India as a Negotiating Partner

Among the three major rising powers—India, China, and Brazil—India stands out to Western
countries for three main reasons.

First, India’s political system is democratic, similar to many developed countries. It is often
called the world’s largest democracy. Even if one does not fully agree with the “democratic
peace” theory (the idea that democracies rarely fight each other), democracy creates a sense of
shared values with the West. This similarity helped the United States, especially under
President George W. Bush, to see India as a potential strategic partner.

Second, India’s use of the English language strengthens this connection. While literacy levels
are still low overall, most of India’s ruling elite are fluent in English and familiar with Western
culture—something not as common in China or Brazil.

Third, India has a demographic advantage. Its population is almost as large as China’s but is
much younger, giving it greater long-term potential for productivity and market growth.

Because of these strengths—and its strong economic growth as part of the BRIC group (Brazil,
Russia, India, China)—many analysts believe that:

1.​ India is likely to be an easier country for Western powers to negotiate with; and​

2.​ Engaging with India will bring high rewards for both sides.​

However, other experts disagree. They argue that India’s slow development and difficult
negotiating history suggest caution. The debate between these two views—optimistic versus
cautious—is lively. This article supports the cautious side, showing that working with India may
not be as simple as many assume. Still, it also points out that India behaves differently with
different partners, and understanding these patterns could help other countries cooperate more
effectively with it. The article ends with recommendations for both India and its international
partners on how to improve negotiations and mutual understanding.

India’s Negotiating Style: Past and Present

Most scholars agree that during the second half of the 20th century, India was a tough and
inflexible and often prickly negotiator. Political scientist Stephen Cohen described Western
frustration with India’s “nonalignment” policy—officially neutral but often leaning toward the
Soviet Union. Indian diplomats, while skilled, were known for lecturing Western counterparts
about morality and India’s civilizational greatness. China also viewed India as proud but poor,
while only Moscow seemed to get along smoothly with New Delhi.
When discussing India as a rising power, however, opinions are divided.

Some rationalist scholars argue that as India grows economically and becomes more
integrated into global trade, its interests will align more closely with other powers. Economic
growth, they believe, will make India a more cooperative and responsible player in the global
system.

Constructivist scholars see a different reason: socialization. As India gains influence in

international institutions, it will internalize and support global norms and rules. In both cases, the
conclusion is that a rising India will become more flexible and pragmatic.

Indian scholar C. Raja Mohan supports this optimistic view. He compares old India to a
“porcupine”—slow, defensive, and prickly—but says the country’s foreign policy since the 1990s
has changed dramatically. India now shows more openness, especially in relations with the U.S.
and regional cooperation. Though some old habits remain, Mohan believes India is gradually
adapting to its new major-power role.

According to him:

1.​ India is moving from prioritizing autonomy to accepting more responsibility in global
affairs.​

2.​ It is forming selective partnerships beyond the developing world.​

3.​ It is shifting from advocating global equality to promoting global order.​

However, others hold the opposite view. Cohen famously called India “the country that can’t
say yes,” emphasizing its resistance and hesitation in negotiations.

Even David Malone, who generally views India positively, admits that its diplomacy is often
seen as “arrogant,” “moralistic,” and “confrontational.” India strongly values sovereignty, avoids
promoting democracy abroad, and rarely abandons its developing-country allies. Despite its
growing power, examples of India taking real global leadership remain few.

George Perkovich agrees, arguing that India’s reputation for being moralistic and contrarian
discourages others from wanting it to lead at the global level.

Economic and Cultural Constraints

Optimists link India’s rising cooperation to its economic success, but critics point out several
serious weaknesses. Since 2009, India’s growth has slowed, and its domestic
challenges—corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and weak infrastructure—are major
obstacles.
 ●​ In 2012, India ranked 94th on the global corruption index (worse than Brazil and China).​

●​ It ranked 132nd for ease of doing business, and 182nd out of 183 countries for
enforcing contracts.​

●​ The 2012 nationwide power blackout, which hit even the capital, showed how weak
infrastructure still is.​

Beyond these material issues, cultural attitudes also matter. Economist Jim O’Neill noted that
many Indian elites show resentment toward Western business practices and liberalization.
Studies show that both elites and the general public remain skeptical of deeper economic
reforms.

These problems suggest that India’s domestic issues—both structural and cultural—make it
difficult for the country to easily align with Western powers or fully embrace global norms.

Conclusion

In short, while some scholars see a modern, flexible India emerging, others view it as still
cautious, self-protective, and resistant to change. The truth likely lies in between. India’s
negotiation behavior varies depending on who it is dealing with, and understanding these
differences is key to building stronger cooperation in the future.

How India Negotiates Depends on Whom It Is Negotiating With

To understand the debate about India’s rise, we now look at how India behaves in negotiations
with five different types of actors: established powers, other rising powers, smaller
countries, non-state actors, and international organizations.

India and the Established Powers

Studying how India negotiates with established powers—especially Western ones—helps us

understand whether its rise is challenging the international system or whether it can fit into it
easily.

After independence, India’s relationship with the Western powers was not easy. India’s
leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement and its close ties with the Soviet Union often
irritated the United States and its Western allies during the Cold War. Instead of joining with
other democratic great powers, India usually tried to balance against them.
In this section, the focus is mainly on India’s relationship with the United States.

During the Cold War, US–India relations were full of frustration and misunderstanding.
Political scientist Stephen Cohen described both countries as “distanced powers”—kept
apart partly because the US supported Pakistan, India’s rival. But regional issues were not the
only problem.

Raymond Cohen highlighted deep differences between Indian and American negotiation
styles. He wrote that Indian pride often limited good relations with the US because Indian
officials were easily offended by any real or imagined insult to their national dignity. Similarly,
Strobe Talbott noted that even though there were a few warm moments—like Jacqueline
Kennedy’s visit to India—these were exceptions, and the overall relationship stayed cool.

However, in the last decade, things have changed significantly.

India, as a rising power, now faces a friendlier United States, partly because of India’s
economic reforms and growing strength, and partly because of the post-9/11 global
context, which changed US strategic priorities.

Has India responded to this shift?​

Many scholars point to the Indo-US nuclear deal as evidence that India has matured
diplomatically and gained long-overdue recognition from the US and other great powers.

To recall, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created after India’s first nuclear test in
1974 (Pokhran I), to stop the export of nuclear technology to countries with nuclear weapon
ambitions. Yet, now, India—which has still not signed either the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)—has gained special
treatment.

India’s nuclear safeguards agreement has been approved by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), and the NSG even granted India a special waiver allowing the
transfer of non-weapon nuclear technology to it.

This major transformation happened largely because of the Civil Nuclear Agreement (the 123
Agreement) between India and the US, and due to US lobbying in international forums to
support India.

For many scholars, these developments show that India has earned recognition, become
more pragmatic, and is now willing to take limited new responsibilities. In the past, India
often criticized the global system as a form of “nuclear apartheid”, defending the rights of
non-nuclear states. Now, however, India has entered into a special relationship with the
US—a big change from its earlier stance.

Still, there are four important caveats that show this cooperation is more complicated than it
seems.
1. India’s Refusal to Compromise on Its Nuclear Policy

Even after the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, when the US applied strong pressure, India
refused to sign the NPT or to accept any bilateral or multilateral limits on its nuclear program.

According to Strobe Talbott, India’s strategy was one of tough resistance—it survived the
wave of US disapproval and outlasted American diplomats in long negotiations. By not
compromising, India proved its resolve and resilience, boosting its national self-esteem and
confidence.

2. Domestic Opposition to the Nuclear Deal

Getting the nuclear deal approved in the Indian Parliament was a difficult and tense process.
Writing in 2006, Stephen Cohen observed that opposition was stronger inside India than in
the US—even though India stood to benefit more from the deal.

He found it “curious” that some members of India’s small but vocal strategic community
could not “accept yes for an answer.”

Eventually, the deal did pass, but only after fierce political debate and a no-confidence vote
that the government survived by a narrow margin (275 in favor, 256 against).

Politicians from across the spectrum—despite their differences—shared a deep suspicion of

the US and the West, and many ordinary Indians supported their skepticism.

3. The Deal Did Not Reflect a New Cooperative Spirit

Some analysts argue that signing the deal was not actually proof that India had become more
cooperative or responsible in global affairs.

Instead, they see it as part of India’s agenda-setting strategy, where India secured special
exceptions, waivers, and unique privileges. This behavior, rather than strengthening global
norms, was disruptive to existing international rules.

4. The Indo-US Deal Is Not an Alliance

Finally, no matter how warmly both sides call each other “natural allies” or “strategic
partners”, the nuclear deal is not an alliance.
Inside India, it is not viewed as the first step toward forming a military or political alliance with
the US or other major powers.

Although India no longer uses the moralizing tone of non-alignment as it did during the Cold
War, its actions still show that it is not bandwagoning with the established powers.

Summary

In summary, while India’s recent engagement with the United States marks a major shift from its
Cold War posture, its core diplomatic behavior remains cautious and independent. The
Indo-US nuclear deal symbolizes both progress and limits—it shows India’s rising influence,
but also its deep attachment to autonomy and resistance to being fully absorbed into
Western-led alliances.

India and Other Rising Powers

The idea of cooperation among the four original BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and
China—and the later addition of South Africa (making BRICS) is strongly emphasized in their
official statements. This unity is shown through their annual BRICS summits and their joint
positions in international forums.

For instance, at the World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference in Geneva
(December 2011), the BRICS countries released their first joint statement. This statement
went slightly beyond the usual vague promises made by both developed and rising powers
(such as in the G20) about completing the Doha Round of trade negotiations and fighting
protectionism.

Instead, the BRICS statement revealed the beginnings of their shared vision for the global
order. They showed support for the “single undertaking” approach (where all members must
agree on the entire deal) instead of the plurilateral approaches being suggested by some
developed countries like the United States.

The BRICS declared:

“We will remain fully engaged in negotiations with a view to concluding the single
undertaking within the shortest possible timeframe. We emphasize that negotiations
on any component of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) must be based on the
mandates agreed since the Round began in 2001 and on the delicate balance of
trade-offs achieved over the last 10 years, which are reflected in the draft texts of
December 2008.”

Another example of BRICS cooperation came from the fourth BRICS summit in Delhi (March
2012). In that meeting, the leaders announced the creation of a working group of finance
ministers to explore the possibility of setting up a new Development Bank. The bank’s
purpose would be to mobilize resources for infrastructure and sustainable development
projects in BRICS countries and other developing economies, complementing the work of
existing global and regional financial institutions.

Limits and Challenges of BRICS Cooperation

However, there are several important caveats to this apparent unity.

First, the cooperation among BRICS members is somewhat artificial. Economist Jim O’Neill,
who originally coined the term “BRIC,” has pointed out that he never intended them to act as a
political club. He argued that, apart from showing the limits of the current G7 system, such a
club’s purpose is quite limited, especially now that South Africa has joined.

At the same time, cooperative groups among these countries existed long before the
BRICS label became popular.

●​ In 2003, Brazil, China, and India led the creation of the G20 coalition at the WTO’s
Cancún ministerial meeting, focusing on agricultural negotiations. Despite bringing
together countries with different interests, this coalition was serious and long-lasting,
and it still exists today.​

●​ That same year, Brazil, India, and South Africa formed the IBSA Dialogue Forum,
which highlighted their shared democratic values.​

●​ In 2009, Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (the BASIC group) cooperated during
the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference.​

●​ Going even further back, in the GATT era, Brazil and India were both leading
members of the G10 coalition during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.​

Given this long history, one might ask whether BRICS summitry is simply “old wine in new
bottles”—that is, a new label for old-style cooperation. Their strong focus on development
issues also resembles the Third Worldist coalitions these countries led in the past.

Unequal Commitments and Conflicts

Second, not all BRICS members are equally committed to each other, and their cooperation
varies across issue areas.
For example:

●​ Brazil and India both want permanent seats on the UN Security Council, but they
know that China and Russia (who are already P5 members) do not support their
bids.​

●​ The BRICS have also failed to coordinate when it comes to leadership positions in
international organizations.​

●​ The relationship between India and China is the most problematic within the group.
Their history includes a major war (1962) and continuing border disputes.​

●​ India also competes with all the other BRICS members for resources and
investments in Africa.​

Because of this mix of cooperation and competition, India’s overall strategy with other rising
powers is inconsistent—it varies depending on who it is negotiating with.

India’s Mixed Strategy

Overall, India’s negotiation style with other rising powers is more distributive than
cooperative. This means India focuses on protecting its own interests rather than seeking
mutual gains through compromise.

For instance, even though India has a long history of cooperation with Brazil at the GATT and
WTO, during the Doha Round talks in July 2008, India adopted a hardline distributive
approach against Brazil—especially when Brazil supported making concessions to reach a
deal.

In terms of coalition behavior, India and the other BRICS countries often form alliances,
though the membership changes depending on the issue area. Most of these coalitions are
aimed at balancing against the established Western powers.

Despite the variation, these coalitions still reflect traces of a “bloc mentality.” They frequently
emphasize development concerns and often include other developing countries. This is
especially visible in fields like trade and climate change, where different combinations of
BRICS members have taken leadership roles to promote the interests of the developing
world.

Interestingly, even though Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are now major players in
the global economy, they continue to identify themselves as developing countries and
speak strongly in defense of the Global South.
Summary

In summary, India’s relations with other rising powers—especially within the BRICS
framework—show both cooperation and competition. While BRICS presents itself as a
symbol of unity and southern solidarity, deep differences, rivalries, and national ambitions often
limit how far this cooperation actually goes. India’s negotiation approach, therefore, remains
strategic, self-protective, and pragmatic, balancing cooperation with competition depending
on the context.

India and Smaller Players

India’s negotiating behavior with smaller countries, such as the least developed countries
(LDCs), is quite different from its approach toward established and rising powers. At the same
time, it has remained fairly consistent over the years.

In dealing with smaller players, India tends to use more cooperative (integrative) strategies
and shows greater willingness to share international responsibilities.

For example, India earned the reputation of being “the voice of the voiceless” in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). It often took the lead in coalitions of poorer developing
countries, defending their interests—even when those demands did not directly benefit India
or its middle-income allies.

Some analysts argue that India’s leadership role was also a strategic choice—by representing
smaller countries, India could gain access to small-group consultations within the WTO,
where important decisions are made.

Still, India has continued to play this supportive role, even after gaining a firm place among the
world’s major trading powers because of its large market size and economic potential.

India regularly highlights LDC concerns in its joint and individual statements, includes
their demands in coalition agendas, shares research, and reports back to those countries
after high-level WTO discussions that they are often excluded from.

India’s Role in Africa

India’s commitment to providing what scholars call “club goods”—shared benefits for
developing partners—is especially visible in its relations with Africa.
India’s trade and investment in Africa are not limited to the resource-rich regions of the
north and west, but have also been expanding in East Africa. India has given preferential
trade access to many LDCs—33 of which are in Africa, including 14 in East Africa.

Indian officials often stress the long-term continuity of this engagement. They highlight the
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program, which dates back to 1964, as
proof that India’s involvement in Africa is not new.

They also differentiate India’s approach from China’s. As one Indian official said:

“While we also have energy considerations, our model is different. The Indian way
is the softer way.”

Economist Harry Broadman supports this distinction. He notes that Chinese firms in Africa
often create vertically integrated businesses—buying supplies from China, selling mainly to
African governments, and rarely integrating local workers socially or economically.

In contrast, Indian firms are generally less vertically integrated. They buy supplies locally
or from global markets, sell more to private African companies, and encourage their
workers to integrate into local communities.

Continuity of India’s Leadership for Developing Countries

India’s leadership on behalf of smaller developing nations today strongly resembles its past
role as a leader of the Third World.

When asked about India’s recent activism in Africa, one interviewee explained:

“We simply didn’t have enough resources to do this in the 1960s. Now we can.”

India’s overall strategy here is clearly integrative. It often makes concessions, allows
free-riding, and shares benefits, especially with the LDCs.

Coalitions that include India (alongside other rising powers) and the LDCs or African
economies remain active in fields such as international trade.

However, India’s involvement sometimes limits its own flexibility. For instance, India cannot
easily make policy concessions on issues like special and differential treatment (which give
developing countries extra privileges in trade agreements). Doing so could upset its LDC allies,
even if it might gain more in other areas. Despite these costs, India chooses to bear them
willingly.
India’s Moral and Strategic Approach

Although India no longer uses the old language of “Third Worldism”, its diplomacy toward
poorer countries still carries a moral tone. It often frames issues in terms of global justice,
policy space, and development rights for poorer nations.

Thus, while India is sometimes criticized for “getting to no” when negotiating with major
powers, it is generally enthusiastic about “getting to yes” when working with smaller and
weaker countries.

Summary

In summary, India’s engagement with smaller players is marked by solidarity, inclusiveness,

and moral responsibility. Unlike its cautious stance with the West, India adopts a cooperative
and generous approach toward poorer nations—especially in Africa and among LDCs—both
for moral reasons and to strengthen its leadership role in the Global South.

India’s Relations with NGOs

India’s negotiations and collaborations with external NGOs have been somewhat more
successful than those with multinational corporations.

A key example is India’s participation in the TRIPS (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual

Property Rights) and public health coalition, where it worked together with other developing
countries and international NGOs. This coalition pushed for greater access to affordable
medicines for poorer nations, and India played a major role in it.

In such efforts, India has also received help from domestic NGOs, such as CUTS (Consumer
Unity and Trust Society), which supports development-oriented initiatives.

However, it is important to note that India’s engagement with NGOs is largely controlled by
the state. The government often strategically manages and limits which organizations get
access and influence. This makes the process top-down and selective, rather than inclusive
and participatory.

Like many other Asian governments, the Indian state acts as a strong gatekeeper, deciding
when and how non-state actors can participate in national and international issues.

India in International Organizations and Global Governance

India’s behavior in international organizations is both important and revealing, given its long
history of activism in such institutions.
During the Cold War, India followed a Third Worldist approach—standing in solidarity with
developing countries and promoting reform of global economic structures. It played a
leading role in UNCTAD, pushing for a “New International Economic Order,” and in the
GATT, where it championed developmental concerns.

Today, although this Third Worldist rhetoric has faded, India still does not act as an upholder
of existing international regimes—old or new.

India and the World Trade Organization (WTO)

The WTO is a particularly interesting case. Unlike the IMF and World Bank, which use
weighted voting systems favoring rich countries, the WTO is a consensus-based
organization. It has even adjusted its decision-making norms to ensure that rising powers like
India are included in the core negotiation groups.

Given these favorable conditions, one might expect India to be more loyal and cooperative
within the WTO. Yet, this has not been the case.

In 2003, during the Cancún Ministerial Conference, India was labeled one of the “can’t-do
countries.” Later, in 2008, journalist Alan Beattie from the Financial Times called India’s chief
negotiator “Dr. No.”

India continues to use a highly distributive strategy, even in a forum that supports its
participation and represents its interests well. Despite repeated appeals for India and other
rising powers to take on greater responsibility for promoting free trade, India still insists on
special treatment for developing countries.

India and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

India’s stance within the IMF shows even more skepticism. Its reluctance to take on new global
responsibilities is understandable, since the IMF’s governance structure is less favorable to
BRIC countries than the WTO’s.

When European countries hoped that the BRIC nations would help fund recovery from the
global financial crisis, India’s response was lukewarm.

At an IMF meeting in April 2012, then–Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee stated:

“We feel that EU efforts should continue to play the primary role for its members as
and when the situation so demands. We feel that IMF assistance should only
underpin the EU’s efforts and play a catalytic role in order to provide confidence to
 investors. We would also stress that any financial contributions made should be
voluntary and not in any way linked with future voice or governance reform.”

In other words, India supported the principle of voluntary contribution, while refusing to tie
such contributions to IMF voting reforms.

However, India continues to demand structural reform of the IMF. Along with its BRICS
partners, it insists that any additional contributions (such as India’s US$10 billion pledge in
June 2012) must be linked to long-promised reforms—particularly the revision of voting
shares agreed upon in 2010.

In parallel, the BRICS countries have started developing new alternatives (or BATNAs) to the
current global financial system—a classic distributive strategy.

The Delhi Declaration (March 2012) outlined ideas such as:

●​ Creating a BRICS Development Bank to fund infrastructure and sustainable growth;

and​

●​ Developing a credit system using local currencies under the BRICS Interbank
Cooperation Mechanism, which could reduce their dependence on the US dollar.​

India in Other Multilateral Institutions

A similar pattern can be seen in other international institutions.

Scholar Xenia Dormandy notes that, aside from India’s active participation in UN
peacekeeping and the tsunami response group, its government has been less enthusiastic
about global burden-sharing mechanisms.

She explains that many Indian policymakers see little reason to take on greater international
responsibilities, due to their high costs and fears that India might be viewed as a pawn of the
United States.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: A Partial Exception

The one regime where India seems to behave differently is nuclear non-proliferation.

India has a strong record of not spreading nuclear weapons technology to other states. In
this respect, it acts more responsibly than some of the officially recognized nuclear weapon
states (NWS).
Indian officials often argue that India’s 1998 nuclear tests did not violate international
obligations because the country was never a signatory to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Moreover, India made voluntary commitments—such as its “no first use” nuclear
policy—which suggest a degree of self-restraint.

This could be interpreted as evidence that India takes its international responsibilities
seriously, especially given its acceptance of inspections for civilian nuclear facilities under
the 123 Agreement with the US.

However, another interpretation is equally valid. Conducting nuclear tests outside the NPT
framework, and then promising restraint afterward, can also be seen as a minimal level of
responsibility.

In reality, India’s agenda-setting behavior in this area has been disruptive. The special
exceptions made for India—recognizing it as a de facto nuclear weapon state—have blurred
the lines between NWS and non-NWS, which form the core distinction of the
non-proliferation regime.

Although India’s deal with the US was a diplomatic success, it is still unclear how effectively
the division between civilian and military nuclear facilities will be maintained in practice.

Ultimately, the commitments on inspections and technology trade are a small price for the
huge gain of achieving international legitimacy as a nuclear power—without ever signing the
NPT.

Therefore, even within the non-proliferation regime, India’s basic negotiation style—focused
on autonomy and distributive outcomes—has not fundamentally changed.

Summary

In summary, India’s behavior in global institutions remains cautious, interest-driven, and

autonomy-focused.

●​ In the WTO, India defends developing-country privileges rather than leading

liberalization.​

●​ In the IMF, it contributes selectively and insists on governance reforms before taking
more responsibility.​

●​ In broader global governance, it avoids overcommitment and carefully protects its

sovereignty.​

●​ Only in nuclear non-proliferation does India appear more cooperative—but even there,
its actions primarily serve to enhance its own legitimacy rather than strengthen the
 regime itself.​

India, therefore, remains a strategic and selective participant in global

governance—assertive in protecting its interests, cautious about commitments, and determined
to preserve its independence and status as a rising power.

Responsible to Whom, and Why?

The previous analysis shows that many continuities remain between post-independence
India and rising India in terms of its negotiation strategy, coalition behavior, and framing
style.

India still mainly uses a distributive strategy—seeking to protect its own interests rather than
making major compromises. Its coalition choices show a reluctance to align (or
“bandwagon”) with Western powers and a preference for bloc-style groupings with developing
countries. Its moralistic framing—where it justifies policies using the language of fairness and
justice—has softened somewhat but still remains present, even as more pragmatic reasoning
occasionally appears.

These habits have deep cultural and historical roots, but they are also reinforced by
developmental challenges at home. The following example illustrates how these domestic
and strategic factors interact.

Case Example: The 2008 WTO Agricultural Deadlock

In the July 2008 WTO negotiations, India was widely blamed for the collapse of talks. The
main disagreement was over agriculture. India, leading a group of developing countries,
demanded greater flexibility through the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) and called for
a reduction in U.S. farm subsidies.

India’s Commerce Minister Kamal Nath defended this stance, saying:

“For us, agriculture involves the livelihoods of the poorest farmers who number in
the hundreds of millions. We cannot have a development Round without outcomes
that protect livelihood and food security in developing countries. The poor of the
world will not forgive us if we compromise on these concerns. These concerns are
too vital to be traded away.”

India’s refusal to compromise on agriculture became a major reason for the breakdown of the
talks. While India’s traditional negotiation culture partly explains this behavior, domestic realities
were equally decisive.
Agriculture contributes less and less to India’s GDP—falling from 18.1% in 2006–07 to 16.6%
in 2009–10—yet it employs over half the population (about 52% of the workforce in
2010–11). Reforming such a low-productivity sector could have been vital for growth, but it
risked jeopardizing millions of rural livelihoods.

Other domestic constraints—like a weak manufacturing base, low literacy, high corruption,
and poor welfare systems—make it hard to absorb displaced agricultural workers. Combined
with India’s food security and price stability goals, these factors explain its defensive
(distributive) stance on trade liberalization.

The same pattern appears in India’s climate negotiations, where it prefers voluntary
commitments rather than binding emission targets.

Coalitions, Framing, and Domestic Pressures

India’s continued preference for balancing coalitions (rather than alliances with major powers)
and moralistic framing also reflects its domestic social and economic pressures.

Although India has benefited from globalization, the gains have been unevenly distributed.
Economic growth has not eliminated poverty or inequality—with around 25% of Indians still
living below the poverty line. Given such realities, India naturally feels closer to developing
country coalitions than to Western powers.

Its wariness toward alliances—formal or informal—is a legacy of both its non-aligned past
and its ongoing developmental challenges.

In terms of rhetoric, India’s discourse has grown more pragmatic and issue-specific. For
example, in trade talks, it now focuses on specific policies such as the SSM in agriculture,
rather than broad ideological appeals to a “new international economic order.”

However, moral arguments remain powerful. Kamal Nath’s fiery statement during the 2008
talks captures this tone:

“Are we expected to stand by and watch a surge in imports destroy the livelihoods
of hundreds of millions? Should we let developed countries keep subsidizing and
dumping products on us, endangering billions of lives? Their self-righteousness will
not do. If it means no deal, so be it.”

This quote shows how moral language and defensive strategy continue to shape India’s
negotiation style, especially when domestic livelihoods are at stake.

Patterns Across Different Negotiation Arenas

India’s responsibility behavior—or how it sees its obligations internationally—depends on
whom it is negotiating with:

●​ With established powers, India mainly uses distributive strategies to protect its
autonomy.​

●​ With MNCs and NGOs, the state maintains control, showing similar distributive
behavior.​

●​ With other rising powers, India adopts a mixed strategy—part competition, part
cooperation.​

●​ With smaller developing countries, it uses a more integrative strategy, showing

willingness to share benefits and leadership.​

India’s coalition choices mirror this pattern. It continues to balance against Western powers,
while forming or leading alliances with developing nations—such as BASIC (on climate),
G20, and G33 (in the WTO).

These groups are mostly composed of developing countries, showing that India’s
coalition-building remains rooted in bloc-style solidarity rather than broad North–South
cooperation.

Even in its language (framing), India adjusts tone based on context:

●​ With developing partners, it speaks of “co-development,” “partnership,” and

“South–South cooperation.”​

●​ With developed countries, it often returns to moralistic justifications like fairness and
justice, especially when resisting pressure to make concessions.​

Interpreting India’s Sense of Responsibility

These variations help explain how India views its international responsibilities.

When responsibility involves sharing global burdens—such as funding international financial

rescues, accepting binding emission targets, or supporting free trade—India shows reluctance.
This is visible in its distributive strategies and defensive stance toward established powers
and global institutions.
However, India is more willing to take responsibility at a “club” level, supporting smaller
developing countries. It often lets weaker partners “free-ride” in coalitions and actively
promotes their interests.

This behavior mirrors post-independence India’s moral commitment to the Global South, but
now with greater capability due to India’s stronger economy and global status.

Why India Acts This Way

Whether rising India’s motives differ from post-independence India’s remains open to study, but
likely both moral and strategic logics are at work.

1.​ The Logic of Appropriateness:​

India continues to act as a leader of the marginalized, consistent with its historical
identity from the first half-century after independence—championing justice and equality
for developing nations.​

2.​ The Logic of Consequences:​

Supporting smaller allies strengthens India’s influence in international forums and
legitimizes its claim to leadership. Balancing with the developing world helps India
counter Western dominance while promoting its own rise.​

Given India’s domestic inequalities, it would be politically difficult to justify major contributions
to global public goods (like European debt relief or IMF bailouts). However, providing “club
goods”—such as aid and technical assistance to poorer countries—fits both its moral image
and strategic interests.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the analysis above, two central questions arise:

●​ How can other countries engage more effectively with India?​

●​ And what lessons can India itself learn as it seeks to fulfill its Great Power ambitions?​

1. Policy Recommendations for India’s Negotiation

Partners
The evidence shows that India is a tougher negotiating partner for some actors than
others.

●​ With established powers, private companies, and international organizations, India

tends to play hardball, using a distributive strategy to protect its autonomy.​

●​ With other rising powers, India shows mixed behavior—sometimes cooperative,

sometimes competitive.​

●​ Only smaller developing countries and LDCs find India consistently cooperative, often
benefiting from its support.​

Despite years of engagement, these first groups have not succeeded in changing India’s
fundamental negotiating behavior:

●​ India has achieved nuclear legitimacy but still refuses to sign the NPT.​

●​ The Indo-US relationship, while improved, remains far from an alliance.​

●​ Despite strong interest from multinational corporations, India’s bureaucracy

continues to make doing business difficult.​

●​ At the WTO, even after gaining a place at the top table, India remains reluctant to make
concessions that could promote free trade.​

In short, Western engagement and concessions have not turned India into a conformist or
pro-West actor, and there is little evidence that it will become one soon.

Two policy lessons follow from this insight.

1.1. Reframe Engagement as a Bargaining Game

A major mistake by established powers and international institutions has been assuming that
greater inclusion automatically leads to greater cooperation. Instead, engagement with
India (and other rising powers) should be treated as a bargaining game, not a gift of prestige.

Market size alone should not be enough to secure seats in key global forums or attract deeper
partnerships. Rising powers should also demonstrate a willingness to share international
responsibilities—for example, by:

●​ Signing key global treaties that uphold existing norms; or​

 ●​ Taking on a higher share of global burdens than most others, such as funding
initiatives, peacekeeping, or trade liberalization.​

So far, rising powers (including India) have resisted linking “reform” with “responsibility”, as
seen in the IMF governance debates. A more conditional approach to inclusion may help align
expectations more clearly.

1.2. Encourage India to Define Alternative Responsibilities

In cases where India (and other BRICS members) strongly resist Western expectations, a
different strategy may be more effective—encouraging India to propose alternative concepts
of global responsibility.

This approach rests on a practical insight: India’s resistance may not come from selfishness, but
from its disagreement with the values underlying certain Western-led norms. Expecting
India to adopt values it does not share would contradict the principles of genuine international
accountability.

Instead of constant criticism, India could be encouraged to articulate what kind of “public
goods” it is willing to provide—perhaps in development cooperation, South–South
solidarity, or climate adaptation.

Such engagement could produce innovative and inclusive ideas, allowing rising powers to
define shared norms that reflect their own values. Since India and others have not yet fully
articulated their vision of global order, this dialogue would be a timely way to help shape that
vision.

2. Policy Recommendations for India as a Rising Power

India, too, can take several steps to protect its national interests while strengthening its
claims to Great Power status.

2.1. Strengthen Domestic Capacity First

Indian negotiators often find their hands tied by domestic development challenges, which
limit their international flexibility. To take on more global responsibility, India must first fulfill its
responsibility to its own citizens.
For example, India could play a larger role in WTO agricultural reform if it addressed key
domestic weaknesses, such as:

●​ Improving literacy and education levels;​

●​ Expanding infrastructure investment;​

●​ Reforming land and agricultural subsidies;​

●​ Encouraging growth in manufacturing; and​

●​ Reducing corruption.​

These changes would give millions of small farmers and workers alternative livelihoods,
allowing India to make trade and investment concessions without endangering domestic
stability.

A more developed and equitable India will be better positioned to act responsibly on the global
stage. However, India does not need to wait for complete development before negotiating
effectively—there are steps it can take immediately.

2.2. Emphasize the Responsibilities It Already Shoulders

India’s continued efforts to provide “club goods”—shared benefits for smaller developing
nations—should be more widely recognized.

From its post-independence leadership of the Third World to today’s South–South

cooperation programs, India has consistently offered technical aid, trade preferences, and
capacity-building to poorer nations.

When Indian negotiators are accused of failing to act like a responsible power, they could
adopt a less defensive posture by pointing to these alternative contributions. India’s
support for LDCs and African economies, for example, represents a different but meaningful
form of international responsibility.

However, if India wishes to transition from a rising power to a true Great Power, it will
eventually need to go beyond “club goods” and accept some role in providing global public
goods—such as climate leadership, peacekeeping, or financial stability.

2.3. Clarify Which Global Public Goods It Can Provide

A third strategy for India is to clearly signal which global public goods it is prepared to
support, instead of merely rejecting others’ proposals.

At present, India has not yet developed a clear national vision of what kind of global order it
wants to help build. Opening domestic policy debates on this issue would be a valuable first
step.

By identifying its own vision of global responsibility and cooperating with other rising
powers and Western actors to achieve it, India could demonstrate real leadership while
staying true to its values and priorities.

Summary

In short:

●​ For India’s partners, engagement should be strategic, conditional, and open to

alternative frameworks of responsibility.​

●​ For India itself, the path to Great Power status lies in balancing moral leadership with
practical responsibility—strengthening its domestic base, articulating its own global
vision, and gradually assuming a fairer share of global burdens.​

If India manages to link its historic moral leadership with modern pragmatic responsibility,
it could emerge not only as a rising power, but as a credible and respected global leader.