Propagating Global Norms on Trafficking in Persons in

Southeast Asia: Questioning the Deliberative Processes

Abstract

The global norm of trafficking in persons, known as Protocol Palermo, has been
successfully adopted in Southeast Asia by the signing of the ASEAN Convention against
Trafficking in Persons (ACTIP) in 2015 which later become a binding legal instrument
following its ratification by all ten member states. However, statistics show that the region
is still facing growing alarming cases of trafficking in persons. This indicates a gap between
the willingness to adopt the global norms at the regional level, and the ability to implement
the norms at the national/local level. This article aims to discuss this gap. Employing a
qualitative approach and applying Dubash's (2009) Norm Propagation as a research
framework, this article examines the factors hindering effective implementation of ACTIP.
Findings indicate problems around the deliberation process of the norms, which is
compromised by: (1) the unequal representation of non-state actors and their limited access
to information – impacting the legitimacy of the process; (2) the micropolitics interventions
during ACTIP negotiations – resulting in the diluted provisions; and (3) the insufficient
institutionalization of ACTIP at the national level – proving the reluctance of member states
to translate ACTIP into practice. Furthermore, goes beyond Dubash's model, this research
identifies one factor which underly the three compromising factors, i.e., ASEAN and most
of the member states’ not-so-democratic institutional character the informal nature of
ASEAN's institutional structure which create hindrance in the implementation of ACTIP.
This research, hence, shows that despite the full ratification of ACTIP, ASEAN is still
unable to properly propagating the global norms on trafficking in persons in the region.

Keywords: ACTIP; ASEAN; deliberative process; norm propagation; trafficking in

persons

Introduction
In recent decades, the significance of norms, understood as established standards of
expected behaviour of actors among common issues, has become increasingly prominent in the
study of International Relations. One of the most highly anticipated global norms is the one on
trafficking in persons. In 2000, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, known as the Palermo Protocol, became the first
global norm which encourages cooperation between States to protect and assist victims of
trafficking, with full respect for their human rights (OHCHR, 2000). At the beginning of its
entry into force in 2003, it was ratified by only forty countries. However, by now, the Protocol
has been ratified by 182 (out of 193) UN member-countries (UN, 2024). This means, more
than 90% of countries in the world are bound to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in
persons, especially children and women (Wardhani & Fitri, 2023).The Palermo Protocol is
currently receiving significant responses from many countries, as well as various non-state
actors, as they agree to cooperate with each other, bilaterally and multilaterally, in handling
issues related to the criminal act of trafficking in persons (TIP). It is widely accepted that this
Journal of ASEAN Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2022), pp. 1-20
ISSN 2338-1361 print / ISSN 2338-1353 electronic
Received: 04th May 2021/ Revised: 24th January 2022/ Accepted: 10th February 2022
norm is considered as the key established framework for countries to develop a more
comprehensive global regulation on TIP.
The increasing relevance of Palermo Protocol is likely correlated with the increasing
global challenge on issues related to TIP. Economic and technology growth fuels a rise in
trafficking for forced criminality, with evolving organized crime using victims in online scams
and other crimes, creating a cycle of exploitation (UNODC, 2024). Moreover, TIP has evolved
into a complex transnational criminal enterprise, intricately linked with ancillary offenses such
as money laundering, people smuggling, and drug trafficking, forming a resilient criminal
ecosystem. The Southeast Asian region exemplifies this alarming trend. The International
Organization for Migration (IOM, 2024) estimates tens of thousands of victims are coerced
into fraudulent cryptocurrency investment schemes operating from online scam centres in
Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. These centres, employing individuals from diverse
nationalities, highlight the transnational organized nature of contemporary TIP (IOM, 2024).
Consequently, a rigorous examination of norms on TIP is imperative to ensure the
standardization of values referred by countries and other international actors in their effort to
develop policies on the issues (Britton & Dean, 2014).
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted the Palermo Protocol
and institutionalized it into a regional binding legal instrument. The ASEAN Convention
Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) was signed by
relevant head of member-states in 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The 6th ratification by the
Philippines in 2017 transformed the convention from a statement of good will into a binding
regional mechanism (ASEAN, 2017). The ACTIP then is acknowledged as one of the legal
instruments in the political-security pillar, indicating that the Palermo Protocol as the
prominent global norms on TIP have been successfully institutionalized to a binding nature in
ASEAN.
Despite the institutionalization, ASEAN countries are still facing concerning issues on
human trafficking practices and are the targets of global trafficking operations. Figure 1
demonstrates the data of prosecutions in East Asia and Pacific region, including in the
Southeast Asia, from the US TIP Report.1 It shows that from 2017 (the year when all member
countries ratified ACTIP) until 2023, there were a total of 19,841 of TIP prosecutions. This
number is an increase compared to the number of TIP victims identified (a total of 16,407)
during the period from 2011 to 2017.

1
The report is produced annually by the U.S. State Department’s Office, aiming to evaluate and then give
grades to efforts and progress made by countries around the world in combating TIP.

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 5,000
4,500 4,570
4,000
3,500 3,414 3,390
3,276
3,000 2,947
2,500 2,460 2,351
2,000 2,127 2,137
1,938 1,838
1,682
1,500 1,440
1,000
500
0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Prosecution number

Figure 1. Number of TIP prosecutions in East Asia and the Pacific

It is not surprising that the increase in the number of TIP cases in Southeast Asia goes
parallel with the equally concerning initiatives of ASEAN member-states in dealing with the
issue, as shown by the US TIP Report. Figure 2 shows the comparison reports in the years 2017
and 2023. Regardless, Laos and Singapore experienced an increase, but in general, the level of
efforts put by most ASEAN member-states in eliminating the traffic tends to be declining and
unchanging.

2017 2023 1: Tier 3 2: Tier 2 Watch List 3: Tier 2 4: Tier 1

Figure 2. Comparison of ASEAN Member States' TIP Ranking in 2017 and 2023.
Analytical Framework
To understand why ASEAN member-states fail to uphold their commitment in
preventing TIP despite the ratification of ACTIP as the regional version of the global norms on
trafficking in person, this research refers to the concept of Norm Propagation introduced by
Dubash (2009). The concept allows us to focus on the process happening in between the
emergence (in this case, the signing and later the ratification of ACTIP by ASEAN) and the
dissemination (in this case, the implementation of ACTIP by member-states) of the norms.

Journal of ASEAN Studies 3

 According to Dubash, to be utterly propagated at the regional level, global norms need
to pass three stages. First, it will face rejection from sceptical local actors (Dubash, 2009,
p.231). Second, often advocated by non-governmental organizations, the norms will gradually
be accepted, selectively, part by part (Dubash, 2009, p.231). At the beginning, it might be a
rhetorical acceptance. However, through times, the acceptance level will increase and officially
manifested in the form of policy statements. The third and final stage would be the long-term
socialization of the newly accepted norms – it will be an on-going processes until the norms is
fully propagated at the regional, national, and local levels (Dubash, 2009, p.232).

From rejection, to acceptance, and then socialization, the norm propagation is

facilitated by processes which Dubash called as ‘deliberative process’. It brings together
government, civil society and private sector actors which will involve in activities such as
changing ideas to develop the regional/national/local logic of norm conformity, as well as
strategic actions to translate the discourse into policies (Dubash, 2009, p,219). Dubash
identifies three elements of deliberative process. First, elements of legitimacy, which refers to
the active participation of various actors, both state and non-state, in the process. Active
participation is guaranteed by the existence of democratic system and equal, non-hierarchical,
representation of various interest groups, where imbalance power relations among participants
is minimized. It also requires an institutional context which supports constructive dialog and
enables mutual understanding, based on wide-ranging information easily accessible to all
participants. A considered legitimate deliberative process hence refers to a condition where
decisions are made based on consideration of various perspectives and interests (Dubash, 2009,
p.225).

Second, element of micropolitics, which requires what Dubash says as ‘opening the
black box of the global norms’(Dubash, 2009, p.227). Here, Dubash highlights the importance
of understanding the factors behind, for example, the character of actors involved, structure
system of the institution involved, level of intensity of persuasion and negotiation, as well as
all the details related to the establishment of the global norms at the first place. Uncovering the
micropolitics will facilitate understanding the focused institutional structure, as it is linked to
deliberative content (Dubash, 2009, p.227). Third, element of state willingness to
institutionalize the norms – to accept and translate the norms into action, to make it applicable
to all the relevant stakeholders. The absence of the willingness of the authorities will lead
deliberative process to nowhere.

The reference to Dubash’s Norm Propagation helps the researchers to find the answer
of why the ratification of ACTIP does not necessarily lead to the elimination of the case of
trafficking in person in Southeast Asia.

Research Method
This research adopts a qualitative approach. Qualitative research aims to understand and
interpret social interactions and tries to find the meaning, process, and context of a behaviour
or social event that is being observed (Bakry, 2016). In other words, this method emphasizes
the understanding of social phenomena through the interpretation of the phenomena (Bryman,
2012). Applying this method, researchers can identify factors that influence the process of norm
formation and dissemination, the actors involved, and the dynamics of interaction between
them. Qualitative research is epistemologically interpretivism, which might include inductive,
constructive, and interpretive processes. Here, based on a collection of data we gathered from
our observation on the process of regionalization of norms, we rely on inductive reasoning in
constructing general conclusions.

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 This research mainly uses secondary, pre-existing data. According to Bryman (2014),
this method of data gathering offers opportunities for researcher to explore a broad range source
of data. The first category of pre-existing data we gathered from official documents published
by ASEAN, government of ASEAN member-states, and related international organizations.
The second category was data that has been collected by other researchers for their research
purposes, which have been published in academic journals or books. All the gathered data was
categorized in such a way – initially by referring to Dubash’s concept, but later open for new
categories, which provides possible answers to the research questions.

Analysis
ASEAN's Process of Regionalization of Trafficking in Persons Norms

In the early phases of the spread of the global norm faced some resistance or negative
reactions during its spread. Initial progress in transferring programs to Thailand and Cambodia,
both countries was not followed by adequate commitments to promote the trafficking agenda
within the ASEAN framework. The lack of political will between the governments of the two
countries is a considerable obstacle. Some politicians in Thailand and Cambodia unexpectedly
associate sexual tourism with economic progress (Burkhalter, 2012). The ongoing corruption
in local governments further complicates efforts to enact substantial reforms (Burkhalter,
2012). At the time, most ASEAN countries considered trafficking to be a lower priority, due
to the lack of awareness and support for the issue among leaders (Qiao & Oishi, 2019). The
issue of trafficking is not a top priority on the ASEAN agenda. The ASEAN agenda does not
cover the issue of trafficking due to the lack of political consensus among member countries
for regional considerations (Qiao & Oishi, 2019).

Over time, growing global awareness of the substantial influence of trafficking,

especially as it relates to transnational criminal networks, has resulted in increased international
efforts to combat this crime. ASEAN then systematically integrates the response to trafficking
into its institutional framework. A shift in emphasis on trafficking at the ASEAN regional level
has been seen since the late 1990s. The inclusion of the issue of trafficking in the transnational
crime agenda in 1997 prompted cooperation initiatives among the governments of ASEAN
member states to address this problem. Since then, the narrative of trafficking has been slowly
integrated into various instruments such as declarations and action plans related to migration
or transnational crimes in ASEAN. Then, in 2004, ASEAN countries announced their
commitment to combat the crime of trafficking by institutionalizing the ASEAN Declaration
Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. This declaration is ASEAN's
dedication to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (Sitohang, 2024).
This declaration then became the seed for the formation of the convention.

In 2015, following protracted negotiations, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Convention

Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP) at the 27th ASEAN
Leaders' Meeting. ACTIP seeks to safeguard the rights and dignity of all individuals within
ASEAN member states, encompassing a comprehensive legislative framework that addresses
prevention, victim protection, and law enforcement. Emphasizing regional cooperation and
national sovereignty, ACTIP also integrates key elements from international instruments such
as the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC), the
Palermo Protocol, and the Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in
Human Beings (Yusran, 2018). Despite subsequent efforts to disseminate ACTIP norms across

Journal of ASEAN Studies 5

various levels, the convention's effective operationalization and the diffusion of its core
principles remain challenged. The Bohol Work Plan (BWP) Report (2022) reveals
inconsistencies in the dissemination and socialization of the work plan across regional entities
and national institutions. Notably, the report identifies a lack of explicit incorporation of the
BWP into national action plans, stemming from inadequate distribution and socialization,
particularly at the national level. Furthermore, there is a dearth of conclusive evidence
indicating explicit efforts by regional entities to integrate the BWP into their respective action
plans. Compounding these challenges is the absence of a clearly defined metric for assessing
the satisfaction or completeness of regional implementation, leading to ambiguity regarding
the attainment of requisite standards (ASEAN, 2022). The limited socialization of the BWP
among key stakeholders, coupled with the absence of transparent reporting mechanisms, has
resulted in a paucity of current information from regional entities concerning BWP
implementation, thereby exacerbating observed shortcomings (ASEAN, 2022).

The problem of socialization raises the problem of adoption, where there are
inconsistencies in policies and laws among member countries. ASEAN has many significant
challenges in terms of protection of trafficking victims across the region, where the main
concern is the difference in viewpoints and priorities between the country of origin and the
destination country. For example, the criminalization of victims, which are often associated
with immigration violations, not only goes against human rights norms but also hinders
rehabilitation efforts and worsens the vulnerability of victims. As a result, victims of trafficking
often do not receive adequate protection, and it is difficult to ensure accountability of
perpetrators (Susanti et al., 2019). In this context, the main problem faced is the lack of
capacity, resources, and political will. Therefore, protection and support for victims of
trafficking in persons requires improvement, especially the alignment of access to
comprehensive rehabilitation and social reintegration programs (Oktavian et al., 2022). In fact,
trafficking is a serious violation of human rights and dignity, and therefore, prioritizing victim
protection activities is important in dealing with trafficking (Susanti et al., 2019). In sum,
ACTIP as a result of the regionalization of global norms of trafficking in persons that
consistently adopts the Palermo protocol (Kumar, 2018), has been successfully created by
having binding power for ASEAN member countries. However, this regionalization process
encountered obstacles in the process of socialization and adoption.

The Challenges of Democratic Procedures

Dubash (2009) argues that the deliberative process is influenced by deliberative

legitimacy which refers to a condition in which decisions are made based on a deliberative
process involving various perspectives and interests. In other words, a key aspect affecting the
legitimacy of the deliberation process is the requirement for inclusive debates involving diverse
interest groups, including non-state entities such as civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs
play an important role in enhancing state initiatives in addressing a wide range of issues,
including crime, emphasizing victim support and situational surveillance. Civil Society
organizations have shown their effectiveness in keeping human rights a priority on the political
agenda. Including CSOs can increase the legitimacy of decisions made in international forums,
as these assessments will more accurately represent the interests and ambitions of the wider
community. In the context of the democratic deficit that is prevalent in global governance,
participation is a very important method to ensure that the interests of the community are
reflected and considered (Dryzek, 2012). CSOs act as intermediaries between communities and
global institutions to increase the responsiveness of global governance to individual needs
(Spang, 2017). Therefore, the active involvement of Civil Society Organizations in policy

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formulation can increase policy effectiveness and strengthen the legitimacy of decision-making
processes. This socialization process demonstrates the importance of soft diplomacy and multi-
stakeholder cooperation in addressing global challenges such as human trafficking. By
engaging a wide range of actors, including government, civil society, and the private sector,
efforts to reach consensus and effective policy implementation can be significantly improved.

Despite the important role of non-state actors in the formation and ratification of
ACTIP, their participation in the socialization and implementation stages is still constrained.
ACTIP indicates the participation of non-state actors, including NGOs, CSO components, and
other groups, only in the capacity to assist victims (ACTIP, 2015). The Bohol report (2022)
indicates that, until now, socialization initiatives seem to only involve regional entities in
ASEAN, especially in data collection efforts. At the same time, other important parties, such
as civil society organizations and recipients of anti-trafficking initiatives, were not involved in
the data collection efforts. This shows that cooperation initiatives in ASEAN are not fully
represented. ACTIP aims to mitigate trafficking by addressing its root causes, such as poverty,
inadequate education, and unequal opportunities, which require the involvement of non-state
actors. The lack of involvement of non-state actors in the process of socializing norms, as well
as the ability to influence policies creates problems in deliberative legitimacy. Dubash (2009)
requires that the conditions of the decisions taken are based on a deliberative process that
involves various perspectives and interests in achieving deliberative legitimacy. However,
ACTIP only requires the involvement of non-state actors including NGOs, CSO elements and
other organizations, only limited to cooperation with the provision of support to victims
(ACTIP, 2015). The opportunities created offer limited ways for CSOs to challenge policies as
a result of tight controls over who can participate and the forms of participation that are
allowed.

In the process of socializing the norms contained in ACTIP in the Region, the weak
participation of CSOs led to inconsistencies in the level of dissemination and socialization both
among regional institutions and national level institutions. This is consistent with the
suggestion issued by the Bohol Report (2022) emphasize ASEAN's efforts that still require
expanded involvement with other actors in implementing the norms contained in ACTIP. This
expansion includes, for example, civil society organizations, the private sector, international
organizations, and non-member states. The Bohol report (2022) suggests that CSOs should be
invited and involved to provide comments or submit their own reports in connection with the
mid-term evaluation. In addition to the constraints of limited access to CSOs in the decision-
making process in ASEAN, obstacles also occur due to the lack of openness of member
countries to civil society participation. This is understandable because there are still many
countries in the Southeast Asian region that are classified as countries with a low level of
democracy. Table 3.1 shows that all ASEAN member countries have a low level of democracy.
Indonesia with the highest democratic value in 2024 is still classified as a democracy with
limited freedom. Still in the same categorization, followed by the Philippines, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand. Meanwhile, the other five countries, namely Myanmar, Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, are even classified as undemocratic countries.

Countries with less democratic political systems tend to avoid the active involvement
of CSOs in ASEAN decision-making mechanisms. Myanmar and Singapore, for example, are
actively trying to inhibit or even prevent CSO participation (Renshaw, 2013). Less democratic
countries in Southeast Asia such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam seem cautious in
dealing with civil society groups. The lack of democratic regimes in most member countries
makes them reluctant to give space for CSOs to discuss sensitive issues. This is because less

Journal of ASEAN Studies 7

democratic countries are not used to allowing civil society to participate in their decision-
making processes, and it is completely absent from their repertoire of actions (Emmerson,
2007). This is evident from the fact that most countries that are cautious about allowing NGO
participation are usually the least democratic, as are Myanmar and Singapore. On the other
hand, countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines encourage CSO participation and
promote democratic values in ASEAN (Ruland, 2020). This motivation is driven by the belief
that democracy is the foundation of stable regional security (Yukawa, 2018).

Furthermore, the second aspect of democratic procedures is the provision of

comprehensive and easily accessible information to all participants. However, the absence of
robust monitoring and reporting mechanisms, as well as inadequate directives on outcomes,
are major problems. The Bohol report (2022) shows that this problem arises from the ongoing
challenge of finding an appropriate structure or channel to deliver national or regional reports
and activities related to the implementation of BWP. As a result, it is possible that certain
programs and actions have been implemented by relevant institutions related to trafficking but
may not have been communicated to the Heads of relevant regional organizations for accurate
documentation and oversight. Although the BWP has stated that it will conduct reporting twice
a year, this has not been implemented. The absence of consistent reporting from regional
entities regarding the implementation of the BWP certainly exacerbates some of the
shortcomings mentioned earlier. Lack of financial resources to implement the work plan,
limited adaptability of BWP to evolving conditions, and differences of understanding among
member countries and regional entities regarding the nature, objectives, and scope of BWP.

Only the Philippines has fulfilled the mandate for member states to designate focal
points for monitoring and reporting. The absence of consistent reporting from regional entities
on the implementation of ACTIP has exacerbated some of the shortcomings already mentioned.
Lack of funds for program implementation is a problem often cited by regional organizations
and contributes to at least 40% of programs identified as unaddressed (ASEAN, 2017). The
absence of transparency and complete data on the number of victims, cases, or prosecutions of
perpetrators is a major obstacle in efforts to overcome trafficking in the ASEAN region.
Currently, there is no standardized and sustainable reporting mechanism at the regional level
that can accurately describe the prevalence of trafficking. As a result, stakeholders at the
national level such as Thailand and Indonesia, are often influenced by data from external
sources, such as the US TIP report issued by the United States Department of State
(Sukonthapan, 2016).

The Challenges of Micropolitics of Norm

Dubash (2009), focusing on the "logic of debate", explains that norms arise from the
interaction between strategic actions and changes in perception and identity. The micropolitics
of norms makes ACTIP emerge with several weaknesses as a result of long negotiations by
considering the interests of various actors, especially the state. First, ACTIP emerged with a
more focused focus on the security aspect of the state, and weakened the human rights aspect
in the case of victimization. These weaknesses can be seen from the lack of a clear mechanism
for the repatriation of victims and the lack of clarity in the procedures for handling violations.
Issues of trafficking in persons are often used to push immigration restriction policies (Loftus,
2011). The traces of ACTIP with the tendency of a state security approach can be seen in 2001,
when the AMMTC declared that trafficking constitutes a crime threatening the security of the
2004 Declaration which focuses on prevention and enforcement efforts, with an emphasis on
immigration measures such as border surveillance and the repatriation of victims. This initial
step has a setting that is still fixated on a very law enforcement and border control approach.

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The formation of this nature also occurs in the phenomenon of rejection of ACTIP proposals
by migrant-receiving countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei. These countries are
worried that the approval of ACTIP will damage their image in the eyes of the international
community as if they are incapable of managing the problem of trafficking in persons at home.

Thus, the outcome of the negotiations makes the main focus then shift to the prosecution
aspect, reflecting the most basic agreement that can be reached in the early stages of
negotiations. Migrant-sending countries, in exchange for the involvement of receiving
countries, agreed to resume negotiations with a focus on the prosecution dimension (Qiao &
Oishi, 2019). The results of these negotiations make efforts to include the victim protection
dimension in ACTIP face significant challenges. Recipient countries tend to be reluctant to
commit to stronger protections as this can increase their cost and liability burden. These
concerns reflect the dilemma between national interests and regional cooperation. The national
preferences of member states, especially countries of migration destinations, have influenced
the level of commitment to victim protection in this regional convention. Thus, it can be
understood that ACTIP emerged with a dimension that focuses more on border issues, and sets
aside human rights aspects, because it considers the interests of ASEAN member countries,
especially migration destination countries.

Second, ACTIP does not regulate the obligation to criminalize corruption of public
officials. This makes ACTIP have provisions that do not meet the legal obligations set out in
UNCTOC and the Palermo Protocol. Traces of these results can be seen in the initial process
of spreading trafficking norms in the region, where several officials in Thailand and Cambodia
attributed the inhibition of the spread of norms to the practice of sexual tourism with economic
growth (Burkhalter, 2012). Thus, endemic corruption at the local government level is also a
factor that hinders efforts to spread more substantial norms in the region (Burkhalter, 2012).
To date, the US TIP Report (2022) states that endemic corruption at many levels of government
continues to limit the ability of individual officials to make progress in holding human
traffickers accountable. In some cases, local or provincial authorities ignore cases of
involvement, so national authorities intervene to investigate and prosecute the case. Many of
the allegations against police and other officials were involved in an online fraud operation that
forced hundreds of Southeast Asian nationals to work in call centres. Observers reported that
police and immigration officials, especially at a lower level, received bribes to facilitate or
ignore trafficking crimes, including damaging or creating false travel documents.

Third, ACTIP which only focuses on victims of trafficking women and children. This
is evident in the naming conventions that state the particularity of women and children. The
boom in tourism in Southeast Asia resulted in sex tourism in Thailand, the Philippines, and
Cambodia, thereby increasing the participation of women and children in labour migration
within and from Southeast Asia (feminization of labour migration) (Piper, 2005). Then, the
phenomenon of Singapore's rejection of the ACTIP proposal can also be said to strengthen the
convention's focus on women and children's issues. A former senior ASEAN Secretariat
official described the negotiation process with Singapore as rejecting the narrative of "taking
action against trafficking", and argued that "there is a need to find measures to protect our
women and children, particularly Singaporean women and children travelling or working
abroad". The narrative, from protecting women and children, then became the first step to
negotiate to get Singapore to agree to ACTIP (Qiao & Oishi, 2019). In fact, male victims are
becoming increasingly worrisome, one of which is because there is an increase in the pattern
of trafficking in the fisheries industry. Compared to the situation in the 1950s, today's fisheries
require twice as much effort. Hence, to continue making a profit, fishing companies cut costs,

Journal of ASEAN Studies 9

which sometimes leads to serious labour violations against workers—many even related to
human trafficking practices (Greenpeace, 2023).

Fourth, ACTIP has a weak implementation mechanism because of sovereignty

considerations by member states. While it is true that obligations under ACTIP are more
acceptable to member states and were the reason for the Convention's early entry into force, its
provisions on implementation and compliance mechanisms are still far from expectations.
ASEAN lacks monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of coherent
regional policies and action plans (UNICJR and TIJ, 2021), where SOMTC can only play a
minimal role with the function of monitoring, reviewing, and reporting periodically to the
AMMTC on the effective implementation of the Convention. This is quite weak, as it only
establishes SOMTC's general obligation to monitor, review, and report on the implementation
of ACTIP to AMMTC. AMMTC as a reporting purpose of SOMTC also has limited roles and
capacities. ACTIP makes no mention of the role of AMMTC, other than to receive reports on
implementation from SOMTC. It is unclear whether the AMMTC can play a role in
encouraging compliance or in acting in cases of non-compliance. Furthermore, AMMTC
experiences uneven implementation of policies and laws among member countries, where
differences in capacity, as well as challenges in protection and support for victims, are still
obstacles that need to be overcome (Oktavian et al., 2024). The absence of a compliance
monitoring mechanism can be detrimental to the ASEAN framework (Kumar, 2018). This is
inconsistent with the common interest in eradicating trafficking, as stated in the Preamble to
ACTIP. Thus, there will be no reliable information on the implementation of the Convention
to be used as a basis for future regional strategies in combating trafficking (Yusran, 2018).
From this problem, can be seen that the problem of implementing this instrument is related to
the first weakness lies in the high state sovereignty in ASEAN member countries. This makes
policies too focused on border surveillance (Junaidi et al., 2019).

The Challenges of Institutionalization of Emerging Norms by Member States

Refers to the definition of institutionalization by Dubash (2009) which is an effective

mechanism for crystallizing a set of norms designed to bring together different actors. Hence,
this paper takes at least three actions in the process that can be distinguished: (1) the creation
or installation of rules, (2) the adaptation of rules, or the development of best practices, and (3)
the change of rules, or the replacement of old rules with new ones (Britannica, t.t.). Referring
to this definition, it can be seen in Table 3.1 that most member states did not make significant
institutionalization changes after the ratification of ACTIP. Only Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand have experienced institutional development with actions such as amending laws,
making new regulations, approving operating standards for victim identification, improving
institutional capabilities, and developing action plans. Brunei Darussalam and Singapore have
also institutionalized quite standardly, but it is understandable because in the US TIP Report
(2023) Singapore has been at level 1 with the category of countries or regions whose
governments fully comply with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA). However, other member countries such as Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and
Malaysia have not made significant institutionalization improvements because they have only
made some practical development efforts, such as developing SOPs or action plans. In fact, the
Myanmar state has not developed any institutionalization efforts at all.

Table 1. Categorization of Institutionalization of ACTIP by ASEAN Countries

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 Yes Country Rulemaking Practice Amendment of the
Development Rules

1 Cambodia v

2 Singapore v v

3 Vietnam v

4 Thailand v v v

5 Myanmar

6 Philippines v v v

7 Laos v

8 Malaysia v

9 Indonesia v v v

10 Brunei Darussalam v v

This is in line with the report from the US TIP report, in 2017 since the enactment of
ACTIP and the latest report in 2023, that ASEAN countries tend to experience setbacks in
efforts to handle trafficking. The US TIP report as the main global barometer of anti-trafficking
initiatives shows that countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand have not
experienced a change in status. Meanwhile, three countries have experienced a decrease in the
level to an inadequate level, namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
Understandably, most of the ASEAN countries have not made adequate efforts to comply with
standards in combating trafficking. This means that some member states are reluctant to
institutionalize this norm at the national level. This lack of institutionalization, according to
Dubash (2009), causes norms to have no effect, because these norms should be disseminated
and accepted through the institutionalization process by the state.

Analysis of the Failure of the Propagation of Human Trafficking Norms

From the results of the analysis of the previous deliberation process, it can be seen that
the problems of each variable are also influenced by structural problems in ASEAN and
member countries. The institutional structure in question is the institutional design of ASEAN
with certain characteristics. According to the results of a literature review related to how
ASEAN usually regionalizes other global norms, ASEAN is known to have unique
regionalization characteristics. ASEAN's approach is less institutionalized and informal, as its
diplomatic conventions, norms, and security practices have an institutional design that has long
prioritized the "ASEAN Way" (Acharya, 2003). The ASEAN Way supports the principle of
conflict avoidance through constructive engagement and non-binding cooperation (Sundrijo,
2020). This characteristic makes ASEAN institutions receive many pessimistic views from
researchers (for example, Elliott, 2012; Jones & Jenne, 2020; Tobing, 2016; Prayuda &
Warsito, 2021).

Journal of ASEAN Studies 11

 The problem is that the structure created by ASEAN by limiting the participation of
non-state actors, and all ASEAN member countries have a low level of democracy. The
weakness of democratic procedures is also related to the level of institutionalization carried out
by member countries. It can be seen that only Indonesia and the Philippines have experienced
significant institutional development with actions such as amending laws, making new
regulations, and developing practices. Both countries are countries with a fairly good level of
democracy in the region. Meanwhile, countries with lower levels of democracy such as
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar did not make a significant increase in
institutionalization because they only made some development efforts in practice, such as
developing SOPs or action plans. Myanmar has not even made any meaningful
institutionalization efforts at all. Moreover, three countries with low democracies have
experienced a decline in the level to inadequate levels in institutional development efforts,
namely Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Understanding that ASEAN is an intergovernmental or intergovernmental institution,

it is important to look at the factors that affect the national level of member countries.
Therefore, the analysis of institutionalization will affect the problems in the variables of
democratic procedures at the ASEAN level that are discussed. The results of the weak
institutionalization analysis show that there is actually a reluctance by member countries to
adopt trafficking norms. So, this will then have implications for the ACTIP arrangements made
by ASEAN. Apart from countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines that encourage CSO
participation and promote democratic values in ASEAN (Ruland, 2020), due to the belief that
democracy is the foundation of stable regional security (Yukawa, 2018). However, since most
countries have low levels of democracy, it is understood that countries with less democratic
political systems tend to avoid the active involvement of non-state actors in ASEAN decision-
making mechanisms. Myanmar and Singapore, for example, are actively trying to inhibit or
even prevent CSO participation (Renshaw, 2013). Less democratic countries in Southeast Asia
such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam seem cautious in dealing with civil society
groups. The lack of democratic regimes in most member countries makes them reluctant to
give space for CSOs to discuss sensitive issues. This is because less democratic countries are
not used to allowing civil society to participate in their decision-making processes, and it is
completely absent from their repertoire of actions (Emmerson, 2007). This is evident from the
fact that most countries that are cautious about allowing NGO participation are usually the least
democratic, as are Myanmar and Singapore. This is also exacerbated by the political culture in
Southeast Asia that tends to be centralistic and hierarchical, often limiting the space for civil
society to participate in policy-making.

In analyzing the micropolitics of the emergence of ACTIP, structural problems that

affect this variable can also be found. The problems seen in the formation of ACTIP as a result
of negotiations that mainly occurred between countries made efforts to include the dimension
of victim protection face significant challenges. Recipient countries tend to be reluctant to
commit to stronger protections as this can increase their cost and liability burden. These
concerns reflect the dilemma between national interests and regional cooperation. The national
preferences of member states, especially countries of migration destination, have influenced
the level of commitment to victim protection in this regional convention. Thus, it can be
understood that ACTIP emerged with a dimension that focuses more on border issues, and sets
aside human rights aspects, because it considers the interests of ASEAN member countries,
especially migration destination countries. The pressure to protect national interests has caused
some provisions related to victim protection to be weaker compared to international standards.

12 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet

This is problematic because the tightening of asylum administration has increased trafficking
in people by forcing desperate people to turn to smuggling (Mountz, 2010).

So, briefly referring to the case of ASEAN, this paper finds a new variable to provide
revisions or additions to the model of the concept of Norm Propagation by Dubash (2009). The
concept of norm propagation by Dubash (2009) provides a gap to consider the importance of
institutional structure problems because it provides a useful middle ground between ignoring
the problem of legitimacy and the problem of authority. From this perspective, the legitimacy
of deliberation is closely related to non-hierarchical conditions among the participants to
minimize power differences, and a "highly institutionalized environment" (Dubash, 2009).
Thus, the lack of formal authority is a big question mark that hangs over the importance and
usefulness of the deliberation process for global governance. Therefore, there is an addition of
institutional structures that affect the three independent variables of the deliberation process.
ASEAN's structural problems, which are known for their informality, affect existing
democratic procedures, norm-forming processes, and institutionalization at the national level.
As a result of structural problems, first, ASEAN, which is influenced by the characteristics of
its member states, creates an arrangement with weak democratic procedures. Second, ASEAN,
which takes sovereignty and consensus into account, creates weaknesses in the micropolitical
process of the emergence of ACTIP because it takes into account the interests of member states.
Third, ASEAN as an institution in the region is unable to exert pressure or force that can force
its members' compliance to institutionalize ACTIP at the domestic level. This is due to the
design of ASEAN institutions that were created with respect for the sovereignty of their
member states, which led to the practice of informal cooperation frameworks. Thus, it can be
understood that structural problems are a significant factor that affects the variables of the
deliberation process in the Southeast Asian region.

Conclusion

Despite the legally binding nature of ACTIP, its implementation by ASEAN member
states has yielded limited progress in mitigating human trafficking within the region, raising
significant concerns. In the regionalization process of global norm, the obstacle is in the process
of propagating norms. This discrepancy can be attributed, in part, to challenges inherent in the
deliberative process. First, the result of the absence of deliberative legitimacy factors which,
according to Dubash (2009), requires the equal placement of a combination of state and non-
state actors. Meanwhile, ACTIP requires the involvement of non-state actors including NGOs,
CSO elements and other organizations, only limited to cooperation with the provision of
support to victims (ACTIP, 2015). This makes weaknesses in the socialization process to its
implementation, by causing inconsistencies in the level of dissemination both among regional
and national level institutions. What's more, the ACTIP arrangement lacks an organized
monitoring and reporting structure. Second, the micropolitics of norms makes ACTIP emerge
with several weaknesses as a result of long negotiations by considering various interests of
actors, especially the state. Weaknesses as a result of micropolitics occur such as: a more
inclined focus on the security aspect of the state, and a weakening of the human rights aspect
in the case of victimization; does not regulate the obligation to criminalize corruption of public
officials; tend to focus only on women and child trafficking victims; and has weak
implementation regulatory mechanisms as a result of sovereignty considerations by member
states. Third, most member states did not make significant institutionalization changes after the
ratification of ACTIP. This indicates that most member states have a reluctance to
institutionalize this norm at the national level.

Journal of ASEAN Studies 13

 Furthermore, the problems in each variable are influenced by institutional structural
problems which are an addition to the norm propagation model by Dubash (2009). This
problem arises because of ASEAN's unique characteristics that make it accustomed to informal
practices, as well as the influence of weak aspects of democracy in the region. This has
implications for the weak democratic procedures in ASEAN since there are many member
countries with low democracy. Weak democratic procedures are related to the level of
institutionalization carried out by member states. ASEAN countries that have a low level of
democracy tend to be reluctant to institutionalize norms at the domestic level. Then, it is natural
that the deterrence created at the ASEAN level in ACTIP also has weak democratic procedures.
This is because non-democratic countries usually avoid the participation of non-state actors,
which has implications for the weak regulation of their participation opportunities in ACTIP.
Meanwhile, the micropolitical process of the emergence of norms is greatly influenced by the
principles of ASEAN sovereignty and consensus, which makes several weaknesses in the
formation of ACTIP. This is because in the process it is influenced by consideration of the
interests of member countries. It is understood that the common thread of every problem of the
deliberation process is due to ASEAN's structural problems. Therefore, to enhance the
effectiveness of ACTIP, ASEAN needs to strengthen its monitoring and evaluation
mechanisms through measurable performance indicators, integrated reporting systems, and
strategic partnerships with various parties. Further research is needed to understand the
institutionalization process of ACTIP at the national level through in-depth case studies in
member countries with different levels of implementation.

Acknowledgement

Please add information on the funding source.

About The Authors

Please add a short biography (around 50-100 words) about the authors after peer review.

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