? The ASEAN Leaders?

Meeting was convened on 24 April 2021 at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta,

Republic of Indonesia, and chaired by His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu?izzaddin Waddaulah,

Sultan and Yang Di-Pertuan of Brunei Darussalam. The Meeting was convened with the view to advance

ASEAN Community building, hasten recovery from the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID19) pandemic,

strengthen ASEAN?s external relations and address pressing issues of common interest to all ASEAN

Member States. 2. In the pursuit to strengthen our regional solidarity and resilience, we reiterated that the

political stability in ASEAN Member States is essential to achieving a peaceful, stable and prosperous

ASEAN Community. We underscored the need to maintain our unity, Centrality, and relevance in the region

and to collectively address common challenges. We recognised that the strength of the ASEAN Community

lies in putting people at its centre and fulfilling their desire to live in a region of lasting peace, security and

stability, sustained economic growth, shared prosperity, and social progress. In this regard, we reaffirmed our

commitment to the purposes and principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, including adherence to the rule

of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government, respect for fundamental

freedoms, and the promotion and protection of human rights. 3. We expressed our full support towards

Brunei Darussalam?s ASEAN Chairmanship priorities and deliverables under the theme of ?We Care, We

Prepare, We Prosper?, which focuses on harnessing the caring nature of people in the region, preparing

ASEAN for the future, and enabling sustainable prosperity in a resilient region. We welcomed efforts to

pursue a Strategic and Holistic Initiative to Link ASEAN Responses to Emergencies and Disasters (ASEAN

SHIELD). We looked forward to the establishment of a platform to enable the peoples of ASEAN to contribute

to natural disaster relief efforts in the region. We reaffirmed ASEAN?s commitment to upholding multilateral

cooperation, anchored in international law, towards achieving peace, security, stability, and prosperity in the

region and beyond. We recognised the importance of focusing on our people and in this regard, agreed to

enhance cooperation with external partners individually and under the East Asia Summit (EAS) to help

address mental health issues in the region. We stressed the importance of fostering a greater sense of

ASEAN identity and belonging, including amongst junior officials. Final 2 4. We expressed our commitment to

support the timely realisation of Brunei Darussalam?s Priority Economic Deliverables (PEDs) under the

ASEAN Economic Community Pillar, which are divided into three strategic thrusts of Recovery, Digitalisation,

and Sustainability. As we aspire towards a people-centred, peopleoriented Community, we appreciated the

continued efforts to further strengthen the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Pillar and its Sectoral Bodies?

agendas towards ASEAN Community building, to ensure ASEAN will be more coordinated, resilient and

prepared for the future. In this regard, we looked forward to the adoption of the Regional Policy Framework

on Fostering Greater Understanding, Tolerance and a Sense of Regional Agendas among Peoples of

ASEAN at the 38th ASEAN Summit in October 2021. 5. On the COVID-19 pandemic, we reiterated our

commitment to implement the Implementation Plan of the ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework in a
timely manner and welcomed ASEAN Sectoral Bodies? efforts to complement the Framework. We welcomed

the decision to utilise the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund to procure vaccines for the people of ASEAN as

soon as possible. We also welcomed the recent announcement made by Brunei Darussalam to respectively

contribute USD 100,000 to the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund. We encouraged the expeditious

conclusion of the ASEAN Travel Corridor Arrangement Framework (ATCAF), as well as the early

operationalisation of the ASEAN Regional Reserve of Medical Supplies for Public Health Emergencies. We

underscored the importance of establishing the ASEAN Centre for Public Health Emergencies and Emerging

Diseases in a timely manner. 6. We underscored the importance of further strengthening ASEAN Centrality

and unity in our engagement with ASEAN?s external partners through ASEAN-led mechanisms in order to

build mutual trust and confidence as well as to reinforce an open, transparent, inclusive, and rules-based

regional architecture with ASEAN at the centre. In this regard, we instructed the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to

hold their meetings with the People?s Republic of China and the United States as soon as possible, prior to

the 54th ASEAN Foreign Ministers? Meeting. Additionally, we looked forward to commemorating the 30th

anniversary of ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations as well as the 25th anniversary of ASEAN-Russia Dialogue

Relations. 7. We agreed to maintain ASEAN?s proactive and outward looking approach in the conduct of

ASEAN?s external relations based on shared interests, constructive engagements, and mutual benefits,

which can contribute to ASEAN?s Communitybuilding and development cooperation efforts. We agreed with

the ASEAN Secretariat?s recommendation for ASEAN to accept the United Kingdom?s application for

Dialogue Partnership and tasked the ASEAN Foreign Ministers to undertake the appropriate process to

facilitate the United Kingdom to become a Dialogue Partner by the 54th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting/Post

Ministerial Conferences (54th AMM/PMC)

? 8. We, as an ASEAN family, had a close discussion on the recent developments in Myanmar and

expressed our deep concern on the situation in the country, including reports of fatalities and escalation of

violence. We acknowledged ASEAN?s positive and constructive role in facilitating a peaceful solution in the

interest of the people of Myanmar and their livelihoods, and therefore agreed to the ?Five-Point Consensus?

attached to this Chairman?s Statement. We also heard calls for the release of all political prisoners including

foreigners. 9. We also underscored the importance of Myanmar?s continued efforts in addressing the

situation in the Rakhine State, including commencing the repatriation process, in a voluntary, safe and

dignified manner in accordance with its bilateral agreements with Bangladesh. In this regard, we looked

forward to the resumption of repatriation of verified displaced persons as soon as possible. We reiterated our

appreciation to the Secretary-General of ASEAN for his efforts in leading the implementation of the

recommendations of the Preliminary Needs Assessment (PNA). We also looked forward to the conduct of the

Comprehensive Needs Assessment (CNA) and encouraged the Secretary-General of ASEAN to continue

identifying possible areas that can effectively facilitate the repatriation process for displaced persons from
Rakhine State. We further underscored the importance of efforts to addressing the root causes of the

situation in Rakhine State. * * * * * Five-Point Consensus On the situation in Myanmar, the Leaders reached

consensus on the following: ?

? First, there shall be immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost

restraint. ?

? Second, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in

the interests of the people. ?

? Third, a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the

assistance of the SecretaryGeneral of ASEAN.

? Fourth, ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre. ?

? Fifth, the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned. * * * *

? The April 2021 ASEAN Leaders' Meeting and the Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar

? Following the February 1, 2021 coup in Myanmar and the escalating violence, ASEAN held an emergency

summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 24, 2021. This meeting was attended by the leaders of all ten ASEAN

member states, including Myanmar's junta chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The summit was convened

by Brunei, which held the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2021.

? Key outcome: the Five-Point Consensus (5PC)

? The primary outcome of the meeting was the adoption of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) on the situation

in Myanmar. The five points included:

? An immediate end to violence.

? Constructive dialogue among all parties.

? The appointment of a special envoy to facilitate dialogue.

? Provision of humanitarian assistance.

? A visit to Myanmar by the special envoy to meet with all parties.

? International and domestic reactions

? Reactions to the 5PC were mixed, with some countries expressing hope while others, including Human

Rights Watch, were skeptical due to the junta's human rights record. Myanmar's military stated it would

"consider" the suggestions only when the situation stabilized.

? Challenges and limitations of the 5PC

? The 5PC faced challenges, including a lack of enforcement mechanisms and the subsequent violation of all

five points by the military junta. Critics also noted the exclusion of other stakeholders like the National Unity

Government (NUG) from the dialogue process and the failure to address the release of political prisoners.

The absence of a specific timeline for implementation also allowed the junta to delay and continue its actions.

? Impact
? While the April 2021 meeting was a significant attempt to address the crisis, the lack of compliance by the

junta and the limitations of the consensus led to its failure to achieve its goals. The situation in Myanmar

continued to worsen. By 2022, Myanmar's lack of progress on the 5PC resulted in ASEAN excluding the

military generals from its meetings.

? Failures in ASEAN's implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC) on Myanmar

? The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC), agreed upon in April 2021 as a framework to address the crisis

in Myanmar, has faced significant failures in its implementation. This is primarily attributed to the junta's

non-compliance, ASEAN's internal divisions, and the limitations of its traditional diplomatic approach.

? 1. Non-compliance by the military junta

? Continued Violence: Despite the 5PC's call for an immediate cessation of violence, the junta has continued

its brutal crackdown on dissent, employing tactics such as killings, bombings, mass arrests, torture, and

indiscriminate attacks on civilians.

? Rejection of Dialogue with All Parties: The junta has consistently rejected calls for constructive dialogue

with all parties, including detained elected leaders like Aung San Suu Kyi and the National Unity Government

(NUG), which it labels as unlawful, .

? Denied Access to Special Envoy: ASEAN's special envoys have been repeatedly denied access to key

stakeholders, including detained leaders, hindering the envoy's role in facilitating dialogue and mediation.

? Obstruction of Humanitarian Aid: The junta has deliberately blocked humanitarian assistance from reaching

populations in need, using it as a form of collective punishment against resistance strongholds.

? 2. Challenges and limitations within ASEAN

? Non-Interference Principle: ASEAN's traditional principle of non-interference in member states' internal

affairs has limited its ability to act decisively and impose consequences on the junta, .

? Consensus-Based Decision-Making: ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making process has created

divisions among member states regarding the appropriate response to the crisis, with some advocating for a

harder line while others prefer engagement with the junta.

? Lack of Enforcement Mechanisms: The absence of clear enforcement mechanisms or consequences for

breaching the 5PC has allowed the junta to disregard its commitments without facing significant

repercussions from ASEAN.

? Ineffectiveness of Special Envoy: The rotating nature of the special envoy role, often tied to the ASEAN

chair country's specific approach, has hindered the development of a consistent and effective strategy.

? Exclusion of NUG and EAOs: The 5PC's focus on dialogue with the junta while excluding the NUG and

ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) from the initial stages of the peace process has made it difficult to

establish a truly inclusive and legitimate pathway to resolving the conflict.

? 3. Broader international context

Human Rights Watch, may have allowed the junta to exploit the international community's deference and

avoid stronger action.

? China and Russia's Support: China and Russia, with their vested interests in Myanmar, have continued to

provide military and diplomatic support to the junta, undermining international pressure and complicating

efforts to achieve a unified international response.

? 4. Impact of failures

? Escalation of Conflict: The failure of the 5PC to achieve its goals has allowed the violence in Myanmar to

escalate, with devastating consequences for the civilian population.

? Deepening Humanitarian Crisis: The lack of progress on humanitarian assistance and access restrictions

by the junta have exacerbated the humanitarian crisis, leading to mass displacement and suffering, according

to [Link].

? Erosion of ASEAN's Credibility: The inability to effectively address the crisis has damaged ASEAN's

international reputation and credibility as a regional body capable of maintaining peace and stability.

? Divisions within ASEAN: The failure of the 5PC has exposed and exacerbated divisions among ASEAN

member states, hindering the bloc's ability to present a unified front.

? The failures in implementing the 5PC highlight the challenges of addressing a complex political crisis

involving a recalcitrant military regime within a regional framework based on principles of non-interference

and consensus. While the 5PC represented a significant step towards addressing the crisis, its shortcomings

have underscored the need for a revised and more robust approach. In light of these challenges, some

analysts suggest that ASEAN may need to consider alternative approaches, including amending its Charter

to allow for stronger action in cases where a member state breaches the Charter's principles.

? Humanitarian aid coordination through the AHA Centre in Myanmar

? The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) has

been involved in humanitarian aid efforts in Myanmar, particularly following the 2021 coup, though its role has

been impacted by the volatile political landscape and internal challenges.

? 1. Mandate and engagement

? The AHA Centre's core mandate is disaster management and emergency response in the ASEAN region.

? It has provided humanitarian assistance in Myanmar following natural disasters and during the ongoing

humanitarian crisis, often in coordination with the Myanmar Government, according to the AHA Centre.

? In the aftermath of the 2025 Mandalay earthquake, the AHA Centre played a crucial role in coordinating

humanitarian relief efforts, facilitating aid from ASEAN member states and partners like Japan, France, and

Switzerland.

? The AHA Centre deployed its Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ASEAN-ERAT) to conduct
needs assessments and coordinate relief efforts with Myanmar's Department of Disaster Management

(DDM).

? The AHA Centre also collaborated with partners like UN agencies, the IFRC, and the ICRC.

? 2. Challenges and limitations

? Political Interference: The military junta has hampered the AHA Centre's ability to operate effectively by

blocking access to affected areas and imposing restrictions on aid delivery.

? Neutrality Concerns: The AHA Centre's reliance on the junta's cooperation and its presence on the

governing board has led to concerns that aid could be manipulated or perceived as supporting the junta,

potentially undermining its neutrality.

? Mandate Limitations: The AHA Centre primarily focuses on natural disaster responses, limiting its

effectiveness in addressing the complex humanitarian crisis fueled by the conflict.

? 3. The 5PC and the role of AHA Centre

? The 5PC, adopted in April 2021, designated the AHA Centre as a key mechanism for humanitarian

assistance in Myanmar.

? The AHA Centre developed a two-pronged approach under the 5PC, including immediate needs for the

COVID-19 response and broader humanitarian needs.

? However, the failures in implementing the 5PC have impacted the AHA Centre's ability to effectively deliver

aid and establish humanitarian corridors, as noted by the .

? 4. Recommendations and way forward

? Need for Greater Autonomy: There have been calls for ASEAN leaders to grant the AHA Centre and the

ASEAN Secretary-General more autonomy in facilitating aid delivery in Myanmar, according to the .

? Engagement with All Stakeholders: Effective humanitarian engagement requires collaboration with all

stakeholders, including the NUG and EAOs, to ensure aid reaches those most in need without being

politicized.

? International Support: International organizations and partners should continue to coordinate with the AHA

Centre and support its efforts while advocating for unrestricted humanitarian access and the demilitarization

of aid, .

? The AHA Centre's efforts to coordinate humanitarian aid in Myanmar are hampered by political

complexities, security concerns, and logistical challenges. Despite these difficulties, its role remains crucial,

particularly in responding to natural disasters and facilitating regional coordination. However, a more

comprehensive and inclusive approach involving all stakeholders and strengthened international support is

necessary to address the escalating humanitarian crisis effectively. The AHA Centre continues to play an

important role in facilitating the deployment of ASEAN support, including relief items and emergency

response teams
? ASEAN countries' stances on the Myanmar crisis and the Five-Point Consensus (5PC)

? ASEAN's response to the Myanmar crisis has been characterized by a consensus-based approach,

centered around the 5PC. However, individual member states hold varying stances, with some advocating for

a firmer approach while others favor engagement with the military junta.

? 1. Countries advocating for stronger action

? Indonesia: Often seen as a proponent of a stronger and more assertive stance, pushing for greater

pressure on the military junta to adhere to the 5PC.

? Malaysia: Historically, Malaysia has also been a vocal advocate for more decisive action and has

expressed concerns about the humanitarian situation. The current Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, intends to

push for a more dynamic strategy to address the crisis, which includes engaging with all stakeholders in

Myanmar.

? 2. Countries favoring engagement and dialogue

? Thailand: Has maintained a policy of engagement with the junta, prioritizing stability along its border and

managing the flow of refugees. Thailand announced it would host an "Extended Informal Consultation" in

Myanmar in December 2024, despite the lack of progress on the 5PC, .

? Cambodia: During its chairmanship in 2022, Cambodia initially attempted to engage with the junta, but its

special envoy faced challenges in making progress.

? Laos: During its chairmanship in 2024, Laos faced criticism for being less successful than previous ASEAN

chairs in implementing the 5PC and ending the war, with some suggesting a decline in the political will to

pressure the military.

? 3. Other member states

? Singapore: Has generally condemned the coup and called for a peaceful resolution and adherence to the

5PC.

? Philippines: Set to hold the rotating ASEAN chair in 2026 and may shift the bloc's approach to the crisis,

potentially advocating for a more assertive strategy that includes political engagement with all relevant

stakeholders.

? Vietnam: While supporting ASEAN's efforts in addressing humanitarian issues and refugee repatriation,

Vietnam maintains a focus on non-interference.

? Brunei: As the ASEAN Chair in 2021, Brunei played a key role in convening the special summit that led to

the 5PC.

? Timor-Leste: While not a founding member, Timor-Leste's stance on the issue is still developing.

? 4. Key issues and challenges

? Enforcement of 5PC: The junta's continued non-compliance with the 5PC remains a major obstacle to

resolving the crisis.

a concern for all ASEAN member states.

? Refugee Flow: The ongoing conflict has led to a significant increase in refugees fleeing Myanmar to

neighboring ASEAN countries like Thailand and India, raising concerns about border security and

humanitarian aid.

? ASEAN's Credibility: The inability to effectively resolve the crisis has raised questions about ASEAN's

effectiveness and credibility as a regional body.

? 5. Recent developments

? In October 2024, ASEAN leaders reviewed the implementation of the 5PC, expressing deep concern over

the escalating conflict and humanitarian situation in Myanmar. They denounced the continued violence

against civilians and urged all parties to halt indiscriminate violence and ensure the protection of civilians.

They also tasked the ASEAN Coordinating Council to review this decision when there is concrete progress on

the implementation of the 5PC.

? Overall, while all ASEAN member states acknowledge the seriousness of the Myanmar crisis and the need

for a peaceful resolution, their approaches and priorities differ, leading to a complex and often challenging

path towards achieving a unified and effective response.

? Envoy controversies and challenges in the Myanmar crisis

? The appointment and actions of various envoys attempting to address the Myanmar crisis since the 2021

coup have been marked by a series of controversies and criticisms.

? 1. ASEAN special envoys

? Limited Progress: ASEAN's special envoys, appointed under the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), have

struggled to make significant progress in resolving the crisis, according to .

? Access Denied: The junta has often denied access to the special envoy to key stakeholders, including the

detained leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the National Unity Government (NUG), undermining the envoy's

ability to facilitate dialogue, .

? Legitimizing the Junta: Critics have argued that engagement with the junta, without meeting other

stakeholders, risks legitimizing the military regime and undermines the 5PC, according to Al Jazeera. This

criticism was notably directed at Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen's visit to Myanmar in January 2022,

where he met with the junta chief but not Suu Kyi.

? Rotation and Inconsistency: The rotating nature of the special envoy role, which changes with each ASEAN

chairmanship, creates a lack of continuity and hinders the development of lasting relationships and a

coherent strategy, according to .

? Divisions within ASEAN: Some ASEAN members have expressed dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of

the special envoys, further highlighting the divisions within the bloc regarding the Myanmar crisis.
? 2. UN special envoys

? Limited Impact: Myanmar analysts and civil society groups have expressed frustration with the UN special

envoys' perceived lack of progress in resolving the crisis, describing the role as ineffective and a "diplomatic

graveyard", according to .

? Controversial Proposals: Some envoys have faced criticism for controversial proposals, such as former UN

Special Envoy Noeleen Heyzer's suggestion of "power sharing" with the military, which drew sharp

condemnation from civil society groups and was later clarified as a misunderstanding, .

? Difficult Mandate: The UN envoys have faced an incredibly challenging environment, with the military

refusing to cooperate meaningfully and a lack of unified support from the UN Security Council, due in part to

the veto power of China and Russia.

? Perceived Lack of Support: Some, like former Special Envoy Heyzer, have reportedly felt a lack of sufficient

support from the UN Secretary-General's office and other UN agencies, hindering their ability to pursue

creative solutions, .

? 3. Humanitarian aid and the IHF controversy

? Independent Humanitarian Forum (IHF): Proposed by the NUG and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the

IHF aimed to establish a parallel mechanism for aid delivery, bypassing the junta's control. Heyzer initially

supported the IHF, but it faced resistance from some ASEAN officials and UN agencies who viewed it as

competing with existing channels like the AHA Centre.

? Junta's Manipulation of Aid: Critics have also raised concerns about the military manipulating humanitarian

aid, diverting resources for its own purposes or using it to pressure populations. This was particularly

highlighted in the context of Thailand's humanitarian corridor initiative, which critics feared could be controlled

by the junta, according to The New Humanitarian.

? 4. Other controversies

? Dialogue with the Junta Outside of the 5PC: Thailand's decision to host "informal consultations" with the

junta in 2023, outside of the established ASEAN framework, drew criticism from other ASEAN members like

Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, who felt it undermined the bloc's unity and legitimised the military

regime.

? The envoy system, while intended to facilitate dialogue and mediation, has been a contentious aspect of

the international response to the Myanmar crisis. The military's intransigence, coupled with internal divisions

and limitations within ASEAN and the UN, has created a complex and challenging environment for envoys to

operate, leading to frustrations and criticism regarding their effectiveness and potential unintended

consequences.