PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

Natural justice is an important concept in administrative law. In the words of Megarry J' it is
"justice that is simple and elementary, as distinct from justice that is complex, sophisticated
and technical". The principles of natural justice or fundamental rules of procedure for
administrative action are neither fixed nor prescribed in any code. They are better known than
described and easier proclaimed than defined.

Natural justice is a branch of public law. It is a formidable weapon which can be wielded to
secure justice to citizens. Rules of natural justice are "basic values" which a man has cherished
throughout the ages. They are embedded in our constitutional framework and their pristine
glory and primacy cannot be allowed to be submerged by exigencies of particular situations or
cases. Principles of natural justice control all actions of public authorities by applying rules
relating to reasonableness, good faith and justice, equity and good conscience

In days bygone the Greeks had accepted the principle that "no man should be condemned
unheard". The historical and philosophical foundations of the English concept of natural justice
may be insecure, nevertheless are worthy of preservation. Indeed, from the legendary days of
Adam and of Kautilya's Arthashastra, the rule of law has had this stamp of natural justice which
makes it social justice.

The traditional English law recognises two principles of natural justice:

1. Nemo judex in causa sua or Nemo debet esse judex in propria causa: No man shall be a
judge in his own cause, or no man can act as both at the one and the same time a party or a
suitor and also as a judge, or the deciding authority must be impartial and without bias.

2. Audi alteram partem: Hear the other side, or both the sides must be heard, or no man should
be condemned unheard, or that there must be fairness on the part of the deciding authority.

However, today another very important principles of natural justice is recognised i.e Speaking
order or Reasoned decision.

A) Nemo judex in causa sua or Rule Against Bias

first principle of natural justice consists of the rule against bias or 1) "No man shall be a judge
in his own cause"; 2) "Justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen
to be done"; and 3) "Judges, like Caesar's wife should be above suspicion".
According to the dictionary, the meaning "anything which tends or may be regarded as
tending to cause such a person to decide a case otherwise than on evidence must be held
to be biased". "A predisposition to decide for or against one party, without proper regard to
the true merits of the dispute, is bias. “

The first requirement of natural justice is that the judge should be impartial and neutral and
must be free-from-bias. He is supposed to be indifferent to the parties to the controversy. He
cannot act as judge of a cause in which he himself has some interest either pecuniary or
otherwise as it affords the strongest proof against neutrality. He must be in a position to act
judicially and decide the matter objectively.

In such cases the test is not whether in fact a bias has affected the judgment; the test
always is and must be whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias
attributable to a member of the tribunal might have operated against him in the final
decision of the tribunal.

As to the test of likelihood of bias what is relevant is reasonableness of the apprehension in

that regard in the mind of the party.

Types of bias:

i. Pecuniary

It is well-settled that as regards pecuniary interest "the least pecuniary interest in the subject-
matter of the litigation will disqualify any person from acting as a judge". In Halsbury's Laws
of England, it is stated, "There is a presumption that any financial interest, however small, in
the matter in dispute disqualifies a person from adjudicating.

In. J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State of Orissa, some of the members of the Committee set up for
selecting books for educational institutions were themselves authors whose books were to be
considered for selection. It was held by the Supreme Court that the possibility of bias could not
be ruled out. Madon J observed, "It is not the actual bias in favour of the author-member that
is material, but the possibility of such bias."

ii. Personal bias

The second type of bias is a personal one. A number of circumstances may give rise to personal
bias. Here a judge may be a relative, friend or business associate of a party. He may have some
personal grudge, enmity or grievance or professional rivalry against such party. In view of these
factors, there is every likelihood that the judge may be biased towards one party or prejudiced
towards the other."

In State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, a departmental enquiry was held against A by B. As one of
the witnesses against A turned hostile, B left the enquiry, gave evidence against A, resumed to
complete the enquiry and passed an order of dismissal. The Supreme Court held that "the rules
of natural justice were completely discarded and all canons of fair play were grievously
violated" by B.

In the leading case of A.K. Kraipak, one N was a candidate for selection to the Indian Foreign
Service and was also a member of the Selection Board. N did not sit on the Board when his
own name was considered. Name of N was recommended by the Board and he was selected by
the Public Service Commission. The candidates who were not selected filed a writ petition for
quashing the selection of N on the ground that the principle of natural justice were violated.

Quashing the selection, the court observed:

“It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did
not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then
the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the
decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the
selection board when the claims of his rivals . He was also party to the preparation of the list
of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the
deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under
those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real
question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person.
Therefore what we have to see is whether there is rea reasonable ground for believing that
he was likely to have been biased.”

iii. Official bias

The third type of bias is official bias or bias as to the subject-matter. This may arise when the
judge has a general interest in the subiect-matter.

Thus, in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. SRTC (Gullapalli I), the petitioners were carrying
on motor transport business. The Andhra State Transport Undertaking published a scheme for
nationalisation of motor transport in the State and invited objections. The objections filed by
the petitioners were received and heard by the Secretary and thereafter the scheme was
approved by the Chief Minister. The Supreme Court upheld the contention of the petitioners
that the official who heard the objections was "in substance" one of the parties to the dispute
and hence the principles of natural justice were violated.

But in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. SRTC (Gullapalli II), the Supreme Court qualified
the application of the doctrine of official bias. Here the hearing was given by the Minister and
not by the Secretary. The court held that the proceedings were not vitiated as "the Secretary
was a part of the department but the Minister was only primarily responsible for the disposal
of the business pertaining to that department"

B) Audi Alteram Partem or "Hear the other side”

"Audi alteram partem" means "hear the other side", or "no man should be condemned unheard"
or "both the sides must be heard before passing any order".

The second fundamental principle of natural justice is "audi alteram partem", i.e. no man should
be condemned unheard, or both the sides must be heard before passing any order. This is the
basic requirement of rule of law. It has been described as "foundational and fundamental"
concept. It lays down a norm which should be implemented by all courts and tribunals at
national as also at international level.

- Notice

Before any action is taken, the affected party must be given a notice to show cause against the
proposed action and seek his explanation. It is a sine qua non of the right of fair hearing. Any
order passed without giving notice is against the principles of natural justice and is void ab
initio.

[Elven God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his
defence. 'Adam" (says God), "Where art thou? Hast thou not eaten of the tree, whereof I
commanded thee that thou shouldst nor eat?"

Even if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order in question
adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice. The object of a notice is to give an
opportunity to the individual concerned to present his case and, therefore, if the party is aware
of the charges or allegations, a formal defect would not invalidate the notice, unless prejudice
is caused to the individual.

- Hearing
The second requirement of "audi alteram partem" maxim is that the person concerned must be
given an opportunity of being heard before any adverse action is taken against him.

Ridge case has rightly been described as the "Magna Carta" of naturel Justice. In that case, the
plaintiff, a chief constable had been prosecuted but acquitted on certain charges of conspiracy.
In the course of the judgment, certain observations were made by the presiding judge against
the plaintiff's character as a senior police officer. Taking into account those observations, the
Watch Committee dismissed the plaintiff from service.

The Court of Appeal held that the Watch Committee was acting as an administrative authority
and was not exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, and therefore, the principles of natural
justice did not apply to their proceedings for dismissal. Reversing the decision of the Court of
Appeal, the House of Lords by a majority of 4:1 held that the power of dismissal could not
be exercised without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and without
observing the PNJ. Order was held illegal.

Again, in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, the passport of the petitioner-journal-opportunity was

given to the petitioner before taking the impugned action. The Supreme Court held that the
order was violative of the principles of natural justice.

In M.S. Nally Bharat Engg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, a senior supervisor was dismissed
from service by the company for committing theft. The dispute was referred to the Labour
Court, Dhanbad, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The workman made an application
to the Labour Court stating that since he was residing at Haripur, it would be convenient for
him if the case were transferred to Labour Court, Patna. That application was made without
intimation to the management. The government also without issuing notice or affording
opportunity to the management acceded to the request of the workman and transferred the case
to Labour Court, Patna. The petition filed by the management against the said order was
summarily dismissed by the Patna High Court on the ground that no prejudice was caused to
the company. The management approached the Supreme Court.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the High Court as well as of the government,
the Supreme Court held that fairness required that an opportunity of hearing ought to have been
afforded to the com pany before passing the impugned order. Regarding prejudice, Shetty]
rightly observed:
The management need not establish prejudice for want of such opportunity.... [T]he principles
of natural justice know of no exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any
difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself
prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of Natural justice
is unnecessary.

- One who decides must hear

Gullapali I(objections heard by secretary decision by minister-violation of PNJ)

and Gullapali II(objections heard by minister and decided by minister)

Post Decisional Hearing

Pre-decisional hearing is a hearing afforded before taking a decision or passing an order. Post-
decisional hearing, on the other hand, is a hearing given by the adjudicating authority after
taking a decision or making an order.

In Maneka Gandhi the passport of the petitioner-journalist was impounded by the Indian
Government in "public interest". No opportunity was given to the peti tioner before taking the
impugned action. When the said action was chal-lenged, the government contended that
application of the audi alteram partem rule would have frustrated the very purpose of
impounding the passport. Even though the Supreme Court negatived the argument, itaccepted
the doctrine of post-decisional hearing in exceptional cases. It laid down that where in an
emergent situation, requiring immediate action, it is not practicable to give prior notice
or hearing, the preliminary action should be soon followed by a full remedial hearing.

C) Speaking order or Reasoned decision

A "speaking order" means an order speaking for itself. To put it simply, every order must
contain reasons in support of it. Giving of reasons in support of an order is considered to be the
third principle of natural justice. According to this, a party has a right to know not only the
result of the enquiry but also the reasons in support of the decision.

The condition to record reasons introduces clarity and excludes arbitrariness and satisfies the
party concerned against whom the order is [Link] provide a safeguard against the arbitrary
exercise of powers by govt authorities, the condition of recording reasons is imposed on them.
The courts insist upon disclosure of reasons in support of the order on three grounds: 1) the
party aggrieved has the opportunity to demonstrate before the appellate or revisional court that
the reasons which persuaded the authority to reject his case were erroneous; 2) the obligation
to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by executive authority
invested with judicial power; and 3) it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is
made. The power to refuse to disclose reasons in support of the order is "exceptional in nature
and it ought to be exercised fairly, sparingly and only when fully justified by the exigencies of
an uncommon situation",

For the first time in Siemens Engg. Case the Supreme Court held that the rule requiring reasons
to be recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them must be
held to be a basic principle of natural justice. Speaking for the court, Bhagwati J (as he then
was) observed:

The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi
alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-
judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit

the Supreme Court in S.N. Mukherjee case- In that case the appellant, a major in the Indian
Army was charge-sheeted and tried by General Court Martial. Since some of the charges were
held proved, punishment of dismissal was awarded. The findings were confirmed by the Chief
of the Army Staff though reasons were not recorded for such confirmation. The post-
confirmation petition of the appellant was dismissed by the Central Government. His writ
petition was also dismissed. The appellant approached the Supreme Court. A substantial
question of law was raised in the appeal, namely, whether recording of reasons in support of
an order can be said to be one of the principles of natural justice. The Constitution Bench
decided the said question in the affirmative. Held: Keeping in view the expanding horizon of
the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record
reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise
of power by administrative authorities.