NEBOSH IGC MOCK EXAM ASSIGNMENT#2

SUBMITTED TO: SIR ABDUL GHAFFAR

SUBMITTED BY: MUHAMMAD IRFAN MALIK (BATCH 107A)

Task 1: Behavioural safety audit checklists

1. The observers use a checklist for the behavioural safety audits. What are the benefits of using a
checklist? (10marks)
Note: You should support your answer, where applicable, using relevant information from the scenario.
Answer:
Using a checklist for behavioural safety audits (BSA) is very useful for both observers and the
organization. It provides a structured and consistent way of observing workers and helps in identifying
safe as well as unsafe behaviours. The following are the benefits of using a checklist:

i. Consistency: A checklist ensures that every observer looks for the same behaviours across all
departments. In the scenario, one checklist is used across the site, which makes the process
uniform and reliable.

ii. Focus on critical risks: The checklist was prepared from analysis of past accidents, so it
highlights the unsafe behaviours that have actually caused previous incidents in this
organization, making the audits more relevant.

iii. User-friendly: Observers can follow the clear step-by-step format without missing key points. In
the scenario, even newly trained volunteers can use it effectively during daily BSAs.

iv. Impartiality: Using the same checklist reduces personal bias of observers. This means all
workers and contractors are assessed in a fair and transparent way.

v. Facilitates observer training: The organization provided observer training, and the checklist
helps new observers learn what to monitor and how to carry out the audit in a structured way.

vi. Improves worker feedback: Observers can use the checklist points to give workers specific
examples of safe or unsafe behaviour during follow-up conversations, making the feedback
more meaningful and productive.

vii. Record keeping: Completed checklists serve as written evidence of observations. In the
scenario, all forms are version controlled, which makes records reliable and traceable.

viii. Helps data analysis: The safety adviser collects and collates the completed checklists weekly.
This makes it possible to identify common unsafe acts or behaviour trends across different
departments.

ix. Supports continuous improvement: Issues identified on the checklist can be used to plan
corrective actions for example refresher training, better supervision or engineering controls. In
the scenario, this links to the weekly feedback meetings where the safety adviser shares
findings with departments and managers, which helps improve performance over time.

x. Encourages worker participation: Workers see that both safe and unsafe behaviours are
being noted in a fair way. This helps to build trust and strengthens worker involvement in the
BSA programme.

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 xi. Time efficient: Observers can complete the audits quickly while still covering all important
points. This saves time and encourages regular daily observations.
xii. Supports management decision making: Information from the checklists is shared in
feedback meetings, which allows managers/directors to monitor progress and decide where
more resources or changes are needed.

Task 2: Explaining to the contractor the obligations of employers to workers

2. What employer obligations are likely to have been contravened, leading to the contractor’s accident
in this scenario? (10marks)
Note: You only need to consider those obligations placed upon employers under Recommendation 10 of
International Labour Organisation R164 - Occupational Safety and Health Recommendation,1981 (No.
164).
Note: You should support your answer, where applicable, using relevant information from the scenario.
Answer:
Under ILO R164, employers have many obligations to keep workers (including contractors) safe. In this
scenario several of these obligations were not fulfilled, which contributed to the contractor’s accident. The
main contraventions are:

i. Safe workplace and equipment: Employers must provide safe plant/equipment and environment.
In this case the machine was not isolated and locked out/tagged out (LOTO) was not applied,
and it started unexpectedly, making the workplace unsafe.

ii. Safe systems of work (SSW): Employers must provide safe methods for high-risk work. The
permit-to-work (PTW) was issued without a physical check and the issuer was overloaded with
up to 75 permits daily, which made the system ineffective.

iii. Adequate supervision and monitoring: Employers must ensure competent supervision. In the
scenario, the supervisor left the contractor alone after a brief tour and did not monitor the work
further, which breached this duty.

iv. Information on workplace hazards: Workers must be told about hazards. The contractor was not
informed about the known fault with the machine (‘DANGER’ warning sign found later), meaning key
risk information was hidden or not communicated.

v. Training and induction: Employers must give site induction training where workers might face new
risks. The contractor was experienced but this was his first time on this site and he was not given
proper site-specific induction.

vi. Safe workplace conditions: Employers must maintain safe conditions. The flickering light above
the machine was ignored by the supervisor, so the contractor worked in poor visibility.

vii. Control of workloads and fatigue: Employers must avoid overburdening staff. The PTW issuer
was handling up to 75 permits a day, which increased the chance of mistakes and unsafe shortcuts.

viii. Protective measures: Employers must provide effective protective and preventive measures.
There was no evidence of proper PPE, machine guarding, or barriers to stop unexpected start-up.

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 ix. Worker consultation: Employers should consult with the workers and act on concerns. When the
contractor raised the issue of poor lighting, the supervisor dismissed it, showing lack of
consultation.

x. Emergency preparedness: Employers must prepare for emergencies and unusual risks. The
machine had a known fault (“starts when it should not”), yet no emergency measures were in place.

xi. Updating knowledge: Employers should act on new information and past learning. The warning
sign on the faulty machine was ignored, showing failure to take lessons from known risks.

Task 3: Management failures

3. You try to inform the supervisor that the root causes of unsafe behaviour are usually management
failures. Based on the scenario only, what management failures are likely to have contributed to this
accident? (10marks)
Answer:
The contractor’s accident was not just the result of unsafe behaviour but was linked to several management
failures. These failures in supervision, systems and culture created the conditions for the accident.

i. Failure to enforce isolation and LOTO: Management allowed work on the machine without
confirming that lockout/tagout (LOTO) was applied or not. This failure directly exposed the
contractor to unexpected start-up.

ii. Weak permit-to-work (PTW) system: Management overloaded the PTW issuer with up to 75
permits daily. No physical checks were made of the work area, showing a serious breakdown in
PTW systems.

iii. Poor supervision and monitoring: The supervisor gave a quick tour and left the contractor alone
for the whole day. No monitoring was done to ensure safe working.

iv. Ignoring known hazard: There was already a warning sign stating that the machine starts
unexpectedly, but management did not repair or withdraw the machine from service.

v. Failure to provide site induction: The contractor was new to the site but was not given site-
specific induction, so was unaware of local hazards and procedures.

vi. Unsafe workplace conditions accepted: The flickering light above the machine was ignored,
and the supervisor allowed work to continue in poor visibility.

vii. Allowing work without documentation: The contractor had no risk assessment and method
statement on site. The supervisor allowed work to continue without these essential documents.

viii. Dismissal of safety concerns: When the contractor raised the issue of poor lighting, the
supervisor dismissed it instead of taking corrective action.

ix. Blame culture from supervisors: The supervisor said accidents are “human error” and
“unavoidable,” showing a culture that blames workers instead of fixing root causes.

x. Failure to control workload: Management did not resource the PTW system properly. The issuer
was under pressure, which led to unsafe shortcuts.
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 xi. Lack of communication and coordination: The contractor could not find the supervisor or
machine operator when questions arose. Management failed to ensure proper lines of
communication.

Task 4: Assessing the permit-to-work system arrangements

4. Based on the scenario only, comment on the application of the permit-to-work system. (10marks)
Answer:
In the scenario, a permit-to-work (PTW) system existed but it was not applied properly. The way it was
managed and implemented showed serious weaknesses. These failures reduced the effectiveness of the
PTW and contributed to the contractor’s accident.

i. Excessive workload: The PTW issuer admitted to issuing up to 75 permits daily, which makes it
hard to do the job safely. This shows poor planning and that the permit system was overloaded.

ii. No physical checks/inspection of work area: The issuer relied on conversation only and did
not go to the machine to confirm hazards or isolation. This is a serious failure in the PTW system.

iii. Assumption about isolation: The issuer told the contractor that the supervisor had locked out the
machine. In reality this was not done, showing unsafe reliance on assumptions.

iv. Unsafe Paperwork: Although the PTW forms were filled and signed, the actual controls (isolation,
safe area checks etc.) were missing. This shows a “tick box” culture (issuance of PTW from the
table).

v. Lack of coordination: The PTW system did not ensure that the contractor, issuer and supervisor
had a common understanding. The contractor was left confused and without any support.

vi. Failure to enforce risk assessment and method statement: The contractor did not bring a risk
assessment and method statement to site. The supervisor still allowed the job to go ahead, which
undermined the purpose of the PTW system.

vii. Workplace conditions ignored: The PTW did not address the unsafe flickering light, even
though this increased the risk of mistakes during maintenance.

viii. Lack of monitoring: Once the permit was issued, no one checked on the contractor during the
task. PTW should include monitoring while work is ongoing and a final clearance check before
returning the machine to service, but this was missing.

ix. Poor hazard management: A warning sign showed the machine could start unexpectedly, but the
PTW system did not identify or control this hazard.

x. False sense of safety: Because paperwork existed, everyone assumed the task was safe. In
reality, the PTW system failed to provide genuine control of risks.

xi. Weak organizational arrangements: Management ignored the problems in the PTW system, such
as overworked issuers and unsafe hazards.

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Task 5: Costs of incidents/accidents
5. The accident could have resulted in a more serious injury.
In this case, what would the likely:
a) Insured costs be for the computer manufacturing organization? (2marks)
b) Uninsured costs be for the computer manufacturing organization? (8marks)
Note: You should support your answer, where applicable, using relevant information from the scenario.
Answer:
Part a). Insured Costs
i. Medical and compensation payments: Insurance would cover the contractor’s hospital visit, x-ray
and any medical treatment, as well as possible compensation for the bruised-hand injury.
ii. Damage to property or equipment: If the machine or its parts were damaged when it started
unexpectedly, the repair or replacement cost could be claimed under the company’s insurance
policy.
Part b). Uninsured Costs

i. Downtime:
The machine would have to be stopped for inspection and repair, causing loss of production and
missed delivery deadlines.
ii. Investigation time/cost:
Managers and the health-and-safety adviser would spend hours finding causes, interviewing
witnesses and completing reports, taking them away from their normal duties.
iii. Extra paperwork and meetings:
Internal meetings, emails and discussions with the contractor’s company would take up
management time and slow down other work.
iv. Replacement labour cost:
Another contractor or in-house engineer might need to finish the job, possibly on overtime or short
notice, increasing labour costs.
v. Training cost:
Supervisors and contractors may need refresher training on the permit-to-work and lock-out
systems to prevent recurrence of the event, adding to training expenses.
vi. Loss of reputation:
Contractors and clients may view the company as unsafe, which could harm future
business/orders and reduce trust in the organization.
vii. Low worker morale:
Workers could lose confidence in management after seeing safety ignored, leading to lower
motivation and productivity.
viii. Enforcement action and legal fees:
Authorities could issue an improvement or prohibition notice. If the case went to court, the company
would face legal costs and possible fines, none of which are insured.
ix. Failure of health and safety management system:
The accident shows weaknesses in supervision and permit system. Management would need to
spend time and resources reviewing and improving these systems to restore effectiveness and
rebuild trust in the behavioural-safety programme.

Comment: Insurance would only pay direct costs like medical bills and equipment repair, but the
uninsured costs including downtime, investigations, enforcement actions, legal fees and system
improvements are far higher and continue to affect productivity, morale and reputation long after the
accident.

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Task 6: Indicators of health and safety culture
6. Part a): Based on the scenario only, what are the positive indicators of health and safety culture
at the computer manufacturing organization? (12marks)
Part b): Based on the scenario only, what are the negative indicators of health and safety culture at
the computer manufacturing organization? (6marks)
Answer:
(a) Positive indicators

i. Top management commitment:

The directors are fully committed to the behavioural safety audit (BSA) programme and have
made it one of the year’s safety objectives, showing leadership involvement.
ii. Appointment of a senior manager:
A senior manager has been appointed to lead the BSA programme and act as the behavioural
safety champion, showing visible leadership and competence in managing safety.
iii. Consultation with workers:
The BSA programme was introduced after consultation with workers, showing participation and two-
way communication between management and staff.
iv. Provision of resources:
Funding was provided for awareness and observer training, showing that management is willing to
invest in health and safety improvement.
v. Inclusive arrangements/special arrangements for vulnerable workers:
Special communication facilities were arranged for an observer with hearing difficulties,
showing commitment to inclusion and equal opportunities.
vi. Behavioural safety awareness training:
All workers attended training sessions to understand the importance of safe behaviour, showing a
proactive approach to safety culture.
vii. Observer training:
Observers were trained before starting their duties, ensuring competence and consistent application
of the BSA system.
viii. Structured observation system:
Observers use a checklist of critical behaviours based on previous accidents, showing a
learning-based and systematic approach to managing safety.
ix. Data collection and feedback:
Completed checklists are collected, analyzed and discussed weekly, showing active monitoring and
feedback for improvement.
x. Version control of documents:
All forms and procedures are version controlled, showing good organization and attention to detail
in safety documentation.
xi. Recognition/Appreciation of safe behaviour:
Observers give praise for safe acts during feedback discussions, reinforcing positive attitudes and
encouraging safe performance.
xii. Worker involvement in safety improvement:
Ten volunteer observers participate in the BSA process, showing strong worker involvement and
ownership of safety standards.
xiii. Commitment to continuous improvement:
Weekly feedback meetings and data analysis show the company aims to learn from observations
and continually improve its safety performance.
xiv. Evidence of management follow-up:
Findings from BSA checklists are shared with departments and acted upon, showing a proactive
culture rather than a reactive one.

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Comment: Positive indicators show strong top-level commitment, worker involvement and structured
systems like BSA and training.

(b) Negative indicators

i. Poor attitude towards safety:

Some supervisors and long-serving managers are not convinced about the value of the BSA
programme, showing lack of belief in safety initiatives.
ii. Blame culture:
The supervisor described the accident as “human error” and “unavoidable,” showing a culture of
blaming workers rather than learning from incidents.
iii. Unsafe acceptance of hazards:
The flickering light near the machine was ignored, showing tolerance towards unsafe conditions.
iv. Lack of communication:
The contractor could not find the supervisor or operator during the task, showing weak
communication and poor coordination.
v. Failure to act on known risks:
A warning sign showed the machine starts unexpectedly, yet the fault was not repaired, showing
poor follow-up and hazard control.
vi. Work without documentation:
The supervisor allowed work to continue without a risk assessment or method statement, ignoring
safe systems of work.
vii. Excessive workload:
The PTW issuer handling 75 permits daily shows unrealistic workloads and weak organizational
arrangements.
viii. Resistance to investigation:
The supervisor initially dismissed the need for further investigation, showing a negative attitude
toward learning from accidents.

Comment: Negative indicators highlight weak supervision, poor communication and a blame culture that
undermine the safety message.

Task 7: Understanding arrangements in ISO 45001: 2018 (Plan, Do, Check, Act)
7. ISO 45001: 2018 incorporates the Plan, Do, Check, Act stages. Indicate which one of these stages
each of the following arrangements belong to:
a Resources (providing resources for the BSA programme). (1mark)
b Occupational health and safety (OH&S) objectives (successful implementation of BSA programme).
(1mark)
c Performance evaluation (reviewing and sharing information on BSAs). (1mark)
d Internal communication (weekly feedback meetings). (1mark)
e Hazard identification (hazards identified and understood by the permit issuer and contractor).
(1mark)
f Control of documented information (careful version control). (1mark)
g Investigating incidents (health and safety adviser investigates contractor’s accident. (1mark)
h Actions to address risks and opportunities (permit-to-work system in place). (1mark)
i Active monitoring (BSAs). (1mark)
j Continual improvement (health and safety adviser informing supervisor that accident investigation
can improve performance). (1mark)

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Answer:
PDCA
No. Arrangement Short Explanation
Stage
Providing resources is part of planning so
Resources (providing resources for the
(a) Plan that people, time and money are available
BSA programme)
before implementation.
Setting objectives happens at the planning
Occupational H&S objectives (successful
(b) Plan stage to define what the system aims to
implementation of BSA programme)
achieve.
Reviewing data and sharing results
Performance evaluation (reviewing and
(c) Check measures performance to see if objectives
sharing information on BSAs)
are met.
Communicating and engaging with workers
Internal communication (weekly feedback
(d) Do are actions carried out while operating the
meetings)
system.
Hazard identification (hazards identified
Recognizing hazards is part of the planning
(e) and understood by permit issuer and Plan
process before work starts.
contractor)
Control of documented information (careful Maintaining and updating controlled
(f) Do
version control) documents is done during implementation.
Investigating incidents (H&S adviser Incident investigation checks how the system
(g) Check
investigates contractor’s accident) worked and identifies gaps.
Applying control measures like the PTW
Actions to address risks and opportunities
(h) Do system is part of doing and operating
(permit-to-work system in place)
planned actions.
Active monitoring (behavioural safety BSAs monitor safe and unsafe acts,
(i) Check
audits – BSAs) providing feedback on system performance.
Continual improvement (H&S adviser Taking lessons from incidents to improve
(j) informing supervisor that investigation can Act future performance belongs to the act /
improve performance) improvement stage.

Task 8: Contractor management

8. Based on the scenario only, what are the negative aspects of the computer manufacturing
organization’s contractor management, associated with the maintenance activity? (10marks)
Answer:
The scenario shows several weaknesses in the organization’s contractor management system. These
failures occurred before, during, and after the maintenance activity, increasing the risk of the contractor’s
accident.

 Before work started (Pre-work stage)

i. No competence verification (Selection of contractor):

The contractor was experienced but new to this site. There is no evidence that management
checked their competence or verified their understanding of the organization’s PTW system before
allowing them to start work.
ii. No pre-job planning:
Management failed to ensure that the risk assessment and method statement were available
before work began. The supervisor allowed the task to proceed without this essential
documentation.

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 iii. No proper site induction:
The contractor was not given site-specific induction, so they did not know about the site rules,
hazards, and procedures, especially the known fault with the machine.
iv. Poor hazard communication:
Important information, such as the machine’s history of starting unexpectedly, was not shared with
the contractor, showing a failure to communicate risks clearly.

 During the work (Execution stage)

i. Lack of supervision and monitoring:

The supervisor only gave a brief tour and then left the contractor alone for the whole day, providing
no on-site monitoring or guidance during the maintenance work.
ii. Issuance of PTW from table:
The PTW issuer assumed isolation and lockout had been done but did not check it personally. This
failure led directly to the unexpected start-up of the machine.
iii. Overloaded permit issuer:
Issuing up to 75 permits a day is unrealistic and increases the risk of errors, showing poor planning
and insufficient resources for the PTW system.
iv. Unsafe working conditions ignored:
The flickering light above the machine was reported by the contractor but ignored by the
supervisor, showing poor response to safety concerns raised during the task.
v. Poor communication and coordination:
The contractor could not find the supervisor or operator when questions arose, showing lack of
coordination between the site and the contractor.

 After the work (Post-work stage)

i. No monitoring or follow-up:
Once the permit was issued, no one checked progress or confirmed that the task was completed
safely before re-energizing the machine.
ii. No learning or review:
Management considered the incident as simple “human error” and did not carry out proper
investigation or review, showing failure to learn from the event and improve systems.

Comment: The organization’s contractor management failed at every stage — selection, induction,
supervision, communication, and review. These weaknesses led to unsafe conditions, poor coordination,
and lack of control over high-risk maintenance work, demonstrating a serious breakdown in contractor
management arrangements.

Task 9: Training recommendations

The computer manufacturing organization wants to help ensure that a repeat of the contractor’s accident
becomes less likely, by helping to ensure that all workers and visitors to site receive appropriate training.
Based on the scenario only, what training should the organization arrange for the different types of
workers? (12marks)
Answer:

To prevent a repeat of the contractor’s accident, the organization should provide clear, targeted training for
different groups of people on site. Each group has different responsibilities and training needs based on the
scenario.

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  Supervisors

i. Permit-to-work (PTW) training:

Supervisors must be trained to understand PTW procedures, including when permits are required,
how to verify isolations, and how to monitor contractors during the job.
ii. Lockout/Tagout (LOTO) training:
They should receive detailed training on machinery isolation, confirming energy sources are locked
and tagged before any maintenance starts.
iii. Leadership and behavioural safety training:
Supervisors need training on positive safety leadership, communication, and supporting the BSA
programme, instead of blaming workers for accidents.
iv. Incident investigation training:
They should learn how to carry out basic investigations, identify root causes and take corrective
actions instead of assuming accidents are “human error.”

 Permit issuers

i. Advanced PTW system training:

Permit issuers need refresher training to manage workload, verify job sites physically, and
understand their legal responsibilities under the PTW system.
ii. Hazard identification and risk assessment:
Training should focus on identifying hazards related to maintenance tasks and ensuring appropriate
controls are in place before issuing a permit.
iii. Time management and prioritization:
Permit issuers should be trained in managing daily workloads effectively to avoid issuing too many
permits without proper checks.

 Contractors

i. Site-specific induction:
Contractors must receive induction covering site rules, emergency procedures, known hazards, and
reporting lines before starting work.
ii. Safe systems of work training:
They should be trained to bring and follow their own risk assessments and method statements, and
to stop work if safety controls are missing.
iii. PTW and LOTO awareness:
Contractors need clear training on how the site’s PTW and LOTO systems operate, including their
duties when accepting a permit.
iv. Communication and stop-work authority:
Training should reinforce that contractors can raise safety concerns, refuse unsafe work, and report
problems immediately without fear of blame.

 All workers (including observers and maintenance staff)

i. Behavioural safety refresher training:

All workers should have periodic refresher sessions to reinforce positive behaviours, observation
skills and feedback techniques used in the BSA programme.
ii. Hazard reporting and near-miss reporting:
Training should remind everyone to report unsafe conditions (like flickering lights or faulty machines)
so issues are fixed before accidents occur.

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iii. Emergency procedures:
All workers and contractors must be trained on what to do in case of unexpected equipment start-
up, fire, or injury, ensuring fast and safe response.

 Visitors and occasional site entrants

i. Basic site safety induction:

Visitors should be given short induction briefings on restricted areas, PPE requirements, emergency
exits, and supervision rules while on site.

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