The Determinants of

Venture Capital



[ I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c e ]

[ F a i z a A s a d ]
[ R i d a F a t i m a ]
[ S e h a r S a j j a d ]
[ H a r u m S a g h i r ]
[ S a m y i a S a f d a r ]
Research Paper
[This paper attempts to identify and evaluate the
main determinants of venture capital (VC). We
develop a theoretical model where macroeconomic
conditions, technological opportunity, and the
entrepreneurial environment affect the demand and
supply of VC.]
The Determinants of Venture Capital

Introduction

Venture capital (VC) is a financial intermediary that aims at fitting innovative start-ups
needs, mainly because these firms are generally associated with large growth potentials
and high levels of uncertainty. A growing number of scholars have documented the
positive impact that venture funds have on the probability of success of start-ups, as well
as on the growth of their sales and employees1. Most government bodies in industrialized
countries now recognize the importance of VC as a factor of firm creation and sustainable
growth. Access to finance is seen as a key factor in the process of R&Ds translation into
commercial outcomes. VC, as a specific type of finance for high-risk projects, has an
important role to play in this translation. (OECD, 1996) Despite this wide recognition of
venture funds as key players underlying a countrys entrepreneurial performances, there
are huge differences across industrialized countries in the relative amounts invested in
VC. VC intensity is relatively high in the USA and Canada for instance, whereas it is
very low in Japan. The diversity of national financial systems is undoubtedly one
important factor underlying these international differences. Black and Gilson (1998) find
a linkage between countries financial system and VC market. Active stock market is
more appropriate to strong venture capital market than bank market because of the
potential for VC exit through an IPO. An active VC market requires a liquid stock
market.

Other factors also play an important role, as shown by Gompers and Lerner (1998), Jeng
and Wells (2000) and Sherlter (2003). With a panel dataset of 21 countries Jeng and
Wells show that labour market rigidities, the level of Initial Public Offerings (IPO),
government programs for entrepreneurship, and bankruptcy procedures explain a
significant share of cross country variations in VC intensity.

The objective of this paper is to contribute to this recent stream of research in three ways.
We first develop a theoretical model which takes into account the factors that affect the
demand and supply of VC. These factors include the growth of GDP, short-term and
long-term interest rates, several indicators of technological opportunity, and of
entrepreneurial environment. Second, we exploit a panel dataset composed of 16
countries over an eleven years period. Third, we investigate to what extent the level of
entrepreneurship and of labour market rigidities affect the impact of the GDP growth rate
and the stock of available knowledge on VC intensity.

* Astrid Romain has a research grant provided by the Rgion de Bruxelles-Capitale. We would like to thank
Wolfgang Bessler (Justus-Liebig_University Giessen), Lydia Greunz (ULB, DULBEA), Pierre Mohnen
(MERIT) and Reinhilde Veugelers (KUL) for their useful comments. The participants to academic
seminars organized at KUL in November 2002, at MERIT in January 2003, at the Institute of Innovation
Research (IIR) of the Hitotsubashi University in July 2003, at Eltville for the 6
th
Bundesbank Spring
Conference Financing Innovation 2004 also provided insightful suggestions. An earlier version of this
paper has been published as a Working Paper of the IIR: WP#03-25. 1 See Engel (2002), Hellmann and Puri
(2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000), Romain and van Pottelsberghe (2003) for empirical evidence on the
economic impact of VC.
The results show that interest rates significantly influence VC intensity. The countries
with lower labour market rigidities benefit from a higher impact of the GDP growth rate
and the available stock of knowledge on the relative level of VC. Higher levels of
entrepreneurship i.e., the percentage of people being involved in the creation of nascent
firms induce a positive and significant relation between the R&D capital stock and VC
intensity.

Literature review

Some articles have so far focused on the determinants of VC performance (Hege et al.
2003; Manigart et al. 2002). Hege et al. (2003) present a rigorous comparative study of
the determinants of performance between the European VC industry and the US VC
industry. They show that the US VCs perform better than the European ones under the
two performance measures: type of exit and internal rate return of the financed project.
There are several differences in the US and the EU behaviour. The use of convertibles
and replacement of the entrepreneur as the syndication are more frequent in the US. Hege
et al. suggest that either US venture capitalists are more sophisticated than their European
counterparts, or the network effects are very important.

In the US, the origin of funds is not the same as in the EU. It has been widely accepted in
the literature that VC investments in the US have been positively influenced by the
clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) prudent man
rule of 1979. As a result pension funds started to invest substantial amounts of money
into VC funds. In 1978 pension funds accounted for 15% of VC funds in the US and in
the middle of the 80s, the share had risen to more than 50 %.

Behaviors may not be the only factor of differences between US and EU. The definition
of VC may also have an impact on the performance analysis. Indeed, the European
Venture Capital Association included management buy-outs (MBOs) and management
buy-ins (MBIs) in the definition of the VC. In that matter, we decided to include in
venture expenditures only seed, start-up and early stage capital and not replacement
capital and buyout. By this way, we obtain the same definition of VC for each country.

To the best of our knowledge, however, only a few articles attempted to evaluate
quantitatively the macroeconomic determinants of VC. Jeng and Wells (2000) develop a
model aiming at identifying the determinants of VC and test it on a cross-section of 21
countries over a period of 10 years. Gompers and Lerner (1998) focus on the US
economy over the period 1969-1994. Schertler (2003) analyses the driving forces of VC
activity with data from 14 Western European countries for the time period 1988 to 2000.
These main results are summarised in Table 1.

According to Black and Gilson (1998), active stock market is important for strong
venture capital market because of the potential for VC exit through an Initial Public
Offering. IPO is considered as being a very important determinant of VC. It is the
strongest driver of VC according to Jeng and Wells (2000) because it reflects the
potential return to VC funds. Gompers and Lerner (1998) take it as a proxy for fund
performance but cannot find any significant effect in their multivariate regressions. It
seems that the IPO variable is strongly correlated with the expected return on alternative
investments and with the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is also a proxy for exit
opportunities. GDP and Market Capitalization Growth (MCG) are part of the impact of
IPOs and therefore turn out to be not significant for Jeng and Wells (2000). However the
reverse is true for Gompers and Lerner who find a positive and significant impact of
Equity Market Return and GDP on VC but no impact of IPO. Higher GDP growth
implies higher attractive opportunities for entrepreneurs, which lead to a higher need for
venture funds. Schertler (2003) uses either the capitalization of stock markets or the
number of firms listed as measure of the liquidity of stock markets. He finds that liquidity
of stock market has a significant positive impact on VC investments at early stages.
However, as Jeng and Wells (2000), he finds that the growth rate of the stock market
capitalisation does not have significant impact on VC investments at early stages.

For Jeng and Wells (2000), getting the basic legal and tax structures into place appears to
be an important factor influencing VC. Gompers and Lerner (1998) also recognize the
importance of government decisions on the private equity funds. The labour market
legislation is typically put in place to protect employees from arbitrary, unfair or
discriminatory actions by employers. Some authors argue that venture financing can
suffer from the rigidity of the labour market in Europe (e.g. Ramn and Marti, 2001).
Jeng and Wells (2000) show that it does not significantly influence total VC but affects
negatively the early stage of VC investment. According to Shertler (2003), labour market
rigidities are significant and positive. That can be the result of differences in the labour-
capital ratio of high-technology enterprises. He also argues that high-technology
enterprises operating in rigid labour markets may demand more capital than comparable
high-technology enterprises operating in flexible labour markets.

With the clarification of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
prudent man rule of 1979, the share of money invested by pension funds had risen to
more than 50 %. Jeng and Wells (2000) find that the level of investment by private
pension funds in VC is a significant determinant of VC over time but not across
countries. Gompers and Lerner (1998) use a proxy for the amendment of the prudent
man rule to show the impact of pension regulation and reach a similar conclusion.

After 1979, the additional capital provided by pension funds led to a dramatic shift in
commitments to VC. Concerning the impact of the Capital Gains Tax Rate (CGTR) on
VC activity, Gompers and Lerner (1998) showed that a decrease in CGTR has a positive
and important impact on commitment to new VC funds. In fact, they confirm the result of
Poterba (1989) who built a model of decision to become an entrepreneur. He found that
decreases in CGTR might increase the raising of VC funds not through stimulation of the
supply side (i.e., the potential fund providers) but rather on the demand side. Indeed,
decreases in CGTR often encourage entrepreneurship and thus the desire of people to
create their own firm and to engage in R&D activities. Anand (1996) also highlights the
fact that the level and composition of investments appear to be negatively affected by
increases in the CGTR but investments in one industry may be affected by myriad of
other factors like technology shifts, tastes, etc.

Both industrial and academic R&D expenditures are significantly related to venture
capital activity at the State level in the model of Gompers and Lerner (1998). For them,
the growth VC fundraising in the mid-1990s may be due to increases in technological
opportunities. Shertler (2003) tests the number of employees in research and development
and the number of patents as the approximation of the human capital endowment. He
finds a positive impact of the number of R&D employees. Also, he highlights that the
coefficients of the patent variable are positive and highly significant. However, there is a
misspecification in the model due to the low number of observations because patent data
are not available for 1999 and 2000.

Interest rates might also be an important factor influencing VC. Although Jeng and Wells
(2000) do not take this factor into account into their cross country investigation, Gompers
and Lerner (1998) show that it affects positively the demand for VC funds in the US.
Economic theory would suggest a reverse relationship: if interest rates rise, the level of
investment should fall. The positive impact estimated by Gompers and Lerner is probably
due to the fact that they use a short-term interest rate. If short term interest rates increase,
the attractiveness of venture financing versus credit through usual financial institutions
increases from the entrepreneurs viewpoint.

Concerning government programs for entrepreneurship, a main rationale of direct
government intervention in the VC industry is the stimulation of economic growth.
Manigart and Beuselinck (2001) find some evidence that a good economic climate, high
stock market returns and a high number of IPO would lead to a lower supply of
government funds to the VC industry.

Some scholars have also focused on the micro determinants of VC. For Gompers and
Lerner (1998) the individual firm performance and reputation, measured with the firm
age and size, positively impact the capacity to raise larger funds. Hellmann and Puri
(2000) use a probit model to show that the strategy of a company is one of the
determinants of VC investment when controlling for the age of the company and its
industrial sector. If the strategy is an innovative one (the company is the first to introduce
a new product or service on the market), it has a higher probability to benefit from VC
compared to companies that follow an imitation strategy (the company uses existing
technologies to develop and improve products and processes). They also find that
innovating companies are able to raise VC earlier in their life cycle than companies with
a strategy of imitation. In other words, their analysis suggests that VC is stimulated by
technological opportunities. However there is less evidence of such a relationship at the
aggregate macroeconomic level.

In a nutshell, there are several potential determinants of VC. Some of them can be
measured qualitatively or quantitatively at the macro level whereas others like the fund
reputation and the strategy of the venture funded firms are microeconomic factors. In the
next section we develop a theoretical model that takes into account the various
macroeconomic factors that might affect the demand and supply of VC.









































The Dependent & Independent Variables

The table below summarizes all the studies that could be located that evaluate determinants having a
direct or indirect effect of venture capital fund return as well as studies evaluating LPs investment
patterns. The majority of those use financial performance of VC investments as the dependent variable.
The headings of the table correspond to the subsections of those chapters. Studies appear in alphabetical
order.

Author(-s): Research reference
Period: Time period covered by the analysis
Data source:
Origin of data used. CONCEPTUAL indicates that the study is purely conceptual and does not present any
empirical data
Sample:
Number and type of objects represented in the sample. PE= Private Equity, BO=Buyout, VC=Venture capital,
PF=Portfolio firms, LP=Limited partners, BA=Business angels
Origin of sample:
AT (Austria), AU (Australia), BE (Belgium), CA (Canada), CH (Switzerland), CS (Czeck Republic), DE
(Germany), DK (Denmark), ES (Spain), EU (Europe), IE (Ireland), FI (Finland), FR (France), IL (Israel), IT
(Italy), JP (Japan), NO (Norway), NL (Netherlands), PL (Poland), SE (Sweden), US, UK

Dependent
variable:
Success measurement. Some of the more common performance measures are IRR (internal rate of return),
PME (public market equivalent), (net) present value, other cash flow calculations, or some profitability index.
Performance could also be measured in other measurements such as the number of successful exits or survival
rate
Independent
variable:
The variable that has an impact on the dependent variable
Conclusion: Used for CONCEPTUAL or comparison based conclusions
Effect: Positive, neutral or negative effect on the dependent variable
IMP
Impact, based on the interpretation of the findings from the literature review. X=some impact on fund
performance, XX= medium impact on fund performance, XXX=high impact on fund performance

Author(-s) Data source Period Sample Origin of sample Dependent variable Independent variable Conclusion Effect IMP
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2003) Dataset from VentureXpert 1990-
2001
200 VC firms US Proportion of successful
exits
Specialized knowledge in
terms of industry
Pos XX
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2003) Proportion of successful
exits
Increased PF age Neg XX
(Giot and Schwienbacher,
2005)
Dataset from VentureXpert 1980-
2003
22042 rounds,
5817 VC firms
US (93%) Faster IPO exit Biotech and Internet firm
investment
Pos XX
(Hege et al., 2003) Questionnaires sent to VC in
EU countries and
Dataset from VentureXpert
- 2001 171 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK, US
Proportion of successful
exits
High rate of early stage
investments
Neg XX
(Manigart et al., 2002a) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
1995-
1997
209 VC firms BE, FR, NL, UK, US IRR Specialization in early stage
phase
Neg XXX
(Manigart, 1994) Environmental factors 1970-
1990
- FR, NL, UK Return Narrow geographical focus Neg X
(Mason and Harrison, 2004a) Dataset collected through use
of questionnaires
1996 127 BA UK No significant difference in
returns from tech and non-
tech investments
XX
(Murray, 1999) Statistics from EVCA, BVCA,
Venture Economics, etc.
1998 - UK IRR Later stage investments Pos XX
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
2001 171 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK, US
Investments in early stage Young VC firms Pos XX
Characteristics of Venture Capital Funds
(Diller and Kaserer, 2005) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
2003
200 PE funds EU IRR for subsequent fund High/Low returns in earlier PE
fund
Pos/
Neg
XXX
(Fleming, 2004) Data collected from Australian
Venture Capital Journals
survey responses
1992-
2002
129 PFs AU IRR for subsequent fund Previous VC fund success Pos XXX
(Gompers and Lerner, 1998) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1969-
1994
885 VC
backed IPOs
US Ability to raise new capital to
VC funds
VC firm age and size Pos XX
(Gompers, 1996) CONCEPTUAL Reputation drives IPO
decision
X
(Gottschalg et al., 2004) Datasets from several sources
containing cash flows to
investors and from PE funds
1980-
1995
(-2003)
1208 VC and
BO-funds
US, EU Profitability index (based on
actual cash flows)
Small fund sizes Neg XXX
(Gottschalg et al., 2004) Profitability index (based on
actual cash flows) for
subsequent fund
High/Low returns in earlier PE
fund
Pos/
Neg
XXX
(Hochberg et al., 2004) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
2003
3 469 VC
funds
US Proportion of successful
exits
Large VC fund sizes Pos XX
(Hochberg et al., 2004) Proportion of successful
exits
First time funds Neg XX
(Hsu, 2004) Sample of E-Lab firms and
data from Venture Economics
2000 149 PF US Entrepreneurs willingness to
accept discount in valuation
VC reputation ranking Pos XXX
(J__skel_inen et al., 2002) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1986-
1996
97 VC firms,
4755 PFs
US Number of IPOs Number of PFs per VC firm
partner
Pos
Neg
XX
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Author(-s) Data source Period Sample Origin of sample Dependent variable Independent variable Conclusion Effect IMP
(Kaplan and Schoar, 2003) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
1997
746 PE funds US IRR Fast VC fund growth Neg XXX
(Kaplan and Schoar, 2003) IRR in subsequent fund High return in earlier PE fund Pos XXX
(Laine and Torstila, 2004) Sample of liquidated VC funds 1970-
2002?
138 VC funds US Proportion of successful
exits
Large VC fund sizes Pos XX
(Laine and Torstila, 2004) Proportion of successful
exits
Sole funds, i.e. funds that are
not followed by another fund
Neg XX
(McCahery and Vermeulen,
2004)
CONCEPTUAL Limited partnersh. structure
offer substantial benefits
XX
(Megginson, 2002) Secondary data, based on e.g.
data from Venture Economics
1974-
2002
US, EUR, OTH EU VC firms seldom orga-
nised in limited partnerships
X
The Investment Process
(Cumming and Walz, 2004) Dataset collected by CEPRES 1971-
2003
72 PE firms,
2211 PE
funds
39 countries N. and
S. America, EU, Asia
IRR Use of convertible securities Pos XXX
(Cumming and Walz, 2004) IRR Syndication Pos XXX
(Cumming, 2002) Hand collected data 2001-
2002
132 PFs AU, BE, CH, CS, DE,
DK, FR, IT, NL, PL
IRR High VC ownership
percentage
Pos XXX
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2003) Dataset from VentureXpert 1990-
2001
200 VC firms US Proportion of successful
exits
Degree of syndications over
all investment rounds
Pos XX
(Diller and Kaserer, 2005) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
2003
200 PE funds EU IRR, PME Ability to select ideas Pos XXX
(Fleming, 2004) Data collected from Australian
Venture Capital Journals
survey responses
1992-
2002
129 PFs AU IRR Syndication Neg XXX
(Giot and Schwienbacher,
2005)
Dataset from VentureXpert 1980-
2003
22042 rounds,
5817 VC firms
US (93%) Longer investment duration Less syndication Pos XX
(Gompers and Lerner,
1999b)
Dataset from Venture
Economics
1961-
1992
794 PFs US Increased IPO rate More VC financing and greater
number of financial rounds
Pos XX
(Gottschalg et al., 2004) Datasets from several sources
containing cash flows to
investors and from PE funds
1980-
1995 (-
2003)
1208 VC and
BO-funds
US, EU Profitability index
(based on actual cash flow)
VC firm often in the role as
lead investor
Pos XXX
(Hege et al., 2003) Questionnaires sent to VC in
EU countries and
Dataset from VentureXpert
- 2001 171 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK, US
Proportion of successful
exits
Screening competence Pos XX
(Hege et al., 2003) Proportion of successful
exits
Staged financing Pos XX
(Hege et al., 2003) Proportion of successful
exits
More syndication in Europe Pos XX
(Hege et al., 2003) Syndication is more often
used in the US than in EU
XX
(Hochberg et al., 2004) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
2003
3 469 VC
funds
US Proportion of successful
exits
Better networked VC firms Pos XX
-
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Author(-s) Data source Period Sample Origin of sample Dependent variable Independent variable Conclusion Effect IMP
(J__skel_inen et al., 2002) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1986-
1996
97 VC firms,
4755 PFs
US Number of IPOs Syndication frequency Pos XX
(Kaplan et al., 2003) Data on 24 countries obtained
from VCs and one LP
1992-
2001
107 PFs, 70
VC firms
US, 23 non-US VC firm survival rate Use of US style contracts Pos XX
(Landier, 2001) CONCEPTUAL US VCs spend a large amo-
unt of time on technological
aspects of investments
X
(Landier, 2001) CONCEPTUAL Debt-like contracts optimal
for EU VC firms
X
(Lerner and Schoar, 2005) Constructed sample collected
from PE firms in developing
countries
1987-
2003
28 PE firms,
210 investm.
26 countries (0 EU,
not US)
Common law countries uses
preferred stocks
X
(Lerner, 1994) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1978-
1989
651 rounds in
biotech PFs
US Invest first time in later
rounds
Experienced VC firms
(measured in age)
Pos X
(Ljungqvist and Richardson,
2003b)
Dataset from one of the largest
institutional investor in PE
1981-
2001
1 LP 3 800
PFs (15% VC)
US IRR Increased number of
investment opportunities
Pos XXX
(Lockett and Wright, 1999) Questionnaire, identified using
BVCA handbook
1987-
1996
62 VC firms UK Finance perspective most
important motive for
syndication
X
(Manigart et al., 2000) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
1995-
1997
209 VC firms BE, FR, NL, UK, US Info used for pre-investment
valuation and methods
differs
(Manigart et al., 2002a) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
1995-
1997
209 VC firms BE, FR, NL, UK, US IRR Role as lead investor Pos XXX
(Manigart et al., 2002b) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
2001 317 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK,
Finance perspective most
important motive for
syndication
X
(Manigart et al., 2002b) High rate of syndications Young VC firms
Large VC firms
Specialised VC firms
Pos X
(Megginson, 2002) CONCEPTUAL Staged financing efficient
way to minimize risk
X
(Megginson, 2002) CONCEPTUAL Use of convertible securities
increase VC return in event
of high success
X
(Sahlman, 1990) CONCEPTUAL Staged capital give VCs
right to abandon failing
projects
(Sahlman, 1990) Convertible pref. security
shifts some costs of poor
performance to the PFs
(Sahlman, 1990) Data from various sources
including Venture Economics
1980-
1988
Return Role as lead investor Pos
(Schmidt, 2004) Unique dataset 1980-
2002
642 PFs US IRR Ability to select ideas Pos XXX
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
2001 171 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK, US
US VCs syndicates more
often than EU VCs
XX
-
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Author(-s) Data source Period Sample Origin of sample Dependent variable Independent variable Conclusion Effect IMP
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Convertible securities less
used in EU
XX
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Use of convertible securities Young VC firms Neg XX
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Frequent syndication Young VC firms Neg XX
(Sepp_ and J__skel_inen,
2002)
Dataset from Venture
Economics
1986-
2000
54 700
investments
US Share of IPOs Centrality in a syndicate of
investors
Pos XX
(Sorenson and Stuart, 2001) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1986-
1998
1025 VC
firms, 7590 PF
US Long distant VC investment Syndication Pos X
The Management of Portfolio Companies
(De Clercq and Dimov, 2003) Dataset from VentureXpert 1990-
2001
200 VC firms US Proportion of successful
exits
Investing in older PF Neg XX
(Diller and Kaserer, 2005) Dataset from Venture
Economics
1980-
2003
200 PE funds EU IRR, PME Skilled VC firms Pos XXX
(Fleming, 2004) Data collected from Australian
Venture Capital Journals
survey responses
1992-
2002
129 PFs AU IRR Experienced VC firms Neu XXX
(Gompers and Lerner,
1999a)
Sample of VC firms 1978-
1992
419 VC firms US Profits VC firm incentives Neu XXX
(Gottschalg et al., 2004) Datasets from several sources
containing cash flows to
investors and from PE funds
1980-
1995 (-
2003)
1208 VC and
BO-funds
US, EU Profitability index (based on
actual cash flow)
Experienced PE firms Pos XXX
(Hege et al., 2003) Questionnaires sent to VC in
EU countries and
Dataset from VentureXpert
- 2001 171 VC firms BE, DE, FR, NL, SE,
UK, US
US VC firms take more
often CEO repl. decisions
XX
(Hellman, 1998) CONCEPTUAL VC in control provide
greater efforts finding
professional managers
XX
(Manigart et al., 2002a) Unique dataset collected
through use of questionnaires
1995-
1997
209 VC firms BE, FR, NL, UK, US IRR Experienced VC firms Pos XXX
(Megginson, 2002) CONCEPTUAL Partners at top US VC are
often engineers/ technically
trained
X
(Schwienbacher, 2002) Proportion of CEO
replacements
Young VC firms Neg XX
(Shepherd et al., 2003) Data collected through use of
questionnaires
1996 47 VC firms AU Reliability Experienced VC firms Neg XX
The Exit Process
(Barnes and McCarthy, 2002) Data produced by BVCA 1992-
1999
85 VC and BO
backed IPOs
UK Age of PFs at IPO date VC firms age Pos XX
(Barnes and McCarthy, 2002) Under pricing of PFs at the
IPO date
VC firms age Neut XX
-
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