1

THE GOVERNANCE
OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
IN MYANMAR’S
STATES AND REGIONS
NOVEMBER, 2020
James Owen
Nilar Myaing
Nay Yan Oo
2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank everyone who took the time to share their experiences
and to contribute to this study, including respondents from government, civil society,
and businesses, and national and international experts. Special thanks are accorded
to the officials from Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State whose support was integral
to the success of the research.

The authors would also like to acknowledge those who reviewed the report for
providing invaluable feedback and advice, with special thanks to the Ayeyarwady
Minister of Planning and Finance U Htay Win and members of the Ayeyarwady Ti-Kaw
committee. Finally we would like to express our gratitude to Peter Yates and Richard
Batcheler of The Asia Foundation and Naung Win and Khine Win for their continued
support and guidance throughout the research and writing.
Any faults in substance or analysis rest with the authors.

AUTHORS
James Owen
Nilar Myaing
Nay Yan Oo

REVIEWERS
U Htay Win
Naung Win
Dan Jollans
Ye Khaung Oo
Adu-Gyamfi Abunyewa

GRAPHIC DESIGNER
Ye Htut Oo

EDITOR
Sandy Barron

Building 186, Room 602, 6th Floor, Nawarat Center No. 11, Ko Min Ko Chin Yeik Thar Street
Corner of Mahabandoola Road and 52nd Street West Ngar Htet Kyi Ward
Pazundaung Township Bahan Township
Yangon, Myanmar Yangon, Myanmar
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PREFACE
Public procurement is a critical pillar of effective and responsive government.
Governments spend huge sums of money procuring goods, services and
infrastructure. How this money is spent matters. Improving public procurement
helps to improve public services, the integrity of government, and the public’s
trust in government. Public procurement reform has become a tool for the
government to demonstrate to the Myanmar people that it is working to rid itself
of the harmful legacies of socialism, authoritarianism, and cronyism.

Myanmar is in the early stages of public procurement reform. The first pieces
of the legal and regulatory framework were only put in place in 2011, as part of
the President Thein Sein government’s steps to introduce more market-oriented
reforms and to upgrade Myanmar’s Public Financial Management (PFM)
system. This system continued to evolve and by 2020 Myanmar’s first Public
Procurement Bill had been drafted. This legislation, and the policy and guidance
that will follow it, could profoundly alter the governance of procurement policy
in Myanmar by placing procurement policy under the responsibility of the union
Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry (MoPFI).

To contribute to the policy discussions around how to operationalize the

new law, this joint policy brief with The Sandhi Governance Institute explores
the under-investigated role of state and region governments. Our analysis of
Kayin State and Ayeyarwady Region suggests that there is much to learn from
those who have been on the frontline of reform, driving implementation and
adapting policy to their context. A critical question for the MoPFI is how, in its
new policymaking role, it can operationalize the law in a way that makes the
most of this local knowledge and the determination of local actors that are
already working to improve Myanmar’s public procurement system. This will
include a mix of old and newly elected state and regions MPs and Ministers. Our
hope is to support these transitions by contributing towards a greater shared
understanding of the system that currently exists, and the changes that are
coming.

Mark McDowell
Country Representative
The Asia Foundation
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CONTENTS
GLOSSARY 5
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 6
1.1 What is public procurement and why does it matter? 6
1.2 Research scope and methodology 7
1.3 Paper outline 9

CHAPTER 2 – PUBLIC PROCUREMENT REFORMS: CHALLENGES, PRINCIPLES

AND MYANMAR’S EARLY EXPERIENCE 10
2.1 Typical challenges to public procurement in developing countries 10
2.2 Principles for public procurement reform – value for money 12
2.3 Principles for public procurement reform – integrity 13
2.4 A short history of public procurement reform in Myanmar 14

CHAPTER 3 – LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: FROM OPEN TENDERING

TOWARDS UNIFICATION AND CENTRALIZATION 16
3.1 The 2016 Guideline for Works with Contractor 18
3.2 The 2017 Regulations on Financial Management of Myanmar 19
3.3 Presidential Directive No. 1/2017 for Tender Procedures 19

CHAPTER 4 – PROCUREMENT IN PRACTICE: OBSERVATIONS

FROM AYEYARWADY REGION AND KAYIN STATE 24
4.1 Who is responsible for public procurement management and oversight? 25
4.2 What governs management and oversight of public procurement? 28
4.3 Management in practice 28
4.4 Oversight in practice 34

CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION 36
5.1 Findings 36
5.2 Recommendations 37

REFERENCES 39
ENDNOTES 41
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GLOSSARY
Bidder: the participant in a tendering process
Contractor: also known as supplier, is a person or business that undertakes a contract to provide
goods or services to agreed terms.
Capital Expenditure: government investments in assets that will last for more than a year, such as vehicles,
land, machinery, buildings, and roads.
Direct Contracting: also known as single source procurement, involves contracting without competition of a
particular manufacturer, supplier, or contractor.
Economy: minimizing the cost of resources for an activity (‘doing things at a low price’).
Effectiveness: the extent to which objectives are met (‘doing the right things’).
Efficiency: performing tasks with reasonable effort (‘doing things the right way’).
eProcurement: also known as electronic procurement or supplier exchange, is the purchase and sale
of supplies, equipment, works and services through a web interface or other networked
system.
Infrastructure: the basic physical structures and facilities (e.g. buildings, roads, power supplies) needed
for the operation of a society or organization.
Open Tendering: a bidding system that is not private. It is opened for all qualified bidders. Bids are then
chosen openly, based on price, quality or other predetermined criteria. It is a means to
encourage competition between suppliers.
Public Financial Management (PFM): the system by which financial resources are planned, directed, and controlled to enable
and influence the efficient and effective delivery of public service goals.
Public-Private Partnership: a contract (institutional relationship) between public and private actors for the co-
operative provision of a public good or service. The essential element is some degree of
private participation in the delivery of traditionally public-domain goods or services.
Public Procurement: the purchase of goods and services by governments and state-owned enterprises. It
encompasses a sequence of related activities, starting with the assessment of needs
through award to contract management and final payment.
Request For Proposals: a document that announces and provides details about a project, as well as solicits bids
from contractors who will help complete the project.
Request For Quotations: a process in which an entity solicits select suppliers and contractors to submit price
quotes and bids for the chance to fulfill certain tasks or projects. Typically used for small
value procurements of readily available off-the-shelf goods, small value construction
works, or small value services procurements.
Restricted Tendering: a procurement method that limits the request for tenders to a select number of suppliers,
contractors or service providers. This method of procurement is also called limited bidding
and selective tendering.
Secondary Legislation: the collection of rules, regulations and guidance that are subordinate to a law (primary
legislation). In Myanmar this would include by-laws, rules, regulations and procedures that
are subordinate to an originating law.
Tender: the process of bidding for contracts let by contracting authorities.
Tenderer: the bidder/participant in a tendering process.
Two-Stage Tendering: a procurement method where the procuring entity awards an initial contractor initial
work on a limited agreement. This allows for the gathering of more information on the
specifications for a second, typically more specialized, tender.
Value For Money: is about meeting needs, however these are defined, at the most reasonable cost. It is
typically explained using the ‘four Es’ of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and equity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1 WHAT IS PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
AND WHY DOES IT MATTER?
Public procurement is the process by which Of particular importance in Myanmar, given its
a government buys goods, services and recent history, is the connection between public
infrastructure, typically from the private sector. In procurement, transparency, and corruption.
the case of schools, public procurements can range How public funds are spent affects peoples’
from the books bought, or consultants brought in to attitudes toward the state, and towards their
help update the curriculum, to school construction elected officials.5 When the integrity of the public
and repairs. Thus, procurement is the process procurement system is compromised, through
through which government engages with the private corrupt or unfair practices, people may begin to
sector to find, manage, and pay suppliers. Public question the legitimacy of the state.6 This, in turn,
procurement represents a decision to focus the role can impact peoples’ willingness to pay their taxes,
of the state away from the direct provision of the which is a cornerstone of stable democracies.7 The
good or service and towards managing the private sums of money at stake and the complexity of the
sector. This can be because the private sector may processes involved in procurement provide ample
be able to deliver the good or service at better value opportunities and incentives for corruption. Thus,
for money due to differences in capacity, capability, safeguarding and procurement oversight, from
and efficiency. inside and outside the government, are crucial to
avoid contracts going to the “best briber” instead of
If public funds are spent more effectively, a to suppliers offering the best combination of price
nation’s people benefit more. For example, a better- and quality.8
governed procurement system could mean that
more schools or hospitals are built, helping improve When the extent of corruption involved in public
access to education and health. All levels of procurement gets out of hand, it can topple
government in Myanmar have prioritized improving governments. For example, when it was discovered
physical infrastructure, as reflected in recent that the Brazilian construction company, Odebrecht,
years by the large increases in government capital was paying bribes to procure government contracts,
expenditure – investment in assets with a lifespan 30 government investigations were launched
of more than one year, such as machinery and that discovered USD 3.5 billion in bribes. The
roads.1 Capital expenditure has nearly doubled since charges resulting from these bribes led to more
2011/12 to reach MMK 5,061 billion—approximately than 200 convictions, including that of the former
USD 3.8 billion and 6 percent of Myanmar’s Gross president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, in a scandal
Domestic Product (GDP)—and is forecast to grow to that led to his resignation and prosecution, as
close to MMK 11,000 billion by 2021/22.2 With such well as the prosecution of two other former
large expenditures the difference between procuring Brazilian presidents, and former presidents of Peru
these assets well and doing so poorly are immense. and Panama.9 In addition to the major political
consequences, the continued unwillingness to
In addition to improving infrastructure and service address corrupt practices resulted in decades of
delivery, governments typically use procurement poorer public investment decisions that robbed the
to pursue wider economic, social or environmental public of opportunities for economic development.
goals. These include supporting the development of
domestic industries and improving environmental
standards.3 Therefore, procurement must support
the delivery of a public organization’s strategic
objectives while meeting the expectations of
taxpayers.4
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BOX 1
The typical public procurement process10

Procurement
Planning
Contract
Requirement
Management
Definition

PROCUREMENT
CYCLE

Contract Tendering
Award or Sourcing
Evaluation
& Selection

PRE-TENDER
1. Preparation of annual budget and budget allocation to government agencies
2. Procurement planning to identify procurement needs and procurement approach
3. Defining procurement requirements and preparing tender documents

TENDER
4. Tendering or sourcing to invite potential suppliers to submit tender proposals
5. Evaluation of tender proposals and selection of winning tender
6. Contract award

POST-TENDER
7. Contract management to ensure supplier delivers goods or service to required quality and is
paid as per the terms of the contract

1.2 RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This policy brief focuses on the governance of common practice and perspectives, and to explore
public procurement. It seeks to understand the what policy adaptations have taken place since
different rules, regulations, capabilities, knowledge, 2011. It focuses on public procurement related to
incentives, and actors that influence public infrastructure spending, given that this has been a
procurement practice in Myanmar. It focuses on the policy priority of successive governments at both
role that Myanmar’s states and region governments the union and state and region level.
play in the management and oversight of the public
procurement system. Myanmar’s fourteen state Outside of the scope of this paper are procurements
and region governments were only formed in 2011 that take place through Public Private Partnerships
and yet play an important role in public finance (PPPs). PPPs are excluded from the main legal and
policy, implementation, and oversight. This paper regulatory framework governing public procurement
seeks to more clearly understand the current legal tendered in states and regions. Such projects are
and policy framework and what influence this has typically too large (approximately above USD 5
on procurement management and oversight by million) and too complex to be managed directly by
state and region governments. It looks to identify states and regions.11 While these are not within the
8

scope of this research, it should be noted that PPPs This paper is based on desk-based research,
constitute major infrastructure spending that takes interviews with development actors working on
place within states and regions and so in reality procurement, and two rounds of field research
are subject to some state and region government that took place between the end of 2018 and
oversight. early 2020. The desk-based research included a
review of the legal and regulatory framework for
A wider objective of the paper is to try to gain public procurement in Myanmar. There is limited
insights into practice on the ground, with the published research available on public procurement
intention that this may inform future policymaking in Myanmar, due to the twin facts that Myanmar
around the Public Procurement Bill and further only recently opened up to the world, and that the
secondary legislation and policy. The paper is not an procurement legal and regulatory framework is very
audit of procurement practice. It is not a systematic recent.
assessment of public procurement systems in the
style of the globally recognized Methodology for From January to February in 2020 the Sandhi
Assessing Procurement Systems (MAPS), nor is it Governance Institute and The Asia Foundation
a systematic audit of procuring entities’ adherence traveled to Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State
to Myanmar’s regulatory framework. The findings to conduct Key Informant Interviews and Focus
of the paper, drawn from only one state and one Group Discussions with government actors, and
region, suggest practice is sufficiently varied across state and region Hluttaw MPs. This included
different departments and locations as to deserve interviews with ministers and officials representing
more careful study. departments responsible for planning, budgeting,
rural roads, electricity, social affairs (education and
health), and Development Affairs (municipal). It
also included members of Township Planning and
Implementation Committees, Construction Work
BOX 2 Inspection Committees, state and region MPs,
Myanmar’s state and region and a chair of a State/Region Public Accounts
governments Committee. Key Informant Interviews were also
conducted with businesses, including suppliers and
The 2008 Constitution introduced 14 those performing roles as third-party quality control
state and region governments across the companies. One state and one region were selected
country, led by centrally-appointed chief to enable a contrast of experiences. Ayeyarwady
ministers and a cabinet of ministers. Region was selected on the grounds that earlier
Ministers are mandated to “manage, research found that additional guidance was being
guide, supervise and inspect” departments prepared by the regional government to support
covering areas for which they have procurement processes.
responsibility, as set out in Schedule 2.12
This brief builds off earlier research conducted by
Most departments in a state or region the Sandhi Governance Institute, with the support of
have two separate budget allocations: The Asia Foundation, on the procurement practices
a union budget and their state or region of subnational government actors in six townships
budget. State and region budgets account in Bago Region, Ayeryarwady Region and Mon
for 11.8 percent of total government State in late 2018 and early 2019. Interviews and
spending13 and 24 percent of capital focus groups were complemented by a series of
expenditure (2018/19 Budget Estimate).14 workshops in July and August 2020 that presented
initial findings to government officials, ministers,
State and region Hluttaws, and Hluttaw MPs and businesses, for whose feedback we are
committees such as the Public Accounts grateful.
Committee, support the drafting of
legislation and in many places play an
active role in monitoring government
activities and supporting their
constituents to interact with government
processes.15 While much policymaking is
driven by the union government, state and
region governments play an important role
in implementation.16
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BOX 3
What role do state and region governments play in infrastructure public procurements?

Responsibility for infrastructure procurement varies according to the location of the

infrastructure project, the size and complexity of the project, and the budget from which it is
drawn. Infrastructure projects are typically tendered within the state or region in which the
project is physically located. In some instances, however, such as a highway project covering
more than one state or region, this is not the case. State and region governments are responsible
for managing public procurement from both the union capital budget and state or region capital
budgets, though the extent of their role varies:

l For tenders called in states and regions but drawn from the union budget, state and region
ministers help manage all competitive tenders through their positions as chairs on tender
committees. Respective state and region departments also manage the procurement process
when they are the procuring department.
l For tenders called in states and regions and drawn from the state or region budget,
management is almost entirely a state or region government affair. As with the union
budget, state and region ministers act as chairs of the Tender Committee and state and
region departments directly manage procurement as the procuring department. In addition,
other “relevant” state and region department officials (typically engineers) support the
management process.

MPs of states and regions play an active oversight role assessing project needs and
specifications, inspecting projects upon completion, and acting as a further check and balance
on procuring entities and committees. Local residents typically feel more confident approaching
their MPs with information and complaints, and use them as a communication channel to
procuring entities and tender committees. Public Accounts Committees (PACs) play a role in
tracking poor performance by contractors. Chapter 5 provides a more detailed assessment of the
roles that different state and region actors play in infrastructure procurement.

1.3 PAPER OUTLINE

While the effectiveness and integrity of public states and regions that influence state and region
procurement systems are widely recognized government infrastructure procurement practice.
as important, the path towards these ends is a It catalogs some of the ways in which state
difficult one. Chapter 2 identifies some of the and region actors have interpreted and adapted
typical challenges developing countries have faced, procurement policy to their specific context and to
introduces principles used to guide reform efforts, learning from implementation. Chapter 5 identifies
and summarizes Myanmar’s reform experience to 11 findings drawn from an analysis of the legal
date. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the legal and regulatory framework and observations of
and regulatory framework that guides procurement procurement in practice. Chapter 6 presents a
policy and practice in Myanmar. It takes a deeper series of recommendations for the MoPFI and state
dive into Directive 1/2017 and presents a simplified and region governments as they move forward into
process map of the tender procedures. Chapter operationalizing the upcoming Public Procurement
4 presents observations from the field research, Bill.
identifying and categorizing the main actors within
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CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC PROCUREMENT
REFORMS: CHALLENGES,
PRINCIPLES AND MYANMAR’S
EARLY EXPERIENCE

While it may be important, procurement reform is notoriously difficult. This chapter summarizes some of
the typical challenges faced by developing countries in the South East Asia region, as providing the most
relevant point of reference for Myanmar policymakers. It then introduces a set of principles that can act
as a guide for those working to support procurement reform, whether in the union or state and region
governments. The chapter ends with a brief overview of Myanmar’s reform journey, which is very nascent
compared to many regional neighbors. While there is much ground to travel, Myanmar’s policymakers
have a unique opportunity to help shape a system of public procurement that is based on the lessons that
have been learned from regional experiences. The initial signs are good, and Chapter 6 provides further
recommendations on how this success can be taken further.

2.1 TYPICAL CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC

PROCUREMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
While many countries in South East Asia have responsibilities of the different actors in the
undertaken impressive economic transformations, procurement system have been vaguely defined
their procurement systems have often struggled or are in conflict. This has led to confusion and
to keep up. Where reforms have been tried, these weaknesses in accountability. A stark example
have typically not had their desired impacts – with was the Philippines, where up until 2003 there
particular difficulties in translating reforms to the were more than 60 laws, presidential decrees
legal and regulatory frameworks into changes in and administrative orders that governed the
actual practice.17 Implementation has typically procurement process. In addition, in South
fallen short of intentions. This has undermined East Asia there has been “an absence of central
poverty reduction efforts, strained the integrity of procurement authorities to oversee procurement
public procurement systems, and stymied reform policy and practices, to review procurement rules, draft
momentum.18 These challenges fall under the bidding documents, advertise intended procurements,
following categories.19 and monitor compliance to the rules.” 20

The legal and regulatory framework: Procurement Institutional and human resource capacity: A
laws and implementing regulations and procedures major impediment to effective procurement
have typically been fragmented and inconsistent. implementation has been inadequate attention
Procedures have been unclear and roles and and resourcing to the capacities and motivation
 11

of procurement officials and those who monitor eliminate, form of corruption is collusion among
the procurement system. The technicalities of potential bidders to reduce competition by working
procurement require systematic training of staff together to strategically bid (e.g. suppliers engage
and other efforts to promote continued upgrading of in rotation bidding where they take turns to be the
skills and capabilities. This can start with promoting sole bidder on a contract).
a general awareness of the rationale behind
public procurement and the existing system and Transparency: New procurement laws and
procedures. implementing rules have typically introduced
measures to promote transparency. However,
Competition and access: Major barriers exist to the there has been considerable variation in the
creation of level playing fields for local businesses. scope and details of conflict of interest disclosure
When bidder eligibility conditions are too stringent requirements and the degree to which transparency
this can undermine competition, to the benefit of requirements are put into practice.
larger, more established businesses, and to the
detriment of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Decentralization: Decentralization brings the
and new start-ups. In areas such as eGovernment, promise of “substantial efficiency gains because
this can result in less innovative service solutions. decisions will be taken at a level of government that
Opinions differ on the extent to which developing has better information and is more accountable to the
countries’ procurement systems should treat local public”.21 Yet if procurement reforms are not
foreign businesses on the same terms as local undertaken alongside this effort there is the risk
ones. While favoring local businesses may in some that decentralization encourages local corruption
cases result in procurements of higher cost or and mismanagement. Lower levels of government
lower quality, this can also form part of an industrial also need investments in the procurement
strategy to support the improvement in the cost- capacities of their staff and efforts should be made
efficiency and capacity of local businesses over to protect against corruption of the procurement
time, through a gradual learning-by-doing process. process by local officials and businesses.

Corruption: Widespread abuses of power to make Over-emphasis on compliance to rules: Many public
illicit personal gains have been enabled by poor procurement reforms are focused on the legal and
enforcement. Fear of the influence and power of regulatory framework, with inadequate attention to
those involved, and the secretive nature of many the broader concept of Value for Money. Systems
of the deals, and weak legal systems, have made it are designed to reduce discretion and encourage
hard to sanction those responsible. This has been enforcement of rules, but this rigidity comes with
most notable in those countries where attitudes trade-offs. Rules can’t account for all eventualities
towards corruption among government and and they act to reduce autonomy, which can be
business are relaxed. Corruption usually takes the demotivating.22, 23 A focus on rule enforcement,
following forms: misappropriation of funds from without wider efforts to build the capacities and
stealing part of the goods or service, bribery (money, motivations of procurement officials, can give the
gifts or favors) for award of a contract, nepotism illusion of an effective system. Many countries
and cronyism resulting in preferential treatment to a have struggled to get the balance right between
bidder, and supplier and contractor fraud (disclosing transparency and compliance on one side, and
false information). A much harder to observe, and agency and managerial effectiveness on the other.24
12

2.2 PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

REFORM – VALUE FOR MONEY
While procurement policy can have multiple incentives to manage the eventual contract, or must
objectives, a principal goal is to achieve value for do so in the context where contract violations are
money in how public funds are spent.25 Value for rarely taken to court. This has been a challenge for
Money is about getting the most value for every some municipal Development Affairs Organizations
kyat invested. This is sometimes mistakenly (DAOs) which have struggled to manage the private
understood as procuring goods or services at the companies they have contracted to provide solid
lowest costs or according to the rules – but Value waste management, with poorer and harder-to-reach
for Money is a much richer concept (see Box 4). households left underserviced.27

Governments attempt to achieve Value for Money The timeliness of public procurement also matters,
throughout the procurement cycle. Central to this for both the needs of end users and for budget
is understanding what the end-user of a product, management. Myanmar’s government annual
service or infrastructure really needs, and finding capital expenditure is consistently lower than
and managing the right people to meet those needs, what was planned, and close to half of capital
at a suitable cost. expenditure takes place in the last quarter. In
the first half of 2019/20 capital expenditure was
Weaknesses at any one stage in the procurement 46 percent of what was planned, representing
process can result in worse procurement outcomes “unrealistic targets as agencies are preparing for
and undermine the overall Value for Money of the procurement”.28
procurement, even if all the rules and procedures
are being followed. For instance, if an unrealistic Ultimately, the concept of Value for Money
budget is assigned for a construction project, it helps prompt us to think beyond the immediate
should come as no surprise that few businesses procurement process and the annual budget cycle
put forward bids, or that those businesses that win when making procurement decisions. Costs should
then lower quality and cut costs to make the project be considered over the whole life of the product,
financially viable for them. service or infrastructure, and not just those incurred
in the first year of procurement. Cheaply built roads
A competitive tendering process can be undermined are not a great deal if they wash away each rainy
if procuring entities don’t have the right skills or season and require regular expensive maintenance.

BOX 4
Value For Money – the ‘three Es’

Value for Money is about meeting needs, however these are defined, at the most reasonable
cost. It is typically explained using the ‘three Es’. 26

l Economy: minimizing the cost of resources for an activity (‘doing things at a low price’)
l Efficiency: performing tasks with reasonable effort (‘doing things the right way’)
l Effectiveness: the extent to which objectives are met (‘doing the right things’)

Competition is one way to improve the economy of procurement as potential suppliers attempt
to outdo each other in terms of the cost and quality of goods or services. Efficiency relates to
the costs (in time and resources) involved in managing procurement processes. Effectiveness
reinforces that what is being procured also matters. Even success in two out of three E’s isn’t
a guarantee of Value for Money. For instance, a bridge built at low cost and quickly, but in a
location that serves few people, is not an effective use of scarce public resources.
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2.3 PRINCIPLES FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

REFORM – INTEGRITY
Many countries recognize that the integrity of to policymakers and practitioners in each country to
public officials matters a great deal. Corruption, consider how to apply them to their own context.
collusion or favoritism can undermine trust in
government and across society. The Organization The Principles are anchored in four pillars:
for Economic Cooperation and Development transparency, good management, prevention of
(OECD), a global think tank, has developed a set of misconduct, accountability and control. The overall
principles that reflect a global view of the policies aim is to enhance integrity efforts so that they are
and practices that have helped improve integrity in fully part of an efficient and effective management
procurement. As these are principles, and not rules of public resources.
or regulations, they are broad guides that give space

BOX 5
OECD Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement

Transparency
Principle 1. Provide an adequate degree of transparency in the entire procurement cycle in order
to promote fair and equitable treatment for potential suppliers.
Principle 2. Maximize transparency in competitive tendering and take precautionary measures to
enhance integrity, in particular for exceptions to competitive tendering.

Good management
Principle 3. Ensure that public funds are used in public procurement according to the purposes
intended.
Principle 4. Ensure that procurement officials meet high professional standards of knowledge,
skills, and integrity.

Prevention of misconduct, compliance and monitoring

Principle 5. Put mechanisms in place to prevent risks to integrity in public procurement.
Principle 6. Encourage close cooperation between government and the private sector to maintain
high standards of integrity, particularly in contract management .
Principle 7. Provide specific mechanisms to monitor public procurement as well as to detect
misconduct, and apply sanctions accordingly.

Accountability and control

Principle 8. Establish a clear chain of responsibility together with effective control mechanisms.
Principle 9. Handle complaints from potential suppliers in a fair and timely manner.
Principle 10. Empower civil society organizations (CSOs), media, and the wider public to
scrutinize public procurement.
14

2.4 A SHORT HISTORY OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

REFORM IN MYANMAR
Myanmar is in the very early stages of a transition making capabilities that has left many officials
to a modern public procurement system, with reluctant to develop the necessary guidance to fill
considerable scope to improve Value for Money and these voids. In the case of procurement governance
integrity. The transition from a socialist command these issues have been exacerbated by the absence
and control economy has been a decades-long of a single entity assigned responsibility for
process, and it was not until 2011 that Myanmar developing procurement policy and providing overall
introduced a procurement system that involved oversight.
participation of the private sector through open
competition. However, since 2016 the National League for
Democracy (NLD)-led government has overseen
In the preceding years, public procurement either a concerted effort to create a single unifying
occurred through Myanmar’s State Economic legal and regulatory framework governing public
Enterprises or well-connected businesses. The procurement and to put overall responsibility for
processes undertaken, and the terms within procurement monitoring, evaluation and policy
contracts, were opaque and kept beyond external under one organization. During 2020 a national
scrutiny. A system of patronage fed a business elite ‘Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Bill’ (hereby
and facilitated the development of a culture within referred to as ‘The Procurement Bill’) was submitted
government that blurred the boundaries between to the Amyotha Hluttaw following consultation
public and private interests.29 The government across union government departments, business
had limited exposure to international practices of associations and development partners including
procurement or wider PFM. A legal and regulatory the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the
framework such as a PFM law, a procurement law, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (UK),
and contemporary financial and administrative and the United States Agency for International
regulations, simply did not exist.30 Development.

In 2011 President Thein Sein broke from tradition The Procurement Bill marks a second step-change
and introduced the first regulatory frameworks for in the governance of public procurement with a
public procurement. In a move to introduce greater deliberate effort to institute a more centralized and
competition into procurement processes, as part coordinated procurement governance framework.
of wider reforms to Myanmar’s PFM system, the This development of the bill has been overseen by
then president introduced two instructions in 2011 the Ministry of Planning of Finance and Industry
that marked a step-change in the governance of (MoPFI) which will take on overall responsibility for
public procurement. The directives requested procurement oversight and policy. MoPFI is already
government departments to change from closed to in the process of drafting the secondary legislation
open tenders for public procurement, to increase and policies that will be needed to operationalize
transparency, and to decentralize procurement the legal framework. These efforts are being
implementation to individual line ministries. The supported by Development Partners, such as the
two directives established open tender as a new World Bank, with measures being taken to establish
norm and a tool to promote competition and, the systems and capabilities to operationalize the
transparency and to reduce corruption.31 These law.
instructions were followed by a series of directives
and guidelines that constitute the foundational The reforms to public procurement currently
elements of a legal and regulatory framework for underway demonstrate an appreciation of the
public procurement. Collectively, the instructions challenges that other countries have faced and
and directives have provided some uniformity in the are aimed at both improving value for money and
guidance to Myanmar’s union and state and region the integrity of public procurement. However,
governments, though substantial gaps remain. considerable challenges remain – principal
among these will be operationalizing the law and
One legacy of decades of military rule has supporting government agencies across the country
been the practice of “governing by directives and through implementation. Historically the MoPFI
commands, rather than by public administrative law has played a limited policy or oversight role, is
and institutional practices.” 32 This has resulted in relatively unfamiliar with existing practice in states
inadequately detailed guidance, a lack of clarity on and regions, and may find it challenging to develop
responsibilities, and an under-investment in policy- guidance and policies relevant to all participants
 15

in public procurement. Fortunately, this research

has identified a range of actors, inside and outside
government, that have a desire to see the public
procurement system improve and are looking for
support to do so. A critical question for the MoPFI is
whether it acts to channel the energies and distinct
capabilities of other actors towards their shared
goal of improved public procurement, or to displace
them through its own more direct actions.

A CRITICAL QUESTION FOR

THE MOPFI IS WHETHER
IT ACTS TO CHANNEL THE
ENERGIES AND DISTINCT
CAPABILITIES OF OTHER
ACTORS TOWARDS THEIR
SHARED GOAL OF IMPROVED
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT, OR TO
DISPLACE THEM THROUGH ITS
OWN MORE DIRECT ACTIONS.
16

CHAPTER 3

LEGAL AND REGULATORY

FRAMEWORK: FROM OPEN
TENDERING TOWARDS
UNIFICATION AND
CENTRALIZATION

Reform of the public procurement system forms The major legal and regulatory framework governing
part of the Myanmar government’s ambitious PFM procurement of Myanmar’s states and region
reform agenda, where it is seen as a tool to promote governments is Presidential Directive 1/2017. All
competition and transparency, and protect the government officials interviewed as part of this
integrity of public funds. Since the first foundational research referenced ‘Presidential Directive 1/2017
elements of a legal and regulatory framework for Tender Procedures’ (hereby referred to as
were introduced in 2011, the governance of public ‘Directive 1/2017’) as the central guidance to follow.
procurement in Myanmar has evolved at a rapid It provides detailed information on the process
pace. This chapter introduces the main components and procedures of public procurement. All works
of the legal and regulatory framework and focuses related to construction, purchase, and procurement
on the three core elements of importance to of services have to be conducted in compliance
infrastructure procurement in states and regions. with Directive1/2017. For construction projects,
the MoC’s 2016 Guideline for Execution of Works
Following on from two instructions in 2011 the by Contractor (hereby referred to as the ‘MoC 2016
Thein Sein Government issued the Presidential Guideline’) is another critical form of guidance.
Directive 1/2013 – Tender Guidelines for The 2017 Regulations on Financial Management
Investments and Business – which provided general mandate that all government departments and
guidance for public procurement of construction organizations have to use the Directive 1/2017 to
projects and goods. While the Directive was a major procure construction works, goods, and services.
step forward, officials still lacked guidance on The major exception to these are PPPs which are
procurement planning, thresholds for tendering, the covered under The Myanmar Project Bank.33
tender procedure for consultancy services, and a
complaint handling system. The 2013 Directive was While the 2013 and 2017 President Office Directives
then followed by the Ministry of Construction (MoC) put in place the first elements of a regulatory
Guideline for procurement in construction projects, framework to guide public procurement, they did
issued first in 2014 and updated in 2016. These not specify which government entity should play an
were soon followed by the 2017 Regulations on overall oversight or enforcement role. Monitoring
Financial Management of Myanmar, the presidential adherence to the regulatory requirements was
Directive 1/2017, and the 2018 Myanmar Project left to the discretion of line ministries and
Bank Notification which included guidance on elected officials. No central body was assigned
procurements related to PPPs. By late 2020, the first responsibility for building the capacity of staff
public procurement law, the Public Procurement within procuring agencies to carry out their
and Asset Disposal Bill, had been submitted to the procurement roles.34
Amyotha Hluttaw.
 17

To address these gaps the cross-government Public

Procurement Rules & Regulations Supervision
Committee (PPRRSC) was developed to establish
a unified procurement legislative framework. The
PPRRSC was formed in April 2015 with the then
Ministry of Planning and Finance Deputy Minister THE UPCOMING PUBLIC
acting as chair, and with the bulk of members
being Director Generals from different departments PROCUREMENT AND ASSET
across three ministries. The Committee developed
a draft Procurement Law, which by late 2020 had DISPOSAL BILL THEREFORE
been submitted to the Union Parliament, and draft
secondary legislation to support operationalization MARKS ANOTHER STEP
of the law.
CHANGE IN MYANMAR’S
The upcoming Public Procurement and Asset
Disposal Bill therefore marks another step-change LEGAL AND REGULATORY
in Myanmar’s legal and regulatory framework for
public procurement. It would specify the MoPFI as FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC
responsible for oversight, enforcement, and further
policy development. This includes the drafting of PROCUREMENT.
secondary legislation and additional guidance and
templates, such as standard bidding documents. It
will be tasked with providing procurement capacity
building training for implementing agencies and will
assume overall responsibility for adherence to the
laws and regulations.

FIGURE 1
Timeline

Presidential Directive
Letter No. 69(1)/6/
1/2017 – For Tender
President Office
Procedures

President Office MoC 2014 Guideline for The 2017 Regulations on

Public Procurement and
Notification Execution of Works by Financial Management
Asset Disposal Bill
No. 87/2011 Contractor of Myanmar

Est.
2011 2013 2014 2016 2017 2018 2021

Presidential Directive
1/2013 – Tender MoC 2016 Guideline for The Myanmar Project
Guidelines for Execution of Works by Bank Notification
Investments and Contractor
Business

4th Amendment to the

Anti-Corruption Law
18

3.1 THE 2016 GUIDELINE FOR EXECUTION OF

WORKS BY CONTRACTOR
The MoC’s Guideline, first introduced in 2014 and the MoC and contractors to align themselves with
updated in 2016, applies to all union government three existing codes, and to use the ministry’s own
and state and region government departments’ estimates of the costs of supplies when developing
construction projects. It was developed following proposals.
consultations with representatives from different
union ministries and updated in September 2016 For construction projects with a value of less than
to include suggestions from the World Bank and MMK 10 million, no tender is required. Such projects
other stakeholders. The stated objectives are to require the establishment of an internal department
enable accurate expenses, ensure good quality board which must award the project to a “company
construction, prevent corruption, implement a it can trust”. To promote open competition and
systemic tendering process, promote transparency, transparency the Guideline contains similar
improve inspection and supervision, and ban those measures to Directive 1/2017. When tenders are
suppliers and companies that provide poor quality opened, they have to be announced publicly. For a
goods and services. value of from MMK 10 million to MMK 100 million
the tender announcement has to be published
Under the guideline the MoC is responsible for the two weeks before the tender opening date on the
execution and supervision of construction and notice board of the relevant departments and the
maintenance projects. The MoC 2016 Guideline district and township administration office. For
instructs that contractors should be used for most projects over MMK 100 million the tender has to
MoC construction and maintenance work, and be announced in newspapers one month before
only projects that require specialized skills should the tender opening date, on relevant department’s
be carried out by the MoC. Joint MoC–contractor notice boards and, if possible, on the ministry’s
projects are also possible. The Guideline instructs website.

FIGURE 2
Open Tender Cost Thresholds

WHAT VALUE IS THE TENDER?

<MMK 10 m MMK 10-100 m > MMK 100 m

QUOTATION OPEN TENDER OPEN TENDER

Publicly announce
Publicly announce
Publicly announce tender in state owned
No need for open tender on ministry’s
tender on noticeboard newspapers at least
tender website for at least
two weeks before two times one month
one month before
before

Choose lowest price Follow remaining tender opening, selection and contract
supplier management procedures
 19

In order to evaluate the tenders, a board has to Guideline also provides detailed information on
be formed which should be composed of at least tender procedures, payment methods, contract
three people from relevant departments, district management, penalties for not meeting deadlines,
administration office, township administration and supervision.
office and outside organizations. The MoC 2016

3.2 THE 2017 REGULATIONS ON FINANCIAL

MANAGEMENT OF MYANMAR
In April 2017 the Ministry of Planning and Finance35 procurement plans for the relevant fiscal year,
issued the Regulations on Financial Management and these must be approved by the controlling
for union-level organizations, ministries and officer. A procurement plan must include detailed
departments, state-owned economic enterprises, information on what goods and services will
the Nay Pyi Taw Council, and state and region be procured and over what timeline for each
departments and organizations. These set out procurement activity. It states that government
the overarching regulatory framework for PFM, departments and organizations shall not act to
with public procurement identified within this. discourage competition, disqualify an entity from
These regulations set out to improve expenditure the competition, discriminate, or favor one supplier
management, promote transparency and over another. The guideline explicitly mentions
accountability, and provide specific procedures that procuring entities shall ensure transparency
for budget preparation, implementation, reporting in the procurement process, and proposes several
and supervision, and management of public funds. measures to this end, including advertising tenders
Public procurement guidelines are described in in newspapers and news media. Government
Chapter 2. officials are instructed to act in compliance
with Directive 1/2017 and are instructed that
According to the regulations all government construction projects shall be carried as per the
departments and organizations shall prepare MoC 2016 Guideline.

3.3 PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NO. 1/2017 FOR

TENDER PROCEDURES

Presidential Directive No. 1/2013 – Tender procurement can be conducted according to parent
Guidelines for Investments and Business, was ministries’ procurement procedures. In addition,
replaced by the NLD government with Presidential if state-owned enterprises provide goods and
Directive No. 1/2017, known as “Tender Procedure services that match required criteria then ministries
for Procurement of Civil Works, Goods, Services, can procure them directly, through a negotiated
Rental and Sale of Public Properties for the contract. For procuring goods or services (including
Government Departments and Organizations”. consultancy services) as part of a loan or grant,
Directive 1/2017 guides tender processes for the it is possible to use the international or partner
procurement of construction, goods and services organization’s own rules and regulations.
undertaken by union, state and region government
departments and organizations. It references The Directive 1/2017 has the stated goals of preventing
MoC 2016 Guideline and acts as the principal the waste of public funds, reducing opportunities
regulatory framework governing public procurement for corruption, creating fair competition, improving
in Myanmar. transparency, and increasing accountability so
as to ensure greater value for money in public
The major exceptions to the Directive include PPPs procurement. It provides detailed information
and procurement related to state defense, state on tender procedures and sets out the roles and
security, and electronic security matters, where functions of different actors. It also includes
20

measures that cover the rental and sale of state- purchases of over MMK 10 m, following the same
owned property (such as government buildings), requirements as The MoC 2016 Guideline (see
which are not the focus of this report. Figure 2).

The Directive sets out the conditions under which The Directive mandates that the procuring entity
open tendering should take place and specifies must form a cross-organization Tender Committee
the nine main steps for such tender processes. and subcommittees to manage any tender process.
It describes the composition and roles of key These cover tenders for union-level departments/
committees and the responsibilities of procuring organizations, tenders called in states and regions
departments, tender bidders, and tender winner. and paid for from the union budget, and tenders
called in states and regions and paid for by the
Within Directive 1/2017 public procurement is state and region budget. The Directive is unclear as
classified into two categories: (a) construction, to whether a Tender Committee must be called for
purchase, and procurement of services and (b) a single procurement (e.g. the construction of one
leasing or selling of state property. This report rural road project), or for all procurements related to
looks at procurement exclusively (i.e. construction a specific type of procurement (e.g. the construction
and procurement of goods and services), as the of all rural road projects in a township or state or
leasing or selling of state property is not technically region). The Directive does not specify any role
procurement. Public tenders are required for for the President’s Office, the (then) Ministry of
Planning and Finance, or state and region MPs.

TABLE 1
Tender Committees and their responsibilities, according to Directive 1/2017

COMMITTEE RESPONSIBILITIES COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Tender Committee Varies according to whether the tender is called

for union level departments / organizations
Overall management of the tender process, or is called in a state or region. When called
ensuring tender procedures are followed, in a state or region the membership varies
as set out in the Directive. This involves the according to whether the procurement is from
creation of sub-committees, the preparation of the union or state and region budget. See
documents, decision-making and announcing Figure 4.
the tender winner.

Committee for Calculating the Floor Price At least three and not more than five
representatives from relevant departments who
Calculate the floor price of the lease and sale are “well-versed in the market of the lease and
of the state-owned property and report it to the sale of the state-owned property.”
tender committee. To note: this is not technically
for procurement.

Tender Acceptance and Evaluation Committee Three to five representatives from relevant
ministries who are well-versed in the
Accept and open tender proposals, evaluate construction, purchase, and procurement of
proposals, and prepare an evaluation report for services, in addition to representatives from
the Tender Committee. the procuring department or organization.

Quality Inspection and Acceptance Committee At least three representatives from procuring
department or organization.
Assess the quality of goods or services as to
whether their quality and standards meet the
descriptions specified in the contract. Accept
or reject the goods or services on behalf of the
procuring department.36
 21

FIGURE 3
Tender Committee membership, according to Directive 1/2017

Tenders called in S/R and Tenders called in S/R and

Union-level departments/
paid for from the union paid for from the state and
organizations
budget region budget

Tender Committee’s Chair

Deputy Ministers/
S/R Minister S/R Minister
Permanent Secretary

Tender Committee’s Members

Head of the procuring Head of the procuring Representatives of the

departments/organizations departments/organizations procuring departments/
in S/R organizations in S/R

Representatives of the Representatives of the

relevant union department/ relevant state or region
organizations departments/organizations

The cornerstone of Directive 1/2017 are nine then publicly announced in front of other tender
procedures over three stages. These are bidders.
summarized in the following process map (Figure
4). Each procedure contains multiple steps, l Complaint mechanism: The Tender Committee
split between the procuring department, tender has to investigate if a bidder complains about a
committees, and suppliers. grievance stemming from the tender selection
process and is able to present “concrete”
The tender procedures include a number of evidence to support the complaint. If he/she
provisions designed to promote transparency, is not satisfied with the decision of the Tender
provide a complaint mechanism, and reduce Committee, it can escalate the complaint to
conflicts of interest and opportunities for bribery the MoPFI. The ministry then has to establish
and corruption. The measures introduced are a complaint resolution team comprising at
summarized below: least three representatives from ministries. The
complaint resolution team is expected to record
l Transparency: Upcoming tenders must be and screen the complaint, hold a discussion
publicly announced on government notice with the bidders who complained, and make a
boards and websites with the method and judgement on the validity of the complaint. The
timeframe varying according to the size of the decision of the complaint resolution team is
tender. On the tender opening day, the tender final and binding. Disputes arising from contract
has to be opened in front of the tender bidders implementation shall be decided through the
in compliance with the procedure, place, and legal system.
time stated in the tender documents. When
opening the tender, names of the tender bidders, l Conflicts of interest: The directive mandates
bidding price, tender period, and the amount that government departments and organizations
and time period of the tender guarantee have must notify the union government if a bid-
to be publicly announced. The tender winner is winning company has a family, social, business
FIGURE 4
22

Procurement process, according to Directive 1/2017

PRE-TENDER TENDER POST TENDER

STEP 1 STEP 2 STEP 3 STEP 4 STEP 5 STEP 6 STEP 7 STEP 8 STEP 9

Prepare the Prepare
Announce Manage
Develop tender Publicly an evaluation Amend and
Check Proposal the tender the contract,
procurement documents announce report, finalize
budget screening winner including
plan including the tender including the contract
publicly payment
contract preferred bidder

ACTOR
Develop Prepare Publicly Head Store
PROCURING Check Evaluate of department Finalize Contract Payment to documentation
DEPARTMENTS budget procurement tender announce approves contract management suppliers of procurement
tenders
plan documents the tender selection process

Chief minister, Specify and Review Publicly

TENDER Check approve announce Sign
minister or evaluation the contract
COMMITTEE budget tender the tender
head of documents report winner
department
approves
procurement
plan Submit Return tender
TENDER evaluation
ACCEPTANCE bid security
AND EVALUATION report citing deposit back to
COMMITTEE preferred tender
contractor applicants

Test and Accept/reject

QUALITY inspect the goods/services
INSPECTION AND Publicly Evaluate on behalf of
ACCEPTANCE open tender tenders quality of
goods/services the purchasing
COMMITTEE department

Submit Issuing invoice

Develop Winner signs
SUPPLIERS proposal in for the goods
proposal the contract or services
sealed envelope

Winner makes
Deposit tender a performance Deliver goods
bid security and services
deposit at a guarantee
recognized bank deposit at to required
a recognized specification
bank
 23

or project-related relationship with respective the tender, disciplinary or administrative actions

union ministers, chief ministers, and members of against the employees from the procuring
the government. departments and organizations per the existing
rules and regulations, and banning the bidders,
l Bribery or corruption: The directive sets out suppliers, or purchasers from other tenders.
actions that can be taken if there are instances The process by which bribery or corruption is
or suspicions of bribery or corruption. These investigated and decided upon is unclear.37
can include the cancellation of the contract and

BOX 6
Incoming Procurement Legislation – The Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Bill38

The Myanmar Government is in the midst of updating its regulatory framework for procurement through the
Public Procurement Bill. The PPRRSC has submitted a Public Procurement Bill for parliamentary approval that,
when enacted, will replace the current Presidential Directive No. 1/2017 and the MoC 2016 Guideline.

At the time of writing this report, it was expected that the Bill would be approved by the new Parliament after
the 2020 election. The ministry has revised the Bill 18 times as part of an extensive internal union government
consultation process. This includes inputs from the now abolished Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Commission for the
Assessment of Legal Affairs and Special Issues, the Public Procurement Rules and Regulations Supervision
Committee, the Union Auditor General Office, the Union Attorney General Office, the National Economic
Coordination Committee, and many others.

The Bill could substantially alter the governance of procurement in Myanmar through the creation of a single
unifying legal framework that will set the overall objectives of future legislation and policy, assign roles to
specific actors, and centralize procurement policymaking and oversight. Below, we summarize the main
expected changes when compared to Directive 1/2017. The Bill:

l calls for the promotion of local industry by encouraging procuring entities to favor local suppliers and to
conduct restricted tendering to promote local small and medium-sized enterprises;
l has been designed to be complemented by subsequent secondary legislation (by-laws, rules, regulations
and procedures) that will provide more detailed instructions. These articles have been separated from
the law to allow for more regular updating in response to changes in the context and learning from policy
implementation;
l assigns the MoPFI a central policymaking role. The MoPFI will be responsible for developing secondary
legislation and guidance related to public procurement. This includes standardized and unified procurement
and asset disposal rules, instructions, and tender documents. But it will also take responsibility for mid- to
long-term policies;
l assigns the MoPFI overall responsibility for monitoring and oversight of public procurement. This will involve
the collection of data from departments and the preparation of annual reports for the union government.
This can include working with other actors, such as state and region governments and CSOs, to support a
more comprehensive system of oversight;
l assigns MoPFI responsibility for developing procurement knowledge and skills, capabilities and training,
offering public procurement training courses to promote and develop public officials in gaining knowledge
and expertise, and providing advice and technical assistance to procuring entities;
l assigns MoPFI responsibilities for procurement transparency and dispute resolution, including the creation
of a web portal for public procurement information, and a Trust Panel (a tribunal) to judge on disputes in the
tender process;
l simplifies procurement management arrangements by removing the necessity for the Tender Committee to
create three subcommittees. This is now optional;
l adjusts the membership of Tender Committees so that membership is apparently no longer based on
whether the procurement is from the union or state or region budget. The head of the procuring department
will now chair the Tender Committee which will be composed of at least three (unspecified) members. It is
unclear what role this assigns for state and region ministers.
l enables procuring entities to choose from seven tender invitation methods: open tendering, request
for quotations, restricted tendering, two-stage tendering, direct contracting, request for proposals, and
e-procurement. Open tendering remains the preferred method for most public procurements.
24

CHAPTER 4

PROCUREMENT IN PRACTICE:
OBSERVATIONS FROM
AYEYARWADY REGION AND
KAYIN STATE

Legal and regulatory frameworks help shape what This chapter uses observations from interviews,
is possible within a governance system. They are focus groups, and workshops to try to show how the
part of the “rules of the game” that influence how management and oversight of procurement takes
different actors behave. While they can act as a place in practice. While there are many similarities
guide, they rarely provide the complete picture, in practice across Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin
in part because laws, directives and rules must State, there are also considerable differences
be interpreted by people other than those who between how state and region government actors
designed them. And they must also be adapted to fit interpret and adapt to the legal and regulatory
the particular context in which actors operate. public procurement framework described in
Chapter 3. This diversity of practice means that
This chapter explores how Myanmar’s state and the reader should not interpret these observations
region governments have interpreted and adapted as a definitive assessment of practice across
the union-developed legal and regulatory framework Myanmar. This research highlights some important
set out in the preceding chapter.39 It does this by examples of policy adaptations to fit policies to
categorizing the multitude of actors that influence their local context and to respond to learning. The
public procurement practice into two discrete emphasis of the research is on public procurement
categories: those who manage procurement, and for infrastructure projects by state and region
those who oversee it. The authors believe that governments.
this simplification is necessary to help the reader
make sense of the network of interconnected and
overlapping groups involved in public procurement.

LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS HELP SHAPE

WHAT IS POSSIBLE WITHIN A GOVERNANCE SYSTEM. THEY
ARE PART OF THE “RULES OF THE GAME” THAT INFLUENCE
HOW DIFFERENT ACTORS BEHAVE.
 25

BOX 7
Policy interpretation and adaptation

Interviews and workshops have revealed that procurement policy by state and region
governments is far more dynamic than it may first seem. While there are few instances of
Kayin State or Ayeyarwady Region launching specific policy documents or guidance to assist
procurement management or oversight, there are instances of very dynamic processes of small-
scale policy experimentation, learning, and adaptation. The research reveals that state and
region governments have developed a mix of process modifications and formal and informal
instructions, and created or re-constituted organizations, based on their understanding of how to
address the specific needs and challenges of their state and region, and to respond to learning
from earlier rounds of modifications.

Such a reflective and adaptive policymaking approach is particularly valuable for procurement
reform because there is little existing evidence of what works in Myanmar, and because
procurement reform is best thought of as a “dynamic game”. Interviews with ministers and MPs
revealed a deep appreciation of this dynamism – with an acknowledgement that those that
benefit from weaknesses in the procurement system will continue to adapt their own strategies
for extracting personal gains in response to policies that try to make this harder. The expanded
role of MPs in oversight can be seen as part of this dynamic process, with MPs directed to
address perceived weaknesses from the earlier rounds of procurement reform.

The research did identify one concrete example of the creation of more specific (and formally
documented) guidance. The Ayeyarwady Region government developed a Standard Operating
Procedures (SOPs) for all construction projects in the region. This was adapted from Directive
1/2017 and the MoC 2016 Guideline. It provides officials with a systematic step-by-step set of
instructions on how to conduct tender procedures for construction projects. Officials and MPs
spoke positively about the SOPs, even in the face of initial implementation challenges. Important
lessons were learned through the design and implementation process which have relevance for
the union government and other states and regions. Implementation has been paused as the
MoC is in consultations with states and regions as part of developing nation-wide SOPs. There
is a great opportunity to learn from the experience of the Ayeyarwady region government, and a
potential pilot state and region to test what SOPs they do develop.

4.1 WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLIC

PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT?
A range of actors are responsible for public procuring entities. They lead the pre-tender process
procurement by state and region governments to specify procurement needs, develop procurement
(Figure 5). Their specific roles can be difficult plans, assemble the necessary documentation,
to untangle given that actors can be involved conduct tenders, select and manage the winner,
in multiple stages of the procurement process, and respond to complaints. They do this as
and belong to multiple groups (e.g. MPs can act direct implementers, and as members of Tender
independently and sit on multiple committees that Committees and their subcommittees. Much of the
oversee procurement). In an attempt to simplify more direct engagement with tender winners takes
the situation, the authors believe that it is possible place at the township level, given that the township
to broadly split actors’ responsibilities into two has the closest office to a project. State and region
different functions: management and oversight. ministers are typically responsible for several
Management: As public procurement in Myanmar departments, and act as chairs of their respective
is decentralized to individual departments, state Tender Committees. The interviews for this study
and region departments and organizations play a highlighted the often informal, but important, role
critical role in the procurement process as the main that ministers play in coordinating the functions of
26

different actors. The MoC plays an important role procurement procedures, and scrutinize and report
in supporting the management of procurement by to ministers and party colleagues on the use of
providing technical expertise at different stages public funds. They do this independently, and
of the procurement cycle. For instance, engineers through their membership on specific committees,
from the MoC support the screening of technical such as the Construction Work Inspection
proposals, provide guidance to committee Committees (Ti-Kaw) and state and region PACs –
members, and participate in the inspections of Budget Oversight Committees. Since 2016, private
construction projects. businesses have served as independent project
quality inspectors.
Oversight: State and region MPs oversee
inspections of projects, monitor adherence to

FIGURE 5
Actors responsible for the management and oversight of public procurement by state and
region governments

ACTOR ROLE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Ministers of state and According to Directive 1/2017 state and region ministers
region governments manage tenders called in states and regions through their
position as chairs of the Tender Committees. This applies
for procurements drawn from both the union budget and
state and region budgets. They ensure the tender procedure
is followed and support the Tender Committee to respond to
implementation challenges. They also support coordination
between different actors throughout the procurement process.

State and region According to Directive 1/2017 state and region departments
departments and initiate and manage tender processes as the procuring
organizations entity. Departmental representatives are members of Tender
Committees in their capacity as the lead procuring entity or as
a “relevant” department with some interest or expertise in the
procurement. Representatives of the department are typically
directors, deputy directors, assistant directors or technical
specialists such as chief engineers.

Representatives of According to Directive 1/2017 tenders called in states and

union departments regions using the union budget must have a representative of
and organizations the union department as a member of the Tender Committee.

State and region According to the MoC 2016 Guideline, MoC state and
departments under region engineers are assigned as technical experts and
the Ministry of provide recommendations in the selection of quality control
Construction companies. They play a major role in supporting pre-
engineering work. Engineers are invited to join committees
in project design, assessment and evaluation, tender and
inspection of projects.

State and region chief While chief ministers are not members of Tender Committees,
ministers they oversee the spending of public funds within their state or
region. They approve some procurement plans and for more
complex or sensitive procurements they may take on a more
active role in setting the direction and coordinating actors.
They help shape the development of procurement policy by
supporting state and region ministers and departments to
interpret union policy and by shaping state- and region-specific
procurement system objectives.
 27

ACTOR ROLE IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

State and region MPs Directive 1/2017 does not specify a role for MPs. However,
through their wider mandates to address the needs of their
constituents, MPs play an important role in monitoring the
completion and quality of projects. MPs can be included as
members of the committees related to public procurement
(see below). In Ayeyarwady a notification was issued stating
that MPs can fill in for ministers’ responsibilities in the
procurement process, at ministers’ discretion.

Public Accounts Article 167 of the 2008 Constitution enabled the creation of
Committee (known state and region Public Accounts Committees (PACs) made
as the Joint Public up of state and region MPs. PACs are responsible for ensuring
Accounts Committee the effective use of public spending and through this broad
in Kayin State) remit they have played roles in monitoring the completion
and quality of infrastructure projects. They also support the
tracking of poor-performing contractors.

State and region State and region Auditor General’s Offices approve the
Auditor General’s completion of infrastructure projects.40
Office

Construction President Office’s Order 9/2016 established a union-level

Work Inspection Construction Work Inspection Committee to approve, suspend,
Committees (Ti-Kaw) cancel or revise national construction-related projects. State-
and region-, district- and township-level versions were later
formed to assist quality control. These committees include
representatives from respective procuring government
departments, the MoC and regional MP for township level or
responsible minister at state/region level. For construction
projects the construction work inspection committee inspects
the quality of the projects.

Third party / quality In 2017 the MoC issued an order to state and region
control agency Construction Departments to hire independent businesses to
assess the quality of procured construction projects. Their
findings are submitted to the procurement Quality Inspection
and Acceptance Committee. In Ayeyarwady the role is divided
in two with a ‘quality control’ agency to check the quality of
the procured construction project and a ‘third party’ agency to
assess projects where the quality control agency’s verdict is
disputed.

State and region State and region budget departments play a limited role in
budget departments the public procurement process. Once budgets have been
and Finance Ministers approved the budget department’s role is limited to tracking
budget progress of projects. The departments are not
typically members of the Tender Committee. State and region
finance ministers are similarly not members of the Tender
Committee (unless the minister is also responsible for another
department). They do not play an active public procurement
policy role.
28

4.2 WHAT GOVERNS MANAGEMENT AND

OVERSIGHT OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT?
Management managed relative to the goals of the legal and
Directive 1/2017 was almost universally referenced regulatory framework can be found within the
in interviews with government officials as the specific details of how those nine major steps are
main regulatory framework governing public managed, covered later in the chapter.
procurement by state and region governments. In
particular, almost all government actors interviewed Oversight
demonstrated familiarity with the tender procedure The research reveals that the oversight of state
set out in Directive 1/2017. Familiarity with the MoC and region public procurement stems from a
2016 Guideline was lower across officials, in part more complex and diffuse set of rules, regulations
reflecting its narrower scope. Officials at all levels and responsibilities. Committees and MPs are
also made reference to the 2018 4th Amendment to governed by legislation and policy that sits outside
the Anti-Corruption Law’s stipulations that if they of Directive 1/2017. This makes their roles no less
don’t follow Directive 1/2017 they are breaking the important or impactful; however, it is harder to
law. Interviews suggested that this appears to be identify the specific policy frameworks that shape
down to a concerted effort by the Anti-Corruption actors’ behavior.
Commission to communicate this, and other key
aspects of the Anti-Corruption Law, to departments. It is noteworthy that Directive 1/2017 and the
MoC 2016 Guideline have little to say on how
Businesses that have worked as government procurement should be overseen. The upcoming
contractors or third-party quality control agencies Procurement Bill is expected to change this
also demonstrated an awareness of the major situation, however, with the MoPFI assigned a
guidelines. However, interviews with businesses specific role in monitoring adherence to the bill and
involved in public procurement revealed that their future policies. What impact this will have on state
understanding of the nine-step tender procedure and region government procurement remains to
within Directive 1/2017 was limited. be seen, though this research suggests that care
Interviewed government officials in each state should be taken to consider how new oversight
and region insisted that the nine major steps responsibilities will map onto the existing web
of the tender procedure are now followed. This of actors fulfilling that role. Given that the MoPFI
includes the establishment of the relevant is relatively new to policymaking, and will be
committees, preparation of tender documents, assuming responsibility for procurement policy for
public announcements of upcoming tenders, the first time, the research suggests much can be
tender evaluation and selection processes, tender learned from the current experience of state and
inspection, and operation of a functioning complaint region actors and the policy adaptations they have
mechanism. The gaps in how procurement is developed.

4.3 MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE

This section provides highlights from field Pre-tender: Procurement planning
research on how tender committees and procuring There appears to be considerable variation
departments and organizations (simplified to in how different departments and states and
“procuring departments” from this point on) regions approach procurement planning and pre-
manage the procurement process. It structures engineering work, warranting further investigation
this according to the three main stages of the than was possible in this research. Directive
procurement cycle. It provides some case studies 1/2017 contains limited guidance on what form
and shines a spotlight on challenges that were procurement plans must take and who must
identified as important across both locations. It approve them. It states that every procurement
concludes with some highlights of perspectives must have a procurement plan and that this must
from businesses. be approved by the relevant union ministry, heads
of departments or organizations, or the state or
 29

BOX 8
Tender Committees in practice

Directive 1/2017 identifies Tender Committees as serving a critical management function in public
procurement in state and regions. They are established as the main entity that must ensure the
requirements within the Directive are followed, which includes creating the three sub-committees
and managing their operations.

The Directive lacks details on how Tender Committees should function, i.e. how decisions should
be made, instructions issued, or disagreements resolved. Interviews with officials in Ayeyarwady
Region and Kayin State found considerable diversity in how Tender Committees function in
practice; unsurprisingly given the lack of guidance. Common across interviews was that Tender
Committees tend to act as coordinating bodies delegating tasks to committee members and other
officials; they also problem-solve implementation challenges, and provide some degree of overall
accountability for tender procedures being followed. The sub-committees they establish are
typically comprised of members of the Tender Committee.

The research revealed that how Tender Committees function in practice depends on the
personalities involved, the relative authority and expertise of different members, and the
sector of the procurements. In some Tender Committees departmental engineers (especially
MoC engineers) play a very active role in discussions due to the authority granted to them by
their technical expertise. Below we provide a short case study to help illustrate how a Tender
Committee works in practice, though we advise against generalizing from this single example.

Ayeyarwady Region Tender Committee for Public Procurements in the education sector
For procurements by the Ayeyarwady Region Department of Basic Education, using the union
budget, the Social Affairs Minister typically assumes the role of chair of the Tender Committee.
On some occasions the Divisional Officer of the Education Department assumed the role of chair.
Other members include representatives from the Department of Highways (normally the Deputy
Director who acts as a joint secretary of the Division Construction Work Inspection Committee)
and other departments which have engineers.

For education construction procurements in Ayeyarwady Region the tender plans are typically
prepared by district due to the large number of projects, though this can vary according to the
size of projects. After the pre-tender process is complete and the tender is announced, the Tender
Committee forms a Tender Acceptance and Evaluation Committee, in line with Directive 1/2017.

Within the annual budget cycle the procurement process takes between one and three months to
transition from pre-tender to contract signing. This process can be delayed if a complaint is made.
As there are many projects the procuring departments are the key players and the Social Affairs
Minister reported not being able to join all tender openings due to other priorities. To address this
the Ayeyarwady Region government circulated a letter that officially sanctioned regional MPs to
join and observe all tender openings on behalf of ministers.

region chief minister. It is ambivalent about who township, a district, or the entire state or region.
must provide approval as to whether each individual More complex projects can require individual
project must have its own separate plan or whether approval. As an illustration, in Ayeyarwady Region
project plans can be packaged together and then it was reported that for construction related to
submitted for approval. schools, education department officials first check
the approved budget is ready and then compare
Interviews revealed that practice varies across this against the projects in each township. These
states and regions and departments. Public individual plans are then aggregated together to
procurements are typically bundled together cover a district and this is submitted for approval
according to the specific sector of the procurement by the Ayeyarwady Region Social Affairs Minister.
and the type of procurement. Plans can also However, there is no standard approach.
be approved that cover procurements across a
30

In both Kayin State and Ayeyarwady Region For instance, in 2018/19 the Ayeyarwady Region
procurement planning can be undermined by government took steps to try to improve the
upstream decisions made around planning and quality of information in construction project
budgeting (such as how much budget to assign tender specifications. This included conducting
for a bridge). Officials in both locations pointed feasibility studies, soil tests and other pre-
to project budgets being too low for the task at engineering work that would help develop more
hand. This is especially problematic when there is appropriate Bill of Quantities (BQ). It contracted
considerable variation across states and regions in out the pre-engineering work to a private company,
the costs to construct a building; for example, there and unfortunately this company under-performed
may be higher costs in parts of the country that are relative to expectations. The engineers hired were
harder to access and supply. Where departments relatively inexperienced, resulting in cases of
have costed similarly designed buildings the same, inaccurate information being used to develop BQ
no matter where they are built, this has led to tender and budget estimates. However, it is not unusual
processes where no bids are received, or the bids to have private sector limitations, especially if this
are of low quality. To offset this some departments work is being commissioned for the first time.
have adjusted the costs and others have adopted The initiative is commendable and the regional
a cross-subsidization system that pairs high-cost government is applying the learning from this
projects with low-cost ones, allowing businesses to practical experience to adapt the process next year.
offset losses in one location with profits from the
other. Interviews suggested that government departments
at the state and region level do systematically and
Tender: Tender documents, announcements and consistently publicly advertise tender information
openings on their notice boards at least two weeks before
To meaningfully participate in a tender process tender invitation or in public newspapers one month
potential suppliers need to know that a tender is in advance when projects are over MMK 10 million,
due to take place, have sufficient time to prepare in line with Directive 1/2017 and the MoC 2016
for the tender, and have sufficient information Guideline.
to develop a feasible, compelling and profitable
tender proposal. What information gets revealed In Ayeyarwady Region, the Social Affairs Minister
to companies is therefore critical for the overall described some of the efforts taken to be “as
transparency and fairness of the procurement transparent as possible”. Tender proposals are
system. A lack of information in the tender publicly opened in front of all tenderers and
document usually results in suppliers increasing displayed on a projector. This includes disclosure
their margins, to account for the greater risks, which of the criteria used to assess the tenders and
increases costs or decreases quality. the points scored by each project for each of the
criteria. In another example of policy innovation
Interviews revealed that Ayeyarwady Region and the Social Affairs Minister for Ayeyarwady Region
Kayin State governments have taken transparency has turned to livestreaming the tender openings on
in tender announcements and openings seriously, her Facebook page. Such a practice is especially
with compelling evidence that the prescriptions valuable as government departments look to
in Directive 1/2017 are typically followed, with enforce social distancing measures in response to
some examples of government departments and COVID-19.
ministers trying new approaches to further promote
transparency. However, interviews with ministers,
MPs and businesses raised serious concerns that
transparency, fairness and the integrity of the
system are undermined through the inconsistent
disclosure of project specifications (e.g.
construction drawings) to give specific businesses
an edge during tender evaluations.

An additional concern is that low project budgets

can restrict the quality of information gathered
for tender documents. Interviews in Kayin State
suggested that most tender documents were
incomplete, requiring companies to prepare their
own designs, and that pre-engineering work to
assess site suitability was not conducted. Even
when some budget has been made available for
pre-engineering work there can be challenges.
 31

BOX 9
Fair competition?

An explicit objective of Directive 1/2017 is to promote competition as a means to improve the value for money
of public procurement projects. The theory goes that with more competition comes better quality tenders, better
tenders selected, and so better projects finished. Yet ministers across states and regions raised serious concerns
that this potential was being undermined.

A critical component of developing a winning tender is understanding the requirements of the tender. This
influences the design of the technical proposal and estimates of the cost of delivering to those requirements.
Yet the research revealed that there are many cases where firms do not have enough information on which to
develop accurate proposals. Tender documents lacked construction drawings, BQs were missing or inaccurate, or
information from feasibility studies was absent.

In the worst instances the absent information is deliberate. By revealing important information to a favored
business, and not others, an official is able to increase the chances this business wins the tender. The absent
information is valuable, enabling more unscrupulous officials with access to the information to exchange it for
money, gifts or favors.

There are clues as to such practice taking place. Business groups refer to the “lucky number” whereby tenders
appear to almost magically exactly match the lowest price the Tender Committee would be willing to accept for
the tender (tenders below a certain price are often not accepted as they suggest that the tender is based on an
unrealistic understanding of the project specifications). Such actions would represent a violation of the integrity
of the procurement system, undermine transparency, reduce competition, and undermine the value for money of
procured goods and services. MPs reported an increasing appreciation of the signs to look out for, the steps they
have taken to respond, and the need for constant vigilance to spot new and old ‘tricks’.

Not all poor information disclosure is malicious. Sometimes information is absent because of simple neglect,
an under-appreciation of the value of the information, or limited resourcing. Officials and ministers spoke of the
challenges of finding sufficient budget to conduct sufficient pre-engineering work to provide suppliers with the
information they need. However, when this information is not provided it shifts the costs of preparing these on to
suppliers (who must each individually develop the information at potentially greater expense to society overall).
In Kayin State businesses claimed that because construction drawings for tendered projects were not provided
in many cases, they had to prepare their own drawings. This increases the costs to businesses in submitting
bids, which can deter competition, and favor more established businesses that have already worked with the
government on similar projects.

BOX 10
Moving online

As part of Myanmar’s eGovernment reforms, many

government departments have created websites and
Facebook pages as depositories of information and,
more recently, platforms for two-way conversation. One
standout approach to improving transparency in public
procurement is the approach taken by the Yangon Region
Government Tender Screening and Evaluation Committee.
All important tender information, such as all tender
invitations, list of registered qualified professionals and
quality controllers, and tender processes, can be viewed
online. As most people (and many smaller businesses) in
Myanmar do not visit websites, the Committee established
a Facebook page in 2017 that is open to all Facebook
users. Its 13,000 followers can track the latest tender
announcements and awards. It is not perfect though, as by
late 2020 it had not been since February 2020.
32

The Ayeyarwady Region government website The large and complex projects bid criteria within
includes a section for information on tenders, Directive 1/2017 prioritizes the offered price
though the page was blank at the time of writing.41 (with over 50 points available). In the absence of
The Kayin State government website does not additional guidance this may account for why some
have a section for information on tenders, though departments similarly consider the offered price
this can be found on some specific departments’ as the most important variable when evaluating
websites and Facebook pages. The research finds tender proposals. This emphasis on offered price is
that practice varies considerably and that with the reinforced by the MoC 2016 Guideline which calls
exception of some standout cases, such as the for a two-stage system whereby technical proposals
Ayeyarwady Department of Urban and Housing are evaluated first, and only those that pass the first
Development and Yangon Regional Government, stage make it to the second stage. In the second
there is limited attention paid to tailoring stage the lowest price is then selected.
communications to the most appropriate channels
for the intended recipients. State and region government departments from
both Kayin State and Ayeyarwady Region have
Tender: Tender evaluation interpreted what limited guidance is available and
Tender evaluation is an area where we observe developed their own scoring system to fit their
considerable policy adaptations and variation in context and policy preferences. These scoring
practice. Directive 1/2017 is ambiguous about systems have continued to evolve in response to
how projects should be evaluated, enabling state lessons state and region governments have learned
and region governments to interpret the guidance through their management of the system. This has
and develop their own policy positions. Interviews led to an interesting divergence in practice, each of
revealed that the initial starting point for many state which has its own logic.
and region departments was the points scoring
system put forward in Directive 1/2017 for large In Kayin State, a maximum of 70 points (out of
and complex projects (with no definition of these 100) are available for the technical proposal (which
provided). Even though it referred to large and contains information on the price, quality and
complex projects it has somewhat unintentionally methodology) and 30 points for the tender proposal
served as a sort of template that departments can (which according to those interviewed contains
use and modify. general information on the company, including its
past experience). This is compared to existing lists
Large and complex projects – bid Points that have been developed that assign companies
criteria42 a classification based on their past performance.
Experience and capacity of the 0 – 10 In Ayeyarwady Region, for health and education
tender bidder projects the profile and background history of
suppliers is worth 22 points (out of 100) and the
Methodology 0 – 10 offered price is worth 20 – 30 points.
Compliance with important 0 – 20
standards Ayeyarwady – bid criteria 43 Points
Employees 0 – 10
Experience and capacity of the 0 – 22
Offered price 50 – 70
tender bidder
Methodology 0 – 15
Compliance with important 0 – 16
standards
Employees 0 – 17

Offered price 20 – 30

Both of these approaches represent a seemingly

clever response to other challenges in the public
procurement system. Past efforts to try and
blacklist companies triggered a counter-response
from poor-performing suppliers, which re-registered
under a new name. Increasing the weighting placed
on past experience makes this option less attractive
to suppliers, though it can also make it harder for
genuine new entrants to the market to win tenders.
 33

Actors are having to constantly navigate these Tender: Complaint mechanism

difficult trade-offs and to adjust policy as they learn An important component of a fair public
more about what works in their context. procurement system is the operation of a complaint
mechanism that allows tender bidders to report any
Another marked difference in evaluation allegations of improper process or discriminatory
approaches reflects a difference in the objectives treatment. Interviews with state and region
of state and region governments. In Ayeyarwady government officials suggest that the complaint
Region the state government wishes to promote mechanism is seen as more of a problem than
local businesses by favoring them through the a tool for protecting the integrity of the system.
procurement process. Local businesses are Ministers worry, perhaps reasonably, that the
awarded an additional 20 points, similar to the complaint mechanism is used by disgruntled
practice in Mon State. However, business owners bidders to punish the government by delaying the
interviewed in Kayin State reported that the process.
Kayin State government has reduced this over
time to only two points for local companies. One The Ayeyarwady Region government has
government minister interviewed in Kayin State interpreted Directive 1/2017 as allowing it to
described how many local companies active restrict the timeframe within which businesses can
in Kayin State were regarded as local cronies file a complaint. Businesses are allowed to file a
affiliated with former military officials, and that complaint with the Tender Committee up until the
they lacked the proper technical knowledge. The end of the tender award meetings, when all bidders
Ayeyarwady Region government also incorporates are brought together, and not afterwards.
the recommendations of MPs into the evaluation
process, though it is unclear just how this Interviews with businesses did not identify any
influences the evaluation process in practice. particular concerns with the complaint process.

BOX 11
Some perspectives of suppliers in Kayin State

Government adherence to tender procedures has improved

“Although there are some areas to be improved in tender procedure, compared to previous governments, at least 70 percent
to 80 percent of government departments have improved, compared to before and they are less corrupt”. – Member of the
Kayin State Young Entrepreneur Association

Government pays more but expects more

“While the [payments per area constructed] have increased, the structure and designs have also been adjusted and the
procuring departments’ demands of us have increased.” – Member of the Contractor Association, Kayin State

Government should move procurement online

“I am working with international NGOs for construction projects in ceasefire areas. They use an online system effectively.
I get all necessary information related to the tender from them online. I just need to upload the tender proposals. We use
an email and online system. We don’t need to meet anyone. It’s very efficient and effective. I don’t understand why the
government is not using an online system for procurement.” – Member of the Kayin State Engineering Association

Businesses want to be able to deposit their 10 percent performance guarantee in banks of their choosing
“The Kayin State Attorney General instructs us to use Myanma Economic Bank, but with them we have to pay 1 percent
of the deposit each year for retention. Over two years that costs us 2 percent of our deposit. We also don’t have that
much cash and so may have to borrow money to make the deposit, costing us even more.” – Member of the Kayin State
Engineering Association

Government doesn’t understand our cash flow challenges

“When 25 percent of the project work is done we are supposed to get paid, but it takes many months to receive that
installment. However, we cannot just stop construction work and wait for the money and so typically we only receive the
installment after 35 to 40 percent of the project work is completed. They don’t care whether we are able to make a profit
and don’t understand how important our cash flow situation is to us, our subcontractors and workers.” – Member of the
Contractors Association, Kayin State
34

However, they did identify parallel complaint onto a blacklist. In Kayin State efforts are made
mechanisms being adopted with companies and to keep track of construction companies’ past
communities looking to complain directly to their performance, with companies placed into four
MPs (who they are more familiar with), government different categories (A, B, C and D). Those that have
ministers and state, region or union Anti-Corruption delivered to an appropriate quality are assigned as
Commissions. The research uncovered anecdotes a category A or B. If the government has projects
of officials being presented with copies of letters that need to be finished urgently or in which
submitted to these institutions, including copies of the initial tender process resulted in no bidder,
letters sent to the President’s Office and the State then companies from these categories are given
Counsellor’s office. preferential treatment.

Post-tender: contract management, penalties and Interviewees reported that the effectiveness of
blacklisting these systems is undermined by the relative ease
One of the main differences between Kayin State with which blacklisted or low-rated companies
and Ayeyarwady Region is how tendered projects can change their names or move to another state
are managed according to the contract. Interviews or region. One downside of the ease with which
suggested that in Kayin State the Chief Minister has the Directorate of Investment and Company
been very active in encouraging officials to finish Administration (DICA) allows companies to be
all tender-awarded projects within the year, and in registered is that it makes it harder to track the
exploring ways to support the contractors to finish owners over time. There is no centrally controlled
the projects on time. However, in Ayeyarwady system to trace the performance of poor-performing
Region, which is a larger entity with considerably companies and interviews suggested that
more procurement projects, the cabinet takes a less coordination among government departments does
direct role in engaging with suppliers, and all tender not work well.
awarded projects which did not finish in a financial
year are paid back as underspent budget. The Ayeyarwady Region tender evaluation scoring
system illustrates one approach to overcoming
In both Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State, efforts these shortfalls. The high weighting placed on the
are taken to penalize contractors that fail to meet profile and background of bidders may make it
project expectations or that bribe officials. The harder for new entrants to compete, but it also acts
Ayeyarwady Region government places companies to discourage companies from re-registering.
that are reported to have attempted to give bribes

4.4 OVERSIGHT IN PRACTICE

Both Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State have at the union and state and region level. State
taken on additional responsibilities with the aim and region governments have since adapted the
of improving the quality of public procurements. instructions and employ different approaches
Both areas hire businesses to conduct third party according to their specific context (e.g. the size of
quality control assessments. In addition, state and the state or region and number of projects to be
region MPs take an active role in project inspection covered). In Kayin State a single “third party quality
through their membership of township and state control” company was hired to independently
and region committees. Interviews suggest that oversee the quality of tender projects throughout
they are also playing a role in ‘overseeing the the State.
overseers’ by monitoring how actors responsible for
procurement oversight fulfil those duties (or don’t). In Ayeyarwady Region the role is split into two with
“quality control” companies hired to independently
The quality control – third party system assess the quality of construction projects. These
Both Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State hire companies are paid 2 percent of the project’s
companies to act as third party quality control value for the service. In Fiscal Year 2019/20 nine
companies and to arbitrate on disputes related to companies were commissioned by Ayeyarwady
the quality of construction projects. The quality Region for “quality control”, with each responsible
control – third party system only began in 2017, for specific townships. “Third party” companies
following a proposal from union MPs. The Deputy are hired to provide a technical assessment of the
Minister of Construction then established a system project in the event that there is a dispute between
 35

BOX 12
Ayeyarwady Region school construction inspection and approval process

Once the contracted construction company has finished the construction of a school building, or a specific
contractual milestone, it informs the school principal. The principal then informs the township Ti-Kaw that the
project is ready for inspection. If a quality control company has been hired then it is assigned to conduct an
assessment of the completion status and quality of the project. It submits a report to the Ti-Kaw which must then
sign off that the milestone or project has been completed to the required quality. Once the Ti-Kaw has signed off on
the milestone or final project the procuring department is able to process the payment to the construction company.
According to MPs interviewed in Ayeyarwady Region, a project can require inspection on at least four different
occasions, in line with the milestones and payment schedule in the contract. The region Ti-Kaw typically keeps
records of project status and inspection reports by quality control businesses. The Ayeyarwady Region Auditor
General’s Office staff usually makes a site visit at the end of the project.

Ayeyarwady Region is experimenting with different configurations of actors responsible for inspection and
approvals. In 2018/19 the Social Affairs Minister replaced the role of the Ti-Kaw with a new committee called the
Health and Education Work Supervision Committee that included a more active role for MPs. Interviews suggested
that having more actors in an oversight role doesn’t necessarily equate to improved outcomes. Interviews with
businesses and officials revealed that a greater number of actors having to sign off on project completion can result
in either greater delays or an increase in requests for bribes to speed approval. Delays are bad for business and for
government departments, which need to finish projects within the fiscal year the budget was allocated to them.

In addition, a number of MPs raised concerns that some quality control companies and some actors within
committees did not even visit project sites and that some members sought bribes in exchange for timely payment. It
can be difficult to determine whether delays are due to limited resources, poor coordination, or gaming by actors in
the system. Understanding these issues requires a detailed understanding of the local context, which helps explain
why MPs have been encouraged to play a more active role in overseeing the overseers.

the contractor and the government or the contractor engineers from the Department of Highways acting
and local community. The government runs as secretaries. This responds to concerns that
separate tenders for quality control companies and the Ti-Kaw were not fulfilling their responsibilities
those that win a contract can be assigned to act as in a way that maintained the integrity of the
a “third party” on projects in other townships. procurement system.

State and Region MPs and oversight committees MPs also appear to play a role monitoring other
Interviews in Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State oversight actors, notably quality control – third
suggest that state and region MPs have played an party businesses and the public officials sitting
active and increasing role in the oversight of public on different committees. Members of the Public
procurement processes. They have done this in their Accounts Committees have a responsibility to
capacity as members of committees such as the oversee how public funds are spent, though they
Ti-Kaw, township-level work supervision committees often take a surprisingly “hands on” role in the
and Public Accounts Committees. Directive 1/2017 sense that MPs make themselves physically
and the MoC 2016 Guideline do not specify a role present in committee meetings and personally
for MPs. Their role is an evolving one that appears inspect project sites. MPs are also able to tap into
to respond to gaps identified by state and region their networks in the townships to understand
governments in the current legal and regulatory how implementation and oversight is taking place.
environment. Interviews suggested that this had helped discover
instances of quality control companies violating
During 2020 the Ayeyarwady Region government their own contracts by relying on photographs sent
experimented with replacing the role played by by construction companies instead of physically
quality control companies/Ti-Kaw for education investigating the site.
and health procurements with township-level
work supervision committees. MPs are members
of these committees and they are chaired by
township education or health officers, with township
36

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 FINDINGS

FINDING 1 – State and region governments play not uncover any examples of union government
a central role in the management and oversight of ministries actively looking to learn from the
public procurement in Myanmar. State and region implementation experience of state and region
departments and organizations and ministers are governments. In part this is because there is
responsible for managing the majority of public currently no central authority responsible for
procurements tendered in states and regions, drawn public procurement policy. But it may also reflect
from both the union and state and region budgets. a more general policymaking norm within the
union government of developing policies and
FINDING 2 – State and region government public then instructing lower levels of government to
procurement practice is guided by an expanding execute them faithfully, with little consideration
set of union government legal and regulatory for feedback. It is notable that while the upcoming
frameworks. Presidential Directive 1/2017 Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Bill
is currently the primary legal and regulatory was developed with extensive consultation with
framework governing public procurement processes union government organizations and business
in Myanmar’s states and regions. For infrastructure associations, we found no evidence that state
projects the MoC 2016 Guideline is also critical. and region governments were included in the
Businesses report improved adherence to these consultation process.
frameworks and reduced instances of corruption.
But these directives and guidelines are very high- FINDING 5 – The management of public
level and do not by themselves equip officials with procurement is principally the responsibility
the information needed to more effectively manage of Tender Committees and procuring state and
and oversee public procurement. region departments. Procuring departments lead
implementation and state and region ministers
FINDING 3 – While there are many commonalities, work to ensure processes are followed and play a
practice can vary considerably between states and coordinating role as chairs of Tender Committees.
regions and across departments. To implement the For infrastructure projects, engineers from the MoC
existing legal and regulatory frameworks, in the and other state and region departments play an
absence of more relevant guidance, state and region important role in tender committees as technical
governments have had to undertake a difficult experts.
process of policy interpretation and adaption.
The downside of this has been an unnecessary FINDING 6 – Oversight of public procurement is
duplication of effort across states and regions – currently a decentralized function with a range
such as in the creation of bidding documents. The of different actors playing a role. Oversight of
upside is that this process has resulted in some state and region public procurement stems from
notable examples of policy innovation, such as the a complex and diffuse set of rules, regulations
creation of SOPs and the tailoring of tender scoring and responsibilities. A Quality Control - Third
systems to local policy priorities and lessons from Party system has been developed that employs
earlier reforms. independent companies to oversee construction
projects. MPs play an active role, individually and
FINDING 4 – There is an opportunity for the MoPFI through their membership of committees, though
and the MoC to learn from the experience of they are governed by legislation and policy that sits
state and region governments. The research did outside of Directive 1/2017.
 37

FINDING 7 – State and region MPs play an FINDING 10 – Management and oversight is
important role in overseeing public procurement undermined by a lack of access to data. Even basic
by state and region governments. State and region data on procurement, such as spending categorized
MPs provide oversight by supporting the inspection according to the procuring department, location,
of specific projects, monitoring adherence to type, budget source (union or state and region),
procurement procedures and reporting to ministers or average procurement time, is not available in
and party colleagues, and by generally scrutinizing accessible formats. Most of this information is
the use of public funds. They do this independently recorded using paper records, though it is not
and through their membership of specific typically aggregated and centrally stored. What
committees, such as the Ti-Kaw and state and aggregation of data does take place is in summary
region Public Accounts Committees. formats, which majorly reduce the scope of
what sort of data analysis is possible. Increased
FINDING 8 – Government has not considered the access to data would help the MoPFI, procuring
role that civil society (e.g. the media and CSOs) can ministries and state and region governments
play in supporting the goals of public procurement conduct foundational data analysis to support the
policy. Few examples were identified of CSOs prioritization of reform efforts.
playing a role in oversight of public procurement.
The media can play an important role in identifying FINDING 11 – A major shift in the governance
or highlighting instances where the integrity of of public procurement is about to take place
the procurement system has been compromised, which should impact the role played by state
which can act as a deterrent and help improve and region governments. The upcoming Public
the functioning of the overall system. It is unclear Procurement and Asset Disposal Bill is expected
whether these roles have been considered and to centralize policymaking by placing the MoPFI in
discounted, or simply not considered. A role for a policymaking and oversight role. The MoPFI has
businesses has been recognized, however, with had success driving PFM reforms though is still
them being used to support oversight. relatively new to policymaking. Beyond supporting
drafting of the Procurement Bill and its secondary
FINDING 9 – Procurement technical capacity is legislation, it has not had responsibility for
almost universally low. This is not surprising given procurement policy. It remains to be seen what role
how early Myanmar is in its procurement reform the MoPFI sees for state for region governments
journey. There is currently no ‘procurement cadre’ and what steps the MoPFI will be taking to
of officials specialized in public procurement. increase the chances that procurement policy is
There is a wide recognition that low capacity implemented as designed and in accordance with
is an impediment to a better performing the diverse capabilities and needs of fourteen state
procurement system and there is strong demand and region governments.
for more training, guidance and ongoing learning
support. This includes demand for non-training-
based capacity building, such as learning from
the experiences of others working on public
procurement.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 1 – The MoPFI should consult an early detection system for provisions that will
with state and region governments as part of struggle to be implemented as intended.
operationalization of the Procurement Bill. Build
off the good practice of consulting across union RECOMMENDATION 2 – The MoPFI should
government departments and expand consultation establish mechanisms for receiving ongoing
for the planned secondary public procurement feedback from state and region governments
legislation to include state and region ministers, and businesses on the operationalization of the
MPs and department officials. There is much Procurement Bill. This should go beyond the
that can be learned from existing implementation aggregation of reporting data and include space
experience and policy adaptations. Consultation for discussion on the inevitable implementation
could help build support among state and region challenges experienced and the scope to improve
governments for the new provisions and provide policies further. Regular feedback will provide the
38

MoPFI with information that can be used to improve on this is already being made as the government
procurement policy over time. Commitment to an is considering how to improve management
annual review/feedback process would be a strong capacity and the new PFM Academy has a module
starting point. on procurement for its training of all mid-level
civil servants with relevant PFM responsibilities.
RECOMMENDATION 3 – The MoPFI and the However, capacity building should not just be for
MoC should consider using state and region officially designated procurement staff in procuring
governments as places to test policy ideas before departments, given the range of actors that play
attempting to roll them out across the country. important management and oversight roles.
Operationalization of the new Procurement Bill will Other members of Tender Committees are prime
require both organizations to develop considerable candidates for management capacity support. In
guidance on public procurement (including addition, the 2020 election will bring with it a new
standardized procurement documents and SOPs set of ministers and MPs, many of whom would be
and new approaches to building the capacity of eager for, and would benefit from, capacity building
those working on procurement. The MoPFI and the support.
MoC should look to pilot policies in willing states
and regions, capture the learning from these pilots, RECOMMENDATION 7 – State and region
and feed this into improvements in the policies. governments should encourage officials, ministers
E-procurement reforms are a prime candidate and MPs involved in procurement to develop formal
for testing given the high failure rate of most or informal networks of practice with their peers
eGovernment reforms.44 in other states and regions. Networks of practice
are a group of people that engage on similar
RECOMMENDATION 4 – The MoPFI should pilot issues. When members of such networks are able
the use of an electronic recording system in at least to exchange information with each other (through
one state or region. An electronic recording system workshops or an online group), it can be a powerful
can allow for easier aggregation of data and enable tool for sharing good practice and building capacity.
MoPFI to conduct data analysis that can be of value Early pilots by the Sandhi Governance Institute
to the MoPFI, procuring ministries and state and suggest there is demand for such networking and
region governments. To improve the management knowledge exchange opportunities.
and oversight of the overall system, the MoPFI
should also consider state and region governments RECOMMENDATION 8 – The MoPFI and state and
as users of this data and test what formats support region governments should work together to ensure
them to conduct the analysis that can improve that a shift to centralized monitoring of public
their management and oversight of the system.45 procurement complements, rather than displaces,
By demonstrating the value of data to those the oversight provided by local actors. There is a
responsible for recording it, the MoPFI can also strong rationale for greater standardization and
encourage more accurate and timely data entry. aggregation of public procurement performance
data across Myanmar’s states and regions.
RECOMMENDATION 5 – The MoPFI and state However, this should be considered as part of a
and region governments should consider what wider strategy to improve oversight, which includes
role civil society can play in supporting their a specific role for states and region governments.
procurement objectives. Principle 10 of the This research identifies ministers, MPs and
OECD’s High Level Principles for Integrity in Public CSOs with valuable local knowledge and a strong
Procurement recommends states “empower civil commitment to oversee public procurement. The
society organizations, media and the wider public MoPFI and state and region governments have
to scrutinize public procurement”. Yet we found a unique opportunity to co-develop an oversight
limited evidence that government officials have a strategy that specifies a division of responsibilities
policy position on the role that civil society can play that plays to the relative strength of each
in helping government reach its objectives. As a and maximizes overall oversight of the public
practical illustration this could involve supporting procurement system.
CSOs to conduct Public Expenditure Tracking
Surveys or a commitment to conduct community
consultations for large or sensitive infrastructure
projects.

RECOMMENDATION 6 – The MoPFI should develop

a strategy for building the capacity of actors
engaging with the procurement system. This
could include awareness of the new Procurement
Bill and planned secondary legislation. Progress
 39

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Batcheler, Richard., Lu Min Lwin, Ney, David, Owen, James, Power, James. Developing Myanmar’s Local
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Dickenson-Jones, Giles. Public Finances and the Social Contract in Myanmar: Reflections from the City Life
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Ford, Michael., Gillan, Michael and Htwe Htwe Thein. From Cronyism to Oligarchy? Privatisation and Business
Elites in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia, Issue 46, 18-41, 2016.

Further Education Library of Procurement. “What is value for money?” ND, accessed 25 August 2020. https://
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Hook, David, U Tin Maung Than, and Ninh, Kim N.B. Conceptualizing Public Sector Reform. Yangon: The Asia
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Simpson, Paul. “Behind Brazil’s Corruption Crisis”. Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply, 5 April
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Khan, Naushad. Public Procurement Fundamentals: Lessons from and for the Field. UK: Emerald Publishing,
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Mamiro, Reginald G. “Value for money: The limping pillar in public procurement -Experience from Tanzania”.
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Moller, Anders K. An Economic Analysis of Solid Waste Management. Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2020.
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Oriana, Bandiera et al., “The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats.”
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PricewaterhouseCoopers. “Are Public Projects Doomed to Failure From The Start? Transformation
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40

Rothery. Robert “Understanding Public Procurement, The Governance Brief, Issue 3”. Asian Development
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Shotton, Roger. Financing Local Development in Myanmar. Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2019.

Wilson, Andrew., Chaw Su Min Han, Shun Lae May. Managing Subnational Finance: Improving the Quality of
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World Bank and Department for International Development. Linking Procurement and Political Economy: A
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World Bank. Subnational Public Expenditure Review 2019: Fostering Decentralization in Myanmar. Yangon:
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 41

ENDNOTES
1. World Bank. Subnational Public Expenditure Review 2019: Fostering Decentralization in Myanmar. (Yangon:
World Bank, 2019). [Link]
expenditure-review-2019-fostering-decentralization-in-myanmar.
2. World Bank. Myanmar Economic Monitor. (Yangon: World Bank, 2020). [Link]
country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-economic-monitor-reports.
3. Robert Rothery. “Understanding Public Procurement, The Governance Brief Issue.” (Asian Development
Bank, 2002). [Link]
4. Reginald G. Mamiro. “Value for money: The limping pillar in public procurement - Experience from
Tanzania.” International Public Procurement Conference 4, 20 July 2010. [Link]
PROCEEDINGS/IPPC4/01ComparativeProcurement/[Link].
5. Giles Dickenson-Jones. Public Finances and the Social Contract in Myanmar: Reflections from the
City Life Survey. (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2020). [Link]
finances-and-the-social-contract-in-myanmar-reflections-from-the-city-life-survey/.
6. The OECD’s Principles for Integrity in Public Procurement define integrity as “the use of funds, resources,
assets, and authority, according to the intended official purposes, to be used in line with public interest.”
Integrity violations can take the form of: corruption, nepotism, cronyism, clientelism, fraud and theft
of resources, conflicts of interest, collusion, abuse and manipulation of information, discriminatory
treatment in the public procurement process and the waste and abuse of organizational resources.
7. James Owen and Hay Mhan Htun. Attitudes Towards Taxation in Myanmar: Insights from Urban Citizens.
(Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2020). [Link]
taxation-myanmar-insights-urban-citizens/.
8. World Bank and Department for International Development. Linking Procurement and Political Economy:
A Guide. 2010. [Link]
gui.
9. Paul Simpson. “Behind Brazil’s Corruption Crisis”. Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply. 5
April 2019. [Link]
10. Naushad Khan. Public Procurement Fundamentals, Lessons from and for the Field. (London: Emerald
Publishing, 2018). [Link]
pdf?_ga=2.86489304.1352583738.1601386470-1625287855.1601386470.
11. State and region governments and the Hluttaw do, however, provide comments on PPP projects in their
state or region.
12. Richard Batcheler. State and Region Governments in Myanmar. New Edition. (Yangon: The Asia
Foundation, 2018). [Link]
new-edition-2018/.
13. Roger Shotton. Financing Local Development in Myanmar. (Yangon: The Asia Foundation, 2019).
14. A. Wilson et al. Managing Subnational Finance: Improving the Quality of Subnational Capital Expenditures.
(Yangon: Renaissance Institute, 2019).
15. Richard Batcheler.
16. Ibid.
17. David S. Jones. “Public Procurement in Southeast Asia: Challenge and Reform”. Journal of Public
Procurement, Volume 7, Issue 1, 3-33, 2007. [Link]
Article_1_JONES.pdf.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
42

21. Ibid.
22. Dan Pink. Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us. (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009).
23. Oriana Bandiera et al. “The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats”
National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper, April 2019. [Link]
w26733.
24. Reginald G. Mamiro.
25. Ibid.
26. Further Education Library of Procurement. “What is value for money?” ND. Accessed 25 August 2020.
[Link]
27. Anders K. Mollen. An Economic Analysis of Solid Waste Management Outsourcing in Myanmar. (Yangon:
The Asia Foundation, 2020). [Link]
waste-management-outsourcing-in-myanmar/.
28. World Bank. Myanmar Economic Monitor.
29. Michele Ford, Michael Gillan and Htwe Htwe Thein. From Cronyism to Oligarchy? Privatisation and
Business Elites in Myanmar. Journal of Contemporary Asia. 2016
30. World Bank. “Policy Note for Operationalizing Proposed Public Procurement Law in Myanmar”.
Unpublished. 2020.
31. Ibid.
32. David Hook, Tin Maung Than and, Kim N.B. Ninh. Conceptualizing Public Sector Reform. (Yangon: The
Asia Foundation, 2015). [Link]
[Link].
33. While sector ministries are expected to develop their own tender procedures for PPPs, interviews
revealed that many still rely on Directive 1/2017.
34. World Bank. “Policy Note.”
35. The Ministry of Planning and Finance (MoPF) was renamed The Ministry of Planning, Finance, and
Industry (MoPFI) in November 2019.
36. Please note that infrastructure procurements are overseen by separate Construction Work Inspection
Committees.
37. Article 3-A-2 of the 2018 Amended Anti-Corruption Law specifies what constitutes corruption in tender
processes.
38. [Link] (accessed August 16, 2020).
39. The chapter is not intended as an audit of actors adherence to the tender procedures set out in
Directive 1/2017 or others, such as the MoC 2016 Guideline.
40. Interviews with MPs suggested that in Ayeyarwady Region and Kayin State the Auditor General’s Office
plays a limited role, while in Mon State (and potentially other states and regions) this approval role is
more prominent.
41. [Link]
42. Source: Directive 1/2017.
43. Source: Supplied by Ayeyarwady Region Social Affairs Minister.
44. PricewaterhouseCoopers. Are Public Projects Doomed to Failure From The Start? Transformation
Assurance.2017. [Link]
html.
45. Richard Batcheler, Lu Min Lwin, David Ney, James Owen and James Powers. Developing Myanmar’s
Local Data Ecosystem.(Yangon: The Asia Foundation 2020).[Link]
uploads/2020/04/Developing-Myanmars-Local-Data-Ecosystem_3.[Link].
Sandhi Governance Institute is a Myanmar Policy The Asia Foundation is a nonprofit international
Research Institute with the focus on enhancing development organization committed to improving
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San Francisco, The Asia Foundation works through
a network of offices in 18 Asian countries and in
Washington, DC.

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