Decisionmaking in the Economic and Social Council

Author(s): Walter R. Sharp

Source: International Organization, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Autumn, 1968), pp. 881-901
Published by: University of Wisconsin Press
Stable URL: [Link] .
Accessed: 14/06/2014 05:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
[Link]

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@[Link].

University of Wisconsin Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
International Organization.

[Link]

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Decisionmakingin theEconomicand
SocialCouncil

WALTER R. SHARP

THE UnitedNationsEconomicand Social Council

(ECOSOC) is nota diplomatic conference, or an executive
or a parliament,
organ,althoughit smacksof all three. Among governmental,
international,
bodiesit is sui [Link] such,it engagesin discussing
deliberative quasi
diplomaticissues,chieflyeconomicand socialin nature,in recommending
policyactionsby governments, in trying to plan and coordinateinteragency
programs in theeconomicand socialdomain,and in innovating and super-
visingprograms underUN sponsorship.

WHO ARE THE DECISIONMAKERS?

Oftencharacterizedas "the problemchild" of the United Nations,ECO-
SOC is a relativelysmall body. Since its enlargementfromeighteento 27
membersby Charteramendmentin I965 its size has corresponded to some
22 percentof the totalmembership of the UN [Link] enlargement, long
urgedby the less developedcountries(LDC's), has made theCouncila much
morerepresentative organ than formerly. When the GeneralAssemblyacted
favorablyon theproposedCharteramendment, it laid down a patternof geo-
graphicdistributionforthe electionof thenew [Link] membership of
the enlargedCouncil would be as follows:twelvefromAfricanand Asian
states;threefromEasternEuropeanstates;fivefromLatin Americanstates;
and sevenfromWesternEuropean and "other"states,i.e., the United States
and Canada.' Withinthispatternthe traditionof electingregularly, without
WALTER R. SHARP, a memberof the Board of Editors,is ProfessorEmeritusof Political Science at
Yale [Link] has held a numberof staffassignmentswith variousUnited Nations specialized
studyof the UnitedNations
[Link] articleis adaptedfroma chapterin the author'sbook-length
Economicand Social Council,to be publishedin I969 by ColumbiaUniversity Press.
1 See GeneralAssemblyResolutioni99i B (XVIII), DecemberI7, I963.

88i

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
882 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

interruption, thepowerswithpermanent seatson theSecurity Council(ex-

cept,sincei96o, China) stll persists. The present membership of ECOSOC
contains, as it were,a built-in majority ofroughly two-thirdsforthedevelop-
ing countries, as a consequence of whichtheynow tendto regardtheCoun-
cil as an organdecidedlymorefavorable to theirneedsand interests than
wasthecasebefore I965.
Nationaldelegations to ECOSOC havein recentyearsvariedin sizefrom
twoor threeto aroundtwenty persons, thelargest beingthoseof theUnited
Statesand theUnionof SovietSocialistRepublics. The averagesize during
thetwoI967 sessions was sixandeight,respectively. ManyoftheLDC's send
minuscule delegations in viewof thescarcity of competent personnel.
While the careerbackgrounds of ECOSOC delegation personnel reflect
a fairlywidevariety ofpatterns, it is significant thatonlya smallnumber of
delegation headsaredrawnfromnationalministries orotherimportant agen-
ciesconcerned witheconomic orsocialpolicy, letalonedevelopment planning.
Typically, exceptfora fewmajorstates, areheadedbymenwith
delegaitions
predominantly foreign officeor careerdiplomatic [Link]-
ally,moreover, doesa minister or deputyminister presideoverhis country's
delegation and eventhenusuallyforonlya fewdaysduringa Councilses-
[Link] advisers
staff thereare,especially forthelargerstates,
a considerable numberof economists and othertypesof specialists drawn
largelyfrompermanent nationalmissionsto UN Headquarters or theUN
Office at [Link] striking, however, is how fewmembers of delega-
tionstaffs havehad anyappreciable previous experiencein UN or specialized
agencyaffairs, thoughthereare now somesignsthatthissituation maybe
changinggradually forthebetter.
In general, ECOSOC maybe saidto be overpopulated withdiplomats and
underpopulated withexperienced generalists in economic and socialprogram
formulation or administration. The deficiencies oftheCouncilin itsdecision-
makingproblems aresignificantly relatedto theseinadequacies ofthehuman
actorsin [Link] someextent, as willbe notedlaterin thisarticle, such
shortcomings arecompensated forbytheparticipation ofUN and specialized
agencysecretariat officialsin thedecisionprocess.

AGEN1DA CONTENT AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS

As an organrepresenting sovereign statesECOSOC may,and not infre-

quentlydoes,includein itsagendaitemsdictated by thewhimor fancyof
individualgovernmentswhichdo notnecessarily bearanycloserelationto
As thefunctional
functions.
itsprincipal rangeof actionby theUN family
has expandedovertheyears,theCouncil'sagendahas more
of organizations
thancorrespondinglygrownin [Link] has theCouncilorganizeditself
tohandleitsbulgingagenda?

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 883
The provisional
agendaforregulrCouncilsessions,
drawnup bytheSecre-
tary-General,
comprises
all itemsproposed bytheCouncilat previous
sessions,
theGeneralAssembly,theSecurity Council(almostnever),theTrusteeship
Council(veryseldom),any Memberof theUnitedNations,theSecretary-
Generalhimself,
anyspecializedagency,and,undercertainconditions,non-
governmentalorganizations A.2For fouryearsduring
(NGO's) in Category
theearlylifeoftheCouncil,
I947-I95I, an AgendaCommittee,
consisting
of
thePresident, twoVice Presidents, and twoothermembers of theCouncil,
functoned as a deviceto screentheprovisional agendapriorto eachsession
and makerecommendations to thefullCouncilat thefirstmeetingof the
session,includingsuggestions as to the inclusion,deferment, iordeletionof
itemsand theorderin whichtheyshouldbe considered. Representativesof
governments, specialized and nongovernmental
agencies, organizationsmight
present theirviewsto thisCommittee.
Aftersomeexperience withsucha Committee it was discoveredthatthe
amountof timespentbytheCouncilitself on determining agen-
itsdefinitive
da continued to be just aboutas greatas beforetheCommittee was estab-
[Link], theCouncildecidedto discontinue theCommittee. Since
thenit has beenthepracticefortheCouncilto meetin a brief"resumed"
sessiontowardtheend of eachregularGeneralAssembly sessionand at that
timeto formulate a "program ofwork"forthefollowing yearas a guideto
construction of sessionalagendaby the Secretary-General. This procedure
doesnot,to be sure,excludechangeslaterbuttheyhavetendedtobe lessex-
tensivethanpreviously.
DuringtheCouncil'sformative yearsand eventhrough theperiodof the
Cold War adoptionof theofficial sessionalagendagaveriseto considerable
acrimonious discussion,oftenabsorbing twoor moreplenary Com-
meetings.
plaintsthattheagendawas tooheavybeganas farbackas thelateI940's and
haveintensified eversince,thoughwithlittleappreciable [Link]
thenumberof agendaitemsper majorregularsessionrangesfromaround
to40 ormore.3
twenty
In I966 theCouncilundertook workbalancebetween
to arriveat a better
its two main sessionsper yearby rearranging theallocationof businessin
thefollowing sense:i) At thefirstsessionheldin thesecondquarterof the
yeartheUN workprogram, reportsof functionalcommissions and commit-
in thesocialand humanrightsfields,and certaintechnical
tees,particularly
questionsnotpreviously consideredbysubsidiary bodieswouldbe dealtwith;
2) at thesecondsessionheldin thethirdquarter theyeartheagendawould
of
includediscussionof majoreconomic and socialpolicy,i.e.,theworldforum
2 See Rule IO of the Council'sRules of Procedure(DocumentE/3o63/Rev.i).
3 These figuresinclude routineas well as [Link] items are currently groupedas
subitemsunder a broaderrubric,e.g., "developmentand coordinationof the activitiesof the organiza-
tionswithintheUN system."

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
884 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

role, coordinationproblems,and examinationof the reportsof the regional

economiccommissions.4 By thisrearrangement it was hoped to dispensewith
one sessionalisubject-mattercommittee at each session,i.e.,theEconomicCom-
mitteeat the springsessionand the Social Committeeat the summersession,
somewhatmoreof the session'sbusinessbeing handledin theplenaryCoun-
cil. The main object,however,was to relievethe summersessionof some of
itsoverload.
During recentyearsdetermination of the officialagenda of a sessionhas
usuallynot involvedmuch timeat the openingof the [Link] thatjunc-
tureactionis also takento allocateitemsby categoriesto sessionalcommittees
or to theplenaryCouncilin accordancewithproposalssubmitted by thesecre-
[Link] regardscertainitems,thisis not alwaysan [Link], at the
43rd sessionit was finallydecided to splitthe itemon the "UnitedNations
DevelopmentDecade" betweentwo committees, the Economic Committee
being allottedthe "economic"aspectsand the CoordinationCommitteethe
"coordination"[Link] such an arrangement the two committees con-
cerned,throughtheirofficers, may findit necessaryto synthesizetheircon-
clusions.
With a view to keepingtheconductof sessionalbusinessmovingat as even
a pace as possiblethe secretariat presentsat the openingof a sessiona sug-
gestedcalendarof work with specifiedperiodsof meetingsfordealingwith
specifiedagenda [Link] thiscalendardoes notbind a committee, it does
serveas a [Link], as not infrequently happens,a committeeappears
to be fallingbehindits schedule,an alertchairmanwill remindhis commit-
tee of the situationand proposeways of speedingup its work. It is rarefor
a sessionalcommitteeto disposeof its docketahead of time!
Accordingto Rule 14 of its Rules of Procedurethe Council is supposedto
include in the sessionalagenda only itemsforwhich "adequate documenta-
tion" has been circulatedto memberssix weeks beforethe beginningof the
[Link] in briefas the "six weeks"rule,thisis in practicedisregarded
perhapsas oftenas it is [Link] a sessionthe Council may revise
the agenda,but only "urgentand important" itemsmaybe added (Rule I7).
But here again,if it is the will of the majorityto add an item,howeverun-
important, it may do so, especiallyif the itemhas been introducedby a per-
sistentmembergovernment.

ELECrIoN OF OFFICERS
In pointof timethe electionof officersnormallyprecedesthe allocationof
agenda [Link] officers include a President,and, since I966, threeVice
[Link] are all electedat the beginningof the firstmeetingeach
4See ECOSOC ResolutionII56 (XLI), Part I, August5, I966.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 885
year and hold officeuntil theirsuccessorsare chosena [Link]
theyare eligibleforreelection,therehave been only two cases of reelection,
as faras thePresidencyis concerned,sincethe establishment of the Council.5
In severalinstances,however,a Vice Presidenthas laterbecome President.
Under existingruleseach Vice Presidentpresidesovera sessionalcommittee,
the Presidentdetermining which committeeis to be chairedby whichVice
President.
How are theseofficers chosen?The recently revisedrulesstatethatin elect-
ing the President"regardshall be had forthe equitablegeographicrotation"
of the officeamong the followingfiveregionalgroups:African,Asian,Latin
American,Socialiststatesof EasternEurope,and WesternEuropeand "other"
[Link] Vice Presidentsare drawn on a similarbasis fromthosegroups
otherthan the one fromwhich the Presidenthas been chosen.6These provi-
sions representthe firstofficialrecognitionof the existenceof an informal
regionalgroup structure in the Council,thoughat least in connectionwith
the electionof theprincipalofficers it has playedsomepartfora considerable
period.
By "gentlemen'sagreement"the Presidentis usually,thoughnot always,
chosenfromthe regionalgroup thatheld the Presidencyof the GeneralAs-
semblythe precedingyear. Each group caucusesto determineits nominee
for the post allottedto it. Thus, as one reads fromthe officialrecordof the
of theCouncil,February
1402nd meeting 23, I966: Said Hasan (Pakistan),
"speakingon behalf of the Afro-Asiangroup [note how two groupscom-
binedhere],nominated[Tewfik] Bouattoura(Algeria)" forPresident, "com-
mendingthe spiritof solidarity thatunitedthecountriesof Africaand Asia."7
Mr. Bouattourawas electedby acclamation,the usual processwherebythe
full Council ratifiesthe nominationssubmittedby the [Link]
occasion one or more groupsmay object to a particularnomineeand the
systemtemporarily breaksdown.8
Various kinds of presidingofficers have been electedas a consequenceof
thisrotationprocess,as well as by themoreopen nominationsystemthatpre-
ceded it,in whichthe secretariatreportedlyplayeda considerable rolein sug-
gestingofficerslates.9Among the Presidentselectedtherehave been a lim-
ited numberof highlyskilledand effective a largermiddle
presidingofficers,
5 The two cases were Sir RamaswamiMudalierof India (I946-I947) and Herman Santa Cruz of
Chile(I950-I95I).
6 See ECOSOC ResolutionII03 (XLI), December2o, I966, amendingthe Council's Rules of Pro-
cedure.
7Economic and Social Council OfficialRecords(40th session), I402nd plenarymeeting,p. I.
8 As a matterof factthis happenedin I967, the objectionbeing to the nomineeof the Asian group
for the [Link] agreementwas reachedthat the East Europeangroup
consultations
shouldnominateforthisoffice.
9 As in the GeneralAssembly,the traditionin the Council is not to chooseits Presidentfromamong
of stateswhich are permanentmembersof the SecurityCouncil.
representatives

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
886 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

groupof fairlywell-qualified persons,and a substantial numberof poorly

equippedand amateurish [Link] have been "permissive" chairmen;
others,
fewerin number, "authoritarian."Withcertain notableexceptionsthe
Presidentsof the Councilduringthepast decadehavereportedly assumed
theirfunctions withlittleconceptionof the"insand outs"of Councilproce-
dureor of itsworkingtraditions. In thiskindof situation thePresidenthas
to dependlargely uponthesortof adviceon tactics he maygetfromthestaff
oftheCouncil.10
secretary As to suchadvice,it is theauthor'sconclusionfrom
observationat severalCouncilsessionsthatit mayvaryfromthesophisticated
and timelyto theobviously inadequate [Link] generaliza-
or politically
don wouldalsoprobably holdas regardsthechairmen of the
and secretaries
committees
sessional [Link] kindofsitua-
tionfacinga chairman, whether of thefullCouncilorofa committee, occurs
whenhe hasto decidewhether to call a delegateoutoforderforhisremarks
becauseoftheirpoliticalconnotationsor theirirrelevancyto thesubjectunder
Not manychairmen
discussion. havethecourageto imposesuchrulings."

THE DISCUSSION CONTEXr

Littleneed be said hereconcerning thepattern by whichdiscussionde-
velopsin theCounciland its committees sinceit conforms to
substantially
thatwhichcharacterizes GeneralAssembly meetings. Beingmuchsmallerin
sizethanthoseof theAssembly, ECOSOC committees, whicharecommittees
of thewhole,operatein a somewhat moreinformal The open-
atmosphere."2
ingphaseof thediscussion of an agendaitemor relatedgroupof itemscon-
ofmoreor lessgeneralstatements
ofa succession
sistsordinarily following the
orderin whichthespeakers haveaskedto be puton thechairman's [Link]
the case of the generaldebateon international
economicand socialpolicy
whichalwaystakesplacein plenarythediscussion maycontinue through as
10 Accordingto one account (related to the authorby a veteranofficialof the UN Secretariat)the
Presidentof the Council for I967, amazed by the intricaciesof the proceduralrules and arrangements,
put himselfin the Secretariat'shands. As it happened,at the 43rd sessionthe Council's secretarywas
also new at his job. On one occasionthe secretarywas reportedto have "thrownthe ball" back intothe
President'shands, saying,in effect,"That's your decision-a politicalonel"
11The story(on reliableauthority)goes that the membersof the Administrative Committeeon Co-
ordination(ACC) invitedthe Chairmanof the CoordinationCommitteeto lunchduringa recentsession
of the Council,with a view to politelyadvisinghim on how to run his [Link]
he was urged to begin meetingson time and "to take firmstands."He was not a forcefulChairman
accordingto this informant. During the cold-warperiod a "tough" Presidentof the Council,in com-
mentingon the Soviet delegate'scharacterization of an intervention by the United Kingdom,declared
that "slandersand lies" should not be permittedin the [Link] Sovietdelegateretorted
that as the representativeof a sovereignpower he did not need the President'sauthorizationto speak
as he [Link] one could referto the delegate'sremarksin such termssince theywere "the truth."
This clash, which took place duringa debateon forcedlabor,resultedin a standoff. See Economicand
Social CouncilOfficialRecords(gth session),324thplenarymeeting,p. 585.
12 Africandelegatesoften referto their colleagues,while speakingfrom the floor,as "friends"or
"brothers."

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 887
manyas a dozenor so meetings. It is in thiscontextthattheCouncilfunc-
tionsas a "worldpolicyforum."
In committee theopeningphasegradually or sometimes abruptly-inorder
to sharpenthedebateas well as to savetime-turns intoa preliminarycoll-
sideration of draftresolutions
proposedby members of [Link] is
notuncommon forthechairman to haveto remindmembers ofhiscommit-
tee thatdraftresolutions shouldbe submitted by a specified
deadlineso as
notto slowdowntheprogress of committee [Link], however,
are notinfrequently [Link] also times,especiallyduringthe
earlydaysofa committee's deliberationson an item,whenthechairman may
haveto adjournthemeetingforlack of speakers, no delegation
apparently
havingcompleted its"homework."'3 The failureof documents to be distrib-
utedon timein all threeof theworkinglanguages(English,French,and
Spanish)is sometimes allegedas a reasonforthis,butit is usuallya mere
pretext. The smallsize of a delegation maybe theexplanation, butit can
happenevenwithmajordelegations amplysuppliedwiththerelevant docu-
ments, thepileupapparently [Link] in someinstances
generalapathywithregardto a particular topicmaylie behindsuchsitua-
[Link],notwithstanding theirheavyworkload, Councilcommittees may
temporarily "runout of steam"duringthecourseof a [Link]
business delayedat timesbyhavingto waitfora quorumto arrive
is further
formeetings.
How RESOLUTIONS TAKE SHAPE
Substantive decisionsby the Councilare normallyexpressed in "resolu-
tions"resultingfromformalvotes.'4 whichdatesfromthevery
This pattern,
beginning ofECOSOC, frequently tendsto accentuate ofviewon
differences
questionswheretheoriginaldifferences maynotbe toosignificant.
Votingis
a ritualresorted an
to notonlyto provide "official record"forCouncildeci-
sionsbut also at timesto servepropaganda duringthe
particularly
purposes,
heydayof theCold [Link] suchis usuallynotverymeaning-
fulsincemostof theconsultation leadingto propositions
whicharethesub-
jectofvotesin openmeetings is carriedon behindthescenes.'5
13 This happened at least three times in the Coordination Committeeat the I967 summersession.
When the Chairmanasked for speakerson item I7 (a broad item with subitemsfroma throughj),
therewas a long, dead [Link] inquiringwhetherany delegatehad commentsto make on the spe-
cialized agencyreports(one of the subitems)the Chairmanreceivedno [Link] speakersfor the
afternoonmeeting?-the frustrated Chairman then asked. Still [Link] Chairmanan-
nouncedthe cancellationof the [Link] thisembarrassing juncturethe UnitedStatesdelegateoffered
to fill in the breachby makingsome preliminary observationsduringthe [Link] morningmeet-
ing, havingbegun as late as ii o'clock,adjournedat 11:30. Four days latera similarsituationoccurred.
A week afterthat an afternoonmeetinghad to be cancelledbecauseof "no speakers,"while the Com-
mitteewaited for the processingof a draftresolutionfor consideration the followingday.
14Nowadays votes are sometimesavoided on fairlyroutinematters.
15For an informative accountof how this worksin termsof intra-and inter-delegation behavioras
of the late I950's see JohnG. Hadwen and JohanKaufmann,How UnitedNationsDecisionsAre Made
(Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff,I960). These two authorsservedfor many yearson theircountries'delega-
tions,Canada and the Netherlands,respectively.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
888 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

The Sponsorship
of Resoltions
Draftresolutionsare introducedby sponsorswhichmay consistof a single
delegationor a group of [Link] a single delegationsponsorsa
draftresoludionit is likelyto be of a relativelynoncontroversial or largely
[Link] so, the originalsponsor,in orderto ensureadoption
by a commandingmajority, may enlista secondor even a thirdsponsor,usu-
ally froma different [Link] class of resolutiontendsto be bal-
anced as to officialsponsorshipeitherbetweenthe West and the East or be-
tweenthe industrially advancedcountriesand theLDC's. The formerpattern
prevailed
duringthei940's and I950's, whilethelatterhas characterized
the
periodsince about I960 as a consequenceof the massiveinfluxof Asian and
Africancountriesinto UnitedNationsbodies.
The more importantthe subjectmatterof a draftresolution, whetherbe-
cause of the extentof the commitment involvedor becauseof its complexity
or novelty,the more is it likelyto be sponsoredby [Link]
typeof resolutionmaybe introducedby a singledelegation,but in thecourse
of "out-of-meeting"consultations additionalsponsorsare sought,or theymay
themselvesask to be added. Thus, to cite one noteworthy example: At the
43rd sessionof the Council a draftresolutionon "Increasingthe Production
and Use of Edible Protein"was introducedby Canada. By the timethe pro-
posal was readyto be actedon by the EconomicCommitteetherewere eight
sponsors,as follows: Canada, Guatemala, India, Pakistan,Peru, Sweden,
the UnitedKingdom,and the [Link] thisgroupwere includedthe
two leadinggrain-producing statesand two of the mostpopulousfood-deficit
[Link] it maybe assumedthatthedesirewas to attractbroadsupport
fortheresolutionsinceit involvedappealsto governments, as well as to UN
systemagencies,to initiateor intensify food supplyp-rograms.'6The resolu-
tionwas subsequently adoptedunanimously.
A somewhatsimilaralignmentof sponsorsemergedfor the draftresolu-
tionon the"Developmentof Activities in theField of Population"at thesame
[Link] the introducer was India and therewere threeadditionalspon-
sors (Pakistan,Sweden,and the United States).The UnitedKingdom asked
to be added as a sponsorbeforethe vote on the resolutiontook place in the
CoordinationCommittee.'7 Becauseof its emphasison "familyplanning"this
proposal provoked objectionsfrom certain delegations,notably Belgium,
Mexico,Venezuela,and the SovietUnion, forreligiousor [Link]
the finalvote on the resolutionin the CoordinationCommitteetwelvedele-
gationsvotedaffirmatively, none against,and nine abstained.
16 UN Document E/AC.6/L.362/Rev.x,adopted as ECOSOC Resolution1257 (XLIII), August 2,
1967.
17 UN Document E/AC.24/L.3i2/Rev.2,adopted as ECOSOC ResolutionI279 (XLIII), August 4,
967.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 889
ofthesponsorship
Therearestillothervariations buttheforegoing
pattern,
examplesmaysuffice thetactics
to illustrate in different
of negotiation kinds
of situations.

TheAmending Process
Intimately relatedto sponsorship patternsis theamending process. In pro-
portion as diverging posturesofopposition to originaldraftresolutions appear
thisprocess maybecomequitecomplex, [Link]-
cedureoftheCouncilany"motion is consideredan amendment to a proposal
if it adds to, deletesfromor revisesthe proposal."Whenmorethanone
amendment is introduced, theone furthest removedin substance fromthe
originalproposalis votedon first,as in theGeneral Assembly, and so on until
all amendments are disposedof. Sponsorsof draftresolutions mayutilize
amendment opportunities forthepurposeofgivingobjectors a sufficient
mea-
sureof satisfaction theirsupport
to attract or at theleastto convert theirop-
positionfromnegativism to [Link] the case of highlycontroversial
resolutionsa whole seriesof draftamendments,sometimesoverlappingin
content,mayflooda committee's hopper,muchto theharassment ofthechair-
who now and thenget tangledup in determining
man and the secretary, the
order in which to put them to the vote. Such amendments,fromhostile
sources,may at timesbe designedto embarrassa resolution'ssupporters, if
[Link] thissort,however,succeed
not to breakup an affirmative
onlyrarely.

Role of the InformalRegionalGroupStructure

During the cold-warphase of ECOSOC's evolutionthepredominant cleav-
age withinit reflected the confrontationof the Westernstatesand the Soviet
bloc. Typically,in thosedayssubstantive a con-
decisions,when not routinely
sensus,were adoptedby a majorityconsistingof the United States,Western
European countries,and the old membersof the BritishCommonwealthof
[Link] majoritywas oftenfortified by one or more Latin American
delegationsand/orby India,Pakistan,or Israelwhen thesewereon theCoun-
the oppositionconsistedmainlyof the membersof the
cil. Again, typically,
then solid Sovietbloc sittingon the Council,whetherexpressedby negative
voteor by abstention. This bifurcationin the Counciloperatedvirtuallyauto-
matically.
During theperiodreferred to abovetheonlyexamplesof a caucusinggroup
appearto have been the Sovietbloc on theone hand and theLatin American
stateson the [Link] lattergroupis said to have mettogetherto determine
its positionon nomineesforCouncil offices, thoughreportedly not oftenon
substantivequestions.
This generalsituationno [Link] firstUN Conferenceon

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
89o INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Tradeand Development (UNCTAD) in I964 thepattern ofconsolidated ac-

tionbytheblocof"77developing countries"thatmarkedthatConference was
transferred, as it were,to ECOSOC in somewhat [Link]-
rently, theretookplacetheenlargement of theCouncil'ssize fromeighteen
to 27 members. In thisnewcontext thefiveregionalgroups, to whichrefer-
encewas madeearlier, havemetin caucusnotonlyon electionmatters but
on important substantive issuesas well.'8Each groupelectsitsownchairman
and themeetings areheldin private;theyare,ofcourse, smallenoughtobe
heldat lunchor dinner, aboutthreetosixorsevenpersons. Fromtimetotime
theAfrican, Asian,and LatinAmerican groupscaucustogether. Delegations
arenot,however, boundbycaucusdecisions, andit is reported thatwhenthe
Africans and Asiansassemble in thesameroom,agreement is oftendifficult
to reach,pandemonium sometimes breaking out.'9The representatives of the
leastdeveloped countries seldomhaveinstructions excepton thetwoor three
reallymajorissuesof a sessionand thuscan sometimes be "seduced"by the
majorpowerstovotethiswayorthat.
It is an interestingquestionwhether thisincipient "party"system in ECO-
SOC has tendedto exaggerate or accommodate substantive [Link]
evidence as maybe derived and
fromdocumentary interview sourcesis incon-
[Link] regionalgrouppattern probably is havinga mixedimpact;cer-
tainlyit doesnotoperateonlyin divisive fash;ion. In thisconnection thetesti-
monyof an eminent LDC delegatefromIran,Majid Rahnema,at theI966
summersessionof theCouncilis suggestive. This delegatewas instrumental
in persuading thethreeLDC groupsto meetprivately withrepresentatives of
the industrial countrieswitha viewto workingout a generally acceptable
resolution on development financing-and withsubstantial success.
Speakingon behalfof theseventeen developing countries at thefinalple-
narymeeting ofthesession, thisdelegatesaidthat
oneofthedistinctive features ofthesession hadbeenthewayin whichthe
developingcountrieshadsucceeded in defining thecommon denominator of
theiressential interests.
. . . It wasworthy of notethatat no timehadthe
groupof developing countries to thetemptation
yielded to useitsnumerical
superiorityto imposedecisions. The resolution on thefinancing ofeconomic
was a goodillustration
development actionoftheThirdWorld
ofthecatalytic
whichhadhelpedto strengthen
countries authority....[The
theCouncil's
session] fora fruitful
theopportunity
hadprovided between
dialogue devel-
opedanddeveloping
countries.20
18 The UnitedStates,the United Kingdom,and France,along with the "white"Commonwealth coun-
tries,sit with the WesternEuropean group. Malta recentlyshiftedfromthe WesternEuropean to the
Asian group. Trinidad and Tobago has joined the Latin Americangroup.
19This is accordingto a knowledgeablestaffparticipantin Council sessionsover recentyears.
20 Economic and Social Council OfficialRecords (41st session), I445th plenarymeeting,August 5,

I966, p. I98.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 89I

LEVELS OF COMPROMISE AND AGREEMENT

The operativelanguage of resolutionsservesas a rough indicatorof the

levelof agreementtheysignify. Accordingly, suchactionexpressions as "takes
note of," "welcomes,""endorses,"or "approves"are typicallyemployedfor
resolutionsreferring to considerationof periodicreportsof ECOSOC com-
missions,the specializedagencies,the UN DevelopmentProgram(UNDP)
Council,and the UN Children'sFund (UNICEF). In addition,resolutions
constituting broad appealsto theworldcommunity or to governments and/or
privategroupsto supportUN programsfinanciallyordinarilyachieveuna-
nimity, as do resolutions in theformof declarations of long-rangepolicygoals,
e.g., for the UN DevelopmentDecade. Normally,in thesecontextsthereis
what may be called a routine [Link] numericaltermssuchresolutions
usuallyaccountfora fourthto a thirdor moreof the totaladoptedon sub-
stantivematters duringa majorCouncilsession.
Moving down the scale, resolutions"inviting"or "requesting"some kind
of action,suchas conductof a studyor an administrative changeby theSecre-
tary-General, at timesreflectminordissents, usuallyin theformof abstentions
fromvotingor explanationsof [Link] a quasi consensusmay be said to
exist.
A thirdclass of resolutionsare thoseinvolving"requests"or "recommen-
dations"relativeto programoperation,intensification, or innovationaddressed
to one or more agenciesor organswithinthe UN familyin connectionwith
the Council's responsibility for programplanning and [Link]
thereis no [Link] general,however,the degreeof dissenttendsto
be sufficient to requiresome adjustmentof positionswhich may or may not
be reflected in the formalvoting.
Here, and to a somewhatlesserextentas regardsthe secondcategorynoted
above, the contentof resolutionstends toward verbosity, or
repetitiveness,
overlappingwith related [Link] tendencyis especiallynoticeablein
thefieldof humanrightsand thestatusof [Link], to citeone example,
a resolutionadoptedat the39thsessionof theCouncilon thestatusofwomen
in educationand civicaffairscontainedeightseparatebut clearlyoverlapping
sectionscallingforaction.2"Moreover,the effort to arriveat a consensusnot
infrequently leads to watered-down, platitudinous, or ambivalentdecisions.
The followingcitationnicelyillustrates ambivalence:22
[The Council]recommends to the Governments of StatesMembersof the
UnitedNationsor members of the specializedagenciesor theInternational
AtomicEnergyAgencyto give all the consideration theymerit[author's
emphasis]to requestsfromdeveloping countries in intensifying
forassistance
the training and high-level
of intermediate technical personnel.
21 ECOSOC ResolutionIo68 (XXXIX), Julyi6, I965.
22 Quoted fromECOSOC ResolutionI029 (XXXVII), August 13, X964.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
892 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

This behavior traitis conducive ofresolutions.23

to a multiplicity Onlyrarely
doestheCouncilseemto be psychologically willingto takeno formalaction
on a substantivematter, howevertrivial, althoughit doesoccasionally post-
poneactionto a latersession, a processthatmayleadtoa prolonged stalemate
lastingthrough severalsessions. Such,forinstance, has beenthehistory of a
proposalintroduced bytheSovietsin the3Ist session(I96I) whichcalledfor
theformulation ofa "Declaration ofthePrinciples ofInternational Economic
Cooperation" and whichwas stillunresolved in I967. In thissituation the
arosefroma deadlockbetween
difficulty EastandWestconcerning economic
ideologyand tradepolicywhichcouldnotbe resolved in thead hocworking
groupsetup to draftthetextof the"Declaration."24
We now cometo a fourth categoryof substantive decisionswherethede-
greeof dissentmaybe of a majorcharacter. Theseresolutions typically in-
volve"declarations" or "recommendations" concerning important policycom-
mitments by membergovernment-commitments on policiestraditionally
withintheirdomestic [Link] was madeearlierto a notable
exampleof thistypeof resolution, wheretheissuewas thevolumeand con-
ditionsofdevelopment assistancetowhichindustrial (donor)countries should
be preparedto committhemselves in relationto the economically less ad-
[Link] variousreasonscertain ofthedeveloped countries either
refused,or statedtheywereconstitutionally unable,to acceptcertain partsof
theoriginaloperative textofthisresolution whichhad to do with"theuntie-
ingofloans,"theacceptance ofloanpayments in goods,andtheobligation to
supplybytheendoftheUN Development Decadeexternal resources equiva-
lentto one percent of theirnationalincome.
As previously suggested, the debateon thisproposalinvolvedprolonged
and delicatenegotiations betweenLDC and donorcountry representatives,
chieflyoutofmeeting. Duringtheconsideration oftheresolution in theEco-
nomicCommittee of theCouncilnotonlywerevariousamendments qualify-
ing suchpolicycommitments submitted and adopted, buta seriesofroll-call
voteswas alsocalledforon separate partsoftheamendedresolution. A second
roundof roll-callvotestookplacein theplenary [Link] outright
negativevoteswerecast,dissent was registered through "abstention"byvari-
countries,
ous industrialized including at times,thoughforquitespecialrea-
sons,[Link] theend theamendedresolution as a wholewas
adoptedby theCouncilby a voteof22 to none,withonlythreeabstentions
23 As far back as I963 the Council took cognizanceof this "multiplicity,"
notingthatit was causing
confusion,particularlyin the [Link] Secretary-General was requestedto studythe
feasibilityof preparingan annotatedindex or compendiumof resolutionsin the economic,social, and
human rightsfieldsadoptedby ECOSOC and the Assembly.(ECOSOC Resolution988 [XXXVI], August
2, I963.) Four yearslater this idea was again advancedin slightly
differentform.
24 This proposal was the subjectof successivead hoc workinggroup resolutions at the 3Ist, 33rd,
and 35th sessionsof the Council and subsequently was deferredto the 43rd and then to the 45th ses-
sions.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 893
(Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia). The United Kingdom
explainedthatits positionwas not determined solelybecauseit currently had
balance-of-payments but also becauseit had not been able to study
difficulties
thoroughly variousprovisionsof the [Link] its objectionto cer-
tain aspectsof the resolutionthe United Statescast its vote in favorof the
proposalas a whole; France,Canada, and Swedendid likewise.
Let us now take as a further exampleof consensus-building an "omnibus"
typeof resolutiondesignedto promotethe "Developmentand Utilizationof
Human Resources"in developingareas.25This resolution, based in largepart
on an extensivereportby theSecretary-General on thissubject,was addressed:
i) to governments, fortheircommentsand observations on thereport;2) to
the Secretary-General, for furtherspecificrecommendations on the imple-
mentationof the report'sproposals;3) to the International Labor Organiza-
tion (ILO), the UN Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), and otherspecializedagenciesconcerned,for special attention
to long-termmeasuresintendedto aid in solvingthe mosturgentproblems
referredto in the report;4) to the regionaland functionalcommissionsof
the Council, for special accountof the close relationshipthat should exist
betweeneconomicgrowthand social advancementin the developingcoun-
tries;and, finally,5) to UNDP, for special consideration of manpowerre-
quirementsin executingprojectsrelatingto naturalresources,industrializa-
tion,and otherrelatedfields.
This resolutionwas sponsoredby nine delegationsrepresenting all five
[Link] thusbegan with strongacross-the-board [Link] so,
a numberof amendmentswere submittedinvolvingdetailedchangesin the
text of the [Link] the most part thesewere verbalchanges
intendedto softenthe appealsaddressedto variousagenciesin theUN family.
Unanimitywas eventuallyachievedin the CoordinationCommitteeand reit-
eratedin the voteon the resolutionin plenary.
A final example of the substantive decisionprocessto be consideredis a
proposalwith distinctly budgetaryimplications. This proposal,submitted by
the Secretary-General, recommended,interalia, the settingup of regional
public information bureauswhich would concentrateon improvingwithin
the developingcountriespublicknowledgeand understanding of UN activi-
ties in the economicand social domain.26Althoughthe Secretary-General
claimedthatthiscould be done withinthe existingOfficeof Public Informa-
tion (OPI) budgetand staffresources, therewere skepticsamongthe Coun-
cil [Link] by France,theseskepticsgave theirsupportto an amend-
mentexpressing doubtas to tlhe"wisdom"of establishing suchbureaus;it was
25 See ECOSOC Resolution1274 (XLIII), August4, i967; see also UN DocumentE/4428, containing
the reportof the CoordinationCommitteerelativeto the historyof thisresolution.
26 See the summaryrecordof the 329th meetingof the Coordination Committee,July28, I967 (UN
DocumentE/AC.24/SR.329).

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
894 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

clearfromthedebatethatthisdoubtwas significantly relatedto thefearthat

additionalexpensewould be [Link] amendment was narrowly de-
featedin a dividedvote,six to seven,withsevenabstentions. Thereappears
to be developingin ECOSOC a specialkindof cleavagereflecting budget
economizers versusexpansionistswhichon specific issuesmaycutacrossthe
developed-developingcountry dichotomy.
Fromtheforegoing illustrations
of the decisionbuilding processit should
be obvioushowdifficult,or possiblyfutile,
it is to attempt to classify
substan-
tiveactionsbylevelof agreement. The variouscategories suggested abovedo
not have clear-cut
boundary lines,and thereare numerous resolutionsthat
defyanysimplecategorization. Evenso, thetentative classification
presented
heremaybe of valuein revealing thedynamics and tacticsof decisionbuild-
[Link] thewholeprocessis thepersistent effortto arriveat
somesortof consensus by [Link] consensus, however,
may,and does,varyfromthethin,vague,or routinetypeto a solid,though
usuallynot entirelyunanimous, kind of affirmative agreement wherethe
minorityis identified
as the"abstainers."Sincetheearlyperiodof theCold
War negativevoteson substantive resolutions in plenary havebeencastwith
steadily
decreasingfrequency. Todaytheyareexceptional.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ROLL-CALL VOTES

Thereis,however, a specialprocedurewhichhasbeen,andstillis occasion-

ally,utilizedto accentuate the differingpositionsof [Link]
referenceto thisprocedure was made duringthe earlierdiscussion of the
handlingof theresolution on thefinancing ofeconomic [Link] the
Councilvotingis normally byshowofhands,buton therequest ofanymem-
must"be takenin theEnglishalphabetical
bera roll-call orderofthenames
of the members, beginning withthememberwhosenameis drawnby lot
by thePresident."27 A checkwas madeby theauthorof theuse of roll-call
votesfromthefifth (1947) through the27th(i959) sessions,a periodmarked
bytherisingandwaningimpactoftheColdWaron Councilbehavior. Down
to aboutI950 nearlyall requests forroll-callscamefromtheSovietUnion.
Of thoserequests37 relatedto substantive and nineto procedural matters.
The purposeof thistacticon thepartof theSovietswas apparently to call
specialattentionto theminority bloc'spositionsinceit was alwaysdefeated
in thevoteandofcourseitwasknownin advancethatthiswouldbe thecase.
In otherterms, as a propaganda maneuver it gavetheSovietsan opportunity
topunctuate therecordwiththeirideological opposition West.
tothecapitalist
FromtheKoreanWar through theensuingdecadethenumberofroll-call
votesnotonlydwindledmarkedly butin parthad as theiradvocatescertain
27 Rule 6i of theRulesof Procedure.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 895
membersoutsidethe Sovietbloc. Even here,however,most of the requests
withEast-Westrelations,such as thevetoof
had to do, directlyor indirectly,
the applicationof the DemocraticRepublicof Germany(East Germany)for
admissionto UNESCO and the requestof the SovietUnion to be included
in the newlyestablishedEconomicCommissionforAfrica(ECA). Of a dif-
ferentcharacter, one such vote concernedthe proposalto make Spanishone
of theworkinglanguagesof the Council; thiswas unanimously adopted.
Since i960 requestsfor roll-callvotes,still less frequent,have tendedto
come fromLDC members,largelyon issuesrelatingto racial discrimination.
Thus in the 36thsession(i963) eightsuchrequestsemanatedfromEthiopia,
all havingto do withthe statusof Portugaland of SouthAfricawithrespect
to ECA.
From the standpointof expeditingthe transaction of Councilbusinessroll-
call voteshave a kind of nuisancevalue sinceeven in a body as small as the
Council it takes severalminutesto go throughthis [Link] is not likely,
however,thatanymembercountry will proposedoingawaywiththe"sacred"
rightto place Council memberson recordin thisidentifiable manner.

STAFF PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONMAKING

In terminatingthissurveyone needsto saysomethingaboutthepartplayed

by secretariatpersonnelin the [Link] is a questionon which
precisedata are extremelyhard to acquire. From such observationand in-
quiryfromstaffand delegatesas the authorfoundit possibleto undertake
it would appearthatthe staffrole is at timesconsiderable but notoftenof sig-
[Link] additionto variousbehind-the-scenes consulta-
tionswith key delegationsby such top-levelstaffas the Undersecretary for
Economicand Social Affairsand the Undersecretary forInteragency Affairs
secretariatrepresentativeson occasionpreparethe textsof draftresolutions
forconsideration by the Council,as well as draftresolutions whichare recom-
mendedforadoptionby theGeneralAssemblyfollowingacceptanceby ECO-
SOC. Only rarely,however,would it seem that the secretariat on its own
initiativeofferspositivesuggestionsforthe adjustmentof differences on im-
portantissues.28This statement,to be sure,does notrefer'toprocedural advice
fromthe "parliamentary" secretariesof the Council and its sessionalcommit-
tees.
The secretariat positionis at best a delicateone, consideringthe
official's
latentsuspicionof the "international bureaucrat"held by manynationaldele-
[Link] key delegateshave a specialtrustin the former'sintegrity and
politicaljudgment,positiveinitiatives takenby him are not likelyto fall on
part in the decisionto increasethe size
one seniorstaffofficialdid play a significant
28 Reportedly,
of ECOSOC commissionsand committees pendingthe enlargement of the Council itself.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
896 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

[Link] so, thereis reasonto believethattheUN Secretariat

mighttakea moreactivepartin decisionmaking thanis now [Link]
and largeitsexisting rolemaybe characterized as one of laissez-faire.
In thecourseof thenegotiation of interagency coordination decisionsthe
staff
representativesofthespecialized agenciesdo on occasionfacilitate agree-
mentbysitting as observersin out-of-meeting ad hocgroups. Theymaysome-
timesbe seen"buttonholing" delegates aftera meeting in whichtheactivities
or policiesof theagenciesconcerned wereundercriticism, someof it often
uninformed. Here theobjectis to clearup confusion and,no doubt,in some
instancesto tryto persuadethedelegates involved to modify theirstatements
in theinterestof accuracy at subsequent meetings.29
The Economicand SocialCouncil,to putthematter in thebroadest terms,
has no generalpolicy"leader"-noequivalent of a primeminister. The an-
nuallyelectedPresident oftheCouncilis notin a position toplaysucha role.
Nor can theSecretary-General of theUnitedNations,if onlybecauseofhis
frequent The Council'sagendainput,moreover,
nonavailability. emanates
froma wide plurality of sources, and itsresponsibilitiesare confusingly di-
[Link] no one comparable to thedirector-generalof a majorspecial-
ized agencyto presenta coherent programand budgetand takechargeof
steeringit throughthe representative For thereis no single
"legislature."30
program, let aloneany legislative bodywithpolicymaking authority.

ECOSOC DECISIONSDISTRIBUTEDBY TARGETS

SUBSTANTIVE
Witha viewto presenting a bird's-eyeviewofthewiderangeof theCoun-
cil'sdecisionmakingwithinitscomplexanduniquesetting theaccompanying
tabulationof thedistributionofsubstantive decisionsbyactiontargets,cover-
inga five-yearperiod,
I962-I967,may be illuminating.
(See page897.)
The coverageof thistabulation doesnotincludethefewrelatively insig-
nificant passedat theshort"resumed"
resolutions sessionsheldjustbeforeor
duringthe GeneralAssembly sessioneach [Link] are routineactionsof
"takingnoteof,""welcoming," "endorsing," or"approving" before
reports the
[Link] weredirected at morethanone distinct
target,each targetwas countedseparately. Explanatory comments on each
category of targets
followbelow.
instanceof thiscame to the writer'sattentionduringa meetingof the Coordination
29 An interesting
Committeeat the Council's 43rd [Link] that time the Soviet delegategave vent to sharp criticism
of the International MonetaryFund (IMF) for allegedlyrefusinga loan to the United Arab Republic
for politicalreasonsjust priorto the outbreakof the Arab-Israeliwar of JuneI967. The representative
of the IMF hastenedto set the Soviet representativerightby explainingto him that his facts,gleaned
fromthe press,were [Link] a latermeetingthe Fund's representative insertedinto the official
record
a smoothly diplomaticstatement Fund policy.
clarifying
30 The Undersecretary for Economic and Social Affairstriesto do this as far as the constitutional
structurepermits,but his positionis far weakerthan thatof the director-generalof a major specialized
agency.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 897

N N N
-1 bH c u)o00 -- in

I
No + . If 00t) N irn If 0

JZI

i~~~Z e t0 If N(

g~~~~. N,) te -(N -ON D N f)

EH

-~~~~ -~cl0 0 - c

Z
U,~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~0
- )x

0~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

H w u Cl
Z I I n
e) 0 - _CN |

H I O CN to (N

Cl) ~ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _____________d____ ____

-
Q

zA
CO
o
C\ C
CO (N 0 0 If) H0

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
898 IERNAn ONAL ORGANIATON

Actionsdirected explicitly (i) at the GeneralAssembly consistedforthe

mostpartof thetransmittal of"legislative" textsin theformofdraftconven-
tionsor declarations of whichofficial Assembly approvalbyvotewas consid-
erednecessary beforetheycouldbe passedalongto governments forappro-
[Link] thefieldof humanrighits, in-
cludingthestatusof [Link] frequent instances thesetextsreceived little
or no consideration fromthefullCouncil,itsrolebeingto servemerely as a
way stationon theroadfromtheCouncilcommission concerned to theAs-
[Link] addition, theCouncilhas fromtimeto timetransmitted to the
Assemblyfor its information important programreportsfromspecialized
agencies,and it has alsosubmitted draftstatutes fornewUN programs, such
as, forexample,theUN CapitalDevelopment Fund.3'The relatively small
numberof actionsintended forsomekindofAssembly consideration, which
are listedin thetabulation, doesnotrevealfullytheroleof thelatterbody
sincea considerable numberof actionsheadedforanother targeteventually
findthemselves on theAssem!bly's agenda,usuallyin modified form.
ECOSOC actionsdirected(2) towardgovernments maybe brokendown
into at leastthreecrisscrossing categories. The foregoing tabulation shows
onlytwoof these:actionsintended forall governments members of theUN
and of thespecialized agenciesand thosedesignedonlyforspecified groups
of governments. A further breakdown mighthave dividedrequestsmerely
forsomekindof information fromrecommendations aimedat nationalpoli-
cies and/oradministrative [Link] maypertainto
observationson a Councilresolution calling,say,fora reappraisal of ECO-
SOC's functions, or,to takea different situation, theymayseekinformation
on thestatus ofhumanrights in dependent territories.
Byfarthegreater num-
ber of thiscategory of actions, however, comprise recommendations urging
governments tomodify an existing,ortoinitiate a new,national [Link],
governments have been urgedto establish effective coordinative machinery
at thenationallevel;to undertake studiesof theeconomicand socialconse-
quencesof disarmament; to expandprograms forchildren and youth;to be-
comepartiesto varioushumanrights conventions; or to intensifytheirefforts
[Link] examplesare manyand varied,rangingfromappeals
couchedin vaguegeneralities to quitespecific requests. Therehas neverbeen
anysystematic attempt to estimate thesubstantive effect of suchrecommen-
dations;anysuchinquiry, if doneon a comprehensive scale,wouldinvolve
tediousand complicated operations, includingthe difficult construction of
criteriaofmeasurement.
DuringrecentyearsCouncilactionsdirected to specific categories of gov-
ernments havebeenon theincrease, thetwomaincategories consistingofthe
economically advancedand thelessdeveloped countries. As was shownin the
31This was done at ECOSOC's 34thsession,summerI962.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 899
previousdiscussion of the resolution on developing financing whichwas
adoptedat the4Ist session, a seriesof goalsand conditions fordevelopment
was setforth
assistance witha view,hopefully, to committing donorgovern-
mentsto acceptthemas [Link] is thiskindof recom-
mendation thatcertainLDC delegations, especiallyfromthenewerAfrican
states,
arewontto regardas "legislation" withbindingeffect, despitethevery
clearCharter limitationson ECOSOC, as well as GeneralAssembly, author-
Less often,the Councilhas addressed
ity.32 itselfspecifically to theLL)C's
withtheobjectof stimulating on theirparteconomic and socialreforms as a
meansof moreeffective nationaldevelopment.
Otherspecialcategories ofgovernments as targets ofECOSOC actionshave
been,forexample, themembers oftheInternational Development Association
(IDA), whichwereurgedtoincrease itsfinancial resources,andthemembers
of UNCTAD, whichwereremindedto takecertainactionsat the second
UNCTAD in I968.
Movingnextto actionsaddressed (3) to theSecretary-General, one should
notethatthisrubricaccounts forI39, or approximately 28 percent, ofthetotal
numberof targets covering thetensessions, exceeding thenextlargestcate-
gory,directappealsto governments, whichtotaledioi, or 20 percent. The
precisefigures haveno particular significance, nordoestheauthorintendto
implythatthecomparative importance ofanyparticular targetcanbe gauged
by thenumberof timesit is [Link] significant
is thefrequency withwhichECOSOC has resorted to requeststo theUN
Secretariatforstudies,reports, or administrative action,e.g.,thecoordination
questionnaires.
of statistical Someof themoreimportant studieshavebeen
farmedout to panelsof experts, but forthemostparttheyhavebeenthe
productsof thestaff oftheUN Department of Economicand SocialAffairs,
oftenin consultation withthespecialized agenciesand suchbodiesas UNDP.
One of theCouncil'sbehavior incidentally,
traits, hasbeento askfora secre-
tariatreport, or foritsrevision or expansion in theformof a secondreport,
as theeasiestwayoutofan agendastalemate. A considerable number ofthese
reportsare issuedperiodically, continuing, in some instances, beyondthe
periodof originalutility and thusaddingto thedocumentation [Link]-
taininquiriesalso involvetheassemblage and analysisof information from
thespecialized agenciesand/or otherbodies, as, forinstance, in the Secretary-
General'simpressive prognosis fortheUN Development Decade.33
Closelyrelatedto requests ticketedto theSecretary-General alonearethose
addressed (4) to ACC through him as its chairman and/or to thespecialized
[Link] classof actionis concerned primarily withinteragency pro-
32 See, on this point,WalterKotschnig'sinsightful
articlein International WinterI968
Organization,
(Vol. 22, No. i), pp. I6-44.
33 See The United Nations DevelopmentDecade: Proposalsfor Action (UN PublicationSales No:

[Link].B.2) (UnitedNations,3962).

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
900 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

gramcoordination in one way or another. Such actionshavetendedto be-

comeincreasingly involvedas thenumberof agenciesand specialprograms
have [Link] a variantfromthe typicalcollectiverecommendation
(embracing nominally theentiregamutof agencies)theCouncilnotinfre-
quentlysinglesoutcertain agencies bynameas theobjectofspecific program
[Link], at the43rdsessionUNESCO was invitedto report
further on new techniques of communication, whiletheWorldHealthOr-
ganization(WHO), the Food and AgrcultureOrganization (FAO), and
UNICEF wereaskedto consider broadening thescopeof theirProteinAd-
[Link], in particular, has been proddedrepeatedly by
ECOSOC, notto mention theGeneralAssembly, withregardto theprogress
ofitscampaign [Link] the36thsession(I963) ILO andUNES-
CO wereaskedto provideinformation in theirperiodicreportson theaccess
of womento professional and technical fields.
The listcouldgo on.
In connection withsuchactionsone detects a tendency to ask variousspe-
cializedagenciesmerely to continue whattheyarealreadydoing,an illustra-
tionof how theCouncilmaygivebirthto formalresolutions evenwhenit
has nothing newto [Link] thesametimeit shouldbe notedthattheheads
of certainspecialized agencies, e.g.,UNESCO, maneuver on occasionto get
ECOSOC to prodtheiragenciestoundertake whichtheagency
activities head
strongly favorsand concerning whichhe wishesto strengthen hishandwith
his owngoverning boardbyhavingECOSOC's official blessing.
Untiltheestablishment of UNCTAD and theIndustrial Development Or-
ganization (UNIDO), ECOSOC actions concerning (5) specialUN programs
werefocusedchiefly on UNICEF and UNDP or on 'theExpandedProgram
of TechnicalAssistance(EPTA) and the SpecialFund previousto their
merger to formUNDP in I965. Whilesuchactionsconsisted mainlyofrou-
tinenotations or approvals, a few proposedminoralterations in program
emphasisor procedures. Withtheadventof UNCTAD and UNIDO these
twoinstitutionally uniquebodiescome,at leastnominally, underECOSOC's
[Link],however, the two new bodiesweresetup as "autonomous
organs"of theGeneralAssembly) ECOSOC mayservemerelyas a halfway
stationfortheirreports as theymovealongthepathto theAssembly. It is
too soonto tellhow theserelationships will actuallydevelop.
Decisionsaffecting (6) subsidiary bodiesoftheCouncilitselftaketypically
theformof directives to undertake new programs, to modify existing
pro-
grampriorities, or,at times,to discontinue or deferspecificoperationalproj-
[Link] is particularlytrueof regionaleconomic commission activities.
As
the parentbody,the Councilenjoysdirectsupervisory authority oversuch
bodies,whether regionalor central-which of coursedoesnothold forthe
specializedagencies.34
34 In passing,it may be of interest
to note thatECOSOC has on severaloccasionsappointedindividual
rapporteurs fromits own currentor previousmembershipto preparereportson [Link]

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DECISIONMAKING IN ECOSOC 9I

As regards(7), theNGO's, thefinalcategoryof targets, littleneed be said.

NGO's collectively, or as relatedorganizations, are sometimesinvitedto co-
operatewith UN systembodies in stimulatinga favorablepublic opinion
and/orin enlistingfinancialsupportforUN priograms dependenton volun-
tarycontributions. Only seldomis an NGO identified by name in thiscon-
[Link],NGO's are asked fromtimeto timeto providespecialtypes
of information, as, forinstance,on humanrightsobservance.
There have been isolatedcases whereintergovernmental organizations not
strictly withinthe UN systemhave been appealedto by ECOSOC to give aid
to UN bodiesin thelaunching,or theexpansion,ofprogramsin theeconomic
or social [Link], at the 4Ist sessionof the Council (summerI966) re-
gional developmentbanks,createdon the initiativeand largelythroughthe
effortsof the regionaleconomiccommissions, were invitedto help finance
operationsin housing in various LDC's located within a bank's regional
jurisdiction.35
The foregoinganalysisof the decisionprocessthathas emergedin ECO-
SOC is intendedto providea partialexplanationof its behaviorwithinthe
changingcontextof theUN familyof organizations, especiallysincethemas-
sive influxof LDC's into the [Link] recentyearsECOSOC has been
going throughan identitycrisisprovokedprimarilyby the tendencyof the
LDC's to downgradeit in favorof the General Assemblyand UNCTAD.
Since theenlargement of thesize of theCouncilin I965 therehavebeen some
indicationsof a resurgence of [Link] so, ECOSOC stillsuffers
on the one hand froman overloadedagenda containinga lot of triviaand
on the otherfromthe atmosphereof frustration producedby the inabilityof
theresource-starved UN systemto satisfy thehopesof thelessdeveiloped coun-
triesforrapid and substantialimprovement in theireconomicstatus-related
in part to the economicand financialdisarrayin which manyof the major
donorcountriesnow findthemselves.
It is not difficult
to conceiveof variousways wherebythe Council might
become a more orderlyand efficient [Link] essence,however,the re-
vitalizationof its centralsubstantive role will depend upon the determina-
tion of membergovernments generallyto utilizeit as an instrument forthe
formulation and promotionof a realisticworld developmentstrategy insofar
as the materialresourcesand moralauthority of theUN systemmay permit.
in thisconnectionthe reporton "Freedomof Information" preparedby SalvadorP. Lopez of the Philip-
pines (UN DocumentE/2426); and the reporton the slaveryquestionby Hans Engin of Norway (UN
DocumentE/2673, and Add.I-4, submittedto the 847th meetingof the Council, April 7, I955). A
more recentexample is the reportby RaymondScheyvenof Belgiumon the issue of a Special United
Nations Fund for Economic Development(SUNFED). Certain of the functionaland regionalcom-
missionshave also used the rapporteurdevice a numberof times.
35 In i967 the Council (see ECOSOC Resolutioni267 B [XLIII] of August3, i967) gave recogni-
tion to the growingnumberand importanceof such non-UN organizationsby invitingthe Secretary-
General to proposenames of organizationsthat should be represented
by observersat Council sessions.

This content downloaded from [Link] on Sat, 14 Jun 2014 05:00:09 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions