Sir John Slessor: RAF Pioneer Biography
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ScribdTranslationsSir John Slessor: RAF Pioneer Biography
Translated by
ScribdTranslationsSIR JOHN COTESWORTH SLESSOR
The future has many names. For the weak, it is the unattainable. For the fearful,
To the unknown. For the brave, it is the opportunity.
BIOGRAPHY.
Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Cotesworth Slessor, (June 3, 1897 - 12
of July 1979), was also known as Jack Slessor, was a high commander of the
Royal Air Force (RAF).
Son of Major Arthur Kerr Slessor and Adelaide Slessor, Slessor was born in Ranikhet, India,
June 3, 1897, and he was educated at Haileybury. Crippled in both legs as a result of
polio was rejected by the military service in 1914
As a pilot in the Royal Flying Corps during World War I, he flew with the
Squadron No. 17 in the Middle East, winning the Military Cross, and with Squadron No. 5
in the Western Front, where he was awarded the Belgian War Cross. Among the
wars commanded Squadron No. 4 in England and Wing No. 3 (India), obtaining the
Distinguished service order.
As the best air philosopher of the Royal Air Force, Slessor showed great talent for
his ability to create a synergy between experience and theory. In 1936 he wrote the
pioneering text "Air Power and Armies" on strategic aerial bombing; in the
World War II.
He had several operational commands during World War II, such as the Command
Costero in 1943 and 1944 was credited with having done much to change the course of the
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Battle of the Atlantic using long-range bombers against the
German submarines.
He was knighted in June 1943. In the final stages of the war, he became
in command of the RAF in the Mediterranean and Middle East and the Lieutenant
General commander-in-chief of the Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean, leading
operations in the Italian and Yugoslav Campaign.
Slessor went on to serve in the most important position in the RAF as Chief of the Air Staff.
from the Air, in the early 1950s, and was considered a strong advocate of the
strategic bombings and nuclear deterrence. Upon his retirement, he published two more books,
including an autobiography.
He died in Wiltshire on July 12, 1979. His son John also joined the RAF.
ascending to the rank of group captain.
ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC THINKING.
One of Slessor's thoughts, who was part of a group of thinkers
referred to as the 'moderate air pioneers' is about the complete delusion of
mobility and the tactical flexibility of air power; this leader indicates that it is necessary to
concentrate maximum strength on any task that may be decisive, or contribute to the
the most useful way to the final decision. This is a principle of supreme importance in the
air war and in fact is the key to the entire strategy of air power. Based on this
In our Air Force, we find these two strengths: mobility and...
As the flexibility within the Aerospace Doctrine, we can realize that
Slessor was very forward-looking and visionary for his time.
Another maxim of this thinker indicates that air power must be used in a way
concentrated, where its influence was more likely to have been decisive at that moment,
whether in defense against a major offensive, in attack or against production sources
enemies on the ground.
It also indicates that all the art of aerial warfare is, first of all, the capacity to
select the correct target at a given moment, that is, an attack
can be decisive and contribute in the most effective way to a final decision,
concentrating all power in a center of gravity, leaving only the minimum employment
essential for the security of air bases.
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In his book Air Power and Armies, Slessor defended the use of air power in
support of ground forces in interdiction missions: attacking the rear
enemy and sowing chaos in the command, logistics, communications systems
and units that were heading towards the front.
Slessor, however, was opposed to an excessive use of close air support,
for being more reactive and needing close coordination with the units
about the ground. Slessorno understood air power as a tool
subordinate to the land military power. I thought that both should act in
set, and for that reason, he recommended that the land operation plans
they incorporate the air factor as a necessary component. Currently the
operations are not carried out separately for each of the forces, in the case of
it is very necessary for our country to implement and adopt a doctrine of employment
set to face the new threats that currently endanger the
security of our state.
Additional stated that the supply and communication lines of the army
enemigo eran considerados un Centro de Gravedad clave, y que si se interrumpía y
neutralized the enemy's transport system, their army would not only be incapable of
not only offer resistance but the entire country would also become paralyzed and vulnerable. For
in the case of the Ecuadorian Air Force, we do possess this doctrine of Centers of
Gravity found within the Intelligence Manual, considering that 'The
the essence of operational art is to determine the adversary's center of gravity and the best
way to neutralize it to prevent it from achieving its objectives, while we ensure the
protection of the own CG to achieve our objectives.
This paralysis, in turn, would have a decisive effect on the ability and the will of the
enemy nation. Essentially, Slessor proposed air interdiction at the strategic level.
operational. For this reason, the RAF rightly pressed for such an air campaign against
Germany in 1944. The 'transport plan,' as it was called, really proved to be
successful in ensuring the success of the landings in Normandy by restricting
drastically the flow of German reinforcements to the operational area. In addition,
widespread destruction of the German railway system in Western Europe had
devastating effects on the total war effort, just as Slessor had predicted.
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CONCLUSIONS.
Based on the analysis above, we will conclude the following:
Despite being lame in both legs, he was a pilot in World War I.
Royal Air Force.
During World War II, he was Coastal Commander in 1943 and 1944, he changed the
course of the Battle of the Atlantic through the use of long-range bombers
against the German submarines.
His greatest work was 'Air Power and Armies' which talks about aerial bombing.
strategic.
His most outstanding thoughts about the use of operational art are:
Full use of the mobility and tactical flexibility of air power.
Air power must be used in a concentrated manner.
the ability to select the right target at a given moment.
He defended the use of air power in support of ground forces in
interdiction missions.
He was against excessive use of close air support.
I did not understand air power as a tool subordinate to power.
land military.
The supply and communication lines of the enemy army were
Key Center of Gravity.
The widespread destruction of the railway system.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
● [Link]
2016_Debate_Primacy_AirPower_JavierJordan.pdf
● [Link]
● [Link]
Basic Aerospace Doctrine, Educational Command and Air Force Doctrine
Ecuadorian.
●Manual of Intelligence, Command of Education and Doctrine of the Air Force
Ecuadorian.
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