Overview of Criminal Procedure Laws
Overview of Criminal Procedure Laws
Chapter 4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
This chapter will deal with the principal criminal procedure legislation excluding those
matters of trial procedure in the Criminal Code which are dealt with in the following
chapter. The principal pieces of legislation annotated are the Arrest Act, Search Act and
the Bail Act.
Any discussion of criminal procedure must depart from the provisions of s 37 of the
Constitution, which contains a number of detailed requirements guaranteeing the rights
of every person in Papua New Guinea to the full protection of the law. This section is
annotated in the previous chapter but it bears repetition that the principle of innocence
until proof of guilt is enshrined in s 37(4)(a) of the Constitution, which provides that:
(a) shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law, ..."
"No person shall be subject to the search of his person or property or to entry of his
premises, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted
by a law -
Against this constitutional background, the Search Act 1977 was passed. Under the Act,
a policeman may search a person where he has reasonable grounds for believing the
person has stolen goods or anything for the commission of an indictable offence: s 3(1).
Also, the police may search when a person is arrested or in lawful custody: s 3 (2) and
(3) . However, all searches must be carried out only with decency and reasonable force:
s 4. In developing standards of decency and reasonable force in searches, the courts must
start afresh as all duties and
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responsibilities imposed by the common law in relation to searches are abolished by the
Act: s 20.
Generally, all searches must be with a warrant (Search Act, s 6 and Constitution, s 44(a)
(i) and (ii)) which issues from a court if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that any building, craft, vehicle or place concerns a committed, or
about to be committed, offence. If anything is found in pursuance of the search warrant
and is seized by the police, a record of the things seized must be kept: Search Act, s 12.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the Search Act may be remediable as breaches
of the rights in ss 44 and 49 of the Constitution, with compensation actions under ss 57
and 58. There is, however, a specific civil action under s 17 of the Search Act 1977
against a person who wrongfully exercises the powers conferred by the Act. Such an
action may be brought in the National or District Court (within its civil jurisdictional
ceiling).
The great difficulty with the Act is that the vast majority of the people are unaware of
their rights, constitutional or statutory, irrespective of the remedies for compensation.
Summons
The accused (the defendant in summary offences) may be brought before a court by
means of either a summons or an arrest. A summons is the usual method for attendance
for summary offences before the District Courts. This is done by drawing up an
information for the offence: see ss 36 and 37 of the District Courts Act. The magistrate
then issues a summons ordering the defendant to appear at the court on a particular day.
Also, it should be noted that a private citizen may lay an information and commence a
prosecution in the lower courts - charges need not necessarily be preferred by the police.
Indictable offences, on the other hand, may not be the subject of private prosecutions,
and must be dealt with according to the provisions of the Criminal Code.
Arrest
A magistrate may issue a warrant to the police for a suspect's arrest if there is any
likelihood that the suspect will not obey the summons: District Courts Act, s 100. A
warrant of arrest issues if the suspect disobeys the summons. The Arrest Act has
consolidated much of the law in arrest, and abolished common law powers, duties and
responsibilities of arrest (Arrest Act, s 31) except in relation to contempt of Parliament.
Importantly, s 8 of the Arrest Act provides the circumstances where the court may issue
a warrant of arrest where it is impractical or undesirable to proceed by summons.
In some circumstances, a suspect may be arrested without a warrant. The police may
arrest without a warrant under s 3 of the Arrest Act, which essentially provides that no
warrant is needed where a police officer believes on reasonable grounds that a person is
about to commit, is committing or has committed an offence. A member of the general
public may make an arrest, but only when he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, that
an offence is being or has been committed: s 5.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 557
When a police officer makes an arrest, with or without a warrant, and the person does
not resist the arrest, the officer is required to inform the person of the following matters:
(a) that he or she is under arrest;
(b) the reason for the arrest; and
(c) ask him or her to go to the police station.
If the person resists, however, the police may use such force as is reasonable in the
circumstances: s 14. Again, it is open to the courts to develop standards of reasonable
force in the circumstances.
After the arrest with or without a warrant, the police officer must take the arrested
person without delay to a police station: s 17.
At the police station, the police may question an arrested person. The police may also
question a suspect who has willingly agreed to accompany an officer to the police
station. Such an interview will be reduced to notes of a record of interview. However,
the necessity or desirability of interrogating the person is not a good ground for not
taking the person without delay before a court: Constitution, s 42(4). A person arrested
or a suspect has no obligation to answer police questions. Unfortunately, the police and
arrested persons are still not familiar with their rights. Moreover, the police are often
content to use records of interview rather than pursue full investigation. Confessional
evidence is all too frequently relied upon.
Before any questioning commences, the police officer conducting the interview ought to
caution the suspect (with words such as "you are not obliged to say anything but
anything you do say may be put in writing and may be used in evidence against you").
Secondly, the police must not use improper methods of force, threats or inducements to
extract statements or confessions. There is a requirement of voluntariness of statements
or confessions. If confessions, statements or records of interview are not voluntarily
given, they are inadmissible in evidence at the trial under s 28 of the Evidence Act. The
question of admissibility is tested by proceedings upon a voire dire.
Bail
There is a right to bail under s 42(6) of the Constitution. The Bail Act was passed in
1977 to give detailed effect to this right. Under bail, a person is released from custody to
attend court on a particular day and on an agreement subject to certain other conditions.
In the case of serious offences, a usual condition of bail is the payment into court of
money by the accused or a surety: s 19. Non-attendance results in forfeiture of the
money. For less serious summary offences, bail is usually granted automatically.
In the case of wilful murder or murder, only the National or Supreme Courts may grant
bail: s 4. In all other cases, any court may grant bail. The police are also empowered to
grant bail (s 5) when it is not practicable to take the person before a court within a
reasonable time. Bail applications can be made at any time after arrest and at any stage
in proceedings: s 6. Bail is generally to be granted except where:
(a) the person in custody is unlikely to appear at his or her trial;
(b) the offence was committed while the person was on bail;
(c) the offence in respect of which the person is in custody consists of a serious
assault, a threat of violence to another person, or possessing a firearm, imitation
firearm, other offensive weapon or explosive;
(d) the person is likely to commit an indictable offence;
(f) the person is likely to interfere with witnesses or the person who instituted the
proceedings; or
(g) the alleged offence involves the property of substantial value which has not
been recovered and the person, if released, would make efforts to conceal or
otherwise deal with the property: s 9(1).
If the bail is refused, written reasons are to be given to the person or his or her lawyer (s
16), and this does not prevent further applications being made for bail
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 559
to another magistrate or judge as the case may be: s 13. As can be seen from the annotations,
there have already been several judicial pronouncements on this Act.
SEARCH ACT
Chapter No 341
Being an Act -
(i) the freedom from arbitrary search and entry conferred by Section 44 of
the Constitution; and
(ii) the right to privacy conferred by Section 49 of the Constitution, so as
to -
(iii) provide for searches of individuals, premises and property in certain
cases; and
(iv) confer on persons making searches certain powers and duties; and
(b) to abolish certain rules of common law, and for related purposes.
Part 1 – Preliminary
1. Interpretation.
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears -
“court” means any court, other than a Village Court, and includes a Judge or
Magistrate of any court, other than a Village Court;
“craft” means -
(a) an aircraft or part of an aircraft; or
(b) a vessel or part of a vessel;
“information” includes a complaint for an offence;
“place of confinement” means a corrective institution, rural lock-up or police
lock-up;
“policeman” means any description of vehicle on wheels or runners;
“warrant” means a warrant issued under any law for the search of any place
including premises, a vehicle, aircraft, vessel, luggage or freight.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a person believes something on reasonable
grounds if -
(a) he personally has that belief; and
(b) there are reasonable grounds for that belief.
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2. Application.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies, notwithstanding the provisions of any
other law, to and in relation to any search whether by or under this Act or any other law.
(2) This Act does not apply to a search carried out under a warrant issued under the
National Intelligence Organization Act.
See s 44 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom from arbitrary search and seizure,
and s 49 which guarantees the right to privacy.
"The powers provided in s 3(4) are very wide and give an owner or a policeman or a
person in command of a craft a wide and unfettered power of search. There is no
suggestion in s 3(4) that the power must follow a
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 561
"For the purposes of s 5(5) of the Search Act, the words 'immediate pursuit' are to be
taken as meaning immediate, physical pursuit, analogous to the notion of 'hot
pursuit', where there is no opportunity or time to take any other course of action
otherwise the opportunity for apprehension, seizure of property, prevention of
concealment of property or prevention of escape will be lost. If investigation,
follow-up or pursuit of a suspect, however notorious, is not 'immediate' then a
search warrant is required under s 6(1). Where a search is carried out without first
obtaining a search warrant where such a search is not in 'immediate pursuit', the
search is unlawful and any evidence obtained thereby is unlawfully obtained and
may be rejected."
(c) any thing as to which there are reasonable grounds for believing is
intended to be used to commit any such offence,
it may issue a warrant to search that building, craft, vehicle or place.
(2) If a court is satisfied by information on oath by a commissioned officer of the
Police Force that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that there is in any
building or buildings in a village or in any part of a village or village garden any thing
specified in Subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c), it may issue a warrant to search the building,
buildings, village, part of the village or village garden.
(3) Where a warrant has been issued under Subsection (2) the person, policeman or
policemen to whom the warrant is directed shall, where it is practicable to do so,
before executing the warrant, endeavour to obtain the co-operation of those persons
who, by custom, are regarded as the leaders of the village in respect of which the
warrant has been issued.
(4) Subsection (1) or (2) does not justify the use of greater force than is reasonable
in the circumstances.
Local Courts have been abolished by the Local Courts (Amendment) Act 2000.
Woods J said in Acting Public Prosecutor v Richard Saronduo [1988-1989] PNGLR 17
at 19:
"Section 6 ... appears to allow for two separate situations for the issue of search
warrants. Subsection (1) generally provides for the issuing of a warrant to search
any building, craft, vehicle or place and the only requirement is that the court be
satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds. There is no
restriction in subs (1) that the information be laid by a commissioned officer.
Subsection (2) is clearly laying down very careful requirements where a search
warrant is sought for a village or a building in a village, and the reference in subs (3)
to the police officer having to endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the village
leaders in the subs (2) situation only emphasises that subs (1) and subs (2) are to be
looked at as dealing with two different situations and thus the requirement for a
commissioned officer in the subs (2) situation is separate from the subs (1) situation.
The Parliament clearly wanted searches in a village situation to be carefully dealt
with by senior police officers: see The State v James Bero Popo [I987] PNGLR
286."
7. Direction of warrant.
A warrant may be directed to all or any of the following:-
(a) to a named person;
(b) to the officer for the time being in charge of police in a particular province
or place;
(c) to all members of the Police Force.
8. Form of warrant.
A warrant shall -
(a) describe the place to be searched; and
(b) state briefly the offence or matter of the information on which it is
founded; and
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(c) order the person to whom it is directed to search the place and seize any
thing he may find in that place which relates -
(i) to the offence or the matter of the information on which the warrant is
founded; or
(ii) to any other offence.
(4) This section does not require the restoration of the structure of any place or
container interfered with by virtue of the powers conferred by this section.
(5) On the hearing of any appeal the court may annul or vary an order made under
Subsection (3).
(1) Where a policeman seizes any thing in a corrective institution under Section
10(3) he may hand that thing to a correctional officer at the institution.
(2) Where a person seizes any thing on board a craft under Section 10(4), he may
throw away, destroy or otherwise deal with that thing so that the craft and persons on
board the craft are no longer endangered.
Part IV – Miscellaneous
(2) All duties and responsibilities imposed by the common law in relation to
searches and search warrants are abolished.
20. Regulations.
The Head of State, acting on advice, may make regulations not inconsistent with
this Act, prescribing all matters that by this Act are required or permitted to be
prescribed or that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or
giving effect to this Act.
ARREST ACT
Chapter No 339
Being an Act -
(a) to specify the circumstances in which persons may be arrested; and
(b) to confer certain powers and duties on persons making arrests; and
(c) to abolish certain rules of common law,
and for related purposes.
PART 1 - Preliminary
1. Interpretation.
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears -
“authorized person” means a person empowered to make an arrest under this
Act or any other law or by a warrant;
“the commencement date” means 3 November 1977, being the date on which
the Arrest Act 1977 came into force;
“court” means any court, other than a Village Court, and includes a judge or
magistrate of any court, other than a Village Court;
“craft” means an aircraft or vessel;
“information” includes a complaint for an offence;
“officer-in-charge”, in relation to a police station at a particular time, means
the policeman who is in charge of the police station at that time;
“place of confinement” means a correctional institution, rural lock-up or
police lock-up;
“policeman” means a member of the Police Force;
“warrant” means a warrant issued under this Act or any other law for the
arrest of a person.
(2) A reference in this Act to an offence for which a penalty is imprisonment does
not include an offence in respect of which a sentence of imprisonment may only be
imposed in default of payment of a fine.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 569
(3) For the purposes of this Act a person believes something on reasonable grounds
if -
(a) he personally has that belief; and
(b) there are reasonable grounds for that belief.
2. Application.
(1) Notwithstanding any other law but subject to Subsection (2) and to Section 24,
this Act applies to and in relation to an arrest for any offence whether made by or
under this Act or by or under any other law.
See generally ss 37, 42 and 76 of the Constitution.
See also Pt V, Div 1 of the Criminal Code, especially ss 245-262. The arrest sections of
the earlier versions of the Code were, in large part, repealed by the Criminal Code
(Arrest) Act 1977 (No 13 of 1977) in anticipation of the Arrest Act.
1. The person arrested must be found committing or must have committed a criminal
offence for which the prescribed penalty is imprisonment: Arrest Act, s 5.
2. The force used, if any, to make the arrest or to prevent the escape of the arrested
person must be reasonable in the circumstances: Arrest Act, s 14(2).
4. Detention must only be for the purpose of enabling the person arrested to be
conveyed to a police officer, a police station, a court or a proper place of
confinement.
5. The person must not be detained for any period longer than is practically and
reasonably necessary for the purposes set out in item 4 above.
See Ronald Alexander McKenzie v The State (1998) SC 596 for a discussion of a
citizen's power of arrest and search and their duties upon arrest.
(ii) to prevent -
(A) the continuation or repetition of the offence; or
(B) the commission of a further offence; or
(iii) to preserve the safety or welfare of a member of the public or of the
person,
the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the person.
Local Courts have been abolished by the Local Courts (Amendment) Act 2000.
The old Police Offences Acts provided powers of arrest without summons where the
arrest was necessary as proceedings against the person by summons would not be
effective. The word "effective" meant effective to ensure the attendance of the alleged
offender at court, but could not be limited to that meaning such that it would render the
power of arrest without warrant ineffectual: Gaigo Kakore v Sing [I975] PNGLR 104.
The accused does not have to be present for a right of audience by his or her counsel on
an application for a bench warrant, and an indictment may be presented against an
accused in his or her absence: R v Byrne [1971-1972] PNGLR 1 (Kelly J).
Local Courts have been abolished by the Local Courts (Amendment) Act 2000.
"It is true in one sense that criminal proceedings formally commence in the National
Court with the presentation of an indictment ... In another, broader sense, however,
criminal proceedings ... commence when the defendant is arrested or when
information is laid against him in the District Court. For the purpose of considering
bail, I think that is the preferred interpretation. The proceedings start in the District
Court on the laying of the information, the case then proceeds on a continuum, as it
were, through the District Court and the National Court. I see the proceedings as
one criminal proceeding processed by two courts rather than two proceedings in to
separate courts. The committal is the preliminary stage and the National Court trial
the final stage ...
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I would interpret s 10 ... in the context of a man committed for trial in the National Court
on a charge of, say, robbery and granted bail by the District Court, as follows:
'Where proceedings have been commenced before a [District] Court ... and the
[National] Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a
person is in breach of a condition of his bail granted in connexion with those
proceedings, the [National] Court may issue warrant for the arrest of that person."'
Woods and Hinchcliffe JJ stated in The State v Gawi [1988-1989] PNGLR 118 at 94-
95:
"The words, 'Where proceedings have been commenced before a court,' in s 10 of the
Arrest Act to our minds mean, in this case, where proceedings have been commenced in
the National Court. The accused men were committed for trial to the National Court
from the District Court. When do the proceedings actually commence in the National
Court? ... We are of the view that the trial commences on the presentment of the
indictment but that is altogether different from when the actual proceedings commence
in the National Court ... We would agree that the proceedings do commence generally on
the laying of an information or even at the arrest stage ... but s 10 ... is referring to when
those proceedings actually commence in the National Court.
We are satisfied that the proceedings commence in the National Court on the day that
the accused is due to answer his bail as ordered by the District Court. Up until then, he is
still within the jurisdiction of the District Court ... the District Court still has jurisdiction
up until the day nominated for the accused's first National Court appearance.
So it seems to us that after commencement of proceedings in the National Court and also
any time after the indictment has been presented, an arrest warrant may issue pursuant to
s 10 ... But after presentment of the indictment, if the accused fails to appear for his
trial then an arrest warrant may issue pursuant to O 3 r 10(b) of the Criminal Practice
Rules."
(c) in the case of a warrant to arrest a defendant -order the person to whom it is
directed to arrest the defendant and to bring him before a court to answer to
the information and to be further dealt with according to law.
"arrest is the initial step of depriving a person of his liberty. To put the matter
differently, 'arrest' and 'detention' are two distinct procedures under the law and
deprivation of liberty, ... is common to both, .... The moment a person
574 Chapter 4
is 'arrested', he is 'detained' from that point on. 'Arrest' is very closely followed in
point of time by 'detention'. That is the law relating to 'arrest' and 'detention' in
relation to persons who are suspected of committing a crime".
In a situation of "near-riot" it was held not practicable for police officers to have
informed the accused of the grounds of arrest and, in any case, the evidence showed that
the appellant knew the general nature of the alleged offence for which he was detained:
Gaigo Kakore v Alan John Sing; Gaigo Kakore v John Pad Nasai [I975] PNGLR 104.
(ii) there are good reasons why the arrested person should not be
proceeded against for an offence; or
(iii) proceedings can be effectively taken by way of summons against the
arrested person; and
(b) if he does not release the person under Paragraph (a) - take the person into
custody and enter in a permanent register of arrests the name of the person
and if it appears that the person arrested -
(i) has committed an offence - the nature of that offence; or
(ii) has been arrested for some other reason - that reason; and
(c) promptly inform the person arrested or cause him to be informed in
language he understands of -
(i) the reason for his arrest; and
(ii) details of the charges against him; and
(iii) his right, immediately and in private -
(A) to communicate with a member of his family or a personal
friend; and
(B) to give instructions to a lawyer of his choice, including the
Public Solicitor if he is entitled to legal aid; and
(d) as soon as practicable consider and accordingly grant or refuse bail in
accordance with the Bail Act ; and
(e) if bail is not granted under Paragraph (d) or if for any other reason the
person arrested remains in custody at the station - take the person, or cause
him to be taken, before a court without delay; and
(f) if bail is granted to the person by a court but for any reason the person
remains in custody at the station after bail is granted - take the person or
cause him to be taken before a court as soon as practicable after the
expiration of 14 days after the bail is granted; and
(g) if bail is granted to the person but he remains in custody after being
brought before a court on one or more occasions - take the person or cause
him to be taken from time to time before a court as soon as practicable
after the expiration of 14 days after the time he last appeared before a
court.
(2) The officer-in-charge of a police station shall at all times permit persons
arrested or detained at the police station -
(a) whenever practicable, without delay and in private to communicate with -
(i) a member of his family or a personal friend; and
(ii) a lawyer of his choice, including the Public Solicitor if he is entitled to
legal aid; and
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(b) to give instructions to a lawyer of his choice, including the Public Solicitor
if he is entitled to legal aid.
(5) If the court is satisfied that the records referred to in Subsection (4), are
required in respect of charges that have already been laid against the person it may
order that the records not be destroyed until that charge has been dealt with.
"In this case, it is regrettable that no blood or other test was taken of the deceased
and the appellant (convicted of dangerous driving causing death under s 328 of the
Criminal Code) after the accident, to determine the blood-alcohol levels. More use
should be made of this section of the Arrest Act in appropriate cases."
(3) Where in any civil proceeding it appears that at a particular time one party to
the proceeding was the officer-in-charge of a police station and another party to that
proceeding was in custody at the police station at that time, the first-mentioned party
bears the onus of proving that he took the other party or caused the other party to be
taken before a court without delay after being brought to that police station.
(1) Notwithstanding any other law, a policeman against whom proceedings are
brought under Section 26(1) shall -
(a) not join the State as a defendant in those proceedings; and
(b) subject to Subsection (2), be fully indemnified by the State in respect of
those proceedings where -
(i) he had, at the time a bona fide belief that he was carrying out his
duties under this Act; and
(ii) he was not acting maliciously or with wilful disregard to his
professional duties and responsibilities; and
(iii) he was not grossly negligent in the performance of his duties.
(2) The court before whom proceedings are brought under Section 26(1) against a
policeman may -
(a) in the case specified in Subsection (1) enter judgement for the plaintiff
against the defendant and, at the same time, order that the whole amount
awarded as judgement for the plaintiff be paid by the State to the defendant
policeman as contribution; or
(b) in any case where the policeman was -
(i) acting maliciously or with wilful disregard to his professional duties
and responsibilities; or
(ii) grossly negligent in the performance of his duties,
enter judgement for the plaintiff against the defendant and, at the same time determine
the amount of contribution to be paid by the State to the defendant policeman.
(3) An order under Subsection (2)(a) and a determination under Subsection (2)(b)
shall be deemed for all purposes to be a judgement of the court in favour of the
policeman against the State and is enforceable and appellable accordingly.
31. Regulations.
The Head of State, acting on advice, may make regulations not inconsistent with
this Act, prescribing all matters that by this Act are required or permitted to be
prescribed or that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or
giving effect to this Act.
BAIL ACT
Chapter No 340
Being an Act -
(a) to provide for bail to be granted more readily; and
(b) to abolish certain rules of common law,
and for other related purposes.
PART 1 - Preliminary
See ss 42(6) and (7), 76 and 155(4) of the Constitution. Section 155(4) vests inherent power
in the National Court to grant bail pending an appeal from a District Court where the
circumstances are such that justice would not otherwise be done: Paul Jerol Aisi v Malkom
Bai (1976) N52.
Section 565 of the Criminal Code (now s 533), repealed by s 32 of the Criminal Code
(Arrest) Act 1977, was the original bail provision, now replaced by the Bail Act.
1. Interpretation.
(1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears -
“bail” means approval, whether or not subject to conditions, for the release
of a person from custody;
“bail authority” means a person or court empowered or required under this
Act or any other law to grant bail;
“bail certificate” means a certificate issued under Section 15;
“bail obligations”, in relation to a person granted bail, means the obligations
imposed on the person under Section 17;
“court” means any court, other than a Village Court, and includes a Judge or
Magistrate of any court, other than of a Village Court;
“guarantor” means a person who undertakes to see that a person granted
bail complies with his bail obligations;
“officer-in-charge”, in relation to a police station at a particular time, means
the policeman who is in charge of the police station at that time;
“place of confinement” means a corrective institution, rural lock-up or
police lock-up;
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2. Application.
Notwithstanding any other law, this Act applies to and in relation to a person
arrested or detained for an offence.
"Whilst the Bail Act is a complete code dealing with the grant or refusal of bail, the
bail authority must still consider the interests of justice as required by this section
and the Constitution. This may involve considerations other than the criteria for
refusing bail as established in s 9 of this Act."
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 583
the officer, at the time he forms that opinion, shall consider and accordingly grant or
refuse bail to that person in accordance with Section 9.
"[Section 6(1)] provides that an application for bail may be made to a court at any
stage of a proceeding. This section follows on directly from s 42(6) of the
Constitution which categorically states that a person arrested or detained for an
offence (other that treason or wilful murder) is entitled to bail at all times to
conviction or acquittal unless the interests of justice otherwise required. Hence the
entitlement to apply for bail is a statutory one and is vested in a defendant at all
times until his court case is finalised by way of acquittal or conviction.
An applicant refused bail previously by a judge of the National Court may re-apply
afresh if changes in relevant circumstances have occurred since bail was last refused: Re
Thomas Markus (1999) N1931. -
"In considering whether there has been a change in circumstances, the change or
changes in circumstances must be relevant. In determining what changes are
relevant circumstances, it is necessary to re-visit the judge's earlier reasons for
refusing bail with reference to s 9(1) of the Rail Act. Any circumstances which did
not form part of the reasons pertaining to the grounds upon which bail was refused
under the criteria in s 9(1) is not a relevant circumstance for which the Court should
re-consider its earlier decision to refuse bail. Indeed it would amount to abuse of
process of the Court for a person refused bail by a judge of the National Court to re-
apply for bail to the same judge or different judge of the National Court simply for
the purpose of taking another bite at the same application before another judge,
without providing evidence of any change in relevant circumstances or with
evidence of change in irrelevant circumstances."
7. Bail on adjournment.
Subject to Section 4, where a person is in custody in connection with any
proceedings, including proceedings for committal for trial or sentence in the
National Court, the court shall, on each occasion that it adjourns the proceedings
before conviction, consider and accordingly grant or refuse bail to that person in
accordance with Section 9.
(f) that the person is likely to interfere with witnesses or the person who
instituted the proceedings; or
(g) that the alleged offence involves property of substantial value that has
not been recovered and the person if released would make efforts to
conceal or otherwise deal with the property;
(h) that there are, in progress or pending, extradition proceedings made
under the Extradition Act (chap 49) against the person in custody; and
(i) that the alleged offence involves the possession, importation or
exportation of a narcotic drug other than for the personal, medical use
under prescription only of the person in custody; or
(j) that the alleged offence is one of breach of parole.
[Subs 1(h) and (i) insrt Act No 11, 1982 (Bail (Amendment) Act 1982), s 1(a); Subs 1(j) insrt Act No 34,
1991 (Bail (Consequential Amendment) Act 1991)]
(2) In considering a matter under this section a court is not bound to apply the
technical rules of evidence but may act on such information as is available to it.
(3) …
(4) For the purposes of Subsection (1)(i), “narcotic drug” has the meaning given to
it in the Customs Act (chap 101).
[Subs (4) insrt Act No 11, 1982 (Bail (Amendment) Act 1982), s 1(b)]
An applicant starts with a heavy presumption in his or her favour, as the Constitution
and the Bail Act entitle an applicant to bail: Re Application for Bail by Paul Lois Kysely
[I980] PNGLR 36.
"It is clear from the Constitution, s 42(6) that an applicant is entitled to bail during
the course of his trial unless the interests of justice otherwise require. Some matters
which are relevant to the interests of justice when considering bail during trial are
set out in an English practice note (119741 2 All ER 794). Under the old law, while
bail was very much in the discretion of the trial judge, in practice, bail during the
course of trial was rarely granted. The State now carries the burden of justifying
detention during trial. It is clear that the Bail Act is a complete code dealing with
interim judicial release in this jurisdiction."
Kapi J expressed the following view in Re Herman Kagl Diawo [1980] PNGLR 148:
"The right to bail is a constitutional right (s 42(6)) and must be given readily unless
the interests of justice require otherwise. The Constitution puts the onus on those
who oppose bail to show why bail should not be granted. Section 9(1) sets out the
considerations upon which the court may refuse bail."
It is clear that the constitutional right to bail set out in s 42(6) and repeated in s 3 of the
Bail Act applies right up until the time of acquittal or conviction.
586 Chapter 4
There can be no question of it not applying in the case of a trial which is part heard.
As bail is a matter of constitutional right, it is not surprising then that the Bail Act in
this section provides a set of criteria not as to the granting of bail but as to its
refusal."
In Re Application for Bail pursuant to s 13(2) Bail Act 1977; Fred Keating v The State
[1983] PNGLR 133, Kidu CJ and Andrew J held:
"If one of the considerations in s 9 is present, it does not follow that bail must
automatically be refused; there is always a discretion in the bail authority to grant
bail."
See also The State v Beko Job Paul [I986] PNGLR 97.
Kidu CJ and Andrew J further stated in Re Application for Bail pursuant to s 13(2) Bail
Act 1977; Fred Keating v The State [I983] PNGLR 133:
"In cases of wilful murder, only those considerations set out in s 9(1) apply, and no
others, because the 'interests of justice' in s 3 of this Act and because s 42(6) of the
Constitution does not apply to wilful murder and treason cases."
"When considering the grant or refusal of bail in cases other than wilful murder or
treason, the courts and other bail authorities are to be guided generally by s 9. But
whilst the Bail Act is a complete code dealing with the grant or refusal of bail, by s
3, in matters other than wilful murder or treason, the bail authority may still have to
consider the question of the interests of justice. This may involve considerations
other than the criteria for refusing bail as established in this section."
In Bernard Juale v The State (1999) N1887 the applicant was charged with wilful
murder of his wife. The applicant raised a number of grounds in relation to his
application for bail, including humanitarian grounds, in that since the death of his wife
the applicant had played both mother and father to his young children. Kirriwom J held
that:
"In my view before I can venture into examining considerations not stipulated in
section 9 (1) of the Bail Act, I have to first satisfy myself as to whether or not, any
of the considerations in section 9(1) have been made out. If I do find that one or
more grounds have been established, then I have to decide whether I should exercise
my discretion to either grant or refuse bail. There is one school of thought that says
that once I have found that one of the grounds in s 9 (1) has been established, I have
no discretion to grant bail if the charge is that of wilful murder. I beg to differ with
this view, even if this is the correct interpretation of the law in Re Fred Keating. If
that is what the law is, in my respectful view, it needs to be corrected. I think there
will be, as is always the case, exceptional circumstances such as those alluded to by
Andrew J in his judgement in the same case that would warrant bail even in wilful
murder cases. The question is always one of degree. Each case must be decided on
its own peculiar circumstances. The Constitution under s 42(6) does not deny bail to
a person charged with wilful murder. It avails bail to all persons at all times except
those charged with wilful murder and treason. The fact that it excepts wilful murder
and treason does not necessarily connote a negative proposition of law. It simply
means that bail is not readily and automatically available but that the person charged
must seek redress for bail through other avenues. That avenue is thus provided
under ss 4 and 6 of the
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 587
Bail Act. It is however unfortunate in my view that section 9 of the Bail Act is
restricted only to those considerations exhaustively defined therein.
In the case before me notwithstanding the view I have expressed above, for reasons
expressed hereinafter, I do not find the plea convincing for me to exercise my
discretion in favour of the applicant."
See also In the Matter of an Application for Bail Pursuant to s 6 of the Bail Act (Ch No
340); Paul Olape and The State (1998) N1890.
In The State v Beko Job Paul [1986] PNGLR 97 it was held that, notwithstanding the
consideration enumerated in s 9(1) of the Bail Act, the nature of an offence itself may
have the effect of operating as a sufficient factor to refuse bail, unless the court is
convinced that the continued detention is not justified: Re Fred Keating [1983] PNGLR
133 considered and applied. In the circumstances, the offence, involving as it did a clear
intent to secure arms, negated any presumptive right under s 42(6) of the Constitution or
under the Bail Act, and as the interests of justice would not be served by failing to give
special significance to the nature of the offence, bail should be refused. Wilson J (at 99)
was of the opinion that:
"the offence the nature of which involves the clear intent to secure arms negates that
presumption and that the interests of justice are not served by failing to give special
significance to this type of crime and the consequences that flow, or could flow
from it. On the basis of this reasoning I refuse bail".
On application for bail pending trial or committal, the prosecution must discharge the
onus under s 9(l)(a) by adducing evidence showing a tendency to abscond or a real
possibility that the applicant will not appear. In this case, as the applicant had lived in
Papua New Guinea for 10 years with his wife and children, had a house and had held the
same job for six years, the onus was not discharged: Re Application for Bail by Samir
Taleb Abdullah Jaber Anabtawi [I980] PNGLR 195.
Breach of a bail condition by failing to report to a police station does not necessarily
show that an applicant will not appear for his or her trial (s 9(l)(a)) if the failure to report
is in the nature of an oversight: Re Application for Bail by Paul Louis Kysely [I980]
PNGLR 36.
In Re Application for Bail by Paul Louis Kysely [I980] PNGLR 36, one attempted
interference with a state witness having occurred, and having regard to the rest of the
evidence, there was a real possibility of a contravention of this provision (s 9(1)(f)).
Re Application for Bail by Paul Louis Kysely [I980] PNGLR 36, was followed in Re
Application for Bail by Samir Taleb Abdullah Jaber Anabtawi [I980] PNGLR 195.
In Yaki v The State [I990] PNGLR 513, the Supreme Court, on appeal, rejected the
application by a member of Parliament for bail on the grounds of attention to political
duties and accounting for government funds. These were not exceptional circumstances.
The courts are vested with a wide discretion under this section. It is to be remembered
that under s 42(6) of the Constitution, and under the Bail Act, the right to bail of an
ordinary person (ie, a person accused of any crime other than treason or wilful murder)
is guaranteed to that person "at all times from arrest or detention to acquittal or
conviction unless the interests of justice otherwise require". No such right is preserved to
the person after conviction, rather suggesting that the legislature contemplated that bail
would be refused at that stage unless circumstances could be shown to exist which
justified the exercise of the judicial discretion. This section nowhere mentions
"exceptional circumstances", and the judicial gloss has been put upon the section
because of the view that "the guilt of the person accused has been established ... in what
must be taken until the contrary be shown to be a trial properly conducted without effort
by law": Arthur Gilbert Smedley v The State [I978] PNGLR 452.
Section 11 confers a wide discretion upon the court. However, applications after
conviction are rare, as the authorities both in Papua New Guinea and Australia make it
clear that they are viewed with very great care. The situation after conviction is different
from that before conviction, when the presumption of innocence still prevails. Post-
conviction the applicant must show there are "exceptional circumstances": Rolf Schubert
v The State [I979] PNGLR 66.
After conviction, an applicant for bail must show "exceptional circumstances" exist
before bail is allowed pending appeal. The fact that a vacation is imminent, which might
cause the hearing of the appellant's appeal to be delayed for several months, is not in
itself an "exceptional circumstance". Likewise, the fact that the grounds of appeal are
prima facie arguable does not itself constitute an "exceptional circumstance": Arthur
Gilbert Smedley v The State [I978] PNGLR 452 (Re Ilett [I974] PNGLR 49 not
followed).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 589
An accused person who appeals to the Supreme Court after conviction will be granted
bail pending the appeal only in very exceptional circumstances: Himson Mulas v The
Queen [1969-1970] PNGLR 82.
Where an application is made for bail pending an appeal against a short sentence, bail
will generally not be granted if the appeal can be speedily heard: Paul Jerol Aisi v
Malkom Bai (1976) N52.
"The court has the power to order that the period during which the appellant was
released on bail shall be taken into account in calculating length of the sentence of
imprisonment imposed upon him. This power is one to be exercised sparingly and
upon it being shown that special circumstances exist."
See also Logalio Piaro v Philip Kumbamung; Pup Tumbant v Philip Kumbamung [I976]
PNGLR 283, and Secretary for Law v Gabriel Poleneu [I973] PNGLR 85.
(b) will not interfere with the person’s legitimate means of earning a living or
making himself available for work; and
(c) will not interfere with the person’s rights to political freedom of action or
movement except insofar as it is necessary to ensure that he appears at
court when required; and
(d) will not cause the person financial hardship; and
(e) are not unreasonable in all the circumstances.
(2) Where a bail authority fixes a condition to be complied with before release
from custody, it shall, in the bail certificate, stipulate the person or class of persons to
verify compliance with that condition.
(3) Any person may, unless the contrary intention appears in the bail certificate,
perform on behalf of the person granted bail, any condition to be complied with before
release from custody.
19. Guarantors.
(1) A bail authority may require as a condition of bail that no more than two
guarantors approved by it undertake to see that the person granted bail appears at the
time and place set for his trial and complies with the condition (if any) of his bail.
(2) A bail authority shall not require any guarantor to give any undertaking under
Subsection (1) unless it is of the opinion that the person granted bail will not appear at
his trial or will not comply with the conditions (if any) of his bail unless a guarantor is
approved.
(3) If the bail authority is a court it may authorize a commissioned officer of the
Police Force or an officer-in-charge of a police station to approve a guarantor.
(4) A bail authority or an officer authorized under Subsection (3) may not refuse to
approve a person as a guarantor unless it or he is satisfied on reasonable grounds that
the proposed guarantor will not honour the undertaking required of him under
Subsection (1).
(5) A bail authority may require a guarantor -
(a) to lodge an amount of money in support of his undertaking; or
(b) to undertake to pay the State an amount of money if the person granted bail
fails to appear at the time and place set for his trial or comply with the
conditions of his bail.
(6) In fixing the amounts of money referred to in Subsection (5) the bail authority
shall take into account the financial means of the guarantor.
(7) If the person granted bail fails to appear at the time and place set for his trial or
fails to comply with the conditions (if any) of his bail the court dealing with his matter
may order -
(a) that the sum of money or part of it lodged by the guarantor be paid to the
State; or
(b) that the guarantor pay to the State the amount or part of the amount he
undertook to pay under Subsection (5).
592 Chapter 4
(8) A guarantor who is affected by an order under Subsection (7) may, within 14
days after the making of the order, apply to the court making the order for variation or
revocation of the order.
(9) The court after hearing an application under Subsection (8) may make any
order it considers just in the circumstances.
In Mili Rumints v William Wulat (1982) N369(M), the court found that a forfeiture of
bail ordered under this section was unjust, as the magistrate led the defendant to believe
that an adjournment would be granted.
Under s 22(1), bail may be forfeited even though the defendant is not present. If it is
later learnt that the forfeiture was unfair, say because the accused was ill in hospital
when he or she was due to answer bail, the accused may apply for revocation of the
forfeiture under s 22(3) within 14 days, or to the Supreme Court for a review of the
decision under s 155(2)(b) of the Constitution at any time: The State v Junior Steven
Gawi & Toliman Juki Viru [1988-1989] PNGLR 118.
(c) wrongfully refuses to approve a guarantor for a person under Section 19,
may be liable in damages to that person.
(2) An action under Subsection (1) may be brought -
(a) in the National Court; or
(b) in a District Court,
and in the case of a District Court the court has jurisdiction within the limits
prescribed by Section 21 of the District Courts Act.
(3) In an action under Subsection (1), a court may award exemplary damages.
(4) The provisions of this section are in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of the Constitution or any other law dealing with the enforcement of any
constitutional right, power, duty, restriction or prohibition.
27. Regulations.
The Head of State, acting on advice, may make regulations not inconsistent with
this Act, prescribing all matters that by this Act are required or permitted to be
prescribed or that are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or
giving effect to this Act.
28. Offences.
A person who -
(a) is alleged to have committed an offence the penalty for which is or
includes imprisonment for a term exceeding 12 months; and
(b) has been granted bail; and
(c) contravenes or fails to comply with his bail obligations,
is guilty of an offence.
Penalty: A term of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.
[S 28 insrt Act No 11, 1982 (Bail Amendment) Act 1982), s 2]