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Asian Journal of Comparative Politics

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Finding a durable solution ª The Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/2057891119883700
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refugee problem: Policies,
prospects and politics

Syeda Rozana Rashid

Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh

Abstract
The article examines the traditional durable solutions to resolving the problem of the Rohingyas who
crossed the Myanmar border during 2017–2018 and took refuge in Bangladesh. The article analyses
the attitudes and behaviour of displaced Rohingyas and of Bangladesh, Myanmar and traditional set-
tlement countries, as well as the hidden forces, including ethnoreligious factors, geo-strategic factors
and public opinion, which impact the Rohingyas. It argues that finding durable solutions through
repatriation, integration or resettlement of Rohingya refugees in their home, host and third countries
respectively is almost unachievable. In line with the recent conceptualization of durable solutions by
academics and practitioners, a context-specific solution is recommended for Rohingyas, combining
national restoration of their civil and political rights in Myanmar, political and economic burden-sharing
by prosperous countries and capacity-building of refugees to influence their own futures.

Keywords
Myanmar, refugee, Rohingya

Introduction
Bangladesh witnessed one of the largest refugee flows in the world during 2017–2018, when more
than 700,000 Rohingya men, women and children crossed the Bangladesh–Myanmar border to
escape ethnic cleansing and genocide by the Myanmar security forces. Since the inception of the
crisis in August 2018, Bangladesh has followed multifaceted diplomatic efforts to find a potential
solution to the crisis. It started bi-lateral diplomacy to persuade the Myanmar government to
repatriate the Rohingyas. In January 2018, Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a document on
“Physical Arrangement”, which stipulated that the repatriation will be completed within two years

Corresponding author:
Syeda Rozana Rashid, Dhaka, 1000, Bangladesh.
Email: srr21rozana@[Link], rozana@[Link]
2 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

(Dhaka Tribune, 2018b). However, the situation in Northern Arakan was not conducive to start
repatriation. To find justice and a solution, Bangladesh attempted to put diplomatic pressure on
Myanmar through China (Daily Star, 2017). It took the issue to different international forums such
as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC),
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the
Organization of African Countries (OIC). Despite the grievous nature of the crimes inflicted upon
the Rohingyas, the international community’s response was timid, partisan and mostly limited to
verbal condemnations. Inside Myanmar, the democratic leader and noble laureate Suu Kye failed
to condemn and resist the brutal atrocities of her military and subscribed to a false perspective of
the genocide. As a result, the Myanmar government remained unchanged on its position regarding
exclusion of Rohingyas from Burmese citizenship and their expulsion from Myanmar, indicating a
grim future of Rohingya repatriation.
As of March 2019, Bangladesh was hosting 913,080 Rohingya refugees in the south-eastern
regions of Ukhiya, Teknaf and Cox’s Bazar. Around 20% of these refugees arrived in Bangladesh
years ago or were born here (UNHCR, 2019). While Bangladesh’s response to the plight of the
Rohingyas proved its generosity, respect towards human rights and state responsibilities, chal-
lenges remain ahead about how to help these people find a lasting solution, especially when a
protracted situation of displacement is already evident and a significant segment of them are
protracted refugees. Questions arise whether Bangladesh’s policies accord with the international
refugee regime’s traditional durable solutions packages, i.e. voluntary repatriation, local integra-
tion or third-country resettlement. It is also apt to ask whether one or more of these “ideal”
solutions can be applied to the Rohingya crisis.
Taking the above background into consideration, this article examines the prospects of a lasting
solution for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Essentially, it adopts a rights-based approach
and framework to understand the state policies which often reflect the sovereign interest beyond
human rights and humanitarian considerations. Analysing the behaviour and attitude of host, home
and the traditional settlement states, as well as that of refugees, the article argues that a coordinated
and context-specific durable solution should be found for the Rohingya refugees.
The article conducted a secondary analysis of data and information collected from journal
articles, books, conference articles and newspaper articles. For facts and figures the article relies
on the official websites and published reports of international organizations working with the
refugees. In analysing the attitude of different actors, the author refers to her past studies as well
as the current studies carried out by academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
The article is organised in five sections. The first section after the introduction presents the
conceptual and analytical framework, which highlights the traditional and new approaches and
variables of durable solution. The next section traces Bangladesh’s policies towards Rohingya
refugees since the 1970s. The extent to which Rohingya refugees can be provided with a safe,
dignified and sustained solution is analysed in the fourth section by examining the different variables
of a lasting solution. Based on the findings and analysis, the last section offers recommendations.

Conceptual and analytical framework of a durable solution

The traditional approaches to a durable solution
A durable solution is a process whereby the refugees would become self-sufficient and able to
support themselves, enabling them to integrate and participate fully in the social and economic life
Rashid 3

of their homeland or their new country, on an equal footing with the host population (Stein, 1986).
Voluntary repatriation, local integration and third-country resettlement are considered to be the
three tenets of durable solutions, as mentioned in the 1951 Convention on Refugees and its 1967
protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention and the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).
Voluntary repatriation is usually regarded as the most preferred solution to refugee problems
(Goodwin-Gill, 1989). Repatriation depends on a number of factors, such as conditions in the home
country, safety and security and a legal framework to protect returnees’ rights and interests
(Cuenod, 1989). The post-war period witnessed the repatriation of millions of refugees, yet vol-
untary repatriation still remains most debated in terms of the guarantee of voluntariness, the
definition of security and the promotion of lasting return and reintegration into people’s homes
in non-political environments (Black and Koser, 1999).
The second most practised and preferred durable solution is local integration. Despite being
used in the refugee context where there is a little chance of voluntary repatriation in the foreseeable
future, local integration is frequently cited as the best solution. Yet, the concept lacks a formal
definition in international refugee law. According to article 34 of the 1951 Convention on Refu-
gees, “the contracting states shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of
refugees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings”
(UNHCR, 2010b: 30).This can only be done, however, with the agreement of the government
of the asylum country concerned.
For refugees who can neither return to their country of origin nor safely remain in their country
of refuge, the only solution is to resettle in a third country. Such a decision is usually taken only in
the absence of other options and when there is no alternative way to guarantee the legal and
physical security of the persons concerned (Cuenod, 1989). Some countries, such as the United
States, Canada and Australia, accept a set number of refugees every year as part of their immigra-
tion policies, whereas others do it for historical and political ties and on humanitarian grounds.1
However, UNHCR statutes and guidelines see third-country resettlement as the least desirable and
most costly solution (Cuenod, 1989).
The notion of durable solutions has recently staged a resurgence in the context of the devel-
opment of the UNHCR’s Convention Plus which stresses a) strategic use of resettlement as a tool
of protection, a durable solution and a tangible form of burden sharing; b) targeting development
assistance to support durable solutions for refugees, whether in countries of asylum or upon return
home; and c) clarification of the responsibilities of states in the event of irregular secondary
movements of refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2003a). In 2003, the UNHCR also adopted
its Framework for Durable Solutions, aimed primarily at promoting local integration in the country
of asylum or repatriation to the homeland through making refugees’ or returnees’ livelihoods
sustainable (UNHCR, 2003b). In 2016, the UNGA unanimously adopted the New York Declara-
tion for Refugees and Migrants, which expresses the political commitment of the international
community to respond in cases of large movements of refugees and migrants, as well as of
protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2018). The declaration sets out a Comprehensive Refugee
Response Framework (CRRF), with specific actions needed to ease pressure on host countries,
enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions and support conditions in
countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. It calls upon the UNHCR to apply the declara-
tion to particular situations, in close coordination with relevant states and involving other United
Nations (UN) agencies and stakeholders. On the basis of this work, the UNHCR was requested to
propose a “global compact on refugees” in its annual report to the General Assembly in 2018.
4 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

These initiatives are of huge significance in examining the possibilities of a durable solution for
Rohingya refugees in this article. At the academic level, over the years there has also been a
growing awareness about creating favourable conditions for refugees. Some of the relevant dis-
cussions are as follows.

The rights-based approaches to a durable solution

The past few decades saw a shift from a needs-based to rights-based approach to resolve crises of
forced migration. Long and Crisp (2010), for example, suggest that the refugee regime should
focus on enhancing refugees’ right to mobility rather than their physical exile while the possibi-
lities of settlement are low. Recognising the fact that refugees are unable to exercise their human
rights, they call upon the UNHCR to embrace mobility as a potential tool of protection since states
continue to impede the movement of refugees across international borders. The durable solution of
a refugee crisis therefore depends, as they contend, on the UNHCR and refugees’ ability to
persuade reluctant states to acknowledge and protect the mobility of refugees, rather than repatria-
tion—something which can be applied to the Rohingyas’ case (UNHCR, 2010a).
Current scholarship offers a comprehensive understanding of repatriation. According to Malkki
(1992), repatriation cannot be equated with mere movement or simple return, but also involves the
re-linking of a refugee to forms of national protection. Understanding repatriation to be a return to
citizenship—rather than a return to physical territory—opens up the possibility of disassociating
repatriation from return. Repatriation—as a “solution” to refugee status—must therefore involve
the process of national recognition and restoration of a wide range of political, social and civil
rights that collectively amount to a meaningful citizenship. In this sense, repatriation can be
understood as the restoration of a refugees’ “right to have rights” through the restoration of
citizenship (Kibreab, 2003). It denotes a political process, involving the remaking of political
community in order that refugees’ rights—political, social, economic and cultural—are restored
in an effective and meaningful manner (Kibreab, 2003). Embracing a “complementarity of
solutions” allows for the restoration of national citizenship through repatriation and allows for
an adequate response to socio-economic needs that may in fact be best met through migration and
mobility (Guterres, 2008).
Loescher and Milner (2003) envisioned a coordinated approach to develop a comprehensive plan
of action that would involve the resolution of the conflict as well as a long range of development
projects in which repatriation of refugees would be one element of the three durable solutions. They
emphasise addressing the political issues behind the protracted nature of conflict, writing:

refugee situations are the combined result of unresolved political and security problems in the country
of origin, the inadequate policy responses of the country of asylum and the lack of sufficient external
engagement in these situations. (Loescher and Milner, 2003: 163)

The above understanding is useful in the discussion of Rohingya refugees, since their repatria-
tion initiatives have been marred by unresolved political and security problems at home.

The variables
Cuenod (1989) identifies five variables which influence the solution of a refugee crisis. These are:
a) the attitude of the refugees themselves; b) the attitude and policy of the country of first asylum;
Rashid 5

c) the attitude and policy of resettlement countries; d) the attitude and policy of the country of
origin; and e) hidden factors.
The attitude, behaviour and preferences of refugees vary from place to place depending on their
level of persecution, social and cultural ties with the host communities and political agenda of
asserting rights in the home country. In cases where the social structure breaks down, refugees can
be divided in their opinion. More importantly, the gender dimension of experiences of forced
migration may create expectations about future settlement. Refugee perspectives thus offer impor-
tant insights into the prospect of a durable solution to their situation.
Finding a durable solution depends to a large extent on the attitude of the host country which
may or may not allow asylum seekers to come and seek refuge (Cuenod, 1989). State responses are
usually of two types: a) allowing asylum seekers to enter and stay temporarily until they decide to
return home, often leading to an indefinite care and maintenance of refugees; and b) allowing
asylum seekers to take refuge, and the naturalisation of refugees through local integration (Cuenod,
1989). Bangladesh belongs to the first category. Writing on the politics of refugee repatriation,
Black and Koser (1999) argued that any attempt to understand the repatriation discourse needs to
focus on the changing political context affecting attitudes towards refugees. It would be interesting
to see how this impacts Bangladesh’s policies towards Rohingyas over time.
As mentioned above, the prospect of resettlement solutions varies in terms of the priorities and
attitudes of developed countries that have refugee integration policies. The prospect of third-
country resettlement, however, is influenced by the lack of legal obligation of resettlement states
to accept refugees as well as their lack of economic incentives and growing xenophobia at the
domestic level—which will also be useful in analysing the case of the Rohingyas in this article.
The attitude and politics of the country of origin are one of most important variables when a
durable solution to a refugee crisis is pursued. In cases where population expulsion is an instrument
of war or part of a wider policy of exclusion, the state of origin rarely cares about its image as a
“persecutor”, and shows little interest in taking back the refugees (Black and Koser, 1999). This is
of particular importance in the case of Myanmar, from where Rohingyas were forced to migrate as
part of a calculated state policy.
Finally, there are hidden forces such as the politics of aid, international politics, funding
problems, vested interests of regional and international powers as well as public opinion which
may seriously impact durable solutions to a refugee crisis.
In what follows, the article will use the above framework to analyse the future of the Rohingya
refugees. First, let us trace the policies adopted by Bangladesh in trying to resolve the crisis since
the 1970s.

Rohingya influx and Bangladesh policies

Rohingyas started streaming into Bangladesh as refugees in 1978, when the Burmese government
launched the Naga Min (Dragon King) Operation in Rakhine state, stripping Rohingyas of their
citizenship and considering them thenceforth as “illegal”. The Burmese government started mass
arrests, persecution and violence, confiscated Rohingya property, denied access to basic rights
such as education, health, employment and freedom of movement, used them as forced labour and
tortured them indiscriminately (Lewa, 2007). In May 1978, 200,000 Rohingyas crossed the Naf
river to take refuge in Bangladesh (Lewa, 2007).
The newly independent Bangladesh took it to be a temporary problem and accordingly tried to
resolve it through bilateral negotiations. The first mass refoulement of Rohingyas took place in
6 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

1979 when Bangladesh repatriated almost the entire camp population. Of those remaining in
Bangladesh, some 10,000 people died after food rations were withdrawn (Médecins Sans Fron-
tières, 2019).
Bangladesh experienced a renewed influx of refugees in 1991–1992, when military intervention
started again with the formation of a democratic government in Myanmar. The ruling State Law
and Order Restoration Council increased its military presence in Northern Rakhine state, and the
Rohingyas were reportedly subject to compulsory labour, forced relocation, rape, summary execu-
tions and torture.
Bangladesh offered “refugee” status to 250,877 refugees, accommodated them in 20 camps in
the Cox’s Bazar region and provided them with badly needed supplies (Abrar, n.d.). It also allowed
NGOs and the UNHCR to coordinate material assistance. Through bilateral negotiations, Bangla-
desh repatriated all but 20,000 of the refugees between 1992 and 2001, and 18 camps were closed
(Abrar, n.d.).
The following years witnessed significant shifts in Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy as the flow
become a regular phenomenon. In 1996 and 1997, 10,000 and 7000 Rohingyas entered Bangladesh
respectively. Bangladesh started refusing refugee status to the new Rohingya asylum seekers
(Abrar, n.d.).
The year 2012 marked a flare-up of sectarian violence in the Rakhine State between the
Buddhist and Muslim communities. Myanmar declared a state of emergency in the area, and
renewed repression of Rohingyas started at the hands of law enforcement agencies. Bangladesh,
this time, showed little compassion for the refugees (Huda, 2013). Law enforcement agencies were
instructed to restrict the movement of Rohingya refugees and to curb their interactions with the
local community. New checkpoints were established at the borders to stop “infiltration” (Huda,
2013). Despite repeated advocacy efforts by the UNHCR, civil society and the diplomatic com-
munity, Bangladesh decided to close the borders to persons fleeing Myanmar.
Discrimination against, attacks upon and other widespread violations of the rights of Rohingyas
in Myanmar continued for decades. In the face of the Bangladesh government’s denial to accept
them as refugees, many of them entered secretly through social networks and started living in
Bangladeshi villages in “undocumented” conditions. More than 300,000 Rohingyas have entered
Bangladesh and settled in bordering villages without the authorisation of the Bangladesh govern-
ment. While they have received compassion from the local community, the Bangladesh govern-
ment was sceptical about making the “unofficial” into the “official”, since it could serve as an
additional “pull” factor (Rahman, 2016).
A parallel can be drawn between Bangladesh’s responses to the Rohingya crisis during 1991–
1992 and 2017–2018. Having experience of sheltering Rohingyas, Bangladesh immediately
opened its borders to the persecuted Rohingyas on humanitarian grounds with the hope that the
crisis would be resolved through repatriation of the refugees, as had happened before. The repa-
triation and physical arrangement deals were signed on 23 November 2017 and 26 January 2018
respectively, and 23 January was set as the deadline for the repatriation of 670,000 Rohingyas who
had sought shelter in Bangladesh. Bangladesh refrained from including the 200,000 Rohingyas
who were already in Bangladesh before August 2017 (BBC News, 2018).
The above discussion shows Bangladesh’s ad hoc and inconsistent response to the Rohingya
problem. Bangladesh is neither a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol,
nor has it any national policy or law to deal with a refugee crisis. Consequently, it depends heavily
on diplomatic endeavours to resolve the crisis on an ad hoc basis. The forced repatriation of
Rohingyas during 1979 and the mid-1990s calls into question the “voluntariness” of the potential
Rashid 7

repatriation which Bangladesh has been pursuing since the very beginning of the present influx.
With this background, the next section will analyse the prospect of a durable solution to the crisis.

The prospect of durable solutions for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh

The attitude of the refugees
The attitude of Rohingyas to staying in Bangladesh or going back to Myanmar or elsewhere must
be analysed within their historical connection with both Arakan and Chottogram. Rohingyas are
Muslim inhabitants of the State of Arakan—currently known as the Rakhine State—of Myanmar.
In 1406, The Rakhine king Nara Meikhla was dethroned by an invading Burmese force and was
driven to Bengal, and thus cordial relations between Bengal and the Rakhine State developed from
that period (Iqbal, 2017). During the transition from the decline of independent Muslim rulers in
Bengal to the arrival of the Mughals from Northern India, Bangladesh’s port city of Chottogram
came under Rakhine rule for some time. Despite these political changes, Rakhine developed a
cosmopolitan culture that included Buddhists as well as Muslims and Hindus (Iqbal, 2017).
Descendants of Moorish, Arab and Persian traders, who arrived there between the 9th and the
15th centuries, married locals and settled down. The Burmese finally captured the throne in 1784,
leaving the Rakhine people—both of Buddhist and Muslim origin—to face unprecedented perse-
cution in their ancestral land. Most of them fled to the Chottogram region across the Naf River
(Iqbal, 2017). More than 100,000 Buddhist Rakhines still live in Ramu, Cox’s Bazar as Banglade-
shi citizens. The British conquered Burma, and since 1937 ruled it as part of India, and then as
British Burma. The period saw a different kind of mobility across today’s Bangladesh–Myanmar
border. People from all over India, including Bengalis from Chottogram, had settled in Arakan for
business, agriculture and commercial purposes, many of whom returned to India after the Japanese
occupation of Burma during the Second World War (Iqbal, 2017).
The current problem of the Rohingyas, resulting in occasional genocidal atrocities, can be
traced back to the 1982 Burma Citizenship Law that enabled the revocation of Rohingya citizen-
ship, excluding them from the pool of 135 recognised ethnic groups in Myanmar (Lewa, 2007). It
was a clear departure from the previous policies of the Burmese government, which showed a
gesture of inclusion of minorities. The next 30 years witnessed the gradual abolition of citizenship
rights and Rohingya representation in the Myanmar government (Lewa, 2007). The above findings
indicate that for decades, Rohingyas have been caught within the politics of expulsion and
repatriation.
They have had mixed attitudes towards their ancestral land and their land of refugee, Bangla-
desh. A study on camp-dwelling Rohingya women (Rashid, 2005) showed that, while they felt an
emotional attachment to Arakan and opted for repatriation, they feared persecution again, and a
section of refugees found the camps safer than Arakan. The recent influx, however, produced
different ideas among refugees regarding return. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most refugees
are unwilling to return home (Yasmin, 2018). As a reason, refugees cite that the fear of persecution
still exists. One refugee woman was quoted by Al Jazeera (2018) as saying: “I don’t know whether
I will go back to Myanmar again . . . It depends on God’s will. I really want to go back to Myanmar,
but only if peace is available there”.
A recent survey carried out by Brac (2019) found that 67% of the Rohingya refugee community
living in Bangladesh would be willing to return to their homes in Myanmar if the authorities met
certain conditions. Issuance of a national identity card that legitimizes their equal rights as citizens
8 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

of Myanmar, compensation for the destruction of their property and possessions, release of cap-
tured Rohingyas and long-term supervision of the repatriation and integration process by interna-
tional NGOs and agencies were set as conditions by the Rohingyas for their safe and dignified
return to Myanmar (Brac, 2019).
In reality, in the past, Rohingyas were forced to return to Burma in less than optimal conditions,
where their life and liberty were at risk. The UNHCR’s involvement in this repatriation was judged
by human rights organisations to be “tantamount to forcible repatriation” (Cuenod, 1989). More
evidently, they had few citizenship rights in Myanmar. As a result, many of the repatriated
Rohingyas returned to Bangladesh again. This questions the durability of the “durable solutions”
pursued earlier. Again, men and women refugees differed in the question of repatriation. While
Rohingya men expressed their willingness to repatriate if their conditions were met, women didn’t
want to stay, due to the brutal gender-specific violence they experienced in Myanmar (Brac, 2019).
State proponents of “safe return” effectively substitute “objective” change of circumstances for
the refugees “subjective” assessment, and this has been clearly evident in the Rohingya refugee
case (Cuenod, 1989). Myanmar has paid little heed to their pleas for return with dignity and rights
to their ancestral home. Bangladesh, being the host country, has often paid little attention to the
testimonies of refugees while pursuing “voluntary” repatriation as the best solution. On the one
hand, the mechanism to assess the “voluntariness” is often weak and manipulated (Guardian,
2018). On the other, refugees lack sufficient capacity in terms of knowledge, leadership and
lobbying to press for their demands (Rashid, 2005). This passivity has further complicated the
issue of a durable solution.

The attitude and behaviour of Bangladesh towards offering local integration

In a situation when most resource-rich countries exhibit anti-refugee attitudes, Bangladesh has set
a unique example by offering admission and shelter to the persecuted Rohingyas from Myanmar.
Nonetheless, there is national consensus about not granting them settlement opportunities in
Bangladesh (Abrar, 2018). Three questions become paramount when we discuss Bangladesh’s
ability to offer local integration opportunities to Rohingyas: Where to accommodate Rohingyas?
How would the local people respond? Who will bear the cost of settlement?
The consensus in Bangladesh over not offering local integration to Rohingyas stems to a large
extent from the fact that the country is already overpopulated. The labour market is often saturated
and unable to ensure employment for around 40% of its nationals. Local integration is regarded as
an economic process which involves offering rights and entitlements to refugees for improving
their potential to establish sustainable livelihoods, attaining a growing degree of self-reliance and
becoming progressively less reliant on state aid and humanitarian assistance (Crisp, 2004). Having
a substantial number of refugees is seen to have negative impacts on resources that are already
severely constrained (Ahmed, 2014). The United Nations (UN) and the Bangladesh government
launched a joint response plan to provide assistance totalling US$950 million to Rohingya refugees
and vulnerable locals in Cox’s Bazar until December 2018, one third of which had not materialised
at the time of writing this article (Daily Star, 2018e). It is in this context that a political push for
repatriation of refugees has evolved.
Local integration denotes a legal process whereby refugees are granted a progressively wider
range of rights and entitlements by the host state (Crisp, 2004). Under the terms of the 1951
Refugee Convention, these include, for example, the rights to seek employment, engage in other
income-generating activities, own and dispose of property, enjoy freedom of movement and have
Rashid 9

access to public services such as education. The process whereby refugees gain and accumulate
rights may lead to the acquisition of permanent residence rights and ultimately to the acquisition of
citizenship in the country of asylum. Because of popular resistance, offering citizenship rights to
around one million Rohingyas would have repercussions in Bangladesh. On the domestic front, it
may give rise to nationalist sentiments against inclusion of foreigners and could seriously affect
domestic politics. Internationally, it would be tantamount to Bangladesh’s failure in terms of
diplomacy and garnering international support for persuading Myanmar to take back its citizens.
In effect, local integration is a preferred option when the number of refugees is seen to be manage-
able. The size of the Rohingya refugee population creates another obstacle in providing them with
settlement costs.
Finally, local integration is a social and cultural process, enabling refugees to live amongst or
alongside the host population, without fear of systematic discrimination, intimidation or exploita-
tion by the authorities or people of the asylum country (Crisp, 2004). While Rohingya refugees
enjoy a certain degree of comfort due to their ethno-religious and linguistic similarities with the
people of south-eastern Bangladesh, the country fears that this can well be used as a leverage to
push Rohingyas into Bangladesh and for denial of their citizenship rights in Myanmar. The
Bangladesh state also denies local integration of the Rohingyas on the question of national security
(Ahmed, 2014). Soon after the influx, the media was full of reports about how a section of
Rohingyas were engaged with Pakistan-based terrorist organisations (BBC News, 2017b). Media
and scholars have even forecasted the creation of a “safe haven” of Islamic terrorists in refugee
camps and radicalisation of Rohingya refugee youth, while others foresee the use of the camp for
the resurgence of Arakan independence movements (Biswas, 2018). Bangladesh also fears smug-
gling of drugs and arms (Ahmed, 2014).

The attitude of countries of resettlement

There are many examples of the third-country resettlement of people displaced by ethnic conflicts,
wars and disaster. Canada alone accepted 25,000 Syrian refugees in 2016, while Europe and
Germany received over 300,000 asylum seekers. During the same period, the United Kingdom
agreed to accept 20,000 refugees who were living in camps in Syria, Turkey and Jordan (Zaman,
2017a). The third-country settlement of Rohingya refugees nonetheless remains a complex issue,
though it did occur at a very small scale until around a decade ago.
Recently, the special envoy of the Canadian Prime Minister recommended that Canada should
welcome refugees from the Rohingya Community (Daily Star, 2018c). Similar interest was also
expressed by the Filipino President (Daily Star, 2018b). While this may express the solidarity of
these countries to the Rohingya causes and to Bangladesh as a host country, in reality in the wake
of the influence of right-wing political forces in Europe and Australia and the retreat of the US—a
traditional refugee resettlement state—from admitting migrants and refugees, third-country reset-
tlement of Rohingyas has a bleak future.
Since the inception of the crisis, the role of the US government has been limited to sharing the
financial burden of humanitarian assistance. Between August 2017 and March 2018, the US
government has committed US$163 million out of the required US$255 million. It has also urged
all stakeholders to play a “constructive role” (Daily Star, 2018a). Canada resettled more than 300
people from Bangladesh camps between 2006 and 2010.2
A number of factors impede third-country resettlement of Rohingyas. First, there are legal
problems for this in any refugee case. “Refugee problems demand durable solutions” is the opening
10 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

statement of the Principles for Action in Developing Countries adopted by the 1984 Executive
Committee of the UNHCR (Cuenod, 1989). This principle weakened the demand for durable
solutions by labelling third-country resettlement as “the least desirable” and “most costly” solution
and by indicating that when “voluntary repatriation is not immediately feasible” it is sufficient to
provide only “temporary settlement” for the refugees (Cuenod, 1989).
Second, with the growing xenophobia and popular antagonism among citizens of the develop-
ing world against Muslim communities, it is more likely that the Rohingya refugees would be seen
as a potential threat to social and political order and peace. The economic value of the community
for the host country’s economy is again lower because of the Rohingyas’ agricultural background
and low levels of education.
Third, allowing third-country resettlement of Rohingyas may open the floodgates for refugees
or persecuted minorities to enter the resettlement countries. “Even a discussion about third country
resettlement of the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh might unsettle the remaining half a million
or so Rohingyas still living in Myanmar and provoke them to join the queue in Bangladesh”, said
the former Director of UNHCR in an interview with the Daily Star (2019).
Last but not least, third-country resettlement of Rohingyas would raise the important moral
question of letting Myanmar get away with the crimes against humanity it has committed. By
exploring solutions other than voluntary return, the international community would not only be
responsible for accepting Myanmar’s long-term policy of expelling Rohingyas from Arakan, but
would also encourage other states to commit atrocities against unwanted minorities, assuming they
will be resettled elsewhere.
In reality, like other cases, the Rohingya refugee crisis witnesses a reluctance of traditional
resettlement states, such as Canada, Australia and the USA, to accommodate large numbers of
refugees, clearly indicating that more prosperous members of the international community are not
sufficiently committed to burden-sharing.

The attitude and behaviour of Myanmar towards repatriation

During 1978, Myanmar allowed Rohingyas to return home. Heads of states of Myanmar and
Bangladesh had exchanged state visits before the signing of a historic “Repatriation Agreement”
in Dhaka on 9 July 1978 (Iqbal, 2017). In the agreement, the Burmese government promised the
“repatriation at the earliest of the lawful residents of Burma” and also of those who were “able to
furnish evidences of their residence in Burma”, such as addresses or any other particulars. Under
the agreement, the Burmese government launched the “Hintha project”, which oversaw the repa-
triation of more than 29,000 families, comprising 177,000 refugees from Bangladesh, to their
former places of residence (Iqbal, 2017).
Myanmar’s attitude towards Rohingyas changed dramatically over the next few decades and
was influenced by their larger exclusionist policies towards selected minorities. The current
practice of burning the habitat and homestead of Rohingyas by the Burmese security forces
seems to aim to pre-emotively forestall any chance of return of Rohingyas as Myanmar citizens,
although it has signed a repatriation agreement with the government of Bangladesh (Abrar,
2018). When repatriation deals were being negotiated, instead of creating an enabling environ-
ment, the security forces in Arakan continued their operations in northern Arakan, killing people,
torching houses and forcing survivors to seek asylum in Bangladesh. Eyewitness and satellite
imagery found that Myanmar has militarised in Northern Arakan by building new roads and
structures over burned villages and land (Amnesty International, 2018). The attitude and
Rashid 11

behaviour of Myanmar has created a high degree of uncertainty about the repatriation of Rohin-
gya refugees (Abrar, 2018).
The agreement also raises questions about the “voluntariness” of the repatriation, since some
families refused to return home while they were in no-man’s land (Dhaka Tribune, 2018a). Even if
refugees return, they might see a new home where they have never lived and where they would
actually consider themselves to be refugees, given the fact that Myanmar was facilitating transmi-
gration of Rakhine Buddhists in the Rohingya land at the time of writing (Daily Star, 2018d).
Despite calls for independent international enquiry into the violence, Myanmar has denied granting
full access to UN fact-finding missions to areas of concern, which makes the situation of
“voluntary repatriation” incongruent, as commented by the International Commission of Jurists.
In the past, too, repatriation of Rohingyas gave rise to a new refugee cycle, initiating only return of
the people due to repression and denial of rights (Lewa, 2007).

Hidden forces: Geo-strategic implications, ethno-religious forces and public opinion

One cannot lose sight of the implications of hidden forces such as geopolitics, the ethno-religious
identity of the Rohingyas, public opinion and the role of the international community and other
regional actors in shaping the future of the Rohingya refugees of Bangladesh. There are other
powerful agents, such as geo-strategic considerations, trade routes and pipelines, which complicate
the situation.
Some scholars link the existential threat to the Rohingya community with the military-
economic interests of the regime due to the geostrategic location of the region. To them, it is trade
routes, gas pipelines, the creation of exclusive economic zones and unearthed natural resources
which have led to grabbing of Rohingya lands (Sassen, 2017). Others, however, have pointed out
the deep-seated causes of ethno-religious identity behind the ethnic cleansing and genocide (Jones,
2017). Jones (2017) argues that Buddhist-Muslim conflict over land and resources in Rakhine has
its roots in British colonialism (1824–1948), which allowed vast in-migration from Bengal to
fill up labour shortages, ultimately giving Muslims a dominant position in society, economy
and politics. Immigration to Burma peaked to 480,000 in 1927, when the total population was
13 million. This resulted in the rise of economic nationalism among Buddhists, resulting in several
riots between 1926 to 1938. The future of Rohingya repatriation has been seriously hindered by
historical animosities between Buddhist and Muslim communities, as well as the geo-strategic
importance of the Arakan land to strategic and economic partners of Myanmar State, i.e. China,
Russia and India.
Public discourses are important factors which influence Bangladesh’s policies towards Rohin-
gyas, who carry a lower status in the local communities. Many of them are thought to be actively
involved in terrorism and militancy, smuggling of drugs and arms and other illegal trades (Yasmin,
2018). They are often held responsible for human trafficking and illegal labour migration through
maritime routes (Rashid and Ashraf, 2016). They are seen to impact the unemployment rate,
inflation and high prices of essential goods, cause slumisation, engage in anti-social activities
such as sex work and transform the local culture by marrying local people.3 Rohingyas, like any
other refugee populations, are blamed for destroying the forest and polluting the air, water and land
through unhygienic sanitation. Rohingya refugees are thus securitised socially, economically,
politically, environmentally and militarily (Ahmed, 2014). The Bangladesh government is well
aware of local sensitivities about land allocation and population pressure, and has unequivocally
rejected all recommendations of local integration.
12 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Finally, the role of the UN and ASEAN fall short of initiatives to exert pressure on Myanmar to
take back Rohingyas and confer on them citizenship rights (BBC News, 2017a). The UNSC has
proved to be highly ineffective in taking resolutions against ethnic cleansing. The European Union,
the United States and the United Kingdom have showed compassion for refugees and have
committed to humanitarian and emergency aid. However, no significant initiative to exert pressure
on Myanmar for creating conditions of Rohingya return was evident. More importantly, such
ambiguous behaviour of the international community is likely to increase the chances of the
Rohingyas’ protracted refugeehood and warehousing, leading to further deterioration of their
humane condition.

Conclusions: Towards a coordinated and comprehensive approach

Taking a rights-based approach, this article analysed the prospect of a durable solution to the
problems of around one million Rohingya refugees sheltered in Bangladesh. It examined the extent
to which the options of voluntary repatriation, local integration and third-country resettlement are
applicable to the Rohingya refugee case, framing five variables as analytical categories: refugee
agency; the attitude and behaviour of the host, home and resettlement states; and hidden forces.
The article showed that different options for durable solutions are hierarchically placed in the case
of Rohingya refugees and have varied from time to time as per the national interest and priorities of
Bangladesh and Myanmar.
In placing the Rohingya refugee influx in Bangladesh within its historical context, the article
demonstrated the ways in which the responses of Bangladesh were inconsistent and ad hoc at
different points in time. As it showed, temporary asylum, voluntary repatriation, forced return and
even summary return and entry restriction were some of the responses which had largely failed to
achieve any lasting solution for those who stayed in Bangladesh or for newcomers. Past records of
Rohingya repatriation also signify the short-lived nature of “return” as a lasting solution.
Despite the legal obligation of states to pay due attention to the ability and willingness of
refugees to decide about their future, solutions such as repatriation or summary return were forced
upon Rohingyas. This indicates that Rohingyas, like any other refugee people, are passive reci-
pients of humanitarian assistance and have little role in shaping their future.
The article uncovered the grim future of Rohingya repatriation unless the Myanmar govern-
ment changes its policy and politics of minority exclusion, which is rooted in ethno-religious
historical incidences and the geostrategic importance of the Arakan land. The inadequate actions
of the international community in persuading Myanmar to return Rohingyas their citizenship
rights constitute another factor impeding lasting solutions. There is also little prospect of Rohin-
gyas being integrated into Bangladeshi society, because it sees Rohingyas to be a threat to
sovereignty, economic development and social cohesion. Finally, third-country resettlement
as an option has no future, because traditional resettlement countries are less likely to absorb
large numbers of low-skilled, Muslim Rohingyas under the growing anti-immigrant sentiments
worldwide.
The above analysis suggests that traditional durable solution packages rarely match with the
realities of the contemporary refugee crises, including that of the Rohingyas. While scholars
emphasise refugees’ rights to mobility, national recognition and restoration of citizenship, and
burden-sharing by resourceful countries to be the essential components of a lasting solution, the
Rohingya case shows that these are largely absent in practice. The case also poses a policy
challenge in incorporating the refugees’ own meanings, perceptions and expectations of home.
Rashid 13

Therefore, any attempt to find a lasting solution to the Rohingya refugees of Bangladesh needs
the adoption of a coordinated and comprehensive approach with three components: a) addressing
the root causes of Rohingyas’ forced migration from Myanmar and ensuring voluntary return of the
Rohingyas; b) sharing of burden by the international community and prosperous states; and c)
making the voices of the refugees heard.
In order to address the root causes, Bangladesh should strengthen its bilateral and multilateral
efforts to obligate Myanmar to restore the nationality and citizenship of the Rohingyas by reform-
ing existing laws or adopting new citizenship laws to build the initial consensus that Rohingyas are
citizens of Myanmar. With reference to the international laws which guarantee the right to citizen-
ship, Myanmar should be obliged to restore the citizenship of the Rohingyas. The international
community should be proactive in this regard by invoking the provisions of the UN and regional
organisations.
International law also provides a framework of rights and obligations vis-a-vis voluntary repa-
triation through customary international law and various elements of international human rights
law. While repatriation of Rohingyas might indicate Myanmar to return non-nationals on its
territory, it is in fact consistent with international human rights laws. Article 13.2 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights gives everyone the right “to return to his [sic] country”, which was
then incorporated in Article 12.4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:4 “No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his [sic] own country”. Thus the right to return
to one’s own country cannot be refuted. According to the UNHCR (1985), the international
protection of refugees owed by states and guaranteed by non-refoulement reaffirms the entirely
voluntary character of repatriation, which must be in safety and dignity. Being the country of
origin, Myanmar is obliged to offer rehabilitation and development assistance to foster the vol-
untary, safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration of Rohingya refugees and ensure the
restoration of their national protection.
As long as the conditions for voluntary repatriation are not met, the international community
should share the burden of protection of these refugees. The disproportionate burden of hosting a
large population by Bangladesh can be eased to a large extent by adopting a combination of a
number of strategies: temporary resettlement of refugees at some resettlement states, and tempo-
rary labour agreements allowing transitional and transnational lifestyles to be shared and imple-
mented by like-minded regional states. The international community should extend diplomatic and
material support to implement such policies.
Most importantly, the refugee voices need to be heard and their capacities should be enhanced
to help them return or resettle to a new environment. This is because host country solutions often
mute them, reduce their agency and make them passive recipients of aid and assistance. Protracted
refugee conditions need to be avoided to reduce refugees’ reliance on aid. It is the victims’
narratives, voices and appeals that may have a significant impact on the international community
to find a durable solution to the Rohingya refugee crisis.

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or
publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
14 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics XX(X)

Notes
1. France accepted refugees from Indo-China, and Denmark accept handicapped refugees, both on humani-
tarian grounds (Cuenod, 1989).
2. Bangladesh stopped issuing exit permits for the resettlement of Rohingya refugees to other countries in
2010 (Reuters, 2018).
3. Author’s personal communication with members of the host community.
4. UNGA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UNGAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171.

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