Catholic University of Louvain

Logic and argumentation

in human sciences

FLTR 1630

Jean Leclercq
Rhetoric, Logic, and Argumentation

To understand why we address 'logic' and 'argumentation', we

It's convenient to start from a discipline (in fact, rhetoric), in our opinion, more general, but that,
it is true, we can hear in a broad sense or in a particular sense, what we are going to
to be evoked soon.

However, let us first make a brief historical remark about this discipline.
understood in its most general sense, which is therefore rhetoric. It is often said that the last
The great treatise on rhetoric was that of Pierre Fontanier, The Figures of Discourse (1818 and
1827), reissued in 1968, with a preface by Gérard Genette. It's true. And we must
add that it is only in the second half of the 20thandcentury that marked a revival
of interest for rhetoric, notably with Chaïm Perelman (1912-1984, jurist, logician
and philosopher – the Treatise on Argumentation, the New Rhetoric of 1958) and Lucie
Olbrechts-Tyteca who collaborates with him, particularly for this work.

Here, rhetoric is an art of argumentation and persuasion, and the examples are
sought in various speeches, such as judicial, religious, philosophical, and
policies. It is a theory of persuasive discourse, with a philosophical question
recurring: how to establish a value judgment? Hence a priority given to rationality.
In this case, the approach is particularly focused on "invention" and it pays less attention to
evidence the affective elements of rhetoric. One can say that it is about inserting 'a
reason at the heart of rhetoric.

However, it should be noted another trend, one represented, for example, by the
Mude Group Liège (General Rhetoric of 1970) or the very well-known Gérard Genette, or Jean
Cohen, or Roland Barthes. Here, rhetoric is more a study of style and figures, it is
which gives the text a literary scope. The examples are then chosen from the corpus
literary and rhetoric becomes restrictively a study on 'language processes'
characteristics of literature" (General Rhetoric, p. 25). These processes are, in fact,
figures of style that deviate, more or less, from the 'zero degree' (as Barthes would say) of
writing. It seems that this structuralist approach actually leads to a critique
philosophical going against the notion of purpose. In this case, rhetoric is no more than its
third part, namely "elocution" (invention, arrangement, and action).

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 However, both of these approaches could be reconciled, especially if one
understand to reflect on the articulation of style and arguments, in the same approach
functional, without separating form and substance from our linguistic modes. This is what is meant
to make Olivier Reboul.

What is rhetoric then? According to Olivier Reboul1rhetoric is the 'art of

"to persuade by speech," the latter being written or oral. The corpus can be very vast, if one
take the angle of persuasion. We will indicate these "literary genres" where it is at work: the
pleading, political speech, sermon or homily (see Bossuet), advertising text,
the pamphlet, the fable and the tale (see Perrault), the letter, the essay, the different modalities of
treatise (especially philosophical or theological), the novel (in a broad sense). The list is not
exhaustive and it is better not to deliver its opposite.

Or, still according to Reboul, we will remember that the criterion of persuasion is a criterion
necessary, where persuasion involves making someone believe (promise, threat, seduction, etc.), without
necessarily result in the action sought by the argument.

"Pierre convinced me that his cause was just." And I believe him!

"Pierre convinced me to defend his case." And I do, but without anyone.
I believe it!

In this sense, rhetorical persuasion therefore consists of making one believe, and only the first
The proposition would be, strictly speaking, 'rhetoric'.

Regardless of this nuance, the question is how a

the speech will be persuasive. There are, in reality, so-called 'rational' means and so-called
emotional", without it always being clear how to separate them. However, this is precisely where
It is observed that rhetoric somewhat covers argumentation (and specifically
the logic where the arguments are well related to the reasoning) and the art of oratory. Thus, it is about
well of a broad definition, if one follows Reboul's interpretation.

The 'rational' means are the 'arguments'. They are qualified in two orders, according to
whether they come back to 'reasoning', or according to whether they come back to 'the example'. It is, in

1
O. Reboul,Introduction à la rhétorique. Théorie et pratique, Paris, Puf, 1991.

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In this first category, syllogisms are studied (and of course all the
logic, in the sense that we will define it) to which we will dedicate an important part.
In this sense, a syllogism belongs to argumentative discourse, and let us already note that this

"Reasoning" falls under the deductive modality. In the case of "the example", we will retain.
which modality is more inductive, so that the example is a type of argument based on
a particular logic of discovery, going from fact to rule or from fact to fact. We
We will revisit these key concepts of 'deduction' and 'induction' with the help of Aristotle.

The means related to "affection" are of two kinds: "ethos" and the
pathos. In the first case, it refers to the character (inspired, dreamer, dynamic, etc.) that
takes the speaker to captivate their audience, which also has its own character; in the
second, it is about the trends, desires, emotions of the audience that the speaker seeks to
to meet, to authenticate, to act upon them (in fact an action on passions, in the sense of
large). C’est en ce sens et à ce niveau que la notion d’herméneutique intervient dans notre
work, because these two dimensions require the authorities in power to interpret themselves
mutually, even to measure each other. Rhetoric (in its argumentative aspect and in its aspect
the oratory) thus has a hermeneutic function. Also, in the case of 'ethos' and the
"pathos", it can therefore be agreed that it is less of a strictly defined issue
argumentative than an oratory issue. But let us repeat that in this area, it is necessary to
do not engage in abusive splits.

Deux exemples de dialogues de François Mitterrand, avec Giscard d’Estaing et Pivot,

can illustrate the power of oratory and the ability to refute an opponent.

First case, during an electoral debate:

Giscard advances: "Do you know the exchange rate of the mark today?" Mitterrand
immediately replied: "But, Mr. President, I am not your student!"

Second case, during a literary show:

Pivot interrogates gloatingly: "But all these constructions, the Louvre, the Great
Library, etc., isn't it a bit pharaonic?

Mitterrand, in a detached tone, replies: "But then, there are several of us.
Pharaohs, because it's not me who made these choices, they are independent commissions.
And then, if I hadn't decided, who would have done it? There is France after all! Well, my
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Critics have no doubt thought of the pharaohs because there is a pyramid. I prefer to think
to the architect!

Very brilliant! The rational and emotional arguments (diminished here because we them
transcriptions) are indeed present. We will see, in the second part of our investigation,
how to identify those notions that particularly influence the 'emotional' aspect.

In addition to this hermeneutic function, one must also add a heuristic function and
an educational function. The second is easily understood, but the first may be
more difficult to grasp. The recourse to the practice of law will be illustrative. Indeed, in a
In court, lawyers present their arguments in various and opposing directions, but it is always
in the service of a judge (or a jury of peers) who is a third party and who will deliver a
In this sense, even though the plea does contain its rhetorical part, it also has a
heuristic function since it must bring about a truth (which will be debatable,
in the case of a call), to find an element or a fact.

It should be noted that the persuasive aspect includes an argumentative component (we

we will start there) and a rhetorical aspect (we will continue with this question),
but which overlap with each other, to the point that it is better not to practice a division
too reductive. Nothing new by the way! Indeed, according to Cicero, it was appropriate to practice
three important actions: "docere" - "delectare" and "movere", where one touches through
the argument, then pleasure and, finally, emotion. And since we are mentioning Cicero, let us proceed.
also the way the Ancients distinguished parts in rhetoric:

The invention or 'heurésis': the search for arguments and means of

persuasion. Types of speeches, evidence and places; but also concepts, facts and
values.

The layout or "taxis": arranging this data and searching for a

coherence. Introduction, narrative, confirmation, and conclusion.

The elocution or 'lexis': the styling (thus written phase) of the discourse, with
these figures. Language, style and figures.

The action of 'hypocrisis': effective pronunciation of the discourse, with the effects
discounted corporals.

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 It should be noted that the Romans will add 'memory'.

Thus, for our first approach, let's retain an important scheme:

Rhetoric → persuasive → Rational means (arguments and examples = logic in

general) and Affective Means (rhetoric = argumentation in a broad sense).

Of course, it can be interesting to see which of the two predominates (we will do it)
see with a speech from another President). But, to show how language oscillates
always between argumentative dimension and rhetorical dimension, we can briefly mention the
the issue of figures of style where the argumentative 'flirts' with the oratorical!

1.1 Entering into argumentation through rhetorical practices

Since ancient times, people have questioned the figures of speech or

the 'tropes'. The Ancients considered them as 'ornaments' of discourse.
Currently, we see in the figures of style very constructed 'anomalies' and
sought after in discourse (which however do not make it absurd). These anomalies
concerning phonetics, syntax, and semantics. But modern linguistics allows
to show which rules are being "violated" and it therefore allows to assign to the
figures of style play an argumentative role.

For our general knowledge, let's mention some figures of style that show us
how much we do it daily, without knowing.

Here are some beautiful cases:

Hypallage: "His sheaf was neither stingy nor hateful." "This new Polo
is really sexy!" It is a displacement of attribution.

Hyperbole: "I'm drained!" "I'm dead!" "I'm wiped out!" It's a

exaggeration of expression.

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Litotes: at the end of a particularly boring and exhausting meal, you say
very politely: "I will take my leave, I am a bit tired!" Or you can say: "He
This little young man is lively. Well, the child (actually a naughty little boy)
(duck) just demolished your living room. It's a signifier diminished in intensity.

Epiphora: "Come see me tonight, or rather wait for me to come to you

visit." This is a correction of the previous term.

Metalepsis: "The one we mourn, the one we loved, the one who was
our joy and the one who brightened our dreary daily life.” It is a replacement.
you signify by a succession of metonymies (designations of one by another)
close element). In this case, one would say more brutally that Alfred is dead.

Prolepsis: "You will tell me that I am rushing things, but it is necessary." "I
You think this course is useless, but still, let me
vous dire son importance. » «On vous dira que… » C’est l’argumentaire de
the opponent who is outpaced, to be turned against him.

The chleuasme: "I may be a poor guy who has messed up everything in my life,"
but I still know what I'm talking about!" "Me, I didn't do
Like you, long university studies, and I have not read all your books.
but I can tell you from my little experience that all that you say is
false!" "Me, personally, I know nothing about it, but I think that it
is wrong..." It is a speaker who belittles himself to gain trust and
sympathy, with a certain revenge on an argument put forward like
simplified and realistic.

The apodictic: "It is not for you, Mr. Michel, to give me lessons.
on these questions!" It's a reasoned refusal to argue where a
notion of authority (superiority of the speaker or inferiority of the audience). If, here,
this figure is violent, it can also be a total rejection of violence. If we
let's say: "We are all Palestinians!" this means that on certain points,
Dialogue is not possible due to a prior refusal of all violence.

Repetition: "Alas, alas, alas!" It is the figure of repetition.

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 Synecdoche: "Oh you Mortals!" (Species) "With you, my comrades,
it's the workers' party that will win." (Part) It's the designation
on the other hand, a relation of necessity (the genus by the species, the whole by the
party, etc.).

Antonomasia: 'Mitterrand is France.' 'Today, it is the victory of

Di Rupo. » «Ursula, it's horrifying! » «Beckham, it's the Man. » It's the
designation of the whole or of the species by a name supposed to be representative.

Here are some cases of "figures of style" where, as we can see, rhetoric comes into play.
accounting line at every moment and in its two components: the rational and the affective.

1.2 Entering logic through the case of syllogism

We can therefore enter into "logic," this time emphasizing more on the "argument" and
on the 'rational' dimension. In this case, form plays a significant role in
the statement of propositions. Here are some appetizer examples on which we
we will return, more extensively, to the development of the argument. Our approach is therefore
voluntarily innocent and simply wants to draw attention to the dimension
argumentative and rational.

Example number 1: an invalid syllogism.

All the encyclopedists of the 18thecentury are truly philosophers

superficiels, or tous ces encyclopédistes sont des philosophes français, donc tous les
French philosophers are really superficial.

Example No. 2 and No. 3: two valid syllogisms, but based on a false proposition.

Every French word starts with a consonant

"Love" does not begin with a consonant

"Amen" does not start with a consonant.

So: "Love" is not a French word.

So: 'Amen' is not a French word.

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 Example No. 4: the same issue, but presented differently.

Every Greek is an islander. Every Greek is insular

Every Athenian is Greek Every Cretan is Greek

Every Athenian is insular Every Cretan is an islander

Valid syllogism but false conclusion Valid syllogism but conclusion true by
chance

These syllogisms illustrate an important principle that we can already put forward: 'from falsehood'

it follows that whatever). For the 'Athenian' case, the reasoning is valid, but false due to
from the first premise. For the 'Cretan' case, the reasoning is also valid, but it is
true by chance. Let us note already that if the form of a reasoning is valid and that the
if the premises are true, then the conclusion is necessarily true, according to another principle.
that we are already advancing: "it is true, unless it is true".

We must therefore remember this important diagram:

True Fake

True True

True True Fake

Example No. 5: a non-valid syllogism.

Every fish has fins.

The whale has fins

The whale is a fish

Example No. 6: a non-valid syllogism.

Every dolphin is adorned with a fin

Prince Philippe is a dolphin

Prince Philippe is therefore adorned with a fin.

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 This syllogism illustrates a semantic change at the level of the middle term and is
so a paralogism.

Exemples n°7 et n°8: un syllogisme non valide et un syllogisme valide.

Every intelligent romantic wears glasses.

Charles-Amédée is wearing glasses.

So Charles-Amédée is an intelligent Romanist.

On the other hand:

Every intelligent Romanist wears glasses.

Charles-Amédée is a Romance scholar.

So Charles-Amédée is wearing glasses.

Example no. 9: two 'perfect' syllogisms according to Aristotle.

I. All living beings are mortal

I. No fish is viviparous.

II. Every man is alive

II. All dolphins are viviparous

III. Every man is mortal

III. Aucundauphin is not a fish

It is with these two "perfect" models of functioning, according to Aristotle, that we

let's stop this introductory enumeration! But, if these few examples show us some
In the case of syllogism, we can see that we will have to try to understand.
rigorously their internal functioning to rule on their validity.

However, what can we already take away from these examples? In fact, they give us
allow to approach these 'rational' means of persuasion that are the 'arguments' and

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to provide a definition of the discipline that specifically takes them as its object
research: logic.

1.2.1 A first definition of logic

In this respect, as part of our company specifically dedicated to the

logically, we can say that it aims to study the valid forms of reasoning and
that she intends to remain at the level of the deduction.

We will therefore retain these important concepts:

A shape is an abstraction of matter. This is typically a way

Greek to practice a distinction. Form therefore distinguishes itself from matter.
or the content.

Reasoning is a mental operation that, based on certain

knowledge recorded in premises, necessarily drawn from a
another knowledge that is recorded in a conclusion, however without
relying on experience. In this particular sense, reasoning is a
deduction (and not induction) that allows one to draw a conclusion without having to
rely on experience.

Validity seeks a correct procedure, with a correction procedure.

as for the form, and it does not materially concern itself with the truth of the
premises. The validity of a reasoning depends on its form and is distinct from
the 'truth' of the premises. A valid reasoning is therefore a reasoning
which remains "always correct or logical," whatever the truth of its
premises.

In fact, logic is not just a rule of discourse but a system of

a priori determinations, to be understood as a principle at the foundation of experience and
like a universal key to understanding.

With this good use of some rules related to the logical functioning of the
language practice and expressions of thought, we will then be able to detect some
"paralogisms" which are errors against validity. This will allow us to distinguish them.
sophisms" (a reasoning of the style "after this, therefore because of this" - "post hoc,

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ergo propter hoc") which are faults against the truth of a premise, which does not already concern
Moreover, strictly speaking, logic deals primarily with validity.

To perfect this definition, it should be noted that logic is not just a study.
inferences that necessarily draw a true conclusion from true premises.
She is also entitled to look at the functioning of a reasoning based on a premise.
false and leading to a true conclusion. This is the case with our 'Cretans' and our
"Athenians" or, as we will see more theoretically, of the possible distinction
between a 'direct proof' and an 'indirect proof.'

1.3 Entering rhetoric through a reflection on involvement

To illustrate, still in a light manner, another way to engage in rhetoric (without

forgetting its relationship with the more 'affective' scope), let’s read a speech by Jacques
Chirac, on August 21, 2003, in the midst of controversy, at the time of the heatwave. It is about entering
this speech and to criticize it in its internal functioning! Thus, one easily notices
that the politician emphasizes confirmations and minimizes denials. Here, the dimension
"logic" (the argument, thus the rational) is ultimately very linked to the dimension
"Affective." The implication can have several repercussions regarding its understanding.

Of course, he enhances oratory over argumentative skills, especially in front of the

masses (meeting, public debate, etc. where argumentative might be more laborious), rather than
in a parliamentary debate (without cameras, of course...), and especially when the
the question is urgent and speaking time is limited (see P. Vrébos's tactics in
his Sunday show: sentences to complete, notes to assign, etc.). This is the case at the time
where Chirac speaks: he must act quickly and persuade swiftly, by implementing 'pathos' and
ethos

In the speech, the President unfortunately goes in every direction... He confuses the
causes and consequences, he alludes to expert opinions, but he is already putting forth his own
analyze, although the announced search for scientific arguments (the importance given
The search that will be conducted by 'experts'!) is therefore hidden. He wants to draw some
consequences, but he already gives them himself. So, the speech shifts and becomes very
Programmatic: death is due to solitude, hence a problem of solidarity, of neighborhood.
of old age, of diseases, etc... Moral of the story: "All together... each at his own

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place... the government is mobilized... France is great... and, of course, the action...
since the alert systems are in place and, therefore, the government has always ensured
(even if the President was on vacation...)!” This is an absolute bypass.

The speech is far from being argumentative when one deciphers it well. Chirac increases
the pathetic function and diminishes rational scope. But, during its pronunciation at the
television, we will notice that after this speech the journalist immediately turns towards the
minister who asks, for his part, to quickly draw conclusions from this sudden
mortality, but he no longer makes any connection between the heatwave and death. As for the representative of
the opposition, which then takes the floor, he hastens to tighten the 'involvement' (and there you go
the logical notion that interests us) and therefore only increases the confirmations.

A diagram should help to understand what happens in the case of an implication and
how can it be used in a rhetorical practice:

The heatwave Involved the dead of

numerous
people

1 1 1

1 0 0

0 1 1

0 1 0

We will come back to this diagram, but let's already point out that the diagram shows beautifully and

although a hypothesis is confirmed only with proof to the contrary (logic of discovery) and
that any information always requires revisiting the hypothesis. This is, by the way, the basic law of
all scientific discourse.

Or a scientific speech, fully aware of the implications of this scheme, will be infinitely
more complexifying, compared to a political discourse that emphasizes confirmations and does not
does not necessarily reflect on all possible figures of implication.

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2 Before technique, a time for thought

To avoid sinking into the impression of nonsense at the moment when we are about to address
the technical question of logic, here are some philosophical considerations that will
help us connect the examples we just mentioned above and the
technical considerations that we will soon make.

This part is important because it rules on essential notions (deduction and

inductive-analytical-dialectical) that also allow us to understand the interest of our
approach. For this, we must return to an... Ancient: Aristotle.

Aristotle is considered the founder of logic, but this discipline

does not appear in his classification of sciences2According to him, the sciences deal with
realities while logic focuses on the discourse ("logos") of science, which makes it a
instrument ("organon") rather than a true science. His work entitled
Organizes logic in relation to other discourses.3.

Two distinctions are important to make.

Logic studies certain syllogisms (or analytical) that start from

premises drawn from the nature of things and deduce the consequences.

Dialectics, on its side, studies only probable arguments that start

simple opinions to get lost in futile discussions.

2
For this entire part dedicated to the essential distinction between deduction and induction,
Aristotle, we are infinitely indebted to Professor Claude Troisfontaines. We thank him for us
to have permission to draw from texts whose clarity is the sign of teaching that has reached its highest
maturity.

3
Under the title of Organon, tradition has grouped various treatises of the philosopher: one finds a theory
of the concept (the Categories) of judgment (On Interpretation), and of formal reasoning (Prior Analytics)
Analytics). We then study the applications of reasoning: the demonstrative syllogism (Seconds
Analytics), the dialectical syllogism (Topics) and the eristic or controversial syllogism (Refutations
sophisticated). Aristotle is also the author of a treatise on Rhetoric that tradition has not linked to
the Organon.

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 Similarly, there are two modes of knowledge: deduction and induction.
what are two approaches or two methods to come to know and make a judgment. It
They must be looked at individually, in their operation.

2.1 Reflections on deduction and its link with syllogism

For Aristotle, the syllogism is the very example of scientific discourse. Indeed,
does it remind him

We think we possess the knowledge of a thing [...] when we believe that we

let us know the cause by which the thing is, that we know that this cause is that of the
chosen, and that furthermore it is not possible for the thing to be other than it is.4

Let's observe the following syllogism:

All animals are mortal.

But men are animals

So men are mortal

It is through the intermediate term 'animal' that the reason for the fact that men are mortal.

It is stated. However, at the same time, it is suggested that this cause indeed belongs to men.
It is therefore not possible for men to be anything other than mortal.

But how to establish that the conclusion logically follows from the premises and what
What qualities must the premises have to obtain a certain conclusion?

There are two different questions to address here. One concerns the formal aspect of validity.
of the syllogism and the other to its material aspect of truth.

2.1.1 The problem of validity and the form of reasoning

Aristotle himself indicated that he discovered the syllogism by criticizing the processes.
from his master Plato. To define a reality, Plato proceeded by successive dichotomies:

4
Seconds Analytiques, I, 2, Tricot, p. 7.

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he divided a notion into two species, then one of the found species into two subspecies and
and so on.

For example:

Fishing with a line is an art; but art is either of production or acquisition; but
acquisition occurs through exchange or conquest; but conquest results from a struggle or
from a hunt, etc. Or Aristotle criticizes this method for not leading to a conclusion
binding: at each stage, the interlocutors agree on one of the parties, but they do not
they do not demonstrate strictly speaking. This is the traditional reproach made to dialectics
Platonist who only evolves on probabilities.

Similarly, according to Aristotle, if it is necessary to demonstrate that man is mortal, it is not useful.

to start by saying that man is an animal that is either mortal or immortal, etc. The
Plato's argument is to consider the term 'animal' as a genus encompassing the species.
"mortal" and "immortal" (and thus as a more universal term than the other two).
Especially since in this case, the term "animal" cannot connect "man" and "mortal". None
conclusion is not possible.

For Aristotle, the term "animal" cannot connect the two terms "mortal" and
a man" only if he has an "average extension" compared to them (he is therefore "average".
in both senses of the term). In other words, it is only if the animals belong to
mortals and that men belong to animals, one can conclude that the
men belong to mortals. Likewise, it is only if it is denied that the
animals belong to the immortals and claimed that men belong to animals,
that one can deny that men belong to the immortals5.

From these considerations, Aristotle identifies two syllogisms that he considers

as "perfect":

5
Aristotle expresses the proposition 'All men are mortal' in several ways. Sometimes he says:
"Man belongs entirely to the mortal", sometimes it is said: "Mortal is universally attributed to man". This
shows that Aristotle's logic is primarily a logic of concepts before being a logic of propositions.

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All animals are mortal. No animal is immortal.

For every man is an animal For every man is an animal

So all men are mortal So no man is immortal.

The examination of the understanding of the term 'animal' allows us to identify that the extension

the term is intermediate between that of the term "mortal" and that of the term "man".
In his view, the form of the syllogism is therefore not entirely separable from its content.

2.1.2 The problem of the truth of the premises and of the matter of
reasoning

We must consider here two cases:

Either the syllogism is valid and the premises are true. In this case, a
direct demonstration of the truth of the conclusion is possible;

either the syllogism is valid, but at least one premise is false. In this case,
An indirect demonstration of the thesis to be proven is possible by the rejection of the premise which
leads to a false conclusion.

[Link] The direct demonstration

The first case is that of 'direct demonstration', also called 'deduction.'

categorical. We say it again: if the form of a syllogism is valid and its
If the premises are true, the conclusion will necessarily be true (and true unless false). The
direct demonstration, according to Aristotle, must therefore begin from true premises, prior to the
conclusion and providing the reason for what is concluded. However, in what sense can one say
that the premises are prior and more known than the conclusion? On this point, Aristotle has
be sure to warn against a possible confusion in this regard:

Previously, the more known have a double meaning, as there is no identity between this
what is anterior by nature and what is anterior for us, nor between what is more known by
nature and more known to us. I call the earlier and better known to us the objects the

17
closer to the sensation, being more absolute and known objects
the furthest from the senses. And the most universal causes are the furthest from the senses,
while the particular causes are the closest.6

This means that the subject first experiences a series of facts in an empirical way and, in this
he knows the conclusion before the premises. But a conclusion without its premises
is not scientific knowledge, because experience may provide
authorized knowledge, but it does not reveal the cause of this knowledge. To achieve this,
It is necessary, therefore, to rise to a greater degree of universality that must allow for explanation.
in all cases.

Another question arises. It concerns how the premises express the cause.
of the conclusion? Or this is indeed the Aristotelian stroke of genius: causality is expressed in
through the medium term.

This explains well a frequent operation of our discursive practice where we

let's make syllogisms without it seeming so and clearly show the issue of causality!
Indeed, every time we use the forms 'since' or 'because', we make
a syllogism. For example: "I can no longer stand Mathilde because she is bourgeois!"
or "Some men learn logic because they want to become scholars." From
even if we assert that this 'vase costs a crazy price,' we state the conclusion of a
syllogism and it is worth searching for the cause of this judgment (in short, a
inductive discovery of syllogism!

This type of syllogism, somewhat disguised, is technically called

"the enthymeme" ("in thumos", due to the fact that a proposition remains "in the
chest). They need to be 'deployed' to see their full impact. Here is the translation of
our three examples.

6
Analytics Seconds, I, 2, Knit, p. 9-10.

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 This vase costs a crazy price!

Every gold object costs a crazy price.

This vase is made of gold.

So this vase costs a crazy price

I can’t stand Mathilde anymore because she is bourgeois!

Not everyone who is bourgeois is bearable to me.

Mathilde is a person who is bourgeois.

So Mathilde is not bearable for me.

Let's translate faster: "Some men learn logic because

that they want to become scholars

All those who want to become scholars learn logic

Or some men want to become scholars.

So some men learn logic

It is easily noticeable that the medium term indicates causality, and in this latter case,
for example, the final cause. But, to return to Aristotle, we note that his conception of the
causality is broad. If we take the example of the vase, we would say that it is costly because it
is made of gold (material cause), but it can also be because it was made by Picasso (efficient cause)
or efficient), because representative of the Hellenistic era in its motifs (formal cause)
or, finally, because it was created for the king's wedding (final causes).

From a general point of view, it is important to note that what has just been said allows us to respond

to the objection of circularity that is often leveled at the syllogism that states: 'It is claimed
that Socrates is mortal because he is a man and that all men are mortal. But for
To know that all men are mortal, one must first know that Socrates is mortal. In short, we
is at the wheel." This objection assumes that only the primary knowledge for us is
valid. Knowing the man, in this context, is only knowing individuals who
this name suggests. However, one can respond that knowing Socrates as a man, this

19
is no longer to know him simply as an individual but to know him as
What animal is born and dies. We have moved from knowledge of the individual to a
knowledge of the universal. This knowledge is inherently prior and it provides the
because of what is stated in the conclusion. There is indeed progress being made in
the syllogism.

[Link] The indirect demonstration

We can now tackle the second case, which is that of the 'indirect proof.'
or "hypothetical deduction" (also called "abduction" in technical terms). Let's recall
so even though, in this case, we reason correctly, but based on false premises (that is
the already seen case of the "Athenians" and the "Cretans"). But when a premise is false, the
the conclusion is either true or false (from false follows anything). This also means that if, in
starting from a false hypothesis, one accidentally arrives at a true conclusion, nothing allows
to decide whether the initial hypothesis is true or false. This asymmetry between confirmation
and the falsification (which Karl Popper made his battle horse) can be easily explained from
of the following diagram (already seen!) :

1retrue premise 1re false premise

2etrue premise 2andtrue premise

True conclusion True conclusion or false conclusion

We must therefore always keep in mind the fact that if we find ourselves in front of a
true conclusion (or a verified consequence), we do not know if this consequence comes from
of a true or false hypothesis. On the other hand, when faced with a conclusion
false (a refuted consequence), we are certain that there is an error in the premises of
departure.

An example illustrates this perfectly: I see lit trees (true conclusion). I

Make the hypothesis: 'Everything that is under the sun is illuminated, and these trees are under the sun.'
But this minor may be false: in fact, trees can also be illuminated by a
projector. We will see in detail the logical translation of this 'implication', in the
course development. However, we had a first illustration in our
consideration of the heatwave which "involved" many deaths.

20
Reflections on induction as another way of
knowledge

It remains to mention the other order of knowledge, that of induction which

corresponds to a logic of discovery. We have just seen that the syllogism was a
means of demonstration. But - Aristotle noted from the beginning - the demonstration
suppose certain unprovable principles, otherwise it would be doomed to regress to
the infinite.

It means that there must be a different knowledge that allows for discovery.
the principles of demonstration (namely the universal notions from which derive the
conclusions). For Aristotle, this other knowledge is not innate, while being first
latent (in the manner of Platonic reminiscence). It is not also acquired from
the outside without participation of the soul (in the manner of an infused science or a revelation
mystique). What is the faculty capable of acquiring the principles and how does it function-
is she?

Aristotle replies:

It is necessarily induction that makes us aware of the principles, for it is from

this way that the sensation itself produces the universal in us. [...] And since,
With the exception of intuition, no form of knowledge can be truer than science,
It is an intuition that will grasp the principles.7

To understand this statement, it is important to see that induction has a dual role:

it first allows for the intuitive grasp of a universal notion from

of a multitude of sensations

and

it then allows to intuitively grasp a principle starting from a

multitude of universal denotations.

7
Seconds Analytiques, II, 19, Tricot, p. 246-247.

21
 The transition to the universal occurs, for Aristotle, right from sensation. To prevent any
misunderstanding, it is necessary to recall first that sensation, considered in itself, is
particular and does not yet constitute a science in the strict sense:

It is not possible [...] to acquire scientific knowledge through sensation.

Indeed, even if the sensation has as its object a thing of such quality, and not only a
individual choice, we must at least necessarily perceive such a determined thing in a
place and at a specific time. But the universal, what applies to all cases, is
impossible to perceive, since it is neither a determined thing nor a determined moment, otherwise
it would not be a universal, since we call universal that which is always and everywhere.8

Thus, no matter how much we observe an eclipse, we do not scientifically know this.
event as long as we ignore the cause. Aristotle, however, hastens to add:

This does not mean that by the repeated observation of this event, we do not
we may, by pursuing the universal, arrive at a demonstration, for it is from a plurality of
specific cases that emerge from the universal.9

There is indeed a first step of induction that allows for intuitive understanding.
the universal in the sensible and then a second stage of induction that rises towards the
principles10To illustrate this double passage, Aristotle puts forward a splendid comparison and he
l’explique ensuitede manière technique :

"Thus, in a battle, amidst a rout, a soldier stops, a"

another stops, then another again, until the army has returned to its original order:
Likewise, the soul is composed in such a way as to be able to feel something similar.
When one of the specifically undifferentiated things stops in the soul, one finds oneself in
presence of a first universal notion; for although the act of perception has as its object

8
Seconds Analytiques, I, 31, Knitting, p. 146-147.

9
Analytical Seconds, I, 31, Knit, p. 148.

10
Tradition will distinguish abstraction (which releases the universal notion of the sensible) and induction (which
eliminates a universal proposition from a series of particular cases). This distinction is unfortunate. Aristotle
It explicitly states: "It is impossible to acquire knowledge of universals otherwise than by
induction »Analytical Seconds, I, 18, Tricot, p. 96. It is therefore indeed by the same operation of thought that
both abstraction and induction take place.

22
the individual, the sensation nevertheless relates to the universal: it is man, for example, and
not the man Callias. Then, among these first universal notions, a new stop occurs
produced in the soul, until the unshareable notions finally cease there
truly universal: thus, such a species of animal is a step towards the animal genus, and
this last concept is itself a step towards a higher concept.11

This text is very informative. It shows that induction for Aristotle initially consists of
to grasp the universal in the repetition of the particular. To know Callias is not simply
to perceive an individual in this place and at this moment is to know an individual as
man. Once this universal notion is established, other notions come into play.
To think of man is to think of him as a rational animal. One of the principles of the
demonstration (namely the definition or the formal cause) is thus obtained. And this principle
leads one to question very fundamental notions. Does man not fall under the
substance category? Can a substance be and not be at the same time under the
same report? In short, it's the entire apparatus of concepts and principles that are organized in
the soul. It is also the philosophy that is implemented as a quest for rationality.

We will therefore remember the operation: to grasp a universal notion from

multiple sensations and then grasp a cause (or a principle) from a multitude of
specific propositions. The steps are important to remember: the sensation (considered in
herself, she is particular and she does not yet constitute a science); then the seizure of
concept and the filing of the case.

Aristotle provided a formalization (in the form of a 'syllogism') of induction.

which must be understood in continuation of what has just been recalled, namely as
an intuitive grasp of the universal based on a few sufficiently enumerated particular cases.
Here is the example given by the philosopher.12:

11
Seconds Analytic, II, 19, Tricot, p. 245-246. We understand the beginning of the second paragraph of
this way: when the still undifferentiated sensation (for example of a man) stops (that is to say, it
precise), then the concept "man" (the universal) appears (and is intuitively grasped). It is the stopping of the first
soldier who will make all the others stop.

23
 The man, the horse, and the mule... live long

Now all the animals without bile are man, the horse, and the mule...

So all the animals without bile live a long time.

It is noted that this inductive 'syllogism' follows the reverse path of the syllogism.
deductive: it starts from the conclusion of the latter to trace back to the major premise.

Indeed, if we reshape the reasoning, we obtain this 'true' syllogism.

deductive

All animals without bile live long

Now all animals (man, horse, and mule...) are the animals without bile.

So all animals (man, horse, and mule...) live a long time.

It will be noted that, in these syllogisms, the middle term is replaced by a

enumeration of particular species and that this enumeration is not complete (Aristotle)
mentions the existence of other animals without malice, like the dolphin). But he
It seems that Aristotle wanted to shorten his list. He explicitly asks that the
Minor "All animals without bile are man, horse, mule..." so it is reciprocal,
that is to say that one can affirm: "All the listed animals (man, the horse, the
mules…) represent well all animals without gall.

12
This reasoning is provided in the First Analytics, II, 23. For a thorough analysis of the text
From Aristotle, cf. Fr. Chenique, Elements of Classical Logic, vol. 2, The Art of Reasoning, Bordas, 1975, pp. 292-293.

24
 In other words, Aristotelian induction is a complete induction or
totalizing that requires a comprehensive enumeration of the parties13From this point of view, the
the following reasoning would be more illustrative than the example given by the philosopher:

Man, animal, and plant produce their likenesses

Man, the animal, and the plant are all living beings (and vice versa)

So all living beings reproduce similar ones

But would this Aristotelian induction be the disguised form of the syllogism?
Deductive? Not at all! Aristotle's aim in induction is to achieve it as quickly as possible.
a possible universal medium term (like 'animals without bile' in the first example). At
In this regard, a sufficiently enumerated series of cases may be sufficient. In reality – Aristotle did it.

clearly stated – induction is not a proof, but what provides to the

demonstration of its principles. It is a thought operation that seeks the common aspect
things that allow for accounting for their properties. The formalization of induction
It is therefore just a research program that indicates how thought should be organized.
in its quest for the universal.

If we accept this explanation, we can also consider the definition as a

form of induction. A text outlining the tasks to be completed to achieve the definition,
shows that Aristotle conceives it well in this way:

[In summary], we must start by considering a group of individuals.

similar to each other and undifferentiated, and to seek which element all these beings may have
identical. We must then do the same for another group of individuals who, while
Returning to the same genre as the first ones, they are specifically identical to each other, but
specifically different from the first. Once that, for the beings of the second group, we have
establish what their common element is, and that we have done the same for others, it is necessary to

13
This is how the complete induction of Aristotle is generally distinguished from the amplifying induction.
from J. S. Mill who starts from a few particular facts to derive a universal law.

25
consider whether, in turn, the two groups have an identical element, until we
reach a single expression, for that will be the definition of the thing.14

Other discovery processes that go in the same direction could be mentioned.

Reasoning by example starts from a single case to infer that it applies.

likely in this way in all cases. Thus, the war of the Thebans
The war against the Phocidians turned out to be disastrous. Now, it was a war between neighbors.

One can thus estimate that the war between the Athenians and the Thebans, which is
also a war between neighbors will prove disastrous.

Analogical reasoning, for its part, establishes a comparison between ...

Relations: A is to B as C is to D. Thus, in biology, Aristotle asserts that the
gills of aquatic animals have a role similar to that of the lungs of
terrestrial animals: these are indeed respiratory organs in both cases.

However, Aristotle acknowledges that reasoning by example or by analogy

are less certain than the definition or than induction. But they are also processes
of discoveries that work in a similar way. In any case, it is about
identifying similarities and differences: that is where the fundamental operation lies
thought in search of the universal.

It will be noted that all Aristotelian themes are closely related. The
human knowledge is initially focused on beings that change, that is to say, that do not
not always themselves. These contingent beings are however intelligible as they form a
groups of realities that resemble each other. To know is to understand that the individuals who
composing a determined group realize the same intelligible form in materials
different, like the form "man" in various bodies. It is by induction, based on a
repetition of sensations, from which the concept 'man' emerges that applies to all individuals
repérés de manière sensible. La pensée s’affranchit ainsi des conditions de moment et de lieu
to which sensitive experience is subjected. Furthermore, as soon as a concept has emerged,
Other concepts are being established. Thought can form definitions and find the
due to the different properties that realities possess.

14
Analytical Seconds, II, 13, Knit, p. 222. Aristotle illustrates this approach by seeking the definition
of pride.

26
 In possession of these causes, thought can deductively explain what it has.
first found inductively from a series of observations. The downward movement
From the demonstration comes to cover and extend the upward movement of discovery. If
man is an animal and that every animal is mortal, then man is also doomed to
disappear. The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. But thought desires
always go further. She seeks to justify the necessity of her premises with reasons
metaphysical. If an animal is destined for death, is it not, ultimately, because everything this
What has begun is destined to end? But if there are changing beings, there must also be a
To be immobile, upon which the stability of heaven and earth depends. And the Being that attracts everything to itself is

undoubtedly a Thought that thinks itself eternally. Hence, the supreme happiness that can
to aspire to the man engaged in the world will consist of identifying oneself through knowledge, during

a brief moment, to that which is by nature.

27
3 La logic: preliminary remarks on the
formalization

After this theoretical and philosophical approach to the link between deduction and
induction, where the question of the syllogism is therefore recurrent, we are going to study some
convincing arguments solely based on form, the sequence of propositions,
of their deployment and their internal articulation, and not at the level of their content. The
Formalization will help us on this point.

Formalization makes us use a precise language, with precise 'signs'.

Let's take this example: a man has become particularly skeptical in his life. He does not
stop saying that, in this world, everything is questionable and that there are no certainties. But,
despite everything, is it not his certainty? So, there is a certainty that is at least that
that there are none. This is thus an implicit affirmation of what is denied. Likewise, the
philosopher marked by the very strong thesis of Schopenhauer such that to put an end to the
pain of the world, it is appropriate to extinguish all forms of the will to live and thus no longer
to want. But to no longer want is still to want to no longer want! Therefore, there remains a will,
as it remained a certainty.

This argument is that of retaliation, which is then expressed in this form:

(Not P implies P) implies P

Of course, we give P a translation. Here, P = 'there is certainty' or 'I

wants

Let us recall our definition of logic: it seeks to study the forms.

valid reasoning; and we said that reasoning leads to the notion of
deduction, of which we have seen the theoretical functioning.

Let's take simple examples to illustrate the point.

Let's assume a store where you can buy jackets in four colors.
different. When will we be sure that at least two buyers have made the
choice of the same color? In fact, as soon as there is one more buyer than the
number of colors, so as soon as the fifth buyer presents themselves.

28
 Or, a bag contains marbles of two colors: 5 white and 5 black.
How many must I extract to be sure of getting two balls of the same kind?
color? If there are only two varieties of colors, the answer is three.

Let's take a box of long gloves. There are ten pairs of gloves, of which 5 are white and 5 are.

the countess of Mondoville must go to the ball of Count d'Esparron and he

All that is left for him, after three hours of preparation, is to put on his gloves.
Unfortunately, a breakdown occurs and Firmin has already gone out to get the car.
So she's in the dark! How many gloves does she need to take out to have a
pairs, to seduce the handsome count? In fact, there are 5 straight whites and 5 whites
2 right-handed blacks and 5 left-handed blacks. So a total of 11 are needed.

We could proceed by induction to find the answer and multiply the

experiments and counts. The path would be very long. But we can also observe that
this type of reasoning is based on a logical law and deduction allows me to
calculate

Thus, based on a deductive approach, we will retain this.

Rule that establishes a relationship between 'properties' and 'individuals': as soon as there is an individual

more than the maximum number of varieties presented by a property, then there must be
at least two individuals who have the same variety of this property.

The case is very explicit for the purchase of jackets and illustrative for gloves (where, in
plus, there are left and right!). It is then noted that this 'form' of
reasoning becomes applicable to any content (marbles, gloves, birds, etc.) and
that it is valid for all models.

We can now enter the study of logic by examining a few

very summary reasoning, to see what the laws of succession are
propositions.

29
4 The logic of unanalyzed propositions

Before studying the 'logic of monadic predicates', we study that of

"unanalysed propositions", that is to say the logic of propositions that one does not
do not decompose, but let us therefore look at it as an indecomposable block, while
observing the possible sequences of these proposals.

We work in this part in two major moments, or according to two major

approaches. First of all, we put forward some general "considerations" on
hypothetical reasoning, simply looking at how they chain together.

Then, at a later time, we will present the method of 'matrix calculation' which
will allow us to "formalize" these reasonings that we have discussed, in the
first point, in an "informal" manner.

4.1 Considerations on Some Hypothetical Reasonings

The first operation consists here in examining elementary reasoning and the
propositions that make them up, without analyzing them, but by looking at how they connect.
and according to what laws.

We will represent these reasoning or propositions by letters: P or Q or M, by

example. But, be careful: a proposal must be translated correctly and always be
indivisible! Example:

This woman has given birth

she has milk

In the arguments that we will study, we will distinguish three moments.

The major. It links two propositions that are related in various ways.
modalités: une implication, une équivalence, une conjonction, une disjonction
(inclusive or exclusive). For example: "if P then Q".

The minor. It poses or it opposes one of the two propositions of the major.
Four figures will therefore be possible. For example: and 'non-Q'.

30
 The conclusion. We then examine the entire reasoning and we
check if this conclusion is authorized to impose or remove the other proposition
which was stated in the major. For example: then 'non-P'.

Here is a deployed example:

If this woman has given birth, she has milk - but this woman has no milk - therefore this woman does not...
not given birth.

If (if P then Q), and not Q, then not P

We will soon see why this sequence is valid. But, let us note that
we are talking here about hypothetical reasonings because they are of the form:

If(...), and..., then...

Also, since we want to study the modalities of chaining propositions,

we are going to study:

conditional reasoning (or with implication);

biconditional reasoning (or reasoning with an equivalence);

incompatibility reasoning (or with negation of conjunction);

reasonings with disjunction (exclusive or inclusive).

Each time, there is a particular way of chaining together

propositions. Also, for certain sequences, we provide observations.
supplementary information on the usefulness of this 'type' of reasoning.

4.1.1 Conditional reasoning or with implication

We have here two types of valid reasoning.

31
[Link] First valid modality: the 'modus ponendo ponens'

The sun shines

It is clear.

Diagram:

M: Yes (If P then Q)

and P

Cl: So then Q

Translation:

If the sun shines, it is clear.

But the sun shines

So it is clear

In this case, if the major premise states an implication ('if...then' linking an antecedent...
and a consequent) and that the minor poses the antecedent, we are allowed to pose the consequent
(Q), but not the antecedent (P). We will talk about the modus 'ponendo-ponens'. It is clear.
To pose means to take back a part of the majority, as it is stated in it.

On the other hand, by stating the consequence, one will not be able to state the antecedent.

the reasoning we provide is therefore not valid (and this is easily understood):

Schema:

M: Yes (If P then Q)

m : And Q

Cl: So P

32
 Traduction :

If the sun shines, it is bright.

But it is clear

So the sun shines

[Link] Second valid modality: the 'modus tollendo tollens'

The sun shines

It is bright.

Schema:

M: Yes (If P then Q)

and non-Q

Cl: So non-P

Traduction :

If the sun shines, it is bright

But it is not clear.

So the sun does not shine

In this case, if the major states an implication ('if...then' linking an antecedent)

and a consequent) and that the minor removes the consequent (Q), we are allowed to remove the antecedent.
We will talk about the modus 'tollendo-tollens'. It is also seen, to remove means to take back a
member of the major by adding a negation.

On the contrary, by removing the antecedent, one cannot remove the consequent. The reasoning
the following that we give is therefore not valid.

33
 Schema:

M: Yes (If P then Q)

m : And non-P

So non-Q

Traduction :

If the sun shines, it is bright.

But it does not shine

So it is not clear

These reasoning with implications have three 'utilities', of which the first is given to us
become very familiar. Here are three points related to this utility.

[Link].1 Reasons to remain in an open logic

This type of reasoning may seem simplistic and one might question its
relevance. However, it states a great epistemological truth that Karl Popper has well
thématisée, avec sa méthode de la falsification. Nous en avons déjà parlé. En effet, une
A scientific hypothesis is often expressed in the form of an implication, but it is
It is important to note that if we state the consequence, we are not allowed to state the antecedent.
This means that a confirmation of a hypothesis does not mean that it is established.
definitely. However, if by removing the consequent we are forced to remove the antecedent, it is
saying that the invalidation of a single consequence will allow for abandonment or correction
the initial hypothesis. The logic of discovery therefore proceeds by falsification, estimating
that a hypothesis will never be confirmed except by proof to the contrary. Hence, thinks Popper,
a scientific theory only works on the model of the falsifiable theory. This comes down to
also to assert that an explanation is never unique and definitive. Any claim
truthful must remain open and subject to a logic of discovery.

34
[Link].2 Reasonings to distinguish a necessary condition and a condition
sufficient

These conditional reasonings highlight the role of sufficient conditions.

and necessary conditions. Thus, the antecedent of an implication expresses a condition
sufficient and the consequent of an implication expresses the necessary condition (or condition
sine qua non

Let's take another example:

Eat chocolate éclairs.

Gaining weight.

"One only needs to eat chocolate eclairs to gain weight." Fair enough! We can see that as soon as
the sufficient condition is established, it leads to the consequence: "If P implies Q, and P, then
Q ».

But this sufficient condition (eating éclairs) is not a necessary condition.

since removing the antecedent does not necessarily remove the consequent. In this way, the mode
If P implies Q, and not-P, then not-Q is not valid.
"Eating éclairs leads to gaining weight, and not eating means not gaining weight." Useless.
to explain, because many other things cause weight gain...

Here is a second example:

To enter this country.

You need a visa.

The necessary condition being removed, what is conditioned by it is also removed. If

the visa is missing, I will not enter. That is to say: "If P implies Q, and not-Q, then not-P."

But this necessary condition is not a sufficient condition. That is to say: 'If P
implies Q, and Q, then P" is not valid. This would translate as: "If, to enter, I
I must have a visa, and since I have a visa, I can enter." This is not valid because it
must also, for example, undergo a test.

35
 A remark should be made regarding the translation of negation. Let's take two
affirmations : «Il n’est pas suffisant d’avoir de longs cheveux pour être beau garçon» et « Il
It is not necessary to be rich to succeed in life.
correctly position the parentheses to properly carry the negation. The first one
says this: "no (P implies Q)" which translates to: "It is false that (the fact of having long
hair leads to being a handsome boy)." The second is stated as: "no (P implies Q)"
It is false that (being rich leads to succeeding in life).
Why? Because if the negation only concerns one of the two members, then the meaning
change. "Non P implies Q" will be translated, in the first case, as follows: "It is sufficient
"not having long hair to be a handsome boy." It should also be noted that, for the second
case, 'P implies not-Q' will be translated as follows: 'It is necessary not to be rich to
succeed in life.

Let's take another example. "It is not enough to have a mustache to please
Amélie, said by 'no (P implies Q)' (where P = 'having a mustache' and Q = 'to please')
Amélie), which amounts to saying this: "It is false (that the act of wearing a mustache
"pleasing Amélie)" because Amélie likes a mustached boy as much as a
boy without a mustache. Similarly, "It is not necessary to have a BMW.
to please Zoé" translates to: "no (P implies Q)" (where P = "please Zoé" and Q = "have
a BMW), which amounts to saying: "It is false (that pleasing Zoe leads to the fact of
own a BMW)" because Zoé likes a boy with a 2CV just as much as a boy with a
BMW. Note that the expression "p implies not-q" will mean: "It is necessary not to
having a BMW to please Zoé" because this time, Zoé hates the boys who show off
this way.

[Link].3 The "modus tollens" expresses reasoning by absurdity

In fact, 'modus tollens' is the expression of reasoning by absurdity. Let there be a

this to be proven by a lawyer: 'Bertrand did not want to kill Marie'
"not P". We then start from the opposite of the thesis to draw a consequence: "for if it had
wanted to kill her, he would have fled immediately" which translates to "if P then Q" (where P = "to kill" and Q =

"to flee"); then, from there, it is shown that this consequence does not hold: "he is there and therefore does not have

I went", which translates to "not Q". This development then allows us to conclude
the initial thesis: you can see it well, 'Bertrand did not want to kill Marie', that is to say:
« not P ». Hence these two possible formalizations of reasoning by contradiction:

36
 (P → Q) → (¬ P → ¬Q)

you

[(P → Q) & ¬ Q] → ¬ P

The resolution of many logical games can be done by reasoning by contradiction.

In a room, there are three monks lined up and they need to be identified. One
there are three characteristics. The Franciscan always tells the truth, the Dominican always lies and the ...
Jesuit, one never knows if he is lying or telling the truth. So we ask the first one: 'Who is at the'
center? » One answer comes: « The Franciscan ». Then we ask the one who is in the center:
Who are you? A response comes: 'I am the Jesuit.' Then they ask the third one:
Who is at the center? A response comes: The Dominican.

We proceed as follows. The first is not the Franciscan because he would not say, as a man.
sincere, that he is on his own side. Then, the one in the center cannot be the Franciscan either.
for he cannot say that he is another. Therefore, the Franciscan is the third. Consequently, the
the Dominican is at the center and has lied well; as for the Jesuit, he is the first and we observe that he
did not tell the truth.

4.1.2 The biconditional reasoning or with equivalence

This is an equivalence relation where P and Q imply each other.

formule est précise : Psi et seulement siQ. Voici les quatre formes valides.

If (P is equivalent to Q) If (P is equivalent to Q) If (P is equivalent to Q) If (P is equivalent to Q)

And P And Q And non-P And non-Q

So Q So P So non-Q So non-P

So, we note that if we introduce an equivalence into the major premise by hypothesis
between two limbs, and that the minor places or removes one of these two limbs, we are allowed to
place or remove in the conclusion the other member.

37
 As a reminder, let's review the implication relation where validity is reduced to two.
modalities ('ponendo ponens' and 'tollendo tollens'). This scheme therefore takes up the point
previous:

If P then Q If P then Q If P then Q If P then Q

m : And P And Q And non-P And non-Q

So Q So P So non-Q So non-P

Valid Invalid !!! Invalid!!! Valid

Let's take an example in language to illustrate this equivalence relationship:

We are human (P) if and only if we are a rational animal (Q)

In this case, these four combinations are then valid, according to a scheme to read
linearly

And we are a man So we are a reasonable animal.

And we are a rational animal. So we are a man

And we are not a man So we are not a reasonable animal

And we are not a reasonable animal So we are not a man

[Link] The usefulness of these reasoning

What would be the usefulness of this figure? In fact, a scientific definition is expressed
in the form of an equivalence, but the art of definition will always remain very complex,
as understood by the designers of dictionaries or legal experts. In a good
definition, the 'definiens' must apply to the entire 'definiendum' and nothing but it. Now, for
check this last point, we must ensure the existence of the equivalence between the two
members of the definition.

Let's take this definition of law: "Law is a rule of social action." One must...
then raise the question of reciprocity and check if it works well. In other words,

38
Does law lead to social action and does social action lead to law? The answer
is negative because the internal regulations that I created for the tenant of my
apartment, in a consensual manner, has no legal value. However, it is indeed an action.
social! So, we need to add to the definition: "[...] decreed and sanctioned by the State." And in
in this case, the definition is correct and will also incline me to make my social act an act
legal... That is to say to implement it according to the laws of the property code as
The state enacts it and, for example, to record my internal regulations!

It should also be noted that, in an equivalence, each member is a condition.

necessary and sufficient of the other member. Thus, the fact of being "enacted and sanctioned by
'The State' makes the condition of my act both sufficient and necessary. Let us also note that the
ordinary language does not always specify the difference between equivalence (if and only if) and

the implication (if then).

If you give me 1 euro, I will give you a fruit

And you don't give me a euro

So I'm not giving you the fruit.

In the case of an equivalence, the reasoning is valid because P is a

necessary and sufficient condition. But in the case of an implication, the reasoning is not
more valid because P is a sufficient condition, but not necessary, since I can choose to
give the fruit, without asking for the euro.

4.1.3 The reasoning of incompatibility or with negation of conjunction

There are two valid options here:

Not (P and Q) Not (P and Q)

And P And Q

So non-Q So non-P

39
 What does it mean? In fact, we hold that the major poses an incompatibility between P and
Q. They cannot go together. From there, if the minor poses one of the two terms, we will be
allowed to remove its opposite in the conclusion. But the reverse does not work (that is to say
non-P, in the first case, and non-Q in the second). Only the two modes 'ponendo
tollens » are therefore valid. In reality, this means that a third solution is possible.

Let's take an example of validity:

One cannot (be a white American and a black American)

And John is a white American And John is a Black American

So John is not a black American. So John is not a white American

Let's continue with the invalid figures:

One cannot (be a white American and a black American)

And John is not a white American And John is not a black American

So John is a Black American So John is a white American.

On le remarque d’emblée, le raisonnement n’est pas valide. John peut être un

yellow American who lives in Chinatown and who is therefore neither white nor black!

This gives these two diagrams which are therefore invalid:

Not (P and Q) Not (P and Q)

And non-P And non-Q

So Q So P

Two remarks are necessary.

First remark: if two propositions P and Q cannot be true at the same time
time and exclude each other due to incompatibility, the two proposals can of course be
false and there can be a third solution. These are referred to as proposals.
"opposites".

40
 One cannot be bearded and shaved at the same time. Third solution: one can have a
three-day stubble. Or again: one cannot wear a white dress and a red dress in
At the same time, it admits a third solution. Indeed, when one wears a green dress, one wears a
robe that is neither white nor red.

Second remark: incompatibility can also apply to a proposal and its

negation, namely P and not-P. This means that the two propositions do not
can be neither true nor false at the same time. These are called propositions
"contradictory." In this case, there can therefore be no third solution.

One cannot be shaved and not shaved at the same time. The example is telling.
himself. Or: one cannot wear a white dress and a non-white dress at the same time.
weather)

This distinction is important because it allows us to define the 'opposite' and the
contradictory.

4.1.4 Reasoning with disjunction (exclusive or inclusive)

We must consider two categories here: disjunction and inclusion.

[Link] The exclusive disjunction

For the exclusive disjunction, we consider four valid modes. It should be noted that the
exclusive disjunction works in the mode 'either P or Q', but not both!

Either P or Q Either P or Q Either P or Q Either P or Q

And P And Q And non-P And non-Q

So non-Q So non-P So Q So P

41
 Let's take this example: Pierre is either Walloon or Flemish, but not both.

P is either Walloon or P is either Walloon or P is either Walloon or P is either Walloon or

flamand Flemish flamingo flamingo

And he is Walloon And he is Flemish And he is neither Walloon nor Flemish

So he is not So he is not So he is Flemish So he is Walloon

Flemish Walloon

Valid Valid Valid Valid

Thus, if we start from an exclusive disjunction, by asserting one of the two members, we are
authorized to remove the other and vice versa.

[Link] The inclusive disjunction

On the other hand, the case will differ for the inclusive disjunction which operates under the
mode 'P and/or Q'. In this case, two modes are valid. These are the 'tollendo- modes.
ponens

For convenience, and by comparison with the exclusive disjunction, let us resume.
a diagram with the four possible modalities, to clearly see which ones are not valid!

Then, let's take the same example by making Pierre an individual who is a lawyer and/or
teacher, assuming however that the two identities are cumulative.

Here is the logical translation:

P and/or Q P and/or Q P and/or Q P and/or Q

And P And Q And non-P And non-Q

So non-Q So non-P So Q So P

Invalid !!! Not valid!!! Valid Valid

42
 Here is the example:

P is a lawyer and/or P is a lawyer and/or P is a lawyer and/or P is a lawyer and/or

professor teacher professor teacher

And he is a lawyer And he is a teacher And he is not a lawyer. And it is not

teacher

So he is not So he is not So he is a teacher So he is a lawyer

professor lawyer

Invalid!!! Invalid!!! Valid Valid

It is clear that in this case, only the two 'tollendo-ponens' are valid.

Another example: Tonight, I am going to the ball of Count de Sainte Colombe (and/or) - (or well

... or at my father's castle. In fact, one must be able to consider both occurrences.
Indeed, an alternative can be inclusive or exclusive. Thus, I can very well go to the ...
Count and at my father's, because their castles are neighbors...

To understand the two modalities of disjunction, an additional example, is

reliant to the one we have chosen for the inclusive disjunction, will allow to understand
its operation.

Exclusive disjunction: Pierre is a lawyer or a professor. In this case, both

functions are incompatible: either one or the other. Likewise, we know that if Pierre does not exercise
one of the two functions, it exercises the other and vice versa.

Inclusive disjunction: Pierre is a lawyer and/or a teacher. In this case, one of the two
functions is indeed hers And both can be hers. It is also by the negative
of a function that we will know that it exercises the other.

[Link].1 A few remarks to keep in mind.

One must not confuse 'exclusion' (in fact, incompatibility) and 'disjunction'.
exclusive. The first simply states that "one cannot be a professor and a lawyer at the same time".
time) » and the second says that "we are either a teacher or a lawyer" and thus we are
one of the two, but the two do not go together.

43
 Also, in the case of a 'contradictory proposition' like 'P and not-P', a
exclusion is equivalent to an exclusive disjunction. Thus, "one cannot be (a lawyer or not-
"lawyer at the same time" means "we are either a lawyer or a non-lawyer."

Similarly, it should be noted that all questions are formulated under the modality of
disjunction, but we cannot say in advance whether it is inclusive or exclusive. In the
In practical terms, disjunction is most often an alternative, that is to say two
possibilities from which one will have to choose. It is clear that an alternative is therefore
not what we most often make of it, wrongly (!), an "alternative solution". Likewise
one should remember that the dilemma is a complex alternative (with two branches) since
each member leads to the same consequence and therefore we have this consequence.

This is the case of Don Rodrigue who wishes to marry Chimène. But Chimène's father
having offended Rodrigue's father, a tragedy occurs... Corneille takes up this theme
Spanish and in fact the theme of his play Le Cid (1636). Thus, we have Rodrigue who must challenge the
father of Chimène (P) who has offended his own father or who chooses not to avenge his father
(Q), but in the first case (P) he loses Chimène (M) (who cannot marry the murderer of ...
his father) and, in the second case (Q), he also loses Chimène (M) (who does not want to marry a coward,
unable to avenge), and therefore he loses Chimène anyway (M).

This translates according to this formula which is a long form:

[(P V Q) & ((P→ M) & (Q→ M))] → M

If you P (defy the father) or Q (do not avenge the father)

And if P → M (not to marry)

And if Q → M

So Mr.

One could also translate it this way, in a brief form:

If (P implies Q) and (not P implies Q), then Q.

Dans ce cas, P = « tuer le père » et Q = « ne pas épouser Chimène ».

Here is another well-known case:

44
 "Smoker or non-smoker? Let's remain courteous!" The conclusion is implied: it
One must remain courteous!

45
4.2 The method of matrix calculation

This initial approach to certain reasoning remains very informal, but it is

necessary to take a step that will allow us to formalize the same statements and
to focus our attention on logical laws. By formalizing, we take a step forward.
additional.

In this section on 'matrix calculations', we will cover four main points:

We first explain the notion of 'truth function';

We provide the matrices of the logical operators;

We then provide six examples to illustrate how the 'calculation' works.

matrix" or how to evaluate truth functions;

We finally provide a series of interesting 'logical laws' that make

appear through calculation what one might call 'eternal truths'.

4.2.1 The concept of truth function

To formalize a reasoning, we must first highlight some

propositional variables that we choose to name with a letter P, Q, M, ... and which
must express elementary propositions. There are necessary conditions: they
must be declarative and capable of having one and only one truth value: either true
(noted 1) or false (noted 0). This is a bivalent logic. It means that the proposition "it
snow" is the only one to be true or false, because its transcription "P" is not true as such.
ne false.

If we choose declarative proposals, we set aside different ones.

propositions :

Imperatives that are neither true nor false: "Get moving!"

The optatives that are neither true nor false: 'Hopefully it will be cool!'

46
 Propositions with intermediate truth values that will either be true or
false: "I will come tomorrow."

Propositions with indeterminate truth value that require to be filled in.

on the existence of the statement made: "The current king of France is bald."

Then we need constants. These are operators that will allow us to build.
from the simple to the complex. They are of two types: a one-argument operator and a two-argument operator.

arguments.

The unary operator is negation. It is called "prefix" because it is

place in front of the propositional variable which then becomes its argument for
form a new propositional expression. Thus: P = "it is snowing" and ¬ P
it is not snowing.

Next come the two-argument operators. They are called 'infixes.'

because they are placed between the variables that serve as arguments for
to form a new propositional expression.

We transcribe five:

If so:

If and only if: ↔

And : &

And/or: V

Either or: W

These operators are 'verification-functional' because they allow for determining the
truth value of propositional expressions that they construct solely from the
truth value of their argument(s).

What does that mean? If "P = it is snowing" is false, then "¬ P = it is not snowing" is true.
This will be verified in complex structures. Likewise, if "P = he is big (true)", "Q = he
is redhead (true), then "P & Q" = "he is big and he is redhead" is true.

47
 A counter-example will help to better understand this concept of
« functional check ». If we move forward: « Marcel is a literary type because he has hair
longs", there are two propositions: "Marcel is a literary person" and "Marcel has long hair"
who are either true or false. But the operator 'because' does not allow for the determination of the
truth of the complex proposition that rather raises the question of whether the length of
Hair has something to do with being a literary person... The operator 'because'
is therefore not functional.

In this sense, a truth function is a propositional expression that

takes a determined truth value from the truth value of its or their
arguments.

However, depending on the complexity of the proposals, it is important to place them properly.
Parentheses to achieve proper functioning. A rule exists!

If the argument of an operator is a function formed by an infix operator, this argument is

put in parentheses.

Here are two examples (a composition and a decomposition) allowing to

understand the procedure

A composition

If it snows, it is cold, and it is not cold, therefore it does not snow.

1. We must start by isolating elementary and declarative propositions: "it

"snow" and "it is cold", namely P and Q.

2. Insert an infix operator whose two arguments are P and Q: P → Q

3. Insert an additional infix operator between 'P → Q' [which because formed
by an infix must take a parenthesis] and '¬ Q'. This operator is an &. Also, as
¬ Q is not an infix, no parentheses are needed! This gives us: (P → Q) & ¬ Q

4. Finally, complete the translation by writing the last term. However, we need to add some
parentheses since there is a new infix which is the &. This gives the transcription
(P → Q) & ¬Q → ¬P

48
 A decomposition

(¬ (P & Q) & P) → ¬ Q

où P = « être magistrat » et Q = « jouer au casino »

1. The function " →" is isolated which separates two arguments whose prefix does not
does not require the parenthesis.

2. Then, we decompose the first argument: ¬ (P & Q) & P. It is formed by

the operator with two arguments &. The first term consists of a function formed by a
the prefix and the second is without operator.

3. For the first term: ¬ (P & Q), it is formed by an infix & and therefore requires some
parentheses, to which a prefix is added.

The proposal is therefore:

[One cannot be a magistrate and play at the casino, and Alfred is a magistrate], therefore he does not

Don't play at the casino.

4.2.2 The matrices of logical operators

The operators will tell us how to obtain the truth value of the function at
based on the truth value of his or her arguments.

[Link] The prefix negation operator: ¬

This operator can only take two truth values, namely true or false.
transform the initial truth value into its opposite.

If P then Q

Let it be P so not P

1 0

0 1

49
[Link] Infix operators

Ils s’appliquent donc àdeuxarguments pour construireunefonction de vérité. Si nous

Let us consider two arguments represented by the two variables P and Q; we must consider four.
possible encounters of truth values.

P Q P&Q PVQ PWQ P if and only if Q If P, then Q

1 1 1 1 0 1 1

1 0 0 1 1 0 0

0 1 0 1 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Thus, we formally find the acquisition of the previous considerations.

The operator & (the conjunction "and") requires that both members are true.

The operator V (the inclusive disjunction "and/or") is true only if one of its
members is true. As a reminder, the example "Franck is an elegant pianist and/or"
virtuoso » allows for joining the observation by intuition.

The operator W (the exclusive disjunction 'either ... or ...') is true only if
these two members have opposite truth values. Here, "Franck is either
pianist or scientist, but not both together.

The operator ↔ (the equivalence 'if and only if') is true only if both of its sides
members have the same truth value. For example: 'to be half empty'
equates to being half full," if both statements are true or
false at the same time.

The operator → (the implication 'if ... then') is more complex to understand, because
this case does not match intuition. That is why we have already seen this
more complex case. As a reminder, this example should help.

50
 If it rains So The ground is wet Value

It is raining So The ground is wet True

It is raining So The ground is not wet Fake

It is not raining So The ground is wet True (a bucket is

overturned!)

It is not raining So The ground is not wet. True

One must therefore understand that an implication indicates that a fact X given, it follows
follows from fact Y, and that X does not go without Y. Moreover, we speak of a 'material implication'.
or a "Philonian junction", in memory of Philon of Megara.

In this sense, the statement 'The moon is a ball of cheese, so I smoke...

cigarettes is formally correct.

4.2.3 Evaluate truth functions

We can now try to assess the truth value of a function based on the
truth value of his or her arguments. We will operate here with examples that
illustrate the point and explain how the calculation works. We do not claim to see
all the operators, which number sixteen. Our approach is therefore not exhaustive and
fully theoretical. We are only outlining a movement. It should be noted, however,
that we find here reasoning that we have already seen in the previous part,
but we translate differently.

First of all, let's note that a rule will facilitate good functioning!

The evaluation is carried out starting from the weakest operator, that is to say the one that is the most
enfermé dans les parenthèses.

Example No. 1: "If Pierre speaks, he is present and he is absent, therefore he does not speak."

not.

Pierre speaks

51
 Pierre is present

We actually find a hypothetical conditional reasoning, in the mode of 'tollendo'

tollens

[(P → Q) & ¬ Q] → ¬ P

1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1

1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1

0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0

0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

We notice it, we have here a logical law! The mode is valid and always true.

Example No. 2: 'If Pierre speaks, he is present and he is present, therefore he speaks.'

Pierre speaks

Pierre is present

[(P → Q) & Q] → P

1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 0 0 0 0 1 1

0 1 1 1 1 0 0

0 1 0 0 0 1 0

We notice that, when stating the consequence, we are not allowed to state the antecedent.
This is a reminder of the rule. Well, matrix calculation clearly shows the dysfunction.
since the terminal column does not align the values '1'. We do not have a law here
logic! We can clearly see the error in this sequence: a false hypothesis (P = 0) can lead to
a true consequence (Q = 1). So it is not because this consequence is true that
The hypothesis is also so.

52
 Example No. 3: "Pierre is a lawyer or a teacher, and he is a lawyer, therefore he is not
not a teacher.

Pierre is a lawyer

Pierre is a teacher

We must study two possibilities. The first is the exclusive disjunction and the
the second is the inclusive disjunction.

The case of exclusive disjunction (either ... or ...):

(P W Q) & P] → ¬ Q

1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1

1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

In the case of exclusive disjunction, the mode is valid and it is a logical law.

The case of inclusive disjunction (and/or):

[(P V Q) & P] → ¬ Q

1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

In this case, the mode is not valid and there is therefore no logical law. We
will notice that only the first line differs. It is clear where the error lies: just as we
One can be a lawyer and a professor; it is not because one is one that one cannot be the other.

53
 Example No. 4: "If by claiming that there is no truth, one claims to say a
truth, then there is a truth.

There is a truth

In this case, it should also be noted that certain functions only involve one.
only variable. We will only consider two possible meetings of truth values.

(¬ P → P) → P

0 1 1 1 1 1

1 0 0 0 1 0

We actually find the argument of retaliation which is a logical law. If we place in

The last operator is an equivalence relation; it is also a logical law. It is appropriate to...
If denying that there is a truth leads to affirming that there is one
To one, it amounts to saying that there is indeed a truth.

Example No. 5: the famous dilemma.

Let's return to the dilemma of Don Rodrigue, whose father has been offended by the father of his...

fiancée... 'Don Rodrigue must challenge Chimène's father (P) or not avenge his father (Q),
but in the first case (P) he loses Chimène (M) (who cannot marry the murderer of her
father) and in the second case (Q) he also loses Chimène (M) (who does not want to marry a coward), and
So he loses Chimène anyway (M).

54
 1 5 (2) 4 3 6

[ V Q) & (P → M) & (Q → M))]→ M

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1

1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0

0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0

We have introduced three variables here, so the truth encounters number

of eight.

The numbering on the first line indicates the course of action for the processing of
calculation. It is clear that this is a dilemma that is a logical law.

Example n°6: "It rains and it does not rain."

P & ¬ P

1 0 0 1

0 0 1 0

This is a contradiction, as we have seen previously, but translated

In calculation. It is noteworthy that its negation is indeed a logical law which is actually the principle of
non-contradiction. Here is its translation.

55
¬ (P & ¬ P)

1 1 0 0 1

1 0 0 1 0

After this approach intended to practice translation, one can consider a few
logical laws

56
4.2.4 Some interesting logical laws

A logical law is a 'tautology', meaning there is coherence of the mind with

himself. It should be recalled that a logical law is always true, regardless of the value of the
premises. We therefore provide here some interesting examples. To assist in the
understanding of the calculation, the final phase of the calculation, in the study of equivalences, is

underlined : 1

[Link] The equivalence report between implication and conjunction (Iercase)

Example No. 7: "If we enter here, we are surveyors" is equivalent to "One cannot
enter here without being a surveyor.

P: "enter here"

to be a surveyor

(P → Q) ↔ ¬ (P & ¬ Q)

1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0

0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0

This example shows the possibility of diverse translations and the relationship existing between
the implication and the conjunction.

[Link] The equivalence report between implication and conjunction (IIandcase)

Example No. 8: "If we serve God, then we do not serve Mammon" is equivalent to
One cannot serve God and Mammon at the same time.

57
 to serve God

Q: 'to serve Mammon'

(P → ¬ Q) ↔ ¬ (P & Q)

1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0

0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1

0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0

There is indeed a relationship between implication and conjunction here. Indeed, 'if we serve
God, then we do not serve Mammon" is equivalent to "We cannot serve God and Mammon at the same time.

fois) ».

[Link] The equivalence report between implication and inclusive disjunction

Example no. 9: "If we succeed with shortcomings, it is because we have a

excuse » equates to "One does not succeed with shortcomings and/or one has a
excuse

P: 'succeeding with shortcomings'

to have an excuse

(P → Q) ↔ (¬ P V Q)

1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1

1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0

0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1

0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0

There is indeed a relationship between implication and exclusive disjunction. We could therefore
have this proposition: 'One does not succeed with insufficiencies and/or one has an excuse.'

58
[Link] The contraposition of the implication

Example n°10: "It is necessary for Amélie to accompany me so that I can go"
The 'to the ball' means 'If she doesn't accompany me, I'm not going to the ball.'

Amélie is accompanying me.

I'm going to the ball

(P → Q) ↔ (¬ Q → ¬ P)

1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1

1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1

0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0

0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0

In this case, the example is therefore equivalent to saying: 'If she does not accompany me, I do not
you are not going to the ball.

[Link] The equivalence report between conjunction and inclusive disjunction (Ihecase

Example no. 11: "This canvas is by Picasso and it is signed by the master"
equates to "It is false (that this canvas is not by Picasso and/or that it is not
not signed by the master).

The painting is by Picasso. The canvas is signed by the master.

(P & Q) ↔ ¬ (¬ P V ¬ Q)

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0

0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1

0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0

59
 In this case, the example amounts to saying: "It is false (that this painting is not by
Picasso and/or that it is not signed by the master).

[Link] The equivalence report between inclusive disjunction and conjunction (IIecas)

Example No. 12: 'Alfred is stupid or mean' is equivalent to 'It is false that
(Alfred is not stupid and he is not mean).

Alfred is stupid

Q: 'Alfred is mean'

P V Q) ↔ ¬ (¬ P & ¬ Q)

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1

1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0

0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1

0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0

In this case, the given example amounts to: "It is false that (Alfred is not stupid and
that he is not mean).

[Link] The law of double negation

Example n°13: "It is false that this door is not open."

This door is open.

¬ (¬ P ↔ P)

1 0 1 0 1

1 1 0 0 0

It can be seen that the statement is equivalent to 'this door is open'.

60
The principle of excluded middle

Example No. 14: "Either this man is innocent, or he is guilty."

P: "this man is innocent"

P W ¬ P

1 1 0 1

0 1 1 0

[Link] The principle of identity

Example n°15: "We have a friend, if and only if we have a friend."

We have a friend

P ↔ P

1 1 1

0 1 0

The weakened form is that of the implication P → P: "If I have a friend, then I have a"
me.

[Link] The principle of non-contradiction

Example No. 16: "One cannot be big and small at the same time."

to be tall

¬ (P & ¬ P)

1 1 0 0 1

1 0 0 1 0

61
[Link] The antinomy

Example No. 17: "I am lying!" – "If I am telling the truth, I am lying, and if I am lying, I

it's true.

(P → ¬ P) & (¬ P → ) ↔ (P & ¬ P)

1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0

1 3 2 5 4

We have chosen the most famous antinomy, which is that of the liar. It is a
tacit contradiction. It can be transposed into imperative form. Let it be: 'Disobey me!' Now
If I disobey, I obey and if I obey, I disobey. This is the problem studied in psychology under
the form of the 'double bind'. It should be noted that the philosophical principle is found here so much
important in the system of the philosopher E. Kant. He held that certain problems
theoretical were antinomic. For example, if I want to demonstrate freedom, I am constrained
to demonstrate determinism and vice versa. There is a contradiction that Kant confronts.
demand where to place it and if it is apparent and real.

[Link] Retaliation

We have already encountered this argument, seemingly paradoxical, but very powerful,
notably to refute skepticism. Its form is simple: (¬ P → P) → P. We have seen,
in introductory terms, its operation.

[Link] The Dilemma

We have already faced the dilemma and we have already seen its treatment. It is in
make an alternative where each branch has the same consequence. This is the case of Orestes.
who must avenge his father, who was killed by his mother and her lover Aegisthus. But he cannot do so
doing it by killing his mother... Thus, whatever he does, he sins against filial piety and the
Erinyes (or Furies), who are the goddesses of vengeance tasked with punishing criminals and
Notably the parricides are waiting for their prey! Or again, this is the case of Don
Rodrigue... Well known!

62
[Link] The conditional syllogism

Example No. 20: "If being Socrates implies being a man, and that
the fact of being a man implies the fact of being mortal, so the fact of being Socrates
implies being mortal.

This example is similar to the Aristotelian syllogism that we are going to study, but it
does not analyze the proposals and strings together a series of facts.

P : « Être Socrate » Q : « Être homme » M : « Être mortel »

1 3 2 5 4

(P → Q) & (Q → M)] → [P → M]

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0

0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1

0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0

0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1

0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0

63
5 The logic of monadic predicates

In the work we have just accomplished, we did not analyze the

propositions. Hence the title: 'Logic of unanalyzed propositions'. We have taken them
in the form of an indivisible block and we observed the sequence of these,
being attentive to validity and providing a method, ultimately simple, for calculation where everything
The main challenge is to accurately translate the proposal that we want to decompose.

We will now break down these proposals into three sections: the subject, the
couple and the predicate, without pushing the analysis to its conclusion, since we will remain in a
logic of the 'monadic predicate', that is to say, which does not decompose the predicate with
relations ("greater than", "located between", etc.). Thus, if previously, we advanced
an 'unexamined proposition' where P = 'Pierre is a lawyer', we will now examine
an 'analyzed proposition' where 'Pierre is a lawyer' must be broken down into a Subject, a
Couple and a Predicate.

This chapter has three main moments.

First of all, we look at how to analyze a judgment and we rule on

the notions of 'predicate', 'copula' and 'subject';

Then, we analyze the "immediate inferences" that actually draw a conclusion.

from a single premise (there are three types of relationships);

Finally, we analyze the "syllogisms" which are certainly "inferences"

immediate," but draw a conclusion from two premises.

5.1 Analysis of the judgment

The sea is choppy.

-predicate. We will also study it, for ease, in the reverse direction.

Let us state from the outset that, for the copula, we remain in the logic of "is–is not".
step
example).

64
 Similarly, we will need to transform the sentences to formalize them. If we say:
Dogs love fish, we will transform to make the copula appear in
(Dogs) are (loving fish). Similarly, 'Pierre speaks' becomes 'Pierre is
speaking.

We work here in four main moments.

We study the notion of 'predicate' in detail;

We study the concept of "copula";

We study the concept of 'subject';

Nous avançons un quatrième point important qui nous permettra de définir les
notions of 'quantity' and 'quality'.

5.1.1 The predicate as an expression of a concept

The predicate expresses a concept. A concept is at the intersection of a double system.

of referral. It refers to other concepts (= its understanding or connotation) and it designates a
set of realities (= its extension or denotation). Understanding is therefore more
"rich" and the extension is more "poor". Thus, if I say "the students" and that
I add 'studying letters', then comprehension increases, but extension decreases.
since I delete those who do not study letters.

We will study this notion in four stages.

The understanding of the concept;

The extension of the concept;

The three characteristics of the concept;

The three relationships existing between the concepts.

[Link] Understanding a concept

The understanding of a concept is therefore the collection of the other concepts that it entails.

presupposes (unless we are dealing with a primitive concept or 'category'). For example,

65
for the concept 'river', we must consider 'running water flowing into the sea' and for the
the concept of 'river', we must consider 'flowing water that flows into another flowing water'.

[Link] The extension of a concept

The extension of a concept is the set of realities to which this concept applies.
It is represented by names (the Meuse, the Rhine, etc.), but also by concepts that
are subordinate to the concept that we consider. Thus, in our case, 'river' and
The term 'river' is indeed part of the extension of 'running water'.

The translation of words sometimes poses problems. For example, the word 'river' has a
understanding poorer than 'river', but a richer extension. Indeed, English
defines the 'river' as a 'watercourse' and thus the Mississippi which, although flowing into
in the sea, will be a 'river', like the slightest little 'cat pee' flowing inside
land.

Moreover, from a philosophical point of view, it can be noted that the empiricist considers
most often the concept according to its extension, while the rationalist does so according to its
understanding.

Here is the summary table:

water stagnant a lake, a pond,

a pond, a
swimming pool.

current be towards a river.

other water
current

let's head towards the sea a river.

[Link] The three characteristics of the concept

A concept presents the following three characteristics:

66
[Link].1 Abstraction

From the point of view of understanding, the concept is abstract. This means
less 'extract from' than 'consider separately'. Indeed, the concept considers separately, isolates
even, an aspect that is common to several realities (color, size, identity,
difference, etc.). The concept applies to the whole thing, but it does not say everything about the thing.
This means that it is adequate, but not exhaustive. It thus allows for an order to be established in the

world, to express a limited aspect of reality. If I state that 'this table is yellow',
I assign a property that applies to the whole table, but does not say everything about the table and
Therefore, do not exhaust the perception we have of it.

It should also be noted that one must not confuse a "total abstraction" (the one that
we have just presented) with a 'formal abstraction'. This transforms a term
abstract in a singular term: a 'white table' → 'the whiteness of the table'.
It will be noted that Aristotle's logic avoids this second form of abstraction. And this
influences of course a philosophical practice. Thus, to say that 'this Greek is a man',
Aristotle understands that the predicate 'man', which is a concept, relates to this Greek. But
Plato rather understands that this Greek participates in the idea of man!

[Link].2 Universality

This point derives from the first. It is from the perspective of its extension that the concept

is universal. In fact, if we abstractly consider a common aspect to several things

(regardless of its applications), it is that the concept can be applied to all
things verifying his understanding.

But, if the concept, taken in itself, is in universal law, it is not always in fact.
used universally when it intervenes in judgment. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the fact
to be applied and to be taken. Let's see these two situations.

Première situation : l’universel qui figure au prédicat peut êtreappliqué

universally or particularly.

All men are mortal: the application of 'mortal' is universal to the

entire class of men. It is a universal application.

67
 Some men are irritable: the application of 'irritable' is made to a
part of the class of men. It is a particular application.

A rule will help us: we should see if the subject is applied universally.
("everything") or particularly ("some"), then to rule.

Second situation: the universal that appears in the predicate can be taken
universally or particularly.

All men are mortal: the application is indeed universal, but the concept -
which refers in law "all mortal beings" - is well taken particularly because we
only considers a part of the living, that is to say, humans. By exploring the entire class of
"mortals," I see that there are also animals!

"No dolphin is oviparous": here, the concept is universally accepted. Indeed, if

I go through the entire class of oviparous animals, I do not discover a single dolphin (in my
current knowledge!)

"All whales have fins": the application is indeed universal, but the
The concept - which designates in law 'all beings having fins' - is well taken.
particularly because we only consider a part of the class "to have fins."

A rule will help us: with affirmative copula, predicate taken particularly and with copula.
negative, universally accepted predicate.

[Link].3 Uniqueness

Finally, a concept is unambiguous. It retains the same understanding regardless of

its applications in extension. The Meuse and the pond in my garden are indeed water. And the
The understanding of the concept 'man' will not change whether I apply it to a black or a white.
to a child or to an old person. Hence, the idea of the universality of human rights.
This fact of keeping 'a single voice' and 'a single meaning' results from abstraction.

It should be noted that one must be attentive to the linguistic accidents of equivocation.
Two examples will help to understand: "My father is the mayor of Mamers and my brother is

68
Masseur. "Or: "Five healthy fathers bore on their breast the seal of their holy father." We
It should be noted that it is the terms that are ambiguous, the concept remains unequivocal.

It should also be noted that certain so-called 'prime' terms are neither unambiguous nor

ambiguous, but analogical because they maintain a 'proportion' (an analogy) of meaning
common, through their various applications. Thus, 'this meal is good', 'this man is
good", "this reasoning is good", the understanding of the term "good" increases with its
extension. This is an exception to the previously mentioned rule.

[Link] The relationships between the concepts

After studying the three characteristics of the concept and providing two rules.
It is important to observe three possible relationships between the concepts.

[Link].1 Subordination

This is the case of the relationship between a genus and its species. It should be remembered that the

concepts that form the extension of a concept presuppose the understanding of that concept,
but no, inversely.

[Link].2 Opposition

It is necessary to distinguish here between the opposition of contraries and the opposition of contradictories.

Contradictories cannot be true at the same time of the same subject, but they
can be false about the same subject. Opposites are the extremes of the same kind,
that is to say they divide a type of property into two opposing groups. Thus, among the
There are 'hair bearers', 'haired' ones and 'bald' ones; but there are indeed beings
which are neither one nor the other, because this property does not concern them (the fish).

Contradictories cannot be both true and false at the same time of the same.
sujet. Les contradictoires partagent l’univers entier puisque aucun objet ne peut être
"hairy" and "non-hairy" at the same time. Thus, even the fish is "non-hairy".
It is clear that the contradictory is based on absolute negation.

Exemple : « Ce pantalon ne peut être blanc et noir en même temps. » Mais il peut être
red.

69
 Example: 'This pants cannot be white and not white at the same time.'

Opposite: White Black

Contradictory: White Non white

[Link].3 Complementarity

These are the expressions 'greater than', 'double of', etc. These relative terms
are actually complex predicates that Aristotelian logic does not consider. Thus,
Pierre is being taller than Paul.

5.1.2 The copula

We have just studied everything related to the predicate. We now need to

move to the copula.

This one, as the word says, connects the subject and the predicate. As said
higher up, we remain in bivalence, that is to say between 'is' and 'is not'. The Ancients
affirmed that an affirmative copula composes and a negative copula divides. Logic
What we study is called 'categorical', because it affirms or denies, without adding to
subsequent modalities ("it is possible", "it is necessary", etc.).

We still need to elucidate the question of the subject.

5.1.3 The subject

It is important to distinguish between two types of subjects: concrete and general.

Concrete subjects involve designations: 'Jean', 'I', 'This'

who are names, personal or demonstrative pronouns. These designations
are not concepts! Indeed, they do have an understanding, but their
extension is not universal since it is an individual or a reality that one
designates. The extension is therefore singular.

It can be noted that one can add a concept to enrich the concrete designation.
In reality, it is an old predicate incorporated into the subject. 'This pianist is a virtuoso'
means saying: 'this is a pianist' and 'this (which is a pianist) is a virtuoso'. The one who

70
refutes saying that 'this pianist is not a virtuoso, because he is mediocre' and not 'this is
not a pianist, but a violinist.

General subjects replace the concrete designation with a quantifier:

be universal: "Everything is ..." - "None is ...". Thus: "All girls are ...
refined.

be particular: "Some is ..." - "Some is not ...". Thus: "Some

Boys are refined.

We see that a general subject includes a quantifier accompanied by a concept.

Every man is mortal.

Note: All psychoanalytic work consists of transitioning from the general subject to the subject.
concrete, from the 'self' to the 'I', from the social object to the speaker of the discourse.

5.1.4 The properties of propositions: quality and quantity

If we summarize all these reflections, we arrive at a schematic table.

which will allow for a quick analysis of the broken down proposals. However, we will retain
well these two big rules:

It will be said that the quality of a proposition depends on the copula. A proposition

is indeed 'affirmative' or 'negative' depending on the action of the copula.

And we will recall the important rule: in affirmative copula, predicate
particularly taken and negative copula, universally taken predicate.

It will be said that the quantity of a proposition depends on the subject. A proposition is

"universal" or "particular" depending on whether it involves a subject

universally or particularly quantified.

71
 We therefore have this table of four propositions on general subjects:

Sigle d’abréviation Sujet (quantité) Copule (qualité) Proposition Memory

A Universal Affirmative AllSetP I affirm

E Universal Negative No one is P nEgo

I Particular Affirmative Some is P I affirm

O Particular Negative Something is not zero

P

All boys are intelligent: Universal affirmative.

No boy is intelligent: Universal negative.

Some boys are smart: Particular affirmative.

Some boys are not smart: Specific negative.

72
5.2 Immediate Inferences

The device is ready to examine reasoning that aims to draw a

conclusion of a single premise, these reasoning processes that are called "inferences"
immediate." On the other hand, the syllogism will involve two propositions taken as
premises.

In this section, we will study three types of reports:

logical oppositions (four figures are possible);

subversions (it is then a transformation operation where we touch on

terms)

conversions (it is then a transformation operation where we touch on the

terms, according to three scenarios).

5.2.1 Logical oppositions

Logical oppositions are actually given or visible through the 'square'

logic!

We are giving it in a large format!

73
A C O N T R A I R E S E

C S

O E

S N R S

U T I U

B R O B

A A T A

L D C L

T I T

E D C E

R A T R

N R O N

E T I E

S N R S

O E

C S

I S U B C O N T R A I R E S O

74
 For reference and to better understand the oppositions:

All the boys are smart. A No boy is intelligent E

Quantité (universel)…..Qualité (+) Quantité (universel)…..Qualité (-)

Some boys are smart I Some boys are not smart. O

Quantité (particulier) .Qualité (+) Quantité (particulier) Qualité (-)

The logical square illustrates the nature of these oppositions which can be here of
four types :

contradictoires (diagonales du carré)

opposites

subcontraries

subalterns (sides of the square).

We will study each of them in detail. But, for a certain ease of

reading this "square", we will remember that, for the inferences concerning the sides of the square, "the
"Truth comes from above" and "falsehood comes from below." It is a mnemonic device.
It will be clearly found in the summary diagram.

[Link] Contradictory propositions

These proposals are opposed in terms of quantity and quality (A and O–I)
and E). They cannot be true or false at the same time. From which we can conclude from the
the truth of one to the falsehood of the other and vice versa.

75
 A opposes O and E to I, according to the square's diagonal.

Thus, from the truth "all men are mortal" (A), one can conclude the falsehood of
"Some man is not mortal" (O) and of the falsehood of "no man is of race.
yellow" (E), we can conclude the truth of "some man is of yellow race" (I). Thus, from
one to the other, we change the quantity and the quality.

[Link] Contrary propositions

These proposals are universally opposing propositions from the perspective of the
quality (A and E). They cannot be true at the same time, but they can be false.
at the same time. Thus, it is only by knowing that one is true that one can declare
the other is false, but not the other way around.

From the truth of 'no man is of green race', I can declare the falsity of
Every man is of green race.

The opposite operation is not possible. If I take two universal propositions.

false like these:

All men are of green race (A) False

"All men are of the white race" (A) False

It is noted that, in one case, the opposite is true and, in the other case, it is
false

No man is of green race (E) True

"No man is of the white race" (E) False

So, if we start from a universally false statement, we cannot say whether the opposite will be true.
or false. But if it is true, we can of course conclude the falsehood of the opposite. We
Remember that 'truth comes from above.'

[Link] The subcontrary propositions

These proposals are specific opposing propositions from the viewpoint of the
quality (I and O / affirmative and negative). They cannot be false at the same time, but they

76
can be true at the same time. Thus, it is only by knowing that one is
false that one can declare the other true, but not vice versa.

Thus, from the falsehood of "some women went to the moon," one can draw the
truth of 'some women did not go to the moon'.

The inverse operation is not possible as shown by the two particularly true ones.
following:

Some women have not gone to the moon (O) True

Some men did not go to the moon (O) True

It is noted that, in one case, the subcontrary is true and, in the other case, it is
false

Some women have gone to the moon (I) False

A few men have gone to the moon (I) True

So, if we start from a true particular, we cannot say in advance whether the
the subcontrary will be true or false. But if it is false, we can certainly conclude to the truth.
from the subcontrary. It is therefore noted that 'falsehood comes from below.'

[Link] Subordinate Propositions

These proposals are of the same quality, but opposed to the point of
view of quantity. The universal (in A or E) is called 'subalternating' and the particular
(in I or in O) is called 'subaltern'. Therefore, there are two types of inferences.

[Link].1 From the subordinate to the subaltern

If the universal (A) is true, the particular (I) is also true; but if the universal is
false, we do not know in advance if the particular is true or false.

For the truth of 'all metals are conductors of electricity', I can say that
"Some metals are conductors of electricity" is true.

77
 The opposite operation is not possible as shown by the two false universals.
following, where we arrive at false or true subordinates:

"No metal is conductive" (E) False

No metal is ferrous (E) False

It is noted that, in one case, the subaltern is false and, in the other case, it is
true

Some metals are not conductors (O) False

Some metals are non-ferrous (O) True

[Link].2 From the subordinate to the subordinates

It is observed that the situation is reversed. If the particular is false, the universal is.
too; but if the particular is true, we do not know in advance if the universal will be true or
false.

From the falsehood of 'some cats are bipedal', I can say that 'every cat is
"biped" is incorrect.

The opposite operation is not possible, as shown by the two particular truths.
following, where we arrive at true or false subordinates:

Some cats are quadrupeds (I) True

Some cats are black (I) True

It is noted that, in one case, the subalternate is true and, in the other case, it is
false

All cats are quadrupeds (A) True

"All cats are black" (A) False

78
[Link] Summary table of logical oppositions and mnemonic device

Appellation Quantity(s) Quality(ies) Nature Compatibility Conclusion Double

the opposition assured conclusion

Contradictory Universal and Is / Is Not Quantity neither true nor if one is always
particular pass quality false true, the other assured
same time is false.

And vice versa

Opposites Universals Is / Is Not Quality True if one is if one is

pass same time: true, so false, so
no the other where the other will be
false true you
False in
false
at the same time

yes

Subcontraries Particular Is / Is Not Quality True if one is If one is

pass same time: false, then true, so
yes the other is the other one where
true true or
False in
false
same time :
no

Subalterns: Universal Is / Is not quantity If universal If

not true the universal
subalterns
particular is false, the
true particular
is it true or false

or false

↓ ↓ ↓

Subalterns: Particular Is / Is not quantity So particular So the

no false particular
subaltern
universal is true
false the universal
will be or true
or false

79
 In summary, we will also keep in mind these scenarios of the logical square:

For inferences related to the diagonal:

One can always infer from a given proposition the contradictory of truth value.
opposite (these two propositions are diagonally opposed, as shown thus the
diagonal)

For inferences related to the sides:

A simple way to remember the rules is to tell yourself that "the truth comes from above and the
falsehood comes from below.

Thus, to infer a contrary (of opposite truth value) or a subalternate (of the same
truth value), it is necessary for the universal (A -E) to be true.

And, to infer a subcontrary (of opposite truth value) or a subalternate (of the same
truth value), the particular (I–O) must be false.

This other diagram summarizes long considerations!

A / True E / False A / False E / True

I / True O / True

A / False E / False

I / False O / True I / True O / False

80
5.2.2 The Obversion

It is a logical operation that transforms the predicate of a proposition into its

contradictory, while changing the quality of the proposition (the truth value of the
premise is preserved). Which gives:

For: 'All men are mortal' (A)

[…] mortel
the quality of the proposal (here move to a negative copula): "No man is not"
mortal » (E).

For: 'Some women are not blonde' (O)

... not non-blonde

quality of the proposal (here shift to a positive copula): "Some women are not
blondes » (I).

5.2.3 The conversions

We will see three types of conversions. First, the simple conversion, then the
conversion by accident and, finally, by contraposition.

[Link] The simple conversion

Simple conversion is an operation that switches the subject and the predicate, without
change the quantity of the proposal. It should be noted that, in general, a conversion is not
validate that if the terms do not change extension, moving from the premise to the
conclusion.

The simple conversion is only valid for propositions in E and I. Hence

the Latin adage: 'I simply did it'.

Let's take four examples to explore all the cases.

However, above all, a reminder is in order: our rule stating that "with a copula
affirmative, predicate taken particularly and with negative copula, predicate taken
universally. One should remember not to confuse the quantity of the

81
proposition and that of the predicate (it can be found using the rule). The quantity of the predicate does not

does not depend on the quantity of the proposition (it indeed depends on the quantity of the subject and
we must therefore look at the quantifier that relates to the subject), but of its quality (a copula
negative or an affirmative copula), according to the rule given above.

We will therefore be vigilant to properly sort the subjects and the predicates, and then identify the

extension increases!

E None European Conversion No American is European. E

is not American valid
Subject: universal
Subject: universal
Predicate: universal
Predicate: universal
No increase in extension.

I Some Corsicans are Conversion Some French are Corsican I

French valid
Subject: particular
Subject: private
Predicate: particular
Predicate: particular
No extension increase.

A All course is Conversion All French is Corsican A

French not valid !!!

Subject: universal
Subject: universal
Predicate: particular
Predicate: particular.

The predicate taken particularly becomes

universal by the quantifier (all), therefore
extension increase.

82
O Some men Conversion Some athletes are not men. O
are not sporty not valid!!!

Subject: private
Subject: private
Predicate: universal
Predicate: universal

The subject taken particularly becomes

universal (couple negative) so
extension increase.

[Link] Accidental conversion

Accidental conversion is an operation that switches the subject and the predicate.
changing the quantity of the proposal.

Accidental conversion is only valid for propositions in E and A.

Hence the Latin saying: 'EvA per accidens'.

Let's take the same examples again:

E No European is Conversion Not every American is European. E

American valid
Subject: universal
Subject: universal
Predicate: universal
Predicate: universal
No extension increase.

I Some Corsicans are Conversion no All French are Corsicans I

french valid!!!
Subject: universal
Subject: individual
Predicate: particular
Predicate: private
The subject taken particularly becomes
universal (all), therefore increase
of extension.

83
A All Corsicans are French Conversion Some French people are Corsican. A
valid
Subject: universal Subject: private

Predicate: particular Predicate: particular

No extension increase.

O Some men do not Conversion no Not all athletes are men O

are not athletic valid!!!
Subject: universal
Subject: individual
Predicate: universal
Predicate: universal
The subject taken particularly becomes
universal (all), thus increase
of extension.

[Link] The conversion by contraposition

The conversion by contraposition is an operation that interchanges the subject and the predicate.

but after transforming them into their contradictions.

The conversion by contraposition is valid only for propositions in A and in

From there comes the Latin adage: "AstO per contrapositionem".

By the way, we now have the three mnemonic formulas! They are
in fact an allusion to the myth of the sin of Origins: Adam: "I did it simply", Eve:
"I did it by accident" and the serpent: "I did it by juxtaposition."

Let's take some examples, but limit ourselves:

Let's start with the proposal in O and make the transformations:

84
Some men are not athletic. Proposal in O.

(Some men are) non-athletic. Contradictory of the predicate

Obversion (contradictory and

change in quality of the
proposition)

Some non-athletes are men. Permutation of the predicate towards the subject

Simple conversion (thus no

change in quantity

Some non-sporty people are not non-men. Contradictory of the predicate

There are some who are not athletic, but they do not
are not to be excluded from the class of men). change in quality of the
proposition).

We can clearly see the development. So we have an obversion, then a simple conversion.
then a new obversion.

Then a proposal in A:

Every bald person is smiling. Proposal in A.

No bald person is not smiling. Contradictory of the predicate

= Obversion (contradictory and

change in quality of the
proposal).

No non-smiling person is bald. Permutation of the predicate towards the subject

= Simple conversion (so no

change of quantity.

85
All non-smiling people are not bald. Contradictory of the predicate

(= there are some who are not athletes, but who do not = Obversion (contradictory and
are not to be excluded from the class of men) change in quality of the
proposition.

We can see the development. We have an obversion, then a simple conversion.

then a new obversion.

A proposal in I. Attention! This example is not valid:

Some Corsicans are French. Proposal in I.

Some courses are not contradictory to the predicate.

French. (O)
Obversion (contradictory and change of the
quality of the proposal.

Some non-French are not Predicate permutation towards the subject

corses.
Simple conversion (so no change in the
quantity).

But the increase in extension has appeared.

So, there is invalidity!

Some non-French are non-Contradictory of the predicate

courses.
Obversion (contradictory and change of the
quality of the proposal.

86
5.3 The syllogisms

Syllogisms are 'immediate inferences', that is to say (most frequently)

reasonings based on two propositions taken as premises. These make up
intervene a common term (called 'mid-term') and two different terms (called
extremes). The purpose of the syllogism is to connect these two terms through the middle term.

We will work here in five steps.

We present the syllogism by providing its 'canonical form' and its

"figures" that we illustrate with examples.

We give the validity rules of the syllogism, first on the "terms", then
on the 'proposals'.

We then advance the rules concerning the truth of the conclusion.

We make a brief remark on the possibility of "reducing" the figures.

We conclude with general considerations on the syllogism.

5.3.1 Presentation of the syllogism

We will proceed in three stages. First, we will present the canonical form of
syllogism, then the different figures and finally the modes.

[Link] The canonical form of the syllogism

Everything is mortal. Maj- Medium term + = deadly = Term that will be predicated in
great extreme conclusion
your

Now all Greek is man Min- Little extreme + = Greek

Term that becomes subject
your medium term in conclusion

So every Greek is mortal Con- Extreme small + The medium term is not included.

clusi- grand extreme more.

on

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 Another illustration of a syllogism canonical:

Every mammal is Majestic- Great extreme + = Mammal = Term that will be

viviparous re Medium term predicate in conclusion

Or no fish is Mineu- Little extreme + = fish Term that becomes

viviparous medium term subject in en
conclusion

So no fish is Conclusion- Small extreme + The medium term is not there

mammal fusion grand extreme figure plus.

Two main laws to remember:

It will be noted that the great extreme of the major becomes a predicate in the conclusion.
that the small extreme of the minor becomes the subject.

The first operation to perform is therefore to look at the predicate of the conclusion and see
From which premise does this term come, which should allow us to identify the major. Indeed, it is necessary to...

always give the syllogism its canonical form, as it can present itself in a way
disordered

Example: 'Whales are not fish, because all fish are oviparous'
"and that whales are not oviparous." The conclusion is at the beginning...

Or again: "I hate Gertrude because she is really snobbish!". This will give:

Identify the predicate of the conclusion: 'snob'. It must be in the major premise.

So "Everyone snobbish is hated by me, but Gertrude is snobbish, therefore Gertrude is hated.
by me." We have already discussed this case which is that of the enthymeme.

[Link] The figures of the syllogism

Depending on the position of the medium term, in the major and the minor, there are four
figures of syllogism.

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Everything is P All P is M Everything is P No P is M

All S is M No S is M Some is S Everything is S

All S is P No S is P Some S is P Some S is not P

Figure Subject Figure Predicate - FigureSubject - Subject PredicateFigure -

Predicate Predicate Subject

[Link] The modes of syllogism

In fact, if the three propositions that make up the syllogism can be according to the
four properties mentioned above (A, E, I, O), there are 4364 different modes; a number that we
multiply by four, because of the four figures. There are therefore 256 possible syllogisms!
these "possibilities", few are valid, because the rules of validity are quite strict. For
to retain the valid modes, the Ancients had developed a mnemonic technique:

Figure S P: Barbara–Celarent–Darii–Ferio

Figure P P: Cesare–Camestres–Festino–Baroco

Figure S S: Darapti–Felapton–Disamis–Datisi–Bocardo–Ferison

Figure P S : Bamalip–Calemes–Dimatis–Fesapo–Fresison

Here are procedure exercises:

All men are mortal

For all Greek is man

So all Greek is mortal

I must identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'mortal'. It gives me the
major which is in a good position. I am looking at the medium term position (2). It is the S figure.
P. I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in A–A–A. I then have the
Barbara's formula. My syllogism is valid!

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 All mammals are viviparous

Or no fish is viviparous.

So no fish is a mammal.

I need to identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'mammal'. It gives me the
major who is in a good position. I look at the medium-term position (2). It’s the P figure.
I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in A–E–E. I then have the
formula cAmEstrEs. My syllogism is valid!

No crocodile is talkative

Every chatterbox is boring

Some boring is not crocodile

I must identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'crocodile'. It gives me the
major that is in a good position. I am looking at the medium-term position (2). It's the P figure.
I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in E–A–O. I then have the
formula fEsApO. My syllogism is valid!

No lawyer is a joker

Some logicians are jokers

Some logicians are not lawyers

I must identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'lawyer'. It gives me the
major which is in a good position. I am looking at the medium-term position (2). It is the P figure.
I then identify the properties of propositions (3). They are in E–I–O. I then have the
fEstInO formula. My syllogism is valid!

Some Europeans are gallant.

All French is European

All French people are gallant.

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 I have to identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'gallant'. It gives me the
major that is in a good position. I am looking at the medium-term position (2). It is the S figure.
I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in I–A–A.

But I note, in my diagram of figures, that for figure S P, this sequence

does not exist! There is therefore a validity problem and we will see for what reason soon!
My syllogism is not valid!

It is noteworthy that the validity schemes allow us to see which one(s)

conclusion(s) we are entitled to draw from two premises. Let's take this example where the conclusion
is not present: "all fools are boring, some talkative people are not boring, so?".
Since we do not have the conclusion, two possibilities must be posed, to the extent that one
and the other can be majors.

Every fool is boring (A) Some talkative people are not boring.

But some chatterboxes are not boring. Or Every fool is boring (A)
(O)

So some talkative people are not fools (O) So every fool is talkative (A)

In fact, the possibilities are limited. Indeed, I have here the figure P P, which I can
identifier since I have two premises. It is similar in both cases. I also know
two properties: A and O, for the first case, and O and A, for the second case. As a reminder, here is
the diagram of possible sequences: Cesare–Camestres–Festino–Baroco. I notice
so that only a 'baroco' is possible and that the second scheme will not give me one
valid syllogism.

5.3.2 The rules of validity for syllogisms

Ensuring the validity of a syllogism is one thing, but understanding the why of it
its invalidity is another! It is therefore appropriate to study rules for good operation,
to detect paralogisms, that is to say these errors against validity. We provide them

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eight. The first four are about the terms and the last four are about the
propositions.

[Link] The rules for the terms

Rule number 1: The medium term must be taken in an unambiguous sense.

Here is a rather amusing case:

Every dolphin is adorned with a fin.

Prince Philippe is a dolphin.

So Prince Philippe is adorned with a fin

A less refined one...

Every crane weighs at least one ton.

But my daughter is a crane

So my daughter weighs at least a ton.

We can clearly see the ambiguity of 'dolphin' and 'crane'.

It will be noted that Kant mentions this rule to defeat the Cogito.
Descartes! He first transforms it into a syllogism:

Every thinking being exists

Now I am a thinking being

So I exist

He then points out that the medium term is sometimes taken objectively and sometimes
subjectively. To this is added a universalization of the subject of the minor. Whence
the equivocity! As for Lacan, he will take up the formula and note it: 'I think: therefore I am'
to indicate that one should not confuse the subject of the enunciation and the object of the statement.

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 Rule No. 2: The middle term must be taken at least once universally.

Here is a more than telling example:

Every fascist wears a green loden.

But you are wearing a green loden.

So you are a fascist

Dans ce cas, le moyen terme est pris deux fois particulièrement. Ce que l’on remarque
easily also by the fact that the copula is affirmative.

Or else:

Every snake has a long neck

But you have a long neck

So you are a snake

Or again:

Every fool is talkative.

But every teacher is talkative

So every teacher is foolish.

Let's go back to an example:

Some Europeans are gallant

All French people are European

All French people are gallant

I must identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'gallant'. It gives me the
major that is in a good position. I am looking at the medium-term position (2). It is the S figure.
P. I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in I–A–A. The figures

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possibilities are: Barbara–Celarent–Darii–Ferio. I note that for the S P figure, this
The sequence does not exist! Therefore, there is a validity issue that can be explained.

Recall the rule: "An affirmative copula, predicate taken particularly and with copula."
negative, predicate taken universally." Similarly, it will be recalled that one must not
confuse the quantity of the proposition and that of the predicate. The quantity of the predicate does not depend

not of the quantity of the proposition (this indeed depends on the quantity of the subject), but of
its quality, according to the rule given above.

Here, in the major: the subject is taken particularly ("some"). In the

minor, it is also taken particularly ("in affirmative copula..."). So, the problem is
repéré! Il y a un paralogisme puisque le moyen terme n’est pas pris au moins une fois
universally.

I could, however, to keep the figure S P, convert I into A. I then have this
valid form where the medium term is then taken at least once universally, in the
major

All Europeans are gallant

All French people are European

So every Frenchman is gallant.

Let's take four more examples to clearly observe the functioning of this rule.
essential

Every intelligent romanist wears glasses, and Charles-Amédée wears glasses,

So Charles-Amédée is an intelligent Romanist! Is this valid?

It is appropriate to translate:

Every intelligent Romanist is wearing glasses.

Charles-Amédée is wearing glasses.

So Charles-Amédée is an intelligent romanist.

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 Let's go faster. We look at the figure: P P, then the sequence: A–A–A.
The possible figures are: Cesare–Camestres–Festino–Baroco. None correspond.
The problem comes from the fact that the medium term is not taken at least once.
universally. Indeed, whether major or minor, it is taken particularly since
always in affirmative copula position.

Or again:

All homosexuals love nudist beaches

Edgar loves nude beaches

Donc Edgar est homosexuel

Without retranslation, we notice that we have here the figure: P P, then the sequence: A
The possible figures are: Cesare–Camestres–Festino–Baroco. None of them
correspond. The problem is perfectly similar to the previous example.

On the other hand, if we take this form:

All homosexuals love nudist beaches

Edgar is homosexual.

So Edgar loves nudist beaches

We have the figure S P, then the sequence: A–A–A. The possible figures
are: Barbara–Celarent–Darii–Ferio. The syllogism is indeed valid, since the middle
the term is taken at least once universally.

Or else:

All boys hate logic, yet Dominique loves logic, so

Dominique is not a boy? Is that valid?

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 It is appropriate to translate:

All the boys hate logic.

Or Dominique does not dislike logic.

So Dominique is not a boy.

We look at the figure: P P, then the sequence: A–E–E. The possible figures.
are: Cesare–Camestres–Festino–Baroco. It is a valid Camestres. Indeed, the rules
are respected, both for the medium term (and for the extremes that do not increase
of extension.

Rule No. 3: An extreme term cannot increase in extension when moving from the premises to the conclusion.

conclusion.

Here we find a situation that has already been studied. Let's take this example:

Every flower is silent

Some flowers are not fragrant

So some (fragrant) plants are not silent.

What happened?

I have to identify the predicate of the conclusion (1) which is 'silent'. It gives me the
major who is in a good position. I am looking at the medium-term position (2). It is the S figure.
I then identify the properties of the propositions (3). They are in A–O–O. I note that,
In my figure diagram, only for figure S S, this sequence does not exist! Therefore,
a validity problem! The problem is that, in the major, the extreme ('silent')
is taken particularly and in conclusion universally. There is therefore an increase
of extension.

On the other hand, I can change my sequence into Bocardo. But I must invert.
my premises and change my conclusion since the predicate of the major must become the
predicate of my conclusion. This gives me:

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 Some flowers are not fragrant (O)

Every flower is silent (A)

So some (silent) plants are not fragrant (O)

Or this other example:

All metal is a conductor of electricity (A)

But water is not a metal (E)

So water is not a conductor of electricity (E)

In this case, this conclusion is true.15, but here the extreme "driver"
Electricity" moves from a major where it is particularly taken to a conclusion where it is
universally accepted. There is indeed an undue increase in extension!

Or else:

All hypocrites are despicable

Now all hypocrites are men

So all men are contemptible

In this case, the middle term is not taken at least once universally and there is
an undue increase in extension, since "men" is taken particularly in the
minor and is universally accepted in the conclusion.

Rule no. 4: The middle term cannot return in the conclusion

The medium term can only return in the conclusion, whether totally or
partially. From the example: "Every cat loves fish; now no dog loves the
"fish", one is tempted to conclude: "So no dog likes cats!"

However, it must be translated:

15
It is true that pure water is not a conductor of electricity. It is the particles in
suspension in water that transforms it into a formidable conductor.

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 Every cat loves fish

Or no dog loves fish.

We identify the two propositions: A and E. Depending on the figure P P, a

Camestres will be possible. As a conclusion, we will therefore have:

No dog is a cat

[Link] The rules for proposals

Rule No. 1: From two negative premises, nothing can be concluded.

Thus:

No tax collector is pleasant to meet.

But no teacher is a tax collector.

So every teacher is pleasant to meet.

Figure S P, with a sequence E–E–A that we cannot do anything about.

Rule No. 2: From two particular premises, nothing can be concluded.

Thus:

Some men are virtuous

But some wicked ones are men

So some villains are virtuous.

Figure S P, with a sequence E–E–E. But this rule is of little use since
one necessarily commits an error against the terms. Here, the mean term is not taken at
minus once universally.

Rule no. 3: From two affirmative premises, one cannot draw a negative conclusion.

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 Thus:

Every fool is boring.

But some men are foolish

So some (other) men are not boring.

We also observe here that the rule is not essential. Indeed, in this sequence
with the S Pet figure the chaining A –I–O, there is anyway a mistake against the
"Boring" is taken particularly in the major sense and universally in conclusion.
there is an undue increase in extension!

Rule No. 4: The conclusion is the consequence of the weakest premise.

Thus we can observe that:

if a premise is negative, the conclusion will also be negative;

If a premise is particular, the conclusion will be too;

If a premise is particular negative (O), the conclusion will also be.

For example:

Every bad person should be avoided

Some women are wicked

So every woman should be avoided

On constate ici aussi que ce cas de la règle n’est pas indispensable. En effet, dans cette
sequence with the figure S P and the sequence A –I–A, there is a mistake anyway
against the terms. 'Women' is taken particularly in a minor sense and universally in
Conclusion. There is an undue increase in extension!

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[Link] As a summary

In addition to questions related to the canonical form, the position of the terms, the referencing

of the quantity and quality, as well as the due consideration of the nature of the subject and the
predicate, we must ensure:

that the medium term is indeed taken at least once universally;

that one of the extremes does not increase in extent;

that the medium term is not ambiguous;

that the medium term does not come back in the conclusion;

that two premises are not negative.

5.3.3 The rules concerning the truth of the conclusion

We have already seen these rules, with the two sayings 'it is true unless it is true' and 'from false'

follows whatever

Indeed, in valid mode, if the premises are true, the conclusion can only be
true. Similarly, if a premise is false, the conclusion will be either false or true. That one
remembers the examples related to the Athenians and the Cretans, and the one concerning the words
French starting with a consonant.

It is worth making an allusion to a famous syllogism. 'All that glitters is not'

but this gold coin shines; therefore this gold coin is not gold." In fact, it is necessary to give
the good translation, because the major premise is a universally declared false: "It is false that (everything

a shiny object is gold), which amounts to saying "It is true that (some shiny objects do
are not gold) .

Hence this syllogism:

Some shiny objects are not gold.

This gold coin is a shiny object

So this louis is not made of gold.

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 It is observed that the figure is S P and the sequence O –A– E. The syllogism is not
valid because the medium term is not taken once universally.

5.3.4 The reduction to the modes of the first figure

For Aristotle, the first two moods of the first figure (Barbara–Celarent)
they constituted axioms that can be expressed in two forms: 'Dictum de omni;'
dictum de nullo - "Everything that is affirmed (or denied) of a subject taken universally and
Distributively, it must also be affirmed (or denied) of all the inferiors included under this.
subject." This means that all valid forms of syllogisms are merely expressions of the
two fundamental modes mentioned above!

We do not enter into the consequential problem: the reduction to the modes of the
first figure. But it should be noted that the exercise is technically possible and involves
also his mnemonic means.

5.3.5 General considerations on the syllogism

We often object (as we saw from the beginning of our theoretical approach) that a
syllogism is nothing but a reasoning based on a vicious circle, since the major premise does not
may be established if one knows the conclusion. If I want to say that 'Every man is
"mortal", I must first acknowledge that Socrates is indeed one! This is an objection.
coming from a surplus of empiricism... Indeed, in this case, the universal proposition does not
will only be established by the verification of all the particular propositions (Pierre, René, Alice,
etc.). Therefore, the proposal is considered provisionally universal, as a
habit of reasoning, but until proven otherwise.

However, we have seen that a concept has an understanding and an extension and
that the understanding of the first term is independent of that of the terms that constitute it.
extension. One can think of 'water' without thinking of 'lake', 'river', 'pond', etc. But not
Conversely. This means that one can assert that 'every man is mortal' based on
of an examination of the understanding of the term 'man', even before considering
applications in extension. This should of course be understood intelligently, to avoid
all the so-called naturalistic postures. Of course, knowing that the term 'man' possesses the
Characteristic of being mortal, it remains to know if Socrates is a man, that is to say, is he indeed.
in the broad sense of the term... In other words, if I say: "Every car thief is punished

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a year in prison", I still need to find out if Alfred, whom I found in the car, is his thief
or a frozen homeless person!

In reality, it is important to understand that the syllogism proceeds from a logic of

the exhibition and deduction. To take up the example, it is certain that the most complex
is to know whether Alfred stole rather than to give the formula 'If Alfred stole, then…'. The
The syllogism simply shows that if we accept these premises, then we must admit
this conclusion, while of course observing laws and rules of operation, as
we have seen it. However, the formatting of the syllogism already offers a research avenue
in the order of discovery. Indeed, Aristotle had noticed that the middle term of the
Syllogism allows us to express the cause and since science seeks to know through the
Because, it could be a wise instrument. We explained it at length.

Let's take a look at what we said: we can wonder about the

the precious character of an object and we will say that it is because it is made of gold and, in this way,
we have designated its material cause. The syllogism highlights it and easily shows that
the medium term is the cause:

Everything that is gold is precious (A)

This vase is made of gold.

So this vase is precious (A)

One can of course recall the other three causes: efficient - it is painted by Picasso,
formal – it is the perfect expression of the cubist style, and final – it was destined for a
world's fair

Thus, our life is a succession of latent syllogisms, one could say. When
We say 'it’s going to rain, the pressure is dropping', we make a syllogism: 'all
a decrease in pressure leads to rain, this moment involves a decrease, so…
measure therefore the natural character of these propositions and the way in which we abbreviate them, all
also naturally. But then, why spend such time studying the
syllogisms? In reality, it is mainly because they easily allow for paralogisms, in
perturbing the validity, and fallacies, by introducing a false premise.

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 Finally, a syllogism can also be presented in an extended manner, by developing the
reasons that allow to advance the different premises. The Ancients called this process
an "epichereme", because each premise was presented "on the hand" ("epi-cheir").
This is the case of the famous Pro Milone by Cicero where his main point is: "Every man attacked

"treacherously by his kind can kill him innocently." However, Cicero proves this.
major by a triple appeal to natural law, written law, and universal law. Then, he establishes
that "Milo was treacherously attacked by Clodius." He then continues with a presentation of
facts and paint the portrait of Clodius. Then, suddenly, he drops his conclusion: "Therefore
Milon is innocent.

Let's finish with one last example: the polysyllogism, of which a beautiful example can be found in

Montaigne: "This river makes noise, but what makes noise stirs, but what stirs
is not frozen, but what is not frozen is liquid, but what is liquid bends under the weight,
but what bends under the weight cannot carry me, so this river cannot carry me.

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 SECOND PART: ORATORICAL ARGUMENTATION

Logic, as we saw in the first part, is the study of validity of

reasonings and this validity is due to their mere form (not to their content). There exists
however, many arguments whose form is not sufficient to establish validity and which it
It is also necessary to examine the content. We had said that they actually have a broader scope.
"affective", plus "oratory".

It is now important to focus on the manifestations of the art of persuasion.

the field of application of this art is very large. First of all, our civilization is not
only scientific and technical: it is also a consumer civilization.
advertising and propaganda play a crucial role and it must be acknowledged that the arguments
rhetorics are common practice and used by all those who must deliberate (politicians,
the jurists, the literary scholars, the philosophers). We had a fine example of it in the speech of
President and with figures of style.

We will proceed, in this new section, in five points.

First of all, we will show (briefly) that a conversation partner must be

in order to clarify the details of the discussion. We will mainly address the concepts of
"definition", "comparison", "allegory" and "analogy", because they are the most
subject to confusion. Then, we will discuss the issue of establishing a fact.
and the search for causes and consequences. The theoretical foundations of our first
part will allow us to go faster, since we will find the concepts of
deduction and induction. Then, we will continue with a study on value judgments
where the notion of 'place' will be decisive. Finally, we will conclude with two final chapters
dedicated to the arguments aimed, on the one hand, at establishing a thesis and, on the other hand, at refuting a

thesis.

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The accuracy of the discussion data

6.1 Generalities

Any discussion must begin by specifying its data. We will see in this
Chapter the main techniques for defining, distinguishing or comparing.

One way to clarify a concept is to analyze its understanding and its

extension. The definition is the analysis of the understanding of a term, while the division
is the analysis of its extension. These techniques of definition and division are strictly
logical and have precise rules.

A second way to clarify a concept is to dissociate or reconcile the

opposite parts a concept.
it has a negative aspect and a positive aspect. Dialectics, on the other hand, unites the thesis and
the antithesis into a higher synthesis. These techniques of dichotomy and dialectic are not
more strictly logical. They are based on a philosophical analysis of things that
initially distinguish between what is apparent and what is real.

Finally, a third way to clarify a concept is to compare it with others.

Notions. Comparison is a relationship of resemblance (which can extend into allegory),
analogy is a resemblance of relationships. These techniques do not always have a great
formal rigor, especially when they are used to establish similarities between
different domains (such as spirit and matter). However, they can be used
to establish similarities within the same field or between related fields.
In this case, they can acquire heuristic or even explanatory value.

It is this third way that we will mainly observe. We will give

first some "rules of definition", but we will focus our attention on the notions of
"comparison" and "analogy" that it is important to learn to distinguish.

6.2 The rules of definition

For the record, it is important that the definition applies to everything defined and nothing but the defined.

and, furthermore, that the term or thing to be defined does not reappear in the definition. One gives
generally two important rules.

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 The first wants the definition to apply to the whole defined and nothing but the defined. We
we have seen that, in the logic of unanalyzed propositions, the definition is formulated as
form of equivalence and not of implication. Indeed, in an equivalence, by posing
the antecedent is the consequent, and vice versa.

The second rule states that the term or thing to be defined must not appear in the definition.

definition, at the risk of creating a vicious circle. Saying that 'color is the quality of this
"who is colored" is evidently a vicious circle. It should be noted that the primary terms
(or "categories") are indefinable and are always presupposed in their definition. By
For example, the term "being" (or "substance") cannot be defined without referring to itself:
"being is ..."

To understand this, let us recall that Aristotle intends to consider beings that are by
themselves, the substances, and beings that exist only through something else, the accidents. If
we say that 'this table is red and small', in a sequence where we attribute to the Subject
the table has two predicates 'red' and 'small', it appears that if the table does exist by itself-
However, this is not the case for the quality 'red' and the quantity 'small'. With this
double partition, that of the substance and its accidents, he intends to read the world around him
and undertakes to identify nine accidents of the substance, in order to develop these
« catégories » qui regroupent donc les deux notions.

With these categories ('katagorein' - 'to accuse', 'to make stand up in public'), Aristotle
can then inform the given of everyday life, with primary concepts of thought.

Let's take an example: I observed that Franck is 'man', but I am doing better
to apprehend it based on the categories grid (the most complete list of categories
is given in the Categories, IV of Aristotle) that will allow me to describe it.

As a reminder, substance is the fundamental category: what a thing is; then

comes what happens to the substance, its events.

Substance ("ousia"): Franck: he is a man.

Quality (‘poion’ - ‘what’): he is a pianist, young and virtuous.

Quantity ('poson' - 'how many'): of medium size and aged 32 years.

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 Relation ("in relation to" - "relative to what"): I am by his side and he is smaller.
than me.

Place ("where" - "where"): in Salon-de-Provence where the concert is held.

Time ("friend" - "when"): in August, as evening fell.

Position or situation ("ekhein" - "to be in a state"): he is in a sitting state.

State or possession ('keisthai' - 'to be in a posture'): he is in summer attire and not in

stage outfit where he is dressed (he is not naked).

Action ("poiein" - "to do"): he plays Schubert on his piano.

Passion ('paskhein' - 'to endure'): he is excited by his game and inspired by the
music.

Finally, beyond its categories, there is the Good, the One, and the True which are concepts.
transcategorial, transcending categories and applying to everything16.

6.3 The comparison and the allegory

Comparison is a relationship of resemblance: it involves bringing together two

notions to explain the properties of one by the properties of the other. It can be
established within the same domain: 'The crime is the same to steal from the State or to do
opulence contrary to the public good."; or between two neighboring areas: "Electricity
resembles a fluid." But the comparison is often used to relate
two different domains, such as, for example, the spiritual and the material. Usually, we
explain the spiritual through the material: "The spirit is like the light that illuminates the
objects."; more rarely, we explain the concrete by the abstract: "The moon, cold as a
doubt," writes J. Laforgue.

16
A note for theology students: Christian theology will take up the category of
"relation" which is a category of accident and will be applied to the substance. It is the relation "being the son of" that
will therefore define the subject. What audacity.

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 The comparison has its rules, here are the three main ones.

The comparison must be fair. One cannot say: 'Her hand was cold as
the one of a snake." However, it is noted that any comparison is
problematic because it is never true except in one respect (hence the saying:
Comparison is not reason.

The comparison must be followed, otherwise we expose ourselves to inconsistency: "The chariot of

"The state is sailing on a volcano" does not follow the theme. It is thus noted that it is
it is always possible to ruin a comparison by pursuing it to the moment
where it becomes ridiculous: "This speech is as clear as water... but just as
nourishing it!

The comparison must finally be clear: it should not explain the obscure by the
more obscure. It is also dangerous to resort to overly scientific notions.
or too philosophical as terms of comparison. For example, it is not
very enlightening to declare: "This union resembles that of matter and
form." This is what Sokal and Bricmont notably observed when they denounced
the 'intellectual impostures'...

As for the allegory, it can be said that it is an extended comparison. In fact, in a

allegory develops a discourse that refers, term for term, to another discourse. By
For example, the riddle of the Sphinx, in the myth of Oedipus, is an allegory: what is the animal that
In the morning, walks on all fours, at noon on two legs, in the evening on three legs? We compare.
from moment to moment the times of the day and those of a man's life (childhood, maturity,
old age). Like the comparison, the allegory must be just, consistent, and clear. Furthermore, it
must remain natural, meaning it should not veer into the artificial. For example, one
one can compare a city to the human body by talking about the lungs of the city (the spaces)
veins), its arteries (or circulation paths), its nerve center (the PTT), its voice (the
radio), from its bowels (the markets), etc. But we would end up falling into the artificial and in the
ridicule if one sought an allegory related to nails, hair, etc.

A small remark, regarding the allegory. The Church Fathers emphasized very early on
a "way" of reading the Scripture, aiming to extract multiple meanings.

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 I: The meaning of the letter or historical meaning, then its diffraction into three spiritual meanings.

I.1: the allegorical and dogmatic sense seeks in Scripture what one must believe;
It is related to the virtue of faith and the transcendental of the true. It is the time of the Incarnation.
historical and eventful, with its extensions in the community of believers.

I.2: the tropological or moral sense seeks what one must do; it is linked to the
virtue of charity and the transcendental of good. It is the time of inner incarnation
appropriate and thus of spiritual emergence.

I.3 : the anagogical or mystical sense seeks the eschatological place towards which one must go
regarding; in relation to the virtue of hope, it relates to the one as transcendental or to the
beautiful if there is one. It is the time of eschatology and fulfillment.

6.4 The analogy

Analogy is a resemblance of relationships and not simply a relationship of

resemblance like comparison. The analogy establishes a sort of equality between
proportions (etymologically 'analogy' also means 'proportion'). It can thus
to be in four terms: A/B = C/D. As in this example: "The eye is to vision as
"The mind is to knowledge"; or in three terms: A/B = B/C. As in this well-known phrase.
known: "As my father has loved me, so have I loved you."

Analogy can be used within the same domain. For example, in

In biology, we compare the arm of a man, the wing of a bat, and the fin of a dolphin.
to highlight divergent adaptations of the same anatomical structure.
Conversely, we can highlight convergent adaptations of structures.
different anatomical structures, establishing a relationship between the insect's wing, the bird's wing and
the wing of the bat.

The analogy can also be used between different fields, and the most
often, moreover, between the material domain and the spiritual domain. Kant describes, for example,
Plato's philosophy as follows: "The light dove, when in its freedom
she cuts through the air of which she feels the resistance, could imagine that she would succeed much better
still in the void. This is how Plato left the sensible world because this world

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opposed to understanding too many diverse obstacles, and ventured beyond this world, on the wings
ideas, in the void of pure understanding.

Les règles de l’analogie sont les mêmes que celles de la comparaison: elle doit être
just, followed and clear. It will also be noted that, following Freud, psychoanalysis resumes
the study of metaphors and allegories to uncover, beneath the clear discourse of the patient, a
hidden discourse referring to the conflicts of the unconscious.

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7 The facts, the causes, the consequences

7.1 Generalities

In ordinary discussion, or in science, facts are involved. These pose

several questions: it is necessary to establish the facts, to trace their causes or to seek to
draw the consequences. Hence our three points.

The prediction of facts is a delicate thing to implement. Not all facts can
not established scientifically, through repeated experimentation (notably in a laboratory),
given that we are mostly dealing with unique facts. We can even argue that
the vast majority of the facts are known by foreign entities (accounts, files,
The establishment of these facts therefore requires a broad critique of the testimony.
du terme. De plus, on remarquera que, dans la discussion, on se contente le plus souvent
of indications or presumptions, that is to say of likely facts, accepted until proof of
on the contrary, which raises the question of who bears the burden of proof.
In this first point on 'Establishing the Facts', we will therefore study three notions:
the experimental fact, then the fact reported by testimony and, finally, the clues and the
presumptions.

Once the facts are established, the discussion shifts to searching for their cause. For
To find a cause, one must proceed inductively, that is to say, starting from the consequences.
current efforts to try to find its origin in the past. There is an "inductive research of
the cause." Science has developed certain rules to find the invariant antecedent of a
group of phenomena. But ordinary discussion involves broader causes than
science: it talks about efficient, formal, material, and final causes. Well-known concepts,
but we will briefly recall. The search for the cause is not easy and it falls
often in sophisms that it is good to list. In the second point on
The inductive search for the cause, we studied three other notions: induction.
amplifier, the causes according to Aristotle and the fallacies of causal induction.

The discussion also tries to foresee the consequences of a decision, the effects
of a cause in the future. Causal deduction has a very precise status in science, where it
relies on the logic of hypothetical conditional reasoning. We have seen their
logical functioning. But everyday discussion anticipates the future with means

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much less rigorous... Indeed, most of the arguments sometimes focus on efficiency
(it's the pragmatic spirit), sometimes on the purpose (it's the idealistic spirit). This results in
uncertainties and even sophisms that are worth examining. In the third point
On 'The deduction of the consequences of a fact', we studied three new notions:
the hypothetical deduction, arguments based on efficiency or purpose and, ultimately,
the fallacies of causal deduction.

7.2 The establishment of facts

7.2.1 The experimental fact

An experimental fact is a fact established within the framework of an experiment and which is in

indefinitely repeatable principle. Thus, if scientists claim to have discovered the virus
of an illness, they must communicate the protocol of their experiment to others
laboratories that must find the same results. The case of human cloning announcements
is, on this point, very interesting.

P. Bacon distinguished three stages in experimental reasoning.

1: we must gather various facts by simply noting them. This is the step of
independent observation, of the compilation.

We must seek to establish relationships between these facts. This is the step of
theoretical imagination, of the hypothesis.

Finally, we must return to the facts to confirm or refute the hypothesis. It is

the verification stage.

It should be noted, however, that between the collected facts and the verified facts lies
the hypothesis, or the guiding idea. This plays, in a way, the role of a medium term in
experimental reasoning. Claude Bernard stated that the fact calls for the idea and that
The idea calls for the fact. The experimental method is therefore both inductive (the fact calls for
the idea) and deductive (the idea calls for the fact). This means that a fact always appears against the background
of this 'framework of understanding' that is the hypothesis. Of course, relative to the discourse

scientific, one can wonder if there are still, even now, some
“cursed facts” that science intends to eliminate a priori, because they do not fit

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in its explanatory framework (for example, UFOs). It should be noted on this point the hypothesis
from the 'synchronicity' developed by Jung and Pauli, to reflect on the link between
contingency and necessity!

7.2.2 The facts reported by testimony

However, most facts do not lend themselves to scientific experimentation for the
a good reason that they are unique. They can only be known by testimony, on report
from a foreign instance. Certain disciplines such as law regulate the evidence of
facts (for example, a debt can only be established based on a writ, since the
oral testimony is excluded in this case). One is sometimes surprised by the conventional nature of the
evidence in law (which for example refuses to examine certain facts after a certain time when it
and 'prescription').

Historical criticism studies more broadly the question of testimony and raises various
questions. She first inquires about the nature of testimony and distinguishes oral testimony.
you write, either the direct or indirect testimony, or the testimony of an actor or a spectator.
By combining these different traits, we define various types of testimony. For example,
the confession comes from a direct, oral witness and actor. Then, it raises the question of the
competence of the witness. Certain rules are issued by combining the notions of quantity and
of quality.

It is thus established that, from the point of view of quantity, the testimony of a single person is

often subject to caution according to the old legal adage: 'One witness, no witness.'
Yet, a single witness can be a good witness. Furthermore, the absence of testimony does not prove
not necessarily the absence of a fact. One must thus be wary of the 'sophism of silence' and
to know that a witness may have very good (or bad) reasons to remain silent (question of
professional secrecy, fear of implicating a third party, etc). Thus, the events
Important historical events are sometimes trivial in the eyes of contemporaries (for example, the
the birth of Christianity). Moreover, the customs seem so obvious that they
are not mentioned (education in antiquity). From the perspective of quality, it is asked
to be direct, independent, disinterested, a good observer and intelligent. The law
eliminate accordingly witnesses of questionable morality, subject to professional secrecy, or
having close relationships with the person involved. Finally, from the point of view of the

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quantity and quality: the agreement of several serious and independent testimonies
constitutes solid evidence.

7.2.3 The indices and the presumptions

In addition to evidence by testimony, there is also the interpretation of certain clues or

the appeal to presumptions. The clues are material traces that need to be interpreted. They
are often misleading and that is why, in trials, there is often an appeal
to scientific experts (who rely on ballistics, pharmacology, medicine and
even in graphology). However, this appeal to science does not exclude certain errors.
judicial!

Presumptions are data that are accepted 'until proven otherwise.'

because they show an obvious character or at least a highly probable one.
Since we accept certain data without discussion, a particular question must be raised here.
posed: who bears the burden of proof 'onus probandi'? This question has an origin
legal. It is actually the accuser (or the claimant) who must establish the prevention (or the
request), and not the one who defends himself. The latter is presumed innocent until proven otherwise.
on the contrary. Thus, if someone is accused of being at the scene of the crime, it is necessary to provide proof.

of what we advance. It is not the accused who must start by establishing his absence (to
provide an alibi).

7.3 The inductive research of the cause

7.3.1 The amplifying induction

After establishing a fact, one seeks its cause. In science, the concept of cause is
rather limited: it is about finding the constant antecedent of a set of phenomena. In
In other words, the causal relationship is expressed by an implication P. Q. But, the
The problem is how to find P starting from Q? J.-S. Mill stated the four
following rules to find the cause.

The rule of concordance: the common circumstance of several cases of a

the phenomenon is the cause of this phenomenon. For example: among all the sounds that
we can hear (sound of bell, violin, drum, human voice,

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 )... what is common? Answer: the vibration of air. We can therefore conclude
that this vibration is the cause of the phenomenon.

The rule of difference: the unique circumstance by which two cases of the same
the phenomenon is different is the cause of this phenomenon. To check if the sound is
related to the vibration of air, it is shown that a tuning fork does not produce sound if it vibrates

in the void. It is a confirmation of the previous rule.

The rule of concomitant variations: when two phenomena vary in

in a symmetrical manner, we can conclude a cause and effect relationship between them. By
for example: we increase the vibration of the air and we observe that the sound intensifies;
Conversely, we reduce the vibration of the air and notice that the sound diminishes.

The rule of residues: if the influence of all known causes leaves a residue,
this residue comes from a cause still unknown. Some aspects of the sound (like
the timbre) can be attributed to the material (copper, wood, etc.). Moreover, one cannot
never exclude that another cause may account for the same phenomena.

7.3.2 The Four Causes

We can be more brief on this point that we have already addressed in our
considerations on the syllogism. As a reminder, Aristotle, referring to the manufacturing activity (the
The term "poiein" distinguished four causes: a potter (efficient cause) who imprints a model.
(formal cause) in clay (material cause), with the aim of providing a container (cause
finale). This "poietic" model has then been extended to other human actions and
notably in the 'praxis'. Thus, we distinguish the four causes.

The efficient cause, that is to say the one responsible for an action, is what produces.
directly or indirectly a set of facts. It is the one that is at the principle of the action.
and who the command. It is sometimes useful to distinguish between the main agent and secondary agents
(the performers).

The formal cause is what explains an action, its "why." Every act has
either an intellectual motive (a well-defined intention), or a sensitive motive (a tendency)
like interest or hatred). The formal cause is the plan of the action, what organizes it. Thus

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two materially similar actions can differ completely by the motivation: one
can throw oneself out of the window out of despair or out of heroism.

The material cause is represented by the means employed by the agent and more
largely due to the circumstances of the action. These means are often diverse and are
revealers of the agent, as well as the goal it pursues.

The final cause aims to remind that every action is performed with the aim of obtaining a
advantage or to avoid a peril. It is permissible to separate the immediate, apparent goals from the end
deep, long-term. The final cause is the "why," that which is sought.

For literary fans, it should be noted that a police investigation spontaneously considers these
four causes. We will start by searching for the murder weapon (material cause) which is
often revealing of the agent (efficient cause). Thus an axe is revealing of a man
violent. We will also question the motive of the crime (formal cause). Did the murderer have-
Was he killed out of vengeance or for interest? The search for the motive often goes hand in hand with the

search for purpose (final cause). Was the murderer seeking money to acquire some?
drug? These causes can also be considered to study a society. One...
demandera what the leaders and the executors are. We will study the material conditions
of life that define a level of development. We will focus on the ideologies that are
acting within the society. We will then examine the goals that this society sets for itself.
(Is she trying to conquer other companies?). The theory of the four causes has experienced a beautiful
intellectual legacy, but also profound questioning. In any case, they
offer a first approach to concrete realities and a 'reading grid'.

7.3.3 The fallacies of causal induction

The search for causes is delicate and can lead to various errors. We are...
We will retain two. Either the error concerns the cause, or it concerns the causal necessity.

In the first case, the error regarding the cause consists of taking an accessory phenomenon
for the cause. Very often this error is due to the fact that one interprets a simple succession
like a causal relationship ("post hoc ergo propter hoc"). Superstitions are notably
based on this fallacy ('being thirteen at the table brings bad luck!'). This fallacy is very common
In everyday life: "It was after seeing Amélie that Alfred embraced the career.
of a comedian, so we can be sure that it was Amélie who put this idea in his head.

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it is clear that Alfred chose to become an actor for other reasons. In the same case of
figure, one can also practice the inversion of cause and effect. The Ancients, for example,
they believed that the great heat was due to the fact that the dog star was becoming bright
in August (hence the 'scorching' heat). In fact, it's the opposite: it's because it is
hot in August when the sky is more transparent and the dog star begins to shine brighter
intensely.

In the second case, that of the error on the causal necessity, a cause is transformed.
accidental into a necessary cause. For example, by stating: "It is true that Alfred has a..."
influence on Minister X and is interested in the drug problem. So, without the intervention
From Alfred, the Minister would not have made any decision in this matter." One could reply that
Alfred's influence only played a secondary role and is not a necessary cause.
(the expression 'without intervention...' is therefore exaggerated). In this case, we categorize the
case of "the error of the anecdotal" where it is true that sometimes, a triggering event is
sometimes minimal, it should not be forgotten that it only has an effect against a background of more conditions

general.

7.4 The deduction of the consequences of a fact

7.4.1 The hypothetical deduction

After the discovery of a cause by induction (which moves from Q to P), science becomes
return to try to deduce the consequences of this cause (posed as an hypothesis):
"If P then Q1, Q2, Q3, etc." As we have seen in logic, a hypothesis
scientific is never fully confirmed by the verification of accuracy of
consequences (it is only so until proven otherwise), but it is refuted by the
falsity of a single consequence. That is why it is requested that a hypothesis explains
all known facts and be contradicted by none. This is a simple application of the rules
conditional reasoning. It should be noted, however, that a disproven hypothesis can
always be corrected. In this sense, some say that there is no 'crucial experience' (in the
sense of Bacon). In other words, an isolated piece of information can always be overcome by the
revised theory that advances entirely toward the encounter with facts.

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7.4.2 The arguments focusing on efficiency or purpose

In everyday life, and especially in political deliberation, it is

difficult to predict the consequences of a decision. Two types of considerations come into play very
often in competition: efficiency and purpose. To illustrate this "polarity", let us start from
three very simple questions and let's observe, for each one, two arguments, then let's see on
What role do they play.

Should we start an action?

The pragmatic argument justifies the decision by emphasizing its immediate benefits.
For example: "This highway needs to be built because it will provide labor."
to the unemployed.

The argument of the order corrects the previous argument by wondering whether there is no
Best decision to make: "The construction of the highway will destroy the environment. It
It would be better to dedicate the money planned for developing the forest.

Should we continue an action?

The argument against waste emphasizes that action has already been taken: "We have done
plans, we have surveyed the ground, the infrastructures are ready to be built, all of this will
Is it lost?

The argument of direction asks to know exactly where we are going: one must not
putting one's finger in the gear, we must be careful of unnecessary escalation. Thus: "The usefulness
Will the short-term benefits of this highway not prove to be a long-term nuisance?

Should we stop an action?

The argument for surpassing insists that we continue an action as long as there is
a way to derive effects from it: "Let’s continue the highway, its economic interest will eventually pay off.

to reveal itself.

The argument insists on the fact that it is better to cut losses.

that of making an irreparable mistake: 'One must know when to stop, this highway is'
of no recognized utility.

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 In fact, the first series of arguments focuses on effectiveness. The strength of this position
does she move things, her weakness is that she is not always well oriented and
that she is not concerned about the purity of the means. The second series of arguments plays on the
goal. The strength of this position is that it provides for the long term, but its weakness is
that it risks being too scrupulous, particularly regarding the means to be used, and thus lead to
inaction. In fact, these two series of arguments are typically rhetorical. The weakness of
One is the strength of the other and vice versa. They are two different 'spirits' as has been
shown by Max Weber in The Scholar and the Politician.

7.4.3 The fallacies of causal deduction

We can draw up here a list of the main errors in forecasting the future, based on
on two attitudes of the mind.

First of all, it is dangerous to believe that facts tend to repeat themselves.

The sophism from particular to particular consists in deducing a fact from another fact:
In Russia, the revolution began with a revolt of sailors. So to win our
revolution, we must start by shaking this army.

The general-to-specific sophism consists of deducing a precise fact from a

general trend. "The Chinese have never made a conquest. So they will not come out of
their country to attack another country.

These two sophisms more broadly raise the question of whether we can draw from
lessons of history. Some will claim that history only stutters without ever
to repeat. It is undoubtedly exaggerated. But it must be acknowledged that prediction in history is
of a probabilistic nature and is subject to denials.

Moreover, it is also dangerous to assume that a cause is always constant.

in its effects.

The sophism of the accident consists in saying that a cause must always produce its
effects, while this cause may, by accident, be absent: "This doctor heals
usually this kind of illness, so he will heal your patient.

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 The sophism of usage, on the contrary, consists in arguing from a defect against the
essential value of a cause: "One should not trust this doctor, because he failed his last
operation.

These two sophisms are linked. On one hand, it would be unfair to start from a flaw.
exceptional for arguing against a cause that is usually effective. But conversely, it
the exception should not become the rule: if a cause no longer keeps its promises, one should not
can keep it indefinitely.

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8 Value judgments

8.1 Generalities

Discussions introduce, in addition to notions and facts, value judgments.

It is claimed that one thing is better than another thing and is therefore preferable.
The realm of values seems very subjective. "One does not discuss tastes and colors,"
says the popular saying. And yet political discourse or advertising discourse
constantly seek to encourage people to make "the right choice". It is therefore interesting to.
to reflect on the 'places of the preferable'. Note that we use this term 'place' in a
narrow sense. For the ancients, a 'place of discourse' was any argument. It concerns
from a metonymy: the container (the store of arguments) has eventually come to designate the content

(the argument itself). As for us, we use the term "place" only to designate
the arguments for the preferable, that is to say the arguments used to highlight such
reality.

These places are 'intrinsic' or 'extrinsic'. Hence our two points.

In the first case, they rely on the very properties of reality to be put into
value. We will first study, in general, how we can take advantage of the existence or
of the essence of a reality, of its efficiency or its purpose, of its quantitative aspects or
qualitative. We will then see how to 'apply' these places, either in a series or in a mix.
mix, be related. This last use of the places will lead us to a more
technique (susceptible to being mathematized), namely that of "optimum".

In the second case, if the preferable places are extrinsic, one resorts to a or
several authorities (in a broad sense), that is to say, one or more foreign entities.
The argument "by example" relies on the quantity of foreign instances invoked,
The argument 'by the model' plays on their quality, the argument 'by authority' (in a sense
) plays on their skill. The argument of 'authority' (in a broad sense) is undoubtedly the
weaker in terms of the arguments, when it comes to an open discussion. This argument
It is however sometimes regulated (as in law). We will observe them in detail.

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8.2 The intrinsic places of the preferable

8.2.1 Some commonplaces

The intrinsic places of the preferable can first be examined in a manner

community. It is about seeing how, in general, certain aspects of reality are valued.

[Link] Place of existence (which encompasses time)

Force: what exists (currently or for a long time) has the privilege of existing and
disqualify the probable, the simply possible. We value a piece of data by emphasizing that it
is durable or that it is the only one available on the market.

Weakness: to devalue the existence of a piece of data, one shows that what exists...
is not the best there is. The ideal prevails over the fact.

[Link] Location of the essence

Force: what best embodies the definition of a thing is presented as

superior. Such a reality is the perfect representative of such a reality, it is the product by
excellence.

Weakness: to devalue an essence, one shows that it is only ideal.

beautiful, but it's not real or it's inaccessible.

[Link] Place of the efficient cause

Force: what produces something is real. What acts effectively acquires.

Prestige is judged by its tangible effects.

Weakness: to devalue the efficient cause, one uses the purpose. Such action
use any means, she has only one immediate goal.

[Link] Place of the final cause

Force: the end justifies the means. An action that aligns with its end achieves its
perfection and a finalized product is adapted to demand.

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 Weakness: to devalue a final cause, one shows that it is ineffective.
The purity of ends is often the characteristic of the dreamer.

[Link] Place of quantity

Force: the whole is worth more than the part, the great number prevails over the small
name, the universal is more important than the particular.

Weakness: quantity can come at the expense of quality. Large numbers.

they generate the mechanical, the stereotypical.

[Link] Place of Quality

Force: we value the precious, the unique, the original, the distinguished, the finesse. We oppose
the elite to the large number.

Weakness: the search for originality can be done at the expense of the universal and
one falls into preciousness, selectivity, snobbery.

8.2.2 Application of Places

In this section, we will study two types of use. First, the use 'in
series," then the use "in a jumble." The use of places in "relation" is the subject
of a particular treatment, under the notion of 'optimum'.

In the case of series use, we notice that the places can cancel each other out or be
to strengthen. The strength of one is the weakness of the other and vice versa. It is noted
also that existence goes hand in hand with efficiency and quantity, while essence goes with
pair quality and purpose. Hence the idea of using the places in a series opposed to each other:

Existence Efficient Cause Quantity

Final cause essence Quality

The classic spirit, for example, chooses the first series. In the prefaces of its
plays, Racine explains that he chose an ancient subject that has proven itself to
to move the spectator and it will highlight the exemplary value of the staged situations.
The romantic spirit, on the contrary, chooses the second series. Victor Hugo chooses a subject.

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new work featuring an exceptional hero, Hernani, whose remarkable actions are praised.
Thus, the classical spirit loves order, measure, the universal (at the risk of becoming boring).
The romantic spirit loves surprise, the unattainable, the singular (at the risk of falling into the
preciosity.

In the case of using them in a jumble, all places can also be used to
Highlight the different aspects of a reality. For example, this description
Tourist information about a church: "Along the river stands the village church, dating back to the 11th century.e

century. It is a perfect representative of the German Romanesque style, with two apses and a
central lantern. Built by the lord of the place for the peasants, the Church has not however
the radiance of an abbey is known. But the delicacy of the sculptures on the porch is astonishing and
the copper baptismal font is unique. One will admire the imposing number of columns and the
frescoes that cover the choir." It is noteworthy here that the places, in this description, sometimes
strengthen, sometimes compensate, sometimes juxtapose. The ancient existence of the Church is
reinforced by the fact that it represents the essence of Romanesque art; the little efficiency of the
The building from a historical perspective is compensated by its popular purpose; the quantity
intervenes for the number of columns and the large surface areas of paint, while the
quality is present in the finesse of the sculptures or the unique character of the tank
baptismal. Let's note it: by analyzing the descriptions of a tourist guide, we end up
often by identifying its implicit 'ideology'. For example, Michelin values everything that is
old, historical, recognized by all: it is a classic spirit.

8.2.3 The optimum

The use of places "in relation" leads to a more technical appreciation of the
values. Here we discover a new concept, that of 'optimum'. The optimum is neither the
perfection is not the greatest nor the most accessible quality, it is the best balance between
essence/existence, purpose/effectiveness, quality/quantity. The most illustrative example is the report
quality/price highlighted in consumer magazines. If we want to buy a
"Compact Disc player" we will not take the "Rolls" of players (the highest quality at
grand prize), nor the "2CV" of the readers (the smallest quality at the lowest price), because the
Master choice is the best value for money (the highest possible quality at the price)
lower). It should be noted that the notion of optimum is relative to the project of
consumer and that it can give rise to very complex mathematical estimates
in various fields of science. It is frequently used by engineers who need to

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solve "to the best" material resistance problems, production and
distribution d’énergie.

8.3 The extrinsic places of the preferable

8.3.1 Arguments by example

The role of the example is to establish the value of a product or a rule of conduct by
citing a large number of people who use this product or follow this rule.
The argument by example relies on the quantity of external instances that are in favor of
such or such thing. Its strength is psychological, insofar as one feels reassured if much
of people make the same choice. But its weakness is however twofold. On one hand, this is not
Just because multiple people make such a choice does not mean it is the best (the quantity is not the factor).

quality). On the other hand, the argument by example often chooses a few examples
significant, but it dismisses counter-examples. In this case, the argument is merely a pretext.
of induction that generalizes too quickly (the quantity itself is at fault).

Thus, if someone states: "I am taking such action, since Pierre, Paul, and Jean are doing it.
"also," it can be replied that it is not because a large number of people
One should not confuse what is such an action as this with what is commendable.
normal and what is normative. For example, if an advertisement for evening classes states:
In our school, Pierre studied economics and he became the director of his company.
Paul took language courses and was able to enter the administration; Jean undertook a
recycling in computer science and he has obtained a higher degree," one can still request a
more accurate statistics on the number of students and the number of social successes.

It should be noted that, sometimes, the argument by example draws no conclusion and leaves this
care for the reader. This is the case in certain advertisements. It will also be observed that surveys
Opinion are arguments by example. Based on a survey of people
forming a representative sample, we manage to predict the outcome of a vote or to establish
the popularity rating of a politician or to gather a general sentiment about a
However, one must remain critical of these surveys that can be manipulated.
(one can "infer" the answer from the questions) or that are only valid for a short time
period (there are changes in opinion).

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8.3.2 Arguments by the model or the anti-model

The role of the argument by model is to invite imitation of an action. This time we play
on the quality of the external instance that recommends a product or an action. Its strength is
psychologique, dans la mesure où un individu commence à se connaître en s’identifiant à un
model. We are playing here on a need for 'models' (of 'pattern' or a template to follow) and
Each era brings one or more types of heroes indicating what the values are.
Imitator. The ancient conqueror is the model of courage and greatness. The knight.
Christian is the model of honor and the defense of the weak. The explorer of the
the Renaissance is the model of the spirit of boldness and broad views. The encyclopedist is the
model of a conscience in love with progress and tolerance. The modern revolutionary is the
model of the pursuit of justice.

But the argument by the model does have certain weaknesses. The first
comes from the fact that certain actions are inimitable because they depend on circumstances
special. One cannot always follow a hero in each of their exploits. The reply
the following is the illustration. A father says to his son: 'At your age, Napoleon was first.'
from your class!" and the son replies to his father: "At your age, he was an emperor!" The second
comes from the fact that we more often imitate the faults of a great man than his qualities. Thus,
instead of invoking a model to encourage the imitation of a virtue, one can introduce an anti-model
to encourage avoiding a vice. The Spartans would intoxicate a slave to show the
consequences of drinking (the drunk illiterate). This is how films are made to show the
harmful effects of drugs or that we conduct advertising campaigns showing the
consequences of an accident without a seatbelt. It should also be noted that the argument by the
ridicule is a variant of the argument by the anti-model. The action of the anti-model is
often more effective than that of the model, at least in the short term.

8.3.3 The arguments of authority and by sacrifice

The appeal to authority (in the narrow sense) aims to strengthen a value by relying on
the competence of the instance that reports it. The invoked authorities are highly variable: sometimes
we resort to unanimous opinion or common opinion; sometimes we use certain categories
of men (scholars, philosophers, etc.); sometimes the authority is impersonal (the
physics, religion); sometimes authority is named (Heidegger, Einstein). The call to the
competence makes the authority argument stronger than other arguments by example or

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by the model. If we invoke Eddy Merckx to sell a Hom brief, it's a simple
model, but if we invoke the same cyclist to sell a bike, then it’s a call
to his authority.

However, the argument from authority remains an extrinsic argument and there is always
ways to shake it. Three means can be used. First, it is shown that
various authorities oppose: if a Nobel Prize winner makes such a statement, there is always a
another Nobel Prize to say the opposite. Then, we oppose an established fact to authority by saying
like the English: 'A fact is worth more than a Lord Mayor.' Finally, we turn to the truth.
against authority: "I am a friend of Plato, but even more so of the truth!" These remarks
also applies to discussions where scientific experts are called upon. To overcome
this defect, the law requires that the debate be contradictory. One can always appeal to a
counter-expert to discuss the conclusions of a first expert. The same rule should
intervene in discussions in the press or on television.

The argument by sacrifice is a variant of the authority argument: 'I only believe that
the stories where witnesses are slaughtered," declares Pascal. This place has an emotional strength.
very large. In the praise or defense of a person, sacrifices are often mentioned.
consent is implied by this. The principle is tacitly invoked: a person's virtue is measured by the
obstacles he had to face. However, this argument remains very weak, as the main causes are
Detestable people always find supporters and they even inspire devotion.
astounding.

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9 The arguments aimed at establishing a thesis

9.1 Generalities

After viewing, in the first three parts, the data of the discussion (the
notions, facts and values), we address the arguments aimed at establishing or refuting
a thesis. Insofar as ancient rhetoric advised to seek to prove
We will first examine his position at length before briefly refuting that of his opponent.
order in these last two parts.

This part - dedicated to a reflection on what it means to 'establish a thesis' -

first examine the arguments based on the nature of the terms, then on the
properties of relations and, finally, on proportions. Within each of these three
divisions, two main groups of arguments emerge.

The first group (going up to arguments based on symmetry) exploits the

"rule of justice" that demands to treat "the same in the same way" and "the other in a
another way." The whole thing is obviously to see how we initially establish the "same"
and "the other." We sometimes start from a definition, sometimes from a division, sometimes from a dichotomy,

sometimes of a reflexivity or of a symmetry. However, we will emphasize the fact that these
arguments are continuously at risk of being used against each other. Our goal is not to
to lead to skepticism, but to show that these arguments are not strictly
conclusions based solely on their form.

A second group of arguments (based on transitiveness arguments) tries

to extend an acquired property for a term or for a set of terms to new ones
terms. This is an 'expansion rule' that influences either transitive relations or
of hierarchies (or proportions), either on analogies or on the transition from parts to the whole
(a formal induction). Here again we will emphasize that the processes used are not
rigorously conclusive. Despite a seemingly mathematical form of argumentation, the
The subjects addressed must be taken into consideration and remain open to discussion. Hence the nature
rhetoric of all these arguments.

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9.2 Arguments based on the nature of the terms

9.2.1 Definition-based arguments

The definition consists of isolating a species by indicating its closest genus and its
specific difference. According to the rule of justice, what is universally applicable to
genre is applicable to the species, but the species also has properties that set it apart from the
other species.

The argument by the genus thus consists of distributing the properties of the genus to the species.

For example: "Man is a rational animal, but as an animal he remains subject to

various biological necessities such as eating, drinking, sleeping, aging.

The argument by species consists, on the contrary, of setting apart the species defined by
in relation to other species. For example: 'Man is not like other animals.
without reason, he produces through his intelligence what birth has not conferred upon him,
clothing, housing, weapons. This is how its industry makes it leave the realm of the
nature for that of culture.

The arguments by gender and by species can obviously be combined to

underline, at the same time, what is common and different in a given species compared to others
species. For example: "Law is a rule of social action prescribed by the State. As a
action rule, law can be the subject of a general sociological analysis. But as for
Determined by the State, the law presents specific mechanisms that pertain to a study.
specifically legal.

It should be noted that the argument by gender is generally used less than
the argument by species because it tends to overlook differences. This is particularly the case
of a comparison between man and animal that would emphasize too exclusively the aspects
common. Certainly, essays like those of D. Morris The Naked Ape or The Human Zoo attempt
to show - not without humor - that human behavior remains consistently that of
of an animal. But one can always argue that there is assimilation of species within the
The argument by species, on the other hand, is very often used because it has the advantage of
highlight the exclusive property of a thing. Thus: 'You will not find the soap
Jumping in all the stores: we only entrust it to specially trained salespeople.

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recognized." Here too one can object that a soap must remain a soap and that the fact
Being entrusted to a specialized seller does not necessarily make it better.

9.2.2 Division-based arguments

The division states the species of a genus. We just saw, in the previous point,
how to analyze a species based on its genus and its differences. Here, it is more about
compare the species with each other to show that they have something in common and
something different. The rule of justice then intervenes to assert, according to the
cases, equal or unequal treatments.

The argument requests that the terms that fall into the same classification
are treated equally (a pari causa). For example, one would say: "If men have the
the right to vote should also apply to women." And we will add to reinforce
The argument: "Women are indeed full citizens."

The contrary argument holds that distinct parties must be treated as

distinct and even opposite manner. For example, doctors tried to escape from a
tax audit saying: "The tax audit must not compromise medical confidentiality.
The case of medicine must therefore be treated separately.

It is noteworthy that the argument by appearances is often stronger than the argument by contradiction.

because it fights against exceptions. The one who uses a contrary argument must on their part
justify why there is an exception, which is not always easy. For example, in the case of
As mentioned earlier, the doctors were not successful, as they were responded to.
that all professions should be held accountable.

These arguments can often be used against each other. For example, at
In Rome, the law did not provide for a special provision for the inheritance of an eldest daughter.
lawyers wondered whether it was legitimate to start from the case provided for the eldest son to
it will reason by contrary, concerning the eldest daughter. To resolve such a conflict,
they had to rely on external elements such as custom, jurisprudence, the spirit of
the law, etc., but both opinions seemed equally defensible. It is true that, sometimes, the
law regulates these arguments. For example, he will say that one cannot reason the same way in this matter.

criminal. Here a tacit principle comes into play, namely that one must always interpret a
law that might severely affect a defendant. For example, if the law enumerates classes of

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persons bound by professional secrecy and that it omits a class (the firefighters of
emergency service), this class is not subject to the law. However, if the law
foresees benefits for citizens (of which it lists some examples), one could
will reason easily.

9.2.3 Dichotomy-based arguments

The dichotomy opposes contrary terms (which still retain an element

similar). According to the rule of justice, opposing terms will be treated differently (sometimes,
more rarely, we will maintain the similarity). We are studying here 'the argument by the
"contrasts" and "the argument by similarities".

The argument by opposites requires that the terms be treated in an opposing manner.
dichotomous. It's a very commonly used argument. Here are some frequent examples: 'To be
Moderation is good, since being intemperate is harmful." - "If matter leads us
in dispersion, the spirit brings us back to unity." - "If the barbarians live from day to day,
["we must consider the eternity of centuries.","If the letter kills, the spirit gives life.","If the"]
Subjective concerns separate individuals, objective worries unite them.
people.

The argument by similarities (much rarer) requires that we deal with

in a similar manner the dichotomous terms, despite their opposition. For example: "If he
It is not right to give in to anger towards those who have hurt us against their will, that one
who did good to us because he was forced to has no right to any recognition.
argument, we equate the 'benefactor' with the 'wrongdoer' because both acted with
in an "involuntary" manner.

It should be noted that we acknowledge that the arguments presented in this first
section, are very close to each other. For example, we considered as a
argument by opposites, the phrase 'If the barbarians live from day to day, we must
consider the eternity of the ages." But one could still say that the "barbarians" and the
"civilized" are two different classes of the term "population" and that the argument is from
reverse opposite. One could also consider that opposites are a kind of
the same kind, we are tacitly relying on the definition of the civilized to make an argument by
the species and highlight a specific characteristic.

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9.3 Arguments based on the properties of relations

9.3.1 Reflexivity-Based Arguments

Reflexivity is the property of certain relations that allows one to move from
the assertion that this relationship exists between A and B to the assertion that it also exists
between A and A. For example, equality is a reflexive relation (if A = B, then A = A). By
against superiority is not reflexive (if A > B, then we cannot say that A > A). It can
It may seem strange to establish a relationship of a thing with itself, but it should be noted that a
choice is only itself in a certain context. The rule of justice can therefore again
to apply oneself and claim sometimes the identity, sometimes the difference of a thing with itself,
due to its relationship with other things. These two arguments are also strong,
condition of being well justified. We will then refer to the 'identity argument' and the 'argument'
of difference.

The identity argument demands that we continue to treat a thing for itself,
whatever the circumstances. For example: "Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's." This
argument also serves to define what is suitable for a thing because of what it is:
The square peg in the square hole.
The argument of identity can finally show that one should not expect from a thing what it
is not: "What do you want? Godard will always be Godard."

The argument of difference, on the contrary, invokes the change of circumstances to

to claim that things are no longer the same: "Rome is no longer in Rome!" This
the declaration was invoked by those who, after a defeat or a complete change of
situation wanted to continue the struggle elsewhere. In any case, it is curious to note that this
argument, which invokes a very technical property of relations, is easily perceived by
the popular consciousness. To the Great King of the Persians who grimaced at the 'brew
black," the Spartan cook replies: "To taste this divine dish, one must have dipped themselves in
the Eurotas (the river that flows in Sparta) !" In clear terms: only a Spartan appreciates a dish.
Spartan, or you are not Spartan...

9.3.2 Symmetry-based arguments

Symmetry is the property of certain relations that allows one to move from the affirmation
that this relationship exists between A and B affirms that it also exists between B and A.

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More broadly, we call two things symmetric if one is the counterpart of the other.
(like, for example, the two hands, the model and the copy, or the partners in an action).
Two symmetrical things are both similar and dissimilar in such a way that the rule of
justice can be used again. We will study here the 'reciprocity argument' and
the argument of inversion

The reciprocity argument requires that terms be treated similarly.

symmetrical. To a buyer who belittles the trade of a merchant, the latter can reply:
"If buying is honorable, selling is too." The golden rule in morality is based on a rule.
of reciprocity, namely: "Do not do to others what you would not want done to you." This
The symmetry argument can also be a powerful means of introducing the concept of relativity:
If we find the customs of a Persian strange, why would he not find ours strange?
strange our own way of living?" However, let us note that if we ask a young person
child: "How many brothers does each of your two brothers have?", he will tend to respond:
"Three!", because he does not yet see that his brothers are in the same situation as him.

The inversion argument, on the other hand, holds that two symmetrical terms must
to be treated differently. The gospel frequently uses this procedure: "Someone
Does he give you a slap on the right cheek? Offer him the left cheek." The justification of
this conduct is that one who wants to be perfect must act differently from what is
Usually done in society. Inversion often serves to highlight superiority.
from one partner to the other: "If you use dishonest means, I will not do so.
as much.

As a reminder, the arguments seen so far are all variations on the 'rule of
justice." Next, we consider the other rule initially announced, regarding
know the 'expansion rule'.

9.3.3 Arguments basés sur la transitivité

Transitivity is the property of certain relations that allows one to move from
the assertion that this relationship exists between A and B and between B and C, to the assertion that it

it also exists between A and C. The argument of transitivity generally consists of extending
(to transfer ‘in transit’) a property of certain terms to new terms. We
It will be noted that the syllogism is a case of transitivity, which appears clearly when we put the
minor premise: "If Socrates is a man, and man is mortal, then Socrates is
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mortal. "We will examine here three transitive relations that have a mathematical appearance, in
noting, however, that reality does not always conform to what seems logical.

The superiority is a transitive relation (if A > B and B > C then A > C). Thus: 'If
A general is superior to a colonel and the latter is superior to a corporal, so the general is superior.
to the corporal. "The argument of superiority is particularly used in the qualifiers of
championship. It is estimated that if team A has beaten team B and that team B has beaten a
team C, team A is superior to team C. However, it should be noted that superiority,
in this case, it is only conjectural.

Equality is also a transitive relation (if A = B and B = C then A = C). One can
apply equality to relationships like friendship: "The friends of my friends are my friends."
But it goes without saying that reality does not always lend itself to this formatting, as in
testifies this man who said to his two mistresses: 'Love each other equally since I'
you love with an equal love.

Implication is also a transitive relation (if A implies B and if B implies

C then A implies C). Thus: "If you want to rule the Empire, first rule your family.
and if you want to govern your family, govern yourself, so if you want to govern the Empire,
start by governing yourself.

9.4 Arguments drawn from proportions

9.4.1 Arguments a fortiori from the lesser

These arguments are based on a certain proportion or hierarchy of two terms:

A/B. One can go up or down from one term to another.

The argument a fortiori considers that what is true for the lesser holds true for the greater.

The minor argument considers that what applies to the highest applies to the lower.
less.

Here are some examples a fortiori, which are actually more frequent than a minori:
If we have the right to kill a thief, we can certainly kill an armed assailant.
takes care of sparrows, he will take care of men." These two arguments are based on a
qualitative hierarchy but sometimes the hierarchy is purely quantitative. Thus: 'If you do not'

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Can't work for an hour, what will you do for a week?” The argument can be very
elliptical as in this wonderful line by Racine: "I loved her inconsistent; what would I have
Are you faithful?

Here are some minor examples: 'He who has killed will not fail to lie to'
to defend oneself." - "He claims to love God, that he loves his brothers first.

One can possibly combine the two arguments in the same development:
The athlete willingly submits to a strict discipline to achieve mastery.
passenger of her body. One who desires to acquire a lasting intellectual skill must,
all the more, to impose effort on oneself. And the best way to overcome oneself is to start by
to face a particularly difficult obstacle. Because if one is able to overcome in this case,
we will easily overcome the lesser oppositions." These arguments a fortiori and of the lesser.
however always debatable. A thief can perfectly take risks if the stake is
is worth it, but he will carefully avoid a minor theft (the minor one is worth
Conversely, a one-hour walk can be very difficult, while a walk
of three hours (which allows you to get used to it) can become easy (the a fortiori is worth
not necessarily).

9.4.2 Reasoning by analogy and comparison

Reasoning by analogy proceeds as follows: given a

proportion A/B and a third term C, there must be a fourth term D. The
reasoning by comparison is simpler, it assumes that if A has such properties, B
those that resemble it must have similar properties. The reasoning by analogy, although
perilous, is very frequently used as a means of invention and discovery. By
For example, in biology, each function (like vision) requires an organ (the eye). Now...
It is noted that bats navigate effortlessly in the dark. One may wonder
Thus, what is the unknown organ of this known sensory function? What is, in other...
terms, the "radar" of the bat? By asking this last question, one actually does
one step further, since we are looking for the unknown organ by comparison with an instrument
human. Research by comparison thus reinforces reasoning by analogy.
properly speaking.

However, reasoning by comparison is precarious. It is particularly

dangerous to try to understand matter by comparing it with what man
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feels: this way of reasoning leads to anthropomorphisms like: 'Nature
"has a horror of emptiness." And, conversely, we often distort the life of the mind by trying to
understanding from material phenomena. For example, if one reduces vision to an act of
Photography, we misunderstand what is unique to vision: seeing indeed is not framing.
the real is to be present to the thing itself. In the same way, a recorder is not
not comparable to a memory: it reproduces traces of both past and present, while the
memory relates to the 'past as past' and seeks to explain it.

9.4.3 Formal induction

Formal induction consists of listing a series of parts that have a property.

common and to attribute this property to the whole. For example, gold, iron, zinc,
Copper... are conductors of electricity. Now, gold, iron, zinc, copper... are metals.
So, all metals are conductors of electricity. However, note the difference between
formal induction and syllogism. In formal induction, there is no middle term.
taken at least once universally, but an enumeration of parts that must be
sufficiently complete. The danger of induction is therefore to commit a
"hasty generalization" of the type: "All swans are white." A statement that seemed
valid until the day black swans were discovered... We have enough
brought up this question before delving into the techniques of logic. On the other hand, the advantage of
Formal induction on the syllogism serves as a means of invention. Indeed, this process
allows for the establishment of certain premises, while the syllogism is never more than a means
of the exhibition.

It is legitimate to relate formal induction to the argumenta fortiori.

still reasoning by analogy. Analogy, in fact, is also a means
intervention and almost momentarily leads to formal induction. For example,
The following analogy: "The eye is to sight, what the ear is to hearing" leads to conclude:
Vision has an organ, hearing has an organ, touch has an organ... vision, hearing, the
Touch is a sense and, therefore, every sense has an organ.

It will be recalled that, in addition to this 'formal induction', passing through the properties of the parts

to that of the whole and of which Aristotle theorized the model, we have seen previously
"the amplifying induction" of Mill which consists of finding the cause of a phenomenon by the
rules of concordance, difference, concomitant variations, and residues, as well as the

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"inductive reasoning" by Bacon which involves defining a property by collecting
facts, by formulating a hypothesis and trying to verify it. These three types of induction have
in common to move from the particular to the universal, and thus to be processes of invention.
However, the legitimacy of inductive methods poses a delicate philosophical problem.
What right can be inferred from a repetition of identical experiences that the experiences
futures will also be identical? Hume, as a good empiricist, stated that induction is
based on habit, that is to say on a belief and not on a theoretical certainty.

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10 Arguments aimed at refuting a thesis

10.1 Generalities

To refute an argument, one attacks their opponent at the head, at the chest, or at the
feet. In the first case, we directly take on the opponent himself, without
discuss the substance of his argument. Three processes can be used. One can tarnish
the opponent or discrediting them to prevent them from intervening. More politely, we do
note that the opponent intervenes wrongly, or outside of the question, or by omitting
certain aspects of the problem to be addressed. More subtly, it is claimed that the opponent defends
bad position: his argumentation proves either too much, or not enough, or both together. These
arguments remain external to the essence of the question. They can be formidable on the
right now, but they need to be explored further later.

In the second case, we corner the opponent into inconsistency. We claim that the
the theses he puts forward either destroy themselves or contain a contradiction.
These arguments have a very strong logical force and can indeed be formalized.
However, it often happens that one exaggerates the contradiction to force the opponent to
defensive. One can also attack the opponent's argumentation to show that it
is inconclusive because it goes in circles or fails to stop.

In the third case, we take the opposite stance to the opponent by declaring either that
the thesis he defends is false, either because it leads to an absurd or ridiculous consequence.
One can also criticize the opponent's way of arguing to denounce a
paralogism (a mistake against logic) or a false premise. This time we argue about
the background.

The three types of refutation, which form the framework of this last part, can
to be combined. For example, one can simultaneously accuse the witness of an accident of being
incompetent, to contradict oneself and to put forward a sophism. It should be noted that when responding to

a refutation, it is recommended to rely on the same form of argumentation as

the one that was put forward. This is called to retort or to reply.

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10.2 To take on the opponent themselves

10.2.1 Discrediting the opponent

The argumentum ad personam is a statement that seeks to disqualify the authority of

the opponent, by prohibiting them from intervening in the matter. One can discredit a person
in different ways:

Declare the adversary incompetent. For example, an expert will tell a lawyer:
"How dare you challenge my results, you are not a scientist?"

Declare the opponent compromised in the question: "How can you speak
against drugs while your son is drugged?

Declare the opponent interested in the question: "Do you want to win this strike?"
because you are looking for a more important position in the unions.
declare to be under suspicious influences: "You are asking for this reform to
favor the oil companies in which you are a shareholder.

Declare the inconsistent opponent: "You are the champion of the palinode:"
today you are asking for the free sale of alcohol, while yesterday you were against it
fiercely opposed.

Declare the opponent as having hidden intentions: "This measure is not

proposed without ulterior motives. Where do you want to lead us?

Declare the opponent as acting in bad faith: "You deny the obvious. Everything you
want, it is to hide your failure.

This ad hominem argument is often effective in the short term, but it is a bad
argument. One can respond by saying that this argument tarnishes the one who uses it and add, in
response: "Instead of insulting me, bring convincing arguments!" One can also...
draper in an offended dignity: "If I rise up against drugs, it is because I have had enough
suffered from the misfortunes of my son!" There would be a study to be done on the use of
the argumentative person in the media, depending on the times and the places. Thus, for example,
In France, at the beginning of the century, people directly targeted the physical appearance of their opponents.

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fat man, with the drooping lip! It remains to be seen how this has evolved.
practice...

10.2.2 Accusing the opponent of ignorance

One politely tells the opponent that they are mistaken by using the ad hominem argument or
that he exits the question by declaring that there is "ignoratio elenchi" or even that his
The argumentation is lacking. The ad hominem argument is a statement that settles into
the opponent's assumptions, without questioning them, to substitute a contrary statement to
the one that is issued. For example, to a person who states: "There are eleven of us at the table,"
that brings bad luck!", one would reply: "But come on, it's thirteen that brings bad luck!
argument may be effective immediately, but it does not get to the heart of the matter and the one who
Using it exposes one to seeing it turn against them: 'Would you also be superstitious?'

Invoking 'ignoratio elenchi' means pointing out that one is mistaken in

advancing such an argument or making such an objection. In other words, we move out of a question that
is not on the agenda. Thus: "You long prove that your client loves the
animals and would not harm a fly. But the question is not there, it is about knowing
if he accidentally ran over my client's dog." It can also be noted that
the opponent that he omitted an aspect of the question and that his investigation has shortcomings. By
For example: "You claim to study modern style. But you limit yourself to France,"
while it is a movement that has experienced various centers in Europe, particularly in
Vienna, Prague, Brussels, etc.

10.2.3 Critique the way to present a thesis

To avoid discussing the substance of an argument, one only attacks the

the manner in which the opponent presents it. Sometimes it is stated that the opponent does not
proves nothing. What is asserted freely can be denied freely. Sometimes, we declare
the opponent does not prove enough. For example: "Everyone knows that I am
innocent." or "You assert it without proof!" Or also: "My wife can vouch for my
"Driving!" and "We need stronger testimonies."

One can also declare that the opponent is trying too hard to prove, which indicates that he
is not certain of his position. Thus: "I will not buy a seal coat because I am
against the massacre of baby seals, which is so fought on television, I am repulsed

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"Moreover, regarding luxury expenses, and furthermore, my wife prefers mink." The two reproaches.
can be combined. It is declared that the opponent proves both too much and too little and that their
fallacious argumentation. Thus, the philosopher Alain declares: "There are no images but
false perceptions (one believes to hear a voice in the ticking of a clock, to see a
man in a tree trunk...)" and Sartre replies: "By removing the image, one grants to
imagination both too much and not enough. Too much, because it is believed that imagination puts everything

the time of judgments of existence while it floats between dream and reality. Not enough, because
the imagination no longer has its own object, yet it can relate to a thing or to a
a person without confusing themselves with the perception of this thing or this
nobody.

A variant of this attitude is to declare that the opponent is always right.

and always wrong. What he claims is true in one sense, but is false in another sense. Thus, at
moralist who claims that there is nothing new under the sun because 'the banker remains
similar to the Jewish usurer, the intellectual to the Chinese mandarin, the bureaucrat to the scribe
Egyptian," Aron replies: "Your argumentation is always true, because passions
human concerns (for gain, honors, assessments) remain the same at all ages. But your
argumentation is always false, because historical evolution has radically changed the
ready, teaching, administration.

10.3 Cornering the opponent into inconsistency

10.3.1 Show that the opponent's thesis destroys itself.

Here is an argument we have thoroughly discussed: retaliation. To remind you, it

consists in showing that the opponent, in wanting to refuse a statement, actually poses it, which amounts to

the advance (¬ P P) P. This very powerful argument has already been encountered in logic. Thus, if
someone states: "Nothing is certain", one will reply: "By saying that there is no
Certainty, you claim to say something certain, therefore there is something certain.
It will be noted that the Cartesian 'cogito' assumes such an argument. More broadly, one can
show that the opponent practically affirms what he denies in theory. Aron, for example,
Note that Marxism claims it is the economy that guides history and not freedom.
but in practice it asks men to free themselves through revolution, so it acknowledges the
freedom.

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 The reduction to the absurd is the opposite of retortion: positing a statement amounts to
to deny. Here: (P ¬ P) It is noteworthy that it is fair game to toughen up the
contradiction to embarrass the opponent. For example, a witness states: "I heard
the noise, I turned around and here is how the accident happened." One can certainly
objector: "Seeing by looking back is not seeing, so you did not see." But the
The witness can reply: 'Sorry, I was alerted by the sound of braking and I saw perfectly'
the accident after turning around." Another presentation of this argument is to show
that a good decision leads to unintended consequences, and therefore it is a bad decision.
For example, it is decided that students who graduate from university are entitled to unemployment benefits.

But, on the other hand, a company that hires an unemployed person receives a bonus.
appreciable, many young graduates must go through unemployment before being
engaged!

10.3.2 Show that the opponent's thesis is contradictory

If the opponent states a clearly contradictory thesis, we object either to the

principle of non-contradiction, either the principle of excluded middle, or a double negation. Thus,
if a lady declares: 'I am campaigning in the M.L.F. because my husband is forcing me to', we
she can reply to him according to the three principles.

Let the principle of non-contradiction: ¬ (P & ¬ P). In this case, one of the two
the proposition is certainly false, because one cannot simultaneously free oneself (P) and...
submit to a constraint (¬ P).

So let the principle of excluded middle: P V ¬ P. In this case, there can only be one
true proposition, in what is put forward and it is necessary to choose. Either to free oneself (P), or to accept the

constraint (¬ P).

Let there be a double negation leading to an affirmation: ¬ ¬ P P. In this case, it is

only by refusing "¬" to be constrained by the husband "¬ P" that the woman will manage to be
free.

It should be noted that the declaration could also lead to a reduction to

the absurd: "You claim to free yourself (P) by accepting the constraint (¬ P), so you
"Stay in submission (¬ P)." It could also lead to retaliation (but then it is necessary to...

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translate P as 'accepting the constraint' where it is asserted: 'You claim to refuse the
constraint (¬ P), but in fact you accept it (P), so you accept it (P).

It should be noted that many contradictions are merely apparent. For example,
Some declare that if there is a necessary order, there is no freedom (everything is left to
determinism) and that if there is freedom, there is no necessary order (everything is left to
chance). But one can argue that freedom is not arbitrariness and that it introduces into the
world an order that results from a reasonable decision. Similarly, some contradictions
between theory and practice are not decisive. Rousseau was mocked for writing
a treaty on education while abandoning his children to public assistance. It remains that
Rousseau's theories had a profound influence on the educational system, even if his
The conduct is not very estimable.

10.3.3 Show that the opponent's argumentation does not conclude.

For an argument to be conclusive, two conditions must be met: on the one hand, one does not
one can prove A by B, then B by A, otherwise we would have a vicious circle; on the other hand, we
cannot prove A by B, then B by C, then C by D, because otherwise we enter into a
regression to infinity. In other words, for a proof to be conclusive, it is necessary to
what serves to demonstrate, the "demonstrans", does not presuppose what is to be demonstrated, the
"demonstrandum", and that this "demonstrans" can be established in a finite number of steps.
These are, one could say, two rules of 'good formation' of the demonstration.

Let’s take a blatant example of a 'vicious circle': 'The stone is heavy because
qu’elle tombe et elle tombe parce qu’elle est pesante.» On est évidemment au rouet. Mais une
A more subtle form of vicious circle is the 'begging the question' which consists of taking
as a premise the conclusion that is to be demonstrated. Thus, if someone states: "Our
the system is not oppressive because it liberates man," one will reply: "Prove that it
free the man and then you can conclude that he is not oppressive." In fact, the petition
The principle is common in propaganda speeches. It is enough to state what one wants.
to establish by advancing as proof a double negation. Hence this example: 'Our party remains
the same since it has not changed." Or this other case: "We are acting in good faith because
we have nothing to hide." In reality, it gives the impression of providing evidence when
that one says the same thing twice.

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 Here is a case of regression to infinity: if someone claims that "nobody can
open one's mouth here without the permission of a higher authority than oneself
replicate that "to enforce this rule, you must call a higher authority that
will in turn have to call a higher authority and we will never get out of it." It should be noted
that infinite regression is sometimes used in philosophy. For example, to show
To see an arrow on the board is not to see what forms in the eye, Descartes
note that there are two inverted images on the retinas and that a third eye would be needed to
to unify the first two images and straighten them but that we have thus been trained in this way
in an infinite regression. The conclusion that emerges from this argumentation is
Negative: to understand the vision, it must be thought of differently than a recording.
of image (a mirror does not see). However, we do not positively say what vision is.

10.4 Taking the opposite stance of the opponent

10.4.1 Accuse the opponent of error or sophism

In a discussion, one is led to correct errors made by the opponent in

saying: 'No, that's false!', 'This prejudice is untenable.' or 'I contest your...
affirmation. "This is the whole problem of negation that arises in this place: The tables of
Truths exposed in logic allow us to see how to deny a simple proposition or two.
related propositions.

Let us recall some examples here:

If someone claims: 'It is raining', one would simply object: 'No, it is not raining.'

to deny an implication, one shows that the antecedent can be true while the
The statement is false: "If you go to Sweden, you will pay a lot for restaurants." Response:
Not necessarily, there are cheap restaurants in Stockholm.

- to negate a (inclusive) disjunction, it is shown that both members can be

false because there is a third solution: "It is you or your wife the murderer
From Alfred. Response: "Sorry, Alfred may have committed suicide!"

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 -to refute a conjunction, one shows that one of the two members is false (or both)
two): "Alfred is a lawyer and a professor." Answer: "No, he is neither a lawyer nor a professor."
Oh: "No, he is a lawyer, but not a professor."

We will also refer to the "logical square" for the relationship between assertions and
negations of the propositions analyzed in subject - copula - predicate. For example, to negate
the statement 'All boys are foolish', one will say: 'I do not agree: all the
boys are not fools." (proposition A declared false) or what amounts to the same thing:
No, I know a few boys who are not foolish.
contradictory in O).

10.4.2 Reasoning by absurdity

It is not always possible to directly establish the falsehood of a thesis. To do so

to arrive, we must reason by contradiction. Aristotle called this reasoning 'apagogical',
that is to say leading to the impossible. Let us recall that, in a reasoning by absurdity, one
start by admitting the thesis opposed to the one you want to defend, then you develop the
consequences of this thesis to show that they lead to an error (or to a
impossibility), which allows for the thesis we support to be posed. We will recall the form
logic: ¬ P because [(P Q) & not Q] ¬ P. There is a simple application of reasoning there.
by implication 'tollendo tollens', as we have already studied.

For example: 'If Alfred had fired a gunshot, we would have found gunpowder.'
under her nails and on her clothes, but the investigations in this direction yielded nothing.
he could obviously reply that Alfred had carefully protected his hands and his clothes
before shooting. Or this other example: 'The sale of an encyclopedia must be done at home.'
Indeed, if we did not go to the client, they would not be able to consult the work, listen.
the seller's advice, ask questions. And it takes at least an hour to explain
the work. So, the thing is impossible in a bookstore.

In fact, reasoning by absurdity leads to the argument by ridicule. One shows

that by admitting the opponent's thesis, one arrives at a consequence that no one dares
defend or leads to a ridiculous situation. A famous example of argumentation by the
Candide is the Ridicule of Voltaire. The disciple of the philosopher, claiming that everything is for the

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better in the best of worlds, wants to put into practice the doctrine of his master. But he
one encounters only imperfections everywhere. So...

Or this example: some historians have denied the existence of Jesus because the
most events of his life could be related to Greek myths or
Easterners. To refute this thesis, an author noted that by using the same criteria, one ...
should deny the existence of Napoleon. The life of the latter indeed reproduces the myth
of Apollo. He was born on one island, disappeared on another island, his mother's name is Letizia = Leto,
he has an equal number of brothers and sisters, his contemporaries declared that he was the
victor of the serpent of the revolution, who led the State like a solar chariot, etc.

10.4.3 Attack the opponent's reasoning

A reasoning can be criticized either because it is based on a logical flaw,

either because it is based on a false premise.

An opponent can first make a logical mistake or a 'paralogism'. It

it is not always easy to spot this logical error because, in ordinary discussion,
the argument is most often presented in a truncated manner ('enthymeme') or in a way
developed ("epichērem" or "sorite"). It is therefore necessary to start by shaping it.
to identify his vice. Thus, if someone declares: 'The Encyclopedists are superficial and
clearly demonstrate the superficiality of French philosophy", it is necessary first of all
State the implied premise: 'All Encyclopedists are superficial. Now all the'
Encyclopedists are French philosophers. Therefore, all French philosophers are
superficial." In this case, it is clear that the term "French philosopher" is increasing.
of extension. One will retort thus: "The superficiality of the Encyclopedists, assuming
that it is established, only proves the superficiality of some philosophers
French." All of this is well known...

Most of the time, however, we attack a reasoning because it contains a

error (or a fallacy) in a premise. It is therefore necessary to start by isolating the sentence
litigious before undermining the argument. For example, if someone claims: "Mélanie is
red since she is Irish," one will reply: "You are tacitly assuming that
greater than "all Irish women are redheads", but this is a hasty generalization.
Or this other example, in which Caliph Omar declares in front of the library.
from Alexandria: 'The books of this library contain or do not contain the same
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anything other than the Quran; in the first case, they are useless (and must be burned) and, in the
In the second case, they are harmful (and must be burned); therefore, these books must be burned.
To refute this dilemma, one must show that the antecedent (being identical to or different from the Quran)
does not suffice to state the consequence. One could then retort to the Caliph in a way
ironic: "What you just said is identical or different from the words of the Quran; in
in the first case, your words are useless and, in the second case, they are harmful; therefore you
"you would have been better off staying silent."

One last remark! A fallacy, as we saw previously, is a principle

erroneous interpretation. Rhetoric books often have a chapter on "refutation of"
sophisms." In this course, we preferred to spread this material by indicating the mistakes.
against definition or division, deceptive analogies, fallacies of causality, etc.

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11 Table of contents

1 RHETORIC, LOGIC AND ARGUMENTATION............................................ 2

1.1 Entering into argumentation through rhetorical practices...... 6

1.2 Entering into logic through the case of syllogism ............................................................. 8

1.2.1 A first definition of logic ........................................................................................... 11

1.3 Enter rhetoric through a reflection on involvement................................................................. 12

2 BEFORE TECHNIQUE, A TIME FOR THOUGHT ............................. 14

2.1 Reflections on deduction and its link to syllogism ................................................................. 15

2.1.1 The problem of the validity and the form of reasoning........................................................... 15
2.1.2 The problem of the truth of the premises and of the matter of reasoning .................................... 17
[Link] The direct demonstration .......................................................................................................... 17
[Link] The indirect demonstration ....................................................................................................... 20

2.2 Reflections on induction as another path of knowledge..................................................... 21

3 THE LOGIC: PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON FORMALIZATION 28

4 THE LOGIC OF UNANALYZED PROPOSITIONS ................................. 30

4.1 Considerations on some hypothetical reasoning.............................................................. 30

4.1.1 Conditional reasoning or with implication....................................................................... 31
[Link] First valid modality: modus ponendo ponens........................................................ 32
[Link] Second valid modality: the 'modus tollendo tollens'.......................................................... 33
[Link].1 Reasoning to remain in an open logic.................................................... 34
[Link].2 Reasonings to distinguish between a necessary condition and a sufficient condition ..
[Link].3 The 'modus tollens' expresses reasoning by contradiction............................................. 36
4.1.2 The biconditional reasoning or with equivalence................................................................... 37
[Link] On the usefulness of these reasoning
4.1.3 The reasoning of incompatibility or with negation of conjunction........................................... 39
4.1.4 Reasoning with disjunction (exclusive or inclusive) .......................................................... 41
[Link] The exclusive disjunction ........................................................................................................... 41
[Link] The inclusive disjunction............................................................................................................ 42
[Link].1 A few remarks to keep in mind............................................................... 43

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4.2 The matrix calculation method ........................................................................................................... 46
4.2.1 The concept of truth function...................................................................................................... 46
4.2.2 The matrices of logical operators
[Link] The prefix negation operator: ¬ .......................................................................................... 49
[Link] Infix operators............................................................................................................... 50
4.2.3 Evaluate truth functions .............................................................................................. 51
4.2.4 Some interesting logical laws ............................................................................................. 57
[Link] The equivalence report between implication and conjunction (Iercase).......................................... 57
[Link] The equivalence report between implication and conjunction (IIe case)......................................... 57
[Link] The equivalence report between implication and inclusive disjunction........................................ 58
[Link] The contraposition of the implication............................................................................................ 59
[Link] The equivalence report between conjunction and inclusive disjunction (Iercas)................... 59
[Link] The equivalence report between inclusive disjunction and conjunction (IIandcase) .................. 60
[Link] The law of double negation ..................................................................................................... 60
[Link] The principle of excluded middle......................................................................................................... 61
[Link] The principle of identity............................................................................................................... 61
[Link] The principle of non-contradiction
[Link] The antinomy
[Link] Retaliation
[Link] The dilemma
[Link] The conditional syllogism

5 THE LOGIC OF MONADIC PREDICATES............................................. 64

5.1 Analysis of the judgment ............................................................................................................................ 64

5.1.1 The predicate as an expression of a concept................................................................................ 65
[Link] The understanding of a concept............................................................................................... 65
[Link] The extension of a concept......................................................................................................... 66
[Link] The three characteristics of the concept ........................................................................................ 66
[Link].1 Abstraction
[Link].2 Universality ......................................................................................................................... 67
[Link].3 Univocité............................................................................................................................. 68
[Link] The relationships between concepts
[Link].1 Subordination ...................................................................................................................... 69
[Link].2 Opposition
[Link].3 Complémentarité ................................................................................................................. 70
5.1.2 The coupling....................................................................................................................................... 70
5.1.3 The subject.......................................................................................................................................... 70
5.1.4 The properties of propositions: quality and quantity...................................................................... 71

5.2 Immediate inferences.................................................................................................................... 73

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 5.2.1 Logical oppositions ................................................................. 73
[Link] Contradictory propositions............................................................................................... 75
[Link] Contradictory propositions................................................................. 76
[Link] Subcontrary propositions ................................................................................................. 76
[Link] Subordinate propositions................................................................................................. 77
[Link].1 From the subordinate to the subordinate.
[Link].2 From the subordinate to the subaltern ...
[Link] Summary table of logical oppositions and mnemonic device.................................... 79
5.2.2 The obversion................................................................................................................................... 81
5.2.3 The conversions............................................................................................................................. 81
[Link] Simple conversion................................................................................................................ 81
[Link] Accidental conversion....................................................................................................... 83
[Link] The conversion by contraposition.............................................................................................. 84

5.3 The syllogisms ...................................................................................................................................... 87

5.3.1 Presentation of the syllogism............................................................................................................ 87
[Link] The canonical form of the syllogism........................................................................................... 87
[Link] The figures of the syllogism........................................................................................................ 88
[Link] The modes of syllogism.......................................................................................................... 89
5.3.2 The rules of validity of syllogisms........................................................................................... 91
[Link] The rules for the terms ........................................................................................................ 92
[Link] The rules for proposals ............................................................................................... 98
[Link] In summary................................................................................................................. 100
5.3.3 The rules regarding the truth of the conclusion ......................................................................... 100
5.3.4 Reduction to the modes of the first figure ............................................................................ 101
5.3.5 General considerations on the syllogism................................................................................. 101

6 THE ACCURACY OF DISCUSSION DATA................................. 105

6.1 Generalities........................................................................................................................................... 105

6.2 The rules of definition

6.3 The comparison and the allegory............................................................................................................. 107

6.4 The analogy

7 THE FACTS, THE CAUSES, THE CONSEQUENCES..................................... 111

7.1 Generalities........................................................................................................................................... 111

7.2 Establishment of the facts.................................................................................................................... 112

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 7.2.1 The experimental fact .................................................................................................................... 112
7.2.2 The facts reported by testimony.............................................................................................. 113
7.2.3 The indices and the presumptions................................................................................................... 114

7.3 The inductive search for the cause.................................................................................................... 114

7.3.1 The amplifying induction............................................................................................................... 114
7.3.2 The four causes......................................................................................................................... 115
7.3.3 The fallacies of causal induction.......................................................................................... 116

7.4 The deduction of the consequences of a fact.......................................................................................... 117

7.4.1 The hypothetical deduction .......................................................................................................... 117
7.4.2 Arguments based on efficiency or purpose..................................................................... 118
7.4.3 The fallacies of causal deduction ....................................................................................... 119

8 VALUE JUDGMENTS..................................................................... 121

8.1 Generalities ........................................................................................................................................... 121

8.2 The intrinsic places of the preferable ................................................................................................. 122

8.2.1 Some common places ............................................................................................................ 122
[Link] Place of existence (which encompasses time)................................................... 122
[Link] Place of essence.................................................................................................................... 122
[Link] Place of the efficient cause .................................................... 122
[Link] Place of the final cause ............................................................ 122
[Link] Place of quantity .................................................................................................................. 123
[Link] Place of quality .................................................................................................................... 123
8.2.2 Application of places................................................................................................................... 123
8.2.3 The optimum................................................................................................................................... 124

8.3 The extrinsic places of the preferable................................................................................................. 125

8.3.1 Arguments by example............................................................................................................ 125
8.3.2 Arguments by the model or the anti-model.............................................................. 126
8.3.3 Authority and Sacrifice Arguments................................................................................. 126

9 THE ARGUMENTS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING A THESIS.................................. 128

9.1 Generalities........................................................................................................................................... 128

9.2 Arguments based on the nature of the terms ....................................................................................... 129

9.2.1 Arguments based on definition ............................................................................................... 129
9.2.2 Arguments based on division.................................................................................................. 130
9.2.3 Arguments based on the dichotomy............................................................................................. 131

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9.3 Arguments based on the properties of relationships............................................................. 132
9.3.1 Arguments based on reflexivity .............................................................................................. 132
9.3.2 Arguments based on symmetry................................................................................................. 132
9.3.3 Arguments based on transitivity.............................................................................................. 133

9.4 Arguments drawn from proportions ....................................................................................................... 134

9.4.1 Arguments from the stronger to the weaker................................................................................................... 134
9.4.2 Reasoning by analogy and comparison ...................................................................... 135
9.4.3 Formal induction................................................................................................................... 136

10 ARGUMENTS TO REFUTE A THESIS ................................ 138

10.1 Generalities........................................................................................................................................... 138

10.2 Attacking the opponent himself............................................................................................... 139

10.2.1 Discredit the opponent................................................................................................. 139
10.2.2 Accusing the opponent of ignorance................................................................................................. 140
10.2.3 Critique the way of presenting a thesis.

10.3 Corner the opponent into incoherence................................................................................................. 141

10.3.1 Show that the opponent's thesis destroys itself....................................................... 141
10.3.2 Show that the opponent's thesis is contradictory............................................................... 142
10.3.3 Show that the opponent's argument does not conclude...................................................... 143

10.4 Take the opposite stance of the opponent.............................................................................................. 144

10.4.1 Accusing the opponent of error or sophism............................................................................ 144
10.4.2 The reasoning by absurdity.................................................................................................... 145
10.4.3 Attack the opponent's reasoning.................................................................................... 146

11 TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................. 149

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