Admissibility of Evidence

i. De Jesus v. Sanchez-Malit, A.C. No. 6470, July 8, 2014

FACTS:

On 23 June 2004, a disbarment complaint filed by Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit on the following grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and unworthiness to become an
officer of the Court. The following acts were made by the respondent:

1) Drafted and notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely named the former as its absolute
and registered owner.

2) Notarization of lease agreement sometime in September 1999 without the signature of the lessees.

3) Notarized a sale agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which was still
covered by the period within which it could not be alienated which complainant entered into with a certain Nicomedes
Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.

4) Three Special Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent which were not signed by the principals and an
Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s secretary/treasurer.

The IBP Board of Governors approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner:

a. Disqualification as notary public for two years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing documents without
the signatures of the parties who had purportedly appeared before her.

b. Suspension from the practice of law for one year for violation of Canon 187 and Rule 188 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility on inaccurate crafting of the real estate mortgage contract.

Her first and second motions for reconsideration was denied so the disbarment case was submitted to SC for final action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the additional documents submitted in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

RULING:

No. Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. "The respondent argues citing the case of Tolentino v. Mendoza, in
which the respondent therein opposed the admission of the birth certificates of his illegitimate children as
evidence of his grossly immoral conduct, because those documents were obtained in violation Rule 24, Administrative
Order No. 1, Series of 1993.

Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the
rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it state that procurement of birth records in violation of said
rule would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only
provides for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal searches and seizures. Consequently, in this
case where complainants, as private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply. Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of the birth
certificates in question, said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should be properly taken into
consideration in the resolution of this administrative case against respondent.

Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain no provision declaring the inadmissibility of documents obtained in
violation thereof. Thus, the IBP correctly considered in evidence the other notarized documents submitted by
complainant as additional evidence. Since the additional documents were relevant to the complainant’s allegations
and no law or rule specifically excluded them, the Court held they were admissible.

ii. People v. Samontanez, G.R. No. 134530, December 4, 2000

FACTS:

Accused Roberto Samontañez was convicted of the crime of rape with homicide in the RTC of Nasugbu, Batangas. The
victim was 18-year old Lolita delas Alas who was seen lifeless and naked in the middle of a sugarcane plantation. She
was apparently raped and killed by the attacker. Nobody witnessed the actual commission of the crime. Police
investigation revealed that Samontañez was seen near the place where the crime was committed at approximately
during the time the crime was committed. Days after, Samontañez was arrested in his workplace in Mendez, Cavite.
During the interrogation. Samontañez admitted that he has the personal belongings of the victim. Seized from him are
the victim’s personal belongings (i.e. Omax wristwatch, gold ring, Joop cologne) inside Samontañez’ bag. On the first
arraignment, Samontañez pleaded not guilty to the crime charged but later on changed it to that of guilty. Trial
ensued. Samontañez’ conviction in the trial court hinged on: Samontañez’ plea of guilty, pieces of evidence found in
possession of Samontañez, and testimonies which seek to establish that Samontañez was seen near the crime scene on
or about the time the crime took place. Roberto Samontañez is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, of
the crime of Rape with Homicide as thus penalized and is hereby sentenced to DEATH, In his Brief, appellant Roberto
Samontañez assails the validity of his plea of guilty to the charge in the information in this case for having been
improvidently made.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the pieces of evidence (i.e., victim’s personal belongings) gathered is inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:

YES. The mentioned pieces of evidence are inadmissible in evidence as they are considered “fruits of poisonous tree”.
It appeared from the records that the police authorities arrested Samontañez in his workplace in Cavite. It does not
appear from the record that the appellant was apprised of his constitutional rights during the police custodial
investigation nor was he assisted by counsel which are enshrined in Article III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution. In
the absence of a valid waiver, any confession obtained from Samontañez as well as any other evidence secured by
that confession is inadmissible in evidence even if the same was not objected to in the trial. The libertarian
exclusionary rule known as the “fruits of the poisonous tree” provides that once the primary source ( the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least
once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Thus, the personal belongings of the victim found inside
the bag of Samontañez, having been gathered by virtue of an illegally obtained confession, is inadmissible in
evidence.

NOTE 1 (other bases of conviction of the trial court):

The only other evidence of the prosecution are the testimonies of Carlito Samontañez and Melecio Mendoza, both of
which merely seek to establish the presence of the appellant near the vicinity of the crime scene on or about the time
when the crime took place.

Ultimately, the conviction of the appellant for the crime charged in the case at bar rested primarily on his plea of
guilty which appeared to have been improvidently made and hence, contrary to the letter and spirit of Section 3, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Court. Based on Section 3, Rule 116, three (3) things are enjoined of the trial court after a
plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered by the accused:

1. The trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences
of his plea;

2. The trial court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability through the requisite quantum of evidence; and,

3. The trial court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.

It must be emphasized that the said procedure is mandatory and any judge who fails to observe it commits grave
abuse of discretion. Why the plea was improvidently made: Lengthy transcript of inquiries of the trial court failed to
dwell on a significant development that transpired on the subsequent scheduled hearings when the appellant revealed
in open court, through counsel, that his subsequent plea of guilty was prompted by "pressure" from a certain policeman
so that he (appellant) agreed to admit the commission of the offense charged. The decision of the trial court is devoid of
any actual finding relative to the actual commission of the crime.

NOTE 2:

RTC to SC -- This is automatic review of Decision of the [Link] RULING: WHEREFORE, the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Nasugbu, Batangasdated May 15, 1998 in Criminal Case No. 1032 convicting the
appellant, Roberto V. Samontañez, of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty
of death is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; and the case is remanded to the court of origin for the proper
arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated

iii. Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999

DOCTRINES

1. Privacy of Communications and Correspondence - The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
private communications. Tape recording is not prohibited if the exchange is not private, as the law prohibits recording
of private communication without the consent of the parties.

2. Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting,
or irritating anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. To be sufficient, it
must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it
must immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party
and the commission of the crime by the accused.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgement of the RTC that Navarro is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide, for allegedly boxing Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun
and when the victim fell, he banged his head against the pavement where the victim died as a result. Navarro is a
member of the Lucena Integrated National Police who assaulted Ike Lingan inside the police headquarters.

The victim, Lingan, is a local media man, and together with another local media person, Jalbuena, they went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing indecent and lewd night shows. Jalbuena brought out his
camera to take a picture, and at that point, the floor manager, Liquin, and the security guard, Sioco, approached
Jalbuena to ask why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job". When the local
media men saw that the security guard was pulling out a gun, they ran outside and went to the police station to report
the matter.

At the station, three of the policemen were drinking, including Navarro. A heated confrontation followed between victim
Lingan and accused policeman Navarro. The altercation lead to the flooring of Lingan. Lingan was brought to the hospital
but died from his injuries. Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between
petitioner and the deceased. At the trial court, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had made,
and was the main force in determining his guilt. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wire-tapping.

ISSUE:

Whether the recorded tape is admissible in view of the Wire-Tapping Act.

RULING:

Yes. The law provides:

SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof,
of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or
trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation
Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited. Nor is there any question
that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness:

(1) that he personally recorded the conversation;

(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and

(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.

In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was
the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation
was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution. The voice recording made by Jalbuena
established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police
blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro
and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

iv. Reyes y Capistrano v. People, G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018

FACTS:

A group of police officers were patrolling when two teenagers approached and informed them of a woman with long
hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm had just bought shabu. A few minutes later, they saw a woman, who was later
identified as the accused, passing by who matched the description and was reeking of alcohol. They asked if she
bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. The accused pulled out something from her breast area which was
immediately confiscated. One of the police officers brought it to the police station and prepared the necessary
documents. The substance inside the sachet was found to be shabu. Defendant alleged that when she denied having
possession of the shabu, she was brought to the police station where the officers tried to extort money from her but
when she failed to do so, they took her for inquest proceedings. RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession under Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165. CA: Affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Reyes was lawfully arrested.

RULING:

NO. Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the general rules for a lawful arrest with or
without a warrant. The instances when warrantless arrests may be lawfully affected are:

a. An arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto

b. An arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed;

c. An arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the
pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In warrantless arrests made in flagrante delicto, the two elements must concur:

1. the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit a crime

2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer

While in Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and
the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. The officer's
personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is essential in order to have a lawful warrantless
arrest.

Further, the overt act test must be passed which should have shown that there was an overt act committed by the
accused within the view of the police officers suggesting that she was in possession of illegal drugs at the time she
was apprehended.

In the case at bar, there was no lawful arrest made since there is no other overt act which could be properly attributed
to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of the police officers that she had just committed, was committing or was
about to commit a crime. The prosecution also failed to prove the conditions of Sec. 5(b), Rule 113 since the arresting
officer's personal knowledge should have been based on reasonable grounds to believe that a crime was committed
by the accused. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. They should have personal knowledge of
facts based on their observation that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. Therefore, the
accused was acquitted of the crime charged.

v. People v. Delociembre y Andales, G.R. No. 226485 (Resolution), June 6, 2018

FACTS:

A buy-bust team was organized to conduct an entrapment operation against Bernie, alias "Axe," who was reportedly
"operating" within Quezon City. The team proceeded to the target area in NIA Road and were able to apprehend him
and Dhats. They proceeded next to the PDEA office where the requisite marking and inventory were done in the
presence of Brgy. Kagawad Ruiz, Jr. and the two accused while SOII Macairap took pictures of the same. IO1 Avenido
then delivered the seized drugs to the PDEA laboratory where Forensic Chemical Officer Santiago who confirmed that
they tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and meferonex, a dangerous drug. Consequently, Santiago
turned over the items to the custody of the trial court. The two accused argued that the officers failed to comply with
the mandatory procedures in the handling and disposition of the seized drugs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the integrity of the seized drugs was maintained notwithstanding the fact the inventory was not done in
the presence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ.

RULING:

No, the integrity of the seized drugs was not maintained the fact that the inventory was not done in the presence of the
representatives from media and the DOJ. The unjustified deviations put into question the evidentiary value of the
seized items. Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when
handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value. The failure of the apprehending
team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves
that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. The records reveal that while the requisite inventory of the seized drugs was conducted in the
presence of the two accused and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence of the
representatives from the media and the DOJ. More significantly, the apprehending officers failed to proffer a plausible
explanation therefor. There was also no showing that the apprehending officers attempted to contact and secure the
presence of representatives from the media and the DOJ apart from the unsubstantiated allegations of the
prosecution witnesses. No plausible reasons were given as to why their presence could not be easily secured.
Procedural lapses committed by the police officers, which were unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by
the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. The procedure in Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 is a
matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

i. People of the Philippines v. Rosemarie Gardon-Mentoy, G.R. No. 223140, September 4, 2019

FACTS:

After receiving information that a certain couple, Poks and Rose was transporting and selling marijuana in Barangay
Malatgao, Narra, Palawan, the Nan-a Municipal Police Station conducted surveillance operation in the National Highway,
Barangay Malatgao, Nan-a, Palawan. The informant relayed to the team that accused-appellant will be boarding a
Charing 19 shuttle van (van) with plate number VRA 698. The police officers flagged down the van as it approached
them and declared that they were conducting a checkpoint. PO1 Rosales asked the passengers who among them was
Rose and accused-appellant presented herself. PO1 Rosales then asked her where her baggage was and she requested
the driver to hand her the pink bag. However, PO1 Rosales noticed that she transferred a block-shaped bundle from the
pink bag to a black bag. They suspected that it was marijuana leaves. The police officers then restrained accused
Rosemarie Gardon-Mentoy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of accused Mentoy was valid.

RULING:

No. The arrest of the accused-appellant did not justify the search of the personal belongings because the arrest did
not precede the search. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, clearly states that "[a] person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant." Accordingly, there should first be a lawful arrest before the warrantless search
can be made; the process cannot be reversed. As such, the search made against the accused-appellant would be valid
only if sufficient probable cause to support it existed independently of the arrest.

What the foregoing disquisition indicates is that the arresting officers plainly ignored the constitutional and statutory
limitations prescribed for a valid search at a checkpoint. They effected the warrantless search of the personal effects
of the accused-appellant without sufficient probable cause, and on that basis arrested her. If the arrest did not
precede the search, where was the probable cause that justified her warrantless arrest?

The conclusion is inevitable that both the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant and the warrantless search of
her personal effects were unreasonable. The consequence is to invalidate the search. The marijuana seized from her
should be deemed inadmissible in evidence pursuant to exclusionary rule enunciated under Section 3(2), Article III of
the Constitution. With the confiscated marijuana being the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the accused-
appellant should be acquitted because the evidence adduced against her was entirely inadmissible.