Here is a focused digest of the two cases with emphasis on the nationality issue
(for your Public International Law subject). I’ll break each down by facts, issue,
decision, and the nationality law principle(s) emerging.
1. Alexander Tellech (United States) v. Austria and Hungary (1928)
Facts
• Alexander Tellech was born in the United States in 1895 to Austrian
parents (so he was a US national by birth).
• When he was about five years old, he and his parents moved to Austria,
where he resided.
• Under Austrian (and Austro-Hungarian) law he had Austrian nationality
by parentage. So he had dual nationality: U.S. and Austrian.
• While resident in Austria in August 1914, he was arrested as an
agitator, interned, and then impressed into military service in the Austro-
Hungarian army.
• The U.S. on his behalf claimed compensation from Austria/Hungary (under
the relevant treaty: the Treaty of Vienna and Treaty of Budapest) for the
internment and forced military service.
Legal Issue
• The core issue: Given Tellech’s dual nationality (U.S. + Austrian) and
his residence in Austria, could he claim protection from the United States against
Austria/Hungary under the treaties? More specifically: Did Austria/Hungary have the
obligation under the treaties to pay compensation considering his dual nationality
and the fact that under Austrian law he was Austrian?
• Also: How is nationality determined in international law in a dual-
nationality scenario, for the purposes of diplomatic protection or state
responsibility?
Decision
• The arbitral tribunal held that nationality is determined primarily by
municipal (domestic) law. Under Austrian law, Tellech was an Austrian citizen since
he had Austrian parentage and had subjected himself to Austrian law by residence.
• Because he was voluntarily residing in Austria (where he subjected
himself to Austrian jurisdiction) the Austrian authorities were within their rights
to treat him as an Austrian citizen.
• The tribunal found that under the Treaty of Vienna and the Treaty of
Budapest there was no obligation on Austria and Hungary to pay compensation to the
U.S. on behalf of Tellech.
Principle(s) on Nationality
• Domestic law of the State plays a critical role in determining
nationality for the purposes of international responsibility: “citizenship is
determined by municipal law.”
• Dual nationality poses issues: where a person possesses two
nationalities, the other State (here the U.S.) cannot necessarily claim protection
if the person has submitted himself to the jurisdiction and obligations of the
other State (here Austria). The claimant risked that by residence in Austria he
would be subject to Austrian law and duties.
• The residence and factual connection matter: because Tellech lived in
Austria and availed himself of Austrian law, the tribunal considered that Austrian
nationality was effective for the circumstances.
• In short for the purposes of this case: If you have dual nationality
and you live under one State’s jurisdiction and were subject to its duties, that
State may treat you as its national and other States may have limited recourse
under diplomatic protection.
⸻
2. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (1955)
Facts
• Mr. Friedrich Nottebohm was born in Germany (Hamburg) in 1881.
• In 1905 he moved to Guatemala and became resident there, engaging in
business, banking, coffee plantations etc. He remained there for decades but never
acquired Guatemalan nationality.
• In October 1939, shortly after the outbreak of WWII, Nottebohm applied
for and obtained citizenship of Liechtenstein. However he did not have substantial
ties (residence, family, business) with Liechtenstein; his habitual residence
remained Guatemala (and his earlier ties to Germany).
• Guatemala regarded him as a German national (enemy alien) during
wartime, arrested and deported him to the U.S. and confiscated his property.
Liechtenstein took up his cause and claimed that Guatemala should recognise his
Liechtenstein nationality and that Liechtenstein should be entitled to exercise
diplomatic protection on his behalf.
Legal Issue
• The key issue: Was the nationality conferred by Liechtenstein to
Nottebohm recognised under international law for the purposes of diplomatic
protection by Liechtenstein against Guatemala? More precisely: Should Guatemala
recognise the naturalisation by Liechtenstein, and thus allow Liechtenstein to
exercise diplomatic protection on Nottebohm’s behalf?
• This touches the broader question: What is the international law
standard for recognising nationality (and thus eligibility for diplomatic
protection) beyond the domestic law of the granting State?
Decision
• The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that while a State has
the sovereign right to determine its nationals under its internal law, such
determination does not necessarily impose an obligation on other States to
recognise that nationality for the purposes of diplomatic protection.
• The Court introduced the principle of effective nationality (or genuine
link): other States may look beyond the formal acquisition of nationality and
assess whether a genuine connection (residence, habitual centre, family, interests)
exists between the person and the State whose nationality he holds, if protection
is sought.
• In Nottebohm’s case the Court found his connections to Liechtenstein
were too weak (no habitual residence, no substantial ties) and his residence and
interests were in Guatemala (and earlier Germany). Therefore Guatemala was under no
obligation to recognise his Liechtenstein nationality for protection purposes and
Liechtenstein had no right to espouse his claim.
Principle(s) on Nationality
• The domestic law test (State’s competence to determine nationality) is
only the starting point. But for diplomatic protection or international claims,
other States may examine whether there is a “genuine link” between the individual
and the State whose nationality is invoked.
• The case emphasises the social fact of attachment (residence, centre of
interests, family, habitual links) between individual and State as part of the test
for “effectiveness” of nationality in the international law context.
• Acquisition of nationality solely for the purpose of gaining diplomatic
protection (or avoiding obligations) may not be effective in international law. The
Court noted that nationality must reflect real connection, not just formal
certificates.
• Use for conflict of dual/multiple nationalities: for diplomatic
protection, the State seeking to protect must demonstrate the nationality is
effective and that the other State is obliged to recognise it in the given context.
Comparative summary & teaching points (Nationality focus)
• Both cases illustrate the significance of nationality in international
law, especially when it comes to diplomatic protection and State responsibility.
• In Tellech, the issue was dual nationality + residence + municipal law;
the tribunal was less concerned with “genuine link” and more with the domestic
status under Austrian law and the claimant’s residence under that jurisdiction.
• In Nottebohm, the focus shifts further: even though Liechtenstein had
conferred nationality under its law, the ICJ required a genuine connection before
other States would recognise it for protection.
• Key takeaway: When assessing nationality in international law, keep
three layers in mind:
1. Domestic law – Does the State grant nationality under its internal
legal system?
2. Recognition by other States / international law context – Is the
nationality one that gives rise to rights and obligations at the international
level (especially diplomatic protection)?
3. Effectiveness / genuine link – Is there a real connection between the
person and the State whose nationality is claimed? Without this, other States may
refuse to recognise the nationality for certain purposes.
• For students of Public International Law: These cases show that
nationality is not just a formal fact but has substantive consequences in
international responsibility. Make sure when analysing nationality issues you
address: dual/multiple nationality, habitual residence, centre of interests, treaty
obligations, recognition by third States.
If you like, I can prepare a tabular comparison of the two cases (including
nationality-issue points) or highlight how these cases are applied in modern
doctrine. Would you like me to do that, Tin?