VI NUMCH

STUDY
GUIDE

(DISEC)
Disarmament
and
International
Security Committee
Dear Delegates,

It is with immense pleasure that I welcome you to the fourth edition of Highbrow
College Model United Nations.

My name is Muhammad Talha Malik, and it is my distinct honor to serve as your

Secretary General.

For some of you, this might be your first foray into the world of diplomacy, for
others, a familiar challenge. For me, it represents another crucial checkpoint in
my journey through this circuit. Having been involved with the public speaking
and debating circuit since I first stepped in at ten years of age in 2018,
I understand the apprehension and the immense potential this platform holds.
This is where future leaders, lawyers, diplomats, and policymakers are forged. This
is far more than just a simulation.

I am currently pursuing my A-Levels with CS subjects, which I frankly call the

'wrong subjects’ because of how my interests have significantly changed in the
past year. What I can attest to is that MUNs have taught me an incredible amount,
whether I was attending as a delegate, serving as a chair, or organizing the
conference itself, and I am sure it would be the same for all of you joining us.

As you finalize your preparations for your committees, remember this: I believe
everything in life happens for a reason. You have prepared, you have arrived, and
you are ready. Your presence here today is not a random occurrence. So work hard,
pray harder. Victory belongs to the most tenacious. Learn from every interaction,
and debate fiercely but fairly.

I look forward to witnessing the exceptional talent and ingenuity you bring to
HCMUN IV.

Regards,
Muhammad Talha Malik
Secretary General
Highbrow College Model United Nations IV

HCMUN IV
Dear Delegates,

I am filled with great joy in welcoming you all to the fourth edition of Highbrow
College Model United Nations.

I’m Zaid Khan, and I have the privilege of serving as your Academic Curator this
year. My role has mostly been behind the scenes: designing committees, fine-
tuning topics, and making sure each of you walks into a room built upon pillars
that brim with creativity, ingenuity, and debate. HCMUN has always been about
more than awards, competition, and procedure; it is also about vision, empathy,
and confidence.

When I first got involved in this circuit, I was drawn in by how MUNs turn complex
global issues into personal conversations. MUNs taught me how to question, to
reason, and to understand perspectives beyond my own. I hope that over the three
days of this conference, you come to truly understand what it means to be a
policymaker, because that, I believe, is where the real value lies.

As you prepare for your sessions, remember that every motion and speech matters
less than the mindset you bring into the room. Don’t be afraid to ask questions, to
rethink your stance, or to simply enjoy the experience. You’re here for a reason, and
that is to reason. Do what you believe is in the best interest of your country, your
committee, and yourself.

I wish you all the best for what I hope will be the most memorable three days of
your delegate career.

With great expectations,

Zaid Khan
Academic Curator
Highbrow College Model United Nations IV

HCMUN IV
Most esteemed Delegates of HCMUN IV,

I, as the Under Secretary General of HCMUN IV, welcome you all to the 4th edition
of Highbrow College Model United Nations.

My name is Muhammad Hassan Iqbal, and it is my distinct honor to serve as your

Under Secretary General.

It is an honor and a pleasure to be able to present to you what we have been

preparing for months and dreaming of for years. We have worked tirelessly to
bring the best you have ever seen, starting with our organization to our academics.

Our objective is to facilitate proficient and elevated diplomatic deliberations,

fostering valuable and constructive solutions throughout the three-day duration of
HCMUN IV, enriched by the collective contributions of all participants. As a
delegate, your journey begins here, with the study guide prepared by us..

I advise you to read this study guide thoroughly and expand your research on
different perspectives, focusing on your allocated country. It is essential to bear in
mind that each nation and every perspective holds significance if you are
adequately prepared to engage with the agenda at hand. You have my best
wishes for success and enriching discussions during these four days of enjoyment.
I eagerly anticipate witnessing the valuable contributions you'll make to our
conference.

Best regards,
Muhammad Hassan Iqbal
Under Secretary General
Highbrow College Model United Nations IV

HCMUN IV
Dear Delegates,

It is an honor to welcome you to HCMUN IV. This is Shaima Mirza, and it is a

privilege to serve as the Under Secretary General for this conference. As we
convene to discuss, debate, and deliberate, keep in mind that the decisions we
make today will shape the world of tomorrow. Let us work together to find
solutions to global challenges and make our voices heard. Let us be guided by the
principles of diplomacy, integrity, and respect.
Kind regards,
Shaima Mirza
Under Secretary General
Highbrow College Model United Nations IV

HCMUN IV
 TABLE OF CONTENT

Section Title Approx. Page

1. Introduction to the Committee 1

2 Introduction to the Topic 2

3 Historical Background: The Road to the ATT 3

4 Definition of Key Terms 5

5 Global and Regional Context of the Arms Trade 6

6 Key Stakeholders 9

7 Past International Action 12

8 Current Situation / Status Quo (as of 2025) 13

9 Major Challenges and Unresolved Issues 15

10 International Legal Framework 17

11 Regional or National Case Studies 19

12 Role of the United Nations & Other Bodies 21

13 Policy Gaps & Recommendations 22

Questions a Resolution Must Answer

14 23
(QARMA)

15 Works Cited / References 24

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 1. Introduction to the Committee

-Mandate, Origin, and Jurisdiction

The First Committee (Disarmament and International Security - DISEC) is one of

the six main committees of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Its
mandate is codified under Article 11 of the UN Charter, which allows the General
Assembly to consider the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of
international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament
and the regulation of armaments. DISEC is the sole committee of the UNGA that
deals exclusively with disarmament, global challenges, and threats to peace that
affect the international community.
DISEC's jurisdiction is vast, encompassing a wide spectrum of issues ranging from
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the trade and diversion of conventional
arms and small arms and light weapons (SALW). While it cannot issue legally
binding mandates like the Security Council, its resolutions and recommendations
carry significant political and moral authority, guiding Member States and the
wider UN system. The committee works closely with the UN Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), which provides substantive support and
coordinates technical assistance programs.

-Key Achievements and Thematic Focus Areas

DISEC has historically served as a critical forum for consensus-building on complex

security issues. Its key achievements include the development of norms and
frameworks that have led to binding treaties. Notable thematic focus areas
include:

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Initiatives leading to the

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and regular review of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
Conventional Arms Regulation: Developing the framework for the UN
Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and laying the groundwork for the
negotiation of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).
Emerging Security Challenges: Addressing the military applications of
information and communication technologies (ICTs) and preventing an arms
race in outer space (PAROS).
The Committee's work is characterized by consensus-seeking resolutions, often
involving substantive debate between nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-
weapon states, and major arms exporters/importers. According to the UN Charter,
the Committee is empowered to make recommendations to the Member States
and the Security Council, affirming its pivotal role in establishing the global
security architecture (UN Charter, 1945). 1
HCMUN IV
 2. Introduction to the Topic

-Concise Overview Linking the Agenda to the Committee’s

Global Purpose

The issue before the Committee is the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the first legally
binding, multilateral agreement to regulate the international trade in conventional
arms. This topic is intrinsically linked to DISEC's core mandate, as the Committee is
charged with regulating armaments and addressing the proliferation of
conventional weapons that destabilize regions and fuel internal conflict. The ATT's
central objective is to establish common international standards for regulating the
import, export, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering of conventional arms,
thereby reducing human suffering and promoting peace and security.
While often conflated with disarmament, the ATT is fundamentally about
regulation and accountability. It does not prohibit the arms trade but seeks to
prevent the diversion of legally traded arms into the illicit market, where they fuel
conflict, organized crime, and violations of international humanitarian law (IHL)
and international human rights law (IHRL). The successful implementation and
universalization of the ATT are critical to fulfilling the Committee's goal of fostering
a stable international security environment (UNGA Resolution 64/48, 2009).

-Why this Issue is Relevant in 2025

The Arms Trade Treaty remains highly relevant in 2025 due to persistent and
evolving global security challenges. The international conventional arms trade is
estimated to be worth tens of billions of dollars annually, and the flow of these
weapons continues to outpace regulatory efforts (Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute [SIPRI], 2024).

The relevance is underscored by several current factors:

[Link] Regional Conflicts: Ongoing conflicts in Eastern Europe, the Sahel,
and the Middle East demonstrate the immediate and devastating impact of
conventional arms transfers, highlighting the difficulty in assessing end-user
risk.
[Link] Advancements: The rise of dual-use technologies, including
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and sophisticated surveillance systems,
challenges the existing definitions and scope of the Treaty's covered items.
[Link] Diversion and Illicit Flows: The persistent problem of arms diversion,
often enabled by weak national controls, corruption, and the use of shell
companies, undermines the Treaty’s intended effect, sustaining non-state
armed groups and criminal organizations (Small Arms Survey, 2023).
[Link] Deficit: Despite having over 113 States Parties, several major
arms exporters and importers have not yet ratified the Treaty, creating
significant loopholes in the global regulatory
2
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 framework. The lack of participation by key states limits the Treaty’s
effectiveness and perpetuates an uneven playing field.
The contemporary challenge for DISEC is not merely securing new signatures but
ensuring robust, transparent, and legally consistent implementation by all States
Parties to prevent the ATT from becoming a mere declaration of intent.

3. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)-

History, Adoption, and Implementation
The Arms Trade Treaty was the culmination of decades of advocacy and diplomatic
efforts to impose ethical and legal accountability on the conventional arms trade.
For much of the 20th century, the conventional arms trade was governed solely by
domestic legislation and bilateral agreements, often subordinated to strategic or
economic interests.

-Early Advocacy and Precursors (1990s): The idea of a global, legally-binding

instrument began gaining traction following the end of the Cold War, which saw
massive surpluses of arms flood developing nations, contributing to numerous
internal and regional conflicts. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), led by
initiatives like the Control Arms Campaign, began lobbying for an international
agreement to stop arms transfers where they would fuel conflict, poverty, or
human rights abuses.

-The Initial UN Push (2000–2006):

2003 (The Mandate’s Genesis): While the final treaty was signed in 2013, the
concept gained significant momentum in the early 2000s. In 2003, a group of
Nobel Peace Laureates issued a public call for an international Arms Trade
Treaty, giving the movement high-level political visibility.
2006 (UN General Assembly): The UNGA adopted Resolution 61/89, titled
Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards
for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms. This landmark
resolution marked the official start of the UN process, requesting the Secretary-
General to seek the views of Member States on the feasibility, scope, and
parameters of a comprehensive, legally binding instrument (UNGA, 2006).

-Negotiation and Drafting (2007–2012):

2007–2008: The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) met to analyze the issue,
concluding that establishing common international standards was both
feasible and necessary.
2009: The General Assembly mandated a UN Conference on the Arms Trade
Treaty to be convened in 2012, setting the stage for formal negotiations. This
was affirmed by Resolution 64/48.
3

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 2012 (First Negotiating Conference): The first UN Conference on the
Arms Trade Treaty ended without agreement. A small number of
states, including the United States, Russia, and China, requested more
time, preventing the adoption of a consensus-based text (UNODA,
2012).
-Adoption and Entry into Force (2013–2014):
April 2, 2013 (Turning Point): Following the failure to achieve consensus at the
previous conference, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to adopt
the Arms Trade Treaty text via a simple majority, bypassing the consensus rule
used in the negotiating conference. The vote was 154 in favor, 3 against (Iran,
Syria, and North Korea), and 23 abstentions (UNGA Resolution 67/234 B).
June 3, 2013: The Treaty opened for signature.
December 24, 2014 (Landmark Event): The ATT entered into force, ninety days
after the 50th instrument of ratification was deposited. This marked the
establishment of the first global, legally binding framework for regulating the
conventional arms trade.

-Post-Ratification Challenges (2015–Present): Since its entry into force, the focus
has shifted from negotiation to implementation and universalization. Subsequent
Conferences of States Parties (CSPs) have focused on strengthening reporting
mechanisms, addressing diversion, and providing technical assistance to
developing nations (ATT Secretariat, 2024). However, the withdrawal of a major
signing power in 2019, followed by significant geopolitical shifts, has continuously
tested the Treaty’s resilience and regulatory capacity.

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 4. Key Terms

A glossary of essential concepts, legal definitions, and UN-standard terminology is

crucial for delegates to engage with the subject matter accurately.

Terms Definition and Context

The first legally binding, multilateral instrument that

establishes common international standards for
Arms Trade Treaty regulating the international trade in conventional
(ATT) arms, aiming to reduce human suffering and
promote peace and security. Adopted by the UNGA
in 2013, entered into force in 2014.

The eight categories of weapons explicitly covered

by Article 2 of the ATT: battle tanks, armoured
combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems,
Conventional Arms
combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships,
missiles and missile launchers, and small arms and
light weapons (SALW).

Easily portable weapons, including revolvers, pistols,

Small Arms and Light rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, and
Weapons (SALW) mortars. Their illicit trade is a primary driver of
violence, particularly in non-state conflicts.

The unauthorized transfer or re-transfer of

conventional arms from legal channels and
authorized end-users to unauthorized or illicit actors,
Diversion
such as criminal organizations or non-state armed
groups. This is a primary challenge to the ATT’s
effectiveness.

A document often required by the exporting state

End-User Certificate from the importing state, confirming the final
(EUC) destination and intended use of the transferred
arms. The reliability and verification of EUCs are
central to compliance efforts.

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 Also known as the laws of armed conflict, IHL seeks
International to limit the effects of armed conflict for
Humanitarian Law humanitarian reasons. The ATT prohibits transfers if
(IHL) there is an overriding risk the arms will be used to
commit or facilitate serious IHL violations.

A body of international law designed to promote and

International Human protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Rights Law (IHRL) The ATT mandates that potential exports must not
contribute to serious violations of IHRL.

The core due diligence requirement of the ATT

(Article 7). Before authorizing an export, the
Overriding Risk exporting State Party must assess whether there is
Assessment an overriding risk that the arms could be used to
commit or facilitate serious IHL or IHRL violations. If
such a risk exists, the export must be denied.

The unauthorized transfer or re-transfer of

conventional arms from legal channels and authorized
Brokering end-users to unauthorized or illicit actors, such as
criminal organizations or non-state armed groups. This
is a primary challenge to the ATT’s effectiveness.

Defined broadly in the ATT as covering the import,

export, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering of
Transfer conventional arms. This broad definition is intended
to close loopholes found in pre-existing national
legislation.

The annual meeting of all States Parties to the ATT,

Conference of States which reviews the Treaty's implementation,
Parties (CSP) considers matters of compliance and
universalization, and approves the annual budget.

HCMUN IV
 5. Global and Regional Challenges

-Geopolitics, Socioeconomic Impacts,and Humanitarian

Consequences

The conventional arms trade is not merely a technical or security issue; it is a

critical component of global geopolitics and economic development. The trade
facilitates the projection of power, enables strategic alliances, and significantly
shapes regional balances of power.
Geopolitical Dynamics: The five permanent members of the UN Security Council
(P5) remain the dominant global arms exporters, accounting for the vast majority
of all international conventional arms transfers (SIPRI, 2024). This concentration of
supply creates an intrinsic conflict between economic interests and the ATT's
human rights obligations. Arms transfers are frequently used as a tool of foreign
policy, establishing spheres of influence and providing leverage over recipient
nations. This strategic use of arms often complicates objective risk assessments,
particularly when arms are transferred to strategic allies involved in active conflicts
or internal repression. The geopolitical importance of the trade often trumps the
humanitarian imperative of prevention (Amnesty International Report, 2023).
Socioeconomic Impacts: The unregulated or diverted flow of conventional arms
has devastating socioeconomic consequences, especially for developing nations.
Conflict Fuel: The availability of SALW perpetuates cycles of violence, obstructs
humanitarian assistance, and undermines state institutions. The presence of
illicit arms is directly linked to higher rates of organized crime, terrorist activity,
and political instability (Small Arms Survey, 2023).
Development Setback: Armed conflict diverts scarce public resources from
essential services like healthcare and education into military expenditures. The
World Bank estimates that countries affected by serious conflict experience
significant economic contraction and take years to recover their pre-conflict
development trajectories (World Bank Conflict Report, 2022).
Refugee Crisis: The proliferation of arms is a key driver of forced displacement
and refugee crises. Weapon proliferation in the Sahel region, for example, has
exacerbated inter-communal violence, resulting in massive internal and cross-
border displacement, placing immense strain on international aid systems
(UNHCR Global Report, 2024).

HCMUN IV
-Challenges, Affected Populations, and Emerging Issues:
The impact of the arms trade varies drastically across regions, defined
by local conflict dynamics and the type of weapons diverted.

Terms Definition and Context Emerging Issues

SALW Diversion: Illicit cross-border Increased use of

Sub-
flows of SALW, often stemming from Improvised
Saharan
poorly secured national stockpiles or Explosive Devices
Africa
foreign military assistance. Affected (IEDs) and low-cost
(Sahel/Gr
populations are predominantly civilians Unmanned Aerial
eat
targeted by non-state armed groups Systems (UAS).
Lakes)
and inter-communal conflict.

High-Volume Transfers: Large-scale

Complex brokering
Middle transfers of heavy conventional weapons
arrangements and
East and (combat aircraft, armored vehicles) to
re-transfer of
North states involved in protracted conflicts.
modern military
Africa Affected populations face IHL violations,
equipment from
(MENA) often stemming from aerial
bombardment and siege warfare. proxy conflicts.

HCMUN IV
 Criminal Group Armament: Flow of The "Iron River" of
pistols and assault rifles from legal US arms from the north
Latin sources, often into the hands of drug fuels political
America cartels and transnational criminal instability and
and the organizations (TCOs). Affected systemic violence
Caribbean populations are caught in high- against police and
homicide-rate environments and gang judiciary.
warfare.

Surplus and Leakage: The massive High-tech weapons

influx of military equipment due to the
leakage and the re-
Russia-Ukraine war creates significant
emergence of
Eastern risk of post-conflict diversion of modern
state-sponsored
Europe NATO and Soviet-era weapons into the
illegal arms
illicit European market and beyond.
Affected populations are refugees and
pipelines.
internal displacement.

The consistent factor across all regions is the disproportionate impact on civilians.
Women and children are particularly vulnerable, experiencing heightened rates of
gender-based violence (GBV) and recruitment into armed groups, which is
demonstrably facilitated by the availability of arms (UN Women Report, 2023)..

6. Key Stakeholders
A variety of state and non-state actors play defining roles in the conventional arms
trade and the implementation of the ATT, often with divergent interests and
influences.

-UN Bodies
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): Acts as the
Secretariat for the ATT, supporting the Conference of States Parties (CSP) and
promoting universalization. UNODA provides critical technical assistance to
developing nations to help establish effective national control systems and is
the primary institutional advocate for ATT implementation.
Security Council (UNSC): While the ATT is a UNGA-adopted treaty, the UNSC
holds the ultimate authority over international peace and security. UNSC arms
embargoes (e.g., against South Sudan or Libya) take precedence over any
individual state's transfer decision. The P5's dual role as permanent members
and major arms exporters creates a tension between their security mandate
and their commercial interests. 9

HCMUN IV
 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR):
Monitors and reports on potential ATT violations, particularly
concerning the risk of arms transfers being used to commit or
facilitate serious violations of IHRL. OHCHR reports provide substantive
evidence for the ATT's overriding risk assessment.

1. Major Arms Exporters (e.g., USA, Russia, China, France, Germany):

Position: They control the global supply. France, Germany, and others are
States Parties and generally supportive of the ATT's goals, although their
transfer decisions are often criticized by civil society groups. Russia and China
have not ratified the ATT, arguing that it could be used to interfere in sovereign
affairs and that existing national controls are sufficient. The United States,
despite being a signatory initially, withdrew from the Treaty in 2019,
undermining the universalization effort and maintaining a highly competitive
advantage in the global market.
Influence: Their export policies dictate the global flow of weapons. Non-
participation by key exporters creates a major loophole, as arms can simply be
sourced from non-ATT States Parties without the legally mandated risk
assessment.

2. Major Arms Importers (e.g., India, Saudi Arabia, Egypt):

Position: Generally prioritize national security and strategic needs over
compliance with international regulatory frameworks, particularly if the latter
imposes intrusive reporting requirements. Many major importers are non-
States Parties or have ratified with reservations.
Involvement: Their demand shapes the supply side and dictates the types of
transfers undertaken. The absence of a large common importing bloc limits
the ATT's ability to create a "buyers' market" that demands compliance.

10

HCMUN IV
3. Small States/Vulnerable States:
Position: Strongly advocate for the Treaty, as they are often the primary victims
of armed conflict and arms diversion. They rely on the ATT to stabilize regional
security and hold exporting states accountable for negligent transfers.
Involvement: These states are key players in the CSP, often leveraging
collective political pressure to push for stricter implementation and greater
transparency, despite having limited individual market influence.

NGOs and Regional Blocs

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs): Organizations like Amnesty

International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and Oxfam (founding members of the
Control Arms Campaign) are critical to the Treaty's success.
Involvement: They monitor compliance, publish detailed reports on alleged
violations (e.g., transfers used in Yemen or Gaza conflicts), and use publicly
available data (like shipping manifests) to track and expose potential
diversions. They play an essential role in providing the public and States Parties
with evidence that may be used in the overriding risk assessment process.
Regional Blocs (European Union, ECOWAS):
EU: The EU, as a whole, is a major proponent of the ATT, using its Common
Position on Arms Exports to enforce high regulatory standards across all
member states, which are also ATT States Parties. The EU provides significant
financial and technical assistance to other nations for ATT implementation.
11

HCMUN IV
 OSCE: The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) has supported arms control through border security
initiatives, SALW stockpile management, and security sector
reform, indirectly supporting the ATT's goal of preventing diversion
and illicit trade.
African Union (AU) / Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS): Regional organizations like ECOWAS have implemented their own
moratoriums and conventions on SALW (e.g., the ECOWAS Convention), often
setting stricter regional standards than the ATT minimum requirements,
demonstrating regional leadership in conventional arms control.

7. Past International Action

The ATT did not emerge in a vacuum but built upon existing, non-binding, or
partial international efforts to control the flow of conventional weapons.

Instrument / Limitations and

Date Outcome
Document Code Gaps

Limitation: Voluntary,
often incomplete
Voluntary
reporting; excludes
mechanism for
UN Register of SALW (the most
Member States to
Conventional Arms frequently diverted
1991 report imports and
(UNROCA) (UNGA weapons). Gap: No
exports of seven
Resolution 46/36) established
categories of major
mechanism for risk
conventional arms.
assessment based on
human rights or IHL.

Limitation: Only
applies to SALW;
A politically binding
Programme of tracing depends
(not legally binding)
Action to Prevent, entirely on the
framework for
Combat and accuracy of national
states to improve
Eradicate the Illicit record-keeping and
2001 national controls,
Trade in SALW in cooperation.
mark and trace
All Its Aspects Gap: Does not cover
weapons, and
(UNPoA) the initial transfer
manage stockpiles.
decision that places
the weapon into the
legal supply chain.

12

HCMUN IV
 Limitation: Only
applies to SALW;
Requires states to
tracing depends
ensure all SALW are
entirely on the
marked at the time
accuracy of national
of manufacture and
International record-keeping and
to respond to
2005 Tracing Instrument cooperation. Gap:
tracing requests
(ITI) Does not cover the
from other states to
initial transfer
determine the illicit
decision that places
origin of seized
the weapon into the
weapons.
legal supply chain.

8. The Arms Trade Treaty: 2025 Status Report

The Current Situation as of 2025

As of late 2025, the Arms Trade Treaty is legally binding for over 113 States Parties,
representing a significant portion of the global community. However, its
effectiveness is being severely tested by high-volume conflicts and the persistent
non-participation of key actors.
Universalization and Participation: The Treaty's geographic coverage remains
uneven. While Europe, Central America, and Sub-Saharan Africa show high
ratification rates, several regions, notably the Middle East, South Asia, and parts of
East Asia, demonstrate a notable deficit in participation. Critically, three of the
world's top five arms exporters—the United States, Russia, and China—are not
States Parties, meaning a vast volume of the global arms trade is conducted
entirely outside the Treaty's legal obligations (ATT Secretariat Status Report, 2024).
Compliance and Transparency: The Treaty mandates two core reporting
requirements: initial reports on national implementation measures and annual
reports on authorized and actual imports and exports.
Annual Reporting: While the majority of States Parties submit their reports,
compliance with timeliness and substantive completeness is highly variable.
Many reports lack the detailed information necessary to allow for meaningful
civil society or parliamentary oversight. Furthermore, the reporting on the
criteria for denying a transfer (Article 7) is often vague, making it difficult to
assess the consistency and rigor of national risk assessments (Control Arms
Coalition Review, 2024).
13

HCMUN IV
 Diversion: The illicit trade of arms remains a critical weakness.
Experts estimate that a significant percentage of legally exported
arms are diverted within a year of transfer, often through
fraudulent end-user certificates, corruption at trans-shipment
points, or capture by non-state actors in volatile regions (Global
Risk Assessment Report, 2023). This is particularly evident in the
movement of weapons through the Horn of Africa and the Balkans.

Trends, Conflict Impacts, and Emerging Policy Responses

Data on Global Transfers:

Trend: The total volume of international transfers of major conventional arms
remains at historically high levels, with an increasing trend in the transfer of
advanced systems, including combat drones and missile technology.
The Exporter/Importer Dynamic (2020–2024): The SIPRI trend indicator data
shows the continuous dominance of the US and Russia as top exporters, with
India, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt as leading importers. Transfers to high-risk
regions continue, placing immense pressure on the overriding risk assessment
threshold (SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, 2024).
Impact of Major Conflicts: The Russia-Ukraine War has dominated recent
arms trade discussions. The massive, urgent influx of military aid to Ukraine,
while justified under collective self-defense, has created complex challenges
for post-conflict demobilization and weapon accountability. The potential
leakage of these modern weapons systems into the European black market is a
growing concern for regional security bodies (OSCE SALW Report, 2024).

Emerging Policy Programs:

Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF): The ATT’s VTF provides financial and technical
assistance to States Parties, especially those in the Global South, to improve
their capacity for national control, record-keeping, and the development of
robust risk-assessment procedures. 14
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 Marking and Tracing: Renewed global emphasis is being placed
on implementing the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) in
tandem with the ATT, recognizing that effective tracing is the only
way to prove diversion and strengthen accountability.
The status quo is defined by a dichotomy: a strong, legally binding treaty exists,
representing a major humanitarian achievement, yet the largest actors in the
market continue to operate outside its parameters, and implementation among
States Parties often lacks the necessary political will and resourcing to prevent
diversion in high-risk zones

9. Major Challenges and Unresolved Issues

The effectiveness and universalization of the ATT are hampered by persistent,
structural issues that challenge the existing global security order. The following are
the top 10 core problems sustaining the crisis.

Foundational Weakness: Deficit in Universalization and Scope

The Treaty's core failing is its inability to govern the majority of the global arms
trade due to non-participation and a narrow focus.
The Universalization Deficit: Non-participation by major geopolitical actors—
notably the US, China, and Russia—is a foundational weakness. As the five
largest arms exporters (including the US, Russia, China, and Germany)
accounted for 72% of global exports (2020–2024), the absence of these key
players creates massive loopholes. This permits the majority of global arms
transfers to bypass the ATT’s mandatory risk assessment and reporting
obligations.
Narrow Scope of the Treaty (Emerging Technologies): The ATT is restricted to
the eight categories of conventional arms defined in 2013, failing to keep pace
with modern warfare. This exclusion means dual-use items (e.g., high-
performance drones and cyber surveillance tools) are often classified
commercially, effectively bypassing the Treaty's regulatory and reporting
requirements. Amending this scope requires politically unattainable
consensus.

Ambiguity and Enforcement Issues

The Treaty lacks the objective legal standards and enforcement teeth necessary to
hold States Parties accountable for high-risk transfers.
Ambiguity of "Overriding Risk" (Article 7): This core operational problem
stems from the ATT providing no legal definition for what constitutes an
"overriding risk" of violating IHL/IHRL. This loophole allows exporting States
Parties to authorize transfers to conflict zones by citing subjective internal
intelligence that the risk is manageable, essentially overriding the Treaty’s
intended objective standard. 15

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 Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms: Unlike robust verification
regimes like the IAEA or OPCW, the ATT has no structural, legally
binding sanctions or compulsory inspection powers. Enforcement
is purely moral and political, relying on a "name and shame" model
and the integrity of national processes, rendering it ineffective
against determined violators.
Loopholes in Implementation and Transparency

National-level failures and regulatory gaps allow legally transferred arms to be

easily diverted into illicit markets.
Diversion to Illicit End-Users: This is fueled by systemic issues: weak national
export/import controls, corruption, and sophisticated methods like forged End-
User Certificates (EUCs) and shell company networks. Legally transferred arms
rapidly end up in the hands of non-state armed groups, criminal organizations,
and terrorist entities, a trend consistently confirmed by the Small Arms Survey.
The Brokering Loophole (Article 10): A significant regulatory failure is the
inability of many States Parties to enact effective national legislation to track
the extraterritorial activities of their nationals. This allows brokers to arrange
illicit transfers between non-ATT states using flags of convenience, effectively
circumventing the Treaty's regulations.
Non-Reporting and Vague Reporting: Low transparency hinders oversight. As
of June 2024, the on-time reporting rate for 2023 was only 44%. This issue is
driven by both low political will to disclose sensitive transfers and a lack of
technical capacity in developing nations for meticulous record-keeping.
Post-Shipment Verification (PSV) Failure: The ATT does not explicitly
mandate robust, routine PSV. Since verification often requires the importer’s
consent (frequently denied), exporters lack a reliable means of confirming that
the arms reached the certified end-user, rendering the initial EUC ineffective
and facilitating re-transfer.

Competing Priorities and Capacity Gaps

The practical obstacles of state self-interest and under-resourcing further impede

effective compliance.
Competing Legal Obligations (Security vs. Rights): States frequently invoke
Article 21 (National Security and Public Order) to justify non-disclosure or
transfers to allies. This functional loophole ensures that major arms exporters
can prioritize strategic alliances and national security interests (Realpolitik) over
their legally binding IHL/IHRL obligations.
Funding and Technical Assistance Gaps: Many developing nations are willing
to comply but lack the essential budget, training, and technological
infrastructure (e.g., licensing systems, stockpile security) to implement complex
controls effectively. The Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), established for
implementation support, remains significantly under-resourced relative to the
global need, exacerbating this capacity deficit.
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 10. International Legal Framework

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) interacts with and is strengthened by several core
instruments of international law. The obligations under the ATT are designed to
reinforce existing state obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
and International Human Rights Law (IHRL).

The effective functioning of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is hampered by several
critical challenges, which collectively undermine its goal of regulating the
international trade in conventional arms and preventing their diversion to illicit
end-users.

Instru Article/
Obligation Relevance to ATT
ment Provision

Prohibits transfer if the

State Party knows the
arms would be used in
Core Authority: The
the commission of
mandatory denial
ATT Article 6 genocide, crimes
criteria; the primary
(2013) (Prohibitions) against humanity,
legal test for a
grave breaches of the
transfer.
Geneva Conventions, or
other serious war
crimes.

Mandates a risk
Due Diligence: The
assessment before
central mechanism
export to determine
for integrating
Article 7 the overriding risk of
ATT human rights and
(Export use for serious
(2013) humanitarian
Assessment) violations of IHL/IHRL
considerations into
or facilitation of acts of
commercial
gender-based violence
decisions.
(GBV).

17

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 IHL Nexus: Requires
States Parties to
Obligation for all High
take positive steps
Contracting Parties to
Geneva to prevent violations,
Common respect and ensure
Conventi which the ATT fulfills
Article 1 respect for the
ons (1949) by prohibiting
Conventions in all
transfers where
circumstances.
grave breaches are
likely.

Criminal Nexus:
Provides the legal
definition of the
Defines and
Rome grave crimes that
criminalizes genocide,
Statute of Articles 6, 7, Article 6 of the ATT is
crimes against
the ICC 8 designed to prevent,
humanity, and war
(1998) linking arms
crimes.
transfers to
individual criminal
accountability.

IHRL Nexus: The

Internatio
arbitrary deprivation
nal
of life, often
Covenant Affirms the inherent
Article 6 facilitated by misuse
on Civil right to life; no one
(Right to of arms, is a core
and shall be arbitrarily
Life) violation the ATT
Political deprived of their life.
seeks to mitigate
Rights
through its risk
(ICCPR)
assessment.

18

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Authority and Enforcement Gaps:
The authority of the ATT stems from its status as a legally binding, multilateral
treaty. For States Parties, the obligations under Articles 6 and 7 supersede national
economic or political transfer priorities. The Treaty’s true authority is derived from
its reinforcement of jus cogens principles and existing IHL/IHRL obligations.
However, significant enforcement gaps persist:
Lack of Judicial Review: The ATT does not establish an international body
with the authority to judicially review a State Party’s decision to authorize or
deny a transfer. Disputes are resolved through consultation or mediation
(Article 17), which lacks coercive power.
Sovereign Interpretation: Because the "overriding risk" assessment is
national, a State Party's justification for a transfer, however dubious, is difficult
to legally challenge on the international stage.
Non-ATT Actors: The legal framework has no force over non-States Parties. A
country that violates the humanitarian spirit of the ATT by selling weapons to
an abusive regime can simply cite its non-participation as a shield from the
Treaty's obligations.
11. Regional or National Case Studies
These case studies illustrate the failures of pre-ATT controls and the persistent
challenges facing implementation.

Case Study 1: South Sudan – The IHL/IHRL Test Failure

Issue: In the years following its independence and subsequent civil war (2013
onwards), South Sudan was subject to numerous reports of grave human
rights violations, including mass atrocities, sexual violence, and forced
recruitment, primarily by government forces and allied militias (UN Human
Rights Council, 2017).
Arms Trade Relevance: Despite these consistent reports, several ATT States
Parties (and non-States Parties) continued to transfer high-volume arms,
ammunition, and components to the South Sudanese government, arguing
these were necessary for "national security" or "counter-insurgency."
Lessons Learned: This scenario demonstrated the failure of the Article 7
(Overriding Risk) assessment. Even with overwhelming evidence of systematic
IHL/IHRL violations documented by UN bodies, the subjective nature of the
national risk assessment allowed states to prioritize political or commercial
goals. It highlighted the need for a stronger, standardized, and evidence-based
mechanism for interpreting "overriding risk.

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Case Study 2: The Sahel Region – Diversion and Leakage
Issue: The Sahel region (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) has seen rapid state collapse
and the proliferation of arms into the hands of extremist and criminal groups,
contributing to regional instability and displacement (UNODC Report on
Transnational Organized Crime, 2023).
Arms Trade Relevance: Arms flowing into the Sahel originate from multiple
sources: leakage from regional state stockpiles (often poorly secured and
maintained, partly due to technical assistance gaps), and diversion of arms
initially sold legally to governments in North Africa or the Middle East. The
arms are often transferred multiple times across porous borders.
Comparative Insights: This case highlights the importance of Article 9 (Record
Keeping) and the implementation of the UNPoA/ITI. The lack of reliable
national records in the region makes tracing nearly impossible, proving that
the ATT’s effectiveness is intrinsically tied to capacity-building in recipient
nations, not just export controls in supplier nations.
Case Study 3: Central America – The North-South Flow (The "Iron
River")
Issue: High rates of gun violence and gang-related homicides in Mexico and
Central America are fueled by the massive, continuous flow of small arms and
light weapons (SALW) originating primarily from the United States. These
weapons, legally sold in the US, are then illegally trafficked across the border.
Arms Trade Relevance: This represents a unique challenge: the ATT does not
cover domestic sales. While the transfers become illicit, the initial source is
often a legal commercial transaction in a major non-State Party (the US). This
highlights a major scope gap. The weapons are often later sold and diverted by
organized criminal groups (Small Arms Survey, 2023).
Lessons Learned: The case emphasizes that domestic legislation in non-States
Parties can severely undermine the ATT's global purpose. It also reinforces the
urgent need to control the secondary market and address illicit trade that is
facilitated by loose legal controls in exporting nations, regardless of their ATT
status.

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 12. Role of the United Nations
& Other Bodies
The United Nations system plays a multi-faceted role in supporting the ATT,
ranging from political advocacy to technical assistance.

UN Responses, Agencies Involved, and Coordination

Mechanisms

1. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA):

Central Role: UNODA is the repository of the Treaty and houses the ATT
Secretariat. It serves as the main coordinating body for universalization and
implementation efforts.
Mechanisms: It facilitates the annual CSP, manages the ATT’s online reporting
tools, and publishes official status reports. UNODA also runs outreach
programs to non-States Parties, explaining the benefits of accession and
ratification (UNODA Mandate, 2024)
2. The Security Council (UNSC):
Coordination: The UNSC is primarily involved through the imposition of arms
embargoes, often targeting specific states (e.g., Libya, Democratic Republic of
the Congo) or non-state entities. These mandatory, binding embargoes
supersede the transfer decisions of all Member States, reinforcing the ATT's
goals by cutting off supply to high-risk zones.
Limitations: The UNSC's effectiveness is constrained by the veto power of the
P5, three of whom are non-States Parties or highly selective in their ATT
compliance, leading to political deadlocks on decisive action.
3. UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR):
Research and Analysis: UNIDIR provides independent, objective research on
diversion, end-use monitoring, and the impact of the arms trade on various
regions. Its reports offer evidence-based insights that are crucial for States
Parties when conducting their Article 7 risk assessments.

Current Initiatives or Funds Supporting the Issue

1. Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF):

Focus: The most crucial ATT-specific fund. The VTF provides financial, material,
and human resources to developing States Parties to help them establish or
upgrade their national arms control systems. This includes training border
control agents, developing robust digital record-keeping databases, and
updating national legislation to align with the ATT (ATT CSP Report, 2024).
Impact: Directly addresses the technical capacity gap, which is a major driver
of diversion.
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HCMUN IV
2. UN Trust Facility for Non-Conventional Weapons (UNTFONW):
Focus: While broader, UNTFONW supports projects that improve the physical
security and stockpile management (PSSM) of conventional arms, especially
SALW.
Impact: By ensuring that existing state stockpiles are not leaked into the illicit
market, UNTFNOW directly contributes to the ATT's objectives of minimizing
diversion.
3. UN Coordination Action on Small Arms (CASA):
Focus: CASA is a mechanism to coordinate the various UN entities involved in
the fight against illicit SALW proliferation. This ensures consistent messaging
and action across peace operations, humanitarian agencies, and development
programs.
Involved Agencies: Includes agencies like the UN Development Programme
(UNDP) and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), demonstrating that
the arms trade is recognized as a cross-cutting development and security
issue.
13. Policy Gaps & Recommendations
Identifying the precise failures of the existing framework is essential for
generating meaningful, future-oriented policy.

Identify Where Existing Mechanisms Fall Short

Sovereignty vs. Scrutiny Gap: The ATT successfully established the principle of
accountability (Article 7) but failed to establish a credible mechanism for peer
review or scrutiny of transfer decisions. States are solely accountable to
themselves, meaning political expediency often overrides humanitarian
assessment.
The Information Gap: The reliance on voluntary annual reports (Article 13) and
the optional nature of specific import/export data (Article 11) creates a vast
information deficit. Without reliable, standardized, and compulsory data,
effective monitoring of diversion becomes a matter of guesswork and reliance
on high-cost NGO investigations.
The Penalization Gap: The absence of clear, mandatory penalties for non-
compliance with the ATT's denial obligation means that the costs of violating
the Treaty are purely reputational, rather than legal or financial, making it a
"low-cost" violation for major powers.
The Technological Gap: The Treaty is structurally ill-equipped to address the
rapid evolution of warfare, including the proliferation of 3D-printed firearms,
autonomous weapons systems (AWS), and dual-use components (e.g., civilian
drone parts repurposed for military use). These elements fall outside the
defined scope, creating a regulatory shadow zone.
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HCMUN IV
 14. Policy Gaps & Recommendations

[Link] can the DISEC compel major non-State Parties (particularly the P5) to
align their national export control policies with the mandatory denial criteria of
ATT Articles 6 and 7, even without formal accession?
[Link] standardized, objective metrics or indices should States Parties adopt to
consistently interpret and apply the subjective concept of "overriding risk" in
Article 7, especially concerning evidence of severe human rights violations?
[Link] the persistent lack of resources, what innovative, self-sustaining financial
models (beyond voluntary contributions) can be proposed to fully capitalize the
Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) and ensure technical assistance reaches all
requesting developing States Parties?
[Link] can the global community utilize existing technologies (e.g., blockchain
for supply chain tracking, advanced satellite imagery) to improve post-
shipment verification (PSV) and prevent the diversion of arms in fragile states?
[Link] concrete legislative measures can ATT States Parties adopt to close the
brokering loophole by making their national brokering regulations truly
extraterritorial and enforceable against their nationals operating globally?
[Link] should the ATT’s scope be practically adapted to address the proliferation
of increasingly sophisticated dual-use technologies, such as weaponized
commercial drone components, without requiring a politically fraught Treaty
amendment?
[Link] measures can be recommended to ensure that arms transferred to a
partner state for the purpose of collective self-defense (e.g., Ukraine) do not
eventually lead to post-conflict diversion and leakage into the global illicit
market?
[Link] can the UNODA and civil society organizations be empowered to issue
"red flags" that States Parties are legally obligated to address and provide
justification for before authorizing a contentious transfer?
[Link] DISEC resolution language could be used to encourage importers (who
are often also non-State Parties) to exert pressure on exporters to accede to the
ATT, thereby utilizing a market-based universalization strategy?
[Link] institutional reforms are needed within the annual Conference of States
Parties (CSP) to move beyond procedural discussions and establish a robust,
objective Compliance Review Mechanism capable of reviewing national
implementation?
[Link] can DISEC propose specific guidelines to States Parties for assessing the
risk of arms contributing to acts of gender-based violence (GBV), a mandatory
consideration under Article 7?

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 15. Works Cited / References

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]
transfers-2024

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]

[Link]
and-gender
[Link]
[Link]

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