JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

BLJ9.3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

SUBMITTED BY:

SHREE PAWAR

UID: UGJ21-47

[Link].B.(Adjudication and Justicing)

Semester-IX

Academic Session:2024-25

SUBMITTED TO:

Prof. Dr. Kailash Vasave

Assistant Professor of Law

 TABLE OF CONTENT

Sr. No. Particulars Pg. No.

1. Introduction

2. Research Design
 Research Aim
 Research Methodology
 Research Questions
 Research Objectives

3. Theoretical Foundations

4. Evolution Of Administrative Control And Judicial Review In

India

5. Grounds For Judicial Review

6. Doctrines And Principles Governing Judicial Review

7. Scope And Limitations

8. Judicial Review Of Administrative Action – The Test Of

Reasonableness And Fairness

9. Contemporary Analysis

10. Conclusion
 TABLE OF CASES

Sr.
Case Name Citation
No.

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.

1 (1947) 2 All ER 680
Wednesbury Corporation

Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil

2 (1984) 3 All ER 935
Service (CCSU Case)

3 Union of India v. G. Ganayutham AIR 1997 SC 3387

4 Gohil Hanubhai v. State of Gujarat (2017) 13 SCC 621

Delhi Development Authority v. UEE Electricals Engg.

5 (2004) 11 SCC 213
Pvt. Ltd.

6 State Bank of India v. K.P.N. Kutty (2003) 2 SCC 449

7 Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40

8 A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150

9 Golak Nath v. State of Punjab AIR 1967 SC 1643

10 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461

11 Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789

12 I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861

(2022) SCC OnLine

13 Amarendra Kumar Pandey v. Union of India
SC 600

TABLE OF ABBREVATIONS
Sr. No. Abbreviation Full Form

1. AIR All India Reporter

2. All ER All England Law Reports

3. SCC Supreme Court Cases

4. SC Supreme Court

5. HC High Court

6. Art. / Arts. Article / Articles

7. IPC Indian Penal Code

8. CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

9. WLR Weekly Law Reports

10. UK United Kingdom

11. U.K. HL United Kingdom House of Lords

12. v. Versus

13. Ltd. Limited

14. J. Justice

15. SCC OnLine Supreme Court Cases Online

16. PIL Public Interest Litigation

17. CJ Chief Justice

18. HCJ High Court Judge

19. Ed. Edition

20. p. / pp. Page / Pages

I. INTRODUCTION
In the expanding framework of modern governance, the role of administrative agencies has
grown to touch nearly every aspect of citizens’ lives. Whether it is the licensing of businesses,
allocation of resources, regulation of markets, enforcement of social welfare policies, or day-
to-day governance, administrative authorities exercise wide-ranging powers. This
administrative expansion in a welfare-oriented state brings with it the risk of abuse of power,
arbitrariness, and injustices sometimes unintended, sometimes a product of overreach or
neglect. It is here that the concept of judicial review of administrative action gains
significance as the principle instrument of constitutional control.

Judicial review operates on the foundational premise that all power, including that exercised
by administrative bodies, is subject to the law and must be exercised within the bounds set by
legislation and the Constitution. This central mechanism ensures that no authority is above
the law, and that state power remains accountable to legal and constitutional norms. Judicial
review does not seek to substitute the wisdom of the courts for that of administrators. Rather,
it acts as a vital check, scrutinizing how administrative power is exercised whether lawfully,
reasonably, and in accordance with fundamental fair-play principles. Its emergence and
evolution reflect the broader efforts in democratic legal systems to balance efficient
administration with the preservation of rights and guarantees against arbitrary state action. 1

Throughout history, especially in common law jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and
India, courts have carefully carved out the boundaries and functions of judicial review. They
have stressed that judicial review must not become an intrusive appellate system evaluating
the merits of every administrative decision, but must remain a robust safeguard against
illegality, irrationality, and procedural lapses. The development of judicial review is therefore
inextricably tied to broader themes in constitutionalism: the rule of law, separation of powers,
limited government, and the necessity of effective remedies for rights violations.

In an era marked by expanding administrative functions, the need for judicial oversight has
become even more pronounced. Judicial review acts as a safeguard against arbitrary,
unreasonable, or mala fide exercise of power, ensuring that administrative discretion remains
anchored in law and justice.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

2.1 Research Methodology

1
Sabhapandit, S. “Article 12 and judicial review of administrative action: an analysis”. Indian Law Review,
2(1), (2018) Pg. 5–25
For the purpose of this research paper, the author used the doctrinal approach of
research. The doctrinal approach of study is a strict methodology that considers the
letter of the law rather than the spirit of the law. Various legislation, case laws,
commentaries, research articles, and other pertinent legal sources have been consulted
by the author. The goal of this research is to collect and organize the law by offering
commentary on the relevant legal sources and to find the fundamental idea or
framework by understanding how the law is interconnected. The MNLU mode of
citation was utilized throughout the research paper.

2.2 Research Aim

To critically examine the scope, principles, and limitations of judicial review of

administrative action, with a focus on the Indian legal framework, and to evaluate
how effectively judicial review balances administrative efficiency with constitutional
safeguards against arbitrariness.

2.3 Research Questions

1. What is the theoretical and constitutional foundation of judicial review in

administrative law?
2. What are the major grounds and legal doctrines through which courts assess
administrative actions?
3. How have Indian courts interpreted and evolved the scope of judicial review in
matters of administrative discretion, natural justice, and fundamental rights?
4. What are the key limitations of judicial review in India, and how do courts
maintain a balance between judicial restraint and intervention?
5. How effective is judicial review in preventing misuse or overreach of
administrative power while allowing efficient governance?

2.4 Research Objectives

1. To explore the historical development and theoretical basis of judicial review

as a mechanism of constitutional control.
2. To identify and analyse the main grounds illegality, irrationality, and
procedural impropriety on which administrative actions are judicially
reviewed.
3. To study significant legal doctrines such as ultra vires, natural justice,
reasonableness, and proportionality as applied in administrative review.
4. To examine the judicial approach in India toward expanding access to review
through public interest litigation and limiting review via doctrines like
separation of powers.
5. To critically evaluate the effectiveness of judicial review in upholding rule of
law without encroaching upon administrative autonomy.

III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

The theoretical underpinnings of judicial review in administrative law can be traced to
several interrelated principles. At its heart lies the concept of limited government that
governmental power, however necessary for the achievement of social and economic
objectives, must not be exercised without legal constraints. This idea has roots in centuries of
legal thought, from the Magna Carta in 1215 to the emergence of constitutional government
in modern times.

Related to this is the supremacy of law, which posits that all persons and authorities, whether
public or private, are subject to and accountable before the law. This foundational value is
enshrined in modern constitutions and permeates the notion of the rule of law. Judicial review
operationalizes these abstract ideas by providing concrete mechanisms through which
administrative actions can be tested for legality and fairness. The separation of powers further
illuminates the boundaries of judicial review. While the legislature creates laws and the
executive administers them, the judiciary interprets and ensures compliance with legal
standards. Judicial review stands as the medium through which the judiciary maintains this
constitutional equilibrium, offering both a shield for individuals and a discipline for state
institutions.2

Historically, judicial review flourished as a creature of common law, developing through

judicial judgments and precedent. The British tradition, for example, did not have a written
constitution but developed principles of review from the writs of certiorari and mandamus to
doctrines such as natural justice and ultra vires that shaped the scope and function of judicial
control over administration. With the advent of written constitutions, especially in post-
colonial societies like India, the scope of judicial review expanded further, taking on a
constitutional guarantee. The Indian Constitution, for instance, clearly envisages a robust
system of checks and balances. Articles 32 3 and 2264 empower the Supreme Court and High
Courts, respectively, to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for any
other purpose, providing for a comprehensive apparatus of judicial review. Judicial review is
not merely an adjunct to legislative and administrative action, but forms an indispensable
core of checks and balances that ensure government according to law.

IV. EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN

INDIA
2
Milton A. Kallis, “The Problem of Judicial Review of Administrative Action”, Chicago kent Law Review, Vol.
17 Issue 04, Sept. 1938
3
INDIA CONST. art. 32
4
INDIA CONST. art. 226
Judicial review of administrative action in India ensures that every action of administrative
authorities is subject to the rule of law. Courts do not act as appellate bodies to replace
administrative decisions, but they check whether such actions are legal, rational, and
procedurally fair. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority v. UEE Electricals
Engg. Pvt. Ltd. held that illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety are the grounds
for review.5 This approach draws from the famous Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd.
v. Wednesbury Corp., where Lord Greene ruled that administrative action is unreasonable if it
is based on irrelevant factors or is irrational. 6 Indian courts also accentuate the principles of
natural justice, as seen in State Bank of India v. K.P.N Kutty 7 and Ridge v. Baldwin8, requiring
fairness and absence of bias even in administrative inquiries. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of
India9, the Supreme Court widened the scope of natural justice, stressing that administrative
authorities must act fairly and justly.

Judicial review is ingrained in the Constitution. Articles 13 and 32 empower courts to strike
down laws violating Fundamental Rights, while Articles 131–136, 226–227, and 246 further
provide the framework for judicial control over both legislation and administration. The
Supreme Court first recognized judicial review of constitutional amendments in Golak Nath
v. State of Punjab10, where it held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights. This
was taken further in the notable Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala11, where the Court
held that while Parliament’s power to amend the Constitution is wide, it cannot alter its basic
structure. Later, in Minerva Mills v. Union of India12, the Court explicitly declared judicial
review itself as part of the basic structure. The position was reaffirmed in I.R. Coelho v. State
of Tamil Nadu13, where the Court unanimously held that judicial review extends to every part
of the Constitution, including amendments.

Over time, Indian judiciary moved from a phase of self-restraint in the first two decades after
the Constitution, to a more activist role especially in the 1970s and later. This shift enabled
the courts to check arbitrary action by both executive and legislature. Judicial activism,
however, was not meant to allow courts to run the government but to ensure accountability

5
(2004) 11 SCC 213
6
(1947) 2 All ER 680
7
(2003) 2 SCC 449
8
(1964) AC 40
9
(AIR 1970 SC 150)
10
1967 2 S.C.R. 762
11
AIR 1973 SC 1461
12
AIR 1980 SC 1789
13
AIR 2007 SC 861
and safeguard constitutional values. As Justice Bhagwati observed in Minerva Mills, judicial
review is essential to prevent the Rule of Law from becoming an illusion. Yet, as Dr. A.S.
Anand later cautioned, judicial review must be exercised with restraint, since courts cannot
overstep constitutional limits or take over executive functions.

Thus, the evolution of judicial review in India reflects a balance: while administrative
discretion and legislative power are recognized, they remain subject to the Constitution and
the courts’ power to strike down arbitrary, irrational, or unconstitutional actions. Through
landmark cases like Wednesbury, Kraipak, Golak Nath, Kesavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills,
and I.R. Coelho, the Indian judiciary has established judicial review as the guardian of
fairness, legality, and the basic structure of the Constitution.

V. GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

The key to effective judicial oversight lies in the clear delineation of the bases what lawyers
call the “grounds” on which courts may intervene in administrative matters. Judicial review is
not and cannot be unlimited; it is confined to distinct, though flexible, categories which
reflect the judicial balancing of administrative necessity with constitutional discipline.

Foremost among these is illegality. This occurs whenever an authority acts outside the powers
conferred by law, misinterprets the statutory limits of its authority, fails to take into account
relevant considerations, or bases its actions on extraneous or improper considerations. For
instance, a licensing authority that grants or refuses licenses by taking into account factors
unrelated to the public purpose set out by statute may fall afoul of the requirement of
legality.14

Next is irrationality. Stemming from the influential English decision Associated Provincial
Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation (the “Wednesbury case”), irrationality or
“unreasonableness” is understood as action so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted
moral standards that no reasonable authority could have ever come to it. 15 Courts are not
entitled to substitute their own decision simply because they would have decided differently;
intervention is warranted only where there is a stark lack of rational justification.

14
Prashant Saurabh, “The Judicial Review Of Administrative Action: An Analysis”, Indian Journal of Integrated
Research in Law, Vol. 02 Issue 03
15
EWCA Civ 1
A third broad ground is procedural impropriety. This embraces both failure to comply with
mandatory statutory procedures, and a breach of the universally recognized principles of
natural justice such as the right to be heard (audi alteram partem) and the rule against bias
(nemo judex in causa sua). For example, a show-cause notice issued without adequate
opportunity to make a defence or passed by an authority with a personal interest in the
outcome provides fertile ground for judicial correction. To these classical categories, the
jurisprudence of judicial review has gradually added further dimensions. Proportionality is
one such modern doctrine. It holds that administrative measures which restrict rights or
freedoms must not exceed what is necessary to achieve a legitimate aim and must be the least
restrictive among available alternatives. In areas impacting fundamental rights or involving
penal consequences, Indian and English courts have increasingly deployed the proportionality
test to set outer boundaries for administrative power.16

Other important bases for review include the doctrines of legitimate expectation and
promissory estoppel, which protect individuals against abrupt, unjustifiable reversals of long-
standing policies or authorities resiling from assurances upon which affected persons have
relied. The doctrine of jurisdictional error (where authorities act without, or in excess of, the
legal powers vested in them) persists as a fundamental ground for judicial intervention, as
does explicit or implicit violation of constitutional and fundamental rights. What unites these
varied grounds is the animating principle that public power must be exercised consistently
with both legality and fairness, and that there must be effective remedies when these
standards are breached.17

VI. DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JUDICIAL REVIEW

A few major legal doctrines regulate the content and process of judicial review. The first and
arguably most pervasive is the doctrine of ultra vires literally, “beyond the powers.” Any
administrative action undertaken without the authority of law or exceeding the limits of the
legislation is void and liable to be struck down. Ultra vires has been both the cornerstone and
the open door for developing nuanced grounds of review.

16
Bell, John, & François Lichère, “Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedure, in Contemporary
French Administrative Law” 154–77 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2022).
17
Mohd Aqib Aslam, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: An Overview, Journal of Indian Scholar, Vol.
06 Issue 4.
A closely associated schema is the doctrine of natural justice, which or its two basic limbs,
the rule of fair hearing and the rule against bias functions as a bulwark against oppressive or
arbitrary administrative decisions. Natural justice applies not only to quasi-judicial decisions
but also to a wide range of administrative actions with civil consequences, unless the context
or an express statute explicitly excludes it. For example, the right to present a case or receive
notice before an adverse administrative decision is part of the universal minimum standard.

The principle of reasonableness (Wednesbury unreasonableness) encourages judicial restraint

in not striking down administrative decisions merely because the court would have reached a
different result. Instead, the court intervenes only when no plausible person could reasonably
have taken a particular view. The doctrine of proportionality goes a step further, especially
significant in contemporary public law where state actions may impinge on constitutionally
protected rights. Here, courts examine whether the administrative response is commensurate
with the aim pursued, and whether a less drastic alternative is available. Proportionality,
while more intrusive than Wednesbury, is particularly apt in cases concerning arrest,
suspension of fundamental rights, or the imposition of penalties. These doctrines collectively
ensure that the administration can discharge its functions without undue judicial interference,
but within a framework guaranteeing legal certainty, fairness, and respect for individual
rights.

VII. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Judicial review of administrative action rests upon the established principles of common law
and equity, enabling courts to interfere when issues of jurisdiction, abuse of power, illegality,
or procedural unfairness arise. Such review may be invoked directly through writs like
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and injunctions, or indirectly when
administrative findings form the basis of disputes between private parties.18

Courts exercise judicial review in three main ways. First, they examine the conclusions of
law reached by administrative agencies, since courts are the final authority on what the law
is. Secondly, when constitutional rights are at stake, courts may even determine questions of
fact for themselves. Thirdly, they may review the procedural fairness, good faith, and
jurisdiction of the administrative body to ensure proper exercise of power.

18
Nandish, Administrative Law And Judicial Review Of Administrative Action Through Writs: Ground Of
Review, Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research, Volume 7, Issue 2
At the same time, the judiciary generally follows a policy of non-interference in
administrative action. This restraint is based on several reasons: the principle of state
sovereignty (the State cannot be sued without consent), the presumption of regularity in
official acts, the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies, and the doctrine of
separation of powers which discourages courts from intruding into executive functions. In
such fields, courts accord deference to administrative discretion and democratic legitimacy,
intervening only where decisions are tainted by illegality, arbitrariness, or breach of
constitutional limits.

Judicial review has also expanded through the evolution of locus standi. Earlier confined to
individuals directly affected, standing has been liberalized in India through Public Interest
Litigation (PIL). This allows any public-spirited person to seek remedies for violations of
collective or diffused rights, especially on behalf of disadvantaged groups unable to approach
courts themselves. This expansion has strengthened access to justice and made judicial
review more responsive to public concerns.19

Review of delegated or subordinate legislation (rules and regulations framed by

administrative authorities) is also permitted. Courts examine whether such rules fall within
the powers delegated by parent statutes, whether they violate any provision of the
Constitution, or are otherwise arbitrary and unreasonable. Equally, judicial review must not
become an open invitation for litigation in every administrative matter. Judicial economy,
regulatory expertise, and respect for competing constitutional values mean courts exercise
review only in cases of manifest error, illegality, or where no other effective remedy exists.

VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION – THE TEST OF

REASONABLENESS AND FAIRNESS

The concept of judicial review of administrative action ensures that the actions of public
authorities remain within the limits of law, fairness, and reason. It allows the courts to check
whether an administrative authority has exercised its powers properly, fairly, and in
accordance with legal and constitutional principles. However, courts do not act as appellate
bodies to reconsider the merits of the decision itself they only examine the process by which
the decision was made.

19
Shatakshi Singh, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Comparative Study of India and Australia,
International Journal Of Law Management & Humanities, Vol. 6 Issue 1.
The landmark English case Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corporation20, commonly known as the Wednesbury Case, laid down the foundational
principles of this doctrine. In that case, the Court held that while administrative authorities
are given discretion to make decisions, such discretion must be exercised reasonably. A
decision would be considered “Wednesbury unreasonable” if:

1. The authority took into account matters it should not have considered;

2. Ignored matters it was required to consider; or

3. The decision was so absurd or illogical that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at it.

The Court explained that unreasonableness can sometimes overlap with bad faith,
arbitrariness, or misuse of power. Therefore, even when the authority acts within its
jurisdiction, the court can interfere if the decision defies logic or accepted moral standards.

Later, the principles were refined and expanded in the Council of Civil Service Unions v.
Minister for the Civil Service21, famously known as the CCSU Case. The House of Lords
summarised the three main grounds of judicial review:

1. Illegality – when the decision-maker acts beyond or against the law, misunderstands
legal limits, or misuses the power granted.

2. Procedural Impropriety – when the authority fails to follow the required procedure or
violates the principles of natural justice, such as fair hearing or impartiality.

3. Irrationality – also known as Wednesbury unreasonableness, where the decision is so

outrageous in its defiance of logic or moral standards that no sensible person could
have made it.

The concept of proportionality was later introduced in European jurisprudence and gradually
influenced Indian administrative law, where courts began to examine whether the action
taken was proportionate to its objective.

In India, the Supreme Court in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham22 adopted the principles of
Wednesbury and CCSU and held that Indian courts act only as secondary reviewing
authorities. This means that while the primary responsibility for decision-making lies with the
20
(1947) 2 All ER 680
21
(1984) 3 All ER 935
22
AIR 1997 SC 3387
administration, the courts can review whether the decision was taken in a reasonable and
lawful manner. The Court made it clear that the choice of action lies with the administrative
authority, and the judiciary cannot substitute its own judgment merely because it would have
decided differently.

Similarly, in Gohil Hanubhai v. State of Gujarat23, the Supreme Court reiterated that judicial
review lies against the decision-making process and not against the decision itself. Courts
will not interfere with administrative discretion unless there is evidence of illegality,
procedural unfairness, irrationality, or arbitrariness.

Judicial review acts as a safeguard against misuse of administrative power. It ensures that
administrative actions conform to the principles of rule of law, reasonableness, and fairness,
maintaining a balance between the autonomy of the executive and the rights of the individual.

IX. CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS

Recently in the case of Amarendra Kumar Pandey vs Union of India 24 the Supreme Court
explained that courts can judicially review administrative actions based on an authority’s
subjective satisfaction that is, when the authority is empowered to act on its own opinion or
belief though this power of review is limited. The Court held that even when the law uses
expressions like “if satisfied,” “if of the opinion,” or “if it considers necessary,” the
authority’s opinion is not beyond scrutiny. Judicial review can examine whether the decision
was formed on relevant facts, whether those facts truly existed, whether the authority acted
honestly and in good faith, and whether it misunderstood or misapplied the law.

The Court further clarified that it can interfere in five main situations:

1. where the facts relied upon by the authority do not actually exist or have no evidence
to support them;
2. where there is no reasonable connection between the facts and the purpose of the
power;
3. where the statutory conditions for exercising power are misunderstood or
misinterpreted;
4. where the power is used for an improper or extraneous purpose; and

23
(2017) 13 SCC 621
24
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 600
 5. where irrelevant grounds are considered or relevant grounds ignored. In such cases,
the authority’s opinion is treated as arbitrary or invalid.

The Court stressed that while it cannot normally question the correctness of the authority’s
conclusions, it can intervene when the satisfaction is unreasonable or perverse meaning that
no rational person could have reached such a conclusion. The “doctrine of reasonableness”
allows the Court to ensure that subjective satisfaction is not used as a cover for arbitrary
action.

X. CONCLUSION
Judicial review of administrative action stands today as one of the cornerstones of
constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It is the judiciary’s most powerful tool to ensure
that every organ of the State acts within the boundaries of law, respects fundamental rights,
and adheres to the principles of reasonableness, fairness, and accountability. Rooted in the
doctrine of ultra vires and strengthened through centuries of common law evolution, judicial
review in India has developed into a dynamic constitutional safeguard against arbitrariness
and abuse of power.

From the early English precedents such as Wednesbury and CCSU, to the landmark Indian
judgments in Kesavananda Bharati, Minerva Mills, and A.K. Kraipak, the principles of
illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety, and proportionality have evolved into a
coherent framework that guides judicial control over administrative decisions. The Indian
judiciary, while inspired by common law principles, has given judicial review a constitutional
foundation under Articles 13, 32, and 226 transforming it from a mere supervisory
mechanism into a guarantee of good governance and protector of the basic structure of the
Constitution.

At the same time, the courts have recognized that judicial review is not an avenue for
substituting judicial opinion for administrative discretion. As reiterated in Union of India v.
G. Ganayutham and Gohil Hanubhai v. State of Gujarat, the courts’ role is to examine the
decision-making process, not the decision itself. This careful balance ensures that judicial
review does not transgress into executive or legislative territory, preserving the separation of
powers while upholding constitutional supremacy.

The contemporary jurisprudence, as seen in Amarendra Kumar Pandey v. Union of India,

reaffirms that even subjective administrative satisfaction is not immune from judicial
scrutiny. The judiciary may intervene when decisions are based on non-existent facts,
irrelevant considerations, or an unreasonable interpretation of law.

Judicial review in India serves a dual purpose it is both a shield for citizens against
administrative excesses and a disciplinary instrument that compels the State to act lawfully,
rationally, and fairly. It embodies the spirit of constitutionalism by ensuring that power
remains a trust for public good, exercised within the framework of justice and equity. judicial
review is not merely a procedural safeguard it is the heartbeat of the rule of law, the guardian
of democratic accountability, and the ultimate assurance that no one, not even the State, is
above the law.
 XI. BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles and Journals

 Bell, John, & François Lichère, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Procedure,
in Contemporary French Administrative Law 154–77 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2022).
 Kallis, Milton A., The Problem of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 17 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 401 (1938).
 Nandish, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Administrative Action Through
Writs: Grounds of Review, 7 J. Emerging Techs. & Innovative Res. 115 (2020).
 Sabhapandit, S., Article 12 and Judicial Review of Administrative Action: An
Analysis, 2 Indian L. Rev. 5 (2018).
 Saurabh, Prashant, The Judicial Review of Administrative Action: An Analysis, 2
Indian J. Integrated Res. L. 1 (2023).
 Singh, Shatakshi, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Comparative Study of
India and Australia, 6 Int’l J. L. Mgmt. & Human. 1 (2023).
 Mohd Aqib Aslam, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions: An Overview, Journal
of Indian Scholar.

Online Sources

 Hein online
 Manupatra
 JSTOR
 SCC
 AIR
 EBC
 LexisNexis
 Google scholar