DRAFT RESOLUTION 1.

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Committee: DISEC ( Disarmament and International Security Committee )
Topic: Denuclearisation in the Middle East
Sponsors: Republic of India, Republic of Canada,
Signatories: United Kingdom, Japan, Us, Israel, France, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Russia, Iran, Germany, Palestine, Turkey

Acknowledging that India,while refraining from accession to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear-Weapons (NPT) due to its inherent discrimination
between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, nonetheless encourages all
states parties to fully comply with their obligations under the treaty, particularly the
disarmament commitment contained in article VI, as an essential step towards toward
genuine global nuclear disarmament,

Recognizing that effective and equitable denuclearization must be undertaken only

when the united nations general assembly, by two-thirds majority, determines that a
specific nuclear programme or stockpile constitutes a threat to international peace and
security, thereby ensuring that any action reflects the collective judgment of the
international community rather than unilateral or politically motivated decisions,

Highlighting that selective, priority-based denuclearisation—focusing first on regions

and facilities posing the highest risk—offers a practical step toward the eventual goal
of complete global disarmament,

1. Calls upon all Middle Eastern states to undertake confidence-building measures

under UN supervision, to be implemented as follows:

a. Voluntary transparency measures in nuclear programs, including regular public

reporting on nuclear energy activities;
b. Regional dialogues facilitated by the United Nations to foster trust, reduce
misperceptions, and promote cooperative security;
c. The creation of regional monitoring groups composed of representatives from
Middle Eastern states, supported by international observers, to encourage dialogue and
peer accountability;
d. Exchange of scientific expertise and training programs in nuclear safety and
security, coordinated through the IAEA;
2. Recommends the formation of the International Selective Nuclear Risk Reduction
Agreement (ISNRRA) to create a targeted, enforceable, and balanced mechanism for
identifying, verifying, and dismantling nuclear programmes that pose a demonstrable
threat to international peace and security while preserving the sovereign right of all
States to pursue peaceful nuclear energy:
a. The Agreement shall be mandated to:
i. establish a Critical Nuclear Threat (CNT) designation process whereby any Member
State, the IAEA Board of Governors, or a recognised regional organisation may
submit evidence to the UN General Assembly, which shall decide by a two-thirds
majority whether a programme, facility, or stockpile constitutes a CNT, this
determination being based on impartial technical review, documented evidence of
weapons intent, and a verified risk of diversion or use;
ii. create an Independent Technical and Assessment Panel (ITAP) composed of
twenty-five members including ten IAEA safeguards experts from all regional groups,
five nuclear scientists nominated by neutral non-NPT States such as India, Brazil, and
South Africa, five representatives of recognised international scientific bodies, and
five specialists in satellite imaging, cyber-monitoring, and arms-control law, all tasked
with conducting site inspections, environmental sampling, forensic analysis of fissile
material, satellite and aerial surveillance, and supply-chain tracking of dual-use
components;
iii. negotiate, within thirty days of a CNT designation, a comprehensive
dismantlement schedule with the concerned State specifying each facility, warhead,
and delivery system to be decommissioned, setting interim milestones not exceeding
twenty-four months in total duration, guaranteeing uninterrupted operation of civilian
nuclear power plants and medical isotope facilities outside the CNT scope, and
including detailed safety and environmental protocols for handling radioactive waste
and spent fuel;
iv. oversee a minimum five-year post-dismantlement verification regime employing
continuous remote-sensing satellites, unannounced on-site inspections, real-time
tamper-proof seals on dismantled warheads and fissile-material canisters, and
blockchain-based chain-of-custody tracking to prevent diversion or reconstitution of
weapons capabilities;
b. The Agreement shall be chaired and coordinated by:
i. a rotating Chairing Troika of neutral states—such as Indonesia, Kenya, and
Switzerland—elected biennially by the General Assembly to ensure balanced
geographic representation and political neutrality;
ii. a permanent Technical Secretariat headquartered in Vienna and jointly staffed by
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the IAEA Department of
Safeguards, and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office to manage logistics,
budget oversight, and liaison with Member States and regional organisations;
iii. an Advisory and Oversight Council including regional organisations such as the
Arab League, the African Union, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation,
together with accredited peacebuilding NGOs, scientific academies, and
representatives from affected local communities, all intended to enhance legitimacy,
provide early-warning intelligence of potential violations, and ensure cultural
sensitivity in implementation;
c. The Agreement shall issue quarterly reports and policy briefings to:
i. the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and the United Nations
Disarmament Commission presenting progress reports, technical assessments, and
financial statements for full Member State review;
ii. the United Nations Security Council transmitting confidential enforcement
recommendations and requesting specific actions where material breach or obstruction
is confirmed;
iii. relevant regional organisations to promote multilateral confidence-building,
coordinate economic-assistance packages, and harmonise export-control regimes;