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2. Legal Framework for Arbitration in Singapore

Document information
Authors: John Choong
Mark Mangan
Nicholas Lingard
Publication: A Guide to the SIAC Arbitration Rules (Second Edition)
Publication date: Feb 2018
Jurisdiction: Singapore
Bibliographic Reference: '2. Legal Framework for Arbitration in Singapore', in John Choong, Mark Mangan, et al., A Guide to the SIAC
Arbitration Rules (Second Edition), pp. 19 - 52
Copyright: © 2025 Kluwer Law International BV, and/or its subsidiaries, licensors, and contributors. All rights reserved,
including rights for text and data mining, AI training, and similar technologies.

2.01 Parties to a SIAC arbitration may choose to seat their arbitration anywhere in the world. (1) Bangalore, Beijing, Dubai, Jakarta, Hong Kong,
London, Michigan, Mumbai, New Delhi, Perth (Australia), Port Louis (Mauritius), Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea), Shanghai, and Tokyo,
among other places, have all been chosen by parties as the seat, or legal home, for a SIAC arbitration. (2) Singapore, however, is of course the
most popular seat for SIAC arbitration. (3) Thus, this chapter addresses the legal framework for the conduct of arbitration and the
enforcement of awards in Singapore. It begins with a look at the legislative framework for arbitration in Singapore in part A. There follows in
part B a consideration of the way in which Singapore courts lend their support to, and exercise supervisory powers over, arbitrations seated
in Singapore. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the means by which awards can be challenged and enforced in Singapore.
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A. The Singapore Legislative Framework for Arbitration

1. The history of arbitration regulation in Singapore
2.02 Singapore was founded in 1819 by the British as part of the Straits Settlements, comprising Penang, Malacca (both in modern-day
Malaysia), and Singapore. Arbitration in the Straits Settlements was initially governed by the Arbitration Ordinance XIII of 1809, which was
based on the English Arbitration Act of 1698. As early as 1889, there is a record of the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements in Singapore
refusing an application to set aside an arbitral award. (4)

2.03 The Arbitration Ordinance of 1809 was ultimately replaced by the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890 (which was based on the English
Arbitration Act of 1889), (5) and subsequently the Arbitration Ordinance of 1953 (which was modelled on the Arbitration Act 1950 (England and
Wales)). (6) The Arbitration Ordinance of 1953 was renamed the Singapore Arbitration Act 1953 (Act 14 of 1953) when Singapore gained its
independence from Malaysia in 1965. (7) The Arbitration Act 1953 was subsequently superseded by the Singapore Arbitration Act of 1985. (8)
These early arbitration laws did not distinguish between international and domestic arbitrations. All were treated the same.

2.04 This changed in 1994 with the enactment of the Singapore International Arbitration Act (IAA). The IAA, as its full name indicates, was
enacted to govern the conduct of international commercial arbitration in Singapore. It did so by adopting (and modifying) the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law). The IAA also gives effect to the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Convention). The regulation of domestic and
international arbitration through different instruments was motivated in part by a desire to ensure that domestic arbitrations would
continue to be supervised closely by the courts, while allowing greater party and tribunal autonomy in international cases. The 1993
government law reform committee which recommended the enactment of the IAA in 1994 noted that:

… a greater degree of curial supervision and intervention is … generally considered to be more appropriate in the case of
domestic arbitration … both for the development of domestic commercial and legal practice, and for a closer supervision of
decisions which may affect weaker domestic parties. (9)

2.05 Having separated the two regimes in 1994, a subsequent law reform committee established in 2001 decided to 'narrow, as far as
possible, the differences between the international and
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domestic statutes so that Singapore will have a harmonious and business friendly regime'. (10) It was decided, however, to still keep the
legislative regimes separate so as to retain a greater degree of curial supervision over domestic arbitration. (11) The 2001 law reform
committee's recommendations were eventually enacted in a new Arbitration Act, which came into effect on 1 March 2002 (and is referred to
herein as the AA ).

2.06 Thus, arbitration in Singapore today is regulated primarily by two statutes: the IAA, which governs international arbitrations, and the AA,
which governs domestic arbitrations in Singapore, with parties at liberty to opt into or out of either regime. (12) A third statute, the Arbitration
(International Investment Disputes) Act (Cap 11, 2012 Rev Ed) (Singapore), implements the 1966 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). Each piece of legislation is considered in turn.

2. The IAA
2.07 In this section the scope of the IAA (a copy of which is appended to this book at Appendix 4) is first addressed, followed by a
consideration of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and the New York Convention, both of which are given legislative effect by the IAA. (13)

a. Scope of the IAA

2.08 The IAA applies to international arbitrations seated in Singapore and the enforcement of foreign awards in Singapore.

2.09 An arbitration is considered 'international' when: (a) at least one party has its place of business outside Singapore; (14) (b) the place of
arbitration is situated outside the state in which the parties have their places of business; (15) (c) either the place where a substantial part of
the contract is to be performed or the place with which the subject of the dispute is most closely connected is outside the state in which the
parties have their places of business; (16) or (d) the parties have agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more
than one country. (17)

2.10 The IAA will also apply to 'an arbitration which is not an international arbitration' if the parties agree in writing that the IAA or the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law will apply to the arbitration. (18) In other words, parties to a domestic arbitration can opt in to the IAA.
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2.11 Conversely, parties to an international arbitration held in Singapore may expressly agree to opt out of the IAA, leaving their arbitration to
be subject to the AA. (19)

2.12 The adoption of arbitration rules such as the SIAC Rules is no longer in itself regarded as an ouster of the IAA or the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law. (20) The SIAC Rules and other terms of any arbitration agreement will be given effect by Singapore law to the extent they are not
inconsistent with provisions of the IAA or the AA from which the parties cannot derogate. (21)

b. The New York Convention

2.13 The New York Convention establishes a legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements and
arbitral awards in contracting states. It is one of the most successful international legal instruments of all time with at least 156 states having
agreed to abide by its terms. The New York Convention has facilitated the success of international arbitration observed in recent decades by
requiring the courts of states which have ratified the treaty to (a) give effect to arbitration agreements and (b) recognize and enforce the
decisions of arbitrators. (22)

2.14 Specifically, Art II(3) of the New York Convention requires the court of a contracting state to stay or dismiss legal proceedings which
conflict with an arbitration agreement unless it finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.

2.15 As for the decisions of arbitrators, Art III of the New York Convention requires each contracting state to recognize and enforce foreign
arbitral awards as they would domestic arbitral awards. Art V enumerates limited grounds on which a court of a Contracting State may refuse
to recognize or enforce a foreign award. These are essentially limited to a lack of jurisdiction, breaches of procedural fairness, or violations
of public policy. A full appeal or review of the legal merits of an arbitral decision is not permitted under the New York Convention.

2.16 Singapore ratified the New York Convention on 21 August 1986 and gave it legislative force pursuant to Part III of the IAA. It did so subject
to a 'reciprocity reservation', (23) whereby Singapore is only obliged to apply the New York Convention to arbitral awards rendered in other
states which have ratified the Convention. The recognition and enforcement in
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Singapore of awards rendered in states which are not party to the New York Convention is still possible and is considered in part C of this
chapter.

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c. The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law

2.17 The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law is intended to provide a template for the development of national arbitration laws based on uniform rules
designed to facilitate consistency in the regulation of international arbitration around the world. (24) It encompasses provisions relating to
the formation of arbitration agreements, the composition of arbitral tribunals, the jurisdiction of tribunals, the conduct of arbitral
proceedings, the making of awards, and the recognition and enforcement of awards.

2.18 Two fundamental doctrines of arbitration codified in the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law are the principle of competence-competence, which
refers to a tribunal's ability to rule on its own jurisdiction, (25) and the principle of separability, which prescribes that an arbitration
agreement can exist and take effect independently of other terms in a contract. (26) Both are considered in Chapter 10.

2.19 As explained in paragraph [2.02], Singapore's early laws on arbitration were modelled on English arbitration statutes, reflecting
Singapore's colonial past. Singapore, however, has in recent times moved in a more international direction. Thus, a government committee
established in 1993 to reform Singapore arbitration law noted that England and Wales had rejected the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, choosing
instead to develop their own arbitration law, albeit inspired in part by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. (27) The Singapore government
committee members were:

… unanimously of the view that Singapore can ill-afford to adopt a similar stance. If Singapore aims to be an international centre
it must adopt a world view of international arbitration. The Committee therefore recommends the adoption of the Model Law. (28)

2.20 The Singapore government committee was concerned that the continued reliance on English arbitration law might close off a significant
(and increasing) slice of the international arbitration market which was familiar with the civil law approach to international arbitration. It was
considered that with:

… her multicultural and multi-lingual society, Singapore was in a unique position to attract parties from both Asia and Europe. The
exclusion of civil law concepts and processes might have the unintended effect of deterring parties from civil law jurisdictions
who are used to conducting arbitrations in accordance with civil law processes. (29)

2.21 One such civil law concept foreign to English common law at the time, (30) but now incorporated into Singapore law, (31) is the ability of a
tribunal to decide a matter ex aequo et bono (ie based on equitable standards of justice) or as an amiable compositeur (ie as a friendly
decision-maker not subject to strict rules of law), if authorized to do so by the parties. (32)

2.22 It was reported to the Singapore parliament during the second reading of the International Arbitration Bill on 31 October 1994 that the
relative success (at that time) of the HKIAC as compared to SIAC was in part due to Hong Kong's adoption of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law in
1990. (33) The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, it was assumed, would 'appeal to international businessmen and lawyers, especially those from
continental Europe, China, Indonesia, Japan and Vietnam who may be unfamiliar with English concepts of arbitration'. (34) The government
believed that the adoption of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law would thus help to achieve its ambition of SIAC becoming the leading regional
centre for international arbitration. (35) The significance of this move has been described by the Singapore Court of Appeal thus:

… the Model Law, which was crafted in such a way as to be acceptable both to common and civil law systems, was to herald a
paradigm shift in the Singapore arbitral framework which had until then been guided by the English arbitration regime. (36)

d. Modifications to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law

2.23 As noted earlier in this chapter, the Singapore government adopted the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law in the IAA in order to internationalize
the practice of arbitration in Singapore, move it away from its English colonial roots, and make it attractive to users of common law and civil
law systems alike.

2.24 The Model Law, however, is not a complete code for arbitration. It does not address a range of issues that arise in international
arbitration, including the interpretation of arbitration agreements, arbitrability, (37) duties and liabilities of arbitrators, costs, interest, the
conduct of multi-party proceedings, confidentiality, arbitrator immunity; and the consolidation of related proceedings, to name a few. These
gaps can be filled by an agreement of the parties, the applicable arbitration rules, and statute.

2.25 Any agreement reached by the parties on the conduct of their arbitration including their choice of arbitration rules, however, cannot
derogate from any mandatory provisions of the IAA, the AA, or the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. The difficulty is that none of these
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sources of law expressly prescribes the provisions from which the parties cannot derogate. (38) The 1993 government drafting committee for
the IAA preferred to leave the determination of whether a provision is mandatory to be decided on a case-by-case basis. (39) While articles of
the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and sections of the IAA which are qualified by the expression 'unless otherwise agreed by the parties' are

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clearly non-mandatory, it does not necessarily follow that the absence of such language makes a provision mandatory. The drafting
committee noted that there is a 'grey area in respect of provisions [in the IAA and 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law] where there is no express
language making reference to the parties' contrary agreement but which may not have been intended to be mandatory'. (40) The drafting
history of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law also reveals a reluctance on the part of those involved in its drafting to list all mandatory provisions.
(41)

2.26 As the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law was never intended to cover all aspects of arbitration, 'national arbitration laws play an important
complementary function'. (42) Thus, the drafters of the IAA and subsequent Singapore parliaments have amended, supplemented, and in
some instances departed from the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law in a number of key respects.

2.27 First, whereas the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law applies only to an 'international commercial arbitration', (43) parties to a domestic dispute in
Singapore can, as already mentioned, opt into the IAA. (44)

2.28 Second, section 3(1) of the IAA expressly excludes Chapter VIII of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (which encompasses Arts 35 and 36) from
having the 'force of law' in Singapore. (45) Art 35 of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that an arbitral award shall be recognized as binding
irrespective of the country in which it is rendered; whereas Art 36 prescribes the grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement of an
award. The exclusion of these provisions from the IAA is of no consequence for foreign awards (ie ones rendered outside Singapore) as Part
III of the IAA gives effect to the New York Convention (which, as explained earlier in this chapter, provides a means by which foreign
arbitration awards can be recognized and enforced in Singapore).

2.29 In contrast, the exclusion of Art 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law from the IAA was held by the Singapore High Court in Astro Nusantara
International BV v PT Ayunda Prima Mitra (46) to have great significance for international awards rendered in Singapore (and thus not subject
to the New York Convention). The Singapore Court of Appeal, however, subsequently overturned that decision and clarified that the terms of
Art 36 of the UNCITRAL Model
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Law continue to apply to awards rendered in Singapore on the grounds that Art 36 reflects Singapore common law. (47)

2.30 Given the importance of the Court of Appeal's ruling to gaining an understanding of how an award rendered in Singapore can be
challenged or denied recognition and enforcement, it is appropriate that the Astro case be considered in more detail. The respondents to
five 'domestic international awards', (48) which ordered them to pay a significant amount of damages to the claimants, failed to exercise their
right under Singapore law to apply to have the awards set aside within the time limits mandated by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law; namely
within three months of the awards being issued pursuant to Art 34. (49) Nevertheless, the respondents sought to defend an application by the
successful claimants to have the Singapore High Court recognize and enforce the awards. The question was whether they could launch such a
defence after having failed to apply to set aside the awards within the prescribed time limit.

2.31 The Singapore High Court held that they could not. Belinda Ang J held that the exclusion of Chapter VIII of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law
from the IAA by section 3(1) meant that unless a set-aside application was successfully made within the prescribed time limits under Art 16 or
34 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, the award 'is recognised as final and binding, and is not subject to any further grounds for refusal of
enforcement'. (50) The High Court rejected the contention that there should be a 'double control' for domestic international awards as there is
for foreign awards whereby a losing party has a choice as to whether to bring a set-aside application within the aforementioned prescribed
time limits and/or seek to resist any application by its opponent to enforce the award. The High Court noted that such a double control is
inconsistent with Singapore's chosen path of 'less curial intervention [contrasting it to the English position], in line with the objectives of the
Model Law'. (51) On that basis, the High Court rejected the respondents' attempt to resist enforcement of the five awards in Singapore. (52)

2.32 The High Court's decision, however, was reversed by the Singapore Court of Appeal, which held that, notwithstanding the express
exclusion of Chapter VIII of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law from the IAA, 'the best way to give effect to the philosophy of the Model Law would
be to recognise that the same grounds for resisting enforcement under Art 36(1) of the Model Law will be equally available under s 19 of the
IAA'. (53) Section 19 of the IAA provides that an award 'may' be enforced by leave of the High Court in the same manner as a judgment or order
of the Court. After considering the legislative history of the IAA and AA, as well as the 1953 England Arbitration Act to which section 19 of the
IAA could be traced, the Court of Appeal concluded that the Singapore Parliament 'intended to retain for the
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courts the power to refuse enforcement of domestic international awards under s 19, even if the award could have been but was not attacked
by an active remedy'. (54) While English law was central to the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the courts retained the discretion to refuse
recognition of a domestic international award, the Court of Appeal relied on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law for inspiration as to how the
Court's discretion should be exercised. In particular, the Court of Appeal concluded that the power of the High Court under section 19 of the
IAA to refuse to recognize or enforce an award should be exercised 'in a manner which is compatible with the overarching philosophy of the
Model Law on the enforcement of awards'. (55)

2.33 Thus, as a matter of Singapore law: 'Parties who elect not to challenge the tribunal's preliminary ruling on its jurisdiction are not thereby
precluded from relying on their passive remedy to resist recognition and enforcement on the grounds set out in Art 36(1) [of the 1985

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UNCITRAL Model Law].' (56) In other words, what had been expressly excluded by Parliament pursuant to section 3(1) of the IAA (specifically,
Art 36 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law), the Singapore Court of Appeal held still applies to domestic international awards by virtue of the
common law. (57)

2.34 Besides the exclusion of Arts 35 and 36, the IAA modifies the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law in a number of other respects. The
aforementioned 1993 law reform committee recommended that the powers of the arbitral tribunal be significantly increased as compared to
those allowed under Singapore's Arbitration Act of 1985 and the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. After consulting with members of the SIAC
Secretariat, the law reform committee recommended, (58) and the Singapore parliament approved, (59) that tribunals be given the power to,
among other things: order the preservation, interim custody, or sale of property; issue orders for securing the amount in dispute; order the
production of documents; make orders to ensure that an award is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets; grant interim
injunctions and other interim measures; and award interest.

2.35 Some of these powers prescribed by the IAA were already available under the 1991 SIAC Rules, (60) while others were added to the 1997
SIAC Rules following the introduction of the IAA. (61)

2.36 The 1993 law reform committee also noted that English law did not, at least at that point, (62) allow a tribunal to proceed inquisitorially,
and that the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law is
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silent on the point. (63) The decision was taken to adopt the civil law approach of allowing a tribunal to be inquisitorial if considered
appropriate, unless the parties otherwise agree. (64)

2.37 Further, the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law does not provide a means for the enforcement of interim orders or directions, (65) a gap which is
now filled by section 12(6) of the IAA and section 28(4) of the AA.

2.38 Confidentiality is also not addressed in the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. While the SIAC Rules provide that an arbitration shall be
confidential, (66) sections 22 and 23 of the IAA seek to ensure that any obligations of confidentiality are respected in court proceedings
relating to an arbitration (see paragraph [2.68]).

2.39 The 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law is also silent on the extent to which arbitrators are immune from prosecution. Section 25 of the IAA
provides that an arbitrator shall not be liable for negligence or any mistake in law, fact, or procedure. The 1993 law reform committee that
recommended the adoption of the IAA was of the view, however, that 'such immunity should not extend to cases where an arbitrator has
wilfully misconducted himself or inordinately caused delay in the arbitration'. (67) The IAA is thus silent on whether an arbitrator is protected
in such circumstances.

2.40 Provisions for the conduct of a combined mediation-arbitration procedure (so-called 'med-arb' or 'arb-med-arb') have also been
adopted in Singapore, with the SIAC President given the role of appointing authority should the parties fail to agree a mediator or conciliator.
(68) The IAA allows the parties to agree that a mediator or conciliator may subsequently act as an arbitrator should the parties fail to reach a

negotiated settlement. (69) Conversely, the parties may agree that an arbitrator in an existing arbitration may change hats and act as
mediator or conciliator. (70)

2.41 The IAA also broadens the grounds for setting aside an award beyond those prescribed in Art 34(2) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. In
addition to the grounds provided under the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, an award may be challenged under the IAA on the basis that it was
induced or affected by fraud or corruption, (71) or because of a breach of natural justice which prejudices the rights of any party. (72)

2.42 Finally, the following minor modifications to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law have been made in the IAA:

(a) in the absence of an agreement of the parties, one arbitrator shall be appointed, (73) rather than three, which is the default position
under the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law; (74) and

(b) the parties, rather than the party-nominated arbitrators, are first given the opportunity under the IAA to nominate the presiding
arbitrator for three-person tribunals. (75)

e. Amendments to the IAA

2.43 Following its promulgation in 1994, the IAA was amended in 2001, (76) 2002, (77) 2005, (78) 2009, (79) 2012, (80) and 2016. (81) The most notable
amendments include: a provision in 2009 empowering the Singapore High Court to award interim relief in support of foreign arbitrations; (82)
the extension in 2012 of the definition of an 'arbitration agreement' to include agreements 'recorded in any form' whether or not the

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arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct, or by any other means; (83) a provision in 2012 for curial review of
negative jurisdictional rulings; (84) a term authorizing tribunals to order the payment of post-award interest; (85) and the transfer of statutory
powers from the SIAC Chairman to the SIAC President following the creation of the SIAC Court in 2013. (86)

2.44 The 2006 amendments to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (referred to herein as the 2006 UNCITRAL Model Law) have not been adopted in
full in Singapore, although the IAA has been adopted to reflect some of the amendments to the UNCITRAL Model Law. (87)

3. The AA
As explained earlier in this chapter, domestic arbitration in Singapore is currently regulated by the Arbitration Act enacted in 2001 (Act 37 of
2001) and revised in 2002 (the AA). Its predecessors include the Arbitration Ordinance XIII of 1809, the Arbitration Ordinance of 1890, the
Arbitration Ordinance of 1953 (which subsequently became the Arbitration Act of 1953), and the Arbitration Act of 1985.

a. Scope of the AA
2.45 As noted in paragraph [2.10], while the AA is designed to regulate domestic arbitrations held in Singapore, parties to a domestic dispute
may agree in writing to opt into the IAA. (88) Conversely, parties to an international arbitration with Singapore as the place of arbitration may
agree that the AA will apply (or that the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law or the IAA does not apply, which will have the same effect). (89)

2.46 In the absence of any opting in or out by the parties, the AA will operate as the default regime for all arbitrations seated in Singapore
which fall outside the scope of the IAA (ie domestic arbitrations). (90)

b. Terms of the AA
2.47 Consistent with the objective of harmonizing the two legislative regimes as much as possible, many of the provisions of the AA are based
on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. The drafters of the latest iteration of the AA also drew inspiration from the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK) and
the Arbitration Act 1996 (New Zealand). (91)

2.48 The major differences between the AA and the IAA reflect the Singapore legislature's intention to provide greater protection for parties
to a domestic arbitration primarily through heightened court supervision (and to foster the 'development of domestic commercial and legal
practice'). (92) Thus:

(a) a Singapore court is obliged under the terms of the IAA to stay court proceedings relating to a matter that is the subject of a valid
arbitration agreement, (93) whereas such a stay is discretionary under the AA; (94)

(b) under the AA, a point of law may be referred in certain circumstances to the courts for a preliminary ruling, (95) whereas no such
procedure exists under the IAA;
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(c) similarly, the AA allows a party to appeal against an award on a question of law, (96) which of course cannot be done under the IAA; (97)

(d) the AA allows the court to extend contractual time limits for the commencement of an arbitration if the barring of a claim would cause
'undue hardship', whereas no such express power is prescribed by the IAA; (98)

(e) under the AA, the tribunal may issue an award dismissing a claim if there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the
claimant, (99) whereas the IAA is silent on the matter;

(f) party costs and tribunal fees are taxable by the Registrar of the Supreme Court for arbitrations governed by the AA, (100) whereas the
SIAC Registrar performs that role for cases subject to the IAA; (101) and

(g) unless the parties agree otherwise, (102) the AA, (103) unlike the IAA, (104) does not expressly grant arbitral tribunals the power to make
orders:

(i) to secure the amount in dispute; and

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(ii) to ensure that any award which may be made in the arbitral proceedings is not rendered ineffectual by the dissipation of assets by a
party.

c. Amendments to the AA

2.49 The AA was amended in 2003, (105) 2005, (106) 2009, (107) 2012, (108) and 2016. (109) The amendments largely track the amendments made to
the IAA described in paragraph [2.43], with the exception that the Singapore High Court is empowered to grant interim relief in aid of foreign
arbitrations under the IAA, (110) but not under the AA. (111)

4. The ICSID Convention

2.50 The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was established in 1965 pursuant to the ICSID Convention of the
same year for the purposes of resolving foreign investment disputes between contracting states and nationals of other contracting
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states. At the time of writing, there are 153 states which are party to the ICSID Convention and under its terms agree to recognize and enforce
arbitral awards rendered under the ICSID Convention.

2.51 Singapore is one of them, having signed the ICSID Convention on 2 July 1968. The ICSID Convention entered into force in Singapore on 13
November 1968 pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act (Act 18 of 1968, followed by a revised edition
in 2012). The Act provides that upon registration with the Singapore High Court, an ICSID award will have the same effect, with respect to the
pecuniary obligations it imposes, as a judgment of the High Court. (112)

B. Singapore Court Supervision and Assistance

1. The judicial hierarchy
2.52 Singapore operates a two-tier court system. The State Courts form the first tier and comprise the District Courts, Magistrates' Courts,
specialized courts, (113) and the Small Claims Tribunal. (114) The Supreme Court constitutes the second tier and comprises the Court of Appeal
and the High Court. (115) The two tiers are demonstrated graphically in Figure 2.1.

2.53 The Court of Appeal sits at the apex of the Singapore judiciary, having become the final court of appeal on 8 April 1994 when appeals to
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London were abolished. (116) The Court of Appeal hears appeals against decisions of the High
Court.

2.54 The High Court hears both criminal and civil cases as a court of first instance. The High Court also hears appeals from the decisions of
the State Courts. (117)

2.55 The High Court is responsible for the supervision and support of arbitration within Singapore. (118) Its decisions on arbitration can be
appealed to the Court of Appeal. An appeal against the High Court's ruling on a tribunal's jurisdiction may only be pursued with leave of the
High Court. (119) The High Court may appoint persons with expertise to assist the Court, including on matters of arbitration. (120)

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Figure 2.1 Singapore's two-tier court system

2.56 Various specialist commercial lists have been established in the High Court. These lists identify High Court judges who have expertise in
specialist areas of law. The specialist list for arbitration was established on 7 April 2003 and at the time of writing comprises four judges and
a judicial commissioner of the High Court. (121) The Court of Appeal also comprises a number of judges with significant international
arbitration experience, including Sundaresh Menon CJ and Quentin Loh J, who were eminent arbitration practitioners before accepting their
judicial appointments and Prakash J, who was previously on the arbitration list when she sat on the High Court.

2.57 The SICC was established in January 2015 as a specialist division of the Singapore High Court for the resolution of cross-border
commercial disputes. The SICC has jurisdiction over 'international' and 'commercial' disputes referred to it by an agreement of the parties
and cases which are transferred to it from the Singapore High Court upon a party's application or by the High Court's own motion. The SICC
panel of judges comprises 15 Singaporean judges from the Singapore High Court and Court of Appeal, alongside 12 international judges,
comprising four from the United Kingdom, two each from Australia and the United States, and one each from France, Austria, and Japan. (122)

2.58 The Supreme Court Registry is led by a Registrar and a team of Senior Assistant Registrars and Assistant Registrars. Certain civil
proceedings in the High Court, such as applications for a stay of court proceedings in favour of arbitration, are heard in chambers (ie the
proceedings are not held in open court) and are dealt with by Senior Assistant Registrars or Assistant Registrars. (123)

2. Court supervision and assistance

2.59 As explained in this section, the Singapore courts support arbitration in Singapore through enforcing arbitration agreements,
determining challenges to arbitrators, issuing subpoenas, granting interim relief, protecting the confidential nature of arbitration, issuing
anti-suit injunctions, and enforcing tribunal orders and directions. Each is considered in turn followed by a discussion on three functions
which could have been performed by the Singapore courts but have been allocated to SIAC, namely the appointment of arbitrators, the
assessment of costs, and the authentication of awards and arbitration agreements. (The challenge and enforcement of awards in Singapore
is considered in part C of this chapter.)

a. Enforcement of arbitration agreements

2.60 The ease with which an arbitration agreement can be enforced in Singapore depends, at least in theory, on whether the agreement falls
within the scope of the IAA or the AA.

2.61 The IAA incorporates Art 8 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, which mandates that a Singapore court must stay any legal proceedings
brought in violation of an arbitration agreement unless the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being
performed, (124) or the dispute is not arbitrable. (125)

2.62 In contrast, under the AA, a Singapore court has discretion whether to stay court proceedings which are inconsistent with an arbitration
agreement even if it forms the view that the arbitration agreement is valid. Before granting a stay, the court must be satisfied that: (a) there
is no sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement; and (b) the
applicant was, at the time the proceedings commenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all things necessary for the proper conduct
of the arbitration. (126)

2.63 In practice, however, the presumption in cases governed by the AA is in favour of a stay, and the party opposing the stay bears the
burden of showing sufficient reason why the matter should not be referred to arbitration. (127)

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2.64 A Singapore court will not ordinarily undertake a full review of an arbitration agreement when considering an application for a stay in
favour of arbitration. (128) In Tjong Very Sumito, (129) the Court of Appeal held that the 'Court's jurisdiction to grant a stay is satisfied once the
prerequisites of s 6 [of the IAA] appear to have been met'. (130) More recently, the Court of Appeal clarified in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd v Silica
Investors Ltd that a Singapore court should grant a stay of court proceedings if it is prima facie satisfied that: (a) there is a valid arbitration
agreement; (b) the dispute in the court proceedings falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; and (c) the arbitration agreement is
not null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed. (131)

2.65 In other words, the courts will consider that the arbitration agreement is 'presumptively valid'. (132) This is consistent with the view under
Singapore law that an arbitral tribunal has the primary competence to determine its own jurisdiction, (133) with the courts there only to
supervise and review such determinations. (134)

b. Challenges to arbitrators
2.66 As discussed in Chapter 8, the SIAC Court determines any challenges made against an arbitrator pursuant to Rule 16.1 of the 2016 SIAC
Rules. The SIAC Court's decision can be appealed to the High Court within 30 days of a party's receiving notice of the decision. (135) As
explained in Chapter 8, paragraph [8.115], this right of appeal is arguably a mandatory provision of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and thus
overrides SIAC Rule 16.4 which provides that the decision of the SIAC Court on an arbitrator challenge is final and not subject to appeal.

c. Subpoenas
2.67 A party may apply to the High Court for a subpoena ordering the attendance of a witness at a hearing within Singapore or the production
of documents. (136)

d. Confidentiality

2.68 As discussed in Chapter 16, Singapore courts are required to respect any confidentiality obligations attaching to an arbitration. (137) Thus,
either party may request that proceedings relating to an arbitration agreement be conducted behind closed doors. (138) Information on
Singapore court proceedings relating to an arbitration may only be published if all parties agree or the court is satisfied that publication will
not reveal any confidential information,
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including the identity of the parties. Publication of a decision may be ordered to be in a redacted form (with the names of the parties
changed) and possibly delayed by up to ten years if the matter is particularly sensitive. (139)

e. Interim measures
2.69 The ability of a party to obtain interim relief from an arbitral tribunal, an emergency arbitrator, or a competent court is addressed in
Chapter 13. For now, it bears noting that the Singapore High Court has the power under the IAA to grant interim measures in relation to
arbitrations both seated in Singapore and, due to legislative amendments made in 2009, those held abroad. (140) If the case is urgent, the
High Court may make orders 'necessary for the purpose of preserving evidence or assets'. (141) If the case is not urgent, the High Court may
make such orders only upon application of one party made with the permission of the arbitral tribunal or the agreement in writing of the
other parties (which, in practice, is unlikely). (142)

2.70 The Singapore High Court, however, does not have the power under the IAA to order security for costs, discovery of documents, or
interrogatories. (143) These orders are considered to be procedural in nature and to fall within the prerogative of an arbitral tribunal. (144) In
contrast, the High Court does have such powers under the AA, which, as already mentioned, provides greater judicial support and oversight
for Singapore domestic arbitrations. (145)

f. Anti-suit injunctions
2.71 The Singapore High Court has the power to grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent a party from commencing or maintaining a court
action in breach of an arbitration agreement. (146)

g. Enforcement of tribunal orders and directions

2.72 All orders and directions made or given by a tribunal are enforceable in Singapore under both the IAA and AA with the leave of the High
Court in the same manner as if they were orders made by a Singapore court. (147) This is necessary as the New York
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Convention only provides a framework for the recognition and enforcement of tribunal awards. (148)

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h. Appointment of arbitrators
2.73 In the event a party fails to nominate an arbitrator, the President of SIAC (149) and individuals appointed to the role by the Singapore
Chief Justice (150) have the power to make the appointment. Notably, the Singapore High Court does not have the power to appoint an
arbitrator. The SIAC President's power of appointment applies to SIAC arbitrations as well as ad hoc arbitrations and those conducted under
the rules of other arbitral institutions. (151) .

i. Assessment of costs

2.74 Prior to the enactment of the IAA, the original AA required party costs to be taxed (ie assessed) (152) by the Registrar of the High Court in
the event a tribunal failed to assess costs. (153) On the recommendation of the 1993 law reform committee which proposed the enactment of
the IAA, (154) the Registrar of SIAC now performs that role for arbitrations subject to the IAA unless the award otherwise directs. (155) The
Registrar of the Supreme Court, however, remains the person responsible for the taxation of both party and tribunal costs for arbitrations
governed by the AA. (156)

2.75 Significantly, the AA provides that an agreement of the parties on the allocation of costs is void unless agreed after a dispute has arisen.
(157)

j. Authentication of awards and arbitration agreements

2.76 The New York Convention requires a party seeking to enforce an arbitral award to submit to the enforcement court (a) a duly
authenticated original or a duly certified copy of the award and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. (158)

2.77 In 2010, amendments were made to the IAA to empower the Singapore Minister of Law to appoint persons to authenticate original
arbitration awards and certify copies of awards and arbitration agreements for the purposes of enforcing a Singapore award in a New York
Convention signatory State. (159) At the time of writing, the appointed persons are the Registrar and Deputy Registrar of SIAC, the Chief
Executive and Deputy Chief Executive of Maxwell Chambers, (160) and the Registrar and the Chairman of the Singapore Chamber of Maritime
Arbitration (SCMA). (161)

2.78 The Registrar and Deputy Registrar of SIAC can authenticate a SIAC award by verifying that it has been duly signed by the arbitrators.
SIAC will do so by comparing the arbitrators' signatures on the award with SIAC's own original copy of the award.

2.79 For awards issued in ad hoc arbitrations seated in Singapore, SIAC will ask the parties to provide it with the contact details of the
arbitrator(s) who issued the award. The arbitrator(s) will be asked by SIAC to provide a copy of the award which will be compared by SIAC to
the version presented by the party for authentication.

2.80 For awards issued in arbitrations seated in Singapore and conducted under the auspices of other arbitral institutions, SIAC will request
an original or certified true copy of the award to ensure it is identical to the award submitted for authentication from either the institution
that issued the award or the arbitrators.

C. Challenge and Enforcement of Awards in Singapore

2.81 The mechanics for challenging an award rendered in Singapore are first addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this part C. There follows a brief
consideration of the general attitude of the Singapore judiciary to attempts to challenge the legitimacy of arbitration awards (section 3),
before a brief analysis is provided of specific grounds for challenging an award (section 4). The enforcement procedures for Singapore
awards, foreign awards, and non-New York Convention awards are then considered (sections 5 to 7), followed by the enforcement of ICSID
awards in Singapore (section 8).

1. Rights of challenge against rulings on jurisdiction

2.82 Singapore law recognizes, and gives first priority to, the power of a tribunal to determine whether it has jurisdiction and the scope of
that jurisdiction. (162) The Singapore courts, however, will have the final word on what matters can be determined by a tribunal. Thus, any
ruling on jurisdiction, including a ruling that the tribunal has no jurisdiction, is subject to review by the Singapore High Court under both the
IAA and the AA. The Court's review of jurisdiction will be undertaken on a de novo basis. Thus, the tribunal's own view of its jurisdiction is not
determinative. But this does not mean that all that transpired before the Tribunal should be disregarded, necessitating a full re-hearing of
all the evidence, only that
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there is no fetter on the court's fact-finding abilities when considering whether the tribunal had jurisdiction. (163)

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2.83 If the tribunal's decision on jurisdiction is made at an early stage of the proceedings or as a preliminary issue, any party has 30 days
after receiving notice of the decision to apply to the High Court for review pursuant to Art 16(3) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. (164) Such a
decision can be 'set aside' or, more accurately, 'reversed', even though it cannot properly be characterized as an 'award'. (165) The High Court's
ruling can be appealed to the Court of Appeal with the leave of the High Court. (166) (While possible, the High Court is unlikely to order a stay
of an arbitration pending its consideration of a tribunal's ruling on jurisdiction. (167) The Singapore High Court recently held that a party
seeking to suspend an arbitration pending a jurisdictional challenge before the Court must show the existence of 'special circumstances'
warranting a stay of the arbitral proceedings, thus affirming the principle of minimal curial intervention. (168) The Court held that 'there must
be something that is over and above inconvenience, time wasted and exposure to costs [in order to justify a stay of the arbitration] even
though all of these matters could be occasioned' if the Courts ultimately rule that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction. (169) Further, the
strength of a party's jurisdictional objection will not be a determinative factor in an application for a stay. (170) )

2.84 In contrast, a decision by a tribunal on jurisdiction (if made in conjunction with a determination of one or more substantive issues (171) )
rendered in the form of an award is subject to challenge within three months of the receipt of the award. (172)

2.85 A party's right to challenge a ruling on jurisdiction under the terms of the IAA and AA applies notwithstanding Rule 32.11 of the SIAC
Rules, which provides that the parties
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'waive their rights to any form of appeal, review or recourse to any State court', 'insofar as such waiver may be validly made'. (173)

2. Rights of challenge against a Singapore award

a. Set-aside applications under the IAA
2.86 A party may seek to have a Singapore arbitral award subject to the IAA set aside on the grounds set out in Art 34 of the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law. These grounds relate primarily to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and public policy. Specifically, Art 34 of the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law provides that an award 'may' (174) be set aside if a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity, the
arbitration agreement is not valid, the tribunal was not properly formed, the applicant was not given proper notice of the proceedings or
otherwise was unable to present its case, the tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or contrary to the agreed arbitral procedure, the subject
matter was not arbitrable, (175) or the award is contrary to public policy. (176) Questions of law cannot be appealed under the IAA, nor can the
merits of the case be reviewed by the High Court. (177)

2.87 In addition to the grounds prescribed by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, an award subject to the IAA may be set aside, as noted in
paragraph [2.41], if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or a breach of natural justice occurred in
connection with the making of the award by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. (178)

2.88 An application to set aside an award must be made within three months from a party's receipt of the award. (179) A party's statutory right
to have an award set aside will prevail over any agreement of the parties to waive a right of review. (180) While the Ministry of Law sought
views in 2011 on whether the IAA 'should be amended to allow parties, by agreement, to waive their right to set aside arbitration awards,
thereby precluding any appeal to the courts', (181) as things stand, a party's right to challenge an award cannot be waived under Singapore
law.
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2.89 If a party fails to apply to set aside an award made under the IAA within the prescribed time limit (ie its 'active' remedy), it can raise
similar arguments challenging the validity of the award if and when its opponent seeks to enforce the award in Singapore (ie a 'passive'
remedy). (182)

b. Set-aside applications under the AA

2.90 The High Court can set aside an award which falls within the scope of the AA on grounds similar to those prescribed in Art 34 of the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law as supplemented by the additional grounds recognized under Singapore law of fraud, corruption, and a breach of the
rules of natural justice. (183)

2.91 In addition, and unlike the IAA, an award subject to the AA can be appealed on a question of law. (184) (Such a right of appeal, however,
may not exist when the parties have agreed to the application of the SIAC Rules. (185) ) An appeal on a question of law can be brought only
with the agreement of all parties (which is rare in practice) or with the leave of the High Court upon its being satisfied of certain stringent
conditions, including that the decision is 'obviously wrong' or the question is one of general public importance and the tribunal's decision is
at least open to serious doubt. (186) The appeal can be lodged only after the appellant has exhausted any arbitral process of appeal or

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review, including an application for correction and interpretation of the award. (187) The appellant may be ordered to provide security for the
costs of the appeal. (188)

3. General attitude of the Singapore courts to set-aside applications

2.92 As noted in Chapter 1, consistent with Singapore government policy of creating an arbitration-friendly hub for the resolution of regional
and international disputes, the Singapore courts actively seek to support arbitration as a means of resolving commercial disputes. This is
revealed in part by their recognition that the principle of party autonomy in arbitration means that not only do the parties have the freedom
to choose how their arbitration will be conducted, but, having chosen arbitration rather than litigation to resolve their disputes, they are
entitled to expect that there will be only limited court involvement in the process. (189) Thus, the Singapore courts generally follow an
approach of minimal curial intervention, particularly in cases governed by the IAA.

2.93 The Singapore High Court in Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd recently noted that the word 'may' in Art 34(2) of the 1985
UNCITRAL Model Law 'underscores the discretionary powers of the supervising court to refuse to set aside an award even if there was a
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breach of the agreed procedure'. (190) Generally speaking, the courts will only set aside an award if the shortcomings of the tribunal caused a
party real prejudice or the tribunal's breach was particularly serious. (191)

2.94 This hands-off attitude extends to the consideration of set aside applications where the courts' starting point is one of deference to the
arbitrators and the choices made by the parties as to how they want their disputes resolved (including through their choice of arbitration
rules). The Singapore courts are also slow to criticize a decision reached by a tribunal whose members will generally not be able to defend
themselves in the set-aside proceedings. (192) Accordingly, the Singapore courts have rejected the vast majority of applications to set aside an
award.

2.95 At the time of writing, there have been 39 publicly known applications made to set aside awards under the IAA and AA, of which only
nine have been granted in whole or in part, or just under a quarter of the applications. (193)

2.96 The approach of the Singapore courts to set aside applications was summed up by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Soh Beng Tee & Co
Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd thus:

[F]airness justifies a policy of minimal curial intervention, which has become common as a matter of international practice. To
elaborate, minimal curial intervention is underpinned by two principal considerations. First, there is a need to recognise the
autonomy of the arbitral process by encouraging finality, so that its advantage as an efficient alternative dispute resolution
process is not undermined. Second, having opted for arbitration, parties must be taken to have acknowledged and accepted the
attendant risks of having only a very limited right of recourse to the courts. It would be neither appropriate nor consonant for a
dissatisfied party to seek the assistance of the court to intervene on the basis that the court is discharging an appellate function,
save in the very limited circumstances that have been statutorily condoned. Generally speaking, a court will not intervene merely
because it might have resolved the various controversies in play differently.

… It must always be borne in mind that it is not the function of the court to assiduously comb an arbitral award microscopically in
attempting to determine if there was any blame or fault in the arbitral process; rather, an award should be read generously such
that only meaningful breaches of the rules of natural justice that have actually caused prejudice are ultimately remedied. (194)

2.97 The High Court will only intervene in 'clear and obvious' cases or, put another way, in ones which the alleged shortcomings of the
tribunal are 'demonstrably clear on the face of the record'. (195) The Court will not 'nit-pick' at an award and will instead read an award 'in a
reasonable and commercial way, expecting, as is usually the case, that there will be no substantial fault that can be found with it'. (196) The
High Court will also not set aside an award if the 'complaint [is] not premised upon circumstances attributable to the tribunal' but are a
consequence of a party's own failures or choices (tactical or otherwise). (197)

2.98 In addition to interpreting and applying the statutory grounds for challenging an award strictly, the Singapore courts have rejected the
notion that they retain a residual discretion to set aside an award based on grounds which are not stipulated in the relevant statute. (198)

2.99 The Singapore High Court will also frown upon a party which attempts to take a 'second bite at the cherry' by raising new arguments
before the Court that were not previously presented to the tribunal. (199) Nonetheless, there appears to be no absolute rule to exclude the
admission of fresh evidence either at first instance before the High Court (200) or on appeal to the Court of Appeal. (201) In that regard, the
Singapore High Court has indicated that it will apply a modified version of the so-called Ladd v Marshall test such that fresh evidence may be
admitted to the Court if:

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(a) the party seeking to admit the evidence demonstrates sufficiently strong reasons why the evidence was not adduced at the arbitration
hearing;

(b) the evidence if admitted would probably have an important influence on the result of the case though it need not be decisive; and

(c) the evidence must be apparently credible though it need not be incontrovertible. (202)

4. Analysis of specific grounds for challenging an award

2.100 Complaints about the existence or exercise of the tribunal's jurisdiction are perhaps the most frequent basis upon which challenges to
an award are brought (or enforcement resisted. Such challenges are considered earlier in part C of this chapter and in Chapter 10. The other
key grounds for challenging (or resisting enforcement of) an award are considered below.
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a. Breach of rules of natural justice

Art 34(2)(ii) of the 1985 UNICTRAL Model Law, incorporated into the IAA pursuant to section 3(1), and section 48(a)(iii) of the AA provide that
the High Court may set aside an award if a party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or was otherwise unable to
present its case. This is supplemented by section 24(b) of the IAA and section 48(1)(vii) of the AA, which provide that an award may be set
aside for a breach of the rules of natural justice by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced. The Singapore Court of Appeal in John
Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corp (Japan) (203) held that a party applying to set aside an award on the basis that a rule of natural
justice has been breached must identify:

(a) the relevant rule of natural justice;

(b) how that rule was breached;

(c) how the breach was connected to the making of the award; and

(d) how the breach prejudiced the applicant's rights.

While the precise content of a tribunal's obligation to honour the rules of natural justice is very much tied to the specific facts and
circumstances of each case, a number of principles can be distilled from Singapore case law, which may provide guidance in future cases.

1. Tribunal duty to treat the parties equally. Art 18 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law mandates that each party shall be treated with equality.
That does not mean, however, that the parties must be treated identically. The Singapore High Court has held that the term 'equality'
requires the tribunal to apply 'similar standards to all parties throughout the arbitral process'. (204) Thus, for instance, the parties do not
need to be given an identical amount of time for speeches or the cross-examination of witnesses. Rather, each party must be given a
reasonable opportunity to present its evidence and arguments, which, depending on the particular circumstances, may mean one party
has more time than the other. (205)

2. Tribunal duty to give each party the opportunity to be heard. The IAA and AA require, respectively, that each party be given a 'full' (206) or
'reasonable' (207) opportunity to present its case. The Singapore courts have drawn no distinction between these different formulations of
the right to be heard. (208) Thus, a party does not have an unlimited right to be heard; just a reasonable one. Further, a party must be
given the opportunity to be heard. It has no grounds for complaint if it fails to seize the opportunity. (209)

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3. Court deference to tribunal case-management decisions. As already mentioned, the Singapore courts are deferential to and respectful of
arbitral tribunals, unless given
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reason not to be, particularly in relation to their case-management decisions. (210) Thus, the Singapore courts will be slow to rule that a
breach of natural justice has occurred where the breach is said to have arisen from a procedural or case-management decision of a
tribunal. In the eyes of the Singapore courts, parties who have chosen to arbitrate in Singapore or under the SIAC Rules have agreed to
give the tribunal a wide and flexible discretion to (a) determine its own procedures and processes, and (b) receive and evaluate
competing evidence and arguments in order to arrive at its determination. (211)

4. Tribunal duty to be impartial and independent. Parties to an arbitration have the right to be heard by an independent and impartial
tribunal. This principle is codified in the SIAC Rules and Singapore law. (212) While allegations that an arbitrator is biased would ordinarily
be raised during the course of an arbitration in the context of a challenge to an arbitrator pursuant to Rule 14.1 of the SIAC Rules,
arbitrator bias could in theory also be a ground for setting aside an award. (213) The Singapore High Court in PT Central Investindo v
Franciscus Wongso and others held that the requirement of impartiality and independence is mandatory under the UNCITRAL Model Law.
A failure of this mandatory requirement could give rise to a breach of the rules of natural justice and/or public policy, or cause an award
to be set aside under Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the UNCITRAL Model Law for not being 'in accordance with the law' or 'in accordance with the
agreement of the parties'. (214)

5. Tribunal duty to attempt to understand the parties' submissions. An erroneous decision by a tribunal is not in itself inconsistent with the
rules of natural justice. More is needed for an award to be set aside. Indeed, having chosen to resolve their disputes through a process
which is intended to produce a decision which can only be challenged based on limited grounds, the parties are taken to have accepted
the risk that the tribunal may come to the wrong conclusion. (215) Thus, it is not a breach of natural justice for a tribunal to 'fail to
comprehend the [parties'] submissions or comprehend them erroneously'. (216) It will be, however, if the tribunal fails to attempt to
understand a parties' submissions, such as when an arbitrator wrongly assumes that a party has abandoned a claim. (217)

6. Duty to give reasons and explanations. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal shall state the reasons upon which the award
is based. (218) The contours of this duty are explored in Chapter 14.

7. Duty to deal with the essential issues. When giving its reasons, an arbitral tribunal is not obliged to deal with every argument. 'Natural
justice requires that the parties should be heard; it does not require that they be given responses on all submissions made.' (219) A
tribunal must take care, however, to ensure that the 'essential' (220) or 'important' (221) pleaded
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issues are dealt with in the award, with the tribunal given considerable latitude to determine what is essential or important. The evidence
(or inference) that an arbitrator has wholly missed one or more such issues must be 'clear and virtually inescapable'. (222)

8. Tribunal duty to not look beyond the parties' submissions. While a tribunal should not decide a dispute on a ground which was not
raised or contemplated, it can decide the dispute based on a premise which is reasonably connected to an argument which was in fact
raised by a party. (223) But an award can be challenged if the tribunal's reasoning reflects a 'dramatic departure from the submissions'
given by the parties or is based on 'extraneous evidence'. A tribunal, however, is not required to inform a party how it should better
frame its case to be in line with the tribunal's views on the dispute (224) and indeed to do so might breach the tribunal's obligations of
independence and impartiality to the opposing party. One view of the difficult balance to be struck by a tribunal was succinctly
summarized by Bingham J of the English High Court (as he then was) thus:

[T]he rules of natural justice do require … that matters which are likely to form the subject of decision, insofar as they are specific
matters, should be exposed for comments and submissions of the parties. If an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never
been raised by either side then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an opportunity to comment … It is not right that a
decision should be based on specific matters which the parties have never had a chance to deal with, nor is it right that a party
should first learn of adverse points in the decision against him. That is contrary both to the substance of justice and to its
appearance, and on the facts of this case, I think that the landlords' case is made out. (225)

9. Tribunal's duty to conduct the proceedings economically and expeditiously. A party's right to be heard must be weighed against the
parties' agreement, when choosing the SIAC Rules or a Singapore seat of arbitration, that the proceedings should be conducted
expeditiously and economically, with the tribunal being granted a wide and flexible discretion as to how it will achieve those objectives.
(226) In particular, the need for a tribunal to provide reasons for its decision must be balanced against its obligation to conduct the

proceedings economically and expeditiously. (227)

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b. Fraud or corruption
2.101 In addition to the grounds provided under the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, an award may be challenged under the IAA on the basis that it
was induced or affected by fraud or corruption. (228)

2.102 The Singapore High Court has held that an arbitral award will be tainted by fraud where there is 'a showing of bad faith during the
arbitration proceedings, such as bribery, undisclosed bias of the arbitrator, or wilful destruction or withholding of evidence'. (229) Perjury
would be another instance of fraud for which an award can be set aside under Singapore law. (230)

2.103 Proof of fraud or corruption is not by itself sufficient to set aside an award; it must be shown that there is a causative link between the
fraudulent conduct complained of and the making of the award. In the words of the Singapore High Court:

Proving fraud or conscionable conduct is insufficient. In order to obtain relief, the complainant must show that the reprehensible
conduct had caused it substantial injustice in that the same procured or substantially impacted the making of the award. (231)

2.104 It is an accepted principle of Singapore law that an arbitral tribunal has the duty to investigate issues of fraud and corruption. (232) The
Singapore High Court has noted (without ruling on the issue) that arbitrators may request additional evidence or an explanation from the
parties, draw adverse inferences, or reverse the burden of proof if there is sufficient evidence supporting an allegation of fraud or
corruption. (233)

c. Public policy
2.105 Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law allows a court to set aside an award if it is in conflict with the 'public policy of this State
[ie Singapore]'. (234) The term 'public policy' is not defined in the UNICTRAL Model Law, the IAA, or the AA.

2.106 A question municipal courts around the world often face is whether the concept of public policy should be applied from an
international perspective, given that the principle in an arbitration context derives from international instruments such as the New York
Convention and UNCITRAL Model Law, or whether it should be interpreted based on local customs and practices, given that the principle has
been incorporated into domestic law and is applied by local judges.

2.107 Singapore law has resoundingly answered the question in favour of an internationalist approach. Thus, the Singapore Court of Appeal in
AJU v AJT held that the 'concept of public policy in Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law has … “an international focus”'. (235) Most recently in Re
Landau, Toby Thomas QC, the Singapore High Court rejected the Singapore Law Society's argument that the concept of 'public policy' under
the IAA was a 'local-centric
47
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one' and therefore accepted that public policy in the context of arbitration could be argued before the Singapore courts by a non-Singapore
law qualified lawyer. (236) The public policy considerations relevant to the Singapore High Court's determination of whether an award
rendered in Singapore should be set aside are the same as those relevant to determining whether to recognize or enforce a foreign award in
Singapore. (237)

2.108 This means in practical terms that the Singapore courts interpret narrowly the public policy ground for setting aside awards as
explained by the Court of Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA:

Although the concept of public policy of the State is not defined in the [IAA] or the Model Law, the general consensus of judicial
and expert opinion is that public policy under the [IAA] encompasses a narrow scope. In our view, it should only operate in
instances where the upholding of an arbitral award would 'shock the conscience'… or is 'clearly injurious to the public good or …
wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public' … or where it violates the forum's most
basic notion of morality and justice. … This would be consistent with the concept of public policy that can be ascertained from the
preparatory materials to the Model Law. (238)

2.109 Thus, an award is not contrary to public policy under Singapore law merely because it is wrong, (239) patently illegal, (240) or inconsistent
with Singapore law. (241) Violations of public policy under Singapore law 'only encompass those acts which are so egregious that elementary
notions of morality have been transgressed'. (242) The concept of 'public policy' in the context of arbitration is much narrower than the
concept of what is in the 'public interest'.
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2.110 The narrow conception of public policy in the context of arbitration endorsed under Singapore law was aptly demonstrated in the 2011
case of AJU v AJT. (243) In that case, an award was allowed to stand despite its subject matter being allegedly illegal under both Thai and
Singapore law, being the law of the place of performance and the law of the seat of the arbitration, respectively. The Singapore Court of
Appeal reversed the High Court's decision to set aside the SIAC award, ruling that the High Court Judge was wrong to re-open the tribunal's
finding of fact that the transaction was not illegal under the relevant law. (244)

2.111 Accordingly, as a matter of Singapore law, the courts will not second-guess a tribunal's findings of fact as to whether a contract is illegal.
(245) Thelegal consequences of the facts, and in particular whether an illegality as found by the tribunal constitutes a violation of public
policy, however, is subject to curial review by the Singapore courts. (246)

2.112 More recently, the Singapore High Court rejected an argument that a delay of 19 months between the parties' closing submissions and
the issuance of an arbitral award was a violation of public policy. (247) When doing so, the High Court noted that the public policy exception
to the enforceability of awards is 'intended to capture: matters of general – rather than particular interest'. (248) For instance, while an alleged
failure by the tribunal to respect the terms of an agreement of the parties may frustrate those parties, it will not be 'clearly injurious to the
public good' (249) and thus is not a basis for setting aside an award under the public policy exception.

5. Enforcement of a Singapore award in Singapore

2.113 A Singapore award, whether made under the AA or IAA, is enforceable in Singapore with the leave of the High Court in the same manner
as a court order or judgment. (250)

2.114 There are two stages to the enforcement of an award in Singapore. First, an application for leave to enforce the award is made ex parte
to a Judge in Chambers (251) or to the Registrar of the High Court. The application must be supported by an affidavit complying with certain
prescribed requirements. The High Court will grant the order giving leave to enforce as long
49
50

as the formal requirements are met without engaging in a substantive review of whether the award ought to be enforced. (252)

2.115 Second, once an enforcement order has been obtained, it must be served on the debtor (ie the losing party). (253) The debtor may then
apply to set aside the order within prescribed time limits. (254) The award cannot be enforced until this period of time has expired or, if there
is an application to set aside the order, until the application is determined.

2.116 As explained in paragraphs [2.28] to [2.33], even if a party does not apply to set aside an award within the prescribed time limits, it may
still resist the enforcement of an award rendered in Singapore under the IAA by raising grounds found in Art 36 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model
Law. (255)

6. Enforcement of a New York Convention award

2.117 As already mentioned, Part III (sections 27–33) of the IAA gives effect to Singapore's obligations under the New York Convention. (256)
Singapore has adopted the reciprocity principle whereby its obligations under the New York Convention are restricted to awards rendered in
fellow New York Convention signatory States. (257) Thus, Part III of the IAA only applies to the enforcement of a 'foreign award', which is
defined in section 27(1) of the IAA as an 'award made in pursuance of an arbitration agreement in the territory of a [New York] Convention
country other than Singapore'.

2.118 An application for the recognition and enforcement of a 'foreign award' is first made ex parte to a High Court Judge in Chambers or to
the Registrar. It should be accompanied by an
50
51

affidavit which must comply with certain prescribed requirements. (258) If the order is granted, it must then be served on the debtor. (259)

2.119 Thereafter, the only grounds the debtor has for resisting the enforcement of a 'foreign award' are those set out in Art V of the New York
Convention, which are reproduced at section 31 of the IAA. These are comparable to the grounds for setting aside an award under Art 34 of
the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (ie for reasons relating to jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and public policy). (260) The High Court will conduct
a hearing of the issues that fall for consideration under section 31 of the IAA and make its findings on the balance of probabilities. (261)

2.120 Fraud, corruption, or a breach of the rules of natural justice do not constitute (express) grounds for refusing to enforce a 'foreign award'
despite being bases upon which a set-aside application can be made for Singapore awards rendered under the IAA or AA. (262) With that said,
the public policy exception will allow an award tainted by fraud or corruption to be refused recognition and enforcement in Singapore. (263)

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Further, the rules of natural justice are reflected in section 31(2)(c) of the IAA, which allows an award to be refused recognition and
enforcement if a party was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise
unable to present its case.

7. Enforcement of a non-New York Convention award

2.121 As noted in paragraph [2.117], Part III of the IAA only provides for the enforcement in Singapore of awards rendered in a New York
Convention signatory State (other than Singapore). There are two other ways in which a foreign award can be enforced in Singapore. First, a
party may rely on Singapore legislation for the reciprocal enforcement of court judgments, which allows an award to be enforced if it has
become enforceable as a judgment of certain foreign courts. (264) Second, the AA provides a means for the enforcement of foreign awards
made in non-New York Convention signatory States. (265)

2.122 The AA provides that awards rendered in Singapore or elsewhere may be enforced in Singapore in the same manner as a judgment or
order with the leave of the High Court. (266) No guidelines or requirements are prescribed on when leave will be granted or refused. The High
Court, however, is likely to be guided by the grounds for refusing recognition and
51

enforcement of an award under Art V of the New York Convention (ie section 31(2) of the IAA).

8. Enforcement of an ICSID award in Singapore

2.123 Awards rendered pursuant to the ICSID Convention may be enforced in Singapore in accordance with the Arbitration (International
Investment Disputes) Act. (267) The procedures for enforcement are set out in the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Rules (268)
and Order 67 of the Singapore Supreme Court's Rules of Court (RSC). (269)
References
1) SIAC Rules (2016), Rule 21.1.
2) For a discussion on the significance of the legal seat in international arbitration, see Ch 9, paras [9.69–9.74]. In particular, Indian parties
have shown a preference for arbitrations conducted under the SIAC Rules with an Indian seat.
3) Singapore was the default seat for SIAC arbitrations in the absence of an agreement of the parties under the 2007, 2010, and 2013 SIAC
Rules. Under the 2016 SIAC Rules, however, Rule 21.1 provides that in the absence of an agreement of the parties the tribunal shall
determine the seat of the arbitration having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
4) Ponachee UJB Westerhout and The East India Company (1889) II SLJ 82.
5) Lum Chang Building Contractors Pte Ltd v Anderson Land Pte Ltd [2000] 1 SLR(R) 648 (Singapore Court of Appeal) para 22.
6) Lum Chang Building Contractors v Anderson Land (n 5) para 24; M Pillay, 'The Singapore Arbitration Regime and the UNCITRAL Model Law,
Arb Intl Vol 20 No 4 355–86, 356.
7) Lum Chang Building Contractors v Anderson Land (n 5) para 24; Pillay, 'The Singapore Arbitration Regime and the UNCITRAL Model Law' (n
6) 356.
8) PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International BV [2014] 1 SLR 372 (Singapore Court of Appeal) para 35.
9) Law Reform Committee, Sub-Committee on Review of Arbitration Laws, Report (1993) paras 10–13.
10) Law Reform and Revision Division of the Attorney-General's Chambers (Singapore), Review of Arbitration Laws, LRRD No 3/2001, vii.
11) Law Reform and Revision Division of the Attorney-General's Chambers (Singapore), Review of Arbitration Laws, LRRD No 3/2001, vii.
12) Parties to a domestic arbitration can opt in to the IAA: s 5(1), IAA. Conversely, parties to an international arbitration held in Singapore
may expressly agree to opt out of the IAA, leaving their arbitration to be subject to the AA: s 15(1), IAA.
13) IAA, s (3)(1), and Parts II and III.
14) IAA, s 5(2)(a).
15) IAA, s 5(2)(b)(i), adopted from the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration 1985 (1985 UNCITRAL Model Law), Art 1(3)(b)(i).
16) IAA, s 5(2)(b)(ii), adopted from 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 1(3)(b)(ii).
17) IAA, s 5(2)(c), adopted from 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 1(3)(c).
18) IAA, s 5(1).
19) IAA, s 15(1).
20) IAA, ss 15(2) and 15A. In John Holland Pty Ltd v Toyo Engineering Corp (Japan) [2001] 2 SLR 262 (Singapore High Court), the Singapore High
Court held that the parties' choice of the ICC Rules was an implicit ouster of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. The successful party in that
case relied on Coop International Pte Ltd v Ebel SA [1998] 1 SLR(R) 615 (Singapore High Court), which stated in dicta that the IAA, Part II or
the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law could be excluded either expressly or by implication. The Singapore legislature subsequently amended
IAA, s 15 effective from 1 November 2001, to require any opting out of the IAA to be done expressly.

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21) IAA, s 15A(1); AA, s 58. Section 15A of the IAA was introduced in response to Dermajaya Properties Sdn Bhd v Premium Properties Sdn Bhd
[2002] 1 SLR(R) 492 (Singapore High Court), in which the Singapore High Court stated in dicta that, if parties adopt a set of arbitration
rules which contains procedures different from those contemplated by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, those arbitration rules would be
regarded as incompatible with the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and would be excluded entirely.
22) The ability to enforce arbitration agreements and awards around the world according to standard criteria is one of the key attractions of
international arbitration as compared to court litigation.
23) New York Convention, Art I(3) provides that any contracting state may declare that it will apply the Convention to only those arbitral
awards made in the territory of another contracting state and/or to only those disputes arising out of legal relationships (whether
contractual or otherwise) which are recognized as commercial under the national law of the contracting state.
24) J Honnold, 'The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law: Mission and Methods' (1979) vol 27 2–3 Am J Comp L 201.
25) UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(1).
26) UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(1).
27) The United Kingdom Arbitration Act of 1996 contains various provisions inspired by the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, including s 30 which
permits a tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.
28) Law Reform Committee Report (1993) (n 9) para 8 (emphasis in original removed).
29) C Lim, 'The Developmental Life Cycle of International Arbitration Legislation—Singapore IAA Case Study' (2011) 7 AIAJ 1, 7. The author was
a member of the 1993 Singapore government law reform committee that recommended the adoption of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.
30) Before 1996, the Arbitration Act 1950 (UK) did not have provisions on ex aequo et bono or amiable compositeur. These are now implicitly
accepted under the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 46(1)(b) which permits the tribunal to decide a dispute 'in accordance with such other
considerations as are agreed by [the parties] or determined by the tribunal'.
31) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 28(3); IAA, s 3(1).
32) These concepts are discussed in Ch 12.
33) International Arbitration Bill (Bill No 14/94), Second Reading, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister
for Law), 31 October 1994.
34) International Arbitration Bill (Bill No 14/94), Second Reading (n 33). The preamble to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law records the aim of
UNCITRAL to harmonize the laws applicable to international arbitration in a manner that is acceptable to states with different legal,
social, and economic systems.
35) International Arbitration Bill (Bill No 14/94), Second Reading (n 33).
36) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) (Singapore Court of Appeal) para 54 (emphasis in original).
37) The concept of arbitrability describes the inquiry made into whether a dispute is capable of being settled by arbitration. See Ch 10 for a
discussion on this issue.
38) See the discussion on mandatory laws in Ch 5.
39) Law Reform and Revision Division, Attorney-General's Chambers Singapore, 'Proposed Amendment to the International Arbitration Act
on Rules of Arbitration (Report)', LRRD 11/2002, 14–15.
40) 'Proposed Amendment to the International Arbitration Act on Rules of Arbitration (Report)' (n 39) 15, citing the example of IAA, s 12(1) of
the IAA which sets out the powers of the tribunal to make interim orders. As s 12(1) makes no reference to the parties' contrary intention,
it is not clear if the section is intended to be mandatory or non-mandatory.
41) H Holtzmann and J Neuhaus, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and
Commentary (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1989) 1120.
42) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) para 52.
43) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 1(1) (emphasis added).
44) IAA, s 5(1).
45) IAA, s 3(1).
46) [2013] 1 SLR 636 (Singapore High Court).
47) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8).
48) The Court of Appeal uses the expression 'domestic international award' to describe an award rendered in Singapore in a case involving
at least one international party.
49) For a discussion on the rights of challenge against an award in Singapore, see part C of this chapter.
50) Astro Nusantara v Ayunda Prima Mitra (n 46) para 74 (emphasis in the original).
51) Astro Nusantara v Ayunda Prima Mitra (n 46) para 112 (emphasis in the original).
52) Astro Nusantra v Ayunda Prima Mitra (n 46) para 94.
53) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) para 143(d). The Court of Appeal determined at para 86 that Chapter VIII of the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law had been excluded from the IAA as the Singapore Parliament did not wish to undermine Singapore's reciprocity reservation
to the application of the New York Convention to Singapore. See para [2.117].

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54) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) para 47.

55) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) para 50.
56) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) para 132.
57) This has the attraction of ensuring that parties to an arbitration seated in Singapore have the same right to resist enforcement of an
award in Singapore as they would if the arbitration were seated outside Singapore.
58) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) para 31.
59) IAA, ss 12 and 20. The tribunal's power to grant interim relief is also derived from the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 17.
60) SIAC Rules (1991), Rules 24(h) (preservation of property) and 24(i) (production of documents).
61) SIAC Rules (1997), Rules 25(j) (interim relief), 25(l) (preventing dissipation of assets), and 28.5 (awarding of interest). The additional
powers of the tribunal are now prescribed in Rules 27 and 32.9 of the 2016 SIAC Rules (see Chs 12 and 14).
62) The Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 34(2)(g) now permits the tribunal to 'take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law'.
63) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) para 59.
64) IAA, s 12(3); see also SIAC Rules (2016), Rules 19.1 and 19.4.
65) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) paras 32–35.
66) SIAC Rules (2016), Rule 39.
67) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) para 58. For a discussion on SIAC Rules (2016), Rule 38, see Ch 16, paras [16.02–16.10].
68) IAA, s 16(1). Previously, this role was performed by the SIAC Chairman.
69) IAA, s 16(3).
70) IAA, s 17(1). See Ch 3 for a discussion of arb-med-arb under the SIAC and SIMC rules.
71) IAA, s 24(a). This modification to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law was arguably unnecessary as the public policy ground for setting aside an
award under Art 34(2)(b)(ii) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law encompasses corruption, bribery, and fraud: PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia
(Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (Singapore Court of Appeal) para 59, citing Holtzmann and Neuhaus, UNCITRAL Model Law
on International Commercial Arbitration (n 41) 914. In Beijing Sinozonto Mining Investment Co Ltd v Goldenray Consortium (Singapore)
Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 814 (Singapore High Court), the High Court observed, at para 41, that:

… if a party bribes the tribunal into giving a decision in its favour, or does anything to corrupt, subvert or compromise the
professional integrity, impartiality and independence of the tribunal, that would certainly shock the conscience and be
clearly injurious to the public good or wholly offensive to the ordinary reasonably and fully informed member of the public,
and amount to a breach of public policy.

See also Re Landau, Toby Thomas QC [2016] SGHC 258 at [66–68].

72) IAA, s 24(b).

73) IAA, s 9. In contrast, Rule 9.1 of the SIAC Rules provides that a sole arbitrator shall be appointed unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
although the SIAC Registrar can decide that there should be a three-person tribunal if warranted by the circumstances of the case. See
Ch 8.
74) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 10(2).
75) IAA, s 9A. In contrast, Art 11(3) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law provides that the party-nominated arbitrators shall appoint the third
arbitrator.
76) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2001 (No 38 of 2001) (Singapore).
77) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2002 (No 28 of 2002) (Singapore).
78) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No 2) Act 2005 (No 42 of 2005) (Singapore).
79) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2009 (No 26 of 2009) (Singapore).
80) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2012 (No 12 of 2012) (Singapore); Foreign Limitations Periods Act (Cap 111A, 2012 Original Ed)
(Singapore).
81) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 (No 16 of 2016) (Singapore).
82) IAA, s 12A. This amendment was considered necessary following a Singapore Court of Appeal ruling in 2007 to the effect that s 12 of the
old IAA did not give a Singapore court the power to grant interim relief in aid of a foreign arbitration: Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica
Marine SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 629 (Singapore Court of Appeal). The amendment also brought the IAA into line with Art 17(H)(1) of the 2006
amendments to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.
83) IAA, s 2A(4).
84) IAA, s 10(3)(b).

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85) IAA, s 20; AA, s 35(2). Rule 28.7 of the SIAC Rules was amended in 2013 to allow tribunals to grant post-award interest. See Ch 14, paras
[14.36–14.38].
86) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016, ss 2 and 11.
87) Specifically, the definition of an arbitration agreement under Singapore law was expanded in 2012 through the adoption of Option 1 of
Art 7 of the 2006 amendments to the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (2006 UNCITRAL Model Law) in the IAA, s 2A, and the Arbitration Act (Cap
10, 2002 Rev Ed) (Singapore) (AA), s 4. In addition, as already mentioned, s 12A was added to the IAA in 2009 to empower the Singapore
courts to grant interim relief in support of foreign arbitrations.
88) IAA, s 5(1).
89) IAA, s 15(1).
90) AA, s 3: 'This Act shall apply to any arbitration where the place of arbitration is Singapore and where the International Arbitration Act
(Cap 143A), Part II does not apply to that arbitration.'
91) Law Reform and Revision Division of the Attorney-General's Chambers (Singapore), Review of Arbitration Laws, LRRD No 3/2001 (n 10)
para 1.2. See para [2.03].
92) Lim, 'The Developmental Life Cycle' (n 29) 8–11.
93) IAA, s 6; 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 8.
94) AA, s 6.
95) AA, s 45.
96) AA, s 49(2) provides that a party to an arbitration governed by the AA can appeal questions of law, subject to any agreement of the
parties precluding such an appeal. Rule 32.11 of the SIAC Rules is likely to represent such an agreement.
97) IAA, s 3(1); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(1).
98) AA, s 10.
99) AA, s 29(3).
100) AA, ss 39(1) and 40(2).
101) IAA, ss 21(1) and 21(2).
102) AA, s 28(1). The choice of the SIAC Rules would constitute such an agreement given the terms of Rules 27(i), 27(k), and 30.1 of the SIAC
Rules (2016).
103) AA, s 28(2).
104) IAA, s 12(1).
105) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2003 (No 9 of 2003) (Singapore).
106) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No 2) Act 2005 (No 42 of 2005) (Singapore).
107) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2009 (No 26 of 2009) (Singapore).
108) International Arbitration (Amendment) Act 2012 (No 12 of 2012) (Singapore); Foreign Limitations Periods Act 2012 (Cap 111A, 2012 Original
Ed) (Singapore).
109) Statutes (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016 (No 16 of 2016) (Singapore). The AA was amended to replace references to the 'Chairman
of SIAC' to 'President of the Court of Arbitration'.
110) IAA, s 12A(1)(b).
111) AA, s 31; cf IAA, s 12A.
112) Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act (Cap 11, 2012 Rev Ed) (Singapore), s 5.
113) Specialized courts include the Family Court, the Coroners' Court, and the Traffic Court. The State Courts were previously known as the
Subordinate Courts. Subordinate Courts (Amendment) Act 2014 (No 5 of 2014) (Singapore).
114) The jurisdictional monetary limits in civil matters for the various court levels are as follows: (a) Small Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction
over claims no higher than S$10,000 or S$20,000 if the parties consent in writing; (b) Magistrates' Courts: S$60,000; (c) District Courts:
S$250,000; and (d) the High Court has jurisdiction over amounts in dispute over S$250,000.
115) Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (Singapore), s 3.
116) The Chief Justice (presently, the former Deputy Chairman of SIAC, Sundaresh Menon SC) sits in the Court of Appeal together with the
Judges of Appeal. A typical Court of Appeal hearing is heard by three judges. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s 30.
117) Singapore Supreme Court, 'Structure of the Courts', available at <[Link]
court/structure-of-the-courts> (accessed 1 November 2016).
118) IAA, s 8; AA, s 2.
119) eg IAA, s 10(4); AA, s 21A(1).
120) Supreme Court of Judicature Act, s 10A. For instance, the Court of Appeal appointed Professor Lawrence Boo as amicus curiae in an
arbitration-related court application in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA (n 71) and again in Tomolugen Holdings Ltd
and another v Silica Investors Ltd and other appeals [2016] 1 SLR 373 para 63.

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121) The arbitration list judges are Justice Belinda Ang, Justice Quentin Loh, Justice Steven Chong, Justice Vinodh Coomaraswamy, and
Judicial Commissioner Kannan Ramesh: Singapore Supreme Court, 'Structure of the Courts' (n 117).
122) Singapore International Commercial Court, 'Judges', available at <[Link] (accessed 1 November
2016).
123) At the time of writing, the Registrar of the Supreme Court is Mr Vincent Hoong and the Deputy Registrar is Ms Teh Hwee Hwee, who is
also the Divisional Registrar of the Singapore International Commercial Court. Supreme Court, 'Registrars', available at
<[Link] (accessed 1 November 2016).
124) IAA, s 6(1) modifies the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 8 such that the party seeking a stay must do so 'before delivering any pleading or
taking any other step in the proceedings' other than making an appearance.
125) Tomolugen Holdings Ltd v Silica Investors Ltd (n 120) at para 74.
126) AA, s 6(2).
127) Kwan Im Tong Chinese Temple v Fong Choon Hung Construction Pte Ltd [1998] 1 SLR(R) 401 (Singapore Court of Appeal); JDC Corp v
Lightweight Concrete Pte Ltd [1999] 1 SLR(R) 96 (Singapore Court of Appeal). In both these cases governed by the AA, a stay of
proceedings in favour of arbitration was granted. In contrast, in Fasi v Speciality Laboratories Asia Pte Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 SLR(R) 1138
(Singapore High Court), a stay was refused because the court proceedings were well-advanced at the time of the stay application such
that the High Court considered that it made little sense 'to order that everything be stayed and parties return to the starting line in
another forum'. In particular, the plaintiff's application for summary judgment had already been heard. In Multiplex Constructions Pty
Ltd v Sintal Enterprise Pte Ltd [2005] 2 SLR(R) 530 (Singapore Court of Appeal), the Court of Appeal held that a stay should only apply to
those parts of a dispute which are capable of being determined by arbitration.
128) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(1); AA, s 21.
129) Tjong Very Sumito and others v Antig Investments Pte Ltd [2009] 4 SLR(R) 732 (Singapore Court of Appeal).
130) Tjong Very Sumito (n 129) (emphasis added).
131) Tomolugen Holdings (n 120) para 63; TMT Co Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc (trading as RBS Greenwich Futures) and others [2017]
SGHC 21 at [63].
132) First Link Investments Corp Ltd v GT Payment Pte Ltd et al [2014] SGHCR 12, para 7.
133) IAA, s 3(1); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(1); AA, s 21(1).
134) Malini Ventura v Knight Capital Pte Ltd and others [2015] SGHC 225 at [27]. The High Court reached this conclusion with reference to the
drafting history of the Model Law, which revealed that a provision conferring upon courts the power to determine a tribunal's
jurisdiction prior to the tribunal's own decision on the issue was proposed for inclusion in the Model Law but ultimately rejected out of
concern that it would encourage dilatory tactics and obstruct the arbitral process.
135) IAA, s 8(1); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 13(3); AA, s 15(4).
136) IAA, s 13(1); AA, s 30(1). In ALC v ALF [2010] SGHC 231 (Singapore High Court) (party names changed to preserve confidentiality), the High
Court revoked the issue of a subpoena that had earlier been granted on an ex parte basis on the grounds that the issue of the
subpoena had been an abuse of process. The defendant had applied for a subpoena even though the tribunal had already rejected,
after a full hearing, the defendant's request that the plaintiff's witnesses provide sworn testimony attesting to the adequacy of
document disclosure.
137) AAY v AAZ [2011] 1 SLR 1093 (Singapore High Court) (party names changed to preserve confidentiality).
138) IAA, s 22; AA, s 56.
139) IAA, s 23(2)–(4); AA, s 57(2)–(4).
140) IAA, s 12A(1). For a discussion on the background to these legislative amendments, see Ch 1, para [1.06].
141) IAA, s 12A(4). The Singapore Court of Appeal in Maldives Airports Co Ltd v GMR Malé International Airport Pte Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 449
(Singapore Court of Appeal) para 43, held that an 'asset' under IAA, s 12A(4) includes contractual rights which, if lost, would not be
adequately remediable by an award of damages.
142) IAA, s 12A(5).
143) IAA, s 12A(2).
144) C Leng Sun SC, Singapore Law on Arbitral Awards (Singapore Academy of Law, 2011) para 2.47.
145) AA, ss 28 and 31(1)(a).
146) In WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1088 (Singapore High Court), an anti-suit injunction
was granted by the Singapore High Court to restrain the defendant from proceeding with an action in the Colombo High Court. See also
Regalindo Resources Pte Ltd v Seatrek Trans Pte Ltd [2008] SLR(R) 930 (Singapore High Court), where an anti-suit injunction was not
granted against a party which had brought foreign proceedings to obtain security despite itself commencing arbitration proceedings in
Singapore; and Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co Ltd v Easton [2004] 2 SLR(R) 14 (Singapore High Court), where the High Court held
that it had no jurisdiction or power to injunct an arbitrator from proceeding with a hearing pending the Court's decision on whether he
should be removed from office.
147) IAA, s 12(6); AA, s 28(4). The AA provides in s 28(4) that tribunal orders are to be treated as orders of the High Court. In contrast, IAA, s
12(6) provides that tribunal orders are to be enforced as if they were orders made by 'a court', which could include a foreign court. This,

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along with the fact the power is in the IAA which covers foreign arbitrations, suggests the court's power extends to the enforcement of
orders and directions of tribunals seated outside Singapore.
148) The Hong Kong courts are similarly available to enforce tribunal orders and directions pursuant to s 61 of the Hong Kong Arbitration
Ordinance, which expressly extends to orders and directions of tribunals seated outside Hong Kong. The courts of England and Wales
will also enforce tribunal orders and directions pursuant to s 42 of the English Arbitration Act.
149) IAA, s 8(2); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 11(3) and (4); AA, s 13(5) and (8), both of which have been amended by the Statutes
(Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2016, ss 2 and 11.
150) IAA, s 8(3). Professor Lawrence Boo held the position of appointing authority from 1 June 2004 to 5 April 2009 (Government Gazette
Notification No 1656 of 2004). Sundaresh Menon SC was appointed from 6 April 2009 to 28 February 2011 (Government Gazette
Notification No 923 of 2009). The appointment of Sundaresh Menon SC was cancelled with effect from 1 October 2010 when he ceased to
be Deputy Chairman of SIAC. In 2011, Cavinder Bull SC was named an appointing authority from 5 September 2011 to 28 February 2013.
Following the amendment to the SIAC Rules on 1 April 2013, the new appointing authorities until 31 March 2015 under the IAA were Dr.
Michael Pryles, Cavinder Bull SC, and John Savage (Government Gazette Notification Nos 758 and 765 of 1 April 2013). Gary Born was
appointed as the President of the SIAC Court of Arbitration with effect from 1 April 2015, and in that capacity has since acted as an
appointing authority under s 8(2) of the IAA.
151) SIAC's statistics on cases 'handled' include those in which it acts as an appointing authority—see Ch 1, paras [1.49–1.50].
152) For a discussion on the assessment of costs in SIAC arbitration, see Ch 15.
153) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) para 42.
154) Law Reform Committee, Report (1993) (n 9) para 42.
155) IAA, s 21(1).
156) AA, ss 39(1) and 40(2).
157) AA, ss 39(2)–(3).
158) New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards 1958 (New York Convention), Art IV(1); IAA, s 30(1).
159) IAA, s 19C.
160) Government Gazette Notification Nos S 650 and 651 of 2009.
161) Government Gazette Notification Nos 734 and 738 of 2010.
162) IAA, s 3(1); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(1); AA, s 21(1).
163) Sanum Investments Ltd v Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [2016] 5 SLR 536 at [41–43], quoting Prakash J in AQZ v
ARA [2015] 2 SLR 972 at [57]. See also Jiangsu Overseas Group Co Ltd v Concord Energy Pte Ltd and another matter [2016] SGHC 153 at
[48]; and BCY v BCZ [2016] SGHC 249 at [36].
164) IAA, s 10(3), 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 16(3); AA, s 21(9).
165) See Ch 14, paras [14.02–14.04]. International Research Corp plc v Lufthansa Systems Asia Pacific Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 130 (Singapore Court
of Appeal) para 69:

The expression 'set aside' or 'setting aside' is used in many different contexts. Understandably, it does not always mean the
same thing. As with so many things, its meaning must depend on the context in which it is used and, in particular in this
case, on what is being set aside. An application to the court to decide on the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal pursuant to s
10 of the IAA read with Art 16(3) of the Model Law 1985 is a perfectly legitimate means of challenging an arbitral tribunal's
preliminary ruling on jurisdiction. It is immaterial in this context that as a matter of form, the relief sought is expressed in
terms of setting aside the arbitral tribunal's decision on jurisdiction. (Emphasis in original.)

166) IAA, s 10(4); AA, s 21A(1).

167) IAA, s 10(9); AA, s 21A(6); 1985 UNICTRAL Model Law, Art 16(3). Both provisions state that a challenge to a tribunal's jurisdictional ruling
'shall not operate as a stay of the arbitral proceedings or of execution of any award or order made in the arbitral proceedings unless
the High Court orders otherwise'.
168) Loblaw Companies Limited v Origin & Co Ltd & another [2017] SGHC 59, para 14.
169) Loblaw Companies Limited v Origin & Co Ltd & another [2017] SGHC 59, (n 168) para 14.
170) Loblaw Companies Limited v Origin & Co Ltd & another [2017] SGHC 59, (n 168) para 17.
171) For a discussion on why a decision on jurisdiction alone cannot qualify as an award under Singapore law, see Ch 14, paras [14.02–14.04].
172) IAA, s 3(1); 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(3); AA, s 48(2).
173) IAA, s 15A(1). See Ch 14, para [14.46]. In Popack v Lipszyc 2015 ONSC 3460, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice held that Art 34 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law is a mandatory provision from which the parties cannot derogate. The court reasoned at [44] that '[i]f parties can
contract out of Article 34 for all purposes, there would be no jurisdiction for a court to set aside an award as a remedy for breach of
[Articles 18 and 24 of the Model Law, which are] admittedly mandatory provisions.' The decision was upheld by the Ontario Court of
Appeal, albeit without addressing this issue.

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174) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(2).

175) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(2).
176) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(2).
177) PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA (n 71) para 57: 'Errors of law or fact made in an arbitral decision, per se, are final
and binding on the parties and may not be appealed against or set aside by a court except in the situations prescribed under s 24 of
the Act and Art 34 of the Model Law.' Appeals on questions of law are allowed, however, under the AA.
178) IAA, s 24.
179) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(3); AA, s 48(2). Where a request has been made under the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 33 or the AA, s
43 (correction and interpretation of award; additional award), the three-month period runs from the date the request has been
disposed of by the tribunal.
180) IAA, s 15A(1) read in conjunction with 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(1).
181) The Ministry of Law observed that such a 'waiver has been introduced in Article 1522 of the new French Arbitration Act, which provides
that “parties may, at any time, expressly waive their right to bring an action to set aside”', Ministry of Law, International Arbitration
(Amendment) Bill Public Consultation Brief, 20 October 2011, para 23 (emphasis added).
182) PT First Media v Astro Nusantara (n 8) paras 65, 71, and 143. See the discussion on this topic at paras [2.30–2.33].
183) AA, s 48.
184) AA, s 49(1). The provision is substantially similar to the Arbitration Act 1996 (UK), s 69.
185) See Ch 16, para [16.40]. A party to an arbitration governed by the AA can appeal questions of law subject to any agreement of the parties
precluding such an appeal. Rule 32.11 of the SIAC Rules is likely to represent such an agreement.
186) AA, ss 49(3)–(5).
187) AA, ss 49(4) and 50(2).
188) AA, s 50(6).
189) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2014] SGHC 220 at [46]: 'There are two aspects to this concept of party autonomy – the
restricted role of the courts in the arbitral process and the procedural freedom and flexibility enjoyed by the parties.'
190) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114 at [60].
191) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114 at [65].
192) An 'arbitral tribunal is not able to defend itself and the accusation can have an adverse impact on the arbitrator's reputation and
standing in the arbitration community': Coal and Oil LLC v GHCL Ltd [2015] SGHC 65, para 2.
193) The figures reported are the results of the author's own research as of 17 March 2017 based on a review through all reported decisions
of the Singapore courts on setting aside applications under the IAA and AA. A total of 29 applications have been brought under the IAA,
of which four were granted (three in full and one in part), while a total of ten applications have been brought under the current AA, of
which five were granted (two in whole, three in part).
194) Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86 (Singapore Court of Appeal) paras 65(c)–(f). Followed in
TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 972 at [43] and AMZ v AXX [2016] 1 SLR 549 at [95], [97], and
[103].
195) TMM (n 194) at [125].
196) TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 186 (Singapore High Court) para 45, relying on Bingham J's
judgment in Zermalt Holdings SA v Nu-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] 2 EGLR 14 at [14].
197) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd (n 190) para 20.
198) L W Infrastructure Pte Ltd v Lim Chin San Contractors Pte Ltd and another appeal [2013] 1 SLR 125 (Singapore Court of Appeal) para 38:
'the certainty sought to be achieved by [Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law] would be significantly undermined if the courts retained
a concurrent “supervisory jurisdiction” over arbitral proceedings or awards that could be exercised by the grant of declaratory orders
not expressly provided for in the [AA or IAA]'. With that said, the Singapore Court of Appeal has accepted that a party can resist
enforcement of a Singapore award for reasons beyond those expressly stated in the IAA. See the discussion of the Astro case at [2.29–
2.33].
199) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd (n 190), at [67]; BLC v BLB [2014] 4 SLR 79 at [53].
200) Jiangsu Overseas Group Co Ltd (n 163) at [53].
201) Sanum Investments Ltd (n 163) at [35].
202) Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic v Sanum Investments Ltd [2015] SGHC 15 at [44]; Sanum Investments Ltd (n 163) at
[27].
203) [2001] 1 SLR(R) 443 at [18].
204) Triulzi Cesare SRL v Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 114, para 112.
205) Triulzi Cesare SRL, (n 190) at [112].
206) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 18, IAA, s 3(1).

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207) AA, s 22.

208) ADG v ADI [2014] 3 SLR 481 at [104].
209) Triulzi Cesare SRL, (n 190) at [116]. In Re Landau, Toby Thomas QC [2016] SGHC 258 at [52] the Singapore High Court noted, without ruling
on the issue, that the applicant argued that its opponent's obstructive conduct—its so-called guerrilla tactics—had deprived it of an
opportunity to be heard. Whether it is a breach of the rules of natural justice for a tribunal to allow one party not to produce
documents to the other side in discovery due to confidentiality constraints was considered in the case of Dongwoo Mann & Hummel Co
Ltd v Mann & Hummel GmbH [2008] 3 SLR (R) 871.
210) ADG v ADI [2014] 3 SLR 481 at [114]. Case-management decisions, however, are still subject to the right to be heard: Triulzi (n 190) at [131].
211) ADG v ADI [2014] 3 SLR 481 (Singapore High Court) paras 111 and 114.
212) SIAC Rules (2016), Rule 13.1; IAA, s 3(1), 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 12(1); AA, s 14(1). See Ch 8 for a discussion on the duty of an
arbitrator to be impartial and independent of the parties.
213) PT Central Investindo v Franciscus Wongso and others and another matter [2014] 4 SLR 978, paras 51–52.
214) PT Central Investindo v Franciscus Wongso and others and another matter (n 213) paras 133–35.
215) Soh Beng Tee, (n 194) at [65(c)].
216) TMM, (n 194) at [91].
217) TMM, (n 194) at [88].
218) IAA, S 3(1), 1985 UNICTRAL Model Law, Art 31(2); AA, s 38(2).
219) SEF Construction Pte Ltd v Skoy Connected Pte Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 733 at [60].
220) TMM, (n 194) at [72–73].
221) AKN v ALC [2015] 3 SLR 488 at [46].
222) AKN v ALC [2015] 3 SLR 488 at [46] followed in Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v King, Ann Rita [2017] SGHC 36 at [89].
223) TMM, (n 194) at [63].
224) AMZ v AXX [2016] 1 SLR 549 at [140]–[149].
225) Zermalt Holdings SA v No-Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd [1985] 2 EGLR 14; referenced with approval in AMZ v AXX [2016] 1 SLR 549 at [142].
Bingham J also said: 'If he feels that the proper approach is one that has not been explored or advanced in evidence or submission,
then again it is his duty to give the parties a chance to comment.' This might be open to question to the extent His Honour was
suggesting an arbitrator should advise a party as to how to present its case, which the Singapore High Court has expressly rejected: AMZ
v AXX at [149].
226) SIAC Rules (2016), Rules 19.1 and 41.2; ADG v ADI [2014] 3 SLR 481 at [108]–[112].
227) TMM Division Maritima SA de CV v Pacific Richfield Marine Pte Ltd (n 194) para 104.
228) IAA, s 24(a); AA s 48(1)(vi).
229) Beijing Sinozonto v Goldenray Consortium (n 71) at [41], following the Singapore High Court decision in Dongwoo Mann+Hummel Co Ltd
v Mann+Hummel GmbH [2008] 3 SLR(R) 871.
230) Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprises Pte Ltd v Exim Rajathi India Pvt Ltd [2010] 1 SLR 573 at [29].
231) Swiss Singapore Overseas Enterprises Pte Ltd v Exim Rajathi India Pvt Ltd (n 230) at [30].
232) Re Landau, Toby Thomas QC [2016] SGHC 258 at [66], following the Singapore Court of Appeal decision in PT Prima International
Development v Kempinski Hotels SA [2012] 4 SLR 98 at [72].
233) Re Landau, Toby Thomas QC [2016] SGHC 258 at [68].
234) 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 34(2)(b)(ii); AA, s 48(1)(b).
235) AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 (Singapore Court of Appeal) paras 37–38; Beijing Sinozonto Mining Investment Co Ltd v Goldenray Consortium
(Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 814 (Singapore High Court) para 38. This may have been inspired by French law, which has an
internationalist approach to the regulation and supervision of arbitration within its borders. Specifically, the Code of Civil Procedure
(France), Art 1520(5) allows an international arbitral award to be set aside if its 'recognition or execution is contrary to international
public policy'.
236) [2016] SGHC 258 at [36]. Nonetheless, the application to have Mr Landau QC appear as counsel in proceedings before the Singapore
High Court challenging an award under the IAA was rejected on the grounds that the arguments raised in the challenge were not
sufficiently novel so as to justify a non-Singapore qualified lawyer being admitted to the Court.
237) AJU v AJT (n 235) para 37.
238) Asuransi Jasa Indonesia v Dexia Bank (n 71) para 59; followed in Prometheus Marine Pte Ltd v King, Ann Rita [2017] SGHC 36 at [106].
239) Asuransi Jasa Indonesia v Dexia Bank (n 71) at [56–57] Beijing Sinozonto v Goldenray Consortium (n 71) at [41].
240) The Singapore Court of Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) (n 71) para 56 expressly rejected the approach of the Supreme
Court of India in Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v SAW Pipes Ltd [2003] 5 SCC 705 (Supreme Court of India) where the Supreme Court
held that an award could be set aside on public policy grounds in India if it is contrary to: '(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or (b)
the interest of India; or (c) justice or morality; or (d) in addition, if it is patently illegal'. One can no longer challenge an international

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arbitration award in India on the basis that it is 'patently illegal', however, following a 2015 amendment to the Indian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996 and the 2013 decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd v Progetto Grano Spa (Civil Appeal No
5085 of 2013 at [27]). A domestic award may still be set aside in India on the basis that it is patently illegal: Arbitration and Conciliation
(Amendment) Act 2015 (India), s 18.
241) In contrast, there appears to be scope for arguing under Chinese law that a decision of an arbitral tribunal which is deemed to be
inconsistent with a binding ruling of a Chinese court violates the public policy of China. In Taizhou Haopu Investment Co Ltd v Wicor
Holding AG [2015] Tai Zhong Shang Zhong Shen Zi, No 00004 (China) the Taizhou Intermediate People's Court refused recognition and
enforcement of an ICC award on the ground that the award was inconsistent with a prior ruling of the Jiangsu High People's Court and
thus contrary to the public interest of China, whereas the US Federal Court in Telenor Mobile Communications v Storm LLC 524 F Supp 2d
332 (SDNY 2007) adopted a narrow view of public policy and upheld an arbitral award notwithstanding a prior decision of a Ukrainian
court which ruled that the arbitration agreement was invalid. The Federal Court held at [357] that even if the arbitral award was in
conflict with Ukrainian law, the decision of the tribunal and that of the US court would have to be 'directly contrary to foreign law in
such a way to make compliance with one necessarily a violation of the other'.
242) Coal & Oil Co LLC v GHCL Ltd [2015] SGHC 65 at [63].
243) [2011] 4 SLR 739 (Singapore Court of Appeal), the party names have been altered in the published decision in order to preserve the
confidential nature of the arbitration.
244) The parties were alleged to have engaged in an illegal attempt to stifle Thai criminal proceedings. AJU v AJT (n 235) at [70]:

… the Tribunal's findings in the present case as to the intention of the Appellant and the Respondent when they signed the
Concluding Agreement, which intention was reflected in cl 1 thereof, are findings of fact which are not correctable as they are
final and binding on both parties. Public policy, based on the alleged illegality of the Concluding Agreement, was not
engaged by such findings of fact. Hence, the Judge should not have reopened the Tribunal's findings.

245) Re Landau, Toby Thomas QC [2016] SGHC 258 at [69]: 'It is clear that if a tribunal finds as a fact that a contract is not illegal, a court
cannot substitute its own factual findings in place of that (AJU v AJT [2011] 4 SLR 739 at [65])'.
246) AJU v AJT (n 235) at [67–69].
247) Coal & Oil Co (n 242), at [63]. The High Court noted that a party concerned with delay in the rendering of an award should make an
application pursuant to Article 14 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law (or SIAC Rule 17.3) for the mandate of the tribunal to be terminated
before the award was released: Coal & Oil Co (n 242) at [65].
248) Coal & Oil Co (n 242) at [62].
249) PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA (n 71) at [59].
250) IAA, s 19; AA, s 46(1).
251) In other words, the proceedings will not be open to the public.
252) Aloe Vera of America, Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR(R) 174 (Singapore High Court); Denmark Skibstekniske Konsulenter A/S I
Likvidation v Ultrapolis 3000 Investments Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 661 (Singapore High Court).
253) The creditor must serve on the debtor the order granting leave to enforce an award either personally or by sending a copy of it to the
debtor's usual or last known place of residence or business or in such other manner as the court may direct. Service of the
enforcement order outside Singapore does not require leave of the court, although it must comply with Rules of Court Order 11, Rules 3,
4, and 6. For awards under the AA, see Supreme Court's Rules of Court (Cap 322, Rule 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (Singapore) RSC Ord 69 r 14, which
sets out the relevant rules on how the application to enforce the award should be made and how an order granting leave to enforce the
award should be served on the debtor. For awards under the IAA, see RSC Ord 69A r 6.
254) If the order is served in Singapore, the debtor has 14 days after service to challenge the order. If the order is served out of jurisdiction,
the period is fixed by the court. For awards under the AA, see RSC Ord 69 r 14(4). For awards under the IAA, see RSC Ord 69A r 6(4).
255) While Art 36 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law is excluded from the IAA pursuant to IAA, s 3(1), the Court of Appeal ruled in the Astro
decision (n 8) that Art 36 reflects Singapore common law.
256) The Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act 1986 (No 24 of 1986) (Singapore) was enacted to give effect to the New York Convention. It was
subsequently repealed and subsumed within the IAA as IAA, Part III.
257) New York Convention, Art 1(3) permits signatory States 'on the basis of reciprocity [to] declare that it will apply the Convention to the
recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State'. Singapore has made such a declaration:
UNCITRAL, 'Status—Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958)', available at
<[Link] (accessed 1 November 2016). It was for this
reason that the Singapore Parliament decided to exclude Part VIII of the UNCITRAL Model Law from the IAA as otherwise all foreign
awards, not just those rendered in a state party to the New York Convention, would be enforceable under the terms of Article 35 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, which mirrors Articles I and III of the New York Convention. This limited objective of the Parliament when it
excluded Chapter VIII of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law from the IAA was a key factor in the Singapore Court of Appeal's finding in Astro
(n 8) that Art 36 of the Model Law reflected the common law of Singapore.
258) IAA, s 30(1). The affidavit should exhibit supporting documents (namely, an authenticated original or certified copy of the award, the
original arbitration agreement or certified copy thereof, and where the award or agreement is in a language other than English, a
certified translation in English). RSC Ord 69A r 6.
259) RSC Ord 69A r 6(2).

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260) IAA, s 31.

261) Strandore Invest A/S v Soh Kim Wat [2010] SGHC 151 (Singapore High Court).
262) IAA, s 24; AA, s 48.
263) IAA, s 31(4). See (n 71).
264) IAA, s 33; Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act (Cap 265, 2001 Rev Ed) (Singapore); Reciprocal Enforcement of Commonwealth
Judgments Act (Cap 264, 1985 Rev Ed) (Singapore). The jurisdictions which have reciprocal enforcement arrangements with Singapore
are Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, India (with the exception of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), Malaysia, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, and the Windward Islands.
265) AA, s 46(3) read with s 46(1). AA, s 46(1) provides that an award 'made by the arbitral tribunal pursuant to an arbitration agreement may,
with leave of the Court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the Court to the same effect'. AA, s 46(3) provides
that notwithstanding s 3 (which relevantly provides that the AA only applies to arbitrations where the place of arbitration is Singapore),
'subsection (1) shall apply to an award irrespective of whether the place of arbitration is Singapore or elsewhere'.
266) AA, s 46(1).
267) (Cap 11, 2012 Rev Ed) (Singapore).
268) (Cap 11, Rule 1, 2002 Rev Ed) (Singapore).
269) (Cap 322, Rule 5, 2014 Rev Ed) (Singapore).

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