Ivler v.

San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010
Carpio, J.
Topic: Article 365

Case Doctrine/s:

For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,
would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not
the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is
single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes
and prosecutions.”

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce's
husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce's vehicle. Petitioner posted
bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On September 7, 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367
and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved
to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second
punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, in a petition for
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the suspension of
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on May 17, 2005,
invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner's motion,
the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner's absence, cancelled
his bail and ordered his arrest. The MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Relying on the
arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A.
No. 2803 for petitioner's loss of standing to maintain the suit.
In an Order dated February 2, 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly
grounding its ruling on petitioner's forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising
from the MeTC's order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC
effectively affirmed the MeTC.

Petitioner laments the RTC's failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803.
Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his prosecution in Criminal Case No.
82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense
of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the
multiple consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Issue/s:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 82366
2. Whether petitioner's constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366

Ruling/s:

1. No, petitioner's non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did
not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803.

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant's escape from custody or violation

of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the
appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the
appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review
judgments of convictions.

The mischief in the RTC's treatment of petitioner's non-appearance at his

arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing becomes
more evident when one considers the Rules of Court's treatment of a defendant who
absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's absence merely renders his
bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman
fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and,
should he fail to surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or
 acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the
accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert
the accused's status to that of a fugitive without standing.

2. Yes, the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from

prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.

The accused's negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. It is not disputed that petitioner's
conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid charge.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its Consequences on Persons and Property

are Material Only to Determine the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution

for the Same Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded the Supreme Court’s unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with
People v. Diaz, decided in [Link] reason for this consistent stance of extending
the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses
was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a
subsequent prosecution for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence" because of the accused's prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the
Court explained: “Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or
acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be
prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal
negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony.
The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it
does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single,
whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.”

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC
succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually
incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both
under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single
prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two categories: (1) when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from
its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other. The legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the
accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of
the penalty for the most serious crime. In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule
penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude . . . behind the act,
the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight . . .," a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one
quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.