Example 1: The Exclusionary Rule in Action –Mapp v.
Ohio
The Exclusionary Rule prohibits evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights
from being used in court, reinforcing the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches. In *Mapp v. Ohio* (1961), police officers forcibly entered Dollree Mapp's home while
searching for a fugitive but found and seized allegedly obscene materials without a valid search warrant.
Mapp was arrested and convicted, but her case reached the Supreme Court, which ruled that evidence
obtained unlawfully could not be admitted in state courts. This landmark ruling extended the
Exclusionary Rule to all states, significantly limiting police overreach and setting a national precedent for
excluding evidence gathered in violation of constitutional rights. This case emphasizes Garland's points
on the importance of procedural fairness and demonstrates the far-reaching impact of the Exclusionary
Rule in protecting individuals from unlawful law enforcement actions.
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Example 2: The Impact of Eyewitness Misidentification – The Case of Ronald Cotton
Eyewitness misidentification has long been recognized as a leading cause of wrongful convictions, and
Ronald Cotton’s story exemplifies its tragic consequences. Cotton was wrongfully convicted in 1984 for
rape and burglary based largely on the victim’s misidentification, despite alibi witnesses and other
conflicting evidence. Years later, DNA testing conclusively proved his innocence, leading to his
exoneration. Cotton’s case prompted significant reforms in identification protocols, as it underscored
the importance of non-suggestive identification methods discussed in Garland’s Chapter 10. His case
influenced law enforcement agencies nationwide to adopt best practices such as double-blind
procedures and sequential lineups to minimize human error and suggestiveness in eyewitness
identifications. This example illustrates the real-world implications of failing to ensure reliability in
eyewitness procedures, supporting Garland’s emphasis on procedural integrity.
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Example 3: The Risks of Show-Ups in Suspect Identification – People v. Dixon
Show-ups are quick, single-suspect identifications conducted soon after an incident. Although expedient,
they carry a high risk of suggestiveness, potentially leading to wrongful identification and conviction. In
*People v. Dixon*, the victim of a robbery misidentified Dixon as the perpetrator in a show-up
conducted shortly after the incident. This misidentification, compounded by the lack of additional
evidence, led to Dixon's conviction, though later evidence proved his innocence. The case highlights
Garland's point that show-ups, although convenient, are prone to error and should be conducted with
caution. Since the Dixon case, many jurisdictions have implemented protocols to mitigate the risk of bias
in show-ups, including conducting them only when necessary and ensuring police do not prompt
witnesses. Dixon's experience underscores the need for more reliable identification processes, validating
Garland's discussion on the dangers of suggestiveness in identification.
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Example 4: Legal Representation in Lineups –United States v. Wade
In *United States v. Wade* (1967), the Supreme Court ruled on the importance of legal representation
during post-indictment lineups, addressing defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Billy Joe Wade, the
defendant, had been placed in a lineup without his attorney, and the witness’s identification of him
became critical evidence in his conviction for robbery. The Court ruled that because the lineup took
place after Wade’s indictment, he was entitled to have his lawyer present to ensure fairness and prevent
suggestive practices. This landmark decision established the “Critical Stage” doctrine, which mandates
attorney presence in post-indictment identification procedures to protect the defendant’s rights. This
case laid the foundation for current practices requiring counsel to be present to safeguard against
undue influence and bias during lineups. Wade’s case illustrates the legal system’s commitment to
procedural justice and serves as a real-world application of Garland’s discussions on protecting
defendants' rights in identification contexts.