UNIVERSITY "ST.

CYRIL AND METHODIUS"

SKOPJE

FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE

WESTERN BALKAN DEMOCRATIES

AUTHOR'S SUMMARY

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

June 2025
SKOPJE

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 ABSTRACT
With the easing of tensions between the Soviet Union and its allies who together
formed the Eastern Bloc, and the United States with its allies who formed the Western
Bloc, Europe faced new security threats and challenges different from those that were
current in the era of bipolarity. The frenzy of civil war and political instability in the
Western Balkans (WB) countries enabled Al Qaeda and other militant Islamist
organizations to infiltrate some of the countries on the Balkan Peninsula. The increased
engagement of the international community in the resolution of the civil war in the
former Yugoslavia and the possibility of new states integrating into collective security
systems resulted in an end to violence and a partial stabilization of the security and
political situation in the WB.

The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11 were a kind of
announcement that global terrorism poses a serious threat to the stability of the WB.
The accession of the WB countries to the US-led Global Coalition to Combat Terrorism,
as well as the partial cessation of financial funds (especially from Saudi Arabia) for the
spread of the ideology of militant Islamism in the Balkan Peninsula, had a positive
impact on political regional stability. Based on these factors, compared to the Middle
East, Western Europe and North Africa, the international community did not perceive
the WB region at all as a key region for the positioning and spread of militant Islamism.
However, the Arab Spring and the events that followed proved that the WB is no longer
just a transit region or a destination for rest and rehabilitation of militant Islamists who
participated in the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Libya and Syria. As a region
characterized by weak border control, an abundance of illegal and cheap weapons,
organized crime groups, and in which the radicalization of the Muslim community is
gaining momentum, towards the end of the first and beginning of the second decade of
the 21st century, the Western Balkans region became a base for recruiting potential
activists in religious extremism and thereby spreading extremism in Central and
Western Europe. Accordingly, religious extremism has grown into a serious security
threat, not only for the Western Balkans countries, but also for the peace and security of
the European continent.

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 INTRODUCTION

As a threat to the regional security of the Western Balkans, religious extremism is a

topic that has not been fully explored at the national and regional levels. As a global
threat to international peace and security, the topic is covered in Yousef H. Abul-Enain’s
work “Militant Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat”, while, as a threat to
regional security, in Christopher DeLiso’s work “The Future Balkan Caliphate: The
Threat of Radical Islam in Europe and the West”. The conclusions of the
aforementioned works point to the fact that the spread of religious extremism poses a
serious threat to global peace and security that requires a serious approach by state
leaders. Among other things, the re-Islamization of the Muslim population is emphasized
as one of the key factors for its radicalization and recruitment by militant Islamist
structures. Creating conditions for the establishment of a global caliphate, of which the
Western Balkans is an inseparable part, is the main focus of the aforementioned works.

According to the authors of the two works mentioned, the solution to the problem is
possible only through a constructive and comprehensive approach offered by the
theoretical framework of regional security, with an emphasis on discovering the center
of gravity of militant Islamism. In this context, the national governments of the WB
countries must precisely distinguish between the concepts of Islam, Islamism and
militant Islamism, and vigorously oppose the ideology of militant Islamism.

The mentioned works, which represent the basic benchmark for the research in
question, do not fully cover the genesis of militant Islamism, the reasons for the
intensified process of re-Islamization, the activities of militant Islamist organizations, as
well as the specific consequences for the regional security of the WB. Complementing
the mentioned shortcomings and the possibility of their implementation in the national
security systems of the WB countries, is the only motive that encouraged me to
approach the planning and implementation of this scientific research that will result in a
scientific paper appropriate to the proposed title.

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 The following key terms will be used for this research:

Islam – a monotheistic religion proclaimed by the prophet Muhammad in the 7th

century AD. The term Islam, which in Arabic means submission, surrender or
submission, emphasizes the fundamental idea of Islam, that the believer (called a
Muslim) accepts to surrender to the will of God (Allah). For followers of Islam, Allah
represents the only God – the creator, maintainer and restorer of the world. Today, more
than 1.5 billion Muslims live in the world, divided into several religious groups, starting
from the main sects led by the Shiites, Sunnis and Sufis, as well as the numerous
doctrinal sects that arise from them.

Islamism – a political ideology that strives to create a state and society based on
religion and Sharia law. However, Islamism is not a homogeneous and monolithic form.
On the contrary, Islamism consists of several directions that differ in terms of the goal
and the means for its realization. A small number of Islamists support violence as a
means to an end. Most of them are focused on promoting the global “Da’wa” (Islamic
Call) whose goal is to protect Muslim identity and faith from the influence of non-
believers. The third form of Islamism focuses on achieving the goal through political
activities within the structure of the established political system of the countries in which
Islamists operate.

Islamist – an individual who supports Islamism, i.e. an individual who uses religious
arguments in order to achieve a certain political goal. Militant Islamism – a term that
refers to a group or individuals who use violence to achieve political goals inspired by
Islamist ideology. Militant Islamism calls for the strictest interpretation of the Quran, the
works and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Such a strict interpretation of Islam is
equally contrary to the beliefs of both Muslims and non-Muslims. Militant Islamists are
against Western democracies, Middle Eastern governments and institutions, and
Islamist political parties that participate in the electoral processes in the countries in
which they are active without the use of violence. Although militant Islamists advocate

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the formation of an Islamic state, they are characterized by a lack of a socioeconomic
agenda and an emphasis on the use of force against other Muslims and non-Muslims.

Violent extremism - Violent extremism is the belief and actions of people who support
or use violence to achieve ideological, religious, or political goals. This includes
terrorism and other forms of politically motivated and communal violence. When a
person's beliefs change from relatively conventional to radical and they want drastic
change in society, this is known as radicalization. This is not necessarily bad and does
not mean that these people will become violent. However, if a person or group decides
that fear, terror and violence are justified in order to achieve ideological, political or
social change, and then acts accordingly, this is violent extremism.

There are many different types of violent extremism. Motivations vary and many of
them are usually related to specific ideologies (for example, interpretations of political
movements or religious beliefs), issues such as environmental or economic problems,
or ethnic or separatist causes. People can also be motivated by more than one issue.
All forms of violent extremism seek change through fear and intimidation, rather than
through peaceful means.

The motivation for violent extremism in Australia is often political. This includes right-
wing or nationalist extremism that aims to preserve a perceived majority culture (usually
white/Anglo-Saxon culture/race) at the expense of other cultures. These ideologies
justify violence on the grounds of patriotism or a belief in superiority over other cultures
and races. There are a small number of extreme nationalist groups in Australia, some of
which promote white supremacist beliefs. They are sometimes called hate groups
because of their racist and dehumanizing propaganda, which promotes anti-immigration
(e.g. "keep Australia white"), anti-Semitic or anti-Islamic beliefs. While their views are
offensive to many, their words and actions are not necessarily illegal. However, using or
advocating violence to promote these or other beliefs is always illegal.

Ideological violent extremism can also be motivated by religious beliefs. In this case,
the underlying motivation is also generally political, but is justified by using
interpretations of traditional religious texts and teachings or by following instructions
from influential people here and abroad. There are examples around the world where
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acts of violence have been committed in the name of many different religions. They
have often been planned by small groups or individuals inspired by foreign
organizations such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. A slightly more distant example that bears
witness to the effect of glocalization, namely of a given individual motivated to act
violently by an interpretation of religious beliefs is the Christian fundamentalist and anti-
abortionist Peter James Knight, who killed one person in an attack on an abortion clinic
in Melbourne in 2001. Violent extremism dedicated to a specific issue or cause, such as
animal liberation, environmental activism, or anti-gun control, is known as issue-based
violent extremism. Supporters of this type of violent extremism may include groups that
are anti-government, anti-globalization, or anti-capitalist. Issue-based activism can be
destructive, but it is often used simply to draw attention to a cause through peaceful
means. However, violence, threatening behavior, and/or criminal damage are
sometimes advocated by people who want to take their cause a step further. People or
groups that use or support violence to promote their cause are of great concern and
may be acting illegally.

For example, in 2009, a group purporting to represent the Earth Liberation Front
personally delivered a threatening letter to the CEO of a major international power
company, stating that your property would not be safe.

The actions of groups or individuals involved in violent political or independence

struggles based on race, culture, or ethnicity, or in a regional - either in the region or
more widely, are often described as ethno-nationalist or separatist violent extremism. An
example of an ethno-nationalist or separatist violent extremist group is ETA (Euskadi Ta
Askatasuna), a Basque separatist group that seeks independence from Spain for the
Basque people. Countries with extensive cultural heritage and ethnically diverse
communities are often directly affected by international conflicts/civil wars. For example,
in the 1980s and 1990s, foreigners travelled to the former Yugoslavia, and more
recently, large numbers of Westerners have illegally participated in conflicts in
Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon and Somalia. Some people who trained or fought abroad
have also attempted to commit acts of violent extremism in their home countries after
returning home from conflict zones. There are examples of individuals being arrested for

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intentionally raising money to support proscribed international terrorist organizations
involved in ethnically motivated conflicts. For example, people have been convicted of
financing terrorism by raising money in Australia to support the Tamil Tigers of Sri
Lanka. While such conflicts can evoke strong emotions in communities in Australia, and
many feel a duty to help those affected, it is important to be aware of the legality of any
measures taken.

Religious extremism – refers to any form of religion that opposes democratic values
such as the rule of law, individual freedoms and mutual respect and tolerance for
cultural diversity or for members of different faiths and beliefs. Religious extremism is a
complex phenomenon and is often present in a latent, more hidden form that makes it
difficult to identify.

Simply put, it can be defined as activities (namely beliefs, attitudes, feelings, activities,
strategies, etc.), which are part of a character whose practice is far removed from every-
day, general religious activity. In a conflict situation, religious extremism manifests itself
in a different form that aims to induce a conflict situation. However, labeling certain
activities, people and groups as religious extremism, while determining what is normal
versus extreme in a given context, is quite often a subjective and political matter. Thus,
when locating religious extremism, when we talk about potential difficulties and
problems, we allude to the moment when the same extremist act will be perceived by
one group as moral (for example, the pro-social “struggle for freedom”), while by
another group the same act will be experienced as injustice and immorality (anti-social
“terrorism”) depending on the context of the observer, i.e. the set of values, policies,
moral awareness, as well as the nature of the connection with the specific actors.

Religious extremism often employs violent methods, although extremists differ in the
types of violent and nonviolent tactics they prefer, the level of violence, and the types of
targets they target, such as infrastructure, military personnel, civilians, or children.
Groups with low to medium power often target direct, episodic forms of violence (such
as suicide bombings), while dominant groups tend to seek connections with power
structures or institutionalized forms of action (such as the covert use of torture or the
informal sanctioning of police brutality). Regional security – is a theory of international

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relations presented by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver and further developed in their joint
work published in 2003, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security.
Buzan and Weaver are known as the key figures behind the influential Copenhagen
School of Security Studies, where an important aspect is the study of security as a
social construct.

Namely, regional security is defined as distinct and stable forms of security interaction
between actors. Models of regional security differ from each other through the degree of
interaction. The level of interaction in related models of regional security is significantly
higher compared to heterogeneous models.

1. Formulation of the research problem

Before the fall of communism in the Western Balkans region, the Muslim population of
the Balkans was completely isolated from the ideological turmoil in the rest of the
Muslim world. After the collapse of the communist regime, religious extremism as a form
of collective action began to infiltrate and spread in various parts of the Western
Balkans, especially in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Muslims from the Balkan
Peninsula did not have enough time to gain the necessary experience and knowledge to
cope with the invasion of ideas, ideologies, sects and other social phenomena. As a
result of this isolation, the Muslim community in the former Yugoslavia, especially in
Bosnia, during the civil war and after its end, did not remain immune to ideological
interpretations of Islam and did not build a firm stance regarding pluralism in the Islamic
world.

Helped by allies from the Middle Eastern countries, militant Islamists in Bosnia
organized recruitment centers, training camps and isolated territories organized in the
spirit of traditional Islamic law, Sharia. Some of them participated in a large number of
international terrorist acts that marked the end of the old and the beginning of the new
millennium. The creator and direct participant in the most mass murder in US history,
and also a Bosnian citizen, Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, is just one of a host of militant
Islamists linked to the Balkan Peninsula. The seriousness of the problem became

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particularly apparent when the late US diplomat Richard Holbrooke emphasized in 2008
that “if it had not been for the Dayton Peace Agreement, the 9/11 attacks would most
likely have been planned in Bosnia, not Afghanistan.”

Today, the process that Bosnia went through during the civil war and the post-war
period is a common problem facing all countries of the Western Balkans. Over the past
decades, militant Islamist structures in the WB region have created a sophisticated
network of isolated settlements, sanctuaries, and mosques under the control of radical
Islamists, in which they promoted the heroism of militant Islamists around the world,
conveyed the orders of the Al-Qaeda leader, and recruited young Muslims to join them
and become part of the global jihad.

To date, there have been frequent activities by both international and national security
services in detecting and suppressing Islamist groups and the activities of religious
extremism, which places this phenomenon at the level of a global security threat.
Namely, in this context is the recent activity of the commandos from the Russian FSB
(Federal Security Service) where elite teams for combating terrorism, after continuous
monitoring and coordination with other services in the domain of state and national
security, conducted a complicated and delicate action throughout Moscow, Tatarstan
and the Tyumen region in Siberia, intensively arresting members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, a
radical Islamist organization designated as terrorist in the Russian Federation, which in
this particular case had a so-called emissary role where the goal was to implement the
first segment of the agenda of individualization, recruitment and radicalization, i.e.
influencing and acquiring new members. In their report, the FSB explains that the goal
of such activities by religious extremists is organized penetration into Russia and the
former Soviet countries.

Such activities often indirectly affect the social context, namely the very activity of
masked service members causes unrest, although very often the high expertise of
security service members manages to deal with such threats without the use of
firearms, as was the case with the FSB action.

The rise of religious extremism, specifically the search of the young Muslim population
for a new Muslim identity, has contributed to Islamic religious communities in some of
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the countries of the Western Balkans slowly but surely losing the fight to preserve their
own identity and protect Muslims from the religious and ideological exhibitionism
imposed by Islamism. The number of religious leaders indoctrinated in the most
extreme forms of Islamism typical of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, more
recently, Syria is increasing.

In this context, the threat to the regional security of the Western Balkans would be a
consequence of the inertia of the state leaderships of the countries in the region in
relation to the aggressive methods of spreading and the activities of militant Islamism.
Therefore, in the spirit of regional cooperation and the determination to integrate into
Euro-Atlantic structures and consistently respect European values, the countries of the
Western Balkans have no other alternative than to define an adequate and coordinated
approach to dealing with religious extremism as a potential threat to regional security.

2. Research Subject

In the last few years, the WB has grown into a new front for religious extremism. In the
period from 2010 to 2013, Balkan militant Islamists carried out a series of terrorist
attacks against the institutions of the system, diplomatic and consular missions, critical
infrastructure, foreign armed forces (FAS) and the civilian population. The attack on the
police station in Bugojno (June 2010), in which one police officer was killed and six were
wounded, was followed by an attack by militant Islamists from Kosovo who killed two
members of the US Armed Forces at Frankfurt International Airport (February 2011).
Seven months later, militant Islamists from Sandzak attacked the US Embassy in
Sarajevo (October 2011). After the heinous act of militant Islamists from the Republic of
Macedonia who killed five innocent Macedonian citizens in cold blood on the eve of the
biggest Christian holiday, Easter (April 2012), there followed the terrorist attack at the
Burgas airport in which nine tourists from Israel were killed, and responsibility for the
attack was claimed by an organization close to Al-Qaeda, "The Basis of Jihad" - Qaedat
al-Jihad (October 2012).

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 The large number of volunteers who sympathize with and daily join the Syrian jihadists
is an additional problem facing the countries of the Western Balkans. According to some
estimates, Bosnia and Herzegovina (per capita) leads other European countries in the
number of volunteers in Syria. Also, the number of Albanian, Kosovar, Macedonian and
Serbian citizens who are in the recruitment phase, training or already fighting on the
side of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) should not be underestimated.
The data published by certain governmental and non-governmental organizations is
shocking, according to which the number of volunteers from the Balkan Peninsula who
joined the Syrian jihad is higher compared to the Central Asian or Caucasus region.

An additional enigma is the return of veterans, their impact on the Muslim population
and the security of the Western Balkans. The actions of the Kosovo and Bosnian
security services against militant Islamists suspected of planning terrorist attacks and
spreading the ideology of militant Islamism in Kosovo and Bosnia are a sufficient
indicator of the seriousness of the problem and the future implications for regional
security.

For these reasons, the subject of this research will be the factors and methods of the
spread and operation of religious extremism from the aspect of the regional security of
the Western Balkans.

3. Research Goals and Objectives

3.1 General Research Goal

The general goal of the doctoral thesis is to gain specific knowledge about the factors
that influence the expansion of militant Islamism and to define the specific methods of
action of this threat in order to endanger the regional security of the Western Balkans.

3.2 Specific Research Goals

Based on the general goal of the research, the following specific goals arise:

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 • To make a clear distinction between the terms "Islam", "Islamism" and "militant
Islamism" as elements of religious extremism;

• To determine the genesis of religious extremism in the Western Balkans;

• Analysis of global militant Islamist movements and organizations;

• Further determination and analysis of the factors for the re-Islamization of the Muslim
population in the Western Balkans;

• To analyze the factors influencing the recruitment and joining process of the Muslim
population in the ranks of ISIS;

• To assess the threats and risks from the actions of veterans from jihadist fronts;

• To determine the risk of endangering the regional security of the WB as a result of the
actions of religious extremism.

4. Practical use of the analysis and necessity of future involvement of the research
body in the matter

Based on the analysis of the findings, the study’s recommendations elaborate specific
measures and alternatives to support the prevention and management of religious
radicalization and violent extremism in the context of the countries of the WB region.
These proposals are not exhaustive and aim to address the problems identified in the
four categories of drivers of religious radicalization and violent extremism: socio-
economic, political, cultural and other factors specific to the region. Although these
recommendations are addressed to three main stakeholders – state institutions,
regional Islamic communities and civil society – the study suggests that the
responsibility for preventing and addressing religious radicalization and violent
extremism must be seen as a broader societal responsibility. Therefore, the process of
assimilating the findings and implementing the recommendations must be guided by an
inclusive approach that addresses the challenges affecting the phenomenon and that
empowers agents of change at the national level, and especially at the local level,
bordering the most vulnerable communities.

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 - The State Administration System

The National Security Document of Albania considers the increase in religious

radicalization as a threat to the values of religious harmony in the country and a
potential cause of social unrest. Maintaining social cohesion and religious harmony is of
primary importance and requires the adoption of a range of supportive measures in
order to improve cooperation with religious communities, design informed policies and
undertake legal, institutional, socio-economic, etc. measures, including raising public
awareness to prevent and combat religious radicalization. In this regard, special
attention must be paid to young people and marginalized communities not only in rural
areas, but also in developed suburban locations. The approach of state institutions must
not be limited to reactive crime. Preventing this phenomenon is closely linked to an
inclusive approach and measures that reflect the nature and dynamics of the drivers
that encourage religious radicalization and violent extremism in vulnerable localities and
the local population.

In this context, the study finds that it is essential for state institutions to address the
following measures:

1. Tackling the phenomenon of religious radicalization and violent extremism beyond

the boundaries of the security sector by actively involving state institutions and agencies
working in the areas of local government, education, social affairs and youth,
employment, anti-discrimination, etc., as well as other non-state actors and, above all,
religious communities and civil society. The design of preventive programs and the
involvement of influential stakeholders must be linked to a more active role of state
institutions, especially those at the local level. Increasing the capacities and resources
of the State Committee on Cults must go hand in hand with specifying its competencies
and establishing mechanisms that ensure constant cooperation with religious
communities. Other forms include joint initiatives with independent institutions
(Ombudsman, Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination, etc.) and with non-
state actors in order to prevent the phenomenon and ensure a timely response to
prejudices of a religious background not only among citizens, but also among
representatives of state institutions and administration.

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 2. Alleviating forms of relative deprivation and frustrated expectations, particularly
among young people in peri-urban and rural areas, requires providing additional
opportunities for vocational training and developing the skills required by employers and
establishing, expanding and improving mechanisms aimed at facilitating the transition
from school to work. To this end, state institutions must cooperate with civil society
organizations to disseminate information on opportunities for retraining, scholarships,
employment and sources of funding for community projects, to support and promote
businesses that employ young people and to support young entrepreneurs through
small grant and microcredit schemes.

3. Actions and measures taken in response by law enforcement agencies must be

combined with the option of rehabilitation or religious deradicalization programs in
cooperation with religious communities and civil society. Proactive investigation of cases
of religious radicalization and violent extremism must also include elements that offer
the opportunity to understand the phenomenon from a religious perspective and the
operation of such groups, as well as to divide the roles between individuals who are
instigators, facilitators, supporters, manipulated, etc.

4. The use of violence, victimization and mistreatment of citizens by the police or

security forces can lead to a desire for revenge against them and support for violent
extremist groups. Therefore, law enforcement agency personnel must receive
appropriate training on how to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms and
prevent such situations. At the same time, citizens must be informed of their rights
through civic awareness programs, and community policing must be promoted.

5. The scope of work of the Ministry of Education and Sports (MES), the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Youth and their regional and local agencies must include tackling
religious radicalization and violent extremism in cooperation with local government
units, religious communities, civil society and other stakeholders, such as the private
sector, the media, etc. In addition to the activity of the State Inspectorate for Education
as a mechanism for monitoring and quality control, MES must promote critical thinking
in the curricula of primary and secondary education and train teachers on this
phenomenon. Cooperation must also be extended to retraining and training programs

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coordinated with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the National Employment Service by
undertaking awareness-raising initiatives to combat discrimination and prevent
radicalization among young people.

- Religious body

The Islamic community has the responsibility to identify, counter religious arguments
and report to the state authority’s centers of radical Islamic ideologies that incite violent
extremism on religious grounds. Cooperation with the State Committee for Cults, for
example in Albania, but also with other institutions, especially at the local level, will
strengthen its influence among the arts. Other recommendations and specific measures
aimed at regional Islamic communities, which can also be applied to other religious
communities in the country, include the following:

1. In relation to countering ideologies and perceptions of Western attacks on Islam and

Muslims, regional Islamic communities must foster informed and diverse discourses on
Muslim societies in the contemporary world. In addition, they must support community
voices that reject the victim narrative used by radical religious groups. They must
provide more information and address cases that may cause perceptions of disrespect
and insult to Islam. In cooperation with non-profit organizations and the media, they
must disseminate information on success stories of Muslim believers in the region or
Western countries.

2. Regional Islamic communities must take measures to consolidate the theological

education of imams, especially those in remote rural areas. In addition, clerics must be
trained in the phenomena of radicalization, violent extremism, and conflicting religious
arguments, and they must be trained in how to address these issues with their ummah.
Empowering the associations of theologians and coordinating their activities with clerics
would significantly improve the religious knowledge of believers. Regional Islamic
communities must continue the efforts initiated in the course of resolving the cases of
illegal mosques, as options for their isolation or confrontation. It is essential that these
efforts gain the support of other social actors.

- The Civil Factor

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 Civil society is almost non-existent in fostering or developing an informed discourse on
the tendencies of religious radicalization, Islamophobia and other religious
developments in the country. In general, the public discourse on this phenomenon has
been superficial and has ignored many important aspects of its prevention. The lack of
civil society in remote areas has left a huge gap in addressing this phenomenon and
other social issues in these communities. The proposals are intended for the role of civil
society in raising awareness of and preventing religious radicalization and violent
extremism, which must also be assessed by other actors cooperating with or supporting
civil society activities, such as state institutions, media, donors, the private sector, etc.

1. Mitigating perceptions and effects of social exclusion and marginalization, especially

among young job seekers, can be achieved by using civil society initiatives focused on
youth, women and vulnerable communities by voicing their concerns and addressing
the challenges they face. Programs for the promotion of employment and gender
equality; awareness against discrimination; volunteering; advocacy on youth issues;
civic participation and activism; involvement in policy-making; and the promotion of
forums for discourses on the values of religion, society, the state and democracy are
part of the initiatives that require the involvement of religious communities and concrete
actions by state actors.

2. Non-profit organizations must run and expand their social programs in the form of
vocational and qualification courses, especially in highly underdeveloped rural areas
and in the peripheral areas of urban centers as an option for individuals and households
who find it difficult or impossible to meet their basic needs. In terms of addressing
concerns about the denial of political rights, civil society actors must be involved in
representing the interests and elaborating on the challenges of vulnerable communities.
Continuous monitoring in cooperation with the media must not be limited to identifying
cases of abuse. On the contrary, it must include their commitment to exert pressure on
state institutions to address and prevent them.

1. Civil society must confront the ideologies and proactive agendas of radical religious
groups by establishing forums in which active opinion makers, religious leaders and
theologians participate. Their messages against radical ideologies must go viral on

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social networks, radio, television and school programs. In addition, civil society must
promote public information about the processes of religious radicalization, their causes
and consequences. Last but not least, promoting studies, supporting research and
continuous monitoring to provide an updated database on the phenomenon and its
trends would help policymakers to develop relevant policies, as well as religious
communities and other social actors.

2. Non-profit organizations must implement and expand their social programs (such as
vocational and qualification courses) in underdeveloped rural areas and peripheral
areas of urban centers as an option for individuals and households who find it difficult or
impossible to meet their basic needs. In relation to addressing concerns about the
denial of political rights, civil society actors must engage in representing the interests
and elaborating on the challenges of vulnerable communities. Continuous monitoring in
cooperation with the media must not be limited to identifying cases of abuse. On the
contrary, it must include their commitment to pressuring state institutions to address and
prevent them.

3. Civil society must counter the ideologies and proactive agendas of radical religious
groups by establishing forums in which active opinion makers, religious leaders and
theologians participate. Their messages against radical ideologies must go viral on
social media, radio, television and school programs. In addition, civil society must
promote public information on the processes of religious radicalization, their causes and
consequences. Last but not least, promoting studies, supporting research and
continuous monitoring to provide an updated database on the phenomenon and its
trends would help policymakers to develop relevant policies, as well as religious
communities and other social actors.

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