[ G.R. No.

179712, June 27, 2008 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EFREN MAGLENTE Y
CERVANTES ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FACTS

Efren Maglente y Cervantes was charged, tried and convicted for the rape of his
daughter. The prosecution’s case rested principally on the victim’s testimony that her
father sexually abused her on multiple occasions and that those acts resulted in her
becoming pregnant; documentary and testimonial evidence in the records
(medical/childbirth evidence and corroborating witnesses) supported the fact of
pregnancy/childbirth. The trial court found the accused guilty; the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction but adjusted the penalty to reclusion perpetua; on appeal to the
Supreme Court the conviction and penalty as modified were again upheld.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Appeals (and ultimately the Supreme Court) erred in finding Maglente
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape of a minor (his daughter) despite alleged
inconsistencies in the victim’s statements, and whether the modification of the penalty to
reclusion perpetua was improper.

RULING

NO, the Supreme Court found no reversible error: it affirmed the conviction for qualified
rape and endorsed the CA’s modification of the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The Court
explained that the testimony of a young and immature victim, particularly when the
accused is her parent and the testimony is corroborated by objective evidence of
pregnancy/childbirth, is entitled to credence; minor discrepancies in non-essential
details do not destroy that credibility. Given the attendant circumstance (the victim’s
minority and the offender’s parental relationship), the factual findings supported conviction for
qualified rape; because the death penalty had been abolished, the proper punishment was
reclusion perpetua (with the concomitant rules on parole/eligibility applicable under existing
law). The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the lower courts’ judgments.

The complainant, AAA, 14 years old accompanied by her aunt CCC and who is the appellant's
own daughter, testified that as a result of the alleged rape, she became pregnant and gave birth
to a child in 2002, which she subsequently gave up for adoption. She expressed
willingness to have the baby undergo DNA testing, but the baby’s whereabouts were
unknown during the proceedings.
The Supreme Court held that even if DNA testing were conducted and it showed that the
appellant was not the father, this outcome would still be insufficient to acquit him of
the rape charge. The rationale: Impregnation is not an element of rape, and the
absence of paternity does not disprove that forced sexual relations occurred.
This reaffirmed the Court’s long-standing position that the victim’s pregnancy or indeed whether
the accused fathered any resultant child is not necessary to prove the crime of rape. The
prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in forced sexual
relations, regardless of pregnancy or paternity. The Appellant Efren Maglente y Cervantes is
found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of qualified rape.

Can DNA evidence showing the

No. Pregnancy and paternity are not elements of rape;
accused is not the father lead to
they are irrelevant to determining guilt.
acquittal?
No. The critical element is the presence or absence of
Is DNA testing necessary for proving
forced sexual relations, not whether the accused fathered
rape?
the child.

The Maglente case thus clarifies that DNA results proving non-paternity do not exonerate
an accused in rape cases, as the essential crime (rape) is not contingent upon impregnation
or establishing paternity.
 G.R. No. 190710 June 6, 2011
JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner,
vs.
JESUS S. LUCAS, Respondent.

JESSE—the father

JESUS—the son

FACTS
Petitioner Jesse U. Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation with a motion
for DNA testing against respondent Jesus S. Lucas before the RTC of Valenzuela City.
Jesse alleged that his mother, Elsie Uy, had an intimate relationship with Jesus Lucas in the late
1960s, resulting in Jesse’s birth. Although his father’s name did not appear in his birth
certificate, Elsie later told him that Jesus was his father. Jesse claimed that Jesus initially
provided financial support but later ceased when their relationship ended.

Attached to the petition were Jesse’s birth and baptismal certificates, educational
documents, and newspaper articles about him. The RTC found the petition sufficient and
ordered publication, giving notice to all interested parties and to the Solicitor General. Jesus
Lucas, though not formally served with summons , filed a special appearance
questioning the court’s jurisdiction, alleging that the petition was adversarial in
nature and required personal service of summons.

Initially, the RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that Jesse failed to establish a prima facie
case as required in traditional paternity actions under Herrera v. Alba. It held that the
petition relied on hearsay and lacked corroborative proof of paternity, such as an
acknowledgment or evidence of being treated as a child by Jesus or his family.

Upon Jesse’s motion for reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and reinstated the case, ruling
that it was premature to dismiss it before trial and that the petition was sufficient in form and
substance. Jesus again moved to dismiss, but the RTC denied his motion. Jesus then elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.

The CA granted Jesus’ petition and dismissed Jesse’s case, ruling that the RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over Jesus due to lack of summons and that DNA testing cannot be ordered unless
there is a prior prima facie showing of paternity. The CA reasoned that without such showing,
DNA testing could lead to harassment and extortion. Jesse moved for reconsideration, but it was
denied.

Jesse filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in treating
the petition as adversarial and in dismissing the case for lack of summons and prima facie
showing.

ISSUE
Whether a prima facie showing of paternity is necessary before a court may issue a DNA
testing order in a petition to establish filiation, and whether the absence of summons
deprived the RTC of jurisdiction over the case.

RULING
YES, a prima facie showing is required before a court can order DNA testing in
paternity and filiation cases, but NO, the absence of summons did not deprive the RTC
of jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court held that a petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in
rem, which concerns the status of a person. Jurisdiction is acquired through publication
rather than service of summons. Summons serves merely to satisfy due process by
notifying the party so he may defend his interests. Here, jurisdiction was properly
acquired since the RTC ordered publication and Jesus actively participated in the proceedings by
filing pleadings and motions.

On the DNA testing issue, the Court clarified that while Section 4 of the Rule on DNA
Evidence does not expressly require a prima facie case, such showing is necessary to
prevent harassment and fishing for evidence. It protects individuals, especially prominent
members of society, from unfounded claims. Thus, during the hearing on a motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity before the court orders testing. The issuance of the order remains
discretionary upon the court, which may deny it if other evidence already suffices to resolve
the case.

The Court ruled that the CA erred in dismissing the petition prematurely since no DNA testing
order had been issued yet and no trial had taken place. Matters such as hearsay and the
sufficiency of proof of filiation are evidentiary issues to be resolved during trial. The RTC
correctly reinstated the case and set it for hearing.

WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court granted Jesse’s petition, reversed and set aside the CA’s
decision, and affirmed the RTC’s orders reinstating the petition.

DOCTRINE:
Before a court can issue a DNA testing order in paternity and filiation cases, the petitioner must
first present prima facie evidence establishing a reasonable possibility of paternity, to
protect against harassment suits and to uphold due process.

Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order?
Yes. before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving
party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion
for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
The issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may,
for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be
corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
FACTS:
Jesse U. Lucas filed a petition for review on certiorari questioning the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the trial court's ruling that required him to undergo DNA testing to
determine his filiation with the respondent, Jesus S. Lucas. Jesus claimed that he was the
illegitimate child of Jesse, alleging that Jesse had a relationship with his mother. Jesus presented
evidence, including testimonies, to support his claim, but Jesse denied paternity.
The Regional Trial Court ordered Jesse to undergo DNA testing to settle the dispute. Jesse
refused, arguing that there was no sufficient basis to compel him to submit to such a test and
that this violated his constitutional rights. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which upheld the RTC’s order. Unconvinced, Jesse brought the case to the Supreme Court,
raising the issue of whether a prima facie showing of paternity is necessary before a
court can order a party to submit to DNA testing.
ISSUE:
Is a prima facie showing of paternity or relationship required before a court may order a
party to undergo DNA testing?
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court held that a prima facie showing is necessary before a court may
issue an order for DNA testing.
The Court explained that DNA testing is a scientific method that can establish identity and
relationships, but it should not be ordered lightly. To protect individuals from
unwarranted intrusions into their privacy and bodily integrity, the Rules on DNA
Evidence require that a party first present prima facie evidence showing the
likelihood of the relationship in question. Only then can the court compel a person to
undergo DNA testing.
In this case, the Court found that Jesus presented sufficient evidence suggesting that he might
indeed be Jesse’s son. The testimonies and circumstances he presented met the threshold of
prima facie evidence. Therefore, the RTC was correct in ordering Jesse to undergo
DNA testing.
The Court further emphasized that while an individual cannot be physically forced to undergo
DNA testing, refusal to comply may result in the court making an adverse inference
against the refusing party, depending on the circumstances of the case.
Summary:
The Supreme Court upheld the order compelling Jesse to undergo DNA testing because Jesus had
presented prima facie evidence of his paternity claim. A prima facie showing is a necessary
safeguard to prevent baseless requests for DNA testing and to balance the need for truth with
the right to privacy.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the
Court of Appeals (CA).
 It upheld the order requiring Jesse U. Lucas (petitioner) to undergo DNA testing,
ruling that:
o Jesus S. Lucas presented prima facie evidence of filiation — sufficient proof to
justify compelling Jesse to submit to DNA testing.
o This was not a violation of Jesse's constitutional rights since the Rules on DNA
Evidence allow the court to order such testing when there is strong preliminary
evidence of a biological relationship.
o While Jesse cannot be physically forced to undergo the test, his refusal could
lead to adverse inferences against him.
 Jesus S. Lucas prevailed because the Supreme Court allowed the DNA testing to
proceed.
 This meant that the case could move forward with scientific evidence to determine his
claim of being Jesse’s illegitimate son.
In short: The Supreme Court sided with Jesus S. Lucas, affirming that there was enough
basis to order DNA testing.

The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court may order DNA testing to determine filiation,
provided the conditions under the Rule on DNA Evidence are met. The Court held that a party
requesting DNA testing need not first establish full prima facie proof of paternity or
filiation. It is enough to show a reasonable possibility that the test would provide relevant
information to resolve the issue.

The Court emphasized that before compelling DNA testing, the following must be established:

1. A relevant biological sample exists;

2. The sample was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing requested, or
if previously tested, there are good reasons for confirmation;
3. The DNA testing method is scientifically valid and accepted; and
4. The DNA test has the potential to yield new relevant information that could help
resolve the case.

In this case, Jesse Lucas presented sufficient allegations and supporting circumstances
indicating a reasonable possibility that he was the illegitimate child of Jesus Lucas .
Given the importance of determining paternity, and considering that DNA evidence is highly
reliable and objective, the Court held that the trial court erred in denying the motion for
DNA testing.
Thus, the Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered DNA testing, balancing the
privacy rights of the alleged father with the child’s right to know his lineage and establish
filiation.

FACT (CONTENTION OF CA):

Herrera v. Alba,7 there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which the parties have
to face:

1. a prima facie case,

2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy, and
4. physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

The court opined that petitioner must first establish these four procedural aspects before he can present evidence of
paternity and filiation, which may include incriminating acts or scientific evidence like blood group test and DNA test
results. The court observed that the petition did not show that these procedural aspects were present. Petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie case considering that (a) his mother did not personally declare that she had sexual
relations with respondent, and petitioner’s statement as to what his mother told him about his father was clearly
hearsay; (b) the certificate of live birth was not signed by respondent; and (c) although petitioner used the surname of
respondent, there was no allegation that he was treated as the child of respondent by the latter or his family. The
court opined that, having failed to establish a prima facie case, respondent had no obligation to present any
affirmative defenses.

RULING:

The statement in Herrera v. Alba34 that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these
so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters
of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case—the first procedural
aspect in a paternity case—is therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been
issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing without corroborative proof is well taken
and deserves the Court’s attention. In light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order, particularly in paternity and other filiation
cases. We, thus, address the question of WHETHER A PRIMA FACIE SHOWING IS NECESSARY BEFORE A COURT CAN
ISSUE A DNA TESTING ORDER.

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in
the judicial system. It provides the "prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e., the
proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible sources of error, the available objections
to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure
that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be
misused and/or abused and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and protects,
rather than prejudice the public."35

Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the
accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. Section 4 states:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall
issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was
previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the
applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a "search,"
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.
Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained —

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of
the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in
cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show
cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the
court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the
court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

1. Conclusive DNA Evidence

o This means the DNA result is definitive and leaves no reasonable doubt about
the identity of a person.
o Example: In a paternity case, a DNA test shows a 99.9% probability of paternity,
which under the Rules is considered conclusive proof that the man is the father.
o Legally, the court must accept this finding unless there is evidence that the test
itself was tampered with or not properly conducted.
2. Corroborative DNA Evidence
o DNA results here are used to support other evidence, but cannot stand alone
to prove a fact completely.
o Example: A bloodstain on a suspect’s shirt matches the victim’s DNA, but there is
no evidence showing how or when it got there. The DNA result strengthens the
prosecution’s case, but it is not by itself absolute proof of guilt.
 3. Disputable DNA Evidence
o This type of DNA evidence can be challenged or contradicted by other evidence.

o Example: A DNA sample suggests the presence of a suspect at the crime scene, but
the defense presents strong alibi evidence and challenges the integrity of the DNA
collection process.
o The court must then evaluate which evidence is more credible.

Summary Table:

Category Definition Example

Conclusive Final and unquestionable proof 99.9% DNA match in paternity test

Corroborati Supports other evidence, but not enough Bloodstain matches victim’s DNA but no
ve on its own link to crime

Can be rebutted or challenged by other DNA match questioned due to improper

Disputable
proof collection

Section 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing Results.

In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following:

1. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of

mismatching DNA evidence;
2. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence
presented in the case; and that
3. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be
considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the Probability of
Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity.

So, the Rule explicitly provides:

 Exclusion (no match) → conclusive proof of non-paternity

 Probability of paternity LESS THAN 99.9% → corroborative evidence
 Probability of paternity GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 99.9% → disputable
presumption of paternity

Probability of Paternity LESS than 99.9% (< 99.9%)

o The DNA result is treated only as corroborative evidence.

o This means it supports other evidence but cannot stand alone to establish
paternity.
o Example: If the probability is 98%, it strengthens the claim but the court still
needs other proof like testimonies or documents.

Probability of Paternity GREATER THAN or EQUAL to 99.9% (≥ 99.9%)

o The DNA result gives rise to a disputable presumption of paternity.

o This means the man is presumed to be the father, unless he presents strong
evidence to rebut it.
o Example: A 99.99% match strongly presumes fatherhood, but the alleged father
may still disprove it by showing evidence of fraud, tampering, or mix-up.

If the DNA completely excludes the man (no match)

 o It is conclusive proof of non-paternity, and the court must accept that he is not
the father.

ADDITIONAL DNA CASE:

[ G.R. NO. 148220, June 15, 2005 ]

ROSENDO HERRERA, PETITIONER, VS. ROSENDO ALBA, MINOR, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER ARMI A. ALBA, AND
HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 48, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

Nature of the case: A petition for review to set aside the Decision dated 29 November 2000 of the Court of Appeals
(appellate court) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. The appellate court affirmed two Orders issued by Branch 48 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (trial court) in SP No. 98-88759. The Order dated 3 February 2000 directed Rosendo Herrera
(petitioner) to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing, while the Order dated 8 June 2000 denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.

SUMMARY

Rosendo Alba (respondent) filed a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against Rosendo Herrera
(petitioner). During trial, respondent filed a motion to take a DNA paternity testing wherein the petitioner argued that
conducting such test violates his right against self-incrimination. The SC held that the privilege (right against self-
incrimination) is applicable only to testimonial evidence.

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before
the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. Petitioner denied that he
is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent's mother. Respondent
filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA
paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

The trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and he asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is
compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional. The trial court denied petitioner's MR.

On 18 July 2000, petitioner filed before the appellate court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of DNA paternity testing. The appellate court
stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right
applies only to testimonial compulsion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA paternity testing violates the accused's right against self-incrimination

RULING:

No. Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-
incrimination. Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence.

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the
belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to
evidence that is communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against
self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material.
As such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting from the
body of the accused was received as evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received
as proof; an order by the judge for the witness to put on pair of pants for size was; and the court can compel a woman
accused of adultery to submit for pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on testimonial
compulsion.

The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.

AGUSTIN VS. CA

GR NO. 162571, JUNE 15, 2005

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite. Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with
Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martin’s conception. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. Arnel
opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the
applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Thus, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.

Ruling:

Yes, DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioner’s
constitutional right to privacy and right against self-incrimination. In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals: The first real breakthrough of
DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision
in People v. Vallejo where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that “the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.”

Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar, we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide,
the principal evidence for which included DNA test results, viz:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, interalia, the following factors: CHCPQ

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and
5. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as
evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victim’s vagina were used to positively identify
the accused Joel “Kawit” Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA
testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and17
of Article III of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is
not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt . It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Over the years, we have
expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-
incrimination. These include photographs, hair, and other bodily substances. We have also declared as constitutional
several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for women accused of adultery, expulsion of
morphine from one’s mouth and the tracing of one’s foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints. In Jimenez v.
Camizares, we even authorized the examination of a woman’s genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by her
husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures
were, to be sure, rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its
results, per our ruling in Yatar, are now similarly acceptable. Nor does petitioner’s invocation of his right to privacy
persuade the Court. Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue.
Petitioner’s case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple
reason that they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life is at stake can be
compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such
dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

G.R. No. 155335 July 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JESUS MACAPAL, JR., Respondent.

Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The acceptance of
his or her testimony depends on the quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make them known
to the court.

FACTS:

One evening in June 1996 at Barangay Manapa, Buenavista, Agusandel Norte. While LigayaSarino was walking on her
way home after she bought kerosene from the nearby store of appellant's father, Jesus Macapal, Sr., appellant suddenly
appeared and waylaid her. Holding both her arms, appellant dragged her to an isolated grassy area where he ordered
her to lie down. Although she wanted to shout, she froze with fear, appellant having poked a knife at her abdomen and
threatened to kill her if she would shout or resist. Appellant thereafter succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her.
On December 23, 1996, when the victim visited her sister Vilma Sarino Salazar, Vilma noticed the victim's stomach
bulging, prompting her to inquire what happened. While the victim initially refused to answer, she was later prevailed
upon to answer upon Vilma's insistence and assurance that she would not be harmed. The victim then revealed what
their neighbor, herein appellant, did to her. When Vilma asked her when the incident happened, the victim answered
'when you just left for Manila which was, by Vilma's account, on June 3, 1996. It is further gathered from the evidence
that Dr. Cheryl T. Zalsos, a psychiatrist at the Northern Mindanao Medical Center who conducted a psychiatric
evaluation of the victim on November 25, 1998, found that 'the patient is suffering from Mental Retardation, mild to
moderate characterized by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning (IQ 70 or below) accompanied by significant
limitations in adaptive functioning, with an onset below the age of 18. And the doctor opined that while the mental
capacity of the victim is comparable to that of a child between 9 to 12 years old, she could testify in court but under
closed door and leading questions should be avoided 'as retarded people may be suggestible and wish to please others.
It is gathered furthermore that when Dr. Benjamin B. Selim, Jr., Medical Officer III of the Butuan Provincial Hospital,
examined the victim on January 13, 1997, he found her to be in a pregnant state and that her hymen was not intact. On
the basis of the ultrasound examination, he opined that she 'had conception probably third to the last week of June
1996.

ISSUE:

WHETHER LIGAYA SARINO’S TESTIMONY IS CREDIBLE DESPITE BEING MENTALLY RETARDATE?

RULING:

YES. Mental retardation per se does not affect credibility. A mentally retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of his or her testimony depends on the quality of his or her perceptions and the manner he or she can make
them known to the court.

In People v. Munar (131 SCRA 44, 46[1984]), although the complainant therein was a 19-year old female, with a mental
age of a 5-year old, the Court still held that she was a competent witness. We therein relied on the findings of the trial
court that complainant's answer were intelligible enough to be understood. The complainant therein could convey her
thoughts by words and signs. Furthermore, an examining physician from the National Mental Hospital was presented in
that case who testified that the mental deficiency of the witness did not prevent her from recalling painful experiences.
In People v. Gerones, (193 SCRA 263, 267 [1991]), the Court found, upon close examination of the records, that the
victim managed to communicate her ordeal to the court clearly and consistently. The trial court found the victim therein
to have the mental capacity of a ten-year old. Hence, we declared that we were convinced that a ten-year old girl could
adequately narrate facts which show that she had been raped. The acceptance of a mental retardate's testimony,
therefore, as in the case of other witnesses, must still depend on its nature and credibility or, otherwise put, the quality
of the person's perceptions and the manner he can make them known to the court. In the case at bar, albeit the victim's
testimony was tainted with inconsistencies, these are mere collateral and minor matters which would not compel this
Court from discrediting her testimony, given her mental retardation. In fact, testimonial discrepancies, which could have
been caused by the natural fickleness of memory, tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they negate any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony and do not destroy the substance of the victim's testimony.