Q. 97 – R.

COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE
DES GRANDS BARRAGES
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VINGT-CINQUIÈME CONGRÈS
DES GRANDS BARRAGES
Stavanger, Juin 2015
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USE OF RISK ANALYSIS FOR FLOOD UPGRADE DESIGN AND

CONSTRUCTION RISK1

Malcolm BARKER
Principal Engineer Dams, GHD Brisbane

Iain LONIE
Senior Engineer Dams, GHD Brisbane

AUSTRALIA

1. INTRODUCTION

Maroon Dam, which is owned by South East Queensland Water

(Seqwater), was constructed between 1969 and 1974. The dam is a multi-
purpose reservoir, constructed to provide potable water supply, irrigation, flood
mitigation and recreation.

The State Dam Safety Regulator has introduced guidelines for evaluating
the required Acceptable Flood Capacity (AFC) for a dam, which is the capacity
required to safely discharge a design flood of a severity based on the
consequence of dam failure [1]. Dams which cannot safely discharge the AFC
require upgrading and the guideline has three methods for assessing the AFC,
including the use of risk assessment. The risk assessment procedure
incorporates the as low as reasonably practicable principle (ALARP) and
considers the safety of the dam for all potential failure modes including
hydrological loading. The method is based on the ANCOLD Risk Assessment
Guidelines [2].

1 Utilisation de l'analyse des risques pour la conception de la prévention du risque de

crue et du risque de construction

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Where the risk profile is above the limit of Tolerability (Fig 8), risk reduction
options are required to bring the risk profile down to the limit of tolerability. The
risk assessment procedure is then used to assess compliance with the ALARP
principle by formulating additional risk reduction options that would bring the risk
profile further below the limit of tolerability. This includes undertaking a cost-
benefit analysis for the upgrade options required to reduce the risk profile below
the limits of tolerability.

As an alternative to the cost-benefit analysis, an equivalent percentage

AFC has been developed using the risk analysis for the upgrade design [3]. The
percentage AFC using risk analysis is the percentage reduction in the flood
frequency data over the full range of floods that is required to lower the risk to the
tolerable line or achieve the percentage AFC compliance levels required by the
State Dam Safety Regulator. This approach was also used for the evaluation of
the coffer dam level required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the
construction period and included consideration of flood seasonality.

2. DAM DESCRIPTION

Maroon Dam has a maximum height of 47 m and a crest length of

approximately 457 m. A plan of the existing dam and the outline of the proposed
Stage 1 upgrade is shown on Fig. 1.

The embankment comprises an earth and rockfill section with a central

earth core, outer gravel drains and rockfill, with upstream and downstream
weighting berms (Fig 2). The dam crest level is at EL 219.78 m and the full
supply level (FSL) is at EL 207.14 m (hereafter, all levels are given as m).

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

Fig. 1
Maroon Dam plan of existing dam and outline of proposed Stage 1 upgrade
Plan du barrage Maroon actuel et des améliorations proposées en phase 1

1 Embankment 1 Digue
2 Raised berm 2 Surélévation de la berme
3 New spillway channel 3 Nouveau chenal du déversoir
4 Right bank coffer dam and grouting 4 Batardeau sur la rive droite
5 Left bank coffer dam and grouting 5 Batardeau sur la rive gauche
6 Laydown area 6 Aire de dépôt
7 Spoil dump 7 Dépôt de déblais
8 Site boundary 8 Limite du site

The spillway comprises an unlined 137 m wide channel excavated through

rock on the right bank with the spillway crest level at 217.51 m. The dam is
currently required to pass the Probable Maximum Precipitation Design Flood
(PMP-DF) of 3180 m3/s, which will result in overtopping of the main embankment
by 1.5 m.

The reservoir capacity between the full supply level 207.14 m and the
spillway level 217.51 m is maintained for flood retention and the peak reservoir
level recorded to date was 210.0 m, which occurred on 11 January 2011. The
operational performance was taken into consideration in the probabilistic
hydrological analysis used for the risk analysis.

The outlet works consist of a low level single inlet tower with a cast in situ
reinforced concrete culvert passing through the embankment section, with a
valve house located within the core of the embankment.

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Fig. 2
Maroon Dam – Typical cross section
Barrage Maroon – Plan en coupe typique

1 Core 1 Coeur
2 Downstream fine filter 2 Filtre fin aval
3 Upstream fine filter 3 Filtre fin amont
4 Coarse filter 4 Filtre grossier
5 Rockfill 5 Enrochement
6 Upstream rip rap 6 Enrochement amont
7 General fill 7 Matériaux de comblement
8 Pressure relief wells 8 Puits de limitation de pression
9 Multi line grout curtain 9 Voile d’étanchéité en multiligne
10 Upstream 10 Amont
11 Downstream 11 Aval
12 Full Supply Level 207.14 m 12 Cote de retenue normale 207,14 m
13 Dam Crest level 219.79 m 13 Crête du barrage 219,79 m

2.1. DAM SAFETY ISSUES

The following dam safety issues were identified and evaluated in the risk
analysis:

 Piping through the abutments above the levels where grouting and the
pressure relief system had been installed during the original construction.
 Piping through the embankment resulting from filter Zone IIA having fines
well in excess of 5%, thereby allowing the filter to hold a crack with reduced
effectiveness in preventing piping through the embankment.
 Embankment instability through the identified weak clay layers on the
abutments and river bed area.
 Spillway erosion in the unlined channel.
 Overtopping breach of the embankment by the revised PMP-DF.

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

3. GEOLOGY, GEOTECHNICAL INVESTIGATIONS

AND CLAY SEAM MODELLING

The site geology in terms of the general distribution of rock types under the
foundations can best be understood from the long section shown on Figure 3,
which is diagrammatic but illustrates the main features.

The section shows the rhyolite (referred to as porphyry) capping the ridges
on the two upper abutments with three dolerite sills (referred to as basalt) on both
abutments above river level and three sills below river level. It also shows clay
seams containing slip surfaces within the clay shales, siltstones and sandstones.

During construction, the foundation clay seams resulted in substantial slope

failures when excavating the outlet conduit and led to extensive investigations
using test pitting, drilling, sampling and testing of the clay zones to determine the
nature and extent on site. The weak clay layers were tested and found to have a
residual friction angle of 8°, however following expert review [4], this was
increased to a peak of 13° to account for shearing through the rock mass in the
foundation. The weighting berms were then added on the upstream and
downstream sides of the embankment to improve embankment stability (Fig. 2).

In order to critically evaluate the embankment stability issues for the design
of the upgrade works, a detailed three dimensional geological model of the
foundation area was developed using the available design investigation borehole
data, grout hole drill data and more recent investigation boreholes. The model
included more than 200 data logs and was used to take cross-sections along the
dam axis and a number of sections with associated potential failure planes
identified in the geological model. Section UA located in the original river bed
area is shown on Figure 4 and has a potential failure plane at 165 m in the
foundation below the downstream shoulder.

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Fig. 3
Maroon dam geological section on dam axis looking upstream [4]
Barrage Maroon - coupe géologique le long du barrage regardant vers l’ amont

1 Overburden 1 Couverture
2 Rhyolite 2 Rhyolite
3 Clay shale, siltstone 3 Schiste argileux, siltite
4 Clay shale, siltstone, sandstone 4 Schiste argileux, siltite, grés
5 Sandstone 5 Grés
6 Clay seams 6 Filon d’argile
7 Dolerite 7 Dolérite
9 Conduit 9 Conduite

Fig. 4
Geological model of slope stability section UA, maximum section
Modèle géologique de stabilité de pente UA, coupe maximale

1 Potential Failure Plane 1 Plan de rupture potentielle

2 Embankment 2 Digue
3 Weighting Berm 3 Poids de la berme
4 Rhyolite 4 Rhyolite

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

3.1. SHEAR STRENGTH AND SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS FOR FOUNDATION WEAK
LAYERS

The shear strength of the weak layers in the foundation was a critical factor
in understanding the potential for dam failure at higher reservoir levels. The
strengths were evaluated along the possible failure surfaces identified at each
slope stability section using a subjective probability approach accounting for the
following:

 Clay origin
– landslide clay formed along the landslide failure plane
– clay zone within the parent claystone rock
– shear zone clay within parent rock claystone or siltstone
 Extent of each clay zone along the potential failure surface
 Waviness/undulations along the failure surface

The proportion or weighting of the three clay origin types (landslide clay,
clay zone and shear zones) along each specific potential failure plane was
evaluated based on the geological profile. Given the uncertainty in the
foundations, this was estimated for three likely weighting scenarios (lower,
expected and upper weighting), as shown on Table 1 for the highest section of
the embankment UA. These proportions given as percentages were used to
estimate the combined strength along the failure surface for use in the slope
stability analysis, accounting for the effective roughness angle along the layers,
using the approach described in Fell et al [5].

Table 1
Variation of weak zones along the potential failure plane in Section UA at
RL 165 m
Variation des zones de faiblesse le long du plan de rupture potentiel dans la
section UA à RL 165 m

Zone Lower weighting Expected weighting Upper weighting

Landslide Clay 30% 20% 17%
Clay Zone 60% 50% 36%
Shear Zone 10% 30% 47%

The strength along each failure plane was calculated using the average
friction angle from laboratory testing and the joint roughness value with the
expected, lower and upper weighting, as shown on Figure 5 for Section
UAErreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable..

Slope stability analyses were completed for each selected section with the
program Slope/W using the strength data for the various embankment zones and
the piezometric pressure evaluated using the 55 hydraulic and 10 vibrating wire

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Q. 97 – R. 2

piezometers in the embankment and foundation. The results for Section UA are
shown in Table 4 for the existing section and upgraded dam with various water
levels up to the dam crest level. Judgemental probabilities of slope failure were
assigned in the risk analysis using the results from the stability analysis.

Fig. 5
Section UA stability analysis strength data for potential failure plane at RL 165 m
Section UA analyse de stabilité des données de résistance du plan de
rupture potentiel pour un niveau de 165 m

1 Upper Strength with roughness 1 Résistance maximale avec friction

2 Expected Strength with roughness 2 Résistance prévue avec friction
3 Lower strength with roughness 3 Résistance minimale avec friction
4 Lower strength no roughness 4 Résistance minimale sans friction
5 Friction angle (degrees) 5 Angle de frottement (degrés)
6 Effective normal stress (kPa) 6 Contrainte normale effective (kPa)

Table 4
Maroon Dam Section UA stability analysis results for flood and normal loading
Résultats de l'analyse de la stabilité de la section UA pour le barrage Maroon en
charge normale et en cas de crue

Stage Clay seam strength Water Level (m)

207.14 217.5 219.89
Existing Min no roughness 1.14 0.98 0.93
1 1.27 1.10 1.04
Existing Min 1.30 1.10 1.05
1 1.45 1.24 1.20
Existing Expected 1.54 1.36 1.27
1 1.75 1.55 1.45

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4. HYDROLOGICAL ANALYSIS

As part of the detailed study for the upgrade options, a probabilistic

reservoir level frequency curve was developed for the annual peak flood events
(generally occurring during the summer season) and the winter season from April
to November (Fig 6). This figure also shows some of the key reservoir levels
used for the risk analysis and the starting reservoir level at the commencement of
the annual series floods.

Fig. 6
Maroon Dam flood frequency analysis
Barrage Maroon : analyse de la fréquence des crues

1 Summer flood frequency curve 1 Fréquence des crues estivales

2 Winter flood frequency curve 2 Fréquence des crues hivernales
3 Starting water level for annual series 3 Niveau d’eau initial des séries
annuelles
4 Dam crest level 219.8 m 4 Niveau de crête du barrage 219,8m
5 Spillway Crest Level 217.5 m 5 Niveau de crête du déversoir 217,5m
6 Historic High water level 209.9 m 6 Niveau d’eau historique à 209,9m
7 Full Supply Level 207.15 m 7 Cote de retenue normale 207,15m
8 Reservoir Level (m) 8 Niveau dans le réservoir (m)
9 Flood AEP (1 in X) 9 Probabilité annuelle de dépassement
(1 de X)

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Figure 6 shows the following:

 The frequency distributions are all almost linear on the log normal plot for
floods between 1 in 5 AEP and 1 in 100 AEP, and floods between 1 in
1,000 AEP and the PMP-Design Flood.
 The linearity of the flood frequency distribution between the 1 in 1,000 AEP
event and the PMP-DF allowed these two events to be used to define the
percentage AFC compliance over this range of floods. The AFC percentage
compliance flood was evaluated using the approach given by the Dam
Safety Regulator in the Department of Energy and Water Supply (DEWS)
AFC guidelines [1] by proportioning the AFC inflow flood hydrograph to
obtain the required flood level after flood routing through the spillway, as
discussed below.
 The spillway level of 217.5 m is not exceeded for any floods more frequent
than the 1 in 450 Exceedance Probability for the annual flood frequency
data. This means that the reservoir is effective in acting as flood retention
storage and the AFC percentage compliance flood was determined for
these events using the percentage of the flood volume rather than
proportioning the AFC inflow flood hydrograph.

5. RISK ASSESSMENT AFC COMPLIANCE

The potential failure modes for the risk assessment compliance were based
on those developed for the Portfolio Risk Assessment completed for Seqwater by
URS [6]. These included piping, slope instability, overtopping and spillway
erosion. The risk analysis model was run for the existing dam configuration,
which showed that the risk was above the ANCOLD limit of Tolerability (Fig 9)
and the majority of the risk (70-98%) occurred with reservoir levels below the
dam crest level. The highest risks were abutment piping and embankment
instability (Table 4).

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

Table 4
Maroon Dam failure mode risk contributions by percentage
Contributions aux risques des modes de rupture
pour le barrage Maroon en pourcentage

Failure Mode Risk Percent Contribution (%)

Overtopping flood 1.50
Slope stability flood 29.24
Slope stability normal 0.15
Piping embankment flood 0.55
Piping embankment earthquake 0.21
Piping foundation flood 68.26
Spillway erosion flood 0.08

Dams that cannot safely discharge the acceptable flood capacity, require
upgrading by the dam safety regulator in accordance with the timing shown on
Table 5.

The AFC percentage compliance evaluated using the proposed risk

analysis approach is the percentage scaling of the flood hydrograph data over the
full range of floods that is required to lower the risk to the tolerable line or achieve
the percentage AFC compliance levels given on Table 4. An example of the
percentage scaling for the PMP-DF required to reach the dam crest level is
shown on Figure 7.

Table 5
Guidelines on acceptable flood capacity for water dams [1]
Directives sur la capacité hydraulique acceptable pour les barrages [1]

Tranche Required minimum flood Date by which the required minimum

discharge capacity flood capacity is to be in place
1 25% of AFC or at least 1:2000 1 October 2015
AEP for erodible dam
embankments (whichever is
the bigger flood)
2 65% of AFC 1 October 2025
3 100% of AFC 1 October 2035

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Fig. 7
Maroon Dam PMP-DF Scaling
Barrage Maroon - Crue probable maximale réduite

1 Dam Crest 219.8 m 1 Crête du barrage 219.8 m

2 PMP-DF 6 Hour Duration Flood 2 Crue probable maximale de 6hr
3 Scaled PMP-DF 3 Crue probable maximale de 6hr- á
échelle réduite
4 Total Outflow (m3/s) 4 Débit total (m³/s)
5 Water Level (m) 5 Niveau d’eau (m)
6 Flow (m3/s) 6 Débit (m³/s)
7 Time (hrs) 7 Temps (hrs)
8 Reservoir Level (m) 8 Niveau (m)

The risk model was used to evaluate the percentage compliance as follows:

 The starting reservoir level was determined for the probabilistic flood
frequency data (Fig. 6).
 The reservoir level over the full range of floods from 1 in 2 AEP event to the
PMP-DF was calculated using the percentage AFC flood volume for floods
below the 1 in 100 AEP, and routing of the floods for floods above the 1 in
1,000 AEP using the starting reservoir level for each flood.
 The percentage for the flood frequency data was changed until the Societal
Risk was at the Limit of Tolerability.
 The Societal Risk was estimated using the DEWS compliance values of
25 percent and 65 percent compliance

The analyses showed that the requirement for passing 25 percent of the
AFC flood by 2015 could be achieved (Fig 8) and upgrading would not be

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required by 2015. Notwithstanding this, the decision was made to continue with
the dam upgrade on the basis that the existing risk plots above the Limit of
Tolerability and the requirement for balancing risk across the Seqwater portfolio
of dams.

Fig. 8
Maroon Dam societal risk for 25 percent compliance
Barrage Maroon : risque pour la société pour une conformité à 25%

1 Ancold Limit Of Tolerability 1 Limite de tolérabilité ANCOLD

2 Existing Risk 2 Risque actuel
3 ALARP 3 ALARP
4 25% AFC Compliance 4 Conformité à 25 % AFC
5 Annual probability of failure with loss 5 Probabilité annuelle de rupture avec
of life >N pertes humaines >N
6 Loss of Life N 6 Pertes humaines (N)

6. CONSTRUCTION RISK

The risk assessment profile identified slope stability (29%) and piping
through the foundation (68%) as the key risks for the dam with overtopping
representing a small fraction (1.5%) of the overall risk of dam failure. During
construction, the excavation of the abutments will necessitate lowering the
embankment crest level on both abutments. The excavation will require partial
removal of the core zone leaving the upstream and downstream rockfill zones as
the means of preventing overtopping in the event of a flood that exceeds the level
of the excavated embankment. The estimated levels for the excavation on the
abutments are shown on the flood frequency curves developed for the summer

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Q. 97 – R. 2

peak flood frequency data from November to March and the off peak winter
season from April to November (Fig. 9)Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable..

Fig. 9
Maroon dam construction flood frequency data
Barrage Maroon : analyse de la fréquence des crues durant construction

1 Summer (Dec to March) flood 1 Fréquence des crues estivales

frequency
2 Winter (April to Nov) flood 2 Fréquence des crues hivernales
frequency
3 Dam crest level 219.79 m 3 Niveau de crête du barrage 219.79m
4 Right bank excavation 218 m 4 Excavation rive droite 218m
5 Left bank excavation 216 m 5 Excavation rive gauche 216m
6 Spillway crest level 217.5 m 6 Niveau du réservoir 217.5m
7 Historic peak 209.9 m 7 Niveau d’eau historique à 209.9m
8 FSL 207.15 m 8 Hauteur normale maximum 207.15m
9 Reservoir Level (m) 9 Niveau du réservoir
10 AEP (1 in X) 10 Probabilité annuelle de dépassement (1
de X)

It was assumed that when doing the excavation, the abutment piping
probability would be reduced by a factor of 0.1 to account for the excavation of
potential open jointed rock formation in the upper abutments but the slope
instability probability was left unchanged. The resulting societal risks were
evaluated with varying levels of coffer dam used to prevent overtopping of the
abutments during the period from April to November, from which is was assessed
that a coffer dam level at 217 m would be adequate for the construction works
(Fig 10), where the societal risk is below the existing risk. The societal risk is

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

also shown for the Coffer dam at this level for the Summer period, which clearly
shows that the risk is unacceptable with the 217 m crest level of the coffer dam.

Fig. 10
Maroon Dam construction societal risk with coffer dam at EL 217 m
Barrage Maroon : risque sociétal de construction
avec un batardeau á 217 m

1 ANCOLD Limit of Tolerability 1 Limite de tolérabilité ANCOLD

2 ALARP 2 ALARP
3 Existing Risk 3 Risque actuel
4 Risk with coffer dam at 217 m 4 Risque avec un batardeau á 217 m et
and Summer flood frequency fréquence des crues estivales
5 Risk with coffer dam at 217 m 5 Risque avec un batardeau á 217 m et
and Winter flood frequency fréquence des crues hivernales
6 Annual probability of failure with 6 Probabilité annuelle de rupture avec
loss of life >N pertes humaines >N
7 Loss of Life N 7 Pertes humaines (N)

7. CONCLUSIONS

Extensive geological modelling and analysis was successfully used to

evaluate the nature and extent of low strength clay seams in the foundation of
Maroon Dam. The model provided the most accurate representation of the
materials along the predicted failure surface and realistic modelling results for
embankment stability.

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Probabilistic methods were used to determine the reservoir starting level for
flood modelling, which was subsequently used for AFC compliance analysis
using a risk analysis approach.

The use of the risk analysis showed that the flood risk is significantly
reduced for works completed in the winter season and the use of a coffer dam
constructed to 1 m below the dam crest level at 217 m results in the societal risk
being lower than the existing risk for the construction period.

REFERENCES

[1] DEWS, Guidelines on Acceptable Flood Capacity for Water Dams,

Department of Energy and Water Supply, Queensland Government,
Brisbane 2003
[2] ANCOLD Guidelines on Risk Assessment 2003
[3] GHD 2013, Maroon Dam, Parapet Wall Detailed design and
Embankment Stability Review, GHD, Brisbane, August 2013.
[4] NUTT, K D, Maroon Dam Embankment and Foundation 1975
[5] FELL, MACGREGOR, STAPLEDON, BELL, Geotechnical Engineering
of Dams, CRC Press, 2005
[6] URS (2013), Seqwater Dams Portfolio Risk Assessment Maroon Dam,
Prepared for Seqwater, 29 January 2013.

SUMMARY

Maroon Dam is a 47 m high zoned earthfill dam completed in 1974. The

dam is a multi-purpose reservoir, which was constructed to provide potable water
supply, irrigation, flood mitigation and recreation.

An Acceptable Flood Capacity (AFC) study and foundation stability

assessments were completed by GHD in 2011 and 2012. This work included
detailed evaluation of the monitoring data from piezometers, survey monuments,
inclinometers and seepage weirs. In particular, the piezometric pressure data
provided a good basis for estimating the response under extreme flood loading.

A detailed foundation model was developed showing the variability of the

clay strengths along potential failure surfaces. Simplified probabilistic analysis
was completed to derive strength estimates for the foundation clay zones. The
likelihood of embankment failure under various flood loads was calculated using
these strength estimates and this was used for evaluation of the AFC upgrade
options using a risk analysis approach.

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 Q. 97 – R. 2

As an alternative to the cost-benefit analysis for evaluating risk reduction

options, an equivalent percentage AFC has been developed using the risk
analysis for the upgrade design. This approach was also used for the evaluation
of the coffer dam level required to reduce the risk to an acceptable level for the
construction period and included consideration of flood seasonality. The analysis
confirmed that a coffer dam level 1 m below the dam crest level would provide an
acceptable level of risk for the construction competed during the winter period.

This paper provides an overview of the dam and issues that were
addressed in the upgrade option selection, followed by details of the approach
used to determine the percentage AFC compliance using the risk analysis and
the construction risk.

RÉSUMÉ

Le barrage Maroon est un barrage zoné en terre de 47 m construit en

1974. Le barrage a des objectifs multiples et assure l’alimentation en eau
potable, l’irrigation, l’atténuation des crues et une zone de loisir.

Une étude de la capacité acceptable de crue ainsi qu’une étude de la

stabilité des fondations ont été effectuées par GHD en 2011 et 2012. Ces études
ont inclus une évaluation détaillée des données de suivi des piézomètres, un
relevé des ouvrages et des infiltrations du déversoir. En particulier les données
de pression piézométrique ont constitué une excellente base pour estimer la
réponse du barrage sous la force d’une crue extrême.

Un modèle détaillé des fondations a été développé, ce modèle montre la

variabilité de la résistance de l’argile le long des surfaces de rupture potentielle.

Une analyse simplifiée de probabilité a été effectuée pour estimer la

résistance de l’argile dans la zone des fondations. La probabilité d’une rupture de
la digue sous la force de différentes crues a été estimée en utilisant ces valeurs
de résistance. Cela a ensuite permis d’évaluer les options d’amélioration du
barrage en utilisant une méthode d’analyse de risque.

Comme alternative à une analyse des coûts et bénéfices pour évaluer les
options de réduction des risques, un pourcentage équivalent de la capacité
acceptable de crue a été développé en utilisant une analyse de risques lors de la
conception des améliorations.

Cette approche a aussi été utilisée lors de l’évaluation du niveau du

batardeau requis pour réduire le risque à un niveau acceptable durant la
construction, la fréquence de crues saisonnières a été aussi prise en compte.

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Q. 97 – R. 2

Cette analyse a confirmé qu’un batardeau à un niveau de 1 m sous la crête

du barrage garantit un niveau de risque acceptable lors de la construction durant
la période hivernale.

Cet article donne une vue d’ensemble du barrage et des problèmes qui ont
été traités lors de la sélection des options d’amélioration. Cet article fournit aussi
les détails de la méthodologie utilisée pour déterminer le pourcentage de
conformité de capacité acceptable de crue en utilisant une analyse de risque.

39