0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views11 pages

Free Speech and Legal Boundaries in India

Uploaded by

saswatagupta2005
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views11 pages

Free Speech and Legal Boundaries in India

Uploaded by

saswatagupta2005
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

I.

Nature and Scope of Free Speech

Freedom of speech and expression is one of the most essential attributes of a


liberal constitutional democracy. It is foundational to individual autonomy,
democratic dialogue, artistic expression, and political accountability. Enshrined
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, this right guarantees every
citizen the liberty to express opinions through various forms—spoken word,
writing, visual media, satire, or symbolic acts. This right is not a mere political
privilege but a fundamental entitlement essential to the development of a healthy,
participatory society.

However, freedom of speech in India is not absolute. The Constitution, through


Article 19(2), permits the imposition of “reasonable restrictions” on the exercise
of this right in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security
of the State, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation,
incitement to an offence, and friendly relations with foreign States. These
restrictions must be justified as necessary in a democratic society and must satisfy
the test of proportionality, as developed in constitutional jurisprudence.

II. Constitutional Backing and Judicial Exceptions

The Supreme Court of India has developed definitive jurisprudence delineating


the scope and boundaries of free speech. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
(2015) 5 SCC 1, the Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, 2000 as
unconstitutional, holding that it infringed the right to free speech by being vague,
arbitrary, and overbroad. The Court observed that only speech which amounts to
incitement to imminent lawless action or a clear and present danger to
public order can be constitutionally curtailed. Mere annoyance, distaste, or
subjective offence does not empower the State to criminalize expression.

In Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257, the Court refined
the test of obscenity by replacing the Victorian-era Hicklin Test with the more
evolved “contemporary community standards” test. Under this approach, the
determination of obscenity must be based on the overall context, intent, artistic or
social value, and the sensibility of the target audience. Obscenity is not to be
deduced from isolated phrases or out-of-context snippets. The Court rightly noted
that vulgarity does not automatically equate to obscenity, and that expression
may offend without being criminal.

Further, in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1, the Court dealt
with the boundaries between offensive and hateful speech. While reiterating that
offensive speech is protected under Article 19(1)(a), it recognised that speech
which vilifies, dehumanises, or incites discrimination against vulnerable
communities can be restricted to protect the constitutional guarantee of dignity
under Article 21. The ruling introduced a “dignitarian” lens to free speech
analysis—emphasising that liberty cannot become a shield for hate, and that
speech cannot be allowed to systematically marginalise groups.

III. Ranveer Allahbadia and “India’s Got Latent”

The ongoing matter of Ranveer Allahbadia v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No.
83/2025, offers a live illustration of the doctrinal tensions between speech,
accountability, and the role of public morality. The controversy arose after the
release of an episode of the YouTube show “India’s Got Latent,” where
comedians engaged in roast-style humour that included sexual innuendos,
ableist comments, and gender-based satire. The video quickly went viral,
eliciting both praise and backlash. FIRs were registered across multiple
jurisdictions alleging violations of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, the Indecent
Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, and Section 67 of the IT Act.

In its 18 February 2025 order, the Supreme Court issued a stern criticism of the
episode, remarking:

“Your client has vomited filth under the guise of comedy… This is not comedy; it
reflects a filthy and dirty mind.”

However, despite this strong moral disapproval, the Court granted interim
protection from arrest, invoking the procedural fairness laid down in T.T.
Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181, where it was held that multiple
FIRs on the same incident are impermissible. The Court also stayed further
criminal proceedings based on the same factual matrix, thereby preventing the
abuse of legal process through forum shopping.

In its 3 March 2025 order, the Court took cognisance of the petitioner’s
compliance with prior directions and the socio-economic consequences of a
blanket broadcast ban, noting:

“Directions are modified primarily keeping in view the fact that livelihood of
around 280 employees is likely to be affected.”

This reasoning reflects a judicial application of the Doctrine of Proportionality,


whereby restrictions on fundamental rights must not only pursue a legitimate aim
but must also be the least intrusive means available.

In the 21 April 2025 hearing, the Court further noted that the petitioner had
complied with earlier directions and had not re-uploaded the removed content.
This demonstrated a form of corrective compliance, consistent with the
rehabilitative rather than punitive ethos of Indian constitutional law.

The proposition also involves:

• The registration of multiple FIRs for a single comedic video;

• Accusations of indecency, vulgarity, and derogatory commentary;

• Digital creators invoking satire and freedom of speech;

• Petitions seeking protection from arrest and procedural consolidation.


IV. Legal Doctrines

Doctrine of Proportionality: As affirmed in Modern Dental College v. State of


Madhya Pradesh and K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, this doctrine
requires that any restriction on fundamental rights must be necessary, suitable,
and the least restrictive alternative. In the Allahbadia case, blanket censorship or
arrest would violate this principle, especially considering that the petitioner
removed the content, issued clarifications, and pledged not to repeat similar
conduct.

Aveek Sarkar Obscenity Test: Applying the standard from Aveek Sarkar, the
content of “India’s Got Latent” though undeniably vulgar-was targeted at an adult
audience, carried content warnings, and was structured as roast comedy. The
context, the genre, and the digital medium must be considered before labelling
the speech as legally obscene. A mere use of sexual or dark humour does not, per
se, amount to criminal obscenity.

T.T. Antony FIR Multiplicity Doctrine: The registration of FIRs across


different states on the same episode constitutes procedural harassment and
violates the principle of fairness articulated in T.T. Antony. The Supreme Court
was right in staying further FIRs to prevent a chilling effect on digital creators
through multiplicative litigation.

Amish Devgan and the Dignity Principle: The Court in Amish Devgan
cautioned that speech, while protected, must not cross into targeted vilification of
protected classes. While the Allahbadia case involves crass humour, it is arguable
whether the content rises to the level of hate speech. The Court’s balanced
approach condemning the tone but preserving liberty demonstrates the application
of Amish Devgan in a contextual, not mechanical, manner.
The case of Ranveer Allahbadia v. Union of India, W.P. (Crl.) No. 83/2025,
presents a mangled intersection of free speech, digital influence, social morality,
and legal restraint. Originating from the controversial episode of "India's Got
Latent," the case has attracted national attention, leading to multiple FIRs across
jurisdictions and three landmark interim orders by the Supreme Court of India
(dated 18 February, 3 March, and 21 April 2025). This argument critically
analyses the merits and demerits of Allahbadia's case by engaging with applicable
constitutional provisions, statutory law, and binding precedents such as Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, Amish Devgan v.
Union of India, and Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal.

Argument in Favour of Ranveer


The foundational defense of Allahbadia rests upon the protection guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) - [(1) All citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of
speech and expression] of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, in
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India [(2015) 5 SCC 1], struck down Section 66A of
the IT Act on the ground that vague and overbroad laws irrevocably, chill free
speech. The Court emphasized that only speech that incites imminent lawless
action or constitutes a clear and present danger to public order can be
constitutionally restricted. Applying this reasoning, Allahbadia's allegedly
offensive content does not meet the threshold of incitement or public disorder.

Importantly, the Supreme Court, despite expressing personal disapproval of the


content, granted interim protection from arrest (Order dated 18 February 2025)
and stayed the registration of further FIRs. The bench held:

"We deem it appropriate to stay arrest... No further FIR shall be registered


against the petitioner on the basis of the episode aired."

This aligns with the ratio in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181],
where the Court held that multiple FIRs on the same incident are procedurally
impermissible and amount to an abuse of process.
Further, the Supreme Court in its 3 March 2025 order modified its prior
restriction on airing content, taking into consideration that the ban affected over
280 employees of the creator's media house. The Court stated:

"Directions are modified primarily keeping in view the fact that livelihood of
around 280 employees is likely to be affected."

Constitutional freedoms must be balanced but not sacrificed entirely for public
sensitivity.

In defending the intent behind the show, comedian Samay Raina publicly stated
that the show was created as a platform for spontaneous, unscripted humor among
friends, drawing inspiration from global formats like the UK’s "Mock the Week"
and "Taskmaster." Raina noted in interviews that the show was "never meant to
hurt or target" anyone but was rather "an experiment in authentic, uncensored
Indian improv comedy." The show garnered massive online support, with several
episodes trending on YouTube and viewers hailing it as "India finally getting its
own version of edgy late-night satire."

Due to this show many talents had a platform to showcase their forte and even
many have an existing show of their own. Furthermore, this show has created
more employment than any other show has ever done - especially in the field of
humour an comedy.

Such public reception indicates that the content resonated with a large section of
the audience, thereby invoking the democratic value of pluralism in taste and
expression. Penalizing such content risks creating a precedent of moral
censorship, especially when no legal standard of obscenity, as clearly articulated
in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [(2014) 4 SCC 257], has been met.

In Aveek Sarkar, the Supreme Court departed from the archaic Hicklin test and
adopted the contemporary community standards test to judge obscenity. The
Court held:
“A picture or article, even if it involves nudity, is not obscene per se unless it has
a tendency to arouse sexual thoughts or is intended to deprave and corrupt the
minds of the audience.”

The Court emphasized that the focus must be on the work as a whole and in
context, not on isolated words or visuals. In Allahbadia’s case, the allegedly
objectionable jokes must be examined in the entirety of the comedic episode and
format. They may have been crude, but their primary aim was humor, not sexual
arousal or moral corruption. Therefore, under the contemporary standards
doctrine, the threshold for criminal obscenity has not been crossed.

Even if the show hurt sentiments of what one would call a minor section of the
public, it is crucial to reiterte the fact that the later episodes were uploaded under
the yt membership scheme - which one has to pay for. This entails that the public
who hates the show so much so that there was a ‘public outrage’ in the the name
of demeaning women and morality, had to pay to watch the content which again
entails that they are willing to ignore the disclaimer provided in the video -
making them susceptible to such ‘harsh and filty’ content, well one can choose to
just not watch. It’s a free country of course.

V. Conclusion

In evaluating whether content is offensive, obscene, or worthy of


censorship, context is everything. But so is consistency.
What is deemed “cool,” “progressive,” or “dark humour” in
English media becomes “vulgar,” “filthy,” or “crass” when
translated into Indian languages-particularly Hindi or Bhojpuri.
This linguistic hypocrisy is neither culturally honest nor
constitutionally sustainable.

Take for example Hollywood cinema, which regularly


showcases nudity, swearing, sex jokes, drug use, and
violent satire in films rated PG-13 or above. Classics such as
Pulp Fiction, The Wolf of Wall Street, Deadpool, and The
Hangover glorify profanity, dark humour, sexual innuendos, and
exaggerated masculine vulgarity. Yet, these movies are
consumed, celebrated, and quoted in India without moral
panic. Their content is praised as “raw,” “real,” “brutally
honest,” and “part of pop culture.”

By contrast, when a Hindi-speaking comedian or content


creator attempts similar satire-even with disclaimers, digital
classification, and an adult audience-the content is met with
FIRs, hashtags, and calls for arrest. The same viewers who
quote “Say what again!” from Pulp Fiction with pride are
offended by a Hindi joke on bodily functions. This inconsistency
does not reflect changing community standards-it reflects
selective elitism.

Moreover, Bollywood and Bhojpuri cinema, especially during


the 70s–90s era, have historically depicted sexually explicit
lyrics, item numbers, and gendered tropes far more degrading
than anything in India’s Got Latent. Yet these films were
considered “mainstream.” Songs like “Choli ke peeche kya hai”,
“Saat Samundar Paar”, and innumerable Bhojpuri tracks from
the early 2000s routinely objectify women, trivialize consent,
and glorify stalking. Where was the outrage then?

What we are witnessing now is not moral concern it is


performative morality, driven by algorithmic outrage. In an
era where virality determines visibility, many individuals and
institutions rush to condemn content not because they are
harmed by it, but because they wish to be seen
condemning it. To be part of a moral tribe is easier than being
left behind. It gives a sense of belonging, relevance, and most
importantly, control.
This digital witch-hunting fuelled by screenshot journalism,
curated headlines, and out-of-context clips is not about the
law, nor about dignity. It’s about attention. And in this race
for performative opinion, creators become collateral damage.

Under the Aveek Sarkar test, obscenity must be judged based


on contemporary community standards, and must possess a
tendency to deprave or corrupt. But who defines these
standards? If the same audience celebrates Hollywood dark
comedies full of swearing and nudity, then condemns Hindi
satire for a roast joke-can we say their moral compass is
consistent? Clearly not.

Article 19(1)(a) does not exist to protect agreeable or “well-


spoken” content. It exists precisely to protect speech that is
provocative, unsettling, and culturally uncomfortable, as
long as it doesn’t cross into incitement or harm. And in the
present case, the content in India’s Got Latent—however vulgar,
does not incite violence, does not spread hate, and does
not cause public disorder.

The worst that can be said is that the show made some people
uncomfortable. But discomfort is not a constitutional ground
for criminal prosecution. As held in Shreya Singhal, mere
annoyance or offensiveness cannot justify a restriction on
speech unless the speech poses a real threat to public order or
dignity.

Ultimately, if the only crime the show committed was being


irreverent in Hindi, then the real problem is not the content, it is
our internalised colonial morality, where English cursing is
cool but Hindi slang is criminal. It is our inability to hold a mirror
to our culture without flinching.
The law cannot protect sentiments at the cost of liberty. Nor can
it be used to validate performative outrage from individuals who,
in truth, were never harmed-but simply wanted to be seen
having an opinion.

If every piece of art, humour, or commentary is to be subject to


the most sensitive viewer, then the only way forward is to
abolish all forms of media books, films, poetry, even public
conversation. Because someone, somewhere, will always find
offence in something.
But that is not the mandate of our Constitution. The Constitution
of India is not a document of comfort it is a charter for freedom.

In Shreya Singhal, this Hon’ble Court made it clear: the freedom


to speak includes the freedom to offend, shock, or disturb. If
the price of living in a plural society is that we must occasionally
be made uncomfortable, then that discomfort is the cost of
liberty—not its contradiction.

A nation cannot become so fragile that roast comedy warrants


FIRs, but violent misogyny in mainstream cinema is tolerated. A
nation cannot mute every unscripted voice just because it
doesn’t speak like the elite, or choose a different language for its
dissent.

This is not a slippery slope; it is a cliff. Once the standard


becomes “who is offended,” there is no objective test left. We
cannot function on the subjective hypersensitivity of the angriest
viewer. The law is based on threshold, not feelings. On
incitement, not insult.

Either ban all media entirely- abolish Hollywood, censor


Bollywood, take down Shakespeare, ban Bhagat Singh's slogans
OR let people keep their outrage to themselves. That is the
only fair, legal, and constitutional position to take.
Because the moment feelings become law, there is no law left,
only tyranny dressed up as morality.

You might also like