Society for Philosophy and Psychology

38th Meeting
21-23 June 2012
University of Colorado at Boulder
 38th Meeting
Society for Philosophy and Psychology and

21-23 June 2012

University of Colorado at Boulder

SESSIONS ARE LOCATED IN WOLF AND FLEMING BUILDINGS

(NUMBERS 32 AND 101 ON THE MAP ON PAGE 28)

CONTENTS

Welcome and Thank You 2

Officers of the SPP 3

General Information 4

Program Schedule 5

Posters 11

Abstracts 15

Map of Boulder 26

Map of CU-Boulder Campus 28

Program Quick Guide 30

 38th Meeting
Society for Philosophy and Psychology and

21-23 June 2012

University of Colorado at Boulder

WELCOME!

Welcome to the campus of University of Colorado for the 38th meeting of the Society for
Philosophy & Psychology. An excellent program has been assembled by the program chairs:
Fiery Cushman (Psychology, Brown University) and Jonathan Weinberg (Philosophy, University
of Arizona).

Along with SPP, the conference is made possible by the generous support of the University of
Colorado at Boulder (CU-Boulder) Graduate Committee on the Arts and Humanities, the CU-
Boulder College of Arts and Sciences Dean’s Fund for Excellence, the CU-Boulder Institute of
Cognitive Science, the CU-Boulder Department of Computer Science, and the CU-Boulder
Department of Philosophy.

In addition to those mentioned above, thanks go to all who refereed papers for the conference or
served on the prize committees. Special votes of thanks are owed to SPP Information Officer
Michael Anderson, Stanton Prize Coordinator Adina Roskies, all the other members of the
Executive Committee of SPP.

We hope that in addition to enjoying the conference itself you’ll have a chance to explore the
University of Colorado campus and the city of Boulder. And we hope that you will join SPP next
year at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island (dates TBA, likely in mid-June).

Brian Scholl, SPP President

Rob Rupert, Local Host
Boulder, June 2012

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 Officers of the
Society for Philosophy and Psychology

PRESIDENT STANTON PRIZE COORDINATOR

Brian Scholl Adina Roskies

PRESIDENT-ELECT POSTER PRIZE COORDINATOR

Michael Devitt Fiery Cushman

PAST PRESIDENT ESPP LIAISON

Louise Antony Brian Keeley

SECRETARY-TREASURER DIVERSITY COMMMITTEE CO-CHAIRS

Tom Polger Carrie Figdor
Valerie Tiberius
INFORMATION OFFICER
Michael Anderson

2011-2012 SPP Executive Committee Members

Michael Anderson Carrie Figdor John Trueswell

Tony Chemero Joshua Greene Deena Skolnick Weisberg
Fiery Cushman Ron Mallon Jen Cole Wright
Luc Faucher Adina Roskies Liane Young

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2012 MEETING IN BOULDER, CO

Rob Rupert

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2013 MEETING IN PROVIDENCE, RI

Bertram Malle

The Society for Philosophy and Psychology is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt charitable organization.

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 GENERAL INFORMATION

On-Site Contacts
For questions that arise at the conference, please contact Rob Rupert
<[Link]@[Link]>, or Tom Polger <[Link]@[Link]>.

Information for Chairs and Speakers

Each contributed session consists of 3 papers allocated a total of 60 minutes each for
presentation, commentary and questions. Speakers are encouraged to prepare remarks of about
35 minutes, leaving 10 minutes for commentary, 10 minutes for questions and 5 minutes for
transition between speakers. Chairs will strictly enforce the total time allocated to each speaker,
and will follow the order of presentations listed in the program. This last detail is especially
important, so that attendees can rely on the start and finish times for each session when planning
their time.

Information about Posters, Poster Madness, and the SPP Poster Prize
The presenting author or other designated presenter should be at the poster during the times
specified on the program.

We are also planning for Poster Madness. During Poster Madness, each poster presenter will
have the opportunity to give a brief 50 second presentation on their poster. The idea is that poster
presenters can use the Poster Madness presentation session to give a quick advertisement to the
topic of their poster. Because presentation time for each quick Poster Madness talk is limited, all
speakers are limited to using a single slide for their Madness and are required to submit their
slide before the session, so that they may be loaded onto the laptop in advance.

Information about the SPP Poster Prize will be distributed at Poster Madness.

Book and Publisher Exhibit

Exhibits during conference hours in Fleming Foyer.
• Cambridge University Press
• The MIT Press
• Oxford University Press
• Routledge / Taylor & Francis

Alcohol
All visitors are subject to CU-Boulder alcohol polices.

Internet Access
Campus wireless Internet access (WiFi) will be provided to conference attendees. The login and
password information for connecting to the campus network will be provided at registration.

4
 Program of the 38th Meeting
Society for Philosophy and Psychology and

21-23 June 2012

University of Colorado at Boulder

SESSIONS ARE LOCATED IN WOLF AND FLEMING BUILDINGS

(NUMBERS 32 AND 101 ON THE MAP ON PAGE 28)

THURSDAY, JUNE 21

8:00-8:30 Registration, Coffee, and Book Display FLEMING FOYER

8:30-9:45 Invited Lecture FLEMING 155

Susan Schneider, University of Pennsylvania
Rethinking Physicalism

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 1: Consciousness and Central Processes WOLF 205

Benjamin Kozuch, Results of Lesions to the Prefrontal Cortex Cast Doubt

on Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Commentator: Liad Murdik

Brandon Liverence, Varieties of Attentional Effects on Perception, and

Criteria for ‘Mental Paint’

Commentator: Michael Anderson

Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels, Do Theories of Scientific Inference

Have Implications for Ordinary Cognition? Fodor on Holism and
Cognitive Architecture

Commentator: Steve Crowley

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 2: Knowledge WOLF 206

Michael Roche, Self-Knowledge of Belief: A Defense of Alex Byrne’s

Transparency Account

Commentator: Joseph Levine

Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman, The Folk Conception of Knowledge

Commentator: Louise Antony

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 Nicholas Leonard, Against Nagel’s Solution to the Harman-Vogel
Paradox

Commentator: Michael Huemer

1:00-2:15 Lunch and SPP Executive Committee Meeting WOLF 202

2:15-3:45 Cutting Edge Session 1: Mental State Attribution and Inference WOLF 205

Joanna Korman and Bertram Malle, Practical Rationality in Action

Explanation: A Crucial Role for Belief Reasons

Brent Strickland, Matthew Fisher, Frank Keil & Joshua Knobe, Syntax
and Intentionality: An Automatic Link Between Language and
Theory-of-Mind
Mark Alicke, David Rose and Dorian Bloom, Culpable Control and
Unintended Outcomes
Jorie Koster-Hale, Rebecca Saxe and Liane Young, Using Multi-voxel
Pattern Analyses to Find Neural Correlates of Moral Judgment in
Neurotypical and ASD Populations

2:15-3:45 Cutting Edge Session 2: Representation WOLF 206

Chris Zarpentine, The Language of Thought and the Problem of

Conceptualization

Brian Keane, Hongjing Lu, Thomas Papathomas, Steven Silverstein and

Philip Kellman, Is Interpolation Cognitively Encapsulated?
Measuring the Effects of Belief on Kanizsa Shape Discrimination
and Illusory Contour Formation

Mariela Aguilera, Cartographic Systems and Nonlinguistic Inference

Elinor Amit, Alek Chakroff and Joshua D. Greene, Greater Reliance on

Visual vs. Verbal Processing Distinguishes Primary vs. Secondary
Emotions

3:45-4:00 Coffee Break FLEMING FOYER

4:00-5:15 Stanton Prize Lecture FLEMING 155

Joshua Greene, Harvard University
Integrative Moral Cognition: A Humean Journey in Reverse

5:15-6:30 Poster Madness FLEMING 155

6:30-8:00 Poster Session 1 & Reception WOLF 201

COMMONS, CAFÉ AND PATIO

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FRIDAY, JUNE 22

8:00-8:30 Registration, Coffee, and Book Display FLEMING FOYER

8:30-9:45 Invited Lecture FLEMING 155

Terry Horgan, University of Arizona
Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgments

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 3: Morality and Affect WOLF 205

Erik Wielenberg, Disgust and Moral Knowledge

Commentator: Nina Strominger

Geoffrey Goodwin & Adam Benforado, Judging the Goring Ox:

Examining Intuitions About Punishing Animals to Better
Understand the Retributive Motive

Commentator: Jonathan Phillips

Katrina Sifferd and William Hirstein, On the Criminal Culpability of

Successful and Unsuccessful Psychopaths

Commentator: Victor Kumar

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 4: Reduction & Its Discontents WOLF 206

Douglas Keaton, An Old-School Approach to Mental Causation

Commentator: Chris Howard

Kari Theurer, Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic

Reduction

Commentator: John Bickle

Jake Wright, Superagents

Commentator: J. D. Trout

1:00-2:15 Lunch

2:15-3:15 Cutting Edge Session 3: Psychology of Modality WOLF 204

Andrew Shtulman and Lester Tong, Cognitive Parallels Between Modal

Judgment and Moral Judgment

Brian Edwards and Lance Rips, An Analysis of People’s Explanations of

Their Counterfactual Inferences

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 Meredith Meyer, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan Gelman and Sarah Stilwell,
Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States
and India

2:15-3:15 Cutting Edge Session 4: Moral Judgment WOLF 205

Clayton Critcher, Erik Helzer, David Tannenbaum & David Pizarro, When
Doing Good Isn’t Good Enough

Ivar Hannikainen, Fiery Cushman and Ryan Miller, A Novel Measure of

Agent and Victim Foci in Moral Decision-Making

James Dungan, Alek Chakroff & Liane Young, Purity Versus Pain:
Distinct Moral Concerns for Self Versus Other

2:15-3:15 Cutting Edge Session 5: Developmental Metaphysics WOLF 206

Deena Weisberg and Alan Leslie (presented by Sydney Levine), Young

Children Distinguish Pretend Situations from Reality and from
Each Other

Lindsey Powell and Elizabeth Spelke, Social Categorization and Inference

in Preverbal Infants

Caren Walker, Patricia Ganea and Alison Gopnik, Causal Learning from
Fiction

3:15-3:30 Coffee Break FLEMING FOYER

3:30-6:15 Invited Symposium: Automatic & Controlled Processes FLEMING 155

Daphna Shohamy, Columbia University
Nathaniel Daw, New York University
Tamar Gendler, Yale University

6:30-8:00 Poster Session 2 & Reception WOLF 201

COMMONS, CAFÉ AND PATIO

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SATURDAY, JUNE 23

8:00-8:30 Registration, Coffee, and Book Display FLEMING FOYER

8:30-9:45 Invited Lecture FLEMING 155

Sharon Thompson-Schill, University of Pennsylvania
Beyond Embodiment

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 5: Philosophical Expertise WOLF 205

Kevin Tobia, Expert Intuition

Commentator: Kaija Mortensen

Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust, The Self-Reported Moral Behavior of

Ethics Professors

Commentator: Eddy Nahmias

Patrick Arnold, How to Answer a Situationist Challenge to Virtue

Epistemology

Commentator: Michael Sechman

10:00-1:00 Contributed Session 6: Concepts WOLF 206

Guillaume Beaulac and Pierre Poirier, “Concept” Heterogeneity and

Definitions

Commentator: Chad Gonnerman

Daniel Weiskopf, The Human Stain: Concepts, Anthropic Kinds, and

Realism

Commentator: Sheldon Chow

Joseph McCaffrey, Reconceiving Conceptual Vehicles: Lessons from

Semantic Dementia

Commentator: Dan Burston

1:00-2:15 Lunch and SPP Business Meeting KOELBEL ATRIUM

2:15-3:15 Cutting Edge Session 6: Influence of Morality on Other Domains WOLF 205

George Newman, Joshua Knobe & Paul Bloom, The Moral Nature of the
True Self

David Rose, David Danks & Edouard Machery, Demoralizing Causation

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 Steven Sloman, Philip Fernbach, Scott Ewing and Andrew Lee, A Causal
Model of Intentionality Judgment

2:15-3:15 Cutting Edge Session 7: Free Will and Agency WOLF 206

Takayuki Suzuki, Koji Tsuchiya & Makoto Suzuki, Do We Really Have

the Concepts of Free Will and Responsibility?

Andrew Monroe, Kyle Dillon & Bertram Malle, Free Will, the Soul, and
Moral Blame

Liane Young, The Conflicted Self Does Not Cause Its Own Actions

3:15-3:30 Coffee Break FLEMING FOYER

3:30-4:30 Presidential Address FLEMING 155

Brian Scholl, Yale University
Philosophical Vision

4:30-7:15 Invited Symposium: Cognitive Science Meets Epistemology FLEMING 155

Michael Bishop, Florida State University
Alvin Goldman, Rutgers University
Peter Todd, Indiana University, Bloomington

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 POSTER SESSION 1

TO BE LOCATED IN WOLF 201 COMMONS, CAFÉ, AND PATIO

Toward a Pragmatic Conception of Mental Disorder Abigail Gosselin

The Dual Functions of Indirect Speech: Strategic Speaking and Aleksandr Chakroff, et al.
Self-Shielding

Feelings as Representations of Value Brian Ballard

Fragility of Belief Chris Jenson

Perception of Features and Perception of Objects Daniel Burnston, et al.

Sartwell’s Minimalist Account of Knowledge Defended David Sackris

On the Inevitability of Anthropomorphic Bias in Comparative Devin Sanchez Curry

Psychology

Why We Punish: The Normative Correlates of Third Party Erik Thulin, et al.
Sanctioning

Influence of Outcome Valence in the Subjective Experience of Felipe De Brigard, et al.

Episodic Past, Future and Counterfactual Thinking

Can Embodied Cognition Deny Representation and Still Explain Gregory Nirshberg
Intentionality?

Differences in the 1st and 3rd Person Perspectives in Realistic Heather Salazar, et al.
Moral Dilemmas

Debunking Deontology: The Role of the Emotions Isaac Wiegman

Frontal-Parietal Network Differences for Item and Category Javier Gomez-Lavin, et al.
Working Memory

Introspection: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Descriptive Jessica Wilson

Experience Sampling

Whose Truth? What Evidence? Joseph Ulatowski, et al.

What are the Cognitive Costs of Racism? A Reply to Gendler Joshua Mugg

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Grounding Content Kelly Trogdon

Delusions as Malfunctioning Beliefs Kengo Miyazono

Self-Deception, Moral Development and Moral Motivation Lina M. Cáceres C.

Anxiety-related Behavior of Orphan Chimpanzees (Pan Maria Botero, et al.

troglodytes schweinfurthii) at Gombe National Park,
Tanzania

Acquiring Ownership and the Attribution of Responsibility Max Palamar, et al.

Quantifying the Response Profiles of Neural Circuits: Do Brain Michael Anderson, et al.
Regions Have Personalities of their Own?

Intelligibility is Necessary for Explanation, but Accuracy May Mike Braverman, et al.
Not Be

A Theory-Theory Account of Mirror Neurons Shannon Spaulding

Determining Relevance: Close Enough is Good Enough Sheldon Chow

Harm, Affect, and the Moral/Conventional Distinction: Revisited Sydney Levine, et al.

Intuitions in a New Light: Expanding the Methods of Taylor Davis, et al.

Experimental Philosophy

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 POSTER SESSION 2

TO BE LOCATED IN WOLF 201 COMMONS, CAFÉ, AND PATIO

10 Month Old Infants Detect Emotional Reactions that are Amy Skerry, et al.
Incongruent with Goal Outcomes

How (not) to Define Morality: An Analysis of Haidt’s and Bruce Maxwell, et al.
Kohlberg’s Approaches

Modifying the Interventionist Solution to the Problem of Causal Danny Pearlberg

Exclusion

Are Embodied Concepts Used in Natural-Language Processing? Deepak Mirchandani

When Psychology Undermines Beliefs Derek Leben

Experimental Phenomenology and Extended Cognition Dobri Dotov, et al.

The Perception of Empty Space Gabrielle Jackson

Finding a Place for Concepts: Context and Eliminativism Grant Goodrich

Are You With Me or Against Me? Identification or Ida Hallgren

Objectification as Mediated by Perceived Relative Status

Children’s Choices and Judgments of Hypothetical Moral Janani Prabhakar, et al.

Scenarios

Intuitions and Self-Deception Jason Kido Lopez

Resolving the Paradox of Moral Focus: Why You Forced Him Jonathan Phillips, et al.
To Do it Even Though He Wasn’t Forced To

Putting Your Best Foot Forward: Punishment and Jordan Theriault, et al.
Forgiveness Differentially Influence Dimensions of Mind
Perception

Moral Beliefs, Personal Need for Structure, and Political Joshua Rottman, et al.
Conservatism

Meta-Semantic Arguments Against Skepticism Justin Fisher

The neural correlates for evaluating psychological versus Lily Tsoi, et al.
physical harm in neurotypical and autism spectrum
individuals

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Phenomenal Consciousness, Conscious States, and the Hard Mikio Akagi
Problem

The Role of Explanation in Two Year Olds’ Prosocial Actions Nadia Chernyak, et al.

Unconscious Phenomenal Experience: An Oxymoron – Or Is It? Nina Atanasova

Paying Attention to Consciousness Rik Hine

Grasping the Horns of the Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Robert Foley

Finding a way between implicit processing and reportability

Remembering the Dinosaur: The Constructive Trace Theory of Sarah Robins

Memory

Preschoolers Use the Past to Explain Ownership Shaylene Nancekivell, et al.

The Moral Mind: Asymmetric Blame and Praise for Mental Steve Guglielmo, et al.
States

Sometimes Psychopaths Get it Right: A Utilitarian Response to Tyler Paytas

“The Mismeasure of Morals”

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 ABSTRACTS OF CONTRIBUTED PAPERS

Cartographic Systems and Nonlinguistic Inference

Mariela Aguilera
Cognitive ethologists and comparative psychologists often assume that non human animals are
capable of making inferences. But a wide philosophical tradition has supposed that the capability
to making inferences require some kind of language. Against these assumptions, I claim that
inferential abilities do not necessarily require a language. In contrast, certain cartographic systems
could be used to explain some forms of inferences. Despite their differences, maps as well as
sentences are capable of warranting rational relations between contents they represent. Moreover,
maps are appropriated to explain some features of animal reasoning.

Culpable Control and Unintended Outcomes

Mark Alicke, David Rose and Dorian Bloom
There are many ways in which the outcomes of a behavioral event can fail to match an actor’s
focal goals. One interesting way, represented in many studies on the “Knobe Effect,” is for an
actor to accept outcomes that he or she foresees but does not desire. In the Knobe effect, harmful
side effects are seen to have been produced intentionally to a greater extent than helpful ones. The
Culpable Control Model (CCM) of blame was applied to explain these effects. We created 16
different conditions that expanded the Knobe effect to show that differences in evaluation
between the harm and help conditions could explain each of its elements. Results supported the
CCM interpretation in every instance.

Greater Reliance on Visual vs. Verbal Processing Distinguishes Primary vs. Secondary
Emotions
Elinor Amit, Alek Chakroff and Joshua D. Greene
Recent approaches to emotion distinguish between primary and secondary emotions (e.g., anger
and happiness vs. shame and pride). Primary emotions are characterized as evolutionarily
conserved, involving less conceptual cognition, having shorter duration, and evoking universally
recognized facial expressions. Secondary emotions are characterized as unique to humans,
involving complex conceptual cognition, having longer duration, and as being less observable.
We provide empirical evidence that (1) those two clusters exist; and (2) primary emotions rely
more on visual imagery while secondary emotions rely more on verbal processing. Implications
for moral decision-making are discussed.

How to Answer a Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology

Patrick Arnold
The situationist challenge to virtue epistemology is long overdue, given both the long history of
situationist critiques in virtue ethics as well as the wealth of empirical literature in social and
cognitive psychology that paints a less than ideal picture of human reasoning and intellectual
virtuousness. Mark Alfano makes significant progress in formulating such a challenge in his 2011
paper, “Expanding the Situationist Challenge to Responsibilist Virtue Epistemology,” where he
argues that the empirical literature on human rationality shows that people generally do not
respond to epistemically relevant reasons, but to normatively irrelevant circumstantial factors,
and respond in ways that worryingly flout intellectual virtuousness and create a situationist
debunking of the empirical reality of global intellectual virtues.
While there are a number of revisions of virtue theories that potentially allow it to avoid the
situationist challenge—the most prominent being John Doris’s “localization” of virtues—in

15
response to Alfano, I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a viable way to deflect the
situationist challenge without rejecting any crucial normative or descriptive components of virtue
epistemology, while also remaining anti-skeptical.1 I argue both that the virtue theorist can
incorporate situational factors into virtuousness without retreating to localization of the virtues,
and that while the irrationality in human cognition plagues intellectual virtues, the social and
cognitive sciences have offered equally powerful ways of improving or sidestepping our
cognitive shortcomings—a malleability which is both expected and required by traditional virtue
theories in ethics and epistemology. Virtue epistemology, I conclude, can consistently and
convincingly avoid the situationist challenge by including sensitivity to situational factors as part
of virtue, and by drawing on social and cognitive psychology to improve intellectual virtues.

‘Concept’ Heterogeneity and Definitions

Guillaume Beaulac and Pierre Poirier
We aim at a rehabilitating the notion of “definition” in concept science – a notion associated to
what is now known as the classical theory of concepts. We defend three broad ideas from which
follow a re-evaluation of the place of definitions in the concepts literature. First, we follow
Machery (2009) in rejecting the natural kind assumption in concept science, viz. there are more
than one body of information that play the roles attributed to concepts. Second, we adopt a dual-
process view of the mind – the view that two broadly opposed types of processes are needed to
explain how the mind works. Third, we reject the necessary-and-sufficient model of definitions.
This allows us to reconsider the role of definitions in cognition since, as we will argue, the
traditional objections to the classical theory of concepts do not hold in the present framework.

When Doing Good Isn’t Good Enough

Clayton Critcher, Erik Helzer, David Tannenbaum and David Pizarro
Research on moral judgment typically studies what features of actions make them praiseworthy
or impermissible. An intuitive assumption is that performing a praiseworthy action intentionally
would merit moral praise. This perspective neglects a key consideration that three studies
identified as crucial: whether a moral agent likely acted out of a commendable moral rule (e.g., a
utilitarian desire to minimize total lives lost). Although moral agents rarely explicitly state their
reason for acting, participants were sensitive to person and situational cues that were thought to
signal what moral rules a person appreciated: the agent’s deficits in emotional or rational thinking
(Study 1), the agent’s time for deliberation (Study 2), and the agent’s visual perspective (Study
3). Participants then praised agents to the extent that the agents were believed to appreciate the
moral rule that would justify their actions. In short, moral credit is awarded not for “good” actions
but for principled actions.

A New Model of Moral Cognition: Distinct Moral Concerns for Self Versus Other
James Dungan, Alek Chakroff & Liane Young
Recent efforts to partition the space of morality focus on the descriptive content of moral domains
(e.g., harm versus purity). Here, we present behavioral and neural evidence for a model in which
a novel dimension interacts with domain content to determine our intuitive moral judgments:
whether the action targets the self or another. We present studies demonstrating that purity norms
function to protect ourselves from impurities, while harm norms function to protect us from
interpersonal harms. These findings are discussed in relation to research showing that mental
states are recruited differently across domains, suggesting distinct functions for distinct moral
norms.

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An Analysis of People’s Explanations of Their Counterfactual Inferences
Brian Edwards and Lance Rips
When engaging in counterfactual thought (e.g., if I hadn’t stopped for coffee, would I still have
missed the bus?), people must imagine changes to the actual state of the world. In this study, we
investigated how people reason about counterfactual scenarios by asking participants to make
counterfactual inferences about a series of causal devices and provide explanations of their
reasoning. Participants’ inferences and explanations were consistent with theories of
counterfactual reasoning that propose that people avoid breaking deterministic causal links (i.e.,
A always causes B), but are willing to break probabilistic causal links (i.e., A sometimes causes
B) to keep prior causal events in the same states as in the actual world. When the causal links
were deterministic, participants used modus-tollens-like reasoning to infer that the states of prior
causal events would have been different in the counterfactual world. In contrast, when the links
were probabilistic, participants said that the states of “cause” variables do not depend on the
states of their effects and cited the links’ unreliability as an explanation for why the states of prior
causal events would have been the same in the actual and counterfactual worlds. Our data suggest
that these principles play an important role in counterfactual reasoning.

Do Theories of Scientific Inference Have Implications for Ordinary Cognition? Fodor on

Holism and Cognitive Architecture
Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels
What implications do accounts of scientific theory construction and confirmation have for
cognitive science? We argue that failing to distinguish between different types of theories of
scientific inference – including normative, population-level, competence, and performance
theories – has lead to fundamental misunderstandings of the implications. In particular, we charge
Fodor with such a misunderstanding. His influential critiques of theories of cognitive architecture
are inappropriately based on a multiply ambiguous conception of the holistic nature of non-
demonstrative inference in science. In contrast, we outline more promising relations that hold
between theories of scientific inference and cognitive science.

Judging the Goring Ox: Examining Intuitions About Punishing Animals to Better
Understand the Retributive Motive
Geoff Goodwin & Adam Benforado
Prior research on the psychology of retribution is complicated by the difficulty of truly separating
retributive and general deterrence motives. We isolate the operation of retribution by
investigating intuitions about punishing animals, which allows us to remove general deterrence as
a relevant consideration. We find that the greater the perceived loss from a violent animal attack,
the more people believe that the animal deserves to be killed. Individuals are also sensitive to an
animal’s culpability, and are more inclined to inflict pain and suffering upon culpable animal
attackers. These results raise questions about the nature and scope of retributive motives.

Act/Impact Morality Scale: A Measure of Agent- and Victim- Foci in Moral Judgment
Ivar Hannikainen, Fiery Cushman & Ryan M. Miller
Moral offenses are typically constituted of an agent and a victim. We hypothesized that one can
condemn these actions by focusing on the agent’s action or on the victim’s experience. So we
developed an instrument to capture individual differences in focus during moral judgment. Agent
focus correlated with greater condemnation of personal moral harm (Experiment 1) and purity
violations (Experiment 2). Agent and victim foci were also associated with different sets of moral
foundations (Experiments 3 & 4). Lastly, we found reliable differences in agent and victim foci
along the political spectrum. These findings point towards two contrasting approaches to moral
judgment

17
Is Interpolation Cognitively Encapsulated? Measuring the Effects of Belief on Kanizsa
Shape Discrimination and Illusory Contour Formation
Brian Keane, Hongjing Lu, Thomas Papathomas, Steven Silverstein and Philip Kellman
Contour interpolation is a perceptual process that fills-in missing edges on the basis of how
surrounding edges (inducers) are spatiotemporally related. Cognitive encapsulation refers to the
degree to which perceptual mechanisms act in isolation from beliefs, expectations, and utilities
(Pylyshyn, 1999). Is interpolation encapsulated from belief? We addressed this question by
having subjects discriminate briefly-presented, partially-visible fat and thin shapes, the edges of
which either induced or did not induce illusory contours (relatable and non-relatable conditions,
respectively). Half the trials in each condition incorporated task-irrelevant distractor lines, known
to disrupt the filling-in of contours. Half of the observers were told that the visible parts of the
shape belonged to a single thing (group strategy); the other half were told that the visible parts
were disconnected (ungroup strategy). We found that distractor lines strongly impaired
performance in the relatable condition, but minimally in the non-relatable condition; that strategy
did not alter the effects of the distractor lines for either the relatable or non-relatable stimuli; and
that treating relatable fragments as a unit improved performance while treating non-relatable
fragments as a unit did not. These results suggest that 1) filling-in effects during illusory contour
formation cannot be easily removed via strategy; 2) filling-in effects cannot be easily
manufactured from stimuli that fail to elicit interpolation; and 3) actively grouping fragments can
readily improve discrimination performance, but only when those fragments form illusory
contours. Taken together, these findings indicate that while discriminating filled-in shapes
depends on strategy, filling-in itself may be encapsulated from belief.

An Old-School Approach to Mental Causation

Douglas Keaton
I offer a novel approach to mental causation that is non-reductive yet does not appeal to familiar
strategies, such as appeals to compatiblism, contrastive causation, or the so-called “disjunctive
move.” Rather, I argue that the basics of causal role functionalism, exploited in new ways, allow
for and indeed require a subtler sort of “causal inheritance” than the simplistic sort that Kim, for
example, used to generate reductionist arguments. I do not offer a comprehensive theory of
mental causation but rather a new way of looking at the standard framework that will, I believe,
allow for the construction of various new views.

Thinking in Patterns: Using Multi-Voxel pattern Analyses to Find Neural Correlates of

Moral Judgment in Neurotypical and ASD Populations
Jorie Koster-Hale, Rebecca Saxe and Liane Young
Actions are judged morally wrong if the actor intended to cause harm, but not if the same
outcome was caused accidentally. This difference between intentional and accidental harm
depends on thinking about another person’s thoughts, a cognitive function associated with a
specific and selective group of brain regions (the ‘Theory of Mind network’), and especially one
region, the right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ). Prior research has found that (i) interfering
with activity in the RTPJ, via transcranial magnetic stimulation, can shift moral judgments away
from reliance on beliefs (Young et al 2010), and (ii) high-functioning individuals with Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD) rely significantly less on beliefs, for moral judgments, than matched
neurotypical (NT) control participants (Moran et al 2011). Puzzlingly, however, the average
response in Theory of Mind regions is not different for intentional versus accidental harmful
actions, in NT or ASD participants. Using Multi-Voxel Pattern Analyses (MVPA), we find that
RTPJ – and not other regions in the Theory of Mind network – shows sensitivity in the pattern,
but not magnitude, of response to the difference between intentional and accidental harms.
Second, we find that individual differences in pattern classification predict individual differences
in behavior: individuals with more discriminable neural patterns showed a larger difference in

18
moral judgments of accidental versus intentional harms. Finally, we find that the difference
between intentional and accidental harms is not encoded in the voxel-wise pattern in participants
with ASD, mirroring their moral judgments. In adults with ASD, higher symptom severity scores
negatively correlated with pattern discriminability.

Results of Lesions to the Prefrontal Cortex Cast Doubt on Higher-Order Theories of

Consciousness
Benjamin Kozuch
According to higher-order theories of consciousness, a mental state is conscious only if it is
represented by another mental state. Higher-order theories entail that there will be some areas (or
networks of areas) in the brain such that, because they produce (the right kind of) higher-order
states, the disabling of these areas will bring about deficits in consciousness. In this paper, I first
argue that the prefrontal cortex is where any higher-order representations are likely to be
produced. Then I survey prefrontal lesion data, looking for evidence of deficits in visual
consciousness. I argue none are to be found, and that this presents a compelling case against
higher-order theories, objections notwithstanding.

Against Nagel’s Solution to the Harman-Vogel Paradox

Nicholas Leonard
The Harman-Vogel paradox involves a pattern of knowledge ascriptions that threatens the
principle that knowledge is closed under entailment. The pattern is this: A proposition, p, can be
easier to know than another proposition, q, even if it is recognized that p entails q. Jennifer Nagel
has recently put forth an interesting argument that, if sound, would explain away the Harman-
Vogel paradox. More specifically, Nagel has argued that by appealing to Dual Process theories of
cognition, we can give a psychological explanation as to how the Harman-Vogel Paradox can be
dissolved. In this paper I argue that Nagel’s solution to the Harman-Vogel paradox is both too
strong and too weak and that it must, therefore, be abandoned.

Varieties of Attentional Effects on Perception, and Criteria for ‘Mental Paint’

Brandon Liverence
Empirical demonstrations that attention alters the character of perception have fueled recent
philosophical arguments for the existence of ‘mental paint’, which in turn is taken to militate
against representationalism and direct realism. I show here that such demonstrations do not serve
as sufficient evidence for mental paint, because they can instead be conceptualized as instances of
attention enhancing — but not fundamentally changing — perception. In contrast, I describe the
results of several new experiments that meet stricter criteria for mental paint, showing that
sustained attention warps spatial perception in surprising and counterintuitive ways.

Reconceiving Conceptual Vehicles: Lessons from Semantic Dementia

Joseph McCaffrey
What are the vehicles of conceptual thought? Recently, cognitive scientists and philosophers of
psychology have developed theories about what kinds of representations concepts are. At one
extreme, amodal theories claim that concepts are amodal representations whose vehicles are
distinct from those of the representations used in perceptual processes. At the other end of the
spectrum, neo-empiricism claims that concepts are strictly perceptual representations. Between
these views are pluralistic theories, which hold that certain concepts are amodal, while others are
perceptual. How should we decide between these competing views? In this paper, I examine how
evidence from the neuropsychological disorder semantic dementia bears on the philosophical
debate about conceptual vehicles. After first spelling out how neuropsychology might inform
theories of conceptual vehicles, I argue that the pattern of deficits in semantic dementia
undermines recent neo-empiricist predictions about where and how conceptual knowledge is

19
organized in the brain. Furthermore, I claim that recent work on semantic processing in the
anterior temporal lobe, the brain region implicated in semantic dementia, makes it plausible that
amodal—albeit in a modest sense—processes are involved in representing certain kinds of
concepts. However, I do not intend my analysis of semantic dementia to lend support to amodal
theories or any particular pluralistic view; instead I draw lessons about how theorizing about
conceptual vehicles should proceed if it turns out that amodal and perceptual resources both
underlie conceptual thought.

Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India
Meredith Meyer, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Susan Gelman and Sarah Stilwell
We investigated whether American and Indian people’s reasoning about organ transplants
showed evidence of essentialist thinking (the tendency to attribute category members’ outward
features to an internal underlying force or essence). Respondents endorsed the possibility of
transplants conferring donors’ attributes on recipients, consistent with essentialism. They also
endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient’s
category membership (e.g., endorsing the idea that a recipient of a pig’s heart would act more
pig-like, but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to
predictions from the “minimalist” position (Strevens, 2000), an alternative to essentialism.

Free Will, the Soul, and Moral Blame

Andrew Monroe and Bertram Malle
A common challenge laid against ordinary people’s concept of free will is that it is imbued with
deep metaphysical beliefs and a reliance on a dualistic soul. Contrary to this view, recent
empirical work suggests that the folk concept is pragmatic and lacks many of the metaphysical
assumptions commonly attributed to it. However, it is possible that the idea of a soul still lurks
within the folk concept, entangled with free will. The current study offers a novel way to
disentangle the soul from free will and to test each concept’s role in moral judgment. Participants
were randomly assigned to read a description about one of five agent types (e.g., human, robot,
cyborg). We measured which capacities (e.g., choice, a soul, intentional action) people attributed
to each agent and used this to predict ascriptions of free will and moral judgments (e.g., blame).
Results showed that having a soul was unrelated to the capacity for free will. Moreover, neither a
soul nor free will were prerequisites for attributing blame. Thus, while people may retain a belief
in a soul, this study shows that such beliefs are unrelated to ascriptions of free will and moral
judgment.

The Moral Nature of the True Self

George Newman, Joshua Knobe and Paul Bloom
We examine whether people are more likely to see the true self reflected in behaviors they deem
to be morally good than in behaviors they deem to be morally bad. Experiments 1 and 2 find that
changes to morally good behavior are thought to result from the emergence of the true self, while
changes to morally bad or neutral behaviors are not. Experiment 3 finds that individual
differences in moral values explain differences in beliefs about the true self. Experiment 4 finds
that this moral view of the true self is independent of the particular type of mental state(beliefs
versus feelings) in question.

20
Social Categorization and Inference in Preverbal Infants
Lindsey Powell and Elizabeth Spelke
Human adults think of themselves and others as members of social categories and use those
categories to make predictions about others’ behavior. The research presented here asks whether
preverbal infants, who lack much exposure to real social category distinctions, already engage in
similar categorization and inference processes. We found that infants introduced to groups of
socially interacting, animate characters used the actions of some group members to generate
expectations about the actions of other members of the same group. When infants were exposed
to similar events featuring inanimate entities or asocial animate characters, they failed to make
these sorts of behavioral generalizations. These results support the conclusion that a domain-
specific tendency to represent others as members of social groups and to use these groups to make
behavioral inferences is already present in the first year of life.

Self-Knowledge of Belief: A Defense of Alex Byrne’s Transparency Account

Michael Roche
Alex Byrne (2005, 2011) claims that we have a special access to our own beliefs, and attempts to
explain this special access, not via appeal to some kind of mechanism of inner sense, but rather in
terms of our ability to follow a certain epistemic rule. The account rejects the idea that one attains
self-knowledge by focusing one’s attention onto one’s mind, requiring instead that one directs
one’s attention outward to the world. Brie Gertler (2011) argues that Byrne’s account makes
possible a certain kind of intolerable error. She then argues that the account can be amended so as
to avoid this kind of error only at the cost of giving up its distinctive outward-directedness. I
defend Byrne from Gertler’s objection, arguing, in part, that the objection is based on an overly
literal reading of a well-known remark made by Gareth Evans (1982), which serves as the
inspiration for Byrne’s account. My defense is significant, given that various philosophers have
recently offered accounts of self-knowledge in the same vein as Byrne’s. These accounts would
appear to be subject to an objection very much similar to Gertler’s objection to Byrne’s account.

Demoralizing Causation
David Rose, David Danks and Edouard Machery
Recently, a number of authors—including Hitchcock & Knobe (2009) and Alicke, et al. (in
press)—have argued that normative considerations are ubiquitous in causal cognition. In this
paper, we first argue that these claims depend on a very large inferential leap that is not warranted
either by the empirical data or on theoretical grounds. We then provide positive reasons—based
both in theory and two novel experiments that we conducted—to think that the
influence of normative considerations on causal cognition is not nearly as widespread as has been
claimed by these authors. Norms can play a significant cognitive role, but their influence is not
ubiquitous.

The Self-Reported Moral Behavior of Ethics Professors

Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust
We examine the self-reported moral attitudes and moral behavior of 198 ethics professors, 208
non-ethicist philosophers, and 167 professors in departments other than philosophy on eight
moral issues. On some issues we also had direct behavioral measures that we could compare with
the self-reports. Ethicists expressed somewhat more stringent normative attitudes on some issues,
such as vegetarianism and charitable donation. However, on no issue did ethicists show
significantly better behavior than the two comparison groups. Our findings on attitude-behavior
consistency were mixed. We discuss implications for several models of the relationship between
philosophical reflection and real-world moral behavior.

21
Cognitive Parallels Between Modal Judgment and Moral Judgment
Andrew Shtulman and Lester Tong
Does variation in the tendency to judge extraordinary actions permissible track variation in the
tendency to judge extraordinary events possible? We investigated this question in the context of a
speeded-reasoning task and found that participants’ modal judgments were predictive of their
moral judgments, even when controlling for disgust sensitivity. Moreover, both sets of judgments
were correlated with similar patterns of justification and response latency. These findings suggest
that modal and moral judgment are linked by a common inference strategy, with some individuals
focusing on why actions/events that do not occur could not occur and others focusing on how
those same actions/events could occur.

On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsuccessful Psychopaths

Katrina Sifferd and William Hirstein
Psychopaths have been deemed by some philosophers to be less criminally responsible than other
offenders because they lack personhood (Murphy 1972), rationality (Morse 2008), or certain
motivations for action or inaction (Roskies 2003). We argue that only some psychopaths should
be deemed less culpable due to diminished mental capacity. When one views the law’s rationality
requirement in terms of executive function of the brain, one can see the heterogeneous nature of
the group “psychopaths.” Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic
activity (Hare, Frazelle et al. 1978; Osumi, Shimazaki et al. 2007), reduced prefrontal grey matter
(Yang, Raine et al. 2005), and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful
psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function
that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals
(Ishikawa, Raine et al. 2001). Thus we claim that many unsuccessful psychopaths have a lack of
executive function that should at least partially excuse them from criminal culpability. However,
successful psychopaths may be fully culpable, because they possess the executive functions to
allow them to notice and correct for their criminal tendencies via rule-following. We will also
argue that current measures of executive activity are insensitive to the cognitive deficits of
successful psychopaths. Their increased executive function, we hypothesize, occurs in conflict
with, rather than in consonance with their increased autonomic activity. This produces a cognitive
style characterized by self-deception and articulate-sounding, but unsound reasoning.

Metaphysics for Toddlers: Young Children Distinguish Pretend Situations from Reality and
from Each Other
Deena Skolnick Weisberg, Alan M. Leslie (Presented by Sydney Levine)
One of the hallmarks of pretend play is that it is socially constructed: Access to any given
object’s pretend identity crucially depends on prior knowledge of that specific pretend situation.
Do young children understand this feature of pretense? Do they understand that pretense differs in
this respect from reality, where objects’ identities do not change based on the whims of those
using them? Using an eyetracker, the current study asks these questions of two- and three-year-
old children and answers both in the positive. Toddlers’ metaphysical and social-cognitive
abilities are thus far more sophisticated than previously suspected.

22
A Causal Model of Intentionality Judgment
Steven Sloman, Philip Fernbach, Scott Ewing and Andrew Lee
We propose a causal model theory to explain asymmetries in judgments
of the intentionality of a foreseen side effect that is either negative or positive (Knobe, 2003). The
theory is implemented as a Bayesian network relating types of mental states, actions, and
consequences that integrates previous hypotheses. It appeals to two inferential routes to judgment
about the intentionality of someone else’s action: bottom-up from action to desire and top-down
from character and disposition. Support for the theory comes from several experiments that test
various predictions of the model. The model fits intentionality judgments reasonably well with no
free parameters.

The Folk Conception of Knowledge

Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman
How do people decide which claims count as knowledge, and which are mere beliefs? We report
four experiments examining the effect of truth, justification, and “Gettiering” on knowledge
attributions. These experiments show that: 1) people attribute knowledge to others only when
their beliefs are both true and justified; 2) people attribute knowledge in Gettier situations; and 3)
knowledge is not attributed in one class of Gettier cases, but only because the agent’s belief is
based on “apparent” evidence. These findings reveal a major difference in the epistemic intuitions
of laypeople and philosophers.

Syntax and Intentionality: An Automatic Link Between Language and Theory-of-Mind

Brent Strickland, Matthew Fisher, Frank Keil & Joshua Knobe
Three experiments showed that when responding unreflectively or under time pressure,
participants had a systematic bias to consider grammatical subjects as acting more intentionally
than grammatical objects. When encouraged to think deeply about the meaning of the sentences,
this bias was eliminated. Control experiments rule out the possibility that these effects are due to
word order. Instead, they suggest a privileged relationship between syntax and central theory-of-
mind concepts. There are (at least) two ways of generating an intentionality judgment: (1) an
automatic bias to treat grammatical subjects as intentional (2) a deeper, more careful
consideration of a given event.

Do We Really Have the Concepts of Free Will and Responsibility?

Takayuki Suzuki, Koji Tsuchiya and Makoto Suzuki
To study our concepts of free will and moral responsibility, it is important to see how we judge
on free will and moral responsibility in ordinary cases. We presented participants with 14
scenarios asked 10 questions. By multiple regression analysis, we found that judgment on
intention is a good predictor for judgment on free will, while there is no single good predictor for
moral responsibility. We also found that there is an individual difference in predictors. These
results suggest our concepts of free will and moral responsibility have more complex nature than
we have thought.

Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic Reduction

Kari Theurer
Recently, some mechanists have embraced reductionism and some reductionists have endorsed
mechanism. However, the two camps disagree sharply about the extent to which mechanistic
explanation is a reductionistic enterprise. Reductionists maintain that cellular and molecular
mechanisms furnish sufficient explanations for mental phenomena. Mechanists deny this claim. I
argue that this dispute turns on whether reduction is a transitive relation. I show that it is.
Therefore, mechanistic explanations at the cellular and molecular level explain mental phe-
nomena directly. I make my case in part by noting that the relation between levels of mechanism

23
is one of composition. Compositional relations are transitive. In addition, they are explanatory. I
conclude that there are direct explanatory linkages from cellular and molecular mechanisms to
mental phenomena within a hierarchy of nested mechanisms.

Expert Intuition
Kevin Tobia
Recent experimental findings have demonstrated that in some cases ordinary people’s intuitions
are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of these intuitions. Some defend the use
of intuition as evidence in philosophy by arguing that philosophers are experts – that
philosophers’ intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. I
conducted three experiments indicating that while philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed
sometimes have different philosophical intuitions, the intuitions of both philosophers and non-
philosophers are affected by framing effects, text size effects and environmental variables. I argue
that this challenges the expertise defense of intuition.

Causal Learning from Fictional Stories: Chidlren’s Sensitivity to the Proximity Between
Real and Fictional Worlds
Caren Walker, Patricia Ganea and Alison Gopnik
Fictional information presents a unique challenge to the developing child. Children must learn
when it is appropriate to transfer information from the fictional space and what contextual cues
should be considered. Here we explore preschooler’s causal inferences about fictional
representations by examining their developing sensitivity to the proximity of the fictional world
to reality, and the effect of this judgment on their generalization of novel causal properties. By 3-
years of age, children are able to evaluate the data that they receive from fiction in order to
inform their generalization of novel story content.

The Human Stain: Concepts, Anthropic Kinds, and Realism

Daniel Weiskopf
Some concepts have the function of tracking mind-independent categories. Others have the
function of tracking categories defined by our own judgments and responses. I argue that aside
from these world-guided and response-dependent concepts there is also an important third
category that is in certain respects intermediate between them: anthropic concepts. Anthropic
concepts track categories that are mind-independent but also defined by their suitability for
various human interests, goals, and projects. Many concepts normally thought to be natural kind
concepts turn out to be anthropic on closer inspection; I discuss several examples drawn from the
chemical, mineral, and biological domains. Moreover, anthropic concepts also may function to
track genuine kinds in the world. I close by offering a defense of mild realism about these
anthropic kinds.

Disgust and Moral Knoweldge

Eric Wielenberg
Scientific investigation of the cognitive processes responsible for human moral beliefs has
yielded a growing body of evidence for the view that emotion and moral cognition are closely
linked, and that our emotions often influence our moral judgments. This is not a new idea. What
is new, however, is the existence of various detailed and empirically-grounded proposals about
which emotions are involved in moral judgment and the specific roles these emotions play in
generating such judgments.
A worry often associated with the idea that our emotions influence our moral beliefs is that
such influence is incompatible with moral knowledge. Some allege that if our moral beliefs are
products of emotion rather than reason, then such beliefs are not “perceptions of external truths”
but merely “projections of internal attitudes.” I examine this worry in connection with the

24
emotion of disgust. For those who worry about the impact of emotion on moral judgment, disgust
is a particularly troubling emotion, at least in part because it appears to have evolved to serve a
non-moral function and subsequently been co-opted into the moral domain. I first describe a
model of moral cognition (the Underlying Principles model) that I claim is plausible given the
presently available empirical evidence. I then show that when this model is combined with the
work of the ancient philosopher Aristotle and the contemporary philosopher Juan Comesana, the
resulting view implies that disgust-related moral cognition can generate moral knowledge. This
result suggests that the influence of the emotions on moral cognition does not inevitably exclude
moral knowledge.

Superagents
Jake Wright
In this paper, I offer an argument in favor of the existence of group minds, or superagents. This
argument is in response to a common line against superagents: to believe in them requires
dubious ontological commitments. I present an example of a group entity, clustered
supercomputers, that is typically accepted as its own ontologically distinct entity. From this, we
see a clear argument in favor of the group entity’s existence. This is followed by a parallel
argument concerning collectives and collective action. This parallel demonstrates that, rather than
require dubious ontological commitments, we have good reason to believe in superagents because
they allow us to explain otherwise inexplicable phenomena. The goal of this paper is to provide a
plausible account of superagency, a concept that has been dismissed too quickly in collective
action.

The Conflicted Self Does Not Cause Its Own Actions

Liane Young
People are typically perceived as causing their own actions, e.g., when she raises her hand, she is
perceived as the cause of that action. The present research reveals an exception to this rule: the
case of internal conflict. When a person’s fear (e.g., of a different race) or disgust (e.g., at a
different sexual orientation) leads her to act in a certain way, is the person herself judged as
causing the action? In Study 1, story protagonists who reject (versus endorse) the psychological
states (fear, disgust) that cause their actions are judged as not causing their own actions (racism,
homophobia). Study 2 shows this pattern extends to non-moral cases. Study 3 reveals this pattern
is not due to differences in the perceived strength of the attitude or psychological state. Study 4
demonstrates that the presence of internal conflict, between psychological states, is the key
determinant of these causal attributions; the conflicted self is afforded less causal efficacy. These
findings have broader impact on debates about free will and responsibility, and folk intuitions
about cognitive conflict (e.g., moral dilemmas) and implicit attitudes.

The Language of Thought and the Problem of Conceptualization

Chris Zarpentine
I raise a problem for Fodor’s version of the language of thought hypothesis involving
conceptualization: a computational process which takes nonconceptual representations as input
and yields conceptual representations as output. According to Fodor, computational processes are
sensitive only to syntactic features. However, he also claims that nonconceptual representations
are syntactically and semantically homogenous. But if there are no syntactic features for
computation to utilize in the process of conceptualization, how can conceptualization be a
computational process? I offer a diagnosis of this problem and conclude with a plea for greater
attention to conceptualization, especially in work on affective representations.

25
 Downtown Boulder Map
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Alpaca Connection - 1334 Pearl St. Yehti Arts & Crafts - 1727 Pearl St. poppy - 2098 Broadway Boulder Creek Quality Inn & Suites - 2020 Arapahoe MontBell - 1500 Pearl St. Lindsay’s Boulder Deli@Haagen Dazs - 1148 Pearl St. Art Cleaners, Inc. - 1715 15th St.
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GoLite - 1222 Pearl St. St Julien Hotel and Spa - 900 Walnut St. Amu Japanese Bistro - 1221 Spruce St. Starr’s Clothing & Shoe Company - 1630 Pearl St.
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Heads Up - 1300 Pearl St. ten20 Nail & Waxing Spa - 2005 Pearl St. Hapa Sushi Grill & Sake Bar - 1117 Pearl St. Two Sole Sisters - 1703 Pearl St.
First National Bank - 1155 Canyon Blvd. [Link] Designs Master Goldsmiths - 951 Pearl St. Brasserie Ten Ten - 1011 Walnut St.
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Holiday & Company - 943 Pearl St. Twig Salon & Spa - 1831 Pearl St. Kasa Japanese Grill & Bar - 1468 Pearl St.
Great Western Bank - 1900 9th St. Pennyweights - 1441 Pearl St. Jax Fish House - 928 Pearl St. Adventures within Reach - 1200 Pearl St., #60
Jackalope & Co. International - 1126 Pearl St. Voodoo Hair Lounge - 1537 Pearl St. Moongate Asia Bistro & Sushi Bar - 1628 Pearl St. Africa Travel Centre - 1405 Arapahoe Ave.
Guaranty Bank and Trust Company - 1375 Walnut St. Peter Rosen Jewelry Designer - 1600 Pearl St. Jill’s - 900 Walnut St.
Jovie - 2015 13th St. West End Salon - 949 Walnut St. Sherpa’s Adventurers - 825 Walnut St. The Kitchen - 1039 Pearl St. James TravelPoints - 1750 14th St.
Key Bank - 1911 Broadway Sol Stones - 1300 Pearl St.
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Lilli - 1646 Pearl St. Sushi Zanmai - 1221 Spruce St. L’Atelier - 1739 Pearl St.
Vectra Bank - 1700 Pearl St. Health / Fitness / Personal Care Swiss Chalet - 1642 Pearl St. Public Buildings
Lunieva - 1500 Pearl St. Zoe Ma Ma - 2010 10th St. Leaf Vegetarian Restaurant - 2010 16th St.
Wells Fargo - 1242 Pearl St. Acupuncture & Oriental Medicine- 840 Pearl St. Todd Reed - 2015 Pearl St. Boulder Chamber of Commerce - 2440 Pearl St.
MAX Clothing Store - 1177 Walnut St. Wells Fargo - 1420 Canyon Blvd. Mateo - 1837 Pearl St.
Barris Laser & Skin Care - 1966 13th St. Brewpubs Boulder Convention & Visitors Bureau - 2440 Pearl St.
MontBell - 1500 Pearl St. Liquor/ Markets/ Smoke Shops Mediterranean - 1002 Walnut St.
Books / Music / Video Bodywork Bistro - 1100 Spruce St. BJ’s Restaurant & Brewery - 1125 Pearl St. Boulder County Justice Center - 1777 6th St.
Old Tibet - 948 Pearl St. Alfalfa’s Market - 1651 Broadway OAK at Fourteenth - 1400 Pearl St.
Beat Book Shop - 1717 Pearl St. Define Defense - 1801 11th St. Mountain Sun Pub & Brewery - 1535 Pearl St. Boulder County Courthouse - 13th and Pearl St.
OM Time - 2035 Broadway Boulder Mart - 1713 Pearl St. Pearl Street Steak Room - 1035 Pearl St.
Boulder Book Store - 1107 Pearl St. Gaiam - 1215 Pearl St. Walnut Brewery - 1123 Walnut St. Carnegie Library - 1125 Pine St.
Patagonia - 1212 Pearl St. Buddha’s & Goudha’s Enlightened Smoke Shop - Q’s Restaurant - 2115 13th St.
Boulder Map Gallery - 1708 13th St. Global Chiropractic - 2023 17th St. Municipal Building - 1777 Broadway
Pitaya - 1211 A Pearl St. 2009 13th St. Casual Riff’s Urban Fare - 1115 Pearl St.
Boulder School of Music - 1320 Pearl St. Public Library - 11th & Arapahoe Ave.
poppy - 2098 Broadway Lush Cosmetics - 1312 Pearl St. Cured - 1825 Pearl St. Absinthe House - 1109 Walnut St. SALT Boulder Bistro - 1047 Pearl St.
Christian Science Reading Room - 1434 Pearl St. RTD Bus Station - 1800 14th St.
prAna- 1147 Pearl St. Massage Specialists - 1640 Broadway Green Piece Pipe & Hydro - 1200 Pearl St. Attic Bar & Bistro - 949 Walnut St.
Goodrich Violin Shop - 1045 Pearl St. Italian / Mediterranean / Pizza U.S. Post Office - 1905 15th St.
Silhouette - 2015 10th St. Om Time - 2035 Broadway Liquor Mart - 1750 15th St. Bitter Bar - 835 Walnut St.
Left Hand Books & Records - 1200 Pearl St. Antica Roma - 1308 Pearl St. YWCA - 2222 14th St.
The Ritz - 959 Walnut St. One Boulder Fitness - 1800 Broadway Lolita’s Market & Deli - 800 Pearl St. BJ’s Restaurant & Brewery - 1125 Pearl St.
Lighthouse Bookstore - 1201 Pearl St. Arabesque - 1634 Walnut St.
Savvy on Pearl - 1114 Pearl St. Pharmaca Integrative Pharmacy - 1647 Pearl St. Mile High Pipe & Tobacco - 1144 Pearl St. Boulder Café - 1247 Pearl St.
Parking Structures
Paul’s Music & Notary- 1321 Arapahoe Ave. Bacaro Venetian Taverna - 921 Pearl St.
Pilates Doctor - 1445 Pearl St. The General Store - 1407 Walnut St. 11th & Spruce
Starr’s Clothing & Shoe Company - 1630 Pearl St. Red Letter Secondhand Books - 1737 Pearl St. Cheesecake Factory - 1401 Pearl St.
West End Wine Shop - 777 Pearl St. Gondolier on Pearl - 1600 Pearl St. 10th & Walnut (St. Julien Hotel) 11th & Walnut
Tibet Gallery - 1916 13th St. Trident Booksellers & Café - 940 Pearl St. Rebecca’s Herbal Apothecary & Supply - 1227 Spruce St. Conor O’Neill’s Irish Pub & Restaurant - 1922 13th St. Nick-N-Willy’s Pizza - 801 Pearl St. 14th & Walnut (RTD Bus Station)15th & Pearl
Topo Ranch - 1505 Pearl St. Six Persimmons Apothecary - 840 Pearl St. Corner Bar - 2115 13th St.
Carts Night Spots / Bars Pasta Jay’s - 1001 Pearl St. 15th & Spruce
Tough Luck Cowboy - 2050 Broadway St Julien Hotel and Spa - 900 Walnut St. Crepes a la Cart - 2018 Broadway
Beans, Inc. - 1300 Pearl St. Absinthe House - 1109 Walnut St. Pastavino - 1043 Pearl St. One Boulder Plaza
Umba - 2043 Broadway Escondido Imports - 1400 Pearl St. Tonic Herban Lounge - 2011 10th St. Cuvee - 946 Pearl St.
Attic Bar & Bistro - 949 Walnut St. Pizza Colore - 1336 Pearl St. All parking structures are free Saturdays, Sundays &
Urban Outfitters - 934 Pearl St. Fast Eddie’s Hot Dogs - 1300 Pearl St. West End Wellness - 2019 10th St. Bacaro Venetian Taverna - 921 Pearl St. Foolish Craig’s Café - 1611 Pearl St. Holidays except One Boulder Plaza and 15th & Spruce
Pizzeria Locale - 1730 Pearl St.
Violette - 1631 Pearl St. Freddie’s Hot Dogs - 1100 Pearl St. Home / Kitchen / Garden Bitter Bar - 835 Walnut St. HBurger Co. - 1710 Pearl St. Trattoria on Pearl - 1430 Pearl St. Parking Lots
Volcom - 1223 Pearl St. Glacier Gelato & Sorbet - 1300 Pearl St. 3rd & Vine Design - 1815 Pearl St. Boulder Theater - 2032 14th St. The Kitchen [Next Door] - 1035 Pearl St.
Weekends - 1200 Pearl St. Mexican / Latin / South American Broadway & Spruce
Glacier Ice Cream - 1400 Pearl St. 8th & Pearl Antiques - 740 Pearl St. Catacombs - 2115 13th St. Lazy Dog Sports Bar & Grill- 1346 Pearl St. 14th & Canyon (by permit only weekdays)
Where the Buffalo Roam - 1320 Pearl St. Heads Up 1300 - Pearl St. Lucile’s Creole Café - 2124 14th St. Aji - 1601 Pearl St.
Bartlett Interiors - 2020 Pearl St. Centro Latin Kitchen & Refreshment Palace - 13th & Walnut
Arts / Crafts / Galleries McDevitt Taco Supply - 1300 Pearl St. 950 Pearl St. Mountain Sun Pub & Brewery - 1535 Pearl St. Centro - 950 Pearl St. Public Library - 11th & Arapahoe
Bayleaf on Pearl - 1222 Pearl St.
Pearl St. Grill - 1100 Pearl St. Conor O’Neill’s Irish Pub & Restaurant - 1922 13th St. Old Chicago - 1102 Pearl St. Chipotle Mexican Grill - 919 Pearl St. Municipal Building - 11th & Canyon
15th Street Studio - 1708 15th St. Bedell & Co. Fine Antiques & Estate Jewelry -
Sol Stones - 1300 Pearl St. Cuvee - 946 Pearl St. Illegal Pete’s - 1447 Pearl St.
Art & Soul Gallery - 1615 Pearl St. 767 Pearl St. Pearl St. Pub & Cellar - 1108 Pearl St. Produced By
Sun Spot - 1200 Pearl St. Johnny’s Cigar Bar - 1801 13th St. Rio Grande Mexican Restaurant - 1101 Walnut St.
Art Mart - 1326 Pearl St. Blue Skies - 1110 Pearl St. Reuben’s Burger Bistro - 1800 Broadway Downtown Boulder Business Improvement District
Sunshine Shave Ice - 1200 Pearl St. Lazy Dog Sports Bar & Grill - 1346 Pearl St. T|ACO - 1175 Walnut St.
Art Source International, Inc.- 1237 Pearl St. Boulder Furniture Arts - 1200 Pearl St. Shine Restaurant & Gathering Place - 2027 13th & City of Boulder Downtown/University Hill
Trek Light Gear - 1200 Pearl St. Mountain Sun Pub & Brewery - 1535 Pearl St. Tahona Tequila Bistro - 1035 Pearl St. Management Division-Parking Services
Bolder World - 2015 Broadway Chantique - 2020 11th St. Shooters Grill & Bar - 1801 13th St.
Boulder and Beyond Art Co-Op - 211 Pearl St. Churches Clutter - 1909 9th St. Nitro Club - 1124 Pearl St. Shug's Low Country Cuisine - 2017 13th St. Quick Service / Sandwiches
Boulder Arts & Crafts Gallery - 1421 Pearl St. First Baptist - 1237 Pine St. Design Within Reach - 2049 Broadway Pearl St. Pub & Cellar - 1108 Pearl St. Snooze, An A.M. Eatery - 1617 Pearl St. 15th St. Coffee - 1727 15th St.
Boulder Bazaar - 1500 Pearl St. First Congregational - 1128 Pine St. Round Midnight - 1005 Pearl St. Ted’s Montana Grill - 1701 Pearl St. Boulder Creek Market - 1801 13th St., #120
Eclectix - 935 Pearl St.
Boulder Map Gallery - 1708 13th St. First Presbyterian Church - 1820 15th St. Shooters Grill & Bar - 1801 13th St. The Kitchen - (Next Door) 1039 Pearl St. Chipotle Mexican Grill - 919 Pearl St.
Fabricate - 2023 17th St.
Boulder Museum of Contemporary Art - 1750 13th St. First United Methodist - 1421 Spruce St. Shug's Low Country Cuisine - 2017 13th St. The Rib House - 1801 13th St. Cured - 1825 Pearl St.
Gypsy Jewel - 820 Pearl St.
Boulder Nepal - 1330 Pearl St. Sacred Heart of Jesus Church - 1317 Mapleton St. Sundown Saloon - 1136 Pearl St. Walnut Brewery - 1123 Walnut St. Dish - 1918 Pearl St.
HW Design - 1913 Pearl St.
Color Me Mine - 1938 Pearl St. Shambhala Center - 1345 Spruce St. Tahona Tequila Bistro - 1035 Pearl St. West End Tavern - 926 Pearl St. Falafel King - 1314 Pearl St.
HW Home - 1941 Pearl St.
Crystal Galleries - 1302 Pearl St. St. John’s Episcopal Church - 1419 Pine St. Walrus Saloon - 1911 11th St. Fast Eddie’s Hot Dogs - 1300 Pearl St.
Trinity Lutheran - 2200 Broadway Mila Tibetan Carpets - 1711 Pearl St. West End Tavern - 926 Pearl St. Coffee / Tea / Desserts / Sweets
Earthwood Gallery - 1412 Pearl St. Freddie’s Hot Dogs - 1100 Pearl St.
Momentum - 1625 Pearl St. Amante Coffee - 1035 Walnut St.
Little Buddha Imports - 1320 Pearl St. Gifts / Stationery / Toys Il Caffe - 1720 Pearl St.
Oliverde - 2027 Broadway Optical Atlas Purveyors - 1505 Pearl
Momentum - 1625 Pearl St. Art Mart - 1326 Pearl St. Illegal Pete’s - 1447 Pearl St.
Now & Zen - 1638 Pearl St. EnVision Boulder - 1011 Pearl St. Ben & Jerry’s Scoop Shop - 1203 Pearl St.
Nomad Designs Beads & Folk Art - 1909 9th St. Bliss - 1643 Pearl St. Lindsay’s Boulder Deli @ Haagen Dazs - 1148 Pearl St.
Penzeys Spices - 1219 Pearl St. Sun Spot - 1200 Pearl Boulder Baked - 1911 Broadway
Old Tibet - 948 Pearl St. Blue Skies - 1110 Pearl St. Lolita’s Market & Deli - 800 Pearl St.
Peppercorn - 1235 Pearl St. Zeal Optics - 1230 Spruce St. Boulder Dushanbe Tea House - 1770 13th St.
Posh - 1468 Pearl St. Bolder World - 2015 Broadway Pita Pit - 1509 Arapahoe Avenue
PosterScene - 1505 Pearl St. Boulderado Emporium Gift Shop - 2115 13th St. Red Pepper Kitchen & Bath - 726 Pearl St. Outdoor & Sporting Goods Boxcar Coffee Roasters - 1825 Pearl St. Salvaggio’s Deli - 1397 Pearl St.
Rembrandt Yard Event Center & Art Gallery - Crystal Galleries - 1302 Pearl St. Savory Spice Shop - 2041 Broadway Boulder Army Store - 1545 Pearl St. Brewing Market Coffee - 1918 13th St. The Cup Espresso Café - 1521 Pearl St.
1301 Spruce St. Fiji - 1345 Spruce St. Studio 3 - 1719 15th St. Full Cycle - 1795 Pearl St. Il Caffe - 1720 Pearl St. Two Spoons - 1021 Pearl St.
303-449-3774
Sambala Arts & Crafts - 1521 Pearl St. Into the Wind - 1408 Pearl St. Top Hat Janitorial Supply - 1729 Pearl St. GoLite - 1222 Pearl St. Glacier Ice Cream - 1400 Pearl St. Unseen Bean - 2052 Broadway [Link]
Smith-Klein Gallery - 1116 Pearl St. Ku Cha House of Tea - 1141 Pearl St. Trek Light Gear - 1200 Pearl St. Gunsport - 1707 14th Kh Cha House of Tea - 1141 Pearl St. Woody Creek Bakery - 1207 Pearl St.
Sweet Bird Studio - 2017 17th St. Momentum - 1625 Pearl St. West End Gardener - 777 Pearl St. High Point Swim and Sport - 1738 Pearl St. Laughing Goat - 1709 Pearl St. Yellow Deli - 908 Pearl St.
1942 Broadway Suite 301
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13TH ST.

46 15 2
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92
UNIVERSITY AVE.
Varsity Lake 89
STADIUM DR.
19 36 Main Campus

MACKY DR.
58 65 126 39
62

FOLSOM ST.
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University Buildings 13. Children’s Center at Smiley Court (L-2) (SMCC) 28. Environmental Design (G-7) (ENVD)
1. Administrative and Research Center—East Campus 14. Computing Center (J-3) (COMP) 29. Environmental Health and Safety Center (H-13)
(J-2) (ARCE) 15. Continuing Education and Professional Studies (D-4) (EHSC)
2. Armory (D-4) (ARMR) (CEDU) 30. Euclid Avenue AutoPark (G-6) (EPRK)
3. ATLAS Building (Alliance for Technology, Learning, 16. Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental 31. Fiske Planetarium and Science Center (J-10) (FISK)
and Society) (G-6) (ATLS) Sciences (F-5) (CIRE) 32. Fleming Building (K-10) (FLMG)
4. Balch Fieldhouse (E-7) (FH) 17. Coors Events/Conference Center (I-12) (EVNT) 33. Folsom Stadium (E-8) (STAD)
5. Benson Earth Sciences (F-9) (BESC) 18. Cristol Chemistry and Biochemistry (G-5) (CHEM) 34. Gamow Tower (F-7) (DUAN)
6. Biotechnology Building (Jennie Smoly Caruthers 19. Dal Ward Athletic Center (D-8) (DALW) 35. Gates Woodruff Women’s Studies Cottage (F-3)
Biotechnology)(L-2) (BIOT) 20. Denison Arts and Sciences (G-4) (DEN) (COTT)
* Bruce Curtis Building. See Museum Collections. 21. Discovery Learning Center (F-11) (DLC) 36. Grounds and Service Center (D-9) (GRNS)
7. Business, Leeds School of (H-10). See Koelbel * Drescher Undergraduate Engineering. (G-11) See 37. Guggenheim Geography (F-3) (GUGG)
Building. Integrated Teaching and Learning Laboratory. 38. Hale Science (E-3) (HALE)
8. Carlson Gymnasium (E-7) (CARL) * Duane Physical Laboratories (F-7). See Duane 39. Health Physics Laboratory (D-9) (HPHY)
9. Center for Astrophysics and Space Astronomy (L-3) Physics and Astrophysics, Gamow Tower, Laboratory 40. Hellems Arts and Sciences/Mary Rippon Theatre
(CASA) for Atmospheric and Space Physics, and JILA. (G-4) (HLMS)
10. Center for Community (I-9) (C4C) 22. Duane Physics and Astrophysics (F-7) (DUAN) * Henderson Building (G-4). See Museum of Natural
11. Clare Small Arts and Sciences (D-6) (CLRE) 23. Eaton Humanities Building (E-5) (HUMN) History.
* Charlotte York Irey Studios (F-4). See University 24. Economics (F-3) (ECON) 41. Housing System Maintenance Center (K-3) (HSMC)
Theatre. 25. Education (G-4) (EDUC) 42. Housing System Service Center (J-2) (HSSC)
12. Children’s Center—Main Offices (A-9) (DACR) 26. Ekeley Sciences (F-5) (EKLC) 43. Imig Music (H-7) (MUS)
27. Engineering Center (F/G-10/11) (EC) 44. Institute for Behavioral Genetics (K-1) (IBG)
continued on back
continued from front

45. Institute of Behavioral Science (C-3) (IBS) 70. Nuclear Physics Laboratory (K-2) (NPL) University Housing
46. IBS No. 1 (D-3) (IBS1) 71. Old Main (E-4) (MAIN) 102. Aden Hall—Quadrangle (G-9) (ADEN)
47. IBS No. 2 (C-2) (IBS2) 72. Page Foundation Center (D-3) (PFDC) 103. Andrews Hall—Kittredge Complex (J-11) (ANDS)
48. IBS No. 3 (D-2) (IBS3) 73. Police and Parking Services (G-12) (PDPS) 104. Arnett Hall—Kittredge Complex (J-12) (ARNT)
49. IBS No. 4 (D-2) (IBS4) 74. Porter Biosciences (E-7) (PORT) 105. Athens Court (B/C-6/7) (ATCT)
50. IBS No. 5 (D-4) (IBS5) 75. Power House (F-6) (POWR) 106. Athens North Hall (B-6) (ATHN)
51. IBS No. 6 (C-2) (IBS6) 76. Ramaley Biology (E-6) (RAMY) 107. Baker Hall (G-7) (BKER)
52. IBS No. 7 (C-2) (IBS7) 77. Regent Administrative Center (I-8) (RGNT) 108. Bear Creek Apartments—Williams Village (L-6)
53. IBS No. 8 (C-3) (IBS8) 78. Regent Drive AutoPark (G-12) (RPRK) (BCAP)
54. Integrated Teaching and Learning Laboratory (G-11) 79. Research Laboratory, Rose Litman RL1 (J-1) (LITR) 109. Brackett Hall—Quadrangle (G-9) (BRKT)
(ITLL) 80. Research Laboratory (K-1) (RL2) 110. Buckingham Hall—Kittredge Complex (K-12) (BUCK)
55. International English Center (G-2) (IEC) 81. Research Laboratory, Life Science RL4 (K-1) (LSRL) 111. Cheyenne Arapaho Hall (H-7) (CHEY)
56. JILA (G-7) (JILA) 82. Research Laboratory, RL6 (Marine Street Science 112. Cockerell Hall—Quadrangle (G-10) (CKRL)
* Jennie Smoly Caruthers Biotechnology. See Center) (J-2) (MSSC) 113. College Inn Hall (B-5) (CICC)
Biotechnology. 83. Research Park Advanced Technologies Center (L-4) 114. Crosman Hall—Quadrangle (G-10) (CROS)
57. Ketchum Arts and Sciences (F-6) (KTCH) (USW) 115. Darley Commons—Williams Village (L-6) (DLYC)
* Koelbel Building (H-10) (KOBL). See Leeds School of 84. Research Park Greenhouse (K-1) (GH-3) 116. Darley Towers—Williams Village (K-5) (DLYT)
Business. 85. Sommers-Bausch Observatory (I-11) (OBSV) 117. Faculty Staff Court (C-5/6) (FACT)
58. Koenig Alumni Center (E-2) (ALUM) 86. Speech, Language, and Hearing Sciences (I-11) 118. Farrand Hall (H-9) (FRND)
59. Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics (F-7) (SLHS) 119. Hallett Hall (H-9) (HLET)
(LASP) 87. Stadium Building (E-8) (STAD) 120. Kittredge Commons—Kittredge Complex (J-10)
60. LASP Space Technology Research Center (L-3) 88. Stadium Ticket Building (F-9) (STTB) (KITT)
(LSTR) 89. Student Recreation Center (D-6/7) (REC) * Kittredge Complex. See Kittredge Commons,
61. Lesser House (F-11) (LESS) 90. Sybase (K-3) (SYBS) Andrews, Arnett, Buckingham, Kittredge West, and
* Life Sciences Laboratories Complex (E-7). See 91. Telecommunications Building (G-6) (TCOM) Smith Halls.
Muenzinger Psychology, Porter Biosciences, and 92. Temporary Building No.1 (D-6) (TB01) 121. Kittredge West Hall—Kittredge Complex (J-10)
Ramaley Biology. 93. Transportation Center (J-2) (TRAN) (KITW)
62. Macky Auditorium (D-4) (MCKY) 94. University Administrative Center and Annex (I-7) 122. Libby Hall (G-8) (LIBY)
63. Mathematics Building (F-10) (MATH) (UCTR) 123. Marine Court (B-7) (MRCT)
64. MCD Biology (E-7) (MCDB) 95. University Club (H-6) (CLUB) 124. Newton Court (B/C-9/10) (NTCT)
65. McKenna Languages (E-4) (MKNA) 96. University Memorial Center (G-5) (UMC) * Quadrangle (Engineering Quadrangle). See Aden,
66. Muenzinger Psychology (E-7) (MUEN) 97. University Theatre (including Charlotte York Irey Brackett, Cockerell, and Crosman Halls.
67. Museum Collections (Bruce Curtis Building) (G-3) Studios) (F-4) (THTR) 125. Reed Hall (H-10) (REED)
(MCOL) 98. Visual Arts Complex (G-6) (VAC) 126. Sewall Hall (D-5) (SWLL)
68. Museum of Natural History, University of Colorado 99. Wardenburg Health Center (H-7) (WARD) 127. Smiley Court (L-1) (SMCT)
(G-4) (HEND) 100. Woodbury Arts and Sciences (E-5) (WDBY) 128. Smith Hall—Kittredge Complex (K-11) (SMTH)
69. Norlin Library (E-6) (LIBR) 101. Wolf Law Building (L-12) (WLFL) 129. Stearns Towers—Williams Village (K-6) (STRN)
130. Willard Hall—South Wing (H-8) (WLRD)
* Williams Village. See Bear Creek Apartments, Darley
Commons, Darley Towers, and Stearns Towers.
131. Williams Village II— (K-6) (WV2)
 THU FRI SAT
Coffee Coffee Coffee
8:30 AM Invited Invited Invited
8:45 AM Speaker Speaker Speaker
9:00 AM S. Schneider T. Horgan S. Thompson-Schill
9:15 AM
9:30 AM
9:45 AM
10:00 AM Contributed Contributed Contributed
10:15 AM Sessions Sessions Sessions
10:30 AM 1&2 3&4 5&6
10:45 AM
11:00 AM
11:15 AM
11:30 AM
11:45 AM
12:00 PM
12:15 PM
12:30 PM
12:45 PM
1:00 PM Lunch Lunch Lunch
1:15 PM
1:30 PM Exec Comm Business
1:45 PM Meeting Meeting
2:00 PM
2:15 PM Cutting Edge Cutting Edge Cutting Edge
2:30 PM Sessions Sessions Sessions
2:45 PM
3:00 PM 1&2 3, 4, & 5 6&7
3:15 PM
3:30 PM Symposium Presidential
3:45 PM D. Shohamy Address
4:00 PM Stanton N. Daw
4:15 PM Lecture T. Gendler B. Scholl
4:30 PM J. Greene
4:45 PM
5:00 PM Symposium
5:15 PM Poster P. Todd
5:30 PM Madness A. Goldman
5:45 PM M. Bishop
6:00 PM
6:15 PM
6:30 PM Poster Poster
6:45 PM Session 1 Session 1
7:00 PM & &
7:15 PM Reception Reception
7:30 PM
7:45 PM
8:00 PM

30