Legisla ve Process in the Indian Parliament

Introduc on to Legisla ve Process

The legisla ve process in the Indian Parliament is one of the most vital components of India’s
democra c framework. It is through this process that the collec ve will of the people, expressed
through their elected representa ves, is transformed into binding laws that govern the na on.
Enshrined in Ar cles 107 to 122 of the Cons tu on of India, the legisla ve procedure reflects the
essence of parliamentary democracy, delibera ve decision-making, and the principle of checks and
balances. Parliament, under Ar cle 79, consists of the President of India and two Houses — the Rajya
Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of the People).

The process begins with the introduc on of a Bill, which is essen ally a dra proposal for a new law
or an amendment to exis ng legisla on. According to Ar cle 107(1), subject to the provisions of
Ar cles 108 and 109, a Bill may originate in either House of Parliament. This allows both Houses to
take an ac ve role in legisla ve ini a on. However, special rules apply to par cular categories of
Bills, especially those concerning financial ma ers, such as Money Bills under Ar cle 110, which can
only be introduced in the Lok Sabha. This dis nc on upholds the democra c principle that financial
control should rest with the House directly elected by the people.

Classifica on of Bills

In the Indian parliamentary system, Bills are classified based on their subject ma er and the
procedure they must follow. This classifica on helps determine the path a Bill must take to become
law and the level of scru ny it requires. Broadly, there are four main types of Bills: Ordinary Bills,
Money Bills, Financial Bills, and Cons tu onal Amendment Bills.

Ordinary Bills may relate to any ma er other than financial subjects. They can be introduced in either
House of Parliament by either a Minister (in the case of a Government Bill) or by a Private Member
(in the case of a Private Member’s Bill). Their passage requires the approval of both Houses in
iden cal form before being sent to the President for assent.

Money Bills, as defined under Ar cle 110, exclusively deal with financial subjects such as taxa on,
borrowing of money, the custody or withdrawal of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India, and
related ma ers. These Bills can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha and that too only with the
President’s recommenda on. The Rajya Sabha has limited powers in their considera on.

Financial Bills, under Ar cle 117, contain financial provisions but are not strictly limited to the
ma ers specified in Ar cle 110. Hence, they follow a procedure similar to that of Ordinary Bills but
must also originate in the Lok Sabha and require Presiden al recommenda on for introduc on.

Finally, Cons tu onal Amendment Bills are governed by Ar cle 368. These Bills seek to amend
provisions of the Cons tu on and follow a separate, more stringent procedure. They require a
special majority for passage in both Houses and, in certain cases, ra fica on by at least half of the
State Legislatures.

Detailed Procedure for Ordinary Bills

First Reading
The First Reading begins with the introduc on of the Bill. The member introducing it must seek the
permission (or “leave”) of the House. When a Bill is introduced by a Minister, leave is usually granted
without objec on, but for a Private Member’s Bill, the mo on for leave may be opposed. If leave is
granted, the Bill is formally introduced and published in the Official Gaze e. No debate on the Bill’s
content takes place at this stage — it is a procedural formality that allows the Bill to enter
Parliament’s agenda.

Second Reading

The Second Reading is the most crucial stage of a Bill’s passage and involves a detailed and
substan ve discussion. It is divided into two phases.

In the first phase, the general principles and objec ves of the Bill are discussed. Members debate its
purpose, necessity, and overall framework. At this stage, members may propose that the Bill be
referred to a Select Commi ee of the House, a Joint Commi ee of both Houses, or circulated for
public opinion. These procedural op ons ensure that complex or controversial Bills are carefully
examined before final considera on. Referral to commi ees allows for expert input and helps refine
the Bill’s content through collec ve delibera on.

In the second phase of the Second Reading, known as clause-by-clause considera on, each clause of
the Bill and any a ached schedules are examined separately. Members may move amendments to
add, modify, or delete provisions. The House debates and votes on each proposed change. This stage
is the most detailed part of law-making, as it determines the precise content and wording of the
legisla on. A er all clauses are dealt with, the member in charge of the Bill moves that the Bill, as
amended, be taken as a whole. This ensures Parliament’s responsibility to thoroughly evaluate each
legisla ve provision before approval.

Third Reading

The Third Reading focuses on the final version of the Bill as a whole. The debate is concise and
limited to arguments for or against its passage. No substan ve amendments are allowed at this stage
— only minor verbal or consequen al changes may be made. Once the mo on that the Bill be
passed is carried, the Bill is deemed passed by that House. The Bill is then transmi ed to the other
House for considera on.

Procedure in the Second House and Resolu on of Disagreements

When the Bill reaches the second House, it goes through a similar process of discussion and
approval. The second House may pass it without amendment, pass it with amendments, reject it, or
simply not act on it. If the second House passes the Bill without changes, it is deemed passed by both
Houses and is then sent to the President for assent. However, if amendments are made, the Bill is
returned to the first House for agreement.

If disagreement persists between the two Houses — for example, if one House rejects the Bill,
disagrees on amendments, or fails to act on it for more than six months — the Cons tu on provides
a mechanism to resolve the deadlock. Under Ar cle 108, the President may summon both Houses to
meet in a joint si ng. The purpose of this session is to deliberate and vote on the Bill collec vely.

At the joint si ng, which is presided over by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha (or, in his absence, by the
Deputy Speaker or another designated person), members from both Houses par cipate in debate
and vote. If a majority of members present and vo ng approve the Bill, it is considered passed by
both Houses.

It is important to note that this joint si ng mechanism does not apply to Money Bills, which already
give primacy to the Lok Sabha, or to Cons tu onal Amendment Bills, which must be passed
separately by each House with a special majority.

Presiden al Assent and Comple on of Legisla ve Process

Once a Bill has been passed by both Houses, either normally or through a joint si ng, it is presented
to the President of India for assent under Ar cle 111. The President then has three op ons:

1. He may give his assent, whereupon the Bill becomes law.

2. He may withhold his assent, effec vely vetoing the Bill.

3. If the Bill is not a Money Bill, he may return it to Parliament with a message reques ng
reconsidera on or sugges ng amendments.

This power to return a Bill is known as the suspensive veto because it only delays, not denies, the
Bill’s enactment. If both Houses reconsider the Bill and pass it again, with or without changes, the
President must then give his assent. This balances the President’s role as a cons tu onal guardian
with the supremacy of the elected legislature.

For Money Bills, the President cannot return the Bill for reconsidera on. Although theore cally, he
may withhold assent, by cons tu onal conven on he acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers,
and assent is typically granted as a ma er of course.

Once Presiden al assent is given, the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament and is assigned an Act
number. It comes into effect either immediately upon assent or on a date specified within the Act or
later no fied by the Government.

Special Procedures for Money Bills and Financial Bills

The procedure for Money Bills and Financial Bills differs substan ally from that of Ordinary Bills,
reflec ng the financial authority of the Lok Sabha. Under Ar cle 110, a Bill is deemed a Money Bill if
it deals exclusively with ma ers such as taxa on, borrowing, the Consolidated Fund, or related
issues.

A Money Bill can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha and requires the President’s recommenda on
under Ar cle 117(1). A er passing in the Lok Sabha, it is sent to the Rajya Sabha for its
recommenda ons, which must be returned within fourteen days. The Lok Sabha may accept or reject
these recommenda ons. If no response is received within fourteen days, the Bill is automa cally
considered passed in the form approved by the Lok Sabha. This process ensures that essen al
financial legisla on is not delayed by the Upper House.

A cri cal element in the Money Bill process is the cer fica on by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha,
whose decision under Ar cle 110(3) on whether a Bill is a Money Bill is final. This cer fica on
appears on the Bill when sent to the Rajya Sabha and the President. Though this power has
some mes been debated, it remains an essen al feature of the financial legisla ve framework,
ensuring procedural clarity and legisla ve efficiency.

Financial Bills, which include financial provisions but are not limited to those under Ar cle 110, are
governed by Ar cle 117(3). They can only be introduced in the Lok Sabha and need the President’s
prior recommenda on. However, unlike Money Bills, both Houses must pass them, and
disagreements can be resolved by a joint si ng under Ar cle 108.

Cons tu onal Amendment Bills

The process for amending the Cons tu on under Ar cle 368 is unique and more rigorous than for
ordinary legisla on. A Cons tu onal Amendment Bill can be introduced in either House of
Parliament, but it must be passed by each House separately with a special majority — that is, a
majority of the total membership of the House and not less than two-thirds of the members present
and vo ng.

Once the Bill is passed by both Houses and, where necessary, ra fied by the States, it is sent to the
President, who must give his assent. The President cannot return or withhold assent from a
Cons tu onal Amendment Bill. On receiving assent, the Cons tu on stands amended in accordance
with the provisions of the Bill.

Conclusion

The legisla ve process in the Indian Parliament is a cornerstone of the country’s democra c system.
It embodies the principles of delibera on, accountability, and representa ve decision-making. Every
law passed by Parliament undergoes a rigorous process of discussion, amendment, and approval to
ensure that it serves the people’s interest and upholds cons tu onal values.

While the procedure may appear lengthy and complex, it is precisely this structure that prevents
arbitrary or poorly considered legisla on. The dis nct procedures for Ordinary Bills, Money Bills,
Financial Bills, and Cons tu onal Amendment Bills reflect the Cons tu on’s careful balancing of
powers between the two Houses of Parliament, between the legislature and the execu ve, and
between the Union and the States.

Ul mately, the legisla ve process is not merely a technical sequence of steps but a reflec on of
India’s democra c ethos. It ensures that laws are created through reasoned debate and consensus,
protec ng both majority rule and minority rights. Through this process, the Parliament of India
con nues to func on as the supreme law-making body, transla ng the aspira ons of the people into
laws that guide the na on toward jus ce, equality, and progress.
Membership, Qualifica ons, and Disqualifica ons of the Rajya Sabha

Introduc on

The Rajya Sabha, or Council of States, forms an integral component of the Indian Parliament and
serves as the embodiment of India’s federal character. As the Upper House of a bicameral legislature,
it provides representa on to the States and Union Territories, ensuring that the voices of India’s
diverse regions are reflected in na onal law-making. The Rajya Sabha performs a stabilizing and
reviewing func on in the legisla ve process, complemen ng the popularly elected Lok Sabha. Its
composi on, qualifica ons for membership, and grounds for disqualifica on are carefully designed
in the Cons tu on to preserve democra c accountability, uphold the principles of federalism, and
maintain the dignity and integrity of the parliamentary ins tu on.

The Rajya Sabha, unlike the Lok Sabha, is a permanent body that is not subject to dissolu on.
Instead, one-third of its members re re every two years, ensuring con nuity and ins tu onal
memory in the func oning of Parliament. The cons tu onal provisions governing its composi on,
qualifica ons, and disqualifica ons are primarily contained in Ar cles 80 to 84, Ar cles 101 to 103,
and Ar cle 102 of the Cons tu on, supplemented by the Representa on of the People Act, 1951.
Collec vely, these provisions define who can become a member of the Rajya Sabha, under what
condi ons membership can be lost, and the rights and privileges that accompany this high office.

Cons tu onal Framework and Composi on of the Rajya Sabha

The Rajya Sabha was established under Ar cle 80 of the Cons tu on as the Council of States. The
framers of the Cons tu on envisaged it as a chamber that would represent the federal units of India
— the States and the Union Territories — and func on as a body of experienced legislators capable
of providing considered reflec on on legisla ve measures passed by the Lok Sabha.

Under Ar cle 80(1), the Rajya Sabha is to consist of not more than 250 members, of whom 12 are
nominated by the President under Ar cle 80(3) and up to 238 are representa ves of the States and
Union Territories, elected in accordance with Ar cle 80(4). The nominated members, according to
clause (3), must be individuals having special knowledge or prac cal experience in ma ers such as
literature, science, art, or social service. The elected members are chosen by the elected members of
the State Legisla ve Assemblies through the system of propor onal representa on by means of the
single transferable vote.

Under Ar cle 83(1), the Rajya Sabha is designed as a permanent body, not subject to dissolu on, but
with one-third of its members re ring every two years. The composi on of the Rajya Sabha thus
achieves a delicate balance between con nuity and change, federal representa on and na onal
integra on, and democra c legi macy and expert contribu on.

Qualifica ons for Membership

The qualifica ons for membership in the Rajya Sabha are prescribed in Ar cle 84 of the Cons tu on.
These qualifica ons ensure that members possess the fundamental a ributes of ci zenship,
maturity, and integrity necessary for par cipa on in na onal legisla on.

According to Ar cle 84, a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Council of
States unless he:
(a) is a ci zen of India,
(b) is not less than thirty years of age, and
(c) possesses such other qualifica ons as may be prescribed by or under any law made by
Parliament.

The requirement of ci zenship ensures that those entrusted with the responsibility of framing
na onal laws owe their allegiance exclusively to India. It excludes individuals who might have foreign
loyal es, thus preserving the sovereignty and independence of the Indian state. The age qualifica on
of thirty years for the Rajya Sabha — compared to twenty-five years for the Lok Sabha — is not
arbitrary but rooted in cons tu onal philosophy.

Furthermore, the Cons tu on authorizes Parliament to lay down addi onal qualifica ons by
legisla on. Parliament has done so through the Representa on of the People Act, 1951, which
mandates that a person must be an elector in a parliamentary cons tuency. This condi on ensures
that members of Parliament remain connected to the democra c process and the electorate.

Before taking their seats, members are required under Ar cle 99 to make and subscribe an oath or
affirma on before the President or a person appointed by him. The form of the oath, contained in
the Third Schedule, binds every member to bear true faith and allegiance to the Cons tu on of India
and to uphold its sovereignty and integrity. This solemn affirma on is a symbolic and legal
commitment to the cons tu onal values of democracy, secularism, and na onal unity.

Disqualifica ons for Membership

The cons tu onal grounds for disqualifica on are enumerated in Ar cle 102(1), which applies to
both Houses of Parliament. A person is disqualified from being chosen as, or for being, a member of
either House of Parliament if:
(a) he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or any State Government, except
offices declared by Parliament not to disqualify their holders;
(b) he is of unsound mind, and so declared by a competent court;
(c) he is an undischarged insolvent;
(d) he is not a ci zen of India, or has voluntarily acquired the ci zenship of a foreign State, or
acknowledges allegiance to a foreign power; or
(e) he is so disqualified by or under any law made by Parliament.

Each of these grounds serves a dis nct cons tu onal purpose.

The disqualifica on rela ng to an office of profit maintains the separa on of powers between the
execu ve and legislature. It prevents the execu ve from using appointments or remunera ve
posi ons to influence legislators. However, recognizing that some offices may need to be held
without compromising legisla ve independence, the Cons tu on allows Parliament to declare
certain offices exempt.

The disqualifica on for unsound mind ensures that members have the mental capacity to perform
their legisla ve du es, while that of undischarged insolvency maintains the financial credibility of
legislators. The disqualifica on for foreign allegiance safeguards the exclusivity of na onal loyalty
and prevents divided loyal es in legisla ve decision-making.

Disqualifica on under the Tenth Schedule: Defec on

In addi on to the general grounds of disqualifica on, Ar cle 102(2) provides that a person shall be
disqualified if he is so disqualified under the Tenth Schedule — the an -defec on provisions
introduced by the Cons tu on (Fi y-second Amendment) Act, 1985. These provisions were designed
to curb the rampant prac ce of poli cal defec ons, which threatened to destabilize governments
and erode public confidence in parliamentary democracy.

Under the Tenth Schedule, a member of Parliament may be disqualified if he voluntarily gives up the
membership of his poli cal party, or if he votes or abstains from vo ng contrary to the party’s
direc on (the party whip) without prior permission. Excep ons exist in cases of mergers and splits
under specified condi ons. The authority to decide ques ons of disqualifica on under the Tenth
Schedule lies with the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha (or the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, as applicable),
and their decision is subject to judicial review by the Supreme Court and High Courts, as affirmed in
Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992).

Statutory Disqualifica ons under the Representa on of the People Act, 1951

In addi on to cons tu onal provisions, Parliament, exercising its authority under Ar cle 102(1)(e),
has enacted several statutory disqualifica ons through the Representa on of the People Act, 1951.
These include:

 Convic on for certain offences, resul ng in a sentence of imprisonment for two years or
more, disqualifying the person during the period of imprisonment and for six years
therea er.

 Engagement in corrupt prac ces during elec ons, such as bribery or undue influence.

 Failure to lodge elec on expense accounts in the prescribed manner.

 Contracts or interests with the government, such as supply of goods or execu on of works.

 Holding an office of profit in corpora ons with significant government shareholding.

 Dismissal from government service for corrup on or disloyalty to the State.

These statutory disqualifica ons strengthen ethical and administra ve accountability in the poli cal
process. They reflect the principle that legislators, as law-makers, must themselves be law-abiding,
financially responsible, and morally upright.

Procedure for Determina on of Disqualifica ons

Ques ons regarding whether a member of Parliament has become subject to disqualifica on are
dealt with under Ar cle 103. If such a ques on arises, it is referred to the President, whose decision
is final. However, the President is cons tu onally required to obtain the opinion of the Elec on
Commission before deciding. This requirement ensures impar ality and independence in the
determina on process, as the Elec on Commission is a neutral cons tu onal authority with
exper se in electoral and parliamentary law.

For disqualifica ons arising under the Tenth Schedule (defec on), however, the ma er is decided by
the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, whose decision is final subject to judicial review. This procedural
difference ensures that poli cal defec ons are addressed within the parliamentary framework, while
other disqualifica ons are handled by an external, independent authority.

Vaca on of Seats

In addi on to disqualifica ons, certain circumstances lead to the vaca on of a member’s seat in
Parliament. Under Ar cle 101(3), a member may resign by wri ng under his hand addressed to the
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. However, as amended by the Cons tu on (Thirty-third Amendment)
Act, 1974, the Chairman is empowered to verify whether such resigna on is voluntary and genuine,
ensuring that members are not coerced into resigning.

Further, under Ar cle 101(4), a member’s seat may be declared vacant if he is absent without
permission for sixty consecu ve days during the session. This ensures accountability and ac ve
par cipa on in legisla ve business.

If a person is elected to both Houses of Parliament, or to a State Legislature and Parliament

simultaneously, he must vacate one seat within a prescribed period, failing which one of the seats
will automa cally fall vacant. This provision upholds the principle of single representa on and
prevents conflict of du es.

Rights and Privileges of Members

Members of the Rajya Sabha enjoy several cons tu onal privileges that enable them to func on
independently and effec vely. Ar cle 105 grants members freedom of speech in Parliament and
immunity from any legal proceedings for statements made or votes given in the House or its
commi ees. This privilege ensures that members can express their views freely without fear of legal
consequences, thereby fostering open debate and legisla ve transparency.

Members are also en tled to salaries, allowances, and benefits as determined by Parliament, which
ensure that they can perform their du es with dignity and independence. The penalty clause under
Ar cle 104 provides that any person who sits or votes in Parliament without taking the oath or while
disqualified is liable to pay a fine of ₹500 per day, emphasizing the seriousness of compliance with
cons tu onal norms.

Conclusion

The cons tu onal framework governing the membership, qualifica ons, and disqualifica ons of the
Rajya Sabha represents a though ul blend of democra c representa on, federal balance, and
ins tu onal integrity. By prescribing eligibility criteria rooted in ci zenship, age, and moral standing,
the Cons tu on ensures that only persons of sound character and judgment enter the na onal
legislature. The disqualifica ons, both cons tu onal and statutory, protect Parliament from conflicts
of interest, corrup on, and disloyalty, thereby preserving public confidence in the legisla ve process.

As the Upper House of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha con nues to serve as the chamber of reasoned
debate, seasoned judgment, and regional representa on, ensuring that the legisla on enacted by
Parliament reflects not only the will of the majority but also the wisdom of the federa on. The
cons tu onal provisions rela ng to its membership and disqualifica ons thus form the founda on of
its credibility, authority, and con nuing relevance in India’s democra c journey.
Procedure of Passing an Ordinance, Bill and Money Bill with Differences

Introduc on and Cons tu onal Basis

The power to promulgate ordinances and the procedure for enac ng money bills represent two
dis nct but equally important aspects of India's legisla ve framework that address different
cons tu onal impera ves. Ordinances, regulated under Ar cle 123 of the Cons tu on, provide the
execu ve branch with the capacity to address urgent legisla ve ma ers when Parliament is not in
session, thereby ensuring that governmental func ons are not paralyzed during legisla ve recesses.
Money bills, defined and governed under Ar cles 110 and 109, reflect the cons tu onal principle
that the House directly elected by the people should exercise primary authority over financial
ma ers affec ng the na on's exchequer. While ordinances represent an extraordinary legisla ve
exercise by the President func oning as the head of state, money bills epitomize the ordinary
legisla ve process subject to the supremacy of the lower house in fiscal affairs. Understanding these
two dis nct mechanisms requires examina on of their cons tu onal founda ons, the procedures
governing their passage or issuance, the limita ons placed upon them, and the significant
differences that dis nguish ordinances from money bills in both form and substance.

Ordinance-Making Power: Ar cle 123

The ordinance-making power of the President, as provided in Ar cle 123(1), is a cri cal execu ve
power that allows the President to issue ordinances when circumstances render immediate
legisla ve ac on necessary and Parliament is not in session. Ar cle 123(1) states that if, at any me
when both Houses of Parliament are not in session, the President is sa sfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate ac on, he may issue such Ordinance as the
circumstances appear to him to require. This provision vests in the President considerable discre on
to respond to emergencies or urgent situa ons that cannot await the convening of Parliament and
the comple on of the ordinary legisla ve procedure. The Ordinance, once issued, has the same force
and effect as an Act of Parliament and is published in the Official Gaze e, making it binding on all
ci zens and enforceable through the courts.

The cons tu onal language gran ng the President the power to issue ordinances reflects an implicit
recogni on that absolute parliamentary sovereignty, while desirable in ordinary mes, may result in
dangerous paralysis when Parliament is not in session and urgent ac on is required. The framers of
the Cons tu on drew inspira on from the Bri sh tradi on of delegated legisla on and from Ar cles
74 and 75 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provided similar emergency powers to the
Governor-General and Provincial Governors. However, the Indian Cons tu on safeguards against
poten al misuse of this power through several mechanisms: the ordinance can only be issued when
both Houses are not in session, it must be based on the President's sa sfac on of necessity (a
subjec ve determina on), it must relate to ma ers within Parliament's legisla ve competence, and
it is subject to parliamentary scru ny upon reassembly. These constraints ensure that the ordinance
power, while broad, is not unlimited and remains subject to ul mate democra c oversight through
Parliament.

Condi ons and Restric ons on Ordinance-Making Power

Ar cle 123 prescribes several important condi ons that circumscribe the exercise of the ordinance-
making power. First, ordinances can be issued only when both Houses of Parliament are not in
session. This requirement is strictly interpreted to mean that if either House is in session, the
President cannot issue an ordinance, even if the other House is not si ng. This restric on ensures
that the ordinance power is truly an emergency measure and not used to circumvent Parliament
when it is available for consulta on. Second, the President must be sa sfied that circumstances exist
which render it necessary for him to take immediate ac on. This sa sfac on is subjec ve and is not
open to challenge in court, as affirmed in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court
held that the sufficiency of circumstances cannot be ques oned by the judiciary. However, the
Supreme Court has suggested that the President's sa sfac on cannot be unreasonable or in u er
disregard of facts, leaving open the possibility of judicial interven on in extreme cases.

Third, an ordinance can relate only to ma ers with respect to which Parliament has power to make
laws. Ar cle 123(3) provides that an ordinance shall be invalid to the extent that it makes any
provision which under the Cons tu on Parliament is not competent to make. Fourth, an ordinance
cannot be issued to circumvent restric ons on Parliament's power to legislate. For instance, if a Bill
would require Presiden al recommenda on to be introduced in Parliament, an ordinance with the
same provisions cannot be issued without Presiden al instruc on. Fi h, certain Bills cannot be
replaced by ordinances at all. For instance, a Bill to amend the Cons tu on cannot be ordinanced;
Cons tu onal Amendment Bills must go through the special procedure prescribed in Ar cle 368
involving both Houses and some mes State Legislatures.

Procedure for Ordinance Issuance and Parliamentary Scru ny

The procedure for issuing an ordinance, while simpler than the legisla ve procedure for Bills, is
followed by important parliamentary oversight mechanisms. When the President is sa sfied of the
necessity, he issues the ordinance on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The Cabinet, which bears
cons tu onal responsibility, provides the advice that forms the basis for the ordinance, reflec ng the
principle of ministerial responsibility even for extraordinary measures. The ordinance is then
published in the Official Gaze e and comes into force immediately, acquiring the force of law from
the date of its issue. The ordinance remains in force un l Parliament reassembles and acts upon it.

Ar cle 123(2)(a) provides the crucial mechanism of parliamentary scru ny: ordinances must be laid
before both Houses of Parliament as soon as they assemble. This mandatory laying of ordinances
ensures that the legislature immediately becomes aware of emergency execu ve ac on and has the
opportunity to examine it. The ordinance shall cease to operate at the expira on of six weeks from
the date of reassembly of Parliament, unless, before the expira on of that period, a Bill to replace it
has been introduced in Parliament and is pending, or a resolu on disapproving it has been passed by
both Houses, or the ordinance has been approved by both Houses. This provision ensures that an
ordinance cannot indefinitely remain in force; if Parliament wishes to retain it beyond six weeks, it
must convert it into a proper Bill or grant explicit approval.

The Supreme Court in R.C. Cooper v. Union of India examined the limits of the ordinance power and
affirmed that while the President's sa sfac on is not open to challenge, the ordinance itself and the
legisla on it prescribes must conform to cons tu onal requirements. If an ordinance violates
fundamental rights or exceeds Parliament's legisla ve competence, it can be struck down by the
courts even though the President's sa sfac on of necessity cannot be ques oned. Furthermore,
Ar cle 123(2)(b) allows the President to withdraw an ordinance at any me if he is sa sfied that
circumstances no longer necessitate its con nuance. This flexibility allows the President to respond
to changing circumstances without awai ng parliamentary ac on.
Procedure for Passing a Money Bill

The Indian Cons tu on gives the Lok Sabha exclusive authority in financial ma ers. This is rooted in
the democra c principle that taxa on and expenditure of public funds must have the direct approval
of the people’s representa ves. Ar cles 109 and 110 set out the special procedure for Money Bills.

A Money Bill, as defined under Ar cle 110, deals solely with ma ers such as imposi on or aboli on
of taxes, regula on of borrowing, custody of the Consolidated Fund, or appropria on of moneys
from it. To qualify as a Money Bill, it must contain only these subjects, and if it includes any other
ma er, it ceases to be a Money Bill. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha cer fies whether a Bill is a Money
Bill, and this cer fica on under Ar cle 110(3) is final.

1. Introduc on and Passage in the Lok Sabha

A Money Bill can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha and only on the recommenda on of the
President. A er introduc on, it is discussed and passed like any other Bill. Once passed, it is
transmi ed to the Rajya Sabha for its recommenda ons.

2. Role of the Rajya Sabha

The Rajya Sabha’s role in the passage of a Money Bill is limited. Under Ar cle 109(2), it cannot
amend or reject the Bill but may return it to the Lok Sabha within fourteen days with
recommenda ons. The Lok Sabha may either accept or reject all or any of these recommenda ons. If
the Rajya Sabha fails to return the Bill within fourteen days, it is deemed to have been passed by
both Houses in the form approved by the Lok Sabha.

This limita on underscores the financial supremacy of the Lok Sabha and the principle of
accountability of the execu ve to the directly elected House.

3. Presiden al Assent

A er the Money Bill is passed by the Lok Sabha, with or without the Rajya Sabha’s
recommenda ons, it is presented to the President under Ar cle 111, who generally gives assent
since such Bills are introduced with his prior recommenda on. Once assented, the Bill becomes law.

Judicial Interpreta on

In Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) and Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P.
(2014), the Supreme Court observed that the Speaker’s cer fica on of a Money Bill is final and
cannot be ordinarily ques oned. However, in K.S. Pu aswamy v. Union of India (2019), the majority
upheld the Aadhaar Act’s passage as a Money Bill, while the dissen ng opinions cri cized the misuse
of Ar cle 110. The Court’s later observa ons in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2019) le
the issue open for reconsidera on by a larger bench, emphasizing that cons tu onal safeguards in
financial legisla on must not be diluted.

Dis nc on Between Ordinances and Money Bills

While both ordinances and money bills are important legisla ve mechanisms, they differ
fundamentally in their nature, purpose, and scope. The first major dis nc on is their cons tu onal
basis: ordinances derive their authority from Ar cle 123 and represent an extraordinary execu ve
power exercisable when Parliament is not in session and circumstances necessitate immediate
ac on. Money bills, by contrast, derive their authority from Ar cles 109-110 and represent an
ordinary form of legisla on subject to parliamentary procedure but with special provisions
recognizing the lower house's primacy.

The second dis nc on concerns the circumstances of their issuance or introduc on. Ordinances can
only be issued when both Houses of Parliament are not in session, making them a true emergency
measure. Money bills, by contrast, can only be introduced in Parliament (specifically the Lok Sabha)
and follow the ordinary legisla ve procedure; they are introduced when Parliament is in session and
represent planned, regular financial legisla on. This difference reflects their different cons tu onal
purposes: ordinances fill a legisla ve vacuum in emergencies, while money bills regulate the ordinary
flow of financial business within Parliament.

Third, the dura on of validity differs substan ally. An ordinance remains in force for a maximum of
six weeks from the date of Parliament's reassembly unless converted into a proper Bill or approved
by both Houses. A money bill, once passed by the Lok Sabha and deemed passed by both Houses
(either through Rajya Sabha's acceptance or a er fourteen days), becomes a permanent part of the
statute book upon Presiden al assent, with no me limita on. This difference reflects the fact that
ordinances are temporary expedients, whereas money bills are permanent legisla on.

Fourth, the procedures for parliamentary scru ny differ. Ordinances must be laid before Parliament
but are not subject to further parliamentary procedure; Parliament can only approve or disapprove
them or demand their replacement by Bills. Money bills, by contrast, go through the full legisla ve
procedure in the Lok Sabha (including three readings) before being sent to the Rajya Sabha, and the
Rajya Sabha provides recommenda ons rather than approval or rejec on.

Fi h, the scope of legisla ve coverage differs. An ordinance can cover any ma er within Parliament's
legisla ve competence, not limited to financial ma ers. A money bill is restricted to ma ers specified
in Ar cle 110 and cannot contain provisions beyond the defined scope of financial legisla on.

Finally, the accountability and responsibility for issuance differs. Ordinances are issued by the
President on the advice of the Cabinet, and ministerial responsibility a aches to the decision to
recommend an ordinance. Money bills are introduced by a member of the Lok Sabha (usually a
Minister) in the ordinary course of parliamentary business, and the responsibility for their content
a aches to Parliament and the Government generally.

Conclusion

The procedures for ordinances and money bills represent two complementary but dis nct
mechanisms through which India's cons tu onal framework addresses different legisla ve situa ons
and principles. Ordinances embody the principle of execu ve flexibility and responsiveness to
emergencies, allowing the President to take immediate ac on when parliamentary procedures
cannot be completed in me. Money bills embody the principle of democra c control over fiscal
affairs, ensuring that the house directly elected by the people exercises primary authority over
financial legisla on affec ng the na on. While ordinances are temporary and subject to replacement
by Bills and parliamentary disapproval, money bills are permanent legisla on surviving the Rajya
Sabha's recommenda ons through an automa c passage mechanism. Understanding both
mechanisms is essen al to apprecia ng the sophis ca on of India's cons tu onal design, which
balances flexibility in emergencies with democra c control in ordinary mes, and ensures that both
execu ve responsiveness and legisla ve supremacy find expression within the cons tu onal order.

An -Defec on Law and the Tenth Schedule

Historical Context and Cons tu onal Basis

The phenomenon of poli cal defec on—where elected representa ves abandon the par es on
whose ckets they were elected—has long been recognized as a serious threat to the stability and
integrity of India’s democra c system. From the early years of the Republic, the problem of elected
legislators switching party allegiances, o en for personal or poli cal gain, led to the frequent
toppling of governments and the erosion of voter trust in democra c ins tu ons. To curb this
menace and to restore the moral and structural balance of the poli cal system, Parliament enacted
the Cons tu on (Fi y-second Amendment) Act, 1985. This landmark amendment inserted the Tenth
Schedule into the Cons tu on of India and simultaneously amended Ar cles 101, 102, 190, and 191
to incorporate provisions rela ng to disqualifica on of members on the ground of defec on.

The Tenth Schedule, commonly known as the An -Defec on Law, was thus a cons tu onal
innova on designed to preserve the sanc ty of electoral mandates. It sought to ensure that elected
representa ves remain loyal to the poli cal party whose pla orm they had embraced during
elec ons and through which they obtained the mandate of the people.

When the Cons tu on was originally framed in 1950, its architects did not an cipate the scale of
party fragmenta on and defec on that would later emerge. Consequently, the original Cons tu on
contained no explicit provisions addressing the ques on of when and how an elected representa ve
ceases to represent the party on whose cket he was elected. However, the decades following
independence, par cularly the 1960s through the early 1980s, witnessed the prolifera on of small
poli cal par es, coali ons, and frequent governmental crises arising from defec ons. The poli cal
scenario reached a nadir during the period of the Emergency (1975–77) and its a ermath, when
large-scale floor-crossing became almost a rou ne feature of both na onal and state poli cs.
Governments were o en destabilized not by electoral defeat but by engineered defec ons within
the legislature.

The passage of the Fi y-second Amendment in 1985 therefore represented a conscious

cons tu onal choice to privilege governmental stability and fidelity to the party system over
unfe ered freedom of individual legislators to change sides at will. The amendment aimed to
strengthen poli cal discipline, ensure the con nuity of elected governments, and reflect the true
democra c will as expressed in general elec ons.

Defini on of Disqualifica on under the Tenth Schedule

The Tenth Schedule provides a detailed and exhaus ve framework specifying the circumstances in
which an elected member becomes disqualified from con nuing as a member of the legislature. The
essence of the an -defec on law is encapsulated in Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, which
enumerates two broad categories of acts that cons tute defec on.

First, a member belonging to any poli cal party shall be disqualified if he voluntarily gives up his
membership of that poli cal party. Second, he shall be disqualified if he votes or abstains from
vo ng in the House contrary to any direc on issued by his poli cal party—or by any person
authorized by that party to issue such direc on—without obtaining prior permission, and if his ac on
is not condoned by the party within fi een days.

The first category, that of voluntarily giving up membership, refers to situa ons where a member
formally resigns from his poli cal party or otherwise makes a clear and deliberate declara on of
intent to dissociate himself from that party. Such giving up must be voluntary and uncoerced; it must
reflect the member’s conscious decision to abandon his poli cal allegiance.

The second category deals with cases where a member, while ostensibly retaining his party
membership, acts in defiance of the party’s official direc ve on a ma er of vo ng. Poli cal par es in
India, as in Westminster systems, issue “whips” or binding instruc ons to their legislators to vote in a
par cular manner on issues considered vital to party policy or government survival. When a
legislator votes or abstains in contraven on of such direc ons, it signifies disloyalty to the party line
and thus amounts to defec on under the law.

These two grounds together address the main avenues through which legislators have historically
undermined party cohesion—by either openly abandoning the party or by covertly sabotaging it
through disobedience in legisla ve votes.

Excep ons to the Disqualifica on

Recognizing that an overly rigid applica on of the an -defec on law might s fle legi mate poli cal
realignment and cause unintended injus ce, the framers of the Tenth Schedule incorporated several
excep ons in Paragraph 4 to balance discipline with democra c flexibility.

The first and most significant excep on concerns merger. Where a poli cal party merges with
another poli cal party, a member shall not be disqualified if he claims that, by reason of such
merger, he has become a member of the merged party. However, for this protec on to apply, at least
two-thirds of the members of the original poli cal party must agree to the merger. This provision
acknowledges that a genuine, large-scale merger represents a collec ve poli cal decision rather than
an act of individual betrayal. It therefore shields members from disqualifica on when the party itself
formally amalgamates with another.

The second excep on relates to absence from mee ngs of the House. A member will not be
disqualified merely because he is absent from a si ng of the House if such absence has been
permi ed as leave by the Speaker or Chairman, or if the member’s absence results from deten on in
custody or other reasons beyond his control, duly in mated to the presiding officer. This safeguard
prevents the unfair penaliza on of members who, for legi mate or unavoidable reasons, are unable
to a end proceedings.

The third excep on deals with independent members. Paragraph 4(a) provides that a member
elected as an independent candidate shall not be disqualified for con nuing as such. However,
paragraph 4(b) s pulates that if an independent member voluntarily joins a poli cal party a er his
elec on, he will a ract disqualifica on. The ra onale is that independent members owe their
mandate to personal creden als rather than party affilia on; joining a poli cal party a er elec on
would distort that independent mandate.

The fourth excep on concerns nominated members, who are appointed to legislatures under
cons tu onal provisions rather than elected through party pla orms. The Schedule clarifies that the
an -defec on provisions do not apply to nominated members, recognizing that such individuals are
not chosen by voters and do not represent poli cal cons tuencies or par es. Hence, their freedom
of associa on remains intact.

Procedure for Determina on of Disqualifica on

The Tenth Schedule establishes a structured procedure to determine when a member becomes liable
to disqualifica on for defec on. This procedural mechanism func ons as a safeguard against
arbitrary decisions and ensures that ques ons of defec on are adjudicated by appropriate
cons tu onal authori es.

Under Paragraph 6, if any ques on arises as to whether a member has incurred disqualifica on, it
shall be referred to the decision of the Speaker (for the Lok Sabha or State Legisla ve Assemblies) or
the Chairman (for the Rajya Sabha or State Legisla ve Councils). The presiding officer’s decision on
the ma er is stated to be final. This arrangement reflects the expecta on that the Speaker or
Chairman, as the impar al head of the legisla ve chamber, is best posi oned to interpret
parliamentary conduct and determine the existence of defec on.

However, the seemingly absolute finality of the presiding officer’s decision was qualified by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992). The Court held that
although the Speaker or Chairman acts as the primary authority for adjudica ng disqualifica on
cases, their decisions are subject to judicial review. The Court ruled that the Speaker, when
exercising powers under the Tenth Schedule, func ons in a quasi-judicial capacity and is bound by
cons tu onal principles of fairness, reasonableness, and natural jus ce. Therefore, if the Speaker’s
ruling is found to be perverse, mala fide, or in viola on of procedural fairness, the courts may
intervene. This interpreta on preserved the ins tu onal autonomy of the legislature while ensuring
protec on against abuse of authority.

Procedural Safeguards and Natural Jus ce

In Kihoto Hollohan, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Speaker or Chairman, when deciding
defec on ma ers, must adhere strictly to the principles of natural jus ce. This means that the
member facing disqualifica on must be given a fair opportunity to be heard, to inspect evidence, and
to present a defense. The presiding officer must render a reasoned order, supported by evidence on
record and guided by law rather than poli cal considera ons.

The requirement of wri en, reasoned decisions not only ensures transparency but also facilitates
judicial scru ny when challenged. The Speaker’s decision cannot rest on arbitrary conclusions or
bias; it must demonstrate that due process was followed. These procedural safeguards, evolved
through judicial interpreta on, ensure that the Tenth Schedule operates within cons tu onal
boundaries and that the rights of members are not sacrificed in the name of party discipline.

Implica ons and Effects of Disqualifica on

Disqualifica on under the Tenth Schedule carries serious and far-reaching consequences. A member
found guilty of defec on immediately forfeits his seat in the legislature and ceases to hold office. He
is thereby disqualified from being a member of that House for the remainder of its term. Thus, a
disqualified legislator cannot contest elec ons or re-enter the same legislature un l the term has
expired.

This sanc on underscores the cons tu onal intent that defec on cons tutes a grave breach of
public trust. It reaffirms that an elected representa ve holds his seat not as personal property but as
a fiduciary responsibility derived from the party’s and electorate’s mandate. Many state legislatures
have supplemented this framework through local laws that impose addi onal disabili es, some mes
extending disqualifica on beyond the current term. Collec vely, these measures create a stringent
deterrent against poli cal opportunism and ensure accountability to the people.

Conclusion

The Tenth Schedule, introduced by the Fi y-second Amendment Act of 1985, cons tutes a pivotal
cons tu onal measure designed to curb the prac ce of poli cal defec on and to reinforce the
credibility of representa ve democracy in India. By disqualifying members who voluntarily give up
their party membership or defy party direc ons in crucial votes, the law seeks to ensure that the
composi on of legislatures reflects the choices made by the electorate. The carefully cra ed
excep ons rela ng to mergers, absences, independents, and nominated members strike a delicate
balance between rigidity and fairness.

The procedure for adjudica ng disqualifica on, entrusted to the Speaker or Chairman and subject to
judicial oversight, ensures both ins tu onal autonomy and legal accountability. While cri cisms
concerning legisla ve freedom and party dominance persist, the an -defec on framework has
undeniably contributed to governmental stability and reduced the frequency of opportunis c
defec ons. As India’s democra c system con nues to evolve, the an -defec on law remains a vital,
though contested, instrument of cons tu onal governance—anchoring poli cal morality and
safeguarding the mandate of the people.

Parliamentary Privileges under the Indian Cons tu on

Concept and Cons tu onal Basis

Parliamentary privileges cons tute a body of rights, immuni es, and protec ons conferred upon the
members of Parliament and upon the Houses of Parliament collec vely, aimed at ensuring that they
can perform their cons tu onal func ons freely, independently, and effec vely, without fear of legal
harassment, in mida on, or external interference. These privileges are fundamental to the smooth
func oning of a parliamentary democracy because they secure members' ability to deliberate, speak,
and vote according to their conscience, maintain the authority and dignity of the Houses, and
preserve the independence of the legislature vis-à-vis the execu ve and judiciary.

The origin of parliamentary privileges in India is deeply rooted in the Westminster system, a legacy
inherited from Bri sh cons tu onal prac ce. These privileges developed historically over centuries
in the Bri sh House of Commons and were intended to protect legislators from undue influence or
coercion, thereby safeguarding the independence and integrity of parliamentary proceedings. The
framers of the Indian Cons tu on incorporated these principles into the cons tu onal framework to
ensure that Parliament could func on as an autonomous and effec ve law-making ins tu on in the
democra c structure.
In the Indian context, Ar cle 105 of the Cons tu on provides the principal cons tu onal founda on
for parliamentary privileges. Ar cle 105 recognizes certain rights and immuni es of members and
the Houses, while simultaneously establishing that these privileges are not exhaus ve and may be
further defined and regulated by Parliament itself. The cons tu onal provision s pulates that
members of either House of Parliament—and persons legally en tled to par cipate in parliamentary
proceedings or commi ees—shall enjoy freedom of speech in Parliament and shall be immune from
legal proceedings in respect of anything said or any vote given in rela on to parliamentary business,
subject to the Cons tu on and the procedural rules of Parliament. This guarantee is designed to
ensure that members cannot be prosecuted, either civilly or criminally, for statements made or votes
cast in Parliament, provided these ac ons are connected with parliamentary business.

By providing such protec ons, Ar cle 105 empowers members to discharge their du es without
external in mida on or judicial interference, thereby strengthening the independence and authority
of the legislature as a co-equal branch of the government.

Specific Parliamentary Privileges in India

Freedom of Speech in Parliament

The most fundamental privilege accorded to members is the freedom of speech in Parliament. Ar cle
105(1)(a) guarantees that members of either House enjoy absolute freedom of expression within
parliamentary proceedings. This privilege shields members from civil or criminal liability for
statements made on the floor of Parliament, enabling them to cri cize government policies,
ministers, officials, and public administra on in robust and candid terms. Members are thereby able
to raise concerns regarding corrup on, inefficiency, mismanagement, or incompetence without the
risk of defama on suits or criminal prosecu on.

This protec on extends not only to statements made during plenary sessions but also to
communica ons made in parliamentary commi ees and documents associated with parliamentary
business. The ra onale behind such absolute freedom is to ensure that representa ves can voice the
grievances and opinions of their cons tuents without fear of reprisal, thus enhancing accountability
and transparency in governance.

Although the freedom is extensive, it is not en rely unlimited. Ar cle 105(2), along with
parliamentary rules and standing orders, imposes certain constraints on the use of this privilege.
Members are prohibited from abusing the privilege to make scandalous, frivolous, or offensive
allega ons that violate parliamentary decorum. These limita ons ensure that freedom of speech is
exercised responsibly, in a manner consistent with the dignity of parliamentary proceedings.

Immunity from Legal Proceedings

Ar cle 105(1)(b) further complements the freedom of speech by conferring immunity from legal
proceedings on members in respect of anything said or any vote given in Parliament. This immunity
is both civil and criminal: a member cannot be sued for damages, prosecuted for criminal libel or
sedi on, or subjected to any other legal ac on for statements made or votes cast in the performance
of parliamentary du es. The immunity exists not merely for the individual benefit of legislators but
primarily for the protec on of Parliament as an ins tu on and for the ci zens it represents.

By providing legal protec on, members can vote and speak according to conscience without fear of
judicial harassment. This immunity helps maintain the independence and authority of the legislature,
ensuring that members' parliamentary ac ons cannot be obstructed by external legal challenges.
Privileges of the Houses

In addi on to privileges granted to individual members, the Houses themselves enjoy collec ve
privileges, which are essen al for regula ng proceedings, maintaining discipline, and preserving
ins tu onal dignity. These powers include the authority to:

Exclude strangers from parliamentary proceedings when necessary;

Maintain order and discipline within the chamber;

Punish breaches of privilege or contempt of the House;

Regulate procedural ma ers, including who may a end sessions and under what condi ons.

The Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha hold specific authority to
suspend members who violate rules or disrupt proceedings, and they may adjourn the House to
maintain order in extreme circumstances. Collec vely, these powers ensure that the legisla ve
process is orderly, respec ul, and effec ve.

Power to Punish for Contempt and Breach of Privilege

A key aspect of parliamentary privilege is the power of the Houses to punish contempt and breaches
of privilege to protect their dignity and authority. Contempt of Parliament may include ac ons that
obstruct legisla ve business, show disrespect to the House or its members, disobey parliamentary
orders, or publish misleading accounts of parliamentary proceedings.

Breaches of privilege occur when an individual’s ac ons violate the rights and immuni es of
members or the Houses, such as denying a member the right to speak, physically preven ng a
member from a ending sessions, or publishing statements misrepresen ng parliamentary
proceedings. The Houses possess the authority to address such acts through reprimands, suspension,
or, in extreme cases, imprisonment.

This power ensures that parliamentary procedures are respected and that members can func on
without interference, preserving the independence of the legislature as a cons tu onal ins tu on.

Codifica on vs. Bri sh Conven on

A significant ques on in Indian parliamentary prac ce is whether parliamentary privileges are fully
codified in the Cons tu on or whether the Cons tu on preserves unwri en Bri sh conven ons
recognizing addi onal privileges. Ar cle 105 enshrines certain core rights, such as freedom of speech
and immunity from legal proceedings, but it does not provide an exhaus ve enumera on of all
parliamentary privileges.

The Cons tu on allows Parliament to define and legislate privileges beyond those expressly stated.
For instance, the Parliament (Protec on of Publica on of Proceedings) Act, 1956, safeguards the
publica on of parliamentary debates and proceedings, thereby extending privileges beyond the
textual provisions of Ar cle 105. Parliamentary rules further reinforce privileges by recognizing
members’ rights to par cipate in debates, move mo ons, and engage fully in legisla ve business.

Indian courts have dis nguished between cons tu onal privileges—which are protected by Ar cle
105—and conven onal or statutory privileges, which derive from parliamentary prac ce or
legisla on. While cons tu onal privileges enjoy robust protec on, conven onal privileges may be
recognized but subject to more limited judicial oversight. This approach represents a middle path
between the Bri sh system of largely conven on-based privileges and a purely codified legal
framework.

Scope and Limita ons of Privileges

The scope of parliamentary privileges, especially the immunity from legal proceedings, is broader in
India than in some other parliamentary democracies. Unlike jurisdic ons where speech must be
“relevant to parliamentary business” to receive protec on, Ar cle 105 requires only that statements
be “said” in Parliament, poten ally encompassing even irrelevant or tangen al remarks.
Parliamentary rules, however, regulate conduct and speech to prevent frivolous or offensive
statements from undermining decorum.

Importantly, the immunity applies only to statements made in Parliament. Once a member speaks
outside Parliament—even if repea ng parliamentary statements—privilege does not apply, and such
statements are subject to legal scru ny. This dis nc on ensures that parliamentary privilege does
not become a vehicle for unaccountable defamatory speech.

Moreover, privileges do not shield members from disciplinary ac on by the House. Members can be
suspended or expelled for misconduct, disorderly behavior, or viola on of parliamentary rules,
underscoring that privileges exist to protect legisla ve func ons, not personal misconduct.

Interac on with Fundamental Rights

The rela onship between parliamentary privileges and fundamental rights under the Cons tu on
presents complex considera ons. Ar cle 105(1) explicitly states that privileges are subject to the
Cons tu on and parliamentary procedural rules. This raises ques ons about poten al conflicts—for
example, whether the right to freedom of speech under Ar cle 19(1)(a) could override parliamentary
restric ons on publishing debates or documents.

Courts have generally held that privileges, as cons tu onal crea ons, cannot conflict with the
Cons tu on itself. Therefore, parliamentary privileges must respect fundamental rights.
Nevertheless, courts recognize that protec ng parliamentary func oning may jus fy certain
limita ons on fundamental rights. For example, legisla on safeguarding the confiden ality of
parliamentary proceedings may restrict press freedom to ensure Parliament operates effec vely. This
delicate balance seeks to uphold both the independence of Parliament and the cons tu onal rights
of ci zens.

Recent Developments and Judicial Interpreta on

Recent judicial interpreta ons have emphasized a nuanced understanding of parliamentary privilege,
balancing protec on for members with safeguards against abuse. Courts have held that while
members enjoy immunity for statements in Parliament, protec on does not extend to using
parliamentary proceedings as a cover for defamatory or extraneous statements unrelated to
legisla ve business.

The Supreme Court has also clarified that parliamentary privilege is not a blanket shield against
accountability. Members remain personally liable for criminal acts, corrup on, or bribery commi ed
under the guise of parliamentary func ons. Privilege protects legisla ve du es, not personal
misconduct.

Conclusion
Parliamentary privileges under the Indian Cons tu on cons tute a combina on of cons tu onal
guarantees and inherited Bri sh conven ons, carefully adapted to the Indian parliamentary context.
Ar cle 105 establishes the cons tu onal founda on, primarily safeguarding freedom of speech and
immunity from legal proceedings for ac ons directly related to parliamentary work.

These privileges are essen al for enabling members to perform their func ons without fear or
external pressure, preserving the dignity, authority, and independence of Parliament. While
privileges are not absolute and are constrained by cons tu onal provisions, parliamentary rules, and
fundamental rights, they provide a structured framework that balances the protec on of legisla ve
independence with accountability and responsible exercise of power.

The dynamic interac on between privilege, judicial review, and fundamental rights reflects the
Indian Cons tu on’s commitment to parliamentary autonomy and democra c governance, ensuring
that Parliament can operate effec vely while remaining accountable within the broader
cons tu onal framework.

Tenth Schedule of Indian Cons tu on

Introduc on and Cons tu onal Context

The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Cons tu on, commonly known as the An -Defec on Law,
represents one of the most significant cons tu onal amendments rela ng to the structure and
func oning of India's legisla ve ins tu ons, added by the Cons tu on (Fi y-second Amendment)
Act, 1985. The Tenth Schedule addresses the cons tu onal and democra c impera ve of
maintaining stable governments, ensuring that elected representa ves remain faithful to the poli cal
mandate they receive from the electorate, and preven ng the destabiliza on of legislatures through
mass defec ons or strategic party changes. The Schedule comprises several paragraphs that
delineate the circumstances under which elected members become disqualified from their seats, the
procedure for determining such disqualifica ons, and the excep ons that recognize legi mate
poli cal changes such as party mergers and the joining of par es by independent candidates. While
the Tenth Schedule has been praised for reducing floor-crossings and stabilizing governments, it has
also a racted significant cri cism from those who contend that it undermines individual conscience,
freedom of associa on, and democra c accountability in favor of rigid party discipline.

The genesis of the Tenth Schedule lies in the acute cons tu onal crisis that plagued Indian
democracy during the 1970s and early 1980s, when successive governments fell not through the
electoral process or through legi mate parliamentary procedures but through the defec on of
elected members from their poli cal par es. These defec ons, o en induced through offers of
ministerial posi ons, financial incen ves, or threats, subverted the electoral mandates granted by
the people and rendered government forma on dependent not on the confidence of the electorate
but on the fickleness of individual legislators. The phenomenon of "floor-crossing" or "turncoa sm,"
wherein members would abandon their original par es a er elec on to sit as members of other
par es or as independents, reached epidemic propor ons during the Emergency period and its
a ermath, threatening the very founda ons of democra c governance. The Fi y-second
Amendment Act, enacted during the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi, represented a cons tu onal
determina on to address this crisis through the mechanism of the Tenth Schedule, introducing penal
disqualifica on for defec ng members in an a empt to ensure that electoral mandates were
respected and that government stability was secured through the mechanisms of parliamentary
democracy rather than through the vagaries of individual party-switchers.
Structure and Provisions of the Tenth Schedule

The Tenth Schedule consists of several paragraphs that together establish a comprehensive
framework for determining and punishing defec on by elected members. The opening provisions of
the Schedule establish its applicability to members of both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha, as
well as to members of State Legisla ve Assemblies and Legisla ve Councils.

Paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule, which forms the substan ve core of the an -defec on law,
specifies the circumstances under which a member of a House becomes disqualified. According to
Paragraph 2(1), a member of a House belonging to any poli cal party shall be disqualified for being a
member of the House if: (a) he voluntarily gives up his membership of such poli cal party; (b) he
votes or abstains from vo ng in the House contrary to any direc on issued by his poli cal party in
rela on to that vote, without obtaining prior permission from such party or such person as may be
authorized by the party in that behalf to permit him to do so; or (c) he is an independent member
elected to the House and he joins any poli cal party a er such elec on.

The first ground of disqualifica on—voluntary giving up of party membership—addresses the

situa on where a member formally resigns from his poli cal party or publicly declares his inten on
to dissociate from it. Such resigna on or dissocia on must be voluntary and not coerced; the
member must make a deliberate, conscious choice to abandon his affilia on with the party. The
burden of proof that such resigna on is voluntary rests with the party establishing the claim of
defec on. The second ground—vo ng or abstaining contrary to party direc on—addresses the
cri cal problem of members who nominally remain in the party but act contrary to its will on ma ers
where the party has issued binding direc ons. The term "direc on" typically refers to what are
known as "whips," communica ons issued by the party leadership indica ng to members how they
must vote on ma ers designated as party issues. The member is disqualified if he votes or abstains
contrary to such direc on without obtaining prior permission from the party, thereby depriving the
party of the member's support on crucial votes.

The third ground of disqualifica on addresses independent members elected to the House. Under
Paragraph 2(1)(c), an independent member elected to the House shall be disqualified for being a
member of the House if he joins any poli cal party a er such elec on. This provision reflects the
principle that those elected as independents do not represent any poli cal party and cannot be
subjected to the an -defec on law unless they voluntarily join a party a er elec on. Once an
independent joins a party, he becomes subject to the an -defec on law and can be disqualified if he
subsequently defects from that party.

Excep ons and Safeguards

Recognizing that rigid applica on of the an -defec on law could create injus ce and prevent
legi mate poli cal evolu on, Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule provides important excep ons and
qualifica ons. These excep ons balance the objec ves of the an -defec on law—maintaining stable
government and respec ng electoral mandates—with the need for flexibility in poli cal alignments
and protec on of individual rights.

The first and most significant excep on, contained in Paragraph 4(a), addresses party mergers. The
provision states that nothing in the Schedule shall disqualify a member who has become a member
of a poli cal party as a result of a merger or amalgama on of his poli cal party with another poli cal
party. However, this excep on is qualified by the requirement that at least two-thirds of the
members of the original poli cal party must have agreed to such merger for the excep on to apply.
This qualifica on ensures that a purported "merger" cannot be used as a cover for individual
defec ons and that genuine mergers, which represent the will of a substan al majority of the party,
are recognized. When a party merges with another, the members of the original party do not
cons tute defectors merely because they become members of the merged en ty, recognizing that
the membership of a merged party cannot remain unchanged when two separate en es combine.

The second excep on addresses leave of absence. Paragraph 4(b)(i) provides that nothing in the
Schedule shall disqualify a member on the ground of absence from any mee ng of the House if such
member has, prior to such absence, obtained or been permi ed to obtain leave of absence from the
House by the Speaker or Chairman. Similarly, Paragraph 4(b)(ii) provides an excep on where a
member has been detained in custody as a result of criminal proceedings or on any other ground
beyond his control and has in mated the same to the Speaker or Chairman

The third and most extensive excep on relates to independent candidates. Paragraph 4 provides that
nothing in the Schedule shall apply to a nominated member in any case. This excep on reflects the
recogni on that nominated members, par cularly the twelve nominated members of the Rajya
Sabha who are appointed rather than elected, do not represent any cons tuency or poli cal party
and therefore cannot, by joining or leaving a party, be deemed to have defected. The Schedule's
provisions apply to elected representa ves whose electoral mandate flows from a specific party
affilia on or from their status as independent candidates; nominated members stand outside this
framework.

Detailed Examina on of Disqualifica on Grounds

Voluntary Giving Up of Party Membership: This ground of disqualifica on, as established in

Paragraph 2(1)(a), requires that the giving up of membership be voluntary, not coerced or induced by
circumstances beyond the member's control. A member may voluntarily give up party membership
by submi ng a wri en resigna on to the party leadership or by making a public declara on that he
is no longer a member of the party. In determining whether membership has been voluntarily given
up, the Speaker or Chairman must consider whether the member's ac ons demonstrate a clear and
unambiguous inten on to cease being part of the poli cal party. In the landmark case Kihoto
Hollohan v. Zachillhu, which examined the applica on of the an -defec on law, the Supreme Court
held that the decision of the presiding officer determining whether membership has been voluntarily
given up must be based on evidence and must not be arbitrary or capricious.

Vo ng Contrary to Party Direc ons: This ground of disqualifica on addresses the core problem that
the an -defec on law was designed to remedy—the vo ng contrary to party direc ons on ma ers
designated as party issues. When a poli cal party issues a direc on (typically called a "whip") on how
members must vote on a par cular issue, members are bound by this direc on. If a member votes or
abstains from vo ng contrary to this direc on without obtaining prior permission from the party, he
may be disqualified. The permission to vote contrary to party direc ons must be obtained from the
party or from such person as may be authorized by the party in that behalf.

The key phrase "direc on issued by his poli cal party" requires that there be a clear, unambiguous
direc on from the party. Not every party communica on cons tutes a "direc on" for purposes of
the an -defec on law; rather, the direc on must be explicit and understood to be binding.
Addi onally, the direc on must relate to a vote or absten on in the House; direc ons rela ng to
conduct outside the House do not fall within the scope of Paragraph 2(1)(b). In the Supreme Court's
interpreta on of the an -defec on law, it has been recognized that the concept of a direc on
presupposes that the party has made a conscious decision that a par cular vote is a party ma er on
which party discipline must be maintained.
Independent Candidates Joining Poli cal Par es: The third ground of disqualifica on, under
Paragraph 2(1)(c), addresses the situa on of members elected as independent candidates. Such
candidates, having received an electoral mandate not as representa ves of a poli cal party but as
individual candidates, are not ini ally subject to party discipline. However, once an independent
candidate joins a poli cal party a er elec on, the an -defec on law applies to him as it does to
members elected on a party cket

Procedure for Determining Disqualifica on

Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule prescribes the procedure for determining whether a member has
become subject to disqualifica on on grounds of defec on. This provision is cri cal because it
establishes the forum and the procedure for a determina on that can result in the loss of a
member's seat in the legislature. According to Paragraph 6, if any ques on arises as to whether a
member of a House has become subject to disqualifica on on grounds of defec on, the ques on
shall be referred for the decision of the Speaker of that House or, in the case of the Rajya Sabha or a
Legisla ve Council of a State, the Chairman of that House.

The ves ng of decision-making power in the presiding officers—the Speaker or Chairman—reflects a

deliberate cons tu onal choice to entrust this determina on to the officers of the House, who are in
the best posi on to assess parliamentary conduct and to apply the an -defec on law in the context
of the specific legisla ve body. The Speaker or Chairman is expected to be familiar with the
parliamentary procedures, party direc ons, and the conduct of members. However, the presiding
officer must act in a quasi-judicial capacity when determining ques ons of disqualifica on and must
observe the principles of natural jus ce.

Paragraph 6 originally provided that the decision of the Speaker or Chairman "shall be final,"
sugges ng that the decision was immune from judicial review. However, this understanding was
significantly revised by the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu, a landmark judgment that
examined the applicability of the an -defec on law to members of the Nagaland Legisla ve
Assembly. In this case, the Supreme Court held that while the Speaker or Chairman is the appropriate
and primary forum for determining disqualifica on ques ons, the Speaker's or Chairman's decision is
not beyond challenge and can be subject to judicial review. The Court established that the decision
can be challenged in court if it violates the principles of natural jus ce, if it is wholly unreasonable, or
if it is based on no evidence. This judicial pronouncement has significantly altered the interpreta on
of Paragraph 6, ensuring that the an -defec on law cannot be misused to arbitrarily disqualify
members through abuse of the presiding officer's discre on.

Procedural Safeguards and Natural Jus ce

Following the Kihoto Hollohan judgment, it is now established that when a presiding officer acts
under the Tenth Schedule, he is performing a quasi-judicial func on and must comply with the
principles of natural jus ce. These principles require that the member against whom disqualifica on
proceedings are ini ated must be given no ce of the charges against him and an opportunity to be
heard. The member must be informed of the evidence on which the allega on of defec on is based
and must be given the opportunity to examine that evidence and to present his defense. The
presiding officer must provide wri en reasons for the disqualifica on decision, and these reasons
must be grounded in the evidence on record and in the law.

The Supreme Court has also held that the disqualifica on decision must be made on the basis of
material evidence and must not be based on conjecture or surmise. If the presiding officer's decision
appears to be manifestly unreasonable or based on no evidence at all, a court can interfere and
overturn the decision. Addi onally, the courts have indicated that if the presiding officer is shown to
have acted with personal or poli cal bias, the decision can be set aside. These safeguards, developed
through judicial interpreta on, ensure that the an -defec on law, while serving the important
purpose of maintaining governmental stability, does not become a tool for arbitrary poli cal
persecu on.

Consequences of Disqualifica on

The consequence of disqualifica on under the Tenth Schedule is severe and reflects the
cons tu onal determina on that defec on is a serious breach of duty to the electorate and the
poli cal party. When a member is disqualified on the ground of defec on, he forfeits his seat in the
House and becomes ineligible to hold the seat for the remainder of the term of that House. This
means that a member disqualified during a five-year legisla ve term cannot seek re-elec on un l
that five-year term expires, effec vely removing him from the legislature for the remainder of that
term.

Beyond the loss of his seat, a disqualified member loses the various privileges, allowances, and
facili es that a ach to membership in the legislature. The member can no longer par cipate in
debates, vote on legisla on, or serve on parliamentary commi ees. If the disqualified member was
holding an office such as that of Minister or parliamentary secretary during his membership, such
office is also vacated upon disqualifica on.

Conclusion

The Tenth Schedule of the Indian Cons tu on represents a deliberate cons tu onal interven on
designed to address the problem of poli cal defec on and to stabilize governmental ins tu ons.
Through its provisions establishing grounds for disqualifica on, excep ons recognizing legi mate
poli cal changes, and procedures for determina on of disqualifica on subject to judicial review, the
Schedule a empts to balance the need for governmental stability with fairness to individual
members and the requirement to respect democra c processes. While the an -defec on law has
undoubtedly reduced floor-crossings and contributed to government stability, it remains
controversial, with cri cs arguing that it unduly constrains individual conscience and freedom of
associa on.

State Legisla ve Assembly – Structure, Powers, and Func ons

Cons tu onal Framework and Composi on

The State Legislature of India, as contemplated in Chapter III of Part VI of the Cons tu on (Ar cles
168 to 212), represents the primary legisla ve ins tu on at the state level through which state-
specific laws are enacted and state affairs are governed. Ar cle 168 provides the founda onal
provision that there shall be a Legislature for every State in the Union, consis ng of the Governor
and a House or Houses of the Legislature.

The Cons tu on contemplates two possible structures for state legislatures: unicameral and
bicameral systems. Most Indian States follow the unicameral system, consis ng solely of the
Legisla ve Assembly, the popular house elected directly by the people. As per current cons tu onal
arrangements, only seven States—Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, and U ar Pradesh—maintain bicameral legislatures with both a Legisla ve Assembly
(Vidhan Sabha) and a Legisla ve Council (Vidhan Parishad). The dis nc on between these two
organiza onal forms reflects cons tu onal flexibility in recognizing that different States may have
different needs and preferences regarding the structure of their legislatures, and that bicameral
legislatures, which provide for a second chamber of review and reconsidera on, may be appropriate
for larger or more complex States.

Ar cle 169 provides for the crea on or aboli on of Legisla ve Councils, empowering Parliament to
make laws providing for the aboli on of an exis ng Legisla ve Council or the crea on of such a
Council in a State where one does not exist. However, the crea on or aboli on of a Legisla ve
Council cannot occur merely through ordinary parliamentary legisla on; rather, it requires that the
Legisla ve Assembly of the State pass a resolu on by a majority of the total membership of the
Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and vo ng. Once the
state legislature passes such a resolu on, Parliament must then pass a law effec ng the crea on or
aboli on, demonstra ng a federal consensus necessary for so fundamental an altera on in state
legisla ve structure.

The Legisla ve Assembly: Structure and Composi on

The Legisla ve Assembly (Vidhan Sabha) is the primary and, in most states, the sole house of the
state legislature, serving as the popular chamber through which the people of the state directly
par cipate in lawmaking. Ar cle 170 prescribes the composi on of the Legisla ve Assembly,
establishing that the minimum number of seats is sixty and the maximum is five hundred. The
alloca on of seats among various cons tuencies within each state is determined based on the
popula on of the state as ascertained at the last preceding census, reflec ng the democra c
principle that representa on should bear a rela onship to popula on. Following each decennial
census, the representa on is readjusted by such authority and in such manner as Parliament
determines by law.

The members of the Legisla ve Assembly are chosen directly by the people through adult franchise
on the basis of territorial cons tuencies within each state. Each territorial cons tuency, as far as
prac cable, comprises approximately equal popula ons, though the exact popula on ra o need not
be rigidly uniform across all cons tuencies. The system of elec on is the first-past-the-post system,
wherein the candidate securing the largest number of votes in each cons tuency, regardless of
whether he receives an absolute majority, is elected to the Assembly. This electoral system is uniform
across states and at the union level, reflec ng the standardized approach to parliamentary elec ons
in India.

Ar cle 170(2) provides for the reserva on of seats in the Legisla ve Assembly for Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes on the basis of their popula on in each state. Addi onally, Ar cle 333 provides
that the Governor may nominate such members of the Anglo-Indian community as he considers
appropriate to the Legisla ve Assembly if he is of the opinion that the community is not adequately
represented in the Assembly.

Originally, the reserva ons for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the nomina on of Anglo-
Indian representa ves were to cease a er ten years from the commencement of the Cons tu on.
However, successive cons tu onal amendments have extended these provisions, and they con nue
to remain in force indefinitely, reflec ng a cons tu onal commitment to ensuring con nued
representa on of these communi es.

The Legisla ve Council: Structure and Role

In those states that maintain a bicameral legislature, the Legisla ve Council (Vidhan Parishad) serves
as the upper house, providing a forum for sober second thought and ensuring that state legisla on
receives the benefit of examina on and review by a body with longer-serving members and greater
experience. Ar cle 171(1) provides that the total number of members in a Legisla ve Council shall
not exceed one-third of the total number of members in the Legisla ve Assembly of that state, but in
no case shall it be less than forty members.

The composi on of the Legisla ve Council, as prescribed in Ar cle 171(3) un l Parliament makes
provision otherwise, consists of members selected through various mechanisms designed to ensure
diverse representa on and exper se. According to Ar cle 171(3): (a) one-third of the members are
elected by the members of the Legisla ve Assembly from persons who are not members of the
Assembly; (b) one-third are elected by an electorate comprising members of local authori es such as
municipali es and district boards; (c) one-sixth are elected by an electorate of teachers registered in
the state and having taught for at least three years; (d) one-sixth are elected by an electorate of
graduate voters; and (e) the remainder are nominated by the Governor from persons having special
knowledge or prac cal experience in literature, science, art, coopera ve movement, and social
service.

Unlike the Legisla ve Assembly, the Legisla ve Council is not subject to dissolu on under Ar cle
172(2). Rather, as nearly as possible one-third of its members re re every two years, crea ng a
permanent, con nuing body wherein some members always remain and provide ins tu onal
con nuity.

Qualifica ons for Membership

Ar cle 173 of the Cons tu on specifies the qualifica ons that a person must possess to be eligible
for membership in the state legislature. A person shall not be qualified to be chosen as a member of
the Legislature of a State unless he: (a) is a ci zen of India; (b) is not less than twenty-five years of
age in the case of the Legisla ve Assembly and not less than thirty years of age in the case of the
Legisla ve Council; (c) possesses such other qualifica ons as may be prescribed by Parliament by
law. The higher age qualifica on for the Legisla ve Council (thirty years) compared to the Legisla ve
Assembly (twenty-five years) reflects a cons tu onal concep on of the Council as a chamber of
more mature and experienced members, similar to the dis nc on between the Rajya Sabha (thirty
years) and Lok Sabha (twenty-five years) at the union level.

Disqualifica ons for Membership

Ar cle 191 prescribes grounds on which a person is disqualified for being chosen as or for being a
member of the state legislature. The disqualifica ons include: (a) holding any office of profit under
the Government of India or the Government of any State, except offices declared by the state
legislature by law not to disqualify; (b) being of unsound mind and so declared by a competent court;
(c) being an undischarged insolvent; (d) not being a ci zen of India or having voluntarily acquired
ci zenship of a foreign state or being under any acknowledgment of allegiance to a foreign state; (e)
being disqualified under any law made by Parliament.

Addi onally, Ar cle 191(2) provides that a person shall be disqualified if he is disqualified under the
Tenth Schedule on the grounds of defec on.

Dura on of State Legislatures

The Legisla ve Assembly, like the Lok Sabha, has a fixed tenure of five years, as provided in Ar cle
172(1). The Assembly is elected for a five-year term, which can be extended only during the
opera on of a proclama on of emergency made under Ar cle 352, and even then only by Parliament
and only for a period not exceeding one year at a me and six months a er the proclama on ceases
to operate. Before the expira on of the five-year term, the Governor, ordinarily on the advice of the
Chief Minister, may dissolve the Assembly if the Government has lost the confidence of the
legislature or if the Governor determines that a situa on has arisen which warrants dissolu on. The
dissolu on of the Assembly results in the dissolu on of the House and necessitates the holding of
fresh general elec ons.

The Legisla ve Council, by contrast, as noted above, is not subject to dissolu on but rotates one-
third of its membership every two years.

Officers of State Legislature

Speaker and Deputy Speaker of Legisla ve Assembly: The presiding officer of the Legisla ve
Assembly is the Speaker, elected by the members of the Assembly from among themselves under
Ar cle 178. The elec on of the Speaker is one of the first procedural acts of a newly cons tuted or
recons tuted Assembly, and the Speaker is expected to be an impar al presiding officer who, once
elected, transcends party affilia on and serves as custodian of the dignity and orderliness of the
House. The Assembly also elects a Deputy Speaker from among its members to assist the Speaker
and to perform the Speaker's func ons during the Speaker's absence.

The Speaker and Deputy Speaker hold office during the pleasure of the Assembly and can be
removed through a resolu on passed by a majority of all members of the Assembly a er fourteen
days' no ce of the inten on to move such a resolu on. If either the Speaker or Deputy Speaker
ceases to be a member of the Assembly, his office automa cally becomes vacant. When the office of
Speaker is vacant, the du es are performed by the Deputy Speaker, and if both offices are vacant, by
such member as the Governor appoints.

The Speaker of the state legislature, like the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, possesses extensive powers
and func ons designed to maintain order and decorum in the Assembly and to facilitate its legisla ve
work. The Speaker presides over the si ngs of the Assembly, regulates the conduct of business,
interprets the rules of procedure, and resolves points of order. The Speaker possesses disciplinary
powers, including the power to suspend members for breaches of parliamentary conduct, and
possesses the cri cal power to cer fy whether a Bill is a Money Bill. The rulings and decisions of the
Speaker are final within the House and cannot be challenged in the courts.

Chairman and Deputy Chairman of Legisla ve Council: In states with a bicameral legislature, the
Legisla ve Council elects a Chairman and Deputy Chairman from among its own members. These
officers perform func ons analogous to those of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, presiding over the
Council's si ngs and maintaining order and decorum. The Chairman may resign or can be removed
by a resolu on passed by a majority of all members of the Council a er fourteen days' no ce.

Legisla ve Powers and Func ons of State Legislature

The state legislature possesses legisla ve authority over ma ers enumerated in the State List
(Schedule 7, List II) and the Concurrent List (Schedule 7, List III) of the Cons tu on. The State List
includes ma ers such as public order and police (except as delegated to the Centre), agriculture,
public health, local government ins tu ons, urban development, intra-state commerce, and
numerous other ma ers of state importance. The Concurrent List includes subjects as to which both
the Centre and States have legisla ve competence, though in case of conflict between a state law
and a central law on a Concurrent List ma er, the central law prevails.
The legisla ve procedure in the state legislature is similar to that in Parliament, with Bills passing
through three readings and requiring passage by both houses (where a bicameral legislature exists)
before being presented to the Governor for assent. Ar cle 196 provides for the basic legisla ve
procedure, specifying that except for Money Bills and Financial Bills, a Bill may be introduced in
either house of a bicameral legislature. A Bill shall not be deemed to have been passed unless it has
been agreed to by both houses, either without amendment or with amendments agreed to by both
houses.

The state legislature also possesses financial powers similar to those of Parliament. The state budget
(termed the Annual Financial Statement) must be laid before the legislature, with the Governor
presen ng a statement of es mated receipts and expenditures. The legislature must pass an
Appropria on Bill authorizing expenditures from the Consolidated Fund of the State, and no state
funds can be withdrawn without parliamentary authority.

Special Procedures: Money Bills

State legislatures follow special procedures for Money Bills analogous to those applicable to Money
Bills in Parliament. Ar cle 198 defines Money Bills in state legislatures similarly to Ar cle 110 in
Parliament. A Money Bill can only originate in the Legisla ve Assembly and cannot be introduced in
the Legisla ve Council. A er passage in the Assembly, the Money Bill is transmi ed to the Council for
its recommenda ons, with the Council having fourteen days to return it. If the Council does not
return it within fourteen days, or if the Assembly rejects the Council's recommenda ons, the Money
Bill is deemed passed by both houses in the form passed by the Assembly.

Privileges and Powers of State Legislatures

Members of state legislatures enjoy privileges analogous to those enjoyed by members of

Parliament. The presiding officers of state legislatures possess powers to maintain order, to suspend
or expel members for disorderly conduct, to punish breaches of privilege and contempt, and to
regulate parliamentary procedure. The state legislatures, like Parliament, have the power to inquire
into ma ers of public importance through ques ons, debates, and commi ee inquiries.

Conclusion

The State Legislature, as contemplated in the Cons tu on and comprising the Legisla ve Assembly
(and in some states, the Legisla ve Council), represents the primary ins tu on through which state-
level governance is exercised in India's federal system. Through its power to legislate on state and
concurrent ma ers, to scru nize state budgets and authorize expenditures, to hold the state
execu ve accountable through ques ons and debates, and to represent the interests and aspira ons
of the people of the state, the state legislature fulfills a cri cal cons tu onal func on. The structure,
composi on, and func oning of state legislatures reflect cons tu onal principles of democracy,
federalism, and representa ve government, adapted to the requirements of state governance. As
India's federal system con nues to evolve and as states con nue to assume greater responsibili es in
implemen ng na onal policies and addressing local needs, the state legislatures will remain central
ins tu ons through which democra c governance is exercised at the state level