 356 (3) are intended to be a check
on the power of President under Article 356(1). If the
proclamation is not approved within two months by two
houses of Parliament, it automatically lapses. This means
that the President ought not to take any irreversible action
till the proclamation is approved by the house of
Parliament. Therefore, the state assembly ought not to be
dissolved.
9. Once the proclamation is approved by Parliament, and then
at the end of six months, or it is revoked earlier, neither the

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dismissed the State Government, nor the dissolved
legislature will revive.
10. If the court invalidates the proclamation, even if approved
by the Parliament, the action of the President becomes
invalid. The State Government, if dismissed, is revived and
the state assembly, if dissolved, will be restored.
11. Article 74(2) bars an enquiry into the question whether any
or what advice was tendered by the Council of Ministers to
the President. Article 74(2) “does not bar the court from
calling upon the Union Council of Ministers to disclose to
the court the material upon which the President had formed
the requisite satisfaction. The material on the basis of
which advice was tendered does not become part of the
advice. Even if the material is looked into by or shown to
the President, it does not partake the character of advice”.
The Supreme Court, in this case, seeks to promote basic and
wholesome constitutional values, society, Parliamentary
system, federalism, control over the executive and secularism.

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Part XIX
Miscellaneous
Article 361 - 367

Topic: “Sale For Purchase Of Goods”

Name of the Case: Gannon Dunkerly & Co. v. State of
Rajasthan, (1993) 1 SCC 364
Bench: Chief Justice M.H. Kania, Justice J.S. Verma, Justice
S.C. Agarwal, Justice Y. Dayal and Justice A.S. Anand
Judgment: Article 366 (29) (A) explains the ambit of the
expression “sale or purchase of goods”.
The object of the new definition introduced in Article 366 (29)
(A) of the Constitution is, therefore, to enlarge the scope of tax
on sale or purchase of goods whenever it occurs in the
Constitution so that it may include within its scope the transfer,
delivery or supply of goods that may take place under any of
the transactions referred to in sub-clause (a) to (f) thereof
whenever such transfer, delivery of supply becomes subject to
levy of sale tax. So construed the expression tax on the sale for
purchase of goods in Entry 54 of the State List, therefore,
includes a tax on the transfer of property in goods (whether as
goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of a
works contract also. The tax leviable by the virtue of Article
366 (29)(A) of the Constitution thus becomes subject to same
discipline which any levy under entry 54 of the state list is
made subject to the Constitution.

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PART XX
Amendment of the Constitution
Article 368

Topic: The Court’s Interpretation On Amendability

Of The Constitution
Name of the Case: Sankari Prasad Singh v. UOI, AIR 1951
SC 458
Bench: Chief Justice Harilal Kania, Justice B.K.
Mukherjea, Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das, Justice N.
Chandrasekhara Aiyar
Fact of the Case: This is the first case on amendability of the
Consultation, the validity of the Consultation (First
Amendment) Act, 1951, curtailing the right to property
guaranteed by Article 31 was challenged. The argument against
the validity of the First Amendment was that Article 13
prohibits enactment of a law infringing or abrogating the
Fundamental Rights, that the word ‘law’ in Article 13 would
include any law, even a law amending the Constitution and,
therefore, the validity of such a law could be judged and
scrutinised with reference to the Fundamental Rights which it
could not infringe.
Judgment: The Supreme Court while adopting the literal
interpretation of the Constitution upheld the validity of first
amendment. The court rejected the contention and limited the
scope of Article 13 by ruling that the word ‘law’ in Article 13
would not include ‘constitutional amending law’ passed under
Article 368. The court stated on this point “We are of the
opinion that the context of Article 13 law must be taken to mean
rules and regulations made in the exercise of ordinary
legislative power and not amendment to the constitution made

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in the exercise of constituent power with the result that Article
13 (2) does not affect amendments made under Article 368.”
The court held that the terms of Article 368 are perfectly
general and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution
without any exception. The Fundamental Rights are not
excluded or immunised from the process of constitutional
amendment under Article 368. These rights could not be
invaded by the legislative organs by means of laws and rules
made in exercise of legislative power but they could certainly
be curtailed, abridged or even nullified by alteration of the
Constitution itself in exercise of the constituent power.
The Court, thus, disagreed with the view that the Fundamental
Rights are inviolable and beyond the reach of the process of the
constitutional amendment. The Court, thus, ruled that Article
13 refers to a ‘legislative’ law, i.e, an ordinary law made by a
legislature, but not to a constituent’ law, i.e, a ‘procedure’ laid
down in Article 368 amend any Fundamental Right.

Case Second: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965

SC 845
Background: The validity of the Constitutional (17th
Amendment) Act, 1964 was called in question. This
Amendment again adversely affected the right to property. By
this amendment, number of statutes affecting property rights
were placed in the 9th Schedule and were, thus, immunised
from Court review.
Issue:
1. Whether the amendment of the Constitution insofar as it
purported to take away or abridged the Fundamental Rights
was within the prohibition of Article 13(2)?

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2. Whether Article 31A and 31 B (as amended by the 17th
Amendment) sought to make changes to Articles 132, 136
and 226, or in any of the Lists in the 7th Schedule of the
Constitution, so that the conditions prescribed in the
proviso to the Article 368 had to be satisfied?
Judgment: The Supreme Court ruled that the ‘pith and
substance’ of the Amendment was only to amend the
Fundamental Right so as to help the State Legislature in
effectuating the policy of the agrarian reform. If it affected
Article 226 in an insignificant manner, that was only incidental;
it was an indirect effect of the 17th Amendment and it did not
amount to an amendment of Article 226. The impugned Act did
not change Article 226 in any manner.
The conclusion of the Supreme Court in Sankari Prasad case
as regards the relation between Article 13 and 368 was
reiterated by the majority. It felt no hesitation in holding that
the power of amending the Constitution conferred on
Parliament under Article 368 could be exercised over each and
every provision of the Constitution. The majority refused to
accept the argument that Fundamental Rights were “eternal,
and beyond the reach of Article 368.”

The Third Case: LC Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR

1967 SC 1643
Bench: Chief Justice K. Subba Rao, Justice K.N. Wanchoo,
Justice M. Hidayatullah, Justice J.C. Shah, Justice S.M. Sikri,
Justice R.S. Bachawat, Justice V. Ramaswami, Justice J.M.
Shelat, Justice V. Bhargava, Justice K.K. Mitter, Justie C.A.
Vaidyialingam
Issue:

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* Whether any of the Fundamental Right could be abridged
or taken away by the Parliament in exercise of its power
under Article 368?

Judgment: The supreme Court while overruling earlier cases

of Shankar Prasad and Sajjan Singh held that the Fundamental
Right were non - amendable through the constitutional
amending procedure set out in Article 368, while the minority
upheld the line of reasoning adopted by the court into earlier
Articles.
The majority took the position that Fundamental Rights occupy
a “transcendental” position in the Constitution, so that no
authority functioning under the Constitution, including
Parliament exercising the amending power under Article 368,
would be competent to amend the Fundamental Rights.
Chief Justice Subba Rao on behalf of himself and four other
judges, equated Fundamental Rights with natural rights and
characterised them as “primordial rights necessary for the
development of human personality”. It was established that
when Parliament would not affect Fundamental Right by
enacting a bill in its ordinary legislative process even
unanimously, how could it then abrogate a Fundamental Right
with only 2/3 majority? While Articles of less significance
require consent of majority of states, can Fundamental Rights
be amended without such consent?
While overruling the judgement passed in Shankari Prasad
and Sajjan Singh case, the Supreme Court held that the term
law in a comprehensive sense would take in even constitutional
law. The court formulated its position as follows, “an
amendment of the Constitution is law within the inclusive
definition of law under Article 13 (2) of the Constitution and,
as the entire scheme of Constitution was to list postulates the

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inviolability of Part III thereof, Article 368 shall not be so
construed as to destroy the structure of our Constitution.”

The Fourth Case: Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,

AIR 1973 SC 1461
Bench: Chief Justice S.M. Sikri, Justice J.M. Shelat, Justice
K.S. Hegde & Justice A.N. Grover, Justice A.N. Ray, & Justice
P.J. Reddy & Justice Palekar, Justice Hans Raj Khanna, Justice
K.K. Mathew, Justice M.H. Beg, Justice S.N. Dwivedi, Justice
B.K. Mukherjea, Justice Y.V. Chandrachud
Issue:
* The constitutional validity of XXIV and XXV Amendment
was challenged?
Judgment: The court made following observation under
several points noted below:
a. The court held that the power to amend Constitution is to
be found in Article 368 itself. It was emphasised that the
“provisions relating to the amendment of the Constitution
are some of the most important feature of any modern
constitution”.
b. Further, the court recognised that there is a distinction
between an ordinary law and a constitutional law.
c. Kesavananda did not concede an unlimited amending
power to Parliament under Article 368. The amending
power was now subjected to one very significant
qualification, viz, That the amending power cannot be
exercised in such a manner as to destroy or emasculate the
basic or fundamental features of the Constitution. A

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constitutional amendment which opens the basic structure
of constitution is ultra vires.
d. Some of the features regarded by the court as fundamental
and, thus, non-amendable are:
I. Supremacy of the Constitution,
II. Republican and democratic form of government,
iii. Secular character of the Constitution,
IV. Separation of power between legislative, executive
and the judiciary,
V. Federal character of the Constitution
e. Therefore, it means that while Parliament can amend any
constitutional provision by virtue of Article 368, such a power
is not absolute and unlimited and the court can still go into the
question whether or not an amendment violates or fundamental
or basic feature of the Constitution. If an amendment does so, it
will be constitutionally invalid.
f. What is the fundamental feature of the Constitution is a moot
point. The list given above is not final or exhaustive of such
features. It is for the courts to decide as and when a question
arises whether a particular amendment of the Constitution
affects any basic or fundamental features of the Constitution or
not. The question of basic feature has to be considered in a case
in the context of concrete problem.
f. It was further held that, Can Parliament under Article 368
rewrite the entire Constitution and bring a new constitution?
The answer to the question is that Parliament can only do that
which does not modify the basic feature of the Constitution and
not beyond that.

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Development in the Concept after Keshavananda Bharti
Case
Name of the case: Minerva Mills v. UOI, 1980 SC 1789
Bench: Justice Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice P.N.
Bhagwati, Justice A.C. Gupta, Justice N.L. Untwalia, Justice
P.S. Kailasam
Background: A writ petition was filed in Supreme Court
challenging the taking over of the management of the mills
under the Sick Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Act, 1974,
and in order made under Section 18-A of the Industrial
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The petition
challenged the constitutional validity of clause (4) & (5) of
Article 368, introduced by Section 55 of the 42nd Amendment.
If these clauses were held valid then the petitioners could not
challenge the validity of the 39th Amendment which had placed
the Nationalisation Act, 1974, in schedule IX Schedule.
Judgment: The Supreme Court held that Article 368 (4) & (5)
to be beyond the amending power of the Parliament and void
since it’s sought to remove all limitations on the power of
Parliament to amend the Constitution and confer power on
Parliament to amend the Constitution so as to damage or
destroy its basic essential feature or its basic structure. The true
object of this clause was to remove the limitations imposed on
parliaments power to amend the Constitution through
Kesavanand Bharti case.
The court observed that depriving the Courts of the power of
judicial review will mean making Fundamental Rights “a mere
adornment” as they will be rights without remedies. A
controlled Constitution will become uncontrolled.
It was held that the goals set out in Part IV of the Constitution,
Directive Principles of State Policy, must be achieved without

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the abrogation of means provided for by party which is
Fundamental Rights. In this sense, Fundamental Rights and
Directive Principles of State Policy both together constitute the
core of the Constitution and combine to form its conscience.
Anything that destroys the balance between the two parts will
ipso facto destroy an essential element of the basic feature of
the Constitution.
Name of the case: Waman Rao v. UOI, AIR 1981 SC 271
Bench: Chief Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Justice A. Sen, Justice
P.N. Bhagwati, Justice Tulzapurkar, Justice V.K. Iyer
Background: The Constitution validity of Maharashtra
Agricultural (Land Ceiling) on Holding Act, 1967 was
challenged. The Act imposed ceiling on agricultural holding in
the state. As the Act had been placed in the 9th Schedule, the
constitutional validity of Article 31A and 31B and an
unamended Article 31C was also challenged on the ground of
damaging the 'basic structure’ of the Constitution.
Judgment: The majority bench of Supreme Court held that all
Acts and Regulations included in the 9th schedule until the
landmark case of Kesavananda Bharati will receive the full
protection of Article 31B. Since, the 9th schedule is a part of the
Constitution, no addition or alteration can be made therein
without complying with the restrictive provisions governing the
amendments of the Constitution. Therefore, the Acts and
regulations included in the 9th schedule after Kesavanand
Bharti will not receive the protection of Article 31B for the
plain reason that in the face of Kesavanand judgement, there is
no justification for making additions to the 9th schedule with a
view to conferring a blanket protection on the law included
therein “The various constitutional amendment, by which
additions were made to the 9th schedule on or after 24th April

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1973, will be held valid only if they do not damage or destroy
the basic feature of the Constitution.“
These laws would not receive the protection of Article 31B ipso
facto. Each law has to be examined individually for
determining whether the constitutional amendment by which it
has been put in the 9th schedule damages or destroys the basic
feature of the Constitution in any manner. If, however any such
Act is protected by Article 31A or 31C (as stood prior to the
42nd Amendment) then the act will be valid.
Article 31C as it stood prior to the 42nd amendment made in
1976 is valid to the extent it constitutionally has been upheld in
Kesavanand Bharati case. Laws passed for giving effect to the
directive principles in Article 39 (b) & (c) “will fortify that
structure”. The Court expressed the hope that Parliament would
utilise to the maximum its potential to pass laws genuinely and
truly related to the principles contained in Article 39 (b) & (c).
___________________________________________________

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Part XXI
Temporary, Transitional and Special
Provisions
Article 369 - 378A
President Order of 2019: Deleting Article 370 from the
Constitution of India.

On 5 August 2019 the Government of India issued the

Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 2019
under Article 370, suspending the Constitution (Application to
Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954. Thus, the special provision
which was granted to State of Jammu and Kashmir was
abrogated and Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019
was passed to convert Jammu and Kashmir status of State into
two separate Union territories. Hereafter, all the acts, rules and
regulation, and the entire Constitution of India will be
applicable on Jammu and Kashmir. The special status
guaranteed to Jammu and Kashmir under Article 35A was also
abrogated.

The constitutional validity of the said order, 2019 was

challenged before the Supreme Court of India.

Name of the case: Dr. Shah Faisal vs. UOI, W.P. (C) No.
1099 of 2019
Bench Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice S.K. Kaul, Justice R.
Subhash Reddy, Justice B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant
Fact of the case: The case pertains to the constitutional
challenge before the Supreme Court as regard to two

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law
constitutional orders issued by President of India in excise of
his power under Article 370 of the Constitution of India. These
Constitution orders made the Constitution of India applicable to
the state of Jammu and Kashmir in its entirety, like other states
in India.
Issue:
1. When can a matter be referred to a larger bench?
2. Whether there is a requirement to refer the present matter to
a larger bench in the view of the earliest contradictory view
of this Court in Prem Nath Kaul case and Sampath Prakash
case?
3. Whether Sampath Prakash case is per incuriam for not
taking into consideration the decision of court in Prem Nath
Kaul case?
Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1959
SC 749: The Supreme Court held that the constitutional
relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the
Union of India should be finally decided by the constituent
assembly of the State and, therefore, he has to be treated as a
temporary provision.
Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1970
SC 1118: The Supreme Court reversed the judgement of Prem
Nath and held that Article 370 as a permanent provision giving
perennial power to the President to regulate the relationship
between the state and the Union of India.
Judgment: The constitutional bench of Supreme Court held
that the Constitutional bench in the Prem Nath Kaul Case did
not discuss the continuation of cessation of the operation of
Article 370 of the Constitution after the dissolution of
constituent assembly of state. This was not an issue in the
question before this Court, unlike in the Sampat Prakash case

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where the contention was specifically made before and refuted
by, the court. This court sees no reason to read into the Prem
Nath Kaul Case and interpretation which result in it being in
conflict with the subsequent judgement of this court,
particularly when an ordinary reading of the judgement does
not result in such an interpretation.
It was held that the contacts of Prem Nath Kaul case was
different, as it was dealing with the validity of legislation
passed by the Yuvraj of Jammu and Kashmir before the sitting
of the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir.
Thus, it was her that there is no conflict between the
judgements in Prem Nath Kaul case and the Sampath Prakash
case. The plea of counsel to refer the present matter to a larger
bench on this ground is therefore rejected.

Following Articles are Repealed Article 379 - 391

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Constitutional Amendments1

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

1st 1. Empowered the state to make special

Amendment provisions for the advancement of Socially
Act, 1951 and Economically backward classes.
2. Provided for the saving of laws providing
for acquisition of Estates, etc.
3. Added ninth schedule to protect the land
reform and other laws included in it from
the judicial review.
4. Added three more grounds of restrictions on
freedom of speech and expression, viz,
public order, friendly relations with foreign
states and incitement to an offence. Also,
made the restriction “reasonable" and thus,
justiciable in nature.
5. Provided that State trading and
nationalisation of any trade or business by
the state is not to be invalid on the ground
of violation of the right to trade or business.
2nd Re-adjusted the scale of representation in the
Amendment Lok Sabha by providing that one member
Act, 1952 would represent even more than 7,50,000
persons.
3rd Empowered the Parliament to control the
Amendment production, supply and distribution of
Act, 1954 foodstuffs, cattle fodder, raw cotton, cotton
seeds and raw jute in the public interest.

1
Source: M. Lakshmikant, Indian Polity- Constitutional Amendment

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

4th 1. Made the scale of compensation given in

Amendment lieu of compulsory acquisition of private
Act, 1955 property beyond the scrutiny of courts.
2. Authorised the state to nationalise any trade.
3. Included some more acts in the ninth
schedule.
4. Extended the scope of Article 31 A (saving
laws)
5th Empowered the President to fix the time
Amendment limit for the State Legislature to express
Act, 1955 their views on the proposed Central
legislation affecting the areas, boundaries
and names of the states.
6th Included a new subject in the Union List,
Amendment i.e, taxes on the sale and purchase of goods
Act, 1956 in the course of the interstate trade and
commerce and restricted the state‘s power
in this regard.
7th 1. Abolished the existing classification of
Amendment states into four categories, i.e, Part A, Part
Act, 1956 B, Part C states, and recognised them into
14 States and 6 Union territories.
2. Extended the jurisdiction of High Court to
Union territories.
3. Provided for the establishment of a common
High Court for two or more states.
Provided for the appointment of additional
and acting judges of the High Court.
8th Extended the reservation of seats for the
Amendment Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
Act, 1960 and especially presentation for the Anglo
Indians in the Lok Sabha and the state
Legislative Assemblies for a period of 10
years (Upto 1970)

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

9th Facilitated the cession of Indian territory of

Amendment Barubari Union to Pakistan as provided in the
Act, 1960 Indo-Pakistan Agreement, 1958

10th Incorporated Dadra and Nagar Haveli in the

Amendment Indian Union.
Act, 1961

11th Changed the procedure of election of the Vice-

Amendment President by providing an electoral college
Act, 1961 instead of a joint meeting of the two houses of
Parliament.
Provided that the election of the President or
Vice-President cannot be challenged on the
ground of any vacancy in the appropriate
electoral college.
12th Incorporated Goa, Daman and Diu in the Indian
Amendment Union.
Act, 1962

13th Gave the status of State to Nagaland and made

Amendment special provisions for it.
Act, 1962

14th 1. Incorporated Puducherry in the Indian

Amendment Union.
Act, 1962 2. Provided for the creation of legislatures and
Council of Ministers for the Union
Territories of Himachal Pradesh, Manipur,
Tripura, Goa, Daman and Diu, and

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

Puducherry.

15th 1. Enable the High Court to issue writs to any

Amendment person or authority even outside its
Act, 1963 territorial jurisdiction if the cause of action
arises within it’s territorial limit
2. Increased the retirement age of High Court
judges from 60 to 62 years.
3. Provided for appointment of retired judges
of the High Court as acting judges of the
same court.
4. Provided for compensatory allowance to
judges who are transferred from one High
Court to another.
5. Enabled the retired judges of High Court to
act as ad hoc judges of the Supreme Court.
3. Provided for the procedure of determining
the age of the Supreme Court and High
Court judges.
16th 1. Empowered the state to impose further
Amendment restriction on the rights to freedom of
Act, 1963 speech and expression, to assemble
peacefully and to form Association in the
interest of sovereignty and integrity of
India.
6. Included sovereignty and integrity in the
form of oath or affirmations to be
subscribed by contestants to the legislatures,
member of the legislatures, ministers,
judges and CAG of India.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

17th 1. Prohibited declaration of land under

Amendment personal cultivation unless the market
Act, 1964 value of the land is paid as
compensation.
2. Included 44 more acts in the ninth
schedule.
18th Made it clear that the power of Parliament to
Amendment form a new State also include a power to form a
Act, 1966 new State or Union Territory by uniting a part
of a state or Union Territory to another state or
Union Territory.
19th Abolished the system of election tribunal and
Amendment wasted the power to hear election petitions in
Act, 1966 the High Courts.

20th Validated certain appointments of District

Amendment Judges in the Uttar Pradesh which were
Act, 1966 declared void by the Supreme Court.

21st Included ‘Sindhi’ as the 15th language in the

Amendment eighth schedule.
act, 1967

22nd Facilitated the creation of a new autonomous

Amendment state of Meghalaya within the State of Assam.
Act, 1969

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

23rd Extended the reservation of seats for the

Amendment Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and
Act, 1969 especially presentation for the Anglo Indians in
the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative
Assemblies for further period of 10 years. (Upto
1980s)
24th Affirmed the power of Parliament to amend any
Amendment part of the Constitution including Fundamental
Act, 1971 Rights.
Made it compulsory for the President to give his
assent to a Constitutional Amendment Bill.
25th Curtailed the Fundamental Right to property.
Amendment Provided that any law made to give effect to the
Act, 1971 directive principles contained in Article 39 (b)
and (c) cannot be challenged on the ground of
violation of the rights guaranteed by Article 14,
19 and 31.
26th Abolished the privy purses and privileges of the
Amendment former’s rulers of princely states.
Act, 1971

27th 1. Empowered the administrators of certain

Amendment Union territories to promulgate ordinances.
Act, 1971 2. Made certain special provisions for new
Union territories of Arunachal Pradesh and
Mizoram.
3. Authorised the Parliament to create the
legislative assembly and council of
ministers for the new state of Manipur.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

28th Abolished the special privileges of ICS officers

Amendment and empowered the Parliament to determine
Act, 1972 their service conditions.

29th Included two Kerala Acts on land reforms in the

Amendment ninth schedule.
Act, 1972

30th Did away with the provision which allowed

Amendment appeal to the Supreme Court in civil cases
Act, 1972 involving an amount of 20,000 and provided
that an appeal can be filed in the Supreme Court
only if the case involves a substantial question
of law.
31st Increased the number of Lok Sabha seat from
Amendment 525 to 545.
Act, 1972

32nd Made special provisions to satisfy the

Amendment aspirations of the people of Telangana region in
Act, 1973 Andhra Pradesh.

33rd Provided that the resignation of the members of

Amendment Parliament and the state legislatures maybe
Act, 1974 accepted by the speakers or chairman only if he
is satisfied that the registration is voluntary or
genuine.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

34th Included 20 more land tenure and land reforms

Amendment acts of various states in ninth schedule.
Act, 1974

35th Terminated the protectorates status of Sikkim

Amendment and conferred on it the status of associated state
Act, 1974 of the Indian Union. The 10th schedule was
added laying down the terms and conditions of
Association of Sikkim with the Indian Union.
36th Made Sikkim a full-fledged state of the Indian
Amendment Union and omitted the 10th schedule.
Act, 1975

37th Provided legislative assembly and Council of

Amendment Ministers of the Indian Union of Arunachal
Act, 1975 Pradesh.

38th 1. Made the declaration of emergency by the

Amendment President non-Justiciable.
Act, 1975 2. Made the promulgation of ordinances by the
President, governors and administrators of
the Union territories non-justiciable.
3. Empowered the President to declare
different proclamations of national
emergency on different grounds
simultaneously.
39th 1. Placed the disputes relating to the President,
Amendment Vice President, Prime Minister and Speaker
Act, 1975 beyond the scope of the judiciary. They are
to be decided by such authority as may be
determined by the Parliament.

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

2. Included certain Central Acts in the ninth

schedule.

40th 1. Empowered the Parliament to specify from

Amendment time to time the limits of the territorial
Act, 1976 waters, continental shelf, the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and Maritime Zone
of India.
2. Included 64 more central and state laws,
mostly relating to land reforms, in the ninth
schedule.
41st Raised the retirement age of members of State
Amendment Public Service Commission and Joint Public
Act, 1976 Service Commission from 60 to 62.

42nd 1. Added three words, i.e, ‘Socialist’,

Amendment ‘Secular’ and ‘Integrity’ in the preamble.
Act, 1976 2. Added fundamental duties by the citizens
(The most (new part IV A)
comprehensi 3. Made the President bound by the advice of
ve the Cabinet.
amendment 4. Provided for administrative tribunals and
made so far tribunals for the other matters (Part XIV A)
to the 5. Froze the seat in the Lok Sabha and State
Constitution. legislative assembly on the basis of 1971
It is also census till 2001.
known as 6. Made the Constitutional Amendments
“mini beyond judicial scrutiny.
constitution“ 7. Curtailed the power of judicial review and
. It gave writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
effect to the High Court.
recommenda 8. Raised the tenure of Lok Sabha and state

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

tion of legislative assemblies from 5 to 6 years.

Swaran 9. Provided that the laws made for the
Singh implementation of Directive Principles
committee. cannot be declared invalid by the courts on
the ground of violation of some
Fundamental Rights.
10. Empowered the Parliament to make laws to
deal with antinational activities and such
laws are take precedence over Fundamental
Right s.
11. Added three new Directive Principles viz..,
equal justice and free legal aid, participation
of workers in the management of industries
and protection of environment, Forest and
wildlife.
12. Facilitated the proclamation of national
emergency in a part of territory of India.
13. Extended the one time duration of the
President’s rule in the state from six months
to 1 year.
14. Empowered the Centre to deploy its forces
in any state to deal with a grave situation of
law and order.
15. Shifted five subjects from the State List to
the Concurrent List, viz, education, forests,
protection of wild animals and birds,
weights and measures and administration of
justice, Constitution and organisation of all
court as it the Supreme Court and the High
Courts.
16. Did away with the requirement of quorum
in the Parliament and the state legislatures.
17. Empowered the Parliament to decide from
time to time the rights and privileges of its
members and committees.
18. Provided for the creation of the All India

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 100 landmark Judgement in Constitutional Law

Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

Judicial Services.
19. Shortened the procedure for disciplinary
action by taking away the right of civil
servant to make representations at the
second stage after the inquiry.
43rd 1. Restored the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Amendment Court and the high courts in respect of
Act, 1977 judicial review and issue of writs.
(Elected by 2. Deprive the Parliament of its special powers
the Janata to make laws to deal with antinational
government activities.
to nullify
some of the
distortion
introduced
by 42nd
amendment
act of 1976)
44th 1. Restored the original term of Lok Sabha and
Amendment State Legislative Assemblies.
Act, 1978 2. Restored the provisions with regard to
(Enacted by quorum in the Parliament and state
the Janata legislature.
government 3. Permitted directions to the British house of
mainly to commons in the provisions pertaining to the
nullify some Parliamentary privileges.
of the other 4. Gave constitutional protection to
distortions publication in newspaper of true reports of
introduced the proceedings in the Parliament and the
by the 42nd state legislature.
amendment 5. Empowered the President to send back once
act, 1976) the advice of Cabinet for reconsideration.
But the reconsidered advice is to be binding
on the president.
6. Deleted the provision which made the

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

satisfaction of the President, Governor and

administrators final in issuing ordinances.
7. Restored some of the powers of Supreme
Court and High Courts.
8. Replaced the term “internal disturbance” by
“armed rebelion” in respect of National
Emergency.
9. Made the President to declare a national
emergency only on the written
recommendation of the Cabinet.
10. Made certain procedural safeguards with
respect to national emergency and
President’s rule.
11. Deleted the right to property from the list of
Fundamental Rights and made it only a
legal right.
12. Provided that the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by Article 20 and 21 cannot be
suspended during a national emergency.
13. Omitted the provisions which took away the
power of courts to decide the election
dispute of the President, Vice President, the
Prime Minister and Speaker of the Lok
Sabha.
45th Extended the reservation of seats from the
Amendment Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the
Act, 1980 special the presentation for the Anglo Indian in
the Lok Sabha and state legislative assemblies
for further period of 10 years. (Upto 1990)
46th 1. Enabled the states to plug loopholes in the
Amendment laws and realise sales tax dues.
Act, 1980 2. Brought about some uniformity in tax rates
on certain items.

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47th Included 14 land reforms act of various states in

Amendment the ninth schedule.
Act, 1984

48th Facilitated the extension of President’s rule in

Amendment Punjab beyond one year without meeting the
Act, 1984 two special conditions for such extensions.

49th Give a constitutional sanctity to the autonomous

Amendment District Council in Tripura.
Act, 1984

50th Empowered the President to restrict the

Amendment Fundamental Rights of persons employed in
Act, 1984 intelligence organisations and
telecommunication systems to set up for the
armed forces or intelligence organisations.
51st Provided for reservation of seats in Lok Sabha
Amendment for Scheduled Tribe in Meghalaya, Arunachal
Act, 1984 Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram as well as in
the legislative assemblies of Meghalaya and
Nagaland.
52nd Provided for the disqualification of members of
Amendment, Parliament and state legislators on the ground
1985 of defection and added a new 10th schedule for
(Also known containing the details in this regard.
as anti-
defection
law)

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53rd Made special provisions in respect of Mizoram

Amendment and fixed the strength of its assembly at a
Act, 1986 minimum of 40 members.

54th Increased the salaries of Supreme Court and

Amendment High Court judges and enable the Parliament to
Act, 1986 change term in future by an ordinary law.

55th Made special provisions in respect of

Amendment Arunachal Pradesh and fixed the strength of its
Act, 1986 assembly at a minimum of 30 members.

56th Fixed the strength of the Goa legislative

Amendment assembly at a minimum of 30 members.
Act, 1987

57th Reserved seat for the Scheduled Tribes in the

Amendment legislative assemblies of the state of Arunachal
Act, 1987 Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Nagaland.

58th Provided for an authoritative text of the

Amendment Constitution in Hindi and give the same legal
Act, 1987 sanctity to the Hindi version of the Constitution.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

59th 1. facilitated extension of President’s rule in

Amendment Punjab up to 3 years.
Act, 1988 2. Provided for the declaration of national
emergency in Punjab on the ground of
internal disturbance.
60th Increased the ceiling of taxes on professional,
Amendment trades, callings and increments from 250 ₹ per
Act, 1988 annum to 2500 ₹ per annum.

61st Reduced the voting age from 21 years to 18

Amendment years for the Lok Sabha and state legislative
Act, 1989 assemblies.

62nd Extended the reservation of seats for the

Amendment Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes and
Act, 1989 special the presentation for the Anglo Indians in
the Lok Sabha and the state legislative
assemblies for the further period of 10 years.
63rd Repealed the changes introduced by the 59th
Amendment amendment act of 1988 in relation to Punjab. In
Act, 1989 other words, Punjab was brought at par with the
other states in respect of emergency provisions.

64th Facilitated the extension of the President’s rule

Amendment in Punjab up to a total period of three years and
Act, 1990 six months.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

65th Provided for the establishment of multimember

Amendment national commission for Schedule Caste and
Act, 1990 Schedule Tribes in the place of a special officer
for Schedule Caste and Schedule Tribes.

66th Included 55 more land reforms act of various

Amendment states in the ninth schedule.
Act, 1990

67th Facilitate the extension of the President’s rule

Amendment in Punjab up to a total period of 4 years.
Act, 1990

68th Facilitated the extension of President’s rule in

Amendment Punjab up to a total period of five years
Act, 1991

69th Accorded special status to the Union Territory

Amendment of Delhi by designing it as the National Capital
Act, 1991 Territory of Delhi. The amendment also
provided for the creation of 70 member
assembly and a seven-member Council of
Ministers for Delhi.
70th Provided for the inclusion of the members of
Amendment the legislative assemblies of National Capital
Act, 1992 Territory of Delhi and the Union Territory of
Puducherry in the electoral college for the
election of the President.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

71st Included Konkani, Manipuri and Nepali

Amendment language in the eighth schedule. With this, the
Act 1992 total number of scheduled languages increased
to 18.

72nd Provided for the reservation of seats for the

Amendment Scheduled Tribes in the legislative assembly of
Act, 1992 Tripura.

73rd Granted constitutional status and protection to

Amendment the Panchayati Raj institutions. For this
Act, 1992 purpose, the amendment has added a new part
nine entitled as “the Panchayats” and a new 11
schedule containing 29 functional items of the
panchayats.
74th Guaranteed constitutional status and protection
Amendment to the urban local bodies, for this purpose, the
Act, 1992 amendment has added a new part 9A entitled as
“the means parties” and a new 12 schedule
containing 18 functional items of the
municipalities.
75th Provided for the establishment of rent tribunal
Amendment for the adjudication of disputes with respect to
Act, 1994 rent, its regulation and control and tenancy
issues including the rights, title and interest of
landlords and tenants.
76th Included the Tamil Nadu Reservation Act, 1994
Amendment in the ninth schedule to protect it from the
Act, 1994 judicial review. In 1982, the Supreme Court
ruled that the total reservation should not
exceed 50%.

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77th Provided for reservation in promotions in

Amendment government jobs for Scheduled Castes and
Act 1995 Scheduled Tribes. This amendment nullified the
Supreme Court ruling with regards to
reservation in promotion.
78th Included 27 more land reforms act of various
Amendment states in the ninth schedule. With this, the total
Act, 1995 number of acts in the schedule increased to 282.
But, the last entry is numbered 284.

79th Extended the reservation of seats for the

Amendment scheduled caste and scheduled Tribes and
Act, 1999 special representation for the Anglo Indian in
the Lok Sabha and the state legislative
assemblies for a further period of 10 years.
(Upto 2010)
80th Provided for an “alternative scheme of
Amendment devolution” of revenue between the Centre and
Act, 2000 states. This was enacted on the basis of the
recommendations of the 10th finance
commission which had recommended that out
of the total income obtained from the central
taxes and duties, 29% should be distributed
among the states.
81st Empowered the state to consider the unfilled
Amendment reserved vacancies of year as a separate class
Act, 2000 for vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding
year or years. Such class of vacancies are not to
be combined with the vacancies of the year in
which they are being filled up to determine the
ceiling of 50% reservation on the total number
of vacancies of that year. In brief, this
amendment ended the 50% ceiling on
reservation in backlog vacancies.

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82nd Provided for making of any provision in favour

Amendment of the schedule caste and schedule Tribes for
Act, 2000 relaxation in qualifying marks in any
examination or lowering the standard of
evolution, for reservation in matters of
promotion to the public services of the Centre
and state.
83rd Provided that new reservation in panchayats
Amendment need to be made for Schedule Caste in
Act, 2000 Arunachal Pradesh. The total population of the
State is tribal and there is no Schedule Castes.

84th Extended the ban on adjustment of seat in the

Amendment Lok Sabha and the state legislative assemblies
Act, 2001 for another 25 years with the same objective of
encouraging population limiting measures. In
the other words, the number of seats in the Lok
Sabha and assemblies are remain same till
2026. It also provided for the readjustment and
rationalisation of territorial constituencies in the
state on the basis of population figure of 1991
census.
85th Provided for “consequential seniority” in the
Amendment case of promotion by the virtue of rule of
Act, 2001 reservation for the government servants
belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled
Tribes with retrospective effect from June 1995.
86th 1. Made elementary education a Fundamental
Amendment Right. The newly added Article 21A
Act, 2002 declares that “the state shall provide free
and compulsory education to all children of
the age of 6 to 14 years in such manner as
the statement determine”.
2. Changed the subject matter of Article 45 in

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

directive principles. It now reads “the state

shall endeavour to provide early childhood
care and education for all children until they
complete the age of six years”.
3. Added a new fundamental duty under
Article 50 1A which reads “it shall be the
duty of every citizen of India who is a
present or guardian or provide opportunities
for education to the children or ward
between the age of six and 14 years”.
87th Provided for the readjustment and
Amendment rationalisation of territorial constituencies in the
Act, 2003 states on the basis of the population figures of
2001 census and not 1981 census has provided
earlier by the 84th amendment act of 2001.
88th Made a provision for service tax. Taxes on
Amendment services are levied by the Centre. But, their
Act, 2003 proceeds are collected as well as appropriated
by both the Centre and States in accordance
with the principles formulated by the
Parliament.
89th Bifurcated the erstwhile combined national
Amendment Commission for Scheduled Castes and
Act, 2003 Scheduled Tribes into two separate bodies,
namely, National Commission for Scheduled
Castes and National Commission for Scheduled
Tribes. Both the commissions consists of a
Chairman, a Vice Chairperson and three other
members. They are appointed by the President.
90th Provided for maintaining the erstwhile
Amendment representation of the Scheduled Tribes and non-
Act, 2003 Scheduled Tribes in the Assam legislative
Assembly from the Bodoland territorial areas
districts.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

91st Made the provision to limit the size of Council

Amendment of Ministers, to debar defectors from holding
Act, 2003 public offices, and to straighten the anti-
defection law:
1. The total number of ministers, including the
Prime Minister, in the central Council of
Minister shall not exceed 15% of the total
strength of the Lok Sabha.
2. Member of either house of Parliament
belonging to any political party who is
disqualified on the ground of defection shall
also be disqualified to be appointed as a
minister.
3. The total number of ministers, including the
Chief Minister, in the council of ministers in
the State shall not exceed 15% of the total
strength of legislative assembly of that state.
But, the number of ministers, including the
chief minister, in a state shall not be less
than 12.
4. Member of either house of a state
legislature belonging to any political party
who is disqualified on the ground of
defection shall also be disqualified to be
appointed as a minister.
5. A member of either house of Parliament or
either house of a state legislature belonging
to any political party who is this qualified
on the ground of defection shall also be
disqualified to hold any remunerative
political post. The expression “remunerative
political post“ means (1) any office under
the Central Government or a State
Government where the salary already
numeration for such office is paid out of the
public revenue of the concerned

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

government; or (2) any office under a body,

whether Inc or not, which is wholly or
partially owned by the Central Government
or State Government and the salary or
renumeration for such office is paid by such
body, except where such salary or a
renumeration paid is compensatory in
nature.
6. The provision of the 10th schedule
pertaining to exemption from
disqualification in case of split by one third
members of Legislature party has been
deleted. It means that the defector have no
more protection on ground of splits.
92nd Included four more languages in the VIII
Amendment schedule. They are Bodo, Dogri, Mathilli and
Act, 2003 Santhali. With this, the total number of
constitutional language increase to 22.

93rd Empowered the state to make special provisions

Amendment for the Socially and Educationally Backward
Act, 2005 Classes or the Scheduled Caste or Schedule
Tribes in educational institutions including
private educational institution, except the
minority educational institutions.
94th Freed Bihar from the obligation of having a
Amendment tribal welfare minister and extended the same
Act, 2006 provision to Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. This
provision will not be applicable to the two
newly formed states and Madhya Pradesh and
Orissa, where it has already been in force.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

95th Extended the reservation of seats for the

Amendment Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
Act, 2009 special day presentation for the Anglo Indians
in the Lok Sabha and the state legislative
assembly is for a further period of 10 years.
(Upto 2020)
96th Substituted “Odia” for “Oriya”. Consequently,
Amendment the “Oriya” language in the eighth schedule
Act, 2011 shall be pronounced as “Odia“.

97th Gave a constitutional status and protection to

Amendment cooperative societies. In this context, it made
Act, 2011 the following three changes in the Constitution
1. It made the right to form a cooperative
society a Fundamental Right
2. It included a new Directive Principles of
State Policy on promotion of cooperative
societies.
3. It added a new Part IX-B in the Constitution
which is entitled as “the cooperative
societies“
98th Provided for a special provisions in the
Amendment Hyderabad Karnataka region of the state of
Act, 2012 Karnataka. The special provisions aim to
establish or use divisional mechanism for
equitable allocation of funds to meet the
development needs of the region, as well as to
enhance human resource and promote
employment from the region by providing for
local cadre in services and reservation in
educational and vocational trainings institution.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

99th Replaced the collegium system of appointing

Amendment judges to the Supreme Court and high courts
Act, 2014 with a new body called national judicial
appointment commission. However, in 2015,
the Supreme Court has declared this
amendment as unconstitutional and void.
Consequently, the earlier collegium system
became operative again.
100th Gave effect to the acquiring of certain
Amendment territories by India and transfer of certain
Act, 2015 territories to Bangladesh in pursuance of the
land boundary agreement of 1974 and its
protocol of 2011. For this purpose, this
amendment act amended the provisions in
relating to that address of four states (Assam,
West Bengal, Meghalaya and Tripura) in the
first schedule of the Constitution.
101st Paved the way for introduction of goods and
Amendment services tax GST regime in the country.
Act, 2016 [The details on this amendment has already
been covered]

102nd Conferred constitutional status on the National

Amendment Commission for Backward Classes which was
Act, 2018 set up in 1993 by an act of parliament.
Relieved the National Commission For
Scheduled Castes from its function with regard
to the backward classes.
Empowered the President to specify the socially
and educationally backward classes in relation
to a state or Union Territory.

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Amendment Objective and Provision Amended

103rd 1. Empowered the state to make any special

Amendment provision for the advancement of any
Act, 2019 economically weaker Sections of citizen.
2. Allowed the state to make a provision for
the reservation of up to 10% of seats for
such Sections in admission to educational
institution including private educational
institutions, whether edit or unaided by the
state, except the Marathi Educational
Institutions. This reservation of up to 10%
would be in addition to the existing
reservations.
3. Permitted the state to make a provision for
the reservation of up to 10% of
appointments or posts in favour of such
Sections. This reservation of up to 10%
would be in addition to the existing
reservation.
104th To extend the reservation of seats of SCs and
amendment STs in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies from
act 2020 70 years to 80 years. Removed reserved seats
for Anglo Indian community in the Lok Sabha
and state assemblies.

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Into Legal World
About Author
Amaresh Patel is a Founder and Managing Director at Into
Legal World and EduCuriosity. Into Legal World, a trademark
of Parivritt Enterprises Pvt Ltd, has established it's reputation in
Legal News Portal, Institute, Publication House and a law firm
under name of Sui Juris Law Firm. The company has also
received monetary award under Startup Uttar Pradesh program.
After the success of Into Legal World, he is also venturing into
a new company named EduCuriosity for bridging up the gaps
between academic learning and the skills required for being a
professional.
He is also author of 4 law books, 3 of which has been
Bestsellers, namely 100 Landmark Judgments of the Year
Series. His newly launched book named 100 landmark
judgement 2020-21 is a foreword by Prof. Balraj Chauhan, VC,
DNLU.
His idea of writing this book, namely, “100 Landmark
Judgment 2021” is to help law students, advocates, teachers,
professionals, and judicial officers to find landmark judgment
pronounced by Supreme Court which has changed the law or
has capacity to change the law. He believes that law is an ever-
changing subject and to understand it, one has to be updated,
and there is nothing best to update oneself in law than going
through important judgments of Supreme Court and High
Courts.

240