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Introduction to Logic and Reasoning

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52 views84 pages

Introduction to Logic and Reasoning

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jaypushpchouhan
Copyright
© All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

COURSE INTRODUCTION

Logic is the systematic study of the general structures of sound reasoning and valid arguments;
the study of the methods and principles used for right reasoning. The proper study of logic will
enable the student to reason well and to pay due attention to the analysis of fallacies and natural
mistakes in reasoning. The study of logic gives the students techniques and methods for testing
the correctness of different kinds of reasoning. Logic will provide us with criteria to correct
reasoning with which we can test arguments for their correctness. Systematic study of arguments
has its origins in several ancient civilizations in ancient India, China and Greece. In the
development of Western logic we see Aristotle systematizing it as examining the general forms
of arguments with distinguishing them between valid and invalid. This course on Logic deals
with all the aspects of classical and modern logic as found in the Western tradition.

Block 1 gives a brief picture of the concerns of the traditional and classical logic as it emerged
from the Aristotelian period onwards. The basic understanding of terms, propositions and
syllogisms with figures and moods enables the students of philosophy to dwell in the realm of
right reasoning and validity and invalidity of argumentation.

Block 2 is concerned with the sentential Logic as in the Modern Logic. It brings home to the
students the importance of argument forms in Modern Logic as it is clear that arguments are
different from argument forms.

Block 3 brings home to the students the methods of proving validity of an argument using
different procedures and rules that are employed in sentential logic. The block elaborates on the
proving validity using rules of inference in the first unit. In the next, attempt is made to give an
idea about conditional proof, by giving definition, importance, and principles of this method. We
then proceed to have an essential understanding of Indirect Proof and the principles used in this
method. Finally, an idea about proving invalidity is given.

Block 4 is dedicated for Predicate Logic dealing with Quantifiers, Rules of Instantiation and
Generalization, Proof of validity and Proving Invalidity. It deals with the basic understanding of
predicate logic with the usage of quantifiers to symbolize the proposition. By doing so the
students would be able to progress their reasoning aptitude by identifying the internal structure of
the proposition. The proof of validity and proving the invalidity in predicate logic are well
covered in this block. Finally, the application part of symbolic logic in terms of digital logic in
the contemporary world brings home the practical use of logic.

1
Indira Gandhi National Open University MPYE – 001
School of Interdisciplinary and
Trans-disciplinary Studies Logic

Block 1

CLASSICAL LOGIC

UNIT 1
Types of Categorical Propositions A,E,I,O and Square of Opposition

UNIT 2
Categorical Syllogism

UNIT 3
Figure, Mood and the Possible Types of Syllogisms

UNIT 4
Validity, Invalidity and List of Valid Syllogisms

1
Expert Committee
Dr. Jose Kuruvachira
Prof. Gracious Thomas Salesian College &
Director, School of IGNOU Study Centre
Social Work Dimapur, Nagaland
IGNOU

Prof. Renu Bharadwaj


School of Humanities Dr. Sathya Sundar
IGNOU Sethy
Dept of Humanities
Prof. George IIT, Chennai.
Panthanmackel,
Senior Consultant, Dr. Joseph Martis
IGNOU St. Joseph’s College
Jeppu, Mangalore – 2
Dr. M. R. Nandan
Govt. College for Dr. Jaswinder Kaur
Women Dhillon
Mandya - Mysore 147, Kabir park
Opp. GND University
Dr. Kuruvila Amristar – 143 002
Pandikattu
Jnana-deepa Prof. Y.S. Gowramma
Vidyapeeth Principal,
Ramwadi, College of Fine Arts,
Pune Manasagangotri
Mysore – 570 001

Dr Babu Joseph
CBCI Centre
New Delhi

Prof. Tasadduq Husain


Aligarh Muslim
University
Aligarh

Dr. Bhuvaneswari
Lavanya Flats
Gangai Amman Koil
St.
Thiruvanmiyur
Chennai – 600 041

Dr. Alok Nag


Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul
Varanasi

2
Block Preparation

Units 1-4 Dr. Kuruvilla Pandikattu


Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth,
Pune – 14.

Content Editors
Dr. V. John Peter
IGNOU, New Delhi.
&
Dr. M.R. Nandan
Mysore.

Format Editor
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

Programme Coordinator
Prof. Gracious Thomas
IGNOU, New Delhi.

3
BLOCK INTRODUCTION

Logic as a tool for distinguishing between the true and the false, as said by Averroes, examines
the general forms which arguments may take, which forms are valid, and which are invalid. An
argument is made up of a certain number of propositions. And a proposition is made up of
obviously of a certain number of words. So we have to start our analysis of the formal structure
of an argument by an analysis of the smallest unit of an argument, ‘term’ and proceed to examine
‘propositions,’ and structure of arguments.

By ‘inference’ is meant that operation of reason by which from some known truth we arrive at
another truth. Everyday experience teaches us that it is the way man learns and that is the way
man argues for or against his beliefs and convictions. In mediate inference, deduction and
induction are used very well. Deduction is when from a more general truth one arrives at a more
particular fact. Induction is when from particular facts one arrives at a general truth. Logically
speaking ‘deduction’ and ‘induction’ differ considerably. Study of different kinds of syllogisms
is so crucial for finding the validity of an argument.

Unit 1 introduces the students to the basics of categorical propositions. This unit has introduced
us to terms, propositions, categorical propositions and Aristotle’s square of oppositions.

Unit 2 dwells on the central discussion of Logic, namely inference. Reasoning in a right way is
the focal point of Logic. Explaining the significance of inference in logic and in life, the unit
introduces the students to the basics of categorical syllogism, along with various kinds of
syllogisms.

Unit 3 deals with figures, mood and types of syllogisms. The epistemological assumptions of
inference by the ‘figure’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of syllogism which is determined by
the function the ‘middle term’ plays in the syllogism. By the ‘mood’ of a syllogism is meant that
kind of a syllogism which is determined by the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three propositions.

Unit 4 helps the students to understand the validity of syllogisms and thus sharpen the process of
inference. As Logic is concerned with the validity of an argumentation this unit provides tools
and different methods to point out the invalid syllogisms giving adequate arguments.

4
UNIT 1 TYPES OF CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS: A, E, I, AND O; SQUARE
OF OPPOSITION

Contents
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Terms and Their Kinds
1.3 Denotation and Connotation of Terms
1.4 Meaning and Supposition of terms
1.5 Propositions
1.6 Square of Opposition
1.7 Let Us Sum Up
1.8 Key Words
1.9 Further Readings and References

1.0 OBJECTIVES

First objective of this unit is to introduce you to the elements of categorical proposition. This
is intended to be achieved through the introduction of the nature of terms and their distinction
from words. The second objective is to establish an important distinction between sentence
and proposition. The last, but not the least, objective is to familiarize you with certain forms
of logical relations called immediate inference which should in turn enable you to establish
and discover certain other important logical relations.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

As a form of critical thinking, logic has its origin in several ancient civilizations, like Indian,
Chinese, Greek, etc. In the Western tradition, logic was systematized by Aristotle and hence he is
credited with its origin. Logic, ‘the tool for distinguishing between the true and the false’
(Averroes), examines the general forms which arguments may take, and distinguishes between
valid and invalid arguments. An argument consists of two sets of statements called premise or
premises, on the one hand, and the conclusion on the other. The premises are designed to support
the conclusion. The presence of this complex relation (also called inference) makes a group of
statements an argument and with which logic is concerned. Thus mere collection of propositions
does not constitute an argument when this relation is absent. In this unit we shall confine
ourselves to an analysis of terms and propositions which are basic to our study of logic and
postpone a detailed study of inference to the next unit.

1.2 TERMS AND THEIR KINDS

Logic makes a sharp distinction between ‘word’ and ‘term’. All words are not terms, but all
terms are words. Terms refer to specific classes of objects or qualities whereas words refer to

1
none of them. Further, a term may consist of more than one word. Table, planet, etc. are terms
which consist of one word only. The author of Hamlet is a term which consists of four words.
Words in different languages may express the same term; e.g. tree, vriksha etc. While there is
only one term in this example, there are two words. Traditional logic has recognized different
kinds of terms. A brief description of kinds of terms throws some light on the way in which
traditional logic understood ‘term’.

Positive and negative: Positive terms signify the presence of desirable qualities e.g., light,
health, etc.; negative terms signify, generally, undesirable qualities or qualities not desired,
rightly or wrongly. The clearest negative terms are those with the negative prefix ‘in’ (or ‘im’),
dis, etc. Inefficient, dishonest, etc. are negative terms. However, it is not always the case. For
example, immortal, invaluable, discover, to name a few, surely, are not negative. Therefore what
constitutes a negative term is, essentially, our attitude in particular and custom in general. In
other words, the distinction is not really logical, but it has something to do with value judgment.
That is why some words without such prefixes are regarded as negative since they too imply
negation: e.g. darkness (absence of light).

Concrete and abstract: Concrete terms are those which refer to perceptible entities; abstract terms
are those which do not; e.g. man, animal, tall etc., are concrete terms; mankind, animalism, etc.,
are abstract terms. However, this classification depends upon use. For example, the word
‘humanity’ is used not only to mean individual men but also the quality of man. Hence use or
meaning determines the class.

Relative and absolute: Relative terms are those which express a relation between two or more
than two persons or things, e.g. father, son, etc. Absolute terms do not express such relation, e.g.
nationality, cone, etc. Comparative terms are obviously relative: e.g., larger, prettier, etc.

Singular and General: Singular terms denote specific objects. It points to one object only. All
proper names are singular terms. Russellian proper names are also counted among singular
terms. ‘The author of Principia Mathematica, The farthest planet from the sun’, etc. are singular
terms. General terms are just class names. Vegetable, criminal, politician, etc., are examples for
general terms.

Univocal, and Equivocal terms: Univocal terms carry only one meaning. Entropy is an example
for univocal terms. Equivocal terms are burdened with at least two meanings. Gravity is
equivocal; so is astronomical. When natural language becomes the medium of expression,
equivocal terms pose hurdles in determining the validity of arguments because such terms cause
ambiguous structure of statements. Therefore in our study of logic we must ensure that the
arguments consist of only unambiguous terms. Later we will come to know that symbolic logic
became indispensable precisely for this reason.

1.3 DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION OF TERMS

By denotation of a term we mean the number of individuals to which the term is applied or
extended. For example, ‘society’ denotes the human society, a philanthropic society, the Society

2
of Jesus, a political society (or a State), etc. Another word used for ‘denotation’ is extension. By
connotation or intension of a term we mean the complete meaning of a term as expressed by the
sum total of its essential as opposed to accidental characteristics. For example, consider the same
term; ‘society’ connotes (a) an association of persons and (b) united by a common interest.
Crowd does not mean the same as society because it lacks these characteristics. Complete
meaning, therefore, excludes accidental and figurative characteristics. The latter is misleading in
the sense that it is not a characteristic at all in the strict sense of the term. Denotation and
connotation together determine what is called class or set of objects. Therefore every term stands
for one class or the other.

In Scholasticism, connotation and denotation are reserved for terms and comprehension and
extension for concepts of which terms are signs, or expressions. Note that the word ‘connotation’
may vary in meaning from time to time. For example, ‘politician’ may acquire a different
meaning in different societies at a given point of time or in the same society at different points of
time. Therefore connotation is only conventional.

It is clear that greater the connotation (intension) of a term smaller the denotation (extension)
and, conversely, greater the denotation smaller the connotation. For example, the term ‘being’
connotes simply ‘existence’ and can be extended to everything that exists (man, animal, plant,
stone, etc.). But as soon as I say ‘human being’, thus increasing the connotation (i.e. ‘human’ and
‘being’), the term includes only human beings; not others. ‘Oriental human being’ is still less
extensive, for the term cannot be applied to Westerners. This is called the law of inverse
variation.

1.4 MEANING AND SUPPOSITION OF TERMS

There is a subtle difference between meaning and supposition. Meaning is what convention
accepts. Therefore many words have more than one meaning because convention is always
inaccurate. Xystus is one such word which has several meanings like covered portico used for
exercise by the athletes in antiquity, a garden walk on terrace, etc. Likewise, ‘Supposition’ of a
word is the function or the use of a word which depends upon the intention of the speaker.
Therefore meaning is objective whereas supposition is subjective. The Scholastics understood
‘supponit’ as the one which stands for the concept.
Check Your Progress I
Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Critically examine various classes of terms.


.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................


2. Analyse the meaning of connotation and denotation.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

3
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

1.5 PROPOSITIONS

In the previous section we came to know that all terms are words, but all words are not terms.
Similarly, all propositions are sentences, but all sentences are not propositions. Only those
sentences are propositions which grammar regards as assertive. A proposition is always either
true or false, but not both; and no proposition is neither true nor false. This means to say that a
proposition is a declarative sentence which gives certain information and it is this information
which makes a proposition true or false. It is equally important to note that there is no need to
know whether a given proposition is true or false. Further, several sentences may express one
proposition. Consider these groups of sentences.
A 1 Jealousy thy name is woman.
2 What is wrong with your car?
3 Copper sulphate is an organic compound.
4 Newton wrote Optiks.
B 1 Cogito Ergo Sum.
2 I think, therefore I am.
In group A, first two sentences are not assertive sentences (the first sentence is misleading. It
appears to be an assertive sentence, but in reality, it is not. Sentences which express emotional
outburst are, more or less, exclamatory). The third sentence is false whereas the fourth sentence
is true. Group B consists of two sentences which belong to different languages but give the same
meaning. Within the same language also it is possible to have two sentences which give the same
meaning. Consider this group.
C 1 Rama killed Ravana.
2 Ravana was killed by Rama.
Sentences in B and C groups show that a proposition is the meaning of a sentence. Although
several sentences can give one meaning, it is impossible in an unambiguous system to have one
sentence with more than one meaning.

A new word is introduced at this point. The truth-value of true proposition is said to be true and
that of a false proposition is said to be false. Here afterwards we frequently employ this term in
our study.

Let us turn to Aristotelian analysis of proposition. A proposition consists of two terms in his
system. The term (class) about which the proposition asserts something is called ‘Subject’ (S)
and what is said about it is called ‘Predicate’ (P). S and P are to be regarded as S-class and P-
class respectively. In a proposition these are related using the verb of the form ‘to be’ called
‘Copula’, which must be always in present tense. According to Aristotle a sentence becomes a
proposition only when it meets all these requirements, not otherwise. It is obvious that only the

4
first example considered above (A3) falls within the limits of Aristotelian system. This sort of
restriction severely thwarted further progress of logic.

Traditional logic considers two kinds of propositions; categorical (unconditional) and


conditional. Assertion is of two types; affirmation and negation. Affirmation or negation is made
in the former without stating any condition, whereas in the latter it is stated with condition or
conditions. Initially, we shall restrict ourselves to the former kind. Affirmation or negation is
possible in this category in two ways; total or partial. If P is affirmed or negated of the whole
class of S, then it is total. On the other hand, if affirmation or negation applies to only a part of
the class, then it is partial. Consequently, we obtain four kinds of categorical proposition.
1 Universal affirmative (total affirmation)
2 Universal negative (total negation)
3 Particular affirmative (partial affirmation)
4 Particular negative (partial negation)
For the sake of simplicity and brevity (in logic these two are very important) these four kinds are
represented symbolically. From Affirmo, a Greek, word we choose A and I to represent first and
third kinds respectively and similarly, from Nego, another Greek word, we choose E and O to
represent second and fourth kinds respectively. It is a mere convention to prefix S and suffix P to
A, E, I and O. In modern parlance the first letters of S-term and of P-term are used in place of S
and P.

Each kind is illustrated below.


S Copula P
1 All (scientific theories) are (improvable). Universal Affirmative SAI
2 No (celestial bodies) are (static). Universal Negative CES
3 Some (fruits) are (bitter). Particular Affirmative FIB
4 Some (chemicals) are not (toxic). Particular Negative COT

The distinction between universal and particular depends upon what is called quantity and the
one between affirmative and negative on what is called quality. Not much discussion is needed to
know what quality is. If any negative word like no, not, etc., occurs in the proposition (2 and 3),
then quality is negative. Otherwise, it is affirmative. A word of caution is required. Sometimes
predicate carries negative force. But it does not make the quality of proposition negative. For
example ‘dishonest’, non-natural, etc. constitute terms in their own right. They have nothing to
do with the quality of proposition. Consider these two propositions.

5 Shakuni is dishonest.
6 Telepathy is a non-natural phenomenon.

These propositions are affirmative only. It means that a proposition is negative only when
negative word is a part of copula. However, quantity of proposition needs elaborate explanation
which becomes intelligible only after explication of what is called the distribution of term.

Distribution of terms is an indispensible concept in Aristotelian logic. A term is said to be


distributed if the proposition in which it occurs, either includes or excludes the said term
completely. Inclusion or exclusion is complete provided the proposition refers to every member

5
of the class. If so, when is it said to be undistributed? Suppose that n is the number of members
in a given class. If the proposition includes or excludes (n – 1) members of that particular class,
say S, then S is said to be undistributed.

Let us turn to the pattern of distribution in categorical proposition. Quantity of any proposition is
determined by the extension or magnitude of S, i.e., the number of elements in the given set and
a term acquires magnitude only when it is a component of a proposition. Only sets have
magnitude (this is so as far as logic is concerned). A set is defined as the collection of well-
defined elements as its members. A null set or an empty set does not have any element. Let us
assume that term is synonymous with set. Then we can accept that a term has magnitude. If
magnitude of any term is total in terms of reference, then it is said that the term is distributed. If
magnitude is incomplete, then that term is undistributed. It shows that any term is distributed
only when the entire set is either included or excluded in such a way that not a single member is
left out. This is another way of explicating what complete magnitude means.

All universal propositions distribute S whereas particular propositions do not. Just as distribution
is explicated, undistribution also must be explicated. A term is undistributed only when
inclusion or exclusion is partial. The meaning of partial inclusion or exclusion is, again,
repeated, but in a very different manner. Let us attempt a formal explication of the same. Let the
magnitude of S be x. Let S* (to be read s-star) denote that part of S, which is included in or
excluded by a proposition. Now the formula, which represents the undistribution of S can be
represented as follows:

|x|>S*≥1 ………….(1)

This is the way to read (1): ‘The modulus of x ( |x| ) is greater than S* greater than or equal to 1’.
It is highly rewarding to use set theory here. (1) indicates that S* is a proper subset of S.
Therefore its magnitude must be smaller than that of x which is the magnitude of S. However,
S* is not a null set. (1) shows that there exists at least one member in S*. In the case of
undistribution, therefore, the magnitude of S* varies between 1 and | x-1|. Now it is clear that in
A and E, S is distributed while in I and O it is undistributed. Just to complete this aspect, let us
state that all affirmative propositions undistribute P whereas all negative propositions distribute
P.

A far better way of presenting the distribution of terms was invented by Euler, an 18th C. Swiss
mathematician and later, John Venn, a 19th C. British mathematician improvised the
representation further. An understanding of the techniques adopted by them presupposes some
aspects of set theory.
Let S and P be non-null (non-empty) sets with elements as mentioned below (it is important that
the status of set must be mentioned invariably, i.e., null or non-null). The following pairs shall
be considered.

1. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {g,h,i,j,k}

6
All letters within parentheses are elements of respective sets. In the first grouping there is no
common element. Now, consider following groupings.

2. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i}
3. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, P = {b,c,d,g,h}
4. S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}, S* = {a,b,c}, P = {m,n,g,h}
5. S = {a,b,c,d,e}, P = {a,b,c,d,e}

Fifth group is unique in the sense that these two sets possess exactly the same elements.
Therefore the magnitude of these sets also remains the same. Such sets are called identical sets.
Identity of elements and also the equality of magnitude make sets identical. In 1908, Zermelo
proposed what is called ‘Axiomatic Set Theory’. One of the principal axioms of this theory is
known as the Axiom of Extension or Extensionality. This Axiom helps us to understand the
structure of identical sets. This theory was modified later by A Fraenkal and T. Skolem. Let us
call this theory Zermelo – Fraenkel – Skolen theory (ZFS theory). This theory states the above
mentioned axiom as follows.

ZFS1: If a and b are non-null sets and if, for all x, x ∈ a iff x ∈ b, then a ≡ b

[Note ‘∈’ is read ‘element of’; ‘iff’ is read ‘if and only if’ and ‘≡’ is read identical.]
Symbolically, it is represented as follows:
{Sa Λ Sb} Λ {∀x (x ∈ A <=> x ∈ b) => a ≡ b
This is the way to read:
Sa = a is a set
Λ = and
∀ = for all values of
<=> = if and only if
=> = if …then
The summary of this formula is very simple. Whatever description applies to S (here a) also
applies to P (here b). When distribution of terms is examined, the magnitude and elements of
sets also are examined. Therefore it is wrong to assert that when S and P are identical sets, P is
undistributed in A. Let us designate this type of proposition as A+ (read A cross). Consider
these two propositions:

7 All bachelors are unmarried men. (BAU)


8 All spinsters are unmarried women. (SAU)

7
Knowledge of English is enough to accept that B ≡ U and S ≡ U
These five groups are explained in terms of set theory. First group corresponds to ‘E’ whereas
second, third, fourth and fifth groups correspond respectively to A, I, O and A+. A brief
description will suffice. It is obvious that the first group differs from all other groups because in
this group nothing is common to ‘S’ and ‘P’.

S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {g,h,I,j,k}

No element of P is an element of S and no element of S is an element of P. The reader must be in


a position to notice that there is symmetric difference between S and P (What we have in this
case is, evidently, difference and nothing else), symbolized by:
S P (‘ ’ reads del)
The second group corresponds to A. Here S is a proper subset of P or P includes S, which is
symbolized as follows:

S ⊂ P or P ⊃ S

The third group corresponds to ‘I’. Here S and P intersect. So we have

S ∩ P = {b,c,d}
(∩ reads ‘intersect’)

Before we consider the fourth group, let us directly proceed to Euler’s diagrams through which
he represented the extension – status of terms in proposition.

1 SAP

a,b,c,
S d,e,f
S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h,i}
g,h,i P
∴ S ⊂ P or P ⊃ S

8
2 SEP

S S
a,b,c, g,h, P S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}

d,e,f I,j,k
P = {g,h,i,j,k}
∴S P

3 SIP

S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
P = {b,c,d,g,h,i}
S∩P = {b,c,d}
4 SOP

S* = {a,b,c}
P = {m,n,g,h}

Now we are in a position to examine the fourth group. It requires a little explication to
understand the status of O with regard to distribution. In this instance S* is incomplete, i.e.,
undistributed and P is completely excluded by S*. It shows that P is distributed. Let us see how
this happens.

1. Let S = {a,b,c,d,e,f}
2. Let S* = {a,b,c}; there is no information on d, e and f.
3. S* ⊆ S (S* ≤ S); S* is smaller than or equal to S. It also means that S* is only a subset, not a
proper subset, of S.
4. Let S – S* = S** (S** ≥ Φ ) or S = S* + S**
‘Φ’ reads phi which stands for null set.

9
5. S** ⊆ P
6. S* || S**; || means that elements of subsets S* and S** are different.

∴ S* || P
∴ Elements of S* and P are different.

John Venn followed a very different method. We shall begin with this proposition.

9 All rabbits are herbivorous – RAH.


Since rabbits are animals, the universe of discourse is, obviously, ‘animals’. Venn represents the
universe of discourse with a rectangle. If rabbits are the elements of the set R, then all other
animals than rabbits constitute the complement of the set R. Complement of R is represented by
R and the same explanation holds good for all classes. Now a new term is introduced, viz.,
‘product class’. Any product class is an intersection of two or more than two sets (as far as logic
is concerned, the number is restricted to three). {RH} is the product class of R and H. Such
product classes may or may not be null sets. But {R R }, {H H } (for example, the set of animals
which are rabbits and other than rabbits at the same time) are invariably null sets. When there are
two terms, we get four product classes, which are as follows.

1 { RH } Set of rabbits, which are herbivorous.


2 { RH } Set of rabbits, which are not herbivorous.
3 { RH } Set of animals other than rabbits, which are herbivorous.
4 { RH } Set of animals which are neither rabbits nor herbivorous.

It is pertinent to note that if there are three terms, then there are not six product classes, but eight
product classes. If x is the number of terms, then 2x is the number of product classes. Now the
time is ripe to introduce Venn’s diagrams.
Fig.1 Fig.2
SAP SEP

SP = Φ SP = Φ

10
Fig.3 Fig.4
SIP SOP

SP ≥ 1 SP ≥1
Or or
SP ≠ Φ S P≠ Φ
The statement (proposition is also called statement), ‘All rabbits are herbivorous’, does not really
mean that there are rabbits and all those rabbits are herbivorous. On the other hand, the statement
really means that if there are rabbits, then, they are herbivorous. Clearly, it means that in the set
{ }
of non-herbivorous not a single rabbit can be found. Therefore RH is a null set. Similarly, the
statement ‘No rabbits are herbivorous’ – (REH) indicates that in the set of herbivorous not a
single rabbit can be found. Therefore {RH} is a null set. In Figures 1 and 2, those parts of the
circle or circles which represent null sets are shaded. RAH and REH only demonstrate that there
are null sets, but they are silent on non-null sets. Therefore an important conclusion is imminent;
universal propositions do not carry existential import.

It is widely held that all scientific laws are universal. An important fall-out of this assumption is
that if universal propositions do not carry existential import, then it also means that scientific
laws do not carry existential import in which case they apply only to non-existing entities.
Therefore all physical objects only approximate to these laws. A scientific law, when stated in
absolute terms, has to be construed as a limiting point.

The case of particular proposition is different. The statement ‘Some rabbits are herbivorous –
RIH’ is true only when ‘there exists at least one rabbit which is herbivorous, not otherwise.
Therefore the product class {RH} is a non-null set. On the same lines, it can be easily shown
{ }
that ROH shows that RH is also a non-null set. Therefore particular propositions carry
existential import.
Let us proceed on a different line. Verbal description makes room for symbolic representation
because this method proves to be a boon at a later stage.

RAH: (∀x) {x∈R) => (x ∈ H)}

11
REH: (∀x) {x∈R) => (x∉H)}; ∉ is read ‘not an element of’
RIH: (∃x) ∋{(x∈R) Λ (x∈H)}; ∃x is read ‘there exists at least one x; ∋ is read ‘such that’.
ROH: (∃x) ∋{(x∈R) Λ (x∉H)}

∀ is known as universal quantifier and ∃ is known as existential quantifier. (x) can also be used
in place of (∀x).

1.6 SQUARE OF OPPOSITION

This is one type of immediate inference because in this type of inference conclusion is drawn
from one premise only. Eduction is another word used for immediate inference Opposition is a
kind of logical relation wherein propositions ‘stand against’ one another in terms of truth-value
when they have the same subject and the same predicate, but differ in quantity or quality or both.
Traditional logic called this relation square of opposition because these relations are represented
by a square. Four such relations are discussed in Aristotelian system.

1. Contradiction: When two propositions differ in both ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’, the relation is
called contradiction, e.g. ‘All men are wise’ (A) – ‘Some men are not wise’ (O). It is the most
complete form of logical opposition because they are neither true nor false together. If one is
true, the other is necessarily false and vice versa. This sort of self - contradiction is due to
incompatibility between respective statements. Similarly, the statements, ‘No men are wise’ (E)
– ‘Some men are wise’ (I) are contradictory.
2. Contrariety: When two universal propositions differ only in ‘quality’, the opposition is called
contrary; e.g. ‘All men are wise’ (A) – ‘No men are wise’ (E). By definition, both contraries can
be false – precisely as in the example given – but they cannot be true at the same time. If one of
them is true, the other must necessarily be false, but if one is false, the other may be true or false.
One kind of proposition called singular proposition (also called simple), whose S is proper name,
has no contrary and its contradiction differs only in quality. One example is ‘Jo is bad – Jo is not
bad’. Another example is ‘The author of Hamlet, is an Englishman and ‘The author of Hamlet’ is
not an Englishman.

3. Subcontrariety: When two particular propositions differ only in ‘quality’, the opposition is
called subcontrariety. E.g. ‘Some men are wise’ (I) – ‘Some men are not wise’ (O). Subcontrary
propositions can be true together – as in the example given, but they cannot be false at the same
time. If one of them is true, the other may be true or false, but if one of them is false, the other
must necessarily be true. The inverse order of ‘contrary’ and ‘subcontrary’ propositions is
evident.

12
4 Subaalternation: W When two proposition
p s differ onlyy in ‘quantiity’ (one is uuniversal annd the otherr
is particcular), the oopposition iss called subbalternation,, e.g. ‘All men
m are wisee’ (A) - ‘Some men aree
wise’ (II). Notice thhat ‘subalterrn’ proposittions can bee true togethher or false ttogether. And
A this is to o
say thatt though froom the truth of the univversal, one can c infer thee truth of thhe particularr the reversee
order do oes not holdd, namely thhat from thee truth of thhe particularr, one cannoot infer the truth of thee
universal. On the other
o hand, though from m the falsityy of the partticular, one can infer thhe falsity off
the univversal, one cannot
c inferr the falsity of the partiicular from the falsity oof the univeersal.

This type of
o relation iss expressed in the form
m of a squaree.

The following twoo schemes and a one diaggram offer visual


v aid too retain moore easily in
n mind whatt
we havee just said aabout the ‘oppposition’ of
o propositioons:

For thee sake of siimplicity thhe truth - reelation whiich holds good
g betweeen various relations iss
provideed in a nutshhell.

Inferencces in Subalternation

From truth of universaal Æ truth of


o particularr
From truth of particulaar /Æ truth of
o universal

From falsityy of particuular Æ falsity of universaal


From falsityy of universsal /Æ falsity of particulaar

Æ: Cann infer
/Æ: Cannnot infer

II. Mneemonic Devvice for rem


membering
g the Squarre of Oppossition (Land
der Univerrsity,
Greenwwood).

A. If yoou picture G
God at the toop of the squuare of opposition and the Devil aat the bottom
m of the
square and
a remembber the phraase ‘both caannot be ...’ for contrariies and subccontraries, the
t
followinng mnemonnic device might
m be hellpful.

133
B. The big ‘X’ acrooss the centter of the Sq
quare repressents contraadictories with oppositee truth –
values. This shouldd be very eaasy to rememmber.

C. Since God (or trruth) is at th


he top of thee diagram, bboth contrarries ‘cannott be true.’

D. Sincce the Devil (or falsity) is at the bo


ottom of the diagram, both
b subconttraries ‘cann
not be
false’.

E. With
h subalternaation, God can send trutth down, bu
ut we canno
ot know whaat it means for
f God to
send fallsity down (hence
( this would be in
ndeterminatte).

But, thee Devil can send falsity


y up (since this
t is what Devils are good at), annd we canno
ot know
what it means for the Devil to o send truth
h up. So thiss relation is indeterminaate.

III. ‘Boouncing Arround the Square


S of Opposition.
O ’
Suppose we know that O (Som me S is not P)
P is false. IIn how man ny ways cann we determ mine the
truth - value
v of I (‘Some S is P’)?
P
There are
a four way ys of determ
mining the truth-value.
t These fourr ways consiist in travellling
between n different ppoints (heree the propossitions are points). The four routes are as folloows.
(Noticee that we coould set an itinerary
i of our journeyy along the selected
s fouur routes. Thhe ‘reason,’’
given below, is, so to speak, ouro ‘inferencce ticket’ foor travel Cf. Lander Unniversity, Grreenwood).
Originnating Pointt Througgh Teerminating Point
P
1 SOOP Direcct SIP
2 SOOP SEP SIP
3 SOOP SAP to SEP SIP
4 SOOP SEP and
a SAP SIP

Route 1: O to I

Statemeent of Reason T
Truth -Valuee

1. Somee S is not P. Given false

2. Somee S is P. su
ubcontrariety
y true

Routee 2: O to I th
hrough E

Statem
ment Reason Truth - Value
V
1. Somee S is not P. given false
2. No S is P. su
ubalternatio
on false

14
4
3 Some S is P. contradictory true

Route 3: O to I through A and E

Statement Reason Truth - Value


1. Some S is not P. given false
2 All S is P. contradictory true
3. No S is P. contrariety false
4. Some S is P. contradictory true
One would think that if our logic were consistent, all possible routes from the false O to I would
result in a false truth - value for the I. But consider the following case--Route 4.

Route 4: O to I through E and A

Statement Reason Truth -Value


1. Some S is not P. given false
2. No S is P. subalternation false
3. All S is P. contrariety indeterminate
4. Some S is P. subalternation indeterminate

Variance of truth-value in the fourth instance of I proposition indicates a hidden part of the
nature of immediate inferences. There is no technique to determine the truth-value of the
conclusion when the premise is indeterminate. The logical relations involve deduction but not
reflection. Change in quantity or quality affects logical force. The logical force, consequently,
differs from one proposition to another. Further, the truth - value of the conclusion depends upon
the logical force of the given proposition. These factors explain variance in truth - value in the
above mentioned instance.

Traditional logic ignored asymmetry involved in universal – particular relation which was
pointed out by Susan Stebbing. On this ground, she replaced square by a figure:

Gaps at four corners point to asymmetry in this interpretation. The truth of A (or E) implies the
truth of I (or O), but the reverse order does not hold good. On the other hand, the falsity of I (or
O) implies the falsity of A (or E), but the reverse order does not hold good. This is what
precisely asymmetry is. These gaps, distinct lines for superaltern and subaltern relations and
unequal lines make this figure of opposition.

15
At this stage, it is important to become familiar with two other types of relation called
conversion and obversion. They are also known as equivalent relation because the truth-value of
both the premise and the conclusion remains the same, i.e. if the premise is true, the conclusion
is true and if the premise is false, the conclusion is also false. When there is a change in the
structure of sentences, on some occasions meaning remains unchanged. It only means that the
very same information is provided in different ways. Recognition of this simple fact helps us in
testing accurately the validity of arguments and also in avoiding confusions. There are two
primary forms of equivalent relation; conversion and obversion. The conclusion in conversion is
called converse and in obversion obverse. The processes of conversion and obversion are quite
simple. These operations deserve a close scrutiny.
Conversion: This is governed by three laws.
1st Law: S and P must be transposed.
After transposition P becomes subject and S becomes predicate. This is the 1st stage.
2nd Law: Quality of propositions should remain constant. If the premise is affirmative, the
conclusion must be affirmative. If the premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative.
3rd Law: A term, which is undistributed in the premise, should remain undistributed in the
conclusion. It can be stated in another way also. A term can be distributed in the conclusion
only if it is distributed in the premise. However, a term, which is distributed in the premise, may
or may not be distributed in the conclusion. The following examples illustrate these rules.
10 All philosophers are kings PAK
Converse: ∴ Some kinks are philosophers. KIP
11 No vegetables are harmful. VEH
Converse: ∴ No harmful things are vegetables. HEV
12 Some women are talkative. WIT
Converse: ∴ Some talkative people are women. TIW
There are three aspects to be noted. Conversion of A is conversion by limitation because the
quantity is reduced from universal to particular after conversion. Secondly, conversion of E and I
is simple because in these cases S and P are just transposed and no other change takes place.
Thirdly, while A, E and I have conversion, O does not have conversion. What happens when A
undergoes simple conversion and O is converted? In these cases conversion leads to a fallacy
called fallacy of illicit conversion. Fallacy in formal logic arises when a rule is violated. In both
these cases conversion violates a rule or rules.
Consider these statements.
13 All Europeans are white.
∴ All white people are Europeans.
14 Some gods are not powerful.
∴ Some powerful beings are not gods.

16
Conversion in these two cases is invalid because the terms, ‘white’ and ‘gods’ are distributed in
the respective conclusions while they are undistributed in the respective premises. This type of
conversion violates the third law. The terms ‘white’ and ‘gods’ remain undistributed in the
premises since the former is the predicate of an affirmative premise while the latter is the subject
of a particular premise. If we obtain affirmative converse from a negative premise in order to
undistibute predicate term, then we violate the second law of conversion. It only means that
when A undergoes simple conversion and when O is converted, in the case of A the third law is
violated and in the case of O second or third law of conversion, as the case may be is violated.
Therefore A becomes I after conversion and ‘O’ has no conversion.

Obversion: This is one technique of preserving the meaning of a statement after effecting
change of quality. The procedure is very simple; change the quality of the premise and
simultaneously replace the predicate by its complementary. We apply this law to the premises
(A, E, I, and O) to obtain the conclusions. The conclusion is called obversion.

15 All players are experts. PAE


∴No players are non-experts. PE E
16 No musicians are novelists. MEN
∴All musicians are non-novelists. MA N
17 Some scholars are women. SIW
∴ Some scholars are not non-women. SO W
18 Some strangers are not helpful. SO H
∴Some stranger are non-helpful. SI H

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.


1 Give symbolic representation of propositions? What do the symbols stand for?
.......................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................... ..........................
...........................
2. Determine all possible product classes of the following terms and their complements.

a) players and experts b) philosophers and kings c) fruits and vegetables d) actors and directors
........................... .................................................................................................................

17
1.7 LET US SUM UP

The basic units of argument are terms and proposition. All words are not terms; all terms are
words. All sentences are not propositions; all propositions are sentences. Subject and predicate
are the constituents of categorical proposition according to Aristotle. There are four kinds of
categorical proposition. Distribution of a term means total extension. Euler and Venn interpreted
distribution diagrammatically. Square of opposition, conversion and obversion are three kinds of
immediate inference.

1.8 KEY WORDS

Supposition: A ‘supposition’ of a word is the function or the use of a word has in a


presupposition depending on the intention of the speaker.
Term: Any word or group of words that stands for the subject or the predicate of a proposition.
Proposition: A statement affirming or denying something of somebody.

Categorical proposition: It is a proposition in which the predicate is affirmed or denied


unconditionally of all or part of the subject.
Copula: A ‘copula’ joins the subject and the predicate of the preposition. Normally it is the verb
‘is’ or ‘is not’.

1.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981].


Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Logic. 10th ed. New Jersy, 1998.
Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2007.
‘Introduction to Logic,’ University of Lander, [Link]
accessed July, 2010.
Priest, Graham. Logic: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: OUP, 2001.
Shand, John. Arguing Well. London. Routledge, 2000.
Zegarelli, Mark. Logic For Dummies. New York: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated, 2006.

18
UNIT 2 CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

Contents:
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Reason and Inference: Meaning and Objections
2.3 Kinds of Inference
2.4 Deductive Reasoning and Syllogism
2.5 Kinds of Syllogism
2.6 Let Us Sum Up
2.7 Key Words
2.8 Further Readings and References

2.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit introduces you to the essence of Aristotelian logic. Since syllogism is the most
important form of inference, you ought to have a background of the nature of inference and
various issues associated with it. One objective of this unit is to give a brief explanation of the
nature of deductive inference and contrast it with inductive inference. Another objective is to
analyze different kinds of syllogism to enable you to understand variety in syllogism.

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Categorical syllogism is the essence of traditional logic. This form of inference is called mediate
inference because the conclusion is drawn from two premises. Further, this is called categorical
because all propositions involved are categorical. Since syllogistic inference is nearly identical
with deductive inference, an exhaustive analysis of inference is required as a prelude to a proper
understanding of syllogism.

2.2 REASON AND INFERENCE: MEANING AND OBJECTIONS

Reasoning consists, essentially, in the employment of intellect, in its ability to ‘see’ beyond, and
within as well, what is available to senses. Reasoning, therefore, is a sort of bridge which
connects ‘unknown’ with ‘known’. While reasoning is regarded so, inference is regarded as the
process involved in extracting what is unknown from what is known. Reasoning is essentially a
psychological process which is, undoubtedly, not the concern of logic. Therefore some logicians
thought it proper to replace reasoning with inference. However, this replacement did not improve
matters much. The reason is obvious. If all human beings stop thinking, then there will be
nothing like inference. This dependence shows that inference is as much a psychological activity
as reasoning is. What is psychological is necessarily subjective. Logic, in virtue of its close
association with knowledge, has nothing to do with anything that is subjective. Therefore it was
imperative for logicians to discover an escape route.

1
Cohen and Nagel for this particular reason chose to use ‘implication’ instead of ‘inference’. The
difference in kind can be understood easily when we look at the usage. Statements always
‘imply’ but do not ‘infer’. Therefore implication is in the nature of relation between statements.
On the other hand, I ‘infer’, but I do not ‘imply’. This clearly shows that inference is an activity
of mind. Salmon fell in line with Cohen and Nagel when he said that the very possibility of
inference depends upon reasoning. Despite the fact that inference is subjective, logicians like
Copi, Carnap, Russell, etc., chose to retain the word inference. But, all along, they only meant
implication. Therefore keeping these restrictions in our mind let us use freely the word
‘inference’.

Though the use of the word ‘reason’ is not much rewarding, the word ‘reasonableness’ has some
weight. We often talk about reasonableness of the conclusion. In this context reasonableness
means ‘grounds of acceptability’. Surely, in this restricted sense, reasonableness is objective just
as inference is.

2.3 KINDS OF INFERENCE

In a broad sense, there are two kinds of inference; deductive and inductive. Deductive inference
regards the form or structure as primary and therefore it is called formal logic (inference and
logic are interchangeable). It remains to be seen what form means. Inductive logic regards matter
or content of argument as primary. Some logicians, like Cohen and Nagel, did not regard
induction as logic at all. Without considering the merits and demerits of their arguments, let us
consider briefly the characteristics of these two kinds.

Our study of formal logic begins with the distinction between truth and falsehood on the one
hand, and validity and invalidity on the other. This particular distinction is very prominent. Only
statements are true (or false) whereas only arguments are valid (or invalid). This distinction will
take us to this table.

Table 1:

Statements Arguments
1) True Valid
2) True Invalid
3) False Valid
4) False Invalid

This table helps us to understand the following possibility. a) A valid argument (1 and 3) may
consist of completely true statements or completely false statements. b) An invalid argument (2
and 4), similarly, may consist of statements in exactly the same manner mentioned above. It
shows that truth and validity, on the one hand, and falsity and invalidity, on the other, do not
coincide always. Similarly, we have to distinguish between material truth and logical truth.
Material truth is what characterizes matter of fact. Logical truth is determined by the structure of
argument. We shall consider examples which correspond to four combinations (see table1). Let

2
us call premises p1, p2, etc. and conclusion q.
Arg1:
p1: No foreigners are voters.
p2: All Europeans are foreigners.
q: ∴No Europeans are voters.
Arg2:
p1: Some poets are literary figures.
p2: All play writers are literary figures.
q: ∴Some play writers are poets.
Arg3:
p1: All politicians are ministers.
p2: Medha Patkar is a politician.
q: ∴Medha Patkar is a minister.
Arg4: p1: 3 is the cube root of – 27.
p2: - 27 is the cube root of 729.
q:∴ 3 is the cube root of 729.
These four arguments apply to arguments 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1 respectively. First and third
arguments have a definite structure in virtue of which they are held to be valid. Second and
fourth arguments have a different structure which makes them invalid. When an argument is
valid, the premise or premises imply the conclusion. If there is no implication, then the argument
is invalid. Validity is governed by a certain rule which is represented in a tabular form. [Let us
designate ‘true’ by ‘1’ and ‘false’ by ‘0’ as a matter convention].
p q
1) T(1) T(1) Valid
2) F(0) F(0) Valid
3) F(0) T(1) Valid
4) T(1) F(0) Invalid

We can also say that the premises necessitate the conclusion and when they necessitate the
conclusion there is implication. In this case, necessity is of a particular kind, viz., logical
necessity. Therefore, when there is implication, conclusion is necessarily true and vice versa.
Very often, deductive logic is identified with mathematical model. It is generally admitted that in
both these disciplines information provided by the conclusion is the same as the one provided by
the premises. It means that both are characterized by material identity. Deductive logic,
therefore, is an example for tautology. This characterization is highly significant and is in need
of some elaboration.

If, one can ask, the conclusion does not go beyond premises (it may go below or well within) and
no new information is acquired in the process, then why argue and what is the use of arguments?
The answer is very simple. Knowledge is not the same as mere acquisition of information. In
other words novelty is not a measure of knowledge. The legend is that Socrates extracted a
geometrical theorem from a slave purported to be totally ignorant of mathematics. The moral is
that knowledge is within, not in the sense in which brain or liver is within. Knowledge is the
outcome of critical attitude. It is discovered, not invented and so goes an ancient Indian maxim:
eliminate ignorance and become enlightened. If what is said is not clear, then consider this path.
Deductive argument helps us to know what is latent in the premises, i.e., the meaning of the

3
premises. It is an excursion into the analysis of their meaning or meanings. And the conclusion is
an expression of the same. If so, it is easy to see how the denial of the conclusion in such a case
amounts to denying the meaning or meanings of the premises which were accepted earlier. What
is called self-contradiction is exactly the same as the combination of the denial of the conclusion
and the acceptance of the premises. Therefore we say that a valid deductive argument is
characterized by logical necessity. If so a deductive argument is always true. This is the meaning
of tautology.

At this stage, two terms are introduced: analytic and a priori. Consider this example: ‘all men
with no hair on their heads are bald’. We know that this statement is true in virtue of the meaning
of the word ‘bald’; not otherwise. Such a statement is called analytic. In such statements the
predicate term (here ‘bald’) is contained in the subject term (here ‘men with no hair on their
heads’). Knowledge obtained from an analytic statement is necessarily a priori, meaning
knowledge prior to sense experience. In philosophical parlance, all analytic statements are
necessarily a priori. Deductive logic provides knowledge a priori, though the premises and the
conclusion considered independently are not analytic. It is the knowledge of the relation between
the premises and the conclusion which is a priori. Therefore deductive argument and analytic
statement share a common characteristic; in both the cases the denial leads to self-contradiction.

How can we say that deductive logic provides a priori knowledge? Consider an example.
Arg. 5: All saints are pious.
All philosophers are saints.
∴All philosophers are pious.
Evidently, there is no need to examine saints and philosophers to know that the conclusion is
true. Indeed, it is not even necessary that there should be saints who are pious as well as
philosophers. This being the case, arg. 5 takes the following form without leading to any
distortion of meaning.
Arg. 5a: If all saints are pious and all philosophers are saints, then all philosophers are pious.
The argument is transformed into a statement which involves relation. Implication (the present
relation is one such) is such that without the aid of sense experience, but with the laws of formal
logic alone, it enables us to derive the conclusion. Thus like an analytic statement, a valid
deductive argument provides a priori knowledge and hence it is devoid of novelty. It is this sort
of relation that precisely describes the relation between the premises and the conclusion in
deductive inference. This does not mean that deductive argument is absolutely certain. This is
because necessity is a logical property whereas certainty is a psychological state. The former is
objective and the latter is subjective.

When sense experience takes back seat, reason becomes the prime means of acquiring
knowledge. Following the footsteps of Descartes, who is regarded as the father of rationalism,
we can conclude, somewhat loosely, that deductive logic is rational. So we have sketched three
characteristics; logical necessity, a priori and rational. There is a thread which runs through these
characteristics. Therefore one character presupposes another.

Deductive argument is characterized by qualitative difference in opposition to quantitative


difference, i.e. the difference between valid and invalid arguments is only in kind but not in
degree. Further, validity is not a matter of degree. Let us make matters clear: a valid argument

4
cannot become more valid in virtue of the addition of premise or premises. On the other hand, if
any one premise is taken out of a valid argument, then the argument does not become ‘less
valid’; it simply becomes invalid. So an argument is either valid or invalid. A valid argument is
always satiated. In other words, the premises in a valid argument constitute the necessary and
sufficient conditions to accept the conclusion. An argument is invalid due to a ‘missing link’ in
the class of premises. Deductive argument, therefore, is regarded as demonstrative argument.
Acceptance of premises leaves no room for any reasonable or meaningful doubt.

We have learnt that validity is an important facet of deductive logic. Any account of validity is
incomplete without considering Strawson’s analysis of the nature of deductive logic. Strawson
lists three aspects of formal logic: generality, form and system. Generality is distinguishable,
clearly, from matter. Generality means that individual is not the subject matter of logic. Formal
logic concerns only with the relation between statements, but not objects. It is futile to embark
upon a study involving objects because such a study has only beginning but no end. Consider
two examples,
Arg. 6:
p1: The author of Abhijnana Shakuntala was in the court of king Bhoja.
p2: Kalidasa is the author of Abhijnana Shakuntala.
q : ∴Kalidasa was in the court of king Bhoja.

Arg. 7:
p1: The author of Monadology was in the court of the queen of Prussia.
p2: Leibniz is the author of Monadology.
q: ∴Leibniz was in the court of the queen of Prussia.
It is easy to decide prima facie that the structure of these arguments is identical. The difference
consists in subject matter only and it is possible to construct, at least theoretically, countless
arguments having an identical structure. Obviously, this is not a profitable exercise. The essence
of formal logic consists in saying that p1 & p2 together imply q or that q follows from or entails
p1 and p2 together. Only implication and entailment are relevant here. Strawson has made this
aspect very clear. Implication or entailment is independent of subject matter. Therefore it is
impossible to identify the subject matter in virtue of recognition of implication. This point can be
further clarified with the help of variables. Let us represent Abhijnana Shakunthala or
Monadology with x, Kalidasa or Leibniz with y and queen of Prussia or King Bhoja with z. Now
the argument takes this form.
Arg 7a : p1: The author of x was in the court of z.
p2: y is the author of x.
q : ∴y was in the court of z.
In this particular context, without knowing the contents of x, y, and z we can know that p1 and
p2 together imply q. Therefore it is possible to determine the validity or invalidity of an
argument without knowing the contents of the argument.

Let us call such forms logical forms. A logical form has two components: variables and
constants. x, y, z etc are variables. In the case of categorical proposition the words all, some, no
and not are constants. In the final analysis, the structure of an argument is determined by
constants, but not variables. The dependence of the laws of an argument on constants is
illustrated in this way. In life science the classification of animals is an important topic. The

5
anatomical features of birds and aquatic creatures differ and there is difference in the function of
those organs. Just as birds have some organs in common, aquatic creatures have certain other
organs in common. These common organs correspond to constants and individual creatures
correspond to variables. Similarly, every class of argument has definite constants. Just as the
structure of birds is different from the structure of aquatic creatures, the structure of one class of
arguments is different from the structure of some other class of arguments. The laws which
explain the function of the organs of birds are different from the laws which explain the function
of the organs of aquatic creatures. Similarly, in the case of arguments when the structure of an
argument differs from that of another, the corresponding laws also differ from one another.

Integration of rules is another characteristic of formal logic. The structures of argument and rules
are mutually dependent. If it is possible to decide the structure of an argument and also different
classes of arguments, then is possible to achieve what is called formalization or systematization
because formalization enables us to make a complete list of rules and also classify them so as to
correlate them with respective arguments..

On the contrary, induction, in the first place, stands for any non-demonstrative argument where
the premises, irrespective of their number, do not and cannot constitute conclusive evidences for
the conclusion. The word ‘induction’ is the translation of what Aristotle called ‘epagoge’. C.S.
Peirce used the term ‘ampliative’ for epagoge because in this type of argument the conclusion
always goes beyond the premises and the premises offer, at best, reasonable grounds to ‘believe’
such conclusion. Belief is not the same as proof, a distinction which was, more often than not,
completely ignored by the protagonists of induction. Nor is it a measure of proof. This is one
difference. Secondly, uncertainty and sense experience characterize inductive argument. Let us
consider the latter first. Inductive inference begins with sense experience. The premises,
therefore, can be called ‘observation-statements’ which directly result from experience.
However, the conclusion is not an observation-statement because it overshoots the material
provided by observation– statements, which is why they cannot justify the conclusion. No matter
how many black crows I have seen, they cannot prove that ‘all crows are black.’

At the stage, it is necessary to dispel a widespread and deep-rooted misconception. It is claimed


erroneously that inductive argument always produces universal statement. On the contrary, what
it provides is a statement which simply depends upon experience for further verification, but in
itself is not an experiential statement. On some occasions, experience vouches for the conclusion,
but on some other occasions, it does not. For example, considering the fact that, today I observed
5384 black crows, I may conclude that ‘tomorrow I will observe the same number of black
crows’. This type of conclusion is characterized by a sort of leap, leap from ‘observed to
unobserved or unobservable’. This is called inductive leap or simply generalization. But this is
not a universal statement as understood by traditional logic. It shows that induction is just
inconceivable in the absence of generalization though universal proposition is not necessary for
an inference to become inductive. It is possible to construct a universal statement within the
limits of sense experience without involving generalization, for example, when I conclude after
close scrutiny that every book in the library is a hardback edition. This has nothing to do with
induction. Therefore inductive inference may or may not yield universal proposition though it
has to yield necessarily generalization.

6
The examples considered above are future-oriented and in principle, they are verifiable.
However, inductive inference need not be so always. It can also be past-oriented which is surely,
‘unverifiable’. History, Anthropology, Geology, etc. consist of arguments which are past-
oriented. But the mechanism, involved in both the cases is exactly the same. Therefore the prime
characteristic of induction is that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises
and that experience precedes inference which means that inductive inference is dubitable and a
posteriori. Whatever knowledge we acquire ‘after experience’, or whatever depends upon
experience is called a posteriori as opposed to a priori.

Uncertainty or dubious nature and a posteriori knowledge provided by inductive logic entitle it to
be called empirical- again loosely- a characteristic disputed by Popper. The uncertainty of
inductive conclusion brought in another term basic to the philosophy of science, viz.
‘probability’. According to some inductivists all inductive conclusions are only probable. It is
important to distinguish validity and probability. As mentioned earlier, validity is not a matter of
degree, whereas probability is a matter of degree. Therefore an inductive inference may be less
probable or highly probable.

2.4 DEDUCTIVE REASONING AND SYLLOGISM

In Aristotelian sense, syllogism is the kind of logical form to which every deductive inference is
reducible. On most of the occasions, when people reason, they reason in methods in which some
logical pattern runs as undercurrent. It is only logicians who discover these undercurrents
because they are capable of critical examination of these undercurrents. The so-called logical
pattern is extracted from a lay-man’s method. A system is evolved by formalizing apparently
disparate arguments. The difference in these methods is clearly perceptible. The difference is that
a logician determines the standard-form which such argument or arguments take whereas a lay-
man is unaware of such standard-form. A logician’s method generalizes various arguments and it
helps in discovering the common form to which all such arguments subscribe. It is important
remember that the process of generalization is an important characteristic of formal logic.
Otherwise, logic will be looked upon as a mere rhetoric and therefore with no practical value. If
this is the way logic is evaluated, then anyone will conclude that it is far removed from the way
people, as a matter of fact, talk and argue which is, no doubt, far from truth.

Logical analysis of syllogism

To make clear what we have just said, let us contrast these methods.
A Lay-man’s method: ‘Does God exist? Of course, he does not! No one has ever seen him,
heard him, talked to him; has any one?’

B Logician’s method:
8 All bodies which exist are perceivable. B AP
God is not perceivable. GEP
∴ God is not a body which exists. ∴G E B

7
A Lay-man’s method: ‘Was the Neanderthal a man? Yes he was. In fact we have proof to
assert that he made tools, could paint, lived in groups etc.’

B Logician’s method:

9 All beings who make tools, can paint, live in groups, etc. are men. BAM
The Neanderthal was a being who made tools, could paint, lived in groups, etc. N A B
∴The Neanderthal was a man. ∴ NAM

What do we notice in these arguments? We notice that these arguments consist of three
propositions (each with an S and a P). The statement to be proved is found in the last place in
logical sense, and hence its technical name is ‘conclusion’; the other two propositions function
as reasons. Hence their logical name is ‘premise’. Premises are found at the very beginning,
again in logical sense. The order of the statements, therefore, is immaterial. Suppose that the
conclusion appears at the end, as it happens generally. Then the conclusion is immediately
preceded by words like therefore, as a result, hence, consequently, etc. It indicates that the
‘consequentia’ (the inference itself, as distinct from the ‘consequence’ which is another word for
‘conclusion’) is valid. The conclusion can as well appear at the very beginning in which case it is
immediately succeeded by words like because, for etc. Any of these words in italics functions as
a bridge connecting the premises with the conclusion. Further, we notice that at least one
evidence is in the form of general principle which is invariably a universal proposition (‘For
somebody to exist….. in the first example and ‘A man is one…’ in the second example) and also
that it is applied it to a particular case. Consequently, syllogism is invalid in the absence of
universal proposition.

A close look at arguments considered above reveals an interesting aspect. Though there are three
propositions, there are only three terms. Each term occurs twice in the arguments. These terms
are named as follows. S and P of the conclusion are called the minor term (S) (or simply minor)
and major term (P) (or simply major) respectively. The premise in which the minor occurs is
called the minor premise and the premise in which the major occurs is called the major premise.
One term is common to both the premises. This is called the middle term (M). In the first
example ‘God’ is minor , ‘bodies which exist’ is major and ‘perceivable’ is middle and in the
second example ‘Neanderthal’ is minor, ‘man’ is major and ‘beings who…groups’ is middle.
Again, order of premises does not matter though, generally, major finds the first place.

Aristotle had convincing reason to choose these names. While the major has maximum
extension, minor has minimum extension. The middle is so called because its extension varies
between the limits set by the minor and the major. Aristotle argued that our inference proceeds
from minor to major through middle. This explains the meaning of mediate inference.

Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space for your answers.

8
1. Compare and contrast deduction and induction. ................................. ...............................
............................. .......................... ...........................

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2. In a syllogism how do you relate the major, minor and middle terms?
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2.5 KINDS OF SYLLOGISM

Syllogism is a class name with several subclasses. The classification is determined by constants.
The types of constants vary from one class of syllogism to another class. Categorical syllogism is
an important subclass. In this subclass propositions with their constituent terms are variables and
quality and quantity of propositions are constants. Variables, i.e., propositions and their
constituent terms do not determine the logical status, i.e., validity or invalidity of arguments
because change of propositions does not affect the logical status as long as quality and quantity
remain the same. Only the latter determine the logical status of arguments. This is an important
aspect of formal logic. Let us first assume that every letter stands for a unique term and then
examine the following arguments.
1 Categorical syllogism:
10 All X are Y. 11 All P are Q. 12 All M are N.
All Y are Z. All Q are S. All N are O.
∴ All X are Z. ∴ All P are S. ∴ All M are O.
The logical status of 10, 11, and12 remains unchanged though terms differ. If terms are
different, then propositions also are different. In these arguments ‘All’ and ‘are’ are constants.
Suppose that ‘All’ is replaced ‘No’ in both the premises of 10. Then the argument becomes
invalid though variables remain unchanged. Even when the argument remains valid, its structure
may vary. This will become evident in the following example.

13 Some X are Y.
All Y are Z.
∴ Some X are Z.
The structure of 10 and 13 are different. It shows that the axioms which determine the logical
status of syllogism deal with quantity and quality of propositions and in turn distribution of
terms. ‘Some’ and ‘not’ are other constants. Constants mentioned above determine the structure
of categorical syllogism.

9
Before we turn to other subclass of syllogism called conditional syllogism we should consider an
important aspect. Modern logic makes a distinct classification of propositions; simple, general
and compound. If a grammatical sentence expresses one and only one proposition, then it is
simple. Categorical proposition is called general in modern logic and conditional proposition,
which is called compound in modern logic, is a combination of two or more than two
propositions of any kind. Those propositions which constitute a compound proposition are
components of such proposition. Several propositions are compounded using constants. Each
constant determines the species which belongs to this subclass. Let us restrict ourselves to
conditional syllogism and postpone further discussion of categorical syllogism to a later stage.

There are three kinds of conditional syllogisms which are discussed briefly.

2. Pure Hypothetical Syllogism (P. H. S.): In this subclass of syllogism all propositions are
hypothetical. They are called hypothetical because they express a condition. The words if ….
then constitute the condition and also constant because in the absence of this particular constant
the proposition ceases to be hypothetical. The statement which appears immediately after if is
called antecedent and the statement which appears immediately after then is called consequent.
P. H. S. is governed by one rule which says that one statement must be common to two premises.
If quality is constant, then it should appear in one premise as antecedent and in another as
consequent. The common statement can appear as antecedent in one and as consequent in
another provided it is affirmative in one and negative in another. In the latter case the conclusion
becomes negative.
P. H. S. is illustrated below.
14 If this party wins, then we shall have a good government. If A, then C.
If we shall have a good government, then we shall prosper. If C, then B.
∴Ιf this party wins, then we will prosper. ∴ If A, then B.
A and C constitute the components of the first premise, C and B constitute the components of
second and A and B constitute the components of the conclusion.

2 Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism (M. H. S.): If the major premise (usually the first one)
alone is hypothetical, then the syllogism is called M. H. S.. Second premise and the
conclusion are simple or general. M. H. S. is illustrated below.

15 If I do my duty, then I shall be happy. If A, then B.


I do my duty. A
∴ I shall be happy. ∴B

In these kinds, there is no ‘middle term’. However, middle term is replaced by a proposition
which is common to both the premises. In 14 ‘we shall have a good government’ is common to
both the premises and in 15 ‘I do my duty’ is common to both the premises. Hence we shall
introduce a new word; middle proposition. An important limitation should be noted at this stage
itself. It is fallacious to affirm B, in the minor premise instead of A and thereby affirm A in the
conclusion instead of B. It is a fallacy because it violates a rule of M. H. S. which states that
antecedent and consequent must be affirmed in the minor and the conclusion respectively. The
only legitimate alternative is to deny the consequent and the antecedent in the minor and the
conclusion respectively. In terms of prohibition it only means that the consequent and the

10
antecedent should not be affirmed in the minor and the conclusion respectively. When antecedent
and consequent are affirmed in the legitimate manner, the structure (technically known as mood)
of the argument is identified as Modus Ponendo Ponens (in brief Modus Ponens). When the
consequent and the antecedent are denied in the minor and the conclusion respectively, then the
structure is identified as Modus Tollendo Tollens ( in brief Modus Tollens). When we undertake a
study of symbolic logic, we will come to know the importance of these moods which are called
the Rules of Inference. If antecedent is denied in the minor instead of affirming, then the fallacy
committed is called the fallacy of denying the antecedent. If the consequent is affirmed in the
minor instead of denying, then the fallacy committed is called, the fallacy of affirming the
consequent. Modus Ponendo Ponens is illustrated by 15. The rest of the structures (both valid
and invalid) are given below.

Modus Tollendo Tollens


16 If C, then D.
not-D
∴ not-C

Fallacy of denying the antecedent Fallacy of affirming the consequent


17 If E, then F. 18 If G, then H.
not- E. H.
∴ not-F. ∴ G.

4. Disjunctive Syllogism (D.S.): In this subclass of syllogism the major premise (usually the first
one) expresses alternatives connected by connectives, ‘either… or’. So they are constants too.
Such a proposition is called disjunctive proposition. In disjunctive proposition the connective
either is implicit many times. Therefore its presence or absence does not alter the structure of the
proposition. Second premise and the conclusion are simple or general. In D.S. itself there are two
types. While regarding these two types the emphasis is on the connective or because as
mentioned above either is implicit many times. One use of or is called inclusive and another is
called exclusive. Or is used in inclusive sense if both alternatives are admissible and it is used in
exclusive sense when the alternatives are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive and the
acceptance of one alternative excludes the other. In the proposition ‘either he is stupid or
stubborn’ or is used in inclusive sense because the same person may be both stupid and stubborn.
However, in the proposition ‘either he is generous or miser’ or is used in exclusive sense because
no one can be both generous and miser at the same time. In order to bring both usages under one
class a rule is devised which says that one of the alternatives must be denied in the minor so that
the remaining alternative is affirmed in the conclusion. The following argument illustrates the
explanation.

19 Either he is stupid or stubborn. Either A or B .


He is not stupid. Not A.
∴ He is stubborn. ∴ B.
Here again there is no middle term. However, one component (A) appears in the first premise
in affirmative mode and in the second in negative mode. This occurrence corresponds to the
affirmative mode of common component in one premise and its negative mode in another in
PHS. A disjunctive argument with this structure is identified as Modus Tollendo Ponens.

11
In a disjunctive proposition the components are commutable, i.e., ‘either A or B’ means the same
as ‘either B or A’. Therefore in the minor premise any component can be denied. Affirming of a
component in the minor premise is not permissible. If this rule is violated, then the fallacy
committed is called the fallacy of Modus Ponendo Tollens. The following example illustrates this
fallacy.

20 Either I or J
I
∴ not-J
However, this is not a fallacy if the alternatives are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.

Check Your Progress II


Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. Describe the structure of Pure Hypothetical Syllogism with an example.


....................................................................................................................... ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................

........................................................................................................................ ...........................
2. Describe the structure of Disjunctive Syllogism with an example.
..................................................................................... ...........................

2.6 LET US SUM UP

Inference and implication are the essence of logic. Inference is psychological and implication is
logical. Deduction and induction are two forms of logic. Deduction is formal and induction is
material. Logical necessity characterizes the former and uncertainty characterizes the latter.
Categorical syllogism, P. H. S., M. H. S. and D.S. are the kinds of syllogism accepted by
traditional logic.

2.7 KEY WORDS

Inference: It is an operation of reason by which from some known truth we arrive at unknown
truth.
Major term: The term occurring in the predicate of the conclusion in a categorical syllogism.
Middle term: The term occurring in both the major and the minor premises of a standard-form
categorical syllogism.
Minor term: is the subject of the conclusion.

12
Major premise: The premise of a categorical syllogism that contains an instance of the major
term and in conditional syllogism the conditional proposition.
Minor premise: The premise of a categorical syllogism that contains the minor term.

2.8 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981?].

Baronett, Stan. Logic. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2008.

Copi, Irving M., and Carl Cohen. Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2007.

Priest, Graham. Logic. New York: Sterling Publishing. 2010.

Yoder, Gil ‘Categorical Syllogisms’


[Link] accessed August 2, 2010.

13
UNIT 3 FIGURE, MOOD AND THE POSSIBLE TYPES OF SYLLOGISMS

Contents
3.0 Objectives
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Moods of Categorical Syllogism
3.3 Figures of Syllogism
3.4 Incomplete Syllogism and Compound Syllogism
3.5 Dilemma
3.6 Avoiding Dilemma
3.7 Let Us Sum Up
3.8 Key Words
3.9 Further Readings and References

3.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit proposes to introduce a very interesting aspect of syllogism, viz. figures and moods.
Through a study of figures and moods you will be in a position to gain an insight into the
intricacies of categorical syllogism. This is the main objective of this unit. Second objective is to
introduce you to the abridged and extended versions of syllogism.
Another equally important objective is to bring out the features of dilemma which is a sort of
pseudo- syllogism so that you will be in a position to contrast a genuine argument like syllogism
with a pseudo-argument. Thereby another objective is also served. Your acumen to evaluate the
logical significance is further sharpened. This is the most invaluable gift of logic.

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Arguments are of complex nature. It is not possible to bring all arguments, even arguments of
one class, under a common head. A detailed analysis of syllogism reveals the hidden
complexities of the same. Such a study consists in the discussion of the structure of syllogism
which leads to figures and moods. A clear understanding of the structure of syllogism exposes
the wealth of syllogistic argument. As usual, the premises have to be taken as true, whether or
not they are factually true.

3.2 MOODS OF CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

In the previous unit a brief reference was made to what is known as ‘mood’. It is not possible to
fully appreciate the role played by moods in the study of syllogism without prior discussion of
what is known as figure. Figure and mood together determine the structure of syllogism. An
appraisal of the significance of structure in deductive inference in general and syllogism in

1
particular is made much easier when we deal with ‘figures and moods’ of syllogism. An analysis
of the structure of argument in deductive inference is a pre-requisite to the classification of
arguments into good (valid) and bad (invalid). Since the very function of logic is to distinguish
arguments in the aforesaid manner, a study of figure and mood occupies an important position in
our study of syllogism. In order to simplify the task, let us state the arguments in what is called
standard-form. Accordingly, the major premise is stated first followed by the minor premise and
ending with the conclusion. The following example illustrates what standard-form means:
1 All humans are mortal.
Joseph is a human.
∴ Joseph is mortal.
Although arguments in ordinary language appear in several forms, it is not at all difficult to
restate them in standard-form. First we identify the conclusion which is to be placed in the final
position. Whichever premise contains the predicate term of the conclusion automatically
occupies the first place because the major premise should be stated first (Kemerling 2010). We
notice that ‘mortal’ is the predicate of the conclusion which appears in the first place in the
argument followed by the minor premise. Therefore this type of arrangement subscribes to
standard-form.

The Mood of a Syllogism


As mentioned earlier, there are four types of categorical proposition; universal affirmative (A),
universal negative (E), particular affirmative (I), and particular negative (O). Since a syllogistic
argument consists of three categorical propositions, they may occur in any order in the
arguments. What is more interesting is the fact that the very same type of proposition may occur
thrice. There is no restriction on the number of occasions on which a particular type of
proposition occurs in an argument. For example, all three propositions in an argument may be A
only. Or they may be I only. Briefly said, the mood of a syllogism is simply a combination of
categorical propositions (A, E, I, or O) which the argument comprises of. Suppose that only O
proposition comprises of an argument, then the mood of the argument is said to be OOO.
Similarly, a syllogistic argument with a mood of OAO has an O proposition as its major premise,
an A proposition as its minor premise, and another O proposition as its conclusion; and EIO has
an E as its major premise, and an I as the minor premise, and an O as the conclusion; etc.
(Kemerling 2010).

Let us consider another example.

2 A: All rocks are hard things.


E: No rocks are liquid.
I: ∴ Some liquid things are not hard.
The mood of this argument is AEI. This shows that every letter states symbolically the
quantity and quality of propositions and every letter occurs in the very same order in which the
propositions occur in the argument. Therefore the order in which the three letters occur specifies
the mood of the syllogism. Consider the following syllogistic argument.

3 E: No women named Deepti are outer island Yapese women.

2
A: All outer island Yapese women are weavers of the baskets.
O: ∴ Some weavers of the baskets are not women named Deepti.

In the above syllogism the minor term (subject of the conclusion) is ‘weavers of the baskets’, the
major term (predicate of the conclusion) is ‘women named Deepti’ and the middle term is ‘outer
island Yapese women’. Therefore the first premise is the major, second is the minor and the third
is the conclusion.

The structure of these arguments is considered for the purpose of illustration. While symbolizing
the propositions, let us use the first letter of the term. The letter which appears in the middle
stands for the quality and quantity of propositions.

1 Major premise: All H are M. HAM 2 All R are H. RAH


Minor premise: J is H. JAH No R are L. REL
Conclusion ∴ J is M. JAM ∴ Some L are not H. ∴LOH

3 Major premise: No W is Y. W EY
Minor premise: All Y is B. Y AB
Conclusion ∴ Some B is not W. ∴B OW

One question remains to be answered. How many moods can we list? For the time being, let
us restrict ourselves to an incomplete answer. Accordingly, we can list 64 Moods. (At this stage,
let us not restrict ourselves to valid Moods). There is no need to list all these 64 Moods. But what
is needed is to know how we arrive at this figure because the number is not fixed arbitrarily.
There are four kinds of propositions which have to take three positions in such a manner that any
proposition can occur in any one of the four different ways; 0, 1, 2 and 3. When we compute all
possible arrangements, we arrive at 64. There are two important aspects. First, we have
discovered a certain number of structures in which syllogistic arguments can be constructed, and
secondly, which we notice later, not all structures to which arguments subscribe are valid. It is in
this sense that the logical status of an argument is determined by the structure of that particular
argument.

3.3 FIGURES OF SYLLOGISM:

It is easy to understand the meaning and significance of figure. The ‘figure’ of a syllogism is
determined by the position of ‘middle term’. We have said that the ‘middle term’ appears both in
the major and in the minor premises. Therefore its possible positions in premises result in four
different configurations. A schematic representation is preferable to verbal description.
Figure 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4
M–P P–M M–P P–M
S–M S–M M–S M–S
S–P S–P S–P S–P

3
From this scheme it is clear that neither P nor S determines the figure of syllogism. History has
recorded that Aristotle accepted only the first three figures. The origin of the fourth figure is
disputed. While Quine said that Theophrastus, a student of Aristotle, invented the fourth figure,
Stebbing said that it was Gallen who invented the fourth figure. This dispute is not very
significant. But what Aristotle says on the first figure is significant.

Aristotle regarded the first figure as most ‘scientific’. It is likely that by ‘scientific’ he meant
‘satisfactory’. One of the reasons, which Aristotle has adduced in defence of his thesis, is what
the nature of laws of mathematics and physical sciences suggest. According to him these
sciences establish laws in the form of the first figure. Second reason is that reasoned conclusion
or reasoned fact is generally found, according to Aristotle, in the first figure. Aristotle believed
that only universal affirmative conclusion can provide complete knowledge and universal
affirmative conclusion is possible only in the first figure. Aristotle quotes the fundamental
principle of syllogism. ‘One kind of syllogism serves to prove that A inheres in C by showing
that A inheres in B and B in C’. This principle can be expressed in this form:
Minor: A inheres in B

Major: B inheres in C

A inheres in C

Evidently, this argument satisfies transitive relation. This is made clear with the help of this
diagram:

Let us consider four examples, which correspond to four figures.

I
M P
Major Premise: All artists are poets. AAP
S M
Minor Premise: All musicians are artists. MAA

Conclusion: MAP
All musicians are poets.

4
S P

II
P M
Major Premise: All saints are pious. SAP
S M
Minor Premise: No criminals are pious. CEP

Conclusion: CES
No criminals are saints.
S P

III
M P
Major Premise: All great works are worthy of study. GAW
M S
Minor Premise: All great works are epics. GAE

Conclusion: EIW
Some epics are worthy of study.
S P

IV
P M
Major Premise: No soldiers are traitors. SET
M S
Minor Premise: All traitors are sinners. TAS

Conclusion: SOS
Some sinners are not soldiers.
S P
We will consider figures in conjunction with moods. Then only knowledge of the ‘figure of
syllogism’ permits us to compute the total number of possible moods. Mood is determined by
quality and quantity of propositions, which constitute syllogism. Since there are four figures, in
all two hundred and fifty six ways of arranging categorical propositions is possible. These are
exactly what we mean by moods. However, out of two hundred and fifty-six, two hundred and
forty-five moods can be shown to be invalid by applying the rules and corollaries. So we have
only eleven valid moods. Even this is not sufficient to have a clear picture. There is no figure in
which all eleven moods are valid. Within the framework of traditional logic, in any given figure
only six moods are valid. They are as follows:

5
I AAA, AAI, EAE, EAO, EIO and AII
II AEE, AEO, EAE, EAO, EIO and AOO
III AAI, AII, IAI, EAO, EIO and OAO
IV AAI, IAI, AEE, AEO, EAO, and EIO

In all these cases, first letter stands for the major premise, second for the minor and third for the
conclusion. Moods are represented above in three ways. Moods in italics and bold form are
called strengthened moods, and moods in mere italics are called weakened moods. All other
moods are represented in normal form. It is important to know the difference between the first
two types. When the laws of syllogism permit two universal premises to yield logically only
particular conclusion, then such moods are called strengthened moods. On the other hand, if we
deduce particular conclusion from two universal premises, even when the laws of syllogism
permit two universal premises to yield logically a universal conclusion, then such moods are
called weakened moods.

In this scheme, we notice that EIO is valid in all the figures. Interestingly, IEO is invalid in all
the figures. The only difference between EIO and IEO is that the minor and the major premises
are only transposed which clearly shows that the position of premises, which is a part of the
structure, determines the validity of argument. Though EIO is valid in more than one figure it is
one mood in one figure and some other in another figure. Likewise, AEE is valid in the second
and the fourth figures. But it is one mood in the second figure and a different mood in the fourth
figure.

Since Aristotle argued that the first figure is the perfect figure, he felt the need to transmute all
valid arguments in II and III figures to I figure so that if the transmuted mood is valid in I figure,
then the corresponding mood in any figure other than the first is also valid. Transmutation from
fourth figure to the first figure must have been evolved by the inventor of the former. Reduction
is the tool to test the validity of arguments. In the thirteenth century, one logician by name Pope
John XXI, devised a technique to remember the method of reducing arguments from other
figures to the first figure. This technique is known as mnemonic verses. Accordingly, each
mood, excluding weakened moods, was given a special name:

I. Fig: AAA BARBARA III. Fig: AAI DARAPTI


EAE CELARENT IAI DISAMIS
AII DARII AII DATISI
EIO FERIO EAO FELAPTON
OAO BOCARDO
EIO FERISON

II. Fig: EAE CESARE IV. Fig: AAI BRAMANTIP


AEE CAMESTRES AEE CAMENES

6
EIO FESTINO IAI DIMARIS
AOO BAROCO EAO FESAPO
EIO FRESISON

The method is like this. If the names begin with C, then the syllogism has to be reduced to the
first figure which begins with a C. For example, CESARE (a syllogism of the second figure) has
to be reduced to CELARENT. Other consonants of the name have also their significance; ‘s’
(like in CESARE) signifies that the preceding ‘E’ needs to undergo simple conversion; ‘p’
signifies that the preceding proposition has to be converted by ‘limitation’; ‘t’ signifies that the
order of the premises has to be changed; ‘st’ indicates that two operations, viz., simple
conversion and transposition of the proposition represented by the preceding vowel are required
to be carried out. BAROCO and BOCARDO are reduced in a different manner. O propositions
in both the moods have to be obverted first and then follow the relevant path to effect reduction.

However, the situation in modern logic is very different. The logicians proved that from
universal propositions alone particular proposition cannot be derived and vice versa.
Accordingly, both strengthened and weakened moods become invalid. Thus in the new scheme
the number of valid moods reduces to fifteen.
Check Your Progress I

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. What are the factors which determine the mood of a syllogism?


.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................


2. Discuss the significance of the ‘figure’ of categorical syllogism.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................

..............

3.4 INCOMPLETE SYLLOGISM AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISM

1. Enthymeme: Enthymeme is called an incomplete syllogism in which one or the other


proposition is not stated explicitly. As a matter of fact, such an incomplete syllogism is closer to
the way we generally argue in everyday life. If standard–form is the criterion, then it is not
logically valid unless what is implicitly understood is taken into consideration. That is, it must be
formally completed.

7
Examples: 1 You have hurt your neighbour.
Therefore you have sinned against God.
(Major premise implicitly understood: Those who hurt their neighbours sin against God).
2 Those who hurt their neighbours sin against God.
Therefore you have sinned against god.
(Minor premise implicitly understood: You have hurt your neighbour).
3 Those who hurt their neighbour sin against God.
And you have hurt your neighbour.
(Conclusion implicitly understood: Therefore you have sinned against God).

When the major premise is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded as the first-order
enthymeme. When the minor premise is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded as the
second-order enthymeme. When the conclusion is implicitly understood, enthymeme is regarded
as the third-order enthymeme. A question may arise in this context. If two propositions are
adequate to convey the information, where is the need to have full-fledged syllogism? This
question can be answered in two ways. When we deal with learned or well-informed persons or
with ourselves, enthymeme will surely serve the purpose. A full – fledged syllogism is needed
when we have to educate not so well – informed, if not ill – informed persons. We should not fail
to notice close similarity between enthymeme and svarthaanumana and paraarthaanumana
(inference for self and inference for others). The question can be answered in this way also.
Syllogism is formal and enthymeme is informal. Choice is subjective.

2 Sorites: If an argument consists of three or more than three premises, then such an argument is
called sorites. It is also called polysyllogism. There are two kinds of sorites: Aristotelian sorites
and Goclenian sorites. The primary rules which govern sorites are the rules of the categorical
Syllogism only.

Let us begin with the structure of sorites. In Aristotelian sorites the first premise is minor and the
last premise is major. In consecutive premises M is predicate in the first premise and in the next
premise subject. In sorites there are two or more than two conclusions which are implicit. Every
such hidden conclusion functions as the premise. Therefore a sorites consists of at least three
syllogistic arguments and hence it consists of a chain of syllogisms which are interrelated. In
order to arrive at the final conclusion these hidden conclusions also must be reckoned.
Consider this example.
1
Premises Hidden conclusions (a and b)
1. All A are B. a. All A are C.
2. All B are C.
3. All C are D. 3 All C are D.
__________
b. All A are D.
4. All D are E All D are E

All A are E.

8
It is easy to understand this structure. From (1) and (2) we have derived (a). This is hidden
because at no point of time is this expressed. When this is conjoined with (3), (a) becomes a
premise. So is the case with b. This shows that every hidden conclusion is, in fact, the premise of
next argument. In this argument ‘a’ and ‘b’ are hidden conclusions which become premises at
subsequent stages. In Aristotelian sorites, the subject of the first premise is also the subject of the
conclusion and the predicate of the last premise is also the predicate of the conclusion. In the set
of hidden conclusions also the same pattern can be noticed. This pattern shows that in
Aristotelian sorites the first premise is the minor and the last premise is the major.

Let us consider the rules of Aristotelian sorites.


1 Only major premise (last premise) can be negative.

2 only minor premise (first premise) can be particular.

In Goclenian sorites the order is reversed. Consider this example.


2
Premises Hidden conclusion (a and b)
1 All A are B. a All C are B.
2 All C are A.
3 All D are C. 3 All D are C.
b All D are B.
4 All E are D. 4 All E are D.
All E are B.
In this kind the predicate of the conclusion is the predicate of the first premise. Therefore the first
premise is major. The subject of the conclusion is the subject of the last premise. Therefore the
last premise is the minor. The rules of this kind are as follows.
1 Only the first premise (major) can be negative.
2 Only the last premise (minor) can be particular.
One point should become clear at this stage. One kind of sorites is the reversal of the other. If we
disregard the positions of premises, then the difference between these two kinds becomes
insignificant.

3.5 DILEMMA

The dilemma consists of three propositions of which two constitute premises and third one is the
conclusion. One of the premises is a conjunction of two hypothetical propositions and the other
one is disjunctive. The conclusion is either disjunctive or simple. Since the dilemma consists of
two hypothetical propositions conjoined by the word ‘and’, it is possible that two different
propositions are found in place of antecedents and two different propositions are found in place
of consequents. But it is not necessary that it should be so. It is likely that both propositions
have a common consequent. If such consequent becomes the conclusion, then, the conclusion is
a simple proposition.

9
Let us consider its so-called value before we proceed further with our analysis. The dilemma, in
the strict sense of the word validity, is neither valid nor invalid. This is so because in this
particular pattern there is no way of fixing the truth-value of the propositions. The dilemma does
not contribute to the growth of knowledge. Nor does it help in testing what is in need of testing.
Its significance is only restricted to rhetoric. The dilemma is an example of misuse or abuse of
logic. Such a situation arises when a person, who is ignorant of logic, is confronted by an
unscrupulous logician. It is most unlikely that the dilemma was ever seriously considered by any
professional committed to logic. It, then, means that the dilemma has only negative significance,
i.e., to know how not to argue.
The Structure of dilemma:
Let us begin with the structure of dilemma. Its uniqueness is quite interesting.
a. The first premise (p1) consists of two hypothetical propositions conjoined together.
b. The second premise (p2) is a disjunctive proposition. Its alternatives either affirm or deny the
consequents of the hypothetical major premise.
c. The conclusion is either simple or disjunctive. It either affirms the consequents or denies.

Kinds of Dilemma:
The kinds of dilemma are represented in the form of a table.

Dilemma

Constructive Distructive

Simple Complex Simple Complex

1. In a complex constructive dilemma (CCD) antecedents and consequents are different. In


the second premise antecedents are affirmed disjunctively and in the conclusion the
consequents are affirmed in similar fashion. In a simple constructive dilemma (SCD), both
hypothetical propositions have common consequents, though antecedents differ. These
antecedents are affirmed disjunctively in the second premise and the consequent is
affirmed in the conclusion. Since there is only one consequent, the conclusion is a simple
proposition.
2. The structure of complex destructive dilemma (CDD) differs slightly from the first kind.
The difference is that the consequents and antecedents are denied respectively in the minor
premise and the conclusion disjunctively. However, the structure of the first premise
remains the same.

3. The structure of simple destructive dilemma (SDD) differs slightly from the second kind.
In this type also the conclusion is a simple proposition, but negative. The second premise

10
has structure similar to that of p2 of CDD. Now, we can make a list of common features of
different kinds of dilemma.

Dilemma Common Features


1. Constructive Different antecedents
2. Destructive Different consequents
3. Complex Disjunctive conclusion
4. Simple Simple conclusion

3.6 AVOIDING DILEMMA

Use of dilemma is restricted to some situations. When neither unconditional affirmation of


antecedent nor unconditional denial of consequent is possible, logician may use this route. It
indicates either ignorance or shrewdness. When we face dilemma, we only try to avoid, but not
to refute. There are three different ways in which we can try to avoid dilemma. All these ways
only reflect escapist tendency. Only an escapist tries to avoid a problematic situation. Therefore,
in logic they do not carry much weight.

1. Escaping between the horns of dilemma: Two consequents mentioned may be incomplete.
If it is possible to show that they are incomplete then we can avoid facing dilemma. This is
what is known as ‘escaping between the horns of dilemma’. It should be noted that even
when third consequent is suggested it does not mean that this new consequents is actually
true. In other words, the new consequent also is questionable.

2. Taking the dilemma by horns: In this method of avoiding dilemma, attempts are made to
contradict the hypothetical propositions, which are conjoined. A hypothetical proposition is
contradicted when antecedent and negation of consequent are accepted. However, in this
particular case it is not attempted at all. Moreover, since the major premise is a conjunction
of two hypothetical propositions, the method of refutation is more complex. (The negation
of conjunction will be introduced at a later stage. For the time being it is enough to know
that in this particular instance there is no such attempt.)

3. Rebuttal of dilemma: It appears to be the contradiction of dilemma. But, in reality, it is not.


In all these cases, the dilemma becomes a potent weapon to mislead the opponent in
debate. Therefore none of these methods amounts to the contradiction of opponent’s view.

We will consider examples for four kinds, which can be used to illustrate these
methods.

i). Complex Constructive Dilemma (CCD):


p
p1: If (any government wages war to acquire wealth), then (it becomes a
q r

11
rogue government) and if (it wages war to expand its territory), then (it
s
becomes colonial).
p r
p2: (Any government wages war either to acquire wealth) or (to expand its

territory) q s
q: It (becomes a rogue government) or (colonial).

ii). Simple Constructive Dilemma (SCD):


p q
p1: If (taxes are reduced to garner votes), then (the government loses revenue).
r
and if (taxes are reduced in order to simplify taxation), then (the
q
government loses revenue).
p r
p2: (Taxes are reduced either to garner votes) or (to simplify taxation)
q
q: (The government loses its revenue).

iii). Complex Destructive Dilemma (CDD):

p q
p1: If (the nation wages war), then (there will be no problem of
r
unemployment) and if (the nation does not revise her industrial policy),
s
then (it will lead to revolution).

not- q not - s
p2: The (problem of unemployment remains unsolved) or (there will not be any
revolution).
not - p not - r
q: (The nation does not wage war) or (the nation will revise her industrial
policy).

iv). Simple Destructive Dilemma (SDD):


p q
p1: If (you are in the habit of getting up early), then (you are a
p r

12
theist) and if (you are in the habit of getting up early), then (you are a labourer).
not - q not - r
p2: (you are not a theist) or (you are not a labourer).
not - p
q: (you are not in the habit of getting up early).

The first way of avoiding the dilemma, i.e., escaping between the horns of dilemma can be
illustrated using 1 (CCD). It is possible to argue that, when the government wages war, the
motive is neither to acquire wealth nor to expand its territory in which case, the government is
neither rouge nor colonial. The motive may be to spread its official religion or personal vendetta
or it may be to protect its interests. If the last one is the motive, then, it becomes difficult to find
fault with such government. Any one of the proposed alternatives or all alternatives to disjuncts
may be false. There is no way of deciding what the situation is. The reader can select remaining
examples to illustrate this method. Likewise, consider fourth argument to illustrate the second
method. I may concede that a person gets up early only because he wants to maintain health. So
the purpose is not to worship God. Nor is he a labourer. Again, this is also an assumption.

Rebutting of dilemma requires a different type of example. Consider this one:

i). p q
p1: If (teacher is a disciplinarian), then (he is unpopular among students) and
¬p r
if (he is not a disciplinarian), then (his bosses do not like him).
p ¬p
p2: (Teacher is a disciplinarian) or (he is not a disciplinarian).
q v r
q: (Teacher is unpopular among students) or (his bosses do not like him).
A witty teacher may respond in this way.

ii). ¬p q
p1 : If (teacher is not a disciplinarian), then (he is popular among students)

p r
and if (he is a disciplinarian) then (his bosses will like him.)

¬p p
p2 : (Teacher is not a disciplinarian) or (he is a disciplinarian)
q ¬r
q : (Teacher is popular among students) or (his bosses will like him)
Only a student of logic discovers that these conclusions of i and ii are not contradictories (you
will learn about it in the forthcoming units) in the strict sense of the term. Hence, there is really
no rebuttal.

13
Further, the dilemma, which an individual faces in day-to-day life, is very different. For
example, moral dilemma has nothing to do with the kinds of dilemma which we have discussed
so far.

Since the dilemma is a medley of both types of conditional propositions, i. e., hypothetical and
disjunctive, it should follow the basic rules of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms. It should
affirm disjunctively the antecedents in the minor or deny disjunctively the consequents in the
minor. The dilemma is powerful if in the major there is a strong cause-effect relationship
between the antecedent and the consequent and in the minor the alternatives are exhaustive and
mutually exclusive. Again, the former is debatable.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answer.

1. What are the characteristics of dilemma?


........................................................................................................................ ......................

........................................................................................................................ .....................

........................................................................................................................ ......................
2. What are the methods of avoiding dilemma?
....................................................................................................................... ......................

........................................................................................................................ ......................

........................................................................................................................ .....................

3.7 LET US SUM UP

The structure of syllogism is determined by figures and moods. The position of the middle term
determines the figure to which syllogism belongs. There are four figures and eleven valid moods.
Strengthened and weakened moods are not valid according to modern logic. The dilemma is a
shrewd way of getting out of trouble. Escaping between the horns of dilemma, taking the
dilemma by horns and rebuttal of dilemma are the ways of avoiding dilemma. Dilemma is not a
sound logical way of arguing.
________________________________________________________________________
3.8 KEY WORDS

Figure: ‘figure’ of a syllogism is determined by ‘middle term’.

14
Mood: ‘mood’ of a syllogism is determined by the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three
propositions.
Dilemma: A dilemma in logic means an argument that presents an antagonist with a choice of
two or more alternatives, each of which appears to contradict the original contention and is
inconclusive. The dilemma is a powerful instrument of persuasion and a devastating weapon in
controversy.

3.9 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. Logic. Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, [1981].


Kemerling, Garth Categorical Syllogisms’ Philosophy Pages, http
[Link] 2001. Accessed on July 2, 2010.
‘Introduction to Logic,’ University of Lander, [Link]
accessed July, 2010.7

Ling, Lee ‘Categorical Syllogisms’


[Link]

Mathew, E.P., and Augustine Perumalil. Critical Thinking and Planned Writing. Chennai: Satya
Nilayam Publications, 2008.

15
UNIT 4 VALIDITY, INVALIDITY AND LIST OF VALID SYLLOGISMS

Contents

4.0 Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.2 The Rules of Categorical Syllogisms
4.3 Special Applications of General Rules
4.4 Reduction of Arguments to I Figure
4.5 Antilogism or Inconsistent Triad
4.6 Venn Diagram Technique
4.7 Boolean Analysis
4.8 Let us Sum up
4.9 Key Words
4.10 Further Readings and References

4.0 OBJECTIVES

This unit brings out the most important part of your study of categorical syllogism. You will be
introduced to the rules which determine the validity of arguments. While this is the most
important objective, the icing on the cake is the variety of the methods of determining the
validity of arguments. Both traditional and modern methods of testing the validity receive due
recognition in this unit. Therefore contribution of both John Venn and George Boole find place
in this unit. This particular study enables you to grasp the relation between logic and set theory
which is brought to the fore in this unit.

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the second and third units we learnt two important aspects of categorical syllogism, viz.,
figures and moods. However, we did not develop the technique of distinguishing valid from
invalid arguments. Consequently, we could not know under what conditions a mood becomes
valid and what is still worse, we could not understand why a certain arrangement or
configuration of propositions in one figure is legitimate (only a legitimate combination of
propositions yields valid mood) and in some other figure illegitimate yielding only invalid
moods, and conversely, why a certain configuration of propositions is illegitimate in some
figures and legitimate in some other figure or figures. In other words, the question what makes
an argument valid was not raised at all. The point is that the validity of an argument depends on
whether or not the conclusion is a conclusion in the strict sense of the word, i.e. whether or not it
logically follows from the premises. This brings us to the vital aspect of our study. Just as
application or non-application of rules makes a game legitimate or illegitimate, mere application
or non-application of rules makes an argument valid or invalid. Application of rules demands
knowledge of rules. Therefore we must focus on the question what rules are there which
determine the validity of syllogism.

1
4.2 THE RULES OF CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM

Classical Logic lists eight rules of valid categorical syllogism; four of them concern the terms,
and four of them concern the propositions. These rules are not provable. They have to be either
accepted or rejected. If they are rejected, syllogism is not possible. Therefore what is given is
only an explication of the rules. Classical logic classified these rules under rules of structure,
rules of distribution of terms, rules of quality, and rules of quantity.

I. Rules of structure

1. Syllogism must contain three, and only three, propositions

Syllogism is defined as a kind of mediate inference consisting of two premises which together
determine the truth of the conclusion. This definition shows that if the number of propositions is
more than two, then it ceases to be syllogism. Therefore by definition syllogism must consist of
two premises and one conclusion. Therefore together they make up for three propositions.

2. Syllogism must consist of three terms only


A proposition consists of two terms. However, three propositions consist of only three terms
because each term occurs twice. Suppose that there are four terms. Then there is no middle term,
a term common to two premises. In such a case the violation of rule results in a fallacy called
fallacy of four terms. Such a fallacy is never committed knowingly because knowing fully well
the fixed number of terms, we do not choose four terms. But we do it unknowingly. It happens
when an ambiguous word is used in two different senses on two different occasions. Then there
are really four terms, not three terms. If an ambiguous word takes the place of middle term, then
the fallacy committed is known as fallacy of ambiguous middle. Similarly, if an ambiguous term
takes the place of the major or the minor term, then the fallacy of ambiguous major or ambiguous
minor, as the case may be, is committed. The following argument illustrates the fallacy of
ambiguous middle.
Fallacy of ambiguous middle:
1
All charged particles are electrons.
Atmosphere in the college is charged.
Atmosphere in the college is an electron.
The word in italics is ambiguous. The other two fallacies are hardly committed. Therefore there
is no need to consider examples for them. The moral is that all sentences in arguments must be
unambiguous. This is possible only when all terms are unambiguous in the given argument. We
must also consider the inversion of ambiguous middle. Suppose that synonymous words are used
in place of middle term. Then apparently there are four terms. But, in reality, there are three
terms. For example starry world and stellar world are not two terms. Such usages also are
uncommon. Hence they deserve to be neglected.
II. Rules of distribution of terms:
1. Middle term must be distributed at least once in the premises. If this rule is violated, then the
argument commits the fallacy of undistributed middle. One example will illustrate this rule.

2
2
All circles are geometrical figures.
All squares are geometrical figures.
 All circles are squares.
2. In the conclusion, no term may be taken in a more ‘extensive’ sense than in the premises. It
also means that a term which is distributed in the conclusion must remain distributed in the
respective premise. This rule can be stated this way also. A term which is undistributed in the
premise must remain undistributed in the conclusion. However, it is not necessary that a term,
which is distributed in the premise, must be distributed in the conclusion.

Suppose that the major term violates this rule. Then the argument commits the fallacy of illicit
major. When the minor term violates this rule, fallacy illicit minor is committed. The following
arguments illustrate these fallacies.
3

All philosophers are thinkers.


No ordinary men are philosophers.
No ordinary men are thinkers.
4

All aquatic creatures are fish.


All aquatic creatures swim.
All those which swim are fish.

First argument illustrates the fallacy of undistributed middle; second illustrates the fallacy of
illicit major and the third illustrates the fallacy of illicit minor.

III. Rules of quality:


1. From two negative premises, no conclusion can be drawn. It only means that at least one
premise must be affirmative.
2. If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion cannot be negative. Negatively, it only means
that a negative conclusion is possible only when one premise is negative.

IV Rules of quantity:

If both premises are particular, no conclusion can be drawn or the conclusion must always follow
the weaker part. Here weaker part is particular. This rule shows that at least one premise must be
universal.

If one premise is particular, then the conclusion must be particular only. It means that universal
conclusion is possible only when both premises are universal. In practice, last three sets of rules
play an important role in determining the validity of categorical syllogism.

Check Your Progress I

3
Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

Examine the following arguments.


1) All kings are thinkers.
Some ordinary men are not kings.
No ordinary men are thinkers.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
2) All stars are bright.
All bright objects are attractive.
 All attractive objects are stars.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

3) Some radicals are good men.


Some good men are honest.
Some radicals are honest.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .... 4
4) The monkey is nonhuman.
Some of those who are of capable of laughter are humans.
 The monkey is not capable of laughter.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ...........................
……………………………………………………………………………

4.3 SPECIAL APPLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL RULES

In the previous unit we learnt that a certain arrangement of categorical propositions is legitimate
in one figure and illegitimate in some other figure, the only exception being EIO. For the purpose
of contrast we should recognize that its reversal, IEO, is invalid in all the figures. One way of
recognizing valid or invalid arguments is the use of rules listed above. We have another method
known as ‘special rules of figures’. These rules are called special rules because they apply to
only that particular figure but not to others. These rules are dependent upon general rules.
Therefore it is possible to give proofs to these rules.

I Figure
a) The minor must be affirmative.
b) The major must be universal.
M–P
S-M
S–P

4
a) If the minor is negative, then the conclusion must be negative. In negative conclusion P is
distributed while it is undistributed in the major premise. This goes against the rule which asserts
that a term undistributed in the premise should remain undistributed in the conclusion. Therefore
minor must be affirmative.
b) That the major must be universal is clear from the fact that if the minor is affirmative, M in it
is undistributed and therefore the major must be universal if M must be distributed in it.

Now we shall apply these special rules to know how or why a certain mood is valid and certain
other moods invalid in a figure, a point which we discussed in the previous unit. Let us omit
weakened moods.
The valid moods of I figure are listed below.

I Fig: AAA BARBARA


EAE CELARENT
AII DARII
EIO FERIO

II Figure:
a) One premise must be negative.
b) The major must be universal.

P–M
S–M
S- P

a) One premise must be negative. Otherwise, M remains undistributed in both the premises. b)
The major must be universal because P is distributed in negative conclusion and hence it must be
distributed in the major.

The valid moods of II figure are listed below.


EAE CESARE
AEE CAMESTRES
EIO FESTINO
AOO BAROCO

III Figure:
a) The ‘minor’ must be affirmative.
b) The conclusion must be Particular.

M–P
M–S
S–P

5
a) Minor must be affirmative because negative minor gives only negative conclusion in
which case P is distributed in the conclusion. P can be distributed in major only if it is
negative. Negative minor results in negative major which is not allowed. Therefore minor
must be affirmative.
b) The conclusion must be particular. Otherwise S becomes distributed in the conclusion
while it remains undistributed in affirmative minor.

The valid moods are listed below.


III Fig: AAI DARAPTI
IAI DISAMIS
AII DATISI
OAO BOCARDO
EIO FERISON
EAO FELOPTON

IV Figure:
a) If the ‘major’ is affirmative, the ‘minor’ must be universal.
b) If the minor is affirmative, the conclusion must be particular.
c) If the conclusion is negative, the major must be negative.
P–M
M–S
S–P

The valid moods are listed below.


AAI DARAPTI
AEE CAMENES
EAO FESAPO
IAI DIMARIS
EIO FRESISON

It would be good logical exercise for the student to take up these special rules and try to deduce
them from the general ones. This is the reason why we have left the special rules of figure 4
unexplained.

4.4 REDUCTION OF ARGUMENTS TO I FIGURE

Reducing arguments from other figures to the first figure is one of the techniques developed by
Aristotle and one of his followers to test the validity of arguments. After reduction, if the
argument is valid in the first figure, then it means that the original argument in the corresponding
figure is valid. This technique is quite mechanical. So we are only required to know what exactly
is involved in this method. We will learn this only by practice. Strengthened moods are included
for the sake of exercise though they are not required from the point of view of modern logic.
There is no need to consider weakened moods separately when the technique involved is

6
reduction. What is required is replacement of universal by its corresponding subaltern in the
conclusion.

1
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
CESARE CELARENT

PEM  Conversion MEP
SAM SAM
SEP SEP

No politicians are poets.  Conversion  No poets are politicians.

All girls are poets. All girls are poets.


No girls are politicians. No girls are politicians.

In CESARE ‘S’ after ‘E’ indicates simple conversion. It shows that ‘E’ (major premise) must
undergo simple conversion.
2
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
CAMESTRES CELARENT
PAM MES

S E M  conversion M E S PAM

SEP P E S conversionS E P

‘S’ and ‘T’ after ‘E’ show that ‘E’ (minor premise) should undergo simple conversion and both
premises be transposed. ‘S’ after second ‘E’ shows that this ‘E’ (conclusion) also should
undergo simple conversion. [The student is advised to construct arguments for this and
subsequent reductions.]
3
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
FESTINO FERIO
PEM  Conversion  MEP
SIM SIM
SOP SOP

FESTINO becomes FERIO when the major premise undergoes simple conversion. The kind of
reduction of the above mentioned moods is known as direct reduction. BAROCO becomes

7
FERIO through the process of indirect reduction. Indirect reduction includes, in addition to
conversion, obversion also.

4
II Figure
II Figure I Figure
BAROCO FERIO
P A M  obversion P E M  Conversion  MEP

S O M  obversion S I M SI M
SOP SOP
5
III Figure
III Figure I Figure
DARAPTI DARII
MAP MAP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SIP SIP
6
DATISI DARII
MAP MAP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SIP SIP
7
FELAPTON FERIO
MEP MEP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
‘P’ which follows ‘A’ in DARAPTI and FELAPTON shows that conversion by limitation
applies to ‘A’.
8
FERISON FERIO
MEP MEP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
9
DISAMIS DARII
MIP MAS MAS

MAS MIP  Conversion PIM


SIP PIS
 Conversion
SIP
While the reduction of the above-mentioned moods is direct, next one is indirect.
10

8
BOCARDO
MOP  Obversion  MIP  Conversion  P IM MAS
MAS
M AS MAS PIM
SOP \\_
P IS
Conversion
SI P
Obversion
SOP

When BOCARDO undergoes reduction, conversion, obversion and transposition are required to
complete the process. Here OAO becomes AII. Further, when we consider obverted conclusion
of AII, we obtain AIO. This is, surely, a paradox.
11

IV Figure
IV Figure I Figure
BRAMANTIP Weakened mood
PAM MAS
MAS PAM
SIP P A S  Conversion S I P
12
CAMENES CELARENT
PAM MES

MES PAM
SEP SEP
13
DIMARIS DARII
PIM MAS

MAS PIM

SIP SIP
14
FESAPO FERIO
PEM  Conversion MEP
MAS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP
As usual ‘S’ stands for simple conversion of ‘E’ (major Premise) and ‘P’ stands for conversion
by limitation of ‘A’ (minor premise). This process is similar to the one applied for first and third
moods of III figure.

9
15
FRESISON FERIO
P E M  Conversion MEP
MIS  Conversion SIM
SOP SOP

From reduction technique one point becomes clear. Originally, there were twenty-four valid
moods. Later weakened and strengthened moods were eliminated on the ground that particular
proposition (existential quantifier) cannot be deduced from universal propositions (universal
quantifier) only, and the number was reduced to fifteen. Now after reduction to first figure the
number came down to four. Strawson argues that reduction technique is superior to axiomatic
technique to which he referred in the beginning of his work ‘Introduction to Logical Theory’. He
regards the moods as inference-patterns. He argues that the path of reduction should be an
inverted pyramid. Strawson also maintains that in addition to equivalence relation, we require
opposition relation also to effect reduction. What we gain in the process is economy in the
number of moods.

4.5 ANTILOGISM OR INCONSISTENT TRIAD

This technique was developed by one lady by name, Christin Lad Franklin. This technique
applies only to fifteen moods. The reason is, again, impropriety of deriving existential from
universals only. The method is very simple. Consider Venn’s results for all propositions. Replace
the conclusion by its contradiction. This arrangement constitutes antilogism. If the corresponding
argument should be valid, then antilogism should conform to certain structure. It must possess
two equations and one inequation. A term must be common to equations. It should be positive in
one equation and negative in another. Remaining two terms ought to appear only in inequation.
Consider one example for a valid argument.

Venn’s Results Antilogism


All Indians are Asians. IĀ=Ø IĀ=Ø

All Hindus are Indians. HĪ=Ø HĪ =Ø


HĀ=Ø HĀ≠Ø
All Hindus are Asians.

In this case, antilogism satisfies all the requirements. ‘I’ is common to equations; in one equation
it is positive and in another negative. There is only one inequation. Remaining terms appear in
10
inequation. In all cases, this is the method to be followed. If any one of these characteristics is
absent in antilogism, then the corresponding mood is invalid.

Now antilogism can be easily constructed for the remaining fourteen moods.

1 Fig.
1) CELARENT
Contradiction

MEP MP= Ø

SAM
SM=Ø
SEP → SIP SP ≠ Ø

2) DARII

MAP M P =Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

3) FERIO

MEP MP=Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

II Fig.
4) CESARE

11
PEM PM=Ø

SAM S M =Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

5) CAMESTRES

PAM P M =Ø

SEM SM=Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

6) FESTINO

PEM PM=Ø

SIM SM≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

7) BAROCO

PAM P M =Ø

SOM
S M ≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

III Fig.
8) DISAMIS

MIP MP≠ Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

12
9) DATISI

MAP M P =Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

10) BOCARDO

MOP M P≠ Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

11) FERISON

MEP MP=Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

IV Fig.
12) CAMENES

PAM P M=Ø

MES MS=Ø
SEP → SIP SP≠Ø

13) DIMARIS

13
PIM PM≠Ø

MAS M S =Ø
SIP → SEP SP=Ø

14) FRESISON

PEM PM=Ø

MIS MS≠Ø
SOP → SAP S P =Ø

Now consider a weakened mood.

II Fig.
Weakened mood:

PAM P M =Ø

SEM SM=Ø
SOP → SAP S M =Ø

There is no inequation in this antilogism. Hence, corresponding argument is invalid. It can be


shown that any other strengthened or weakened mood is invalid.

4.6 VENN DIAGRAM TECHNIQUE

Let us extend our knowledge of Venn diagram to the testing of arguments. If two terms yield
four product classes, then three terms should yield eight product classes according to the formula
2x = n, where x stands for the number of terms and n stands for the number of product classes.
Since syllogism consists of three terms, we have eight product classes. Let us begin with a valid
mood and list these product classes.
1 BARBARA
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  All S are P SP  

14
The product classes are as follows: -

SMP
SMP
SMP SMP SMP
S P
SM P SMP
S MP
S MP
SMP SMP
S MP
SM P SMP
SMP

M SMP
While listing product classes, sufficient care should be taken to ensure that no product class is
repeated. It is always advisable to make a list of product classes with diagrams and mark classes
accurately to avoid confusion.
Now let us use diagram to represent the propositions. The procedure is as follows. null sets are
shaded and non-null sets are starred. We should also note that product of null set and non-null
set is a null set. It is like saying that 4 x 0 = 0. But the union, i.e., addition of a non-null set and
null set is a non-null set. Remember 4 + 0 = 4.
Since M P is a null set, not only SM P , but also S M P is a null set. It does not mean that there
are two null sets. There is only one null set. S M is also a null set. Therefore not only the
product of S M & P, but also S M and P is a null set. Now we shall shade relevant subsets,
which are null.

SMP SMP SMP


S P
SMP
SMP SMP

SMP

Fig. 2. M SMP

15
p1 and p2 show that: S M P = SM P = S MP = S M P = Ø. The conclusion shows that S P also is
a null set. We did not specially shade S P . Shading of M P and S M included naturally the
shading of S P segment. This is what actually happens in the case of valid arguments. Marking
of premises naturally includes the conclusion. It is not marked separately. In other words
marking, of conclusion is inclusive. When we adopt Venn diagram technique, this important
condition should be borne in mind. Secondly, when any premise is particular, the segment, which
corresponds to the universal premise, should be shaded first. This is the initial step to be
followed. Now we shall consider some moods. Others are left for the student as an exercise. [In
all cases all product classes should be identified by the student even if there is no need. This is a
good exercise.]

2 BAROCO

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø


p2: Some S are not M. SM≠Ø
____________________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. SP≠Ø


q

p1

S * P
p2

3 DATISI

p1: All M are P. MP=Ø


p2: Some M are S. M S≠ Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø

16
q

S P
*
p2

4 DISAMIS

p1: Some M are P. MP≠Ø


p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø
q

S P
*
p1

p2

17
q

S P

p2 *
p1

M
5 FERISON
p1: No M are P. MP=Ø
p2: Some M are S. MS≠Ø
________________ ______________
q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø

6 BOCARDO

p1: Some M are not P. MP≠Ø


p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø


q

S P

p2
*
p2

M
18
7 CAMENES

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø


p2: No M are S. MS=Ø
_________________________________ ______________

q: No S are P. SP=Ø
q

S P
p1
p2

8 DIMARIS

p1: Some P are M. PM≠Ø


p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. SP≠Ø

19
q

S P
*
p1

p2

9 FRESISON

p1: No P are M. PM=Ø


p2: Some M are S. MS≠Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are not P. S P ≠Ø


q

S P

p2
*
p1

Let us examine a few weakened and strengthened moods using Venn’s diagram.

10 BRAMANTIP

p1: All P are M. PM=Ø


p2: All M are S. M S= Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: Some S are P. SP≠Ø

20
S P
p1
?

p2

No information on S M P and SMP is available after the premises are diagrammed. Therefore
BRAMANTIP is invalid. Now consider a weakened mood.

AAI
p1: M A P. MP=Ø
p2: S A M. SM=Ø
______________________________ ______________

q: S I P. SP≠Ø

S ? P
p2

p1

In this case also no information is available on S M P and S M P after the premises are
diagrammed. Hence AAI is invalid.

4.7 BOOLEAN ANALYSIS:

21
George Boole published his work The Mathemaical Analysis of Logic in 1847. This work
provided not only the required breakthrough to logic but also a new direction to its development.
This analysis is known as The Boolean Algebra of Classes. It is a rewarding exercise to
understand this approach.

Boolean analysis presupposes some axioms. Basson and O’connor list thirteen axioms while
Alexander considers seven. However, for our purpose only four of them are sufficient to
understand this analysis. Let us begin with these axioms.
1 Law of multiplication: a) the product of a universal set and a non-null set(S) is a non-null set.
b) The product of null set and a non-null set is null set.

1 × S =S (where 1 is the universal set.) 1a


×S= 1b
2 Law of addition: The addition of complementary sets is universal set.
S S 1 2
3 Law of Commutation for a) addition and b) multiplication: Transposition of two or more than
two sets is equivalent to original structure.
a) (S+ P + M) = (S+ M +P) = (P + M + S) = (M+ S +P) ….. 3a
b) (S PM) = (SMP) = (MSP) = (MPS)……… 3b
(Instead of addition and multiplication we can also use union and product respectively.)
4 Law of distribution: The multiplication of a l set on the one hand and the addition of two non-
null sets on the other is equivalent to the addition of the product of two sets.
S(P+M) = SP+PM……. 4
Some valid moods are worked out and the rest are left as exercises for the student.

1) BARBARA
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  All S are P SP  
Boolean analysis begins with the expansion of statements. The first stage of the expansion
of major premise is as follows.

MP  MP  1 Rule 1b
 
 MP S  S  MP Rule 2
 MP S  MP S  MP Rule 4

Now we shall pass on to the second stage.


S  MP  SMP  Φ 
a)  Rule 1
S  MP  S MP  Φ 
MP  SMP  S MP  Φ
The last line corresponds to the expansion of major premise. While expanding these lines,
we must obtain the addition or union of the product of all relevant sets and their
complements as well. On these lines, we shall expand remaining lines.

22
P  SM  PSM   
b)  Rule 1b
P  SM  P SM   
PSM  SMP   
 Rule 3b
P SM  SM P   

S M  S MP  S M P  
The last line corresponds to the expansion of minor premise.

SP  M  SPM   
c)  Rule 1b
SP  M  SP M   
SPM  SMP   
 Rule 3b
S P M  SM P   
SP  SMP  SM P  
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

Since the union of four product classes is null set any set in this group is null set. Consider
the union of relevant sets.
SMP  SM P  
Since this is equivalent to what we have obtained from the conclusion, the argument is valid.
This shows that the expansion of conclusion must be equal to or less than the union of premises
if the argument is valid. Hence this conclusion is not repeated further while dealing with some
arguments which are valid. Since we follow this method throughout, we should bear in our mind
all these details.

2 CELARENT

p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

SPM  SMP

23
 SMP  SPM  SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  


c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

3) DARII
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q : Some S are P. SP  
Expansion of major premise:
a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

SMP  S MP  

  SMP  
SMP  Φ
SMP  SMP  
a  b  SMP  SMP  
Since SMP is a non-null set, its union with null set yields a non-null set.
c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

4) FERIO
p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:

24
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:

c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  


   SMP  

SMP  
SMP  SM P  
c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

5) CESARE
p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
c  SMP  SMP  
ab c

6) CAMESTRES

p1: All P are M. PM  


p2 : No S are M. SM  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:

25
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
:c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

7) FESTINO

p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : Some S are M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
   SMP  

 SMP  

c  SMP  SMP  

ab c

8) BAROCO

p1: All P are M. PM  


p2 : Some S are not M. SM  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:

26
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  


   SM P  

 SM P  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

9) DISAMIS

p1: Some M are P. MP  


p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
 SMP    

SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

10) DATISI

p1: All M are P. MP  


p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
27
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  


   SMP  

SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

11) BOCARDO
p1: Some M are not P. MP  
p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion.:
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
   SMP  

 SMP  

 SMP  SMP  

ab c

12) FERISON

p1: No M are P. MP  
p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. S P  
Expansion of major premise:

28
a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  


   SMP  

 SMP  

 SMP  SMP  
ab c

13) CAMENES

p1: All P are M. PM  


p2 : No M are S. MS  
q :  No S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
 SMP  SMP  
ab c

14) DIMARIS

p1: Some P are M. PM  


p2 : All M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: S MP  S MP  
Expansion of conclusion:

29
c: SMP  SMP  
ab  SMP  S MP  S MP  S MP  
 SMP    
SMP  
 c  SMP  SMP  Φ
ab c

15) FRESISON

p1: No P are M. PM  
p2 : Some M are S. MS  
q :  Some S are not P. SP  

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  
   SMP  
 SMP  
 SMP  SMP  Φ
ab c
Let us examine an invalid mood which is regarded as valid in traditional framework.

16) AAI
p1: All M are P. MP  
p2 : All S are M. SM  
q: Some S are P. S P≠ Ø

Expansion of major premise:


a: SMP  S MP  
Expansion of minor premise:
b: SMP  SMP  
Expansion of conclusion:
c: SMP  SMP  

30
a  b  SMP  S MP  SMP  SMP  

abc
This is so because from equations alone it is not possible to obtain inequation.
Antilogism, Venn Diagram Technique and Boolean Analysis have one distinct advantage. They
do away with the concept of distribution of terms which is a cumbersome to apply. What is
required is only the application of some elements of set theory.

Apply these techniques for the following arguments to test their validity.

1 All dogs have four legs.


All animals have four legs.
All dogs are animals.

2 All dogs have four legs.


All chairs have four legs.
All dogs are chairs.

3 No bats are cats.


No rats are bats.
No rats are cats.

4 No fish are birds.


No golden plovers are fish.
No golden plovers are birds.

5 All Indians are people.


John is a person.
John is an Indian.

6 Some readers are philosophers.


Chanakya is a philosopher.
Chanakya is a reader.

7 No human being is perfect.


Some human beings are presidents.
Some presidents are not perfect.

8 All matter obeys wave equations.


All waves obey wave equations.
All matter is waves.

9 All human action is conditioned by circumstances.


All human action involves morality.
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All that involves morality is conditioned by circumstances.

10 All that is good is pleasant.


All eating is pleasant.
All eating is good.

11 All patriots are voters.


Some citizens are not voters.
Some citizens are not patriots.

12 All potatoes have eyes.


John’s head has eyes.
John is a potato head.

Check Your Progress II

Note: Use the space provided for your answers.

1. EIO is valid and IEO is invalid in all the figures. Explain.


.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... .................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................


2. If both premises are universal, then the conclusion must also be universal. Explain.
.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

.............. .................... ............................... ............................. .......................... ..................

................................................................................................................................................

4.8 LET US SUM UP

General rules apply to all figures whereas special rules apply to specific figures. Special rules
indirectly depend upon general rules only. Antilogism, Venn diagram technique and Boolean
analysis do away with the concept of distribution of terms. According to the last three methods
weakened and strengthened moods become invalid though traditional logic regards them as
valid.

4.9 KEY WORDS

Mood: By the ‘mood’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of a syllogism which is determined by
the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the three propositions.

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Figure: By the ‘figure’ of a syllogism is meant that kind of syllogism which is determined by
the function the ‘middle term’ plays in the syllogism.

4.10 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Azzopardi, Salvino. ‘Logic.’ Pune: Jnana Deepa Vidyapeeth, n.d.

Copi, Irving M. and Carl Cohen. Introduction to Logic. 12th ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.:
Pearson/Prentice Hall, 2005.

Essentials of Logic. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007.

‘Introduction to Logic.’ University of Lander, [Link]


accessed July, 2010.

Kemerling, Garth. ‘Categorical Syllogisms’ Philosophy Pages.


[Link] 2001. Accessed on July 2, 2010.
Ling, Lee ‘Categorical Syllogisms’
[Link]
Mathew, E.P. and Augustine Perumalil. Critical Thinking and Planned Writing. Chennai: Satya
Nilayam Publications, 2008.

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