A L L I N D I A

P O L I T I C A L
TKH
MUN
P A R T Y

CHAIR : AVANI NAIK

AIPPM
 1. L E T T E R F R O M T H E
E X E C U T I V E B O A R D

2. A B O U T T H E
C O M M I T T E E
CONTENTS

3. U N D E R S T A N D I N G
A G E N D A
T H E
TABLE OF

4. B R O A D E R V I E W
T H E A G E N D A
A T

5.
K E Y L E G A L A N D
I N S T I T U T I O N A L
F R A M E W O R K S :
A N A L Y S I S A N D
C O N T R O V E R S I E S

6. C A S E S T U D I E S

7. Q A R M A

8. R E F E R E N C E L I N K S
Letter from the
Executive Board
Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the All India Political Parties Meet (AIPPM) at this esteemed MUN conference.
As your executive board member, we extend our warmest welcome and greetings to all the
participating members! We are delighted to see a room full of young leaders ready to
debate. We are fortunate to have the opportunity to be your chairs with such amazing
delegates. We are looking forward to witnessing passionate arguments, creative problem-
solving, questions and above all, respectful diplomacy. We are confident that you all will put
forth constructive debates that contribute to insightful resolutions and sure that you will
laud your decision to participate in the deliberations in the AIPPM at the TKH MUN 4.0.
This study guide is here to help the delegates better understand the committee, the
agenda and its processing in a simple and easy way. One very crucial point to emphasise
is DO NOT confine your research to this guide only, delve into the agenda beyond what’s
outlined here. In committee sessions please try to be active during the proceedings. We will
be closely at your side and do not hesitate to ask for any sort of help. If you have any
queries, feel free to contact us. We are more than happy to help. Looking forward to a
wonderful conference!

Wishing you the best,

Avani Naik,
avaninnaik@[Link]
Chairperson
About the Committee
AIPPM
The All India Political Parties Meet (AIPPM) is a pretty unique committee where you don’t
represent countries but the Indian political parties and members. So basically, you’ll have
the opportunity to channel your inner politician and speak like party leaders, and debate
real Indian issues from your party’s point of view :)

Also note It’s NOT a Parliament, so you’re not gonna be passing real bills but it is a
powerful platform where parties come together to discuss, debate, and maybe (not really
i’ll be honest) agree on stuff. Also AIPPM is a private com basically meaning the
discussions are not public and stay within the committee. Bilingual speeches like English
and Hindi are allowed, and that the tone can be informal (you can be sassy yeah) but
please note be respectful to each other.

In this committee, you deal with domestic problems like internal security, Centre-State
coordination, terrorism, and laws like UAPA, and agencies like the NIA and NSC too. Now
you have to understand your party’s ideology, and stand your ground. Make sure your
arguments are loud and clear, and propose your solutions that will help. (not the ones that
already exist please)
You’ll get to:

● R E L E A S E P R E S S S T A T E M E N T S

So basically press statements are brief, formal communications

issued by a political party/ blog to express its stance on current
developments. They help shape narrative, clarify positions, and
influence the committee’s direction.

Also since in AIPPM, we don’t really have a typical Draft Resolution

like the UN committees because it’s a consultative and legislative
body :) So what we do Instead (atleast here) is that your Press
Release will act as the DR. So basically It’s your party’s final media
statement with your stance and solutions on the agenda.

● F O R M C O A L I T I O N S A N D R I V A L R I E S

Delegates MUST form alliances with other parties that are

(preferably pls) like minded so it can help to strengthen their
proposals or counter the opposing [Link] also often come up
because of the ideological differences of the parties.

● S E N D D I R E C T I V E S D U R I N G C R I S I S
U P D A T E S

so Directives are official actions that are taken by a party in response

to some crisis situation and they basically reflect a party’s ability to
act fast and propose realistic solutions to handle emergencies with
authority quickly.

to conclude AIPPM is less about formal diplomacy but more about

passionate and powerful debating which is also very chaotic and
enthusiastic :) just make sure that you research your party well and that
you respect the rules, make sure to stay in character and have fun!
Understanding the
Agenda
T H E A G E N D A :
I N D I A ’ S I N T E R N A L S E C U R I T Y : C E N T R E - S T A T E
C O O R D I N A T I O N O N A N T I - T E R R O R I S M

Now let’s understand our agenda in a bit more depth :-

So as we are aware, India faces a lot of serious internal threats like terrorism, insurgency,
and violent extremist movements. So basically Terrorism is about sudden violent attacks
like 26/11 which are often planned across borders whereas Insurgency well it refers to
more of local and long-term like Naxalism or separatist movements that are aiming to fight
the government or demand a separate region so they don’t really cooperate much with
them So now we have the part where it gets confusing, law and order is handled by states
right? but national security is handled by the Centre.

So now suppose when a terror or maybe an insurgent threat takes place, of course both
the state and centre need to step in. However because their powers are divided
(federalism), it often causes a lot of confusion, misunderstandings, manipulation or even
political clashes. So now this well it makes fighting terrorism and insurgency much more
harder than it already is :(

So now the Centre, it uses tools like UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act), the NIA
(National Investigation Agency), and even the AFSPA in disturbed areas. There are also
coordination bodies like the MAC and NSC. But now suppose if the states don’t trust the
Centre or feel politically targeted, they may hold back cooperation. And that eventually
leads to delay in action which ends up putting lives at risk.

SO YEAH. Basically through this AIPPM committee, we’ll figure out how to fix this!
Broader Understanding
Now let’s dive a bit deeper into the agenda and understand a few concepts better.

● W H A T I S I N T E R N A L S E C U R I T Y ?

So Internal security refers to the protection of our country from threats within our own
borders so basically this includes terrorism, insurgency, communal riots, cybercrime, etc.
The goal here is to maintain law, order and peace along with national stability and ensure
that we are safeguarding citizens from any threats that can shake up the country from the
inside.

● W H A T E X A C T L Y I S T H E D I F F E R E N C E
B E T W E E N T E R R O R I S M A N D
I N S U R G E N C Y ?

Lets first get it clear that both of these are internal threats to the country. Now, terrorism
usually involves targeted violence against civilians or any kind of institution in order to
spread fear and push different ideological agendas which often have an international link.
Now, on the other hand Insurgency, is a long-term armed rebellion, which is often regional,
So here the groups seek political or territorial control over a particular state for example,
the Red Corridor or the Northeast.

● U N D E R S T A N D I N G T H E F E D E R A L
D I V I S I O N O F P O W E R S .

India’s internal security setup is shaped by its federal structure as most of us our aware and
here powers have been divided between the Centre and the States. The Constitution’s
Seventh Schedule splits responsibilities into three lists:

● U N I O N L I S T :

Centre controls things like defense, national security, and intelligence.

● S T A T E L I S T :

States handle police, law and order, and local security.

● C O N C U R R E N T L I S T :

Both Centre and States can make laws (like criminal law or preventive detention).
While this system does aim to create shared responsibility, it also causes regular conflicts.
Well States want their autonomy in law and order, while the Centre has a duty to protect the
nation as a whole and not in pieces . Not exactly a flaw but this is how Indian federalism
was curated that too especially after Partition, to help keep our country united and to make
it work today, there has to be constant coordination. Trust is the key.

Let’s see the seventh schedule in more detail :-

So the Union List contains subjects of national importance that only the Parliament can
legislate on. Key areas relevant to internal security under this list include defense, foreign
affairs, atomic energy, banking, and the Central Bureau of Intelligence and Investigation.
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld Parliament’s broad powers in these areas,
even when overlaps with the State List occur, by emphasizing the priority of national
interest (as seen in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla vs. Union of India, 1957).

On the other hand, the State List includes subjects primarily handled by state
governments, such as public order, police, public health, and land. These reflect the states’
responsibility for managing day-to-day law and order and responding to local-level security
threats.

The Concurrent List covers areas where both the Centre and States can legislate, such as
criminal law, education, and forests. In case of a conflict between a state and central law on
a Concurrent subject, the Union law prevails, especially if it has received Presidential
assent, as per Article 254 of the Constitution.

This system helps reflect the constitutional balance between the state autonomy and the
central authority to help in the making of internal security a shared responsibility, but yeah
it’s still also a frequent zone of conflict and cooperation.
Here is an Analysis of Articles 355 and 356, the Concept of a ‘Strong Center,’ and Fiscal
Imbalances.

Beyond the Seventh Schedule, We have the Articles 355 and 356 provide the Union
government with significant powers to intervene in state affairs, especially concerning
internal security.

Article 355 imposes a fundamental duty on the Union to protect every State against
external aggression and internal disturbance and to ensure that the governance of each
State is carried out in accordance with constitutional provisions. This article serves as a
primary justification for central intervention in matters affecting state security.

Building upon this, Article 356, commonly known as President’s Rule, empowers the
Centre to assume control of a state government if its constitutional machinery is deemed to
have failed. This power extends to suspending or dissolving the State Legislative Assembly
and enabling Parliament to exercise the state’s legislative powers. Article 365 further
reinforces this by allowing the President to declare a constitutional breakdown if a State
fails to comply with directions issued by the Centre.

● W H Y I S T H E R E A N E E D F O R
C E N T R E - S T A T E C O L L A B O R A T I O N ?

So basically, terrorism doesn’t follow any state boundaries, and delays in responding can
be really deadly and cause loss to lives. While the states have local-level intelligence, the
Centre has national agencies like the NIA, NSG, and R&AW. In simple words if there is
timely coordination, no gaps in communication, investigation, then response can emerge.
So now that leaves us with a coordinated system which means faster responses, fewer
overlaps, and better safety of our people.

● T H E C H A L L E N G E S F A C E D

1. Jurisdiction Clashes: Law and order is a State subject, so states often resist central
interference, especially when national agencies step in without consultation.
2. Political Bias: Central agencies are sometimes seen as being used against opposition-
ruled states, which reduces trust and cooperation.
3. Lack of Trust: States may hesitate to share intelligence fearing political misuse, leaks, or
being sidelined.
4. Over-Centralisation: The Centre sometimes makes major decisions on internal security
without involving states, leading to friction.
5. Delayed Action: In crises, unclear roles and poor coordination can slow down response,
risking more damage.
Key Legal and
Institutional Frameworks:
Analysis and
Controversies
India’s approach to internal security is underpinned by several key legal and institutional
frameworks, each subject to ongoing debates concerning their scope, application, and
impact on Centre-State relations and civil liberties. The evolution of these laws and
institutions, particularly the trend towards centralizing anti-terrorism powers, suggests a
perceived need for efficiency and decisive action against complex threats. However, this
trend simultaneously creates a fundamental tension with federal principles and risks
alienating states, potentially undermining overall security efficacy.

A . T H E U N L A W F U L A C T I V I T I E S
( P R E V E N T I O N ) A C T ( U A P A )

The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), originally enacted in 1967, was designed
to effectively prevent unlawful activities and associations that threaten India’s integrity and
sovereignty. This legislation has undergone significant transformations over time, notably
being substantially strengthened after the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) was
withdrawn in 2004, with many of POTA’s provisions being re-incorporated into UAPA.
Further amendments followed the 2008 Mumbai attacks and again in 2019. The 2019
amendment marked a pivotal change, empowering the Union Government to designate
individuals as terrorists without a formal judicial process, a power previously restricted to
organizations. The Act also permits detention of suspects without charge for up to 180 days
and denies bail unless the court is satisfied of the accused’s innocence.

Despite its stated objectives, UAPA has been a subject of considerable controversy. Critics
argue that its definitions of “terrorist” and related terms are excessively broad, making the
Act susceptible to misuse and placing an undue burden of proof on the accused.
Significant concerns have been raised regarding the Act’s potential to infringe upon
fundamental civil liberties, including freedom of speech and expression (Article 19(1)(a)),
the right to dissent, and the right to reputation. It is alleged that the Act has been utilized to
target political dissidents, human rights activists, and marginalized communities, thereby
eroding public trust in the criminal justice system. A notable statistic highlighting these
concerns is the persistently low conviction rate: between 2016 and 2020, out of 5,027
cases registered against 24,134 individuals, only 212 were convicted, while 386 were
acquitted.
This disparity raises questions about the quality of evidence or the underlying intent behind
the arrests. This situation suggests a significant “legitimacy gap” where the practical
application of these laws deviates from their stated intent, eroding public trust and
potentially exacerbating grievances that fuel internal disturbances. If a law designed to
combat terrorism primarily results in low convictions but high arrests, and is widely
perceived as a tool to suppress dissent, its perceived legitimacy among the public and
affected communities plummets, transforming it from a tool for justice into a source of
grievance and distrust.

In terms of Centre-State power dynamics, while prosecution under certain sections (e.g.,
16, 17, 18) requires the State government’s permission, Section 13 cases only require
approval from the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Furthermore, the National Investigation
Agency (NIA) can seize property with the consent of its Director General, a provision that
critics argue can potentially bypass the State Director General of Police (DGP)

B . T H E N A T I O N A L I N V E S T I G A T I O N
A G E N C Y ( N I A ) A C T , 2 0 0 8

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) was established under the NIA Act, 2008, in the
immediate aftermath of the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks. It functions as India’s primary
counter-terrorism agency, tasked with investigating and prosecuting offenses that threaten
the nation’s sovereignty, security, and integrity, including those falling under UAPA, the
Arms Act, and the Explosives Act. The NIA’s jurisdiction extends across India and
encompasses terror-related offenses committed by Indian citizens or affecting Indian
interests abroad, a power further expanded by a 2019 amendment.

The establishment and expanding powers of the NIA have generated considerable debate.
Critics, including various opposition parties, express apprehension that the agency’s broad
powers encroach upon the states’ constitutional rights over policing, as law and order is
fundamentally a state subject. Several states, such as West Bengal, Kerala, and
Maharashtra, have accused the Centre of misusing central investigative agencies like the
NIA for political motives. Concerns have been voiced that the NIA could potentially evolve
into a “National Interference Agency”. The NIA’s capacity to seize property with the
approval of its own Director General, potentially bypassing the State DGP, is another
significant point of contention regarding the erosion of state authority.
C . T H E A R M E D F O R C E S
( S P E C I A L P O W E R S ) A C T ( A F S P A )

The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) is one of India’s most contentious laws.
It was initially introduced in 1958 to address insurgencies in the northeastern states and
was subsequently extended to Jammu & Kashmir in 1990 due to escalating militancy.
AFSPA grants sweeping powers to the armed forces in areas declared ‘disturbed,’
including the authority to shoot to kill, arrest individuals without a warrant, and conduct
searches without judicial oversight. A critical provision of the Act is the legal immunity it
provides to security personnel from prosecution unless sanctioned by the central
government.

AFSPA has consistently faced severe criticism, primarily on human rights grounds.
Opponents argue that it violates several fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian
Constitution, particularly Article 14 (Right to Equality), and has been linked to numerous
allegations of human rights abuses, including custodial deaths, enforced disappearances,
sexual violence, and fake encounters. While the Supreme Court has upheld AFSPA’s
constitutional validity, it has also mandated guidelines to prevent its abuse (Naga People’s
Movement for Human Rights v. Union of India, 1997) and directed investigations into
alleged fake encounters (Extra-Judicial Execution Victim Families Association v. Union of
India, 2016).

The Act is also a significant source of Centre-State friction. The power to declare an area
‘disturbed’ rests with the Governor of the state, the Administrator of a Union Territory, or the
Central Government. Although state governments can suggest whether the Act is required,
their opinion can be overruled by the Governor or the Centre. A 1978 amendment explicitly
granted this power to the central government, leading to instances where states like Tripura
were declared disturbed despite state opposition. Consequently, states, particularly in the
Northeast and Jammu & Kashmir, have consistently called for its repeal or significant
amendment.
D . I N T E L L I G E N C E S H A R I N G A N D
C O O R D I N A T I O N M E C H A N I S M S

Effective internal security hinges on robust intelligence sharing and coordination. India has
developed several mechanisms to facilitate this, though their implementation and efficacy
remain subjects of continuous evaluation. T

he Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) serves as India’s centralized intelligence-sharing platform,

operating under the Intelligence Bureau (IB). Established in 2001 following the Kargil War
and significantly strengthened after the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks, MAC facilitates real-
time intelligence exchange among 28 organizations, including the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW), various armed forces, and State police units. Recently, the MAC has been
technologically upgraded with Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and
Geographic Information System (GIS) capabilities to enhance predictive analysis, hotspot
mapping, and ensure last-mile connectivity down to district Superintendents of Police
(SPs).

The National Security Council (NSC), headed by the Prime Minister, functions as the apex
advisory body on all internal and external security-related matters, having been constituted
in 1999. Its secretariat, the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), led by the
National Security Advisor (NSA), is responsible for providing strategic direction and a long-
term vision for national security preparedness. Within the NSC structure, the Strategic
Policy Group (SPG) acts as the principal mechanism for inter-ministerial coordination and
integrating inputs for national security policies. The NSA heads the SPG, with the Cabinet
Secretary coordinating the implementation of SPG decisions across Union Ministries,
departments, and State governments.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) plays a pivotal role as the nodal ministry for internal
security, border management, Centre-State relations, and capacity building for state police
forces. The MHA is responsible for directing the strengthening of the security grid, ensuring
zero cross-border infiltration, and working towards the elimination of terrorism. It also
coordinates the deployment of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) and implements
various schemes for the modernization and upgradation of state police forces and their
intelligence apparatus
The following table directly addresses the political stances and biases, allowing for quick
identification of the positions of major parties on key laws and broader federalism issues.
This enables the formulation of arguments, anticipation of counter-arguments, and
understanding of the political motivations behind different policy approaches, which is
essential for a realistic and robust debate.
Different Case Studies
Examining specific incidents of terrorism and insurgency provides concrete illustrations of
the complexities inherent in Centre-State coordination on internal security. These cases
highlight both successes and persistent challenges, offering valuable material for debate.
India’s internal security coordination often ends up working in this reactive loop where
something massive happens, and only then the gaps in state-level coordination come to
light. That’s when the Centre steps in heavy. But the actual long-term success of those
interventions depends on how strong state capacities are and whether there’s real
collaboration instead of just top-down pressure.

A . T H E P A H A L G A M A T T A C K S ( 2 0 2 5 )

The Pahalgam attack on April 22, 2025, was brutal. Five Pakistan-backed militants hit
Baisaran Valley in J&K, targeting Hindu tourists specifically. They reportedly asked people
their names and even forced some men to strip to check for circumcision. In total, 26
civilians died, along with one local Muslim pony operator. It was the worst civilian attack
since 26/11.

Immediately after, there was a joint operation by the Indian Army, paramilitary forces, and
the J&K Police. Pahalgam was locked down, helicopters were brought in, and the state
government announced that security forces had a “free hand” to go after the terrorists and
break OGW (Over Ground Worker) networks.

The Centre jumped into action too, Operation SINDOOR was launched to target terror
camps in Pakistan. This led to Indian airstrikes by May 7. Pakistan’s diplomats were
expelled, the Indus Waters Treaty was suspended, and the MHA ordered a complete
security overhaul to stop any cross-border movement.

Debate Point: Central Efficacy vs. Local Preparedness

● Pro-Centre: The Centre acted fast and aggressively. From military strikes to diplomatic
isolation of Pakistan, it showed clear leadership and seriousness about national security.
Terror attacks in J&K have reduced since this approach got stricter.

● Pro-State: But like, why did such a high-profile attack happen in a tourist zone in the first
place? That’s not on the Centre and that’s on local intel and ground-level failure. Instead of
only retaliating hard after an attack, maybe more effort needs to go into state police
capability and better human intelligence to prevent such lapses.
B . M U M B A I 2 6 / 1 1 A T T A C K S ( 2 0 0 8 )

The 26/11 attacks basically broke whatever confidence people had in the internal security
system back then. Ten terrorists entered by sea and went on a killing spree across Mumbai.
What it exposed wasn’t just terror threats but how bad coordination was so between
agencies, in emergency response, and in even figuring out who was in charge. A US report
later said that leads about David Headley, one of the main guys behind the plot, had been
ignored.

The Centre responded by creating the National Investigation Agency (NIA) through the NIA
Act, 2008. It was meant to be a central body to handle terrorism that crosses state borders
or has international links. Around the same time, the MAC (Multi-Agency Centre) was
revamped to improve real-time intelligence sharing.

Debate Point: Centralization vs. Local Empowerment

● Pro-Centre: This was exactly the kind of case where you can’t expect local police to deal
with global terror. States have their limits. Creating the NIA was a logical move to
streamline investigations and eliminate red tape between states.

● Pro-State: But the attack also showed local issues, poor hospital triage, confused police
response, lack of gear. The NIA doesn’t fix that. States need actual funding and training to
respond instantly. Just setting up a central body isn’t enough if the state’s first response
fails.
On December 13, 2001, terrorists from Jaish-e-Mohammed tried to storm the Indian
Parliament. They got in using fake ID stickers and killed nine people, including security
staff. 17 others were injured. It was a wake-up call because this wasn’t just any attack, it
was on the literal heart of Indian democracy.

Investigations later proved the link to Pakistan’s ISI. While Afzal Guru and others were
convicted, a lot of criticism came in about intelligence failures. Later attacks like Uri and
Pathankot also showed similar gaps, which pointed at a larger, more systemic issue in how
intelligence agencies were coordinating (or not).

Debate Point: Proactive Intelligence vs. Reactive Investigation

● Pro-Centre: The response was actually pretty fast. Investigations were strong, the
judiciary moved quickly, and Delhi Police, under the Union Home Ministry, did their job. It
shows why the Centre needs to have robust intel powers to take over in critical cases.

● Pro-State: The fact that they got so close to Parliament is insane. The debate shouldn’t
be only about how good the investigation was, it should be about why the attack wasn’t
stopped at all. You need smooth coordination between state intel and Centre agencies. If
they’re not syncing, then real-time prevention won’t happen
C . L E F T W I N G E X T R E M I S M ( L W E )

LWE, or Naxalism, is a chronic issue. It’s not just about guns and attacks; it’s deeply
rooted in poverty, tribal displacement, and bad governance. And because it affects multiple
states, Centre-State coordination becomes super important. But here’s the thing, the
Centre often sends CAPFs (like CRPF) and funding, but the actual state-level execution?
Not always great.

Combat capabilities of state police forces are usually weak in these areas. Training is poor,
local forces don’t have proper intel or access to remote zones, and that delays or messes
up operations.

To tackle this, the Centre has gone for a multi-pronged approach: mix of force,
development programs, rights-based policies, and rehabilitation efforts. CIAT (Counter-
Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism) schools have been set up, and some states have managed
successful surrender policies.

Debate Point: Central Support vs. State Autonomy

● Pro-Centre: Without the Centre’s money, CAPF presence, and long-term vision, many of
these areas would’ve collapsed into total anarchy. It’s the Centre that’s kept LWE under
control and helped reduce the number of affected districts.

● Pro-State: Fair but the fact that most of these areas still struggle shows that just
deploying CAPFs isn’t enough. The real fix is strengthening local police, building
governance in tribal areas, and letting the state take the lead with better autonomy and less
bureaucratic interference.
D . N O R T H E A S T I N S U R G E N C I E S

The Northeast is a whole different landscape when it comes to internal security. Since the
1950s, various insurgent groups have fought for autonomy or independence, often based
on ethnic and cultural identity. The Centre introduced AFSPA here in 1958, giving the
military a lot of unchecked power in “disturbed areas.”

There have been some win, like the Mizo Peace Accord, Bodo Territorial Region Accord,
and talks with ULFA and NLFT. Diplomatic engagement with Bhutan and Bangladesh also
helped. But even now, people in the Northeast often feel alienated, especially when they
see heavy-handed tactics by security forces or development projects that don’t include
them.

Debate Point 1: Security vs. Human Rights & Self-Determination

● Pro-Centre: AFSPA is needed. The terrain is rough, state police often can’t manage, and
insurgent groups are heavily armed. The Army needs that legal shield to operate quickly
and decisively.

● Pro-State: But AFSPA has led to years of alleged fake encounters, disappearances, and
a total erosion of public trust. Even peaceful protesters have been suppressed. It’s not
sustainable in a democratic country. If the people you’re protecting don’t trust you, how are
you solving anything?

Debate Point 2: Centre-led Peace Processes vs. State-Specific Autonomy Demands

● While peace accords have helped, they’re usually signed between the Centre and the
groups — states aren’t always involved in shaping the terms. The core issue here is identity.
And if the Centre doesn’t genuinely understand or represent those regional aspirations,
peace won’t last. The Manipur violence is proof that sidelining state concerns only creates
more tension later.
E . T H E K H A L I S T A N I I N S U R G E N C Y
( P U N J A B , 1 9 8 0 S – 9 0 S )

Well basically, the Khalistan movement was this separatist demand for a Sikh homeland
that took place in Khalistan in Punjab. so, now what started with peaceful protests and
autonomy demands had sadly eventually turned into full-blown insurgency during the 80s
And trust. It got REAL violent pretty quick. There were bombings, assassinations, and an
entire state caught between militants and the Indian state. And well of course, Pakistan’s
ISI was also involved But what really pushed it over the edge was Operation Blue Star in
1984, where the Indian Army stormed the Golden Temple to flush out militants. That single
move, seen as a major religious violation, triggered nationwide outrage among Sikhs. And
then came Indira Gandhi’s assassination by her Sikh bodyguards, which had led to the
horrifying 1984 anti-Sikh riots. The entire state just spiraled, President’s Rule was imposed
multiple times, and central forces completely took over.

What followed was years of intense policing, heavy-handed tactics, fake encounter
allegations, and zero trust between Punjab and the Centre. And even though the
movement was crushed militarily by the late 90s, the emotional and political scars still exist.

Debate Point: Over Centralisation vs. Sensitivity to Identity Politics

● Pro-Centre/BJP: well Look, the state was literally on the verge of having a civil war.
Central takeover was pretty much non-negotiable without direct intervention, Punjab
could've quite literally become another Pakistan. National integrity had to come first, and
the crackdown worked in terms of restoring order.

● Pro-State/Opposition: But it also radicalized an entire generation plus the Centre didn’t
consult any local leadership, it ignored cultural sensitivities, and even turned a manageable
political movement into a militant one. If early demands for more autonomy were respected,
this wouldn’t have escalated.
F . T H E R E D C O R R I D O R A N D T H E M A O I S T
I N S U R G E N C Y

So the Red Corridor now simply is this belt of areas, across areas like Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, Odisha, parts of Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and also a few others, that
have been majorly affected by Left-Wing Extremism also called LWE for decades. We’re
talking about Maoist insurgents, also called Naxals, who started off fighting for land rights
and social justice but turned into a full-blown armed rebellion against the Indian state. And
while it’s kind of died down in recent years, the fact that it even went this far is a serious
reflection of where Centre-State coordination failed big time.

The Centre has been throwing CAPFs, security schemes, and surveillance into these
regions. You’ll hear names like Security Related Expenditure (SRE), Special Infrastructure
Scheme, and CIAT (Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism) schools. But none of that
works if state police forces are undertrained, underfunded, or just not trusted by local
communities. And a lot of the time, that’s exactly what’s happening.

The problem is, a lot of these areas are super remote. No roads, no schools, no hospitals.
So when tribals see both corporates and the state taking land and giving nothing back,
they don’t really see much of a difference between either. Maoists step in and exploit that
anger, offering people protection or a cause to fight for. So it’s not just a security issue, it’s
a governance vacuum. Yes, things have improved. The number of affected districts has
dropped. But that success isn’t equal across states. Like, Chhattisgarh is still struggling
while Andhra’s done better. So clearly, implementation depends a lot on how committed
and capable the states are, and how much freedom they get to tailor strategies. That’s
where the Centre-State clash comes in. The Centre wants to push a one-size-fits-all
crackdown, but states want more space to adapt policies to their own terrain, people, and
politics.

Debate Point: Central Security Boost vs. Strengthening Local Governance

● Pro-Centre/BJP: Look, this is not just a law and order problem, it’s an armed insurgency
funded by extortion and weaponized ideology. Without central intervention, these areas
would have spiraled out of control. The CAPFs, tech upgrades, and coordination efforts
from MHA are what brought the violence down.

● Pro-State/Opposition: Sure, but central forces come and go. It’s the state that has to
rebuild trust with locals. You can’t kill your way to peace. States need more say, more
resources for rural development, and less top-down micromanagement. Otherwise, the
violence just mutates or pauses, doesn’t actually go away.
G . T H E L T T E & T A M I L N A D U ’ S D E L I C A T E
B A L A N C E

Now this one’s interesting because it’s not entirely exactly about India’s own militants, but it
still became a big internal security issue. So basically the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam) was this Sri Lankan Tamil militant group that fought for an independent Tamil
Eelam. During the Sri Lankan civil war, a lot of LTTE members, arms, and sympathisers
found shelter in Tamil Nadu, because the local population here genuinely empathised with
the Tamil struggle across the border.

Things escalated when India sent peacekeeping troops (the IPKF) to Sri Lanka in the 80s.
That well went super badly. The local Tamil population in India saw it as a betrayal.
Eventually, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in 1991 by an LTTE suicide bomber during a
campaign rally in Tamil Nadu. That shook the country.

Post that, the Centre got super strict about any pro-LTTE voices in India, but it still had to
tread carefully. Also tamil nadu always had strong opinions on Sri Lankan Tamil issues, and
any Centre led policy that does not involve any state consultation automatically creates
backlash. Even now, diplomatic moves with Sri Lanka well like deporting Tamil refugees or
trade with Colombo can cause political tensions in there.

Debate Point: Foreign Policy vs. Regional Sensitivity

● Pro-Centre/BJP: LTTE was a terrorist organization that assassinated an Indian PM.

National security and foreign policy can’t be left to regional emotion. The Centre must have
full control to prevent cross-border terrorism and secure borders.

● Pro-State/Opposition: But you also can’t ignore local sentiment. The Centre acted
without listening to TN’s political voices, and that led to alienation. If Centre-State
coordination had been stronger and emotionally intelligent, things wouldn’t have gotten
that out of hand.
Questions a Resolution
Must Answer(QARMA)
So as noted earlier, in AIPPM, we don’t exactly end up passing a formal resolution or
document like in other MUN UN committees but Instead what we do is that, we rely on a
press release to sort of act as the committee’s official voice and that helps us tell the world
what went down inside that room.

So Now, even though it’s a press release, it’s not just for flair. It NEEDS to be super clear,
solution-driven, and show the people the real direction. You’re not just reporting that a
bunch of politicians debated on internal security or insurgency. But shouting the public and
media that this discussion has helped in bringing clarity, proposing reforms, and making
progress towards goals.
So the press release should give the media or public a concise but informative overview of:

W H A T W A S T H E I S S U E B E I N G D E B A T E D ?
( T H E A G E N D A , A N D W H A T P A R T O F I T
T H E C O M M I T T E E
F O C U S E D O N )

W H A T S O L U T I O N S O R R E F O R M S C A M E
U P ? ( W E R E T H E R E N E W I D E A S , B I L L S
P R O P O S E D , I N S T I T U T I O N A L C H A N G E S
D I S C U S S E D ? )

W H O S U P P O R T E D W H A T A N D W H Y ?
( S H O W C A S E S T H E D I V E R S I T Y O F
O P I N I O N A N D W H A T I D E O L O G I E S
C L A S H E D O R A L I G N E D )

W H A T W A S A C H I E V E D ? ( C O N S E N S U S
P O I N T S , A R E A S O F C O O P E R A T I O N , A N Y
D R A F T P R O P O S A L O R W O R K I N G P A P E R
M A Y B E )

W H E R E I S T H E C O M M I T T E E H E A D I N G ?
( W H A T D I R E C T I O N A R E T H E T A L K S
M O V I N G I N ? I S A J O I N T A C T I O N B E I N G
P L A N N E D , O R I S T H E H O U S E S T I L L
D I V I D E D ? )
 Now for questions that should be answered or talked about in the press release :-

W H A T C O N C R E T E R E F O R M S O R
C O O R D I N A T I O N F R A M E W O R K S A R E
B E I N G P R O P O S E D T O I M P R O V E C E N T R E -
S T A T E C O O P E R A T I O N O N I N T E R N A L
S E C U R I T Y ?

H O W A R E D E L E G A T E S P L A N N I N G T O
B A L A N C E S T R O N G N A T I O N A L A N T I -
T E R R O R I S M R E S P O N S E S W I T H
R E S P E C T I N G S T A T E A U T O N O M Y A N D
F E D E R A L V A L U E S ?

A R E T H E R E A N Y S U G G E S T I O N S T O
R E F O R M O R R E G U L A T E A G E N C I E S L I K E
N I A O R L A W S L I K E U A P A T O A V O I D
P O L I T I C A L M I S U S E A N D I M P R O V E
T R U S T ?

W H A T R O L E D O D E V E L O P M E N T S C H E M E S
O R C O M M U N I T Y E N G A G E M E N T P L A N S
P L A Y I N T A C K L I N G T H R E A T S L I K E L E F T -
W I N G E X T R E M I S M O R K H A L I S T A N I
R E S U R G E N C E ?

A R E T H E R E P R O P O S A L S F O R R E A L - T I M E
I N T E L L I G E N C E - S H A R I N G M E C H A N I S M S
T H A T B O T H C E N T R E A N D S T A T E S T R U S T
A N D A C T I V E L Y P A R T I C I P A T E I N ? )
Reference Links
for Study
So The following links will provide verified, credible information related to India’s
internal security, anti-terror laws, Centre-State coordination, insurgency
movements, and legislative frameworks. These sources include Indian government
portals, major news agencies, and legal resource so you guys can make sure to
use them to support your arguments, cross-check facts, and deepen your
understanding of the agenda. Avoid relying solely on AI-generated content please
verify and back your points with solid reference :) and go much beyond whatever is
mentioned in the study guide.

● [Link] — Reuters India coverage on conflict,

security, and policy
● [Link] — Al Jazeera reporting on India’s
political and security developments
● [Link] — Press Information Bureau (PIB) for government press
releases and statements
● [Link] — Lok Sabha official portal for debates, bills, and
question hour data
● [Link] — Rajya Sabha portal with committee reports and
debates
● [Link] — Ministry of Law and Justice for bare acts like UAPA,
NIA Act, AFSPA
● [Link] — PRS Legislative Research: summaries and critiques of
Indian laws
● [Link] — Observer Research Foundation: articles on
governance and security
● [Link] — South Asia Terrorism Portal: insurgency data and
backgrounders
● [Link] — Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: strategic
research and papers
● [Link] — The Hindu: national security and
federal issues
● [Link] — India Today: counter-terrorism, centre-state
coordination news