1

Question one

Mary, an undergraduate student, visits her local police station to report her rape by an
unidentified taxi driver the previous evening. All taxi drivers in the area are subsequently
required to attend an informal identification parade whereby they are put standing in a row
in a yard, with Mary viewing them through a ground floor window of a building fronting onto
that yard.

Mary identifies Tom, the taxi driver positioned immediately outside her viewing window
during the informal identification parade, as the man who had raped her.

Prior to the informal identification parade, Gardaí had provided Mary with a photograph of
the man whom they told her was the likely suspect. The man in the photograph was Tom.
Twenty years earlier, Tom had been convicted of manslaughter after killing his neighbor in a
fight caused by a row over parking.

LEGAL ISSUE

Legal Issue:
[Link] the identification procedure was so unfair that it violates Tom’s right to a fair
trial and makes the identification evidence unreliable or inadmissible?
[Link] Tom’s old manslaughter conviction should be excluded from evidence because it
is highly prejudicial and not relevant to determining whether he committed the alleged rape?

1. Whether the identification procedure was so unfair that it violates Tom’s right to a fair
trial and makes the identification evidence unreliable or inadmissible?

Yes the identification procedure was unfair and it violates Tom’s right to a fair trial hence
rendering the identification evidence unreliable.

In R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224, it was stated that it is prudent for courts to examine the
circumstances in which the witness first observed the suspect such as lighting, distance,
duration, and level of stress. Turnbull further stresses that any subsequent identification
procedure must be fair and free from suggestion, as a flawed procedure can easily
contaminate the witness’s memory.

Pre-Exposure to Tom’s Photograph

The identification procedure in Tom’s case was fundamentally compromised from the start.
Police showed Mary a photograph of Tom before the identification [Link] have
repeatedly condemned by Ugandan courts.

In Kibale v Uganda [1999] UGSC 6, the Supreme Court held that exposing a witness to a
photograph of the suspect before a parade creates a significant risk of suggestion and taints
the identification. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in Njiku v Uganda [2006] UGCA 2
 2

emphasized that pre-parade exposure undermines the independence of the witness’s judgment
because the witness may simply pick the person they were primed to [Link] single flaw
already renders the identification highly unreliable.

The “Identification Parade” Was Not a Parade in Any Legal Sense

The procedure used by the police did not meet the basic requirements of a lawful
identification parade. Instead of assembling people of similar appearance in a neutral,
supervised setting, the Gardaí simply placed taxi drivers in a yard and had Mary view them
through a window with Tom positioned directly in front of her.

In Ssentale v Uganda [1968] EA 365, the court held that a proper identification parade must
follow recognized standards of fairness.

Similarly In Musoke v Uganda [1976] HCB 12, it was emphasized that all participants must
be treated uniformly and resemble the suspect in appearance.

Lastly In Kasule v Uganda [1992–1993] HCB 47, the court stressed that the suspect must
never be singled out or “pointed out,” directly or indirectly.

Placing Tom right in front of Mary’s window clearly singled him out, violating all
established safeguards.

Police Suggestion to the Witness

The situation was further worsened when police told Mary beforehand that Tom was their
“likely suspect.” Courts have consistently condemned such suggestive remarks. In Eliphaz
Maeda v Republic (2003) 2 EA 51, it was held that any form of police suggestion regarding
the suspect’s identity fatally contaminates the [Link] explicit suggestion leaves
no room for claiming that Mary’s choice was independent or reliable.

Violation of Tom’s Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial

These procedural irregularities also breach Tom’s constitutional rights. Article 28(1) of the
Constitution of Uganda guarantees every accused person a fair and impartial hearing, and
Article 44 makes this right non-derogable. The Supreme Court in Uganda v Kibwamu &
Others, SC Crim. App. No. 19 of 2003, affirmed that a fair trial includes protection from
tainted or improperly obtained evidence.

Given the level of procedural impropriety in this case, the identification evidence is
fundamentally inconsistent with constitutional standards.

In conclusion,taken together, the pre-exposure to Tom’s photograph, the irregular and

suggestive identification parade, and the police’s explicit influence on the witness amount to
a serious violation of established legal principles and constitutional rights. I therefore submit
that the identification evidence is therefore unsafe, unreliable, and should be excluded or
given no weight whatsoever.
 3

2. Whether Tom’s old manslaughter conviction should be excluded from evidence because it
is highly prejudicial and not relevant to determining whether he committed the alleged rape?

Yes,Tom’s old manslaughter conviction should be excluded from [Link] 53 of the

Evidence Act Cap 8 establishes the general rule that evidence of a person’s character is
irrelevant unless character is itself a fact in issue. Section 54of the Evidence Act permits the
use of previous convictions solely for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness
and only where the accused chooses to testify, thereby putting his credibility in issue. Section
56 reinforces these restrictions by providing that evidence of bad character is inadmissible
unless the accused has first adduced evidence of his good character. These provisions
embody the long-standing common law principle that an accused person must be tried on the
facts of the case before the court, and not on their past conduct or alleged disposition.

Cornelius Henry Mukiibi; The Law of Evidence in Uganda (2021) 1st Edition page 23 states
that in criminal trials, a careful distinction must be maintained between relevance and
prejudice. In R v Sims [1946] KB 531, the court emphasised that evidence of previous
convictions is inadmissible if its primary effect is merely to blacken the character of the
accused without contributing any meaningful insight into the offence charged. Ugandan
jurisprudence has consistently aligned with this approach. In Kajjubi v Uganda [1975] HCB
204, the High Court held that the prosecution may not introduce prior criminal history simply
to suggest a propensity to commit crime. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in Wasswa & Another v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1999, which
stressed that prior convictions are excluded precisely because they risk distracting the court
from the essential issue whether the accused committed the offence charged not whether he is
a person of bad character.

Tom’s decades-old manslaughter conviction fails every test of admissibility. The conviction
arose from a fight over a parking space and bears no logical or legal connection to the offence
of rape. It reveals no pattern of sexual offending, no distinctive modus operandi, and no
similarity that could bring it within the narrow exception for similar-fact evidence. The
leading authority, Boardman v DPP [1975] AC 421, widely applied in East African courts,
holds that similar-fact evidence is admissible only where the similarities between the acts are
so striking that coincidence becomes objectively implausible. Here, no such striking
similarity exists. To admit the old conviction would therefore serve no legitimate evidentiary
purpose and would operate only to inflame prejudice.

Given its overwhelming prejudicial effect and complete lack of probative value, admitting the
manslaughter conviction would seriously undermine Tom’s constitutional right to a fair trial.
Nothing in the Evidence Act permits its admission in these circumstances. It must therefore
be excluded in its entirety.

In conclusion Both the identification evidence and the attempt to introduce Tom’s old
conviction offend well-established principles of Ugandan evidence law and constitutional
fair-trial protections. The identification procedure was irregular, suggestive, and
fundamentally unfair, rendering the resulting identification unreliable. Meanwhile, Tom’s
twenty-year-old manslaughter conviction is irrelevant to the rape charge and inadmissible
under sections 53, 54, and 56 of the Evidence Act, as well as binding judicial precedent. I
therefore submit that Admitting either form of evidence would gravely compromise the
fairness of the proceedings and risk a miscarriage of justice.
 4

Bibliography

Evidence Act, Cap. 8

Abdalla bin Wendo & Another v R (1953) 20 EACA 166

Boardman v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] AC 421
Bogere Moses & Another v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1997
Eliphaz Maeda v Republic (2003) 2 EA 51
Kajjubi v Uganda [1975] HCB 204
Kasule v Uganda [1992–1993] HCB 47
Kibale v Uganda [1999] UGSC 6
Musoke v Uganda [1976] HCB 12
Njiku v Uganda [2006] UGCA 2
R v Sims [1946] KB 531
R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224
Roria v Republic [1967] EA 583
Ssentale v Uganda [1968] EA 365
Uganda v Kibwamu & Others, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 2003
Wasswa & Another v Uganda, Supreme Court Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1999