Carmelitas Model UN 2025 Overview
Carmelitas Model UN 2025 Overview
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CARMELITAS MODEL OF UNITED NATIONS 2025
INDEX:
Letter of the Secretary-General………………………………………………………3
Letter from the Directors……………………………………………………………..4
Introduction to the Topic……………………………………………………………..6
History of the Committee…………………………………………………………...10
Statement of the problem……………………………………………………………11
Points of Contention………………………………………………………………...13
Case studies…………………………………………………………………………16
QARMA’s…………………………………………………………………………..21
Final Remarks………………………………………………………………………22
Position Papers……………………………………………………………………...23
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………...24
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My name is Valentina Guinassi and in this edition of CarMUN I'm excited to say that I will be this
year’s Secretary General. To be part of the team and contribute to what has been cultivated over the
years is both an honor and a responsibility. CarMUN has long stood as a platform for personal and
collective growth and diplomatic exchange. It continues to embody the values of leadership,
commitment, and collaboration that I deeply admire and aspire to uphold.
In 2022, my best friend encouraged me to participate in Model United Nations (MUN), but I was
initially hesitant to engage in debate and explore new opportunities due to my fear of getting out of
my comfort zone. However, in 2023, my best friend joined, and I also decided to do so.
At first, I was apprehensive about speaking or being seen to be actively participating, but after my
first MUN, I realized that it was a place where I felt empowered. The opportunity to meet new people,
learn about different matters, and experience the unknown was a highly motivating factor. In 2025,
I was fortunate enough to attend Harvard. Despite not achieving the expected results, I gained
valuable insights and experiences thanks to the support of the delegation, faculties, and coaches. I
came to realize that it was an unforgettable experience, and I have no regrets about participating.
After a prolonged period of personal growth and development along these years in this activity, I
have come to recognize and appreciate the positive changes that have taken place. Among them, a
more genuine way of connecting with others, and a more thoughtful understanding of who I am and
who I wish to become. This inner journey has reaffirmed the importance of essential human values,
like empathy, integrity, responsibility, and respect, which in recent years seem to have been forgotten
or challenged in many aspects.
And it is precisely with this in mind that this year, we have chosen “Rebuilding a World of Values”
as our central theme. Our mission is to inspire delegates not only to win awards or engage themselves
in critical discussions, but to renew their commitment to the principles that form the foundation of a
just, loving, and respectful society.
Sincerely,
Valentina Guinassi,
Secretary General
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Beyond the skills, MUN has been a community where I have built meaningful friendships,
some of which have become among the most important in my life. It has also pushed me to
step out of my comfort zone, to take on responsibilities I once thought beyond my reach,
and to discover the value of being informed about the world and my own country. These
experiences have made me appreciate MUN not only as a simulation, but as a platform for
growth, dialogue, and connection.
As the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, DISEC plays a central role
in addressing matters of international peace and security. It serves as a forum where all
member states can deliberate on disarmament, arms regulation, and collective security issues
that remain at the heart of today’s geopolitical challenges. This year, our agenda will focus
on the influence of military alliances on global stability, a timely and complex topic that
invites us to reflect on cooperation, security, and the power dynamics shaping our world.
My hope is that, throughout this experience, you will not only refine your research, debating,
and negotiation skills, but also gain perspectives and insights that will stay with you far
beyond the committee room. I encourage you to step out of your comfort zone, challenge
yourselves, and, most importantly, enjoy every moment of this journey. If you have any
doubts or concerns, please do not hesitate to reach out to me. I greatly look forward to
meeting each of you and to witnessing the outstanding debates you will bring to the table.
Best regards,
Luciana Arana Vargas
Director of Disarmament and International Security Committee
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Dear delegate, welcome to the United Nations Disarmament and International Security Committee
(DISEC) of CarMUN 2025!
My name is Alonso Belevan and I am honored to be your director for this edition of CarMUN, even
more so because we’ll be directing DISEC, my favorite committee. I’m looking forward to hearing
you fiercely defend your policies in a topic as relevant and controversial as the influen ce of military
alliances in global stability. With today’s political climate feeling more cruel and polarized than ever,
I hope that this committee will showcase the importance of diplomacy, negotiation, and critical
thinking in order to stand up for what's right, establish conversations, and find solutions to seemingly
unsolvable problems.
I joined MUN in 2021, while our country was still partially on lockdown and MUN conferences
were almost exclusively virtual. The next year, I graduated from Colegio Nuestra Señora del Carmen.
Even though my time as a delegate was relatively short, during those two years I had many enriching
experiences. I participated in a fair share of committees, won awards, developed new skills while
refining old ones, met incredible people and even got the opportunity to travel with my delegation
to Washington DC. Furthermore, I had the pleasure to be part of the secretary for CarMUN 2022,
composed of some of the most wonderful people I know, where I served as Secretary of Substantial
Affairs alongside who would become one of my closest friends, my co -director for this occasion,
Luciana Arana. Currently, I am studying Mechatronic Engineering at Universidad de Ingeniería y
Tecnología (UTEC), making full use of the skills I learned throughout my experience in MUN.
Lastly, I would like to encourage you to lead with empathy, which means always getting involved.
It implies establishing conversations and seeing each issue through multiple perspectives so that you
may come up with all-encompassing solutions, both inside and outside the committee. Don’t stop at
just doing good, inspire others to do good as well. See you at CarMUN 2025!
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Throughout history, organized military forces have played a key role in the development of societies
and the establishment of global power structures. The beginning of written history, around 3400
B.C.E. in Mesopotamia, shows traces of standing armies, dedicated to the expansion and
consolidation of empires. Starting around 1000 C.E. in Europe, the expressed purpose of armed
forces shifted from expansion to national defense and maintaining the balance of power in a continent
that lacked one singular, consolidated, power. This period was marked by almost constant conflict
in the continent, which would peak in the 17th century, in which Europe saw only 7 years of peace.
This dynamic would lay the foundation for the rise of professional armies and, with the creation of
the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance in 1386, the emergence of the first military alliances according to
modern understanding.
Military alliances are agreements between states, both recognized and unrecognized by
the international community. That is to say, it only matters that there is an independent
authority with military power that governs a certain population and territory in order to
form a military alliance. As of today (2025), there are a total of 12 nations that are not
yet recognized by all members of the United Nations, mostly due to territorial disputes.
For instance, both the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) claim sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula.
As a result, neither acknowledges the legitimacy of the other, and formal diplomatic
recognition has yet to be established. Nevertheless, almost none would argue against
the legitimacy of South Korea as a major non-NATO ally (1987) or the North Korean-
Russian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2024).
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• Binding agreements:
As previously mentioned, military alliances are explicit agreements between states that
address matters of national security. These agreements do not have a uniform structure:
some establish broad frameworks for cooperation, while others are tailored to specific
contingencies. Nevertheless, although most alliances include provisions for ongoing
collaboration, such as joint exercises or intelligence meetings, their core function is to
establish obligations of member states in the event of an occurrence as discussed in the
treaty (usually an armed attack against one of the members). In this sense, alliances are
multilateral promises that demand active contributions from all parties that depart from
their ordinary patterns of behavior. Unlike other arrangements, such as neutrality pacts
and non-aggression treaties, military alliances imply an obligation for members to
allocate their own resources in defense of others, with failures to hold to the agreements
resulting in political and economic consequences and the underminement of the
violating member’s credibility.
In recent times, military alliances have shifted toward being highly institutionalized entities that
promote constant cooperation and strategic coordination between member states. This tendency is
most evident in bodies such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is often
regarded as the most sophisticated example of a multilateral security organization. Furthermore,
NATO’s North Atlantic Council functions as a permanent forum where decisions are constantly
being evaluated and chosen by consensus, reinforcing its character as an international organization
rather than a mere treaty framework. Similarly, the Collective Security Organization (CSTO)
embodies a comparable model in Eurasia. Even in the case of the Australia-United Kingdom-United
States partnership (AUKUS), which is newer and narrower in scope, is highly institutionalized into
pillars based on military growth and technological development.
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Global stability refers to a condition in which the international system sustains peace, predictability,
and cooperation among states over time. It involves not only the absence or reduction of armed
conflict, but also adherence to international law, the effective functioning of multilateral institutions,
and the capacity to respond collectively to emerging threats. Scholars often distinguish between
static stability, understood as the simple absence of war, and dynamic stability, which denotes the
system’s ability to absorb shocks and adapt to crises without collapsing into widespread violence
(Antonini, 1999; Kühn, 2023).
To assess the degree of global stability, analysts frequently examine indicators such as the frequency
and intensity of conflicts, the effectiveness of regional and international mechanisms for dispute
settlement, compliance with legal norms and arms control regimes, the distribution of military
expenditures, and the cohesion of multilateral bodies like the United Nations. Quantitative indices
provide additional insight. The Global Peace Index (GPI), compiled annually by the Institute for
Economics and Peace, measures levels of peacefulness by assessing ongoing conflicts, societal
safety, and degrees of militarization. It captures how secure and cooperative the international
environment is. The Fragile States Index (FSI), by contrast, evaluates states’ vulnerability to
political, economic, and social pressures, highlighting their institutional resilience in the face of
crises. Taken together, these indices emphasize that stability depends not only on preventing large-
scale armed conflict, but also on strengthening the institutions and societal resilience that allow states
to withstand crises without collapsing. A stable order enables cooperation in trade, human rights,
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Although the Committee does not possess the authority to take legally binding decisions, as that
responsibility lies within the Security Council, its work carries substantial political weight. The
recommendations and draft resolutions adopted by DISEC set the tone for the international
disarmament agenda and reflect the views of the entire UN membership. Today, DISEC continues
to meet annually during the General Assembly session, with all 193 Member States participating. Its
agenda addresses pressing challenges such as nuclear disarmament, conventional weapons, outer
space security, and the impact of new and emerging technologies on global stability. By providing a
platform for multilateral dialogue, the Committee remains a cornerstone of the UN framework for
promoting peace, security, and disarmament.
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However, the growing prominence of military alliances also makes them a subject of controversy in
the wider international community. While, in theory, they strengthen cooperation and deter
aggression, in practice there are situations in which the presence and activities of alliances create
unease beyond their membership, heighten tensions in volatile regions, or project power in ways that
blur the limits of acceptable state behavior. These dynamics raise questions about whether alliances
ultimately contribute to stability or, conversely, risk undermining it through actions that strain both
international law and political trust.
When evaluating the extent to which military alliances contribute or undermine global stability, it is
necessary to question the relationship between them and the framework of collective security
outlined in the United Nations Charter. The Charter establishes guiding principles for the
maintenance of peace, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the limits placed on the use of force,
all of which are directly relevant to the operation of alliances. Taken into special consideration should
be Article 1(1), Article 1(2), Article 2(3), and Article 2(4):
• Article 1(1): “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which
might lead to a breach of the peace;”
• Article 1(2): “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;”
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• Article 2(3): “All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered;”
• Article 2(4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;”
Furthermore, the nature of the United Nations as an intergovernmental organization, as well as the
preamble of the UN Charter: “We the Peoples of the United Nations” and the elaborate mechanism
established through its bodies for the purpose of collective security, qualifies the organization itself
as a universal alliance of all member nations. By contrast, military alliances that include some while
actively excluding other members of the United Nations, essentially function as alliances within an
alliance, a structure that risks inconsistency with the universality envisioned by the Charter. This
concern is heightened in cases where alliances are defined by political ideology, programmed for
expansion, or heavily reliant on military strength, as such characteristics may lead to the
intensification, expansion, and militarization of political divisions reminiscent of the Cold War,
thereby standing in direct tension with the principles of collective security. As the following section
turns to specific cases and points of controversy regarding military alliances, it is essential to bear in
mind the four Charter articles previously outlined, which serve as the foundation for assessing the
compatibility of alliances with global stability.
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a. Threat to Non-allies:
Military alliances are, at least in principle, defensive in nature, formed to safeguard the sovereignty
and security of their members rather than to project aggression. Their effectiveness, however,
depends fundamentally on the conduct of joint military exercises, which serve to test and refine
strategic doctrines, ensure interoperability among forces, and provide allied troops with the practical
experience necessary to sustain credible collective defense. Due to this, joint exercises have long
been recognized as a legitimate right of allied states, grounded in their sovereignty and their
prerogative to organize defense measures within their own territories. However, there are cases in
which military exercises can be interpreted as conducted for political purposes, which entails credible
implication of hostile intent characteristic to the threat of force explicitly prohibited by Article 2(4)
of the UN Charter. Matter of fact, a 2020 study done by independent researchers of the University
of Miami concluded that joint exercises carried over allied territory had little to no effect on conflict
escalation, while joint exercises carried over in border territory and, while an uncommon occurrence,
exercises executed on non-allied territory seemingly always escalated conflict and interfered in peace
negotiations. Nevertheless, the overarching issue when evaluating whether joint exercises constitute
a threat of force is the ambiguity of the line between legitimate defense preparedness a nd coercive
signaling.
b. Entanglement-based escalation:
As previously mentioned, most military alliances incorporate defense pacts that provide for
mechanisms by which the allied members act collectively in self-defense. For example, Article 5 of
the NATO Charter provides that:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised
by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic
area.”
Such policies reinforce the principle of collective security within the alliance, an attack on a single
NATO or CSTO member is now understood as an attack on all member nations for each respective
alliance, thereby significantly increasing the deterrent effect against potential aggressors. That being
said, there is also an implication that membership in such alliances inevitably brings the weight of
extensive military capabilities into any dispute involving a member state, adding additional layers of
complexity and mistrust. Arguably, membership in a military alliance can accidentally heighten
tensions and make diplomatic solutions more fragile. This has been showcased on multiple occasions
during the Cold War, with events such as the Korean War (1950 - 1953) and most prominently in
the Vietnamese War (1955 - 1975); similarly, one could argue the entirety of World War I (1914 -
1918) was a result of conflict escalation caused by the activation of multiple defense pacts between
European countries. The risks of entanglement and escalation are further amplified when deterrence
extends to nuclear capabilities. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the policy of
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nuclear deterrence by mere possession of, or participation in a nuclear umbrella, such as that under
a nuclear-possessing military alliance, as a form of threat of force.
c. Coercive demands:
In international politics, a coercive demand refers to a political request accompanied by the condition
that non-compliance will result in the use of force. Such demands have long been regarded as threats
of force and are therefore prohibited under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. While a coercive demand
issued by a singular state already falls under this prohibition and would be subjected to scrutiny, one
made collectively through a military alliance accentuates the threat in three distinct ways:
• In the case of military alliances that can be considered regional organizations for the
purposes of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the use of force envisioned by its coercive
demand may enter a dubious space of legality. For example, the legality of NATO’s
bombing campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999, which had been preceded by a coercive
demand for Yugoslavia to withdraw troops and accept NATO’s deployment of troops
to Kosovo, has been defended by some by reference to actions taken by a regional
organization despite it being an out-of-area operation.
• For military alliances that qualify as an international organization, complete with their
own multilateral decision-making mechanism, the very issuance of a coercive demand
gives an air of legitimacy, particularly when the legality of the threatened use of force
is contested. For example, even when the US failed to secure support from France and
Germany in issuing an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein before the invasion of Iraq (2003),
it requested token support from NATO to plan ahead for the defence of Turkey in case
of an attack on its territory in the forthcoming war. The participation of some, yet not
all, NATO allies had symbolic significance by transforming what was a unilateral use
of force into a multilateral use of force.
d. Armed intervention:
The recognition of governments carries profound implications under the norm of non-intervention.
While effective control over a territory is often cited as the criteria for the existence of a state, it does
not guarantee broader claims to legitimacy. Furthermore, concerns with potential violations of the
norm of non-intervention has begun a wave of states that abstain from recognizing governments
altogether, but has not stopped the practice of recognition of “legitimate representatives” of a nation
when undergoing civil strife. On that basis, military alliances may also hold a pivotal role under
certain standing arrangements in the potential restoration of peace and security in the state
undergoing civil strife and potentially the international community. Often a military alliance
provides for some form of mutual security assistance between allies in addition to defense pacts.
Furthermore, if the alliance qualifies as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter, then they have a responsibility to deal with matters related to maintaining international
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peace and security as long as their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the
United Nations as detailed in Article 52(1) of the UN Charter. Therefore, military alliances tend to
be of major importance in influencing the outcome of a civil strife in an allied nation, prompting
concerns regarding ulterior purposes to supporting a faction.
The capacity of military alliances to contravene the non-intervention norm by recognizing one party
over another in a civil conflict is closely linked to their potential to violate the same norm through
armed intervention. These interventions are highly controversial under international law, as Article
2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force with exceptions in narrowly defined circumstances,
specifically, it only allows for interventions at the invitation of the state’s government as an exercise
of the intervener’s right of collective self-defense. This arrangement creates predisposition towards
armed intervention, particularly politically-motivated interventions, in member states undergoing
internal instability. Such Governments may invoke alliance mechanisms to quell rebellions under
the guise of preserving order, blurring the line between lawful assistance and unlawful interference.
As such, alliance-based interventions sit at the heart of the tension between sovereignty, legitimacy,
and the prohibition of force, raising persistent doubts about whether they serve the restoration of
peace or the pursuit of political advantage.
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In 1999, NATO launched an air campaign against Serbian forces to stop mass killings and ethnic
cleansing in Kosovo. The operation lasted 78 days and involved thousands of airstrikes, eventually
forcing Serbian troops to withdraw. What made this case controversial was that NATO acted without
authorization from the United Nations Security Council, making it the first large-scale humanitarian
intervention without a UN mandate.
This sparked intense debates about its legality and legitimacy: proponents framed the operation as a
moral necessity to prevent atrocities, while critics argued that it undermined the post-1945
international legal order by reverting to unilateral uses of force. The intervention highlighted how
alliances can redefine the boundaries between collective defense, humanitarian responsibility, and
international law, while also underscoring the risks of bypassing multilateral frameworks.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States were a major shock for the
international community. For the first time in its history, NATO decided to use Article 5 of its treaty,
which says that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all. This showed how
a military alliance could quickly react to protect one of its members in a moment of crisis.
NATO launched missions such as Operation Eagle Assist, where members sent radar planes
(AWACS, large aircraft with special radar to watch the skies and help organize air defense) to patrol
U.S. airspace, and Operation Active Endeavour, a naval mission in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent
terrorism and illegal trafficking. Later, NATO also changed its strategy to officially recognize
terrorism as one of the main threats to global security.
This example shows how alliances can adapt to new dangers that do not come from states but from
groups like terrorist organizations. At the same time, it raised important debates about legality,
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sovereignty, and the risks of acting without a UN mandate. For DISEC, it highlights the key question
of whether collective defense should only apply to armed attacks by states, or if alliances can also
expand that principle to cover threats from non-state actors such as terrorist groups.
In December 2016, Gambian President Yahya Jammeh lost the presidential election but refused to
step down, sparking a constitutional crisis. The Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS), invoking its standby force and regional norms for democratic governance, threatened
military intervention if Jammeh did not relinquish power.
On 19 January 2017, approx. 7,000 troops from Senegal, Nigeria, and Ghana entered The Gambia
under Operation Restore Democracy. Around 4,000 ECOWAS troops remained after Jammeh's
departure to stabilize the transition. President Adama Barrow requested that 2,500 forces stay for
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several months to help with security and governance. These troops supported law enforcement,
secured key sites (ports, border crossings), and helped prevent escalation of violence.
The intervention was widely supported initially, seen as a principled effort to uphold election results
and avoid violence. Nevertheless, some Gambians later criticized the ongoing military presence as
overstepping: concerns over sovereignty, the risks of external interference in domestic affairs, and
whether the continued deployment was necessary. This example shows how a regional alliance can
go beyond traditional defense roles by safeguarding democratic transitions and preventing internal
conflict. It also highlights the dilemma of duration: while the initial intervention was welcomed, the
continued presence of foreign troops created unease among Gambians. For DISEC, it raises the issue
of whether alliances should influence domestic political outcomes, and how long such involvement
can remain legitimate before it begins to strain sovereignty and public trust.
After the end of the Cold War, NATO expanded into Eastern Europe, offering membership to former
Soviet republics and allies. For many states, joining NATO was seen as a guarantee of protection.
However, Russia viewed this enlargement as a direct threat to its security and sphere of influence.
This tension escalated with the 2014 annexation of Crimea and reached a peak in 2022, when Russia
launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. NATO has not admitted Ukraine as a member, but it has
provided unprecedented levels of support: billions of dollars in weapons, training for Ukrainian
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forces, intelligence sharing, and humanitarian aid. Still, because Ukraine is not covered by NATO’s
Article 5, the alliance has stopped short of direct military intervention.
Ukraine’s ambiguous position, receiving unprecedented support while remaining outside NATO’s
Article 5, highlights both the strength and the uncertainty of military alliances. On the one hand,
NATO assistance has boosted Ukraine’s defense and deterred further escalation; on the other, it has
also fueled rivalry with Russia and raised mistrust. For DISEC, the situation illustrates how alliances
can simultaneously deter aggression and deepen divisions, reshaping global security far beyond their
immediate scope and raising questions about the limits of allied commitments.
In 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced AUKUS, a new security
partnership focused on the Indo-Pacific. Its most notable feature is the transfer of nuclear-powered
submarine technology to Australia, making it only the second country (after the UK) to receive such
assistance from the U.S. The pact also covers cooperation on advanced military technologies like
cyber, artificial intelligence, and undersea warfare.
In 2024, North Korea and Russia signed a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, pledging mutual
assistance if either country was attacked. The agreement quickly expanded beyond diplomacy.
Reports indicate that North Korea has supplied Russia with artillery shells and missiles to support
its war in Ukraine, while Russia has offered North Korea political backing and the prospect of
military cooperation.
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For North Korea, the partnership provides rare international support and resources despite heavy
sanctions. For Russia, it secures badly needed supplies and an ally willing to challenge Western
influence. However, the pact also worries the international community: it undermines sanctions, may
increase weapons proliferation, and creates new instability in both Europe and Asia.
The partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang shows how alliances between isolated powers can
complicate international security by undermining sanctions and influencing conflicts beyond their
immediate regions. For DISEC, it opens debate on whether such alignments represent legitimate
security cooperation between sovereign states or whether they weaken the effectiveness of
multilateral mechanisms designed to preserve stability and international norms.
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6. QARMA’S
Delegates should consider the following critical questions (QARMAs) that any resolution
or proposal should address:
● Q1: To what extent should military alliances be considered compatible with the
collective security framework of the United Nations?
● Q2: How can the UN ensure that military alliances contribute to international peace
and stability rather than undermine them?
● Q4: How can joint military exercises be conducted in ways that avoid escalation or
the perception of aggression?
● Q5: What role should the United Nations play in mediating tensions that arise from
the expansion or formation of new alliances?
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Due to the highly technical nature of this committee, effective communication will be a key skill in
negotiations and policy sharing. True effective communication, however, goes beyond having a grip
on complex terminology, it’s about making sure your point lands clearly with everyone in the room,
no matter their background or experience. If you can explain your policy in a way that’s both accurate
and accessible, you’ll be far more persuasive than someone who hides behind complicated language.
We highly encourage all of you to critically assess the extent to which alliances both safeguard and
challenge global stability, as well as explore innovative approaches that reconcile the right to form
exclusive alliances with the collective security framework envisioned by the United Nations. We ask
you to consider multiple perspectives and to truly and thoughtfully evaluate your country's position
in the debate instead of assuming a policy based on surface-level information such as membership
status.
Lastly, if you have any questions about the content of the committee don’t be afraid to let us know,
we will answer questions as soon as possible. Thank you, and we look forward to seeing you all
excel at CarMUN 2025.
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The position paper is a document, standard in Model UN preparation, that allows delegates to
research the policy of their country (or character), while putting their writing skills in practice. It
should mention previous actions towards the committee date and propose solutions.
Delegates should send their position papers via the Committee’s email: disec@[Link]
When sending the document, delegates must indicate their name, school (or delegation), and the
country they’re representing. It should be attached as a PDF file. Furthermore, all documents must
be written in Times New Roman 11, single-spaced, and with standard margins.
The deadline for sending position papers is October 10th until 11:59 p.m. Punctuality will be part
of the evaluation.
Header: It should include the name of the committee, topic, delegate, and school. Next to this
information, there should be images of the coat of arms and flag of the country to be represented.
First paragraph: This paragraph should serve as an introduction to the topic, as well as your
country’s policy. Usually, this is the shortest paragraph on a position paper, so delegates need to
summarize their ideas. The beginning and end of the paragraph must provoke interest in the reader.
To do so, you can use a quote, question, or storytelling, among others.
Second paragraph: This paragraph comprehends your country’s relations to the topic and
committee, through past actions on the matter. It is a substantive paragraph, as delegates will
mention what they have discovered during their research such as legislations, and resolutions,
among others. The aforementioned does not mean that this paragraph should consist only of copy-
paste, on the contrary, the country’s opinion should always be present. Take into account this is the
largest paragraph of a position paper.
Third paragraph: This paragraph gives a purpose to the position paper, as it focuses on proposals.
Delegates will be able to create solutions to the committee’s topic, taking into consideration their
country’s policy. Also, there should be a strong closing sentence, since this is the last paragraph of
the document.
Sources: On a second sheet delegates must cite all resources used in the preparation of the
document, in APA 7 format. If a source is omitted, it will be considered plagiarism and will be
sanctioned by the chair. It is recommended to read official, primary sources, such as the websites
of international organizations, governments, or the United Nations itself.
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10. Bibliography
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