SIP: A Comprehensive Survey on Features, Challenges,

Potential Solutions, and Emerging Research Trends

Tanay Jaiswal1 , Mohammed Arif2*, Deepti Tamrakar3 , Neelam Dayal4 ,

Pritee Khanna5 , Aparajita Ojha6
1,2*,3,4,5,6
Computer Science and Engineering, PDPM IIITDM Jabalpur, Dumna Road,
Jabalpur, 485002, MP, INDIA.

*Corresponding author(s). E-mail(s): 23pcse01@[Link];

Contributing authors: [Link]@[Link]; deeptitm ra@[Link];
[Link]@[Link]; pkhanna@[Link]; aojha@[Link];

Abstract
The SIP has become a cornerstone of modern real-time communication systems, enabling seam-
less integration of voice, video, messaging, and multimedia services across IP networks. Despite its
widespread adoption, SIP faces numerous challenges related to QoS, security, scalability, and interop-
erability, particularly in complex and large-scale deployments. This paper presents a comprehensive
survey of SIP, systematically exploring its core features, associated challenges, mitigation strategies,
and emerging research trends. Through an extensive bibliometric and keyword-based analysis of over
2500 scholarly articles, the study identifies prevailing research themes, technological advancements,
and gaps in the existing literature. Key areas such as SIP’s role in VoIP systems, QoS optimisa-
tion, secure communication protocols, and integration with emerging technologies like blockchain, AI,
SDN, and 5G are thoroughly examined. Additionally, the paper includes a healthcare-focused case
study demonstrating SIP’s deployment in telemedicine environments, highlighting its effectiveness in
addressing QoS, security, interoperability, and scalability concerns. The findings provide valuable in-
sights and actionable recommendations for researchers, developers, and industry professionals working
to advance SIP-based communication frameworks and drive innovation in next-generation networks.

Keywords: Session Initiation Protocol, VoIP, Quality of Service, Security, Interoperability, Scalability, AI,
Blockchain, SDN

Abbreviations
Acronym Full Form
5G 5th Generation
ABR Adaptive Bitrate
ACLs Access Control Lists
AEAD Authenticated Encryption with
Associated Data
AI Artificial Intelligence
ALEX Address List Extension
1
Acronym Full Form Acronym Full Form
AR Augmented Reality RBAC Role-Based Access Control
ASPS Adaptive Semi-Persistent RDP Registration Request Delay
Scheduling RRD Registration Request Delay
B2BUA Back-to-Back User Agent RTP Real-Time Transport Protocol
DADP DNS Attack Detection and Pre- S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet
vention Mail Extensions
DDoS Distributed Denial-of-Service SBCs Session Border Controllers
DiffServ Differentiated Services SDD Session Disconnect Delay
DMA Direct Memory Access SDN Software Defined Networks
DoS Denial-of-Service SDP Session Description Protocol
DTA Dynamic Traffic Assignment SIP Session Initiation Protocol
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Secu- SIP- SIP-Cluster Memory Utilisation
rity CMU
E2EE End-to-End Encryption SIPS SIP Signalling
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography SLAs Service Level Agreements
EKT Encrypted Key Transport SPIT Spam Over Internet Telephony
FEFM Front-End Flow Management SPoF Single Points of Failure
GRUUs Globally Routable User Agent SRDP Session Request Delay
URIs
SRTP Secure Real-Time Transport
HMIPv6 Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 Protocol
HMM Hidden Markov Models S-SIP Secure-SIP
HMSIP Hierarchical Mobile SIP SVM Support Vector Machine
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol TaaS Telecom as a Service
IDPS Intrusion Detection and Preven- TF-SIP Three Factor SIP
tion Systems
TLS Transport Layer Security
IDS Intrusion Detection Systems
UC Unified Communications
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
UCaaS Unified Communications as a
IMS IP Multimedia Subsystem Service
IoT Internet of Things VLB- Virtual Load Balanced Call Ad-
MAC Media Access Control CAC mission Controller
MFA Multi Factor Authentication VoIP Voice over IP
MITM Man-in-the-Middle VR Virtual Reality
ML Machine Learning VRRP Virtual Router Redundancy Pro-
OSRTP Opportunistic Secure RTP tocol
PAR-SIP Predictive Address Reservation WebRTC Web Real-Time Communication
with SIP XMPP Extensible Messaging and Pres-
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Net- ence Protocol
work
QoS Quality of Service
QPPR Quick Partial Packet Recovery

2
1 Introduction the concept of UC [10], integrating multiple com-
munication modes—such as voice, video, email,
1.1 Overview of SIP and instant messaging—into a cohesive system
The SIP is a signalling protocol widely used for ini- that enhances business productivity, streamlines
tiating, managing, and terminating communica- workflows, and fosters collaboration. Its ability
tion sessions in IP networks. Standardised by the to interact with protocols like SDP and RTP
IETF through RFC 3261 [1], SIP plays a pivotal [6] reinforces SIP’s role in delivering end-to-end
role in enabling real-time multimedia communica- communication solutions.
tion, including voice, video, messaging, and other Modern communication systems demand scal-
interactive services [2]. Its primary design focuses ability to support dynamic user bases and traffic
on simplicity, scalability, and flexibility, making patterns. SIP’s lightweight design and modu-
it an essential component of modern communica- lar framework offer the adaptability required for
tion systems. Operating at the application layer both small-scale and large-scale deployments. It
and following a client-server model, SIP allows is highly extensible, allowing developers to intro-
end devices or applications, known as user agents, duce new features or customise the protocol for
to establish and manage multimedia sessions us- specific use cases, including OTT services [11] and
ing a text-based message modelled after HTTP WebRTC [12]. As global networks transition to
and SMTP [3]. These messages facilitate seamless 5G and the proliferation of IoT devices contin-
interactions by conveying session parameters, par- ues, SIP’s evolution ensures compatibility with
ticipant addresses, and control commands between advanced networking paradigms and the ability
various communication endpoints. to support rich multimedia sessions, solidifying
The origins of SIP trace back to the mid- its position as a cornerstone in next-generation
1990s when the increasing demand for real-time communication technologies. It is increasingly in-
communication over IP networks necessitated the tegrated into IoT ecosystems to facilitate seamless
development of efficient signalling protocols. SIP device-to-device and device-to-human communi-
was introduced as a lightweight and extensible al- cation [13].
ternative to earlier protocols like H.323 [4] as part SIP-based systems also offer significant cost
of the IETF’s initiatives to support multimedia savings compared to traditional communication
conferencing and Internet telephony. Over time, infrastructure by utilising IP networks instead
SIP evolved to accommodate emerging needs, in- of expensive circuit-switched networks, deliver-
cluding mobility, security, and QoS, contributing ing affordable solutions for individual and enter-
to widespread adoption across industries. In mod- prise use. Its integration with cloud-based services
ern applications, SIP is extensively implemented has further minimised operational costs, mak-
in VoIP systems, Internet-based video conferenc- ing advanced communication tools accessible to
ing, unified communications platforms, and IoT a broader audience. Furthermore, security is a
environments [5]. A comprehensive representation critical consideration in modern communication
of some of the potential applications is given in systems, and SIP incorporates robust mechanisms
Figure 1. Its versatility is further enhanced by its to ensure data integrity and privacy. Security
interoperability with other protocols, such as the features such as TLS [14], SRTP [15], and SIP Au-
RTP [6] for media delivery and the SDP [7] for thentication provide encrypted signalling and me-
session negotiation. dia transmission, protecting users against threats
SIP’s broad acceptance is largely attributed such as eavesdropping and fraud [16].
to its adherence to open standards defined by Despite SIP’s broad adoption and versatil-
the IETF, ensuring interoperability across devices, ity, several challenges persist, including security
applications, and networks from various vendors, vulnerabilities [17], interoperability issues [18],
thus promoting universal communication proto- and scalability concerns in large-scale deploy-
cols [1, 8, 9]. This standardisation has enabled the ments [19]. These challenges highlight the need
development of versatile communication systems for ongoing research and innovation to address
that operate seamlessly across platforms and geo- evolving demands within SIP-based communica-
graphical boundaries. Additionally, SIP underpins tion systems. However, the current literature lacks
a bibliometric systematic literature review that

3
 Figure 1: Applications of SIP

comprehensively examines the various aspects of communication frameworks for next-generation

SIP. This gap presents an opportunity for a de- networks. To fulfil these objectives, the following
tailed exploration of SIP’s evolution and research research questions are formed:
trends. RQ 1: How has SIP research evolved, and
what are the major research areas and
1.2 Objectives of the Survey prominent research themes in SIP?
RQ 2: How do the key QoS features in
This paper aims to conduct a comprehensive SIP impact communication performance,
and structured investigation into the development, and what are the major challenges and
current challenges, and prospects of the SIP in emerging solutions?
modern communication systems. The study ex- RQ 3: How can security and privacy in
plores the evolution of SIP research, identifies SIP-based communication be enhanced to
key research themes, examines key QoS param- mitigate emerging threats, address vulner-
eters, and assesses security, interoperability, and abilities, and ensure robust authentication,
scalability concerns. In addition, it analyses the encryption, and intrusion detection mecha-
role of SIP in critical application domains such nisms?
as telemedicine. It outlines emerging issues and RQ 4: How can interoperability across
future research directions essential to building se- heterogeneous networks be achieved while
cure, high-performance, and adaptable SIP-based

4
ensuring extensibility for emerging com- workings, key features, optimisation techniques,
munication technologies and addressing the and future research directions. The paper begins
challenges posed by existing regulatory and with Section 1, which includes an overview of
technical standards of SIP implementation, SIP, the objectives of the survey, and an out-
security, and global compliance? line of the manuscript’s structure. Following this,
RQ 5: How can SIP be adapted to sup- Section 2 delves into the research evolution of
port large-scale deployments while effec- SIP and its major research themes, offering in-
tively addressing challenges such as net- sights into how SIP has developed over time.
work congestion, fault tolerance, and high Section 3 provides a detailed explanation of
availability in modern communication envi- SIP’s fundamental working principles and archi-
ronments? tecture, breaking down its key components such
RQ 6: How can the SIP protocol and as user agents, proxy servers, registrar servers,
its associated network elements be effec- and redirect servers, as well as its basic operations
tively deployed to ensure scalable, secure, like INVITE and REGISTER methods. Section
and interoperable multimedia communica- 4 highlights the core features of SIP, including
tion in telemedicine while addressing the QoS, security and privacy, interoperability, scala-
challenges of QoS, security, compliance, and bility, and compliance with standards, while also
reliability in healthcare settings? discussing the associated challenges and issues.
RQ 7: What open issues indicate potential Section 5 highlights the role and implementation
future research directions to improve its of SIP in healthcare organisations in the form of
security, performance, and adaptability in a case study. In Section 6, the manuscript dis-
next-generation communication networks? cusses current research trends, identifies ongoing
By answering these research questions, this challenges, and presents future research directives
paper seeks to serve as a foundational reference for SIP. Section 7, summarizes the answers to re-
for researchers, engineers, and industry profession- search questions. Finally, Section 8 presents key
als working on SIP advancements, offering valu- takeaways of the study. This structured approach
able insights into protocol enhancements, security ensures a logical flow of information, guiding the
frameworks, and next-generation communication reader through both the foundational aspects and
paradigms. The study aims to bridge theoretical the latest advancements in SIP research.
research with practical implementations, enabling
a deeper understanding of SIP’s evolution and
role in future communication networks. The main 2 SIP Evolution and Research
highlights of the present survey are as follows. Themes
• Primary research questions mentioned above The systematic literature review begins by defin-
are answered comprehensively. ing the scope and objectives, followed by formu-
• This study is the first to integrate SIP-related lating research questions as shown in Figure 2.
keyword analysis for quantitative research with Next, appropriate data sources are selected, and
bibliometric analysis. a search strategy is designed using keywords and
• The review provides key features, challenges filters. The search criteria are then evaluated for
and potential counter-measures for SIP. comprehensiveness; if inadequate, the strategy is
• Based on quantitative analysis, review of open refined. Once validated, data are collected, ex-
challenges and empirical studies, this study ported, and preprocessed by removing duplicates
offers valuable insights and practical recommen- and low-quality literature. The bibliometric anal-
dations for future research in SIP. ysis is then conducted using the R programming
tool ‘Biblioshiny’ [20, 21], followed by visuali-
1.3 Structure of the Manuscript sation and interpretation of the results. Finally,
the findings are used to answer the research ques-
The structure of this manuscript is designed to tions. If all questions are satisfactorily addressed,
provide a comprehensive exploration of the SIP by the process concludes; otherwise, adjustments are
systematically covering its evolution, fundamental made to refine the analysis.

5
Figure 2: Workflow of the Bibliometric-Systematic Literature Review

6
 Following the abovementioned procedure, sev- and Security, with a major focus on fields such as
eral databases were systematically searched for optimisation approaches, anomaly detection, au-
relevant literature. After thoroughly evaluating thentication, and cryptography techniques. In the
and excluding irrelevant studies, a bibliometric last decade, research focus has shifted towards SIP
analysis was conducted on the remaining articles. integration with emerging technologies such as 5G,
The specifics of the data sources and their respec- blockchain, deep learning, ML, etc.
tive contributions to the literature are presented Based on these research domains and the re-
in Table 1 and Figure 3. curring keywords in SIP-related research as shown
in Figure 5, core areas of research are focused on
domains such as:
Table 1: Identification and Screening of the Lit-
erature • Networking & Communication: SIP serves
Source Articles as a foundational protocol for real-time com-
IEEE 1183 munication over IP-based networks, support-
ACM 128 ing services such as VoIP, mobile communi-
Web of Science 401 cation, and wireless networking. Research in
Science Direct 492 this domain focuses on SIP’s role in internet
Scopus 1898 telephony, signalling protocols, and transport
Total Papers (Initial consideration) 4102 mechanisms that enhance its scalability, effi-
Removed after Manual screening 1540 ciency, and adaptability across different commu-
(Duplicates - 1412, nication platforms. Key topics include Internet
Out of Scope/Insufficient Details/S- Telephony, IP Networks, VoIP, Wireless Net-
tandardisation - 128) works, and Transport Protocols [22, 23, 24, 25,
Total Papers (Final consideration) 2562 26, 27].
• Security & Privacy in SIP: SIP-based com-
munication is vulnerable to cyber threats, in-
cluding DoS attacks, identity spoofing, unau-
thorised access, and intrusion attempts. Re-
search in this area aims to develop authenti-
cation mechanisms, encryption techniques, and
IDS to enhance SIP security. Studies focus
on cryptographic solutions, privacy-preserving
techniques, and secure SIP implementations to
protect against evolving threats in VoIP and
multimedia applications. Relevant research ar-
eas include SIP Security, Authentication, Cryp-
tography, Privacy, and VoIP Security[28, 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34].
Figure 3: Percentage Share of Literature among • QoS & Performance Optimisation: Main-
Major Databases taining high service quality and network per-
formance is critical for SIP-based applications.
Research in QoS optimisation and performance
Figure 4 demonstrates various stages of evo- analysis investigates ways to reduce latency,
lution of the SIP research. The initial develop- manage bandwidth efficiently, minimise jitter,
ment of protocols began in the early 2000s. The and improve overall system reliability. In ad-
focus during this initial research phase mainly dition, studies on handover mechanisms ensure
concentrated on establishing the groundwork for seamless session continuity in mobile networks.
fundamental research. Later, the focus shifted to- This research category covers topics such as de-
wards SIP application in multimedia, streaming lay, delay, jitter, performance, reliability, and
and telephony, with a major area of research be-
ing VoIP. This is followed by Quality of Service

7
Figure 4: Evolution of SIP Research: A Timeline of Key Focus Areas over the Years

8
 Figure 5: Major SIP Research Themes based on Classified Keywords

performance analysis in SIP-based communica- networking. The shift toward cloud comput-
tion [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41]. ing and decentralised architectures has led to
• SIP in Multimedia & Streaming: SIP plays research on scalable SIP solutions that im-
a key role in multimedia communication, video prove resilience, fault tolerance, and efficiency.
conferencing, and real-time streaming applica- This category includes Client-Server Architec-
tions. Research in this area focuses on session ture, Cloud Computing, Distributed Systems,
management, media adaptation, and interop- and SIP Servers [50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55].
erability with IMS frameworks. Advancements • SIP in Emerging Technologies: The inte-
in adaptive streaming, codec optimisation, and gration of AI, blockchain, and SDN with SIP
SIP-WebRTC integration further enhance its has opened new research directions aimed at en-
role in next-generation multimedia services. hancing SIP security, optimising routing, and
Major topics in this category include Multi- enabling dynamic traffic control. AI-driven ap-
media Systems, Streaming Media, IMS, and proaches are being explored for predictive traf-
Multimedia Communication [42, 43, 44, 45, 46, fic management, anomaly detection, and auto-
47, 48, 49]. mated QoS adjustments. Blockchain-based de-
• SIP in Computing & Architecture: The centralised authentication mechanisms are also
computing infrastructure supporting SIP-based being studied to mitigate identity fraud and
networks is a crucial area of research, focusing enhance privacy in SIP-based communications.
on server optimisations, distributed architec- Research topics include ML, Deep Learning,
tures, cloud-based SIP deployments, and P2P

9
 Table 2: Major Publication Sources and the agents, with each playing a distinct role in the
Number of Articles Considered lifecycle of the SIP session.
Sources
Ar- 3.1 User Agents
ti-
cles In SIP architecture, User Agents are fundamental
Computer Communications 91
components responsible for initiating and receiv-
Computer Networks 82
ing communication sessions, such as VoIP and
multimedia conferencing. The SIP User Agent
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
is an endpoint in the SIP network and is di-
(Including Subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial
vided into two logical entities: the UAC and
Intelligence and Lecture Notes in 81
Bioinformatics) the UAS. SIP User Agents thus work collabo-
Bell Labs Technical Journal 49 ratively to establish and manage communication
Journal of Network and Computer Applications 42 sessions, each playing a distinct role in session ini-
International Journal of Communication 22
tiation, routing, and management [63]. SIP follows
Systems a client-server communication model and employs
Procedia Computer Science 19 methods like INVITE, ACK, BYE, CANCEL, OPTIONS,
Computers & Security 18 and REGISTER to manage sessions [64, 65].
Multimedia Tools and Applications 18
Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing 17 3.1.1 User Agent Client:
The UAC initiates SIP requests, such as REGISTER
and INVITE, to establish sessions with the callee.
These methods are listed in Table 3. In typi-
Blockchain, SDN, and Next-Generation Net- cal VoIP scenarios, the UAC first registers with
working [56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62]. a SIP server before establishing communication
[66]. Bare PC implementations of UACs have
Some of the most prominent and relevant demonstrated reduced processing times compared
authors in various research fields of SIP are Hen- to conventional systems [67].
ning Schulzrinne, Georgios Kambourakis,
Vijay K. Gurbani, Antonio Estepa and
Dimitris Geneiatakis . The top 10 sources with
Table 3: Common SIP Request Methods and their
the respective number of SIP-related articles are
Functionalities.
tabulated in Table 2.
Method Functionalities
REGISTER Send the UA information to the
3 SIP Architecture, SIP Server and maintain connections
through NATs
Components and Workflow INVITE Invite an account to join the call
ACK Confirm receipt of the INVITE re-
SIP is a signalling protocol used to initiate, main- quest.
tain, and terminate real-time sessions that include CANCEL Cancels a pending INVITE request.
voice, video, and messaging applications. SIP is OPTIONS Queries the capabilities of the other
text-based, similar to HTTP and SMTP, and it party.
operates at the application layer. Its main func-
tions include user location, user availability, user
capabilities, session setup, and session manage-
ment [22]. Figure 6 illustrates the SIP architec-
ture, depicting the interactions between SIP com- 3.1.2 User Agent Server:
ponents, including the UAC, UAS, Proxy Server, The UAS receives and processes incoming SIP requests
Redirect Server, and Registrar Server. These com- and sends the appropriate responses back to the UAC.
ponents work together to establish, initiate, route, For instance, upon receiving an INVITE request, the
and manage communication sessions between user UAS responds with status codes such as 180 Ringing

10
 Figure 6: SIP Architecture and Components with Registration and Call Setup Workflow

or 200 OK, as shown in the figure [68]. These response • Forward INVITE messages to appropriate des-
methods are listed in Table 4. In some scenarios, the tinations,
UAS may be part of a B2BUA, which combines both • Modify SIP headers to assist with NAT traver-
UAC and UAS functionalities and is commonly used sal,
in devices like IPBXs and SBCs [69]. Efficient UAS • Provide load balancing for performance and
implementations have proven to enhance multimedia
availability.
communication performance [70, 68, 64, 65].

Performance Challenges: SIP proxy servers

3.2 SIP Servers may experience significant performance issues, es-
pecially during overload situations. This can lead
SIP utilises three main types of servers for sig- to degraded throughput due to excessive retrans-
nalling and call management: Proxy Servers, Reg- missions. Factors like CPU core allocation and
istrar Servers, and Redirect Servers. Each of these scheduling algorithms can also influence packet
servers plays a critical role in routing, registering, service times and call drop rates [71].
and directing SIP messages within the network. Load Balancing Strategies: Effective load
balancing is essential for optimising performance.
3.2.1 Proxy Server Various algorithms, such as round-robin [72, 73],
priority-based request scheduling [74], and short-
Proxy servers act as intermediaries, forwarding est queue methods [71], are used to efficiently
SIP requests between user agents and returning distribute incoming calls. A novel approach using
responses. They are responsible for routing SIP history-weighted average response time improves
messages, authenticating users, and managing ses- load balancing without additional processing over-
sion setup and termination. The proxy server may head [75].
also:

• Query the Redirect Server for routing informa-

tion,

11
 Table 4: Examples of SIP Response Messages 3.2.3 Redirect Server
categorised by Class and Response Code Redirect servers facilitate the redirection of SIP
Class Response Examples messages to alternative IP addresses without re-
Code laying the messages themselves. This redirection
Informational 100 Trying process enhances communication efficiency and
(1xx) reduces the processing burden on proxy and reg-
180 Ringing istrar servers. Such servers are instrumental in
183 Session in scenarios like call redirection for busy lines and
Progress
maintaining uninterrupted connectivity in dis-
Success 200 OK tance education environments [66, 3]. Moreover,
(2xx)
redirect servers improve communication perfor-
202 Accepted
mance in home automation applications by inte-
Redirection 300 Moved
(3xx)
grating with the OSGi framework [79].
302 Multiple
Key features of SIP redirect servers include:
Choices
305 Use Proxy • Dynamic routing of calls based on real-time
Client Error 401 Unauthorized network conditions, allowing optimal resource
(4xx) utilisation and quality of service [80],
403 Forbidden • Reduction of reliance on centralised physical
404 Not Found infrastructure by employing distributed archi-
415 Unsupported tectures, particularly in GSM-based networks
Media Type [81],
428 Use Identity • Mitigation of DoS attacks through SIP ”wash-
Header ing machines,” which filter out malicious traffic
486 Busy Here while preserving service continuity for legiti-
Server Error 501 Not Imple- mate users [82, 80].
(5xx) mented
503 Service Un-
While redirect servers contribute significantly
available
to SIP network scalability and robustness, they
Global Error 600 Busy Every-
(6xx) where also introduce complexities in managing redirec-
tion logic and maintaining system security, ne-
cessitating further research and development for
widespread deployment.

3.2.2 Registrar Server 3.3 Workflow

Registrar servers handle REGISTER requests SIP is primarily employed to initiate, manage,
from user agents and maintain a database of users’ and terminate communication sessions between
current IP addresses. This allows SIP clients to up- smart devices. This section outlines the call setup
date the network with their active locations. Key and teardown processes between the UAC UAS
aspects include: through the SIP server. The sequence of request
and response messages exchanged during these
• Efficiency Improvements: Compressing SIP procedures is illustrated in Figure 7.
messages to reduce data transmission and server
load, Reusing REGISTER messages to min-
Call Setup Process
imise overhead [76, 77].
• Security Challenges: Registrar servers face • Initiation: The calling SIP User Agent sends
security issues, unauthorised registrations and an INVITE request to the recipient, signalling
spoofing attacks, requiring robust authentica- the intention to establish a communication ses-
tion mechanisms [78]. sion [83].

12
 Figure 7: SIP Message Flow for Session Setup and Teardown

• Response: The recipient’s User Agent Despite the robustness of SIP in managing ses-
replies with provisional responses such as 180 sion control, challenges such as network latency,
Ringing, followed by a final response such as NAT traversal, and compatibility with legacy tele-
200 OK upon accepting the call [84]. phony systems persist. These issues underscore the
• Acknowledgment: The caller completes the need for continuous enhancements in SIP protocol
handshake by sending an ACK message to ac- implementations and infrastructure [67].
knowledge receipt of the 200 OK response, final-
izing the call setup [85].

Call Teardown Process 4 Key Features and associated

• Termination Request: Either the caller or re- Issues in SIP
cipient can terminate the session by sending a
The rapid adoption of Internet-based communi-
BYE request to the other party [68].
• Confirmation: The receiving User Agent ac- cation technologies has emphasised the need for
a flexible and scalable signalling protocol. SIP’s
knowledges the BYE request with a 200 OK
capability to integrate with legacy telephony sys-
response, confirming the session has been suc-
tems such as the PSTN, ensure seamless inter-
cessfully terminated [1].
operability across heterogeneous networks, and

13
support mobility and security extensions has so- allocation within SIP-based networks, address-
lidified its position as the de facto standard for ing challenges in multimedia service deployment
real-time communication. However, its widespread and management.
deployment has introduced significant challenges, • Latency Control and Minimisation: Tech-
including security vulnerabilities, QoS concerns, niques for minimising latency in SIPVoip sys-
interoperability issues, and regulatory compliance tems involve multiple optimisations across dif-
complexities. Effectively addressing these chal- ferent network layers. DMA buffer triggering en-
lenges is crucial for ensuring secure, efficient, hances real-time processing by increasing DMA
and scalable communication in modern and next- interrupt frequency, reducing voice transmis-
generation networks. This section presents a de- sion delays. Cross-layer mobility management,
tailed analysis of SIP’s core features, associated utilising SIP and HMIPv6, improves handover
challenges, and potential mitigation strategies. efficiency by handling mobility locally, thereby
reducing signalling overhead and ensuring end-
to-end QoS [90]. Overload control mechanisms,
4.1 QoS such as window-based algorithms, mitigate call
QoS in SIP is a critical aspect of ensuring ef- establishment delays by dynamically manag-
fective and reliable communication in VoIP and ing network congestion without explicit feed-
other multimedia applications. SIP, a signalling back [91]. SIP message optimisation is achieved
protocol, plays a pivotal role in managing the ini- through SigComp technology, which compresses
tiation, modification, and termination of commu- lengthy SIP messages to conserve bandwidth
nication sessions, which can include voice, video, and decrease transmission delays, particularly
and messaging. The QoS in SIP-based systems in wireless environments [92]. For mobility man-
is influenced by various factors such as network agement, HMSIP provides an efficient micro-
conditions, codec selection, and the underlying mobility solution, minimising handoff latency
network architecture. Here are the key aspects of and backbone signalling while ensuring seam-
QoS in SIP: less SIP session continuity with QoS support
[93]. These integrated approaches collectively
enhance SIP network performance, reducing
4.1.1 Features
latency and improving overall communication
• Bandwidth Allocation and Management: efficiency.
Efficient bandwidth allocation and management • Packet Loss Reduction and Recovery
are critical for maintaining QoS in SIP-based Mechanisms: Packet loss in SIP-based net-
applications, particularly for real-time services works degrades real-time communication qual-
like VoIP. Hassan et al. [86] propose extending ity, necessitating efficient reduction and re-
SIP functionalities to coordinate QoS mecha- covery mechanisms. Zero packet loss mech-
nisms, focusing on session scheduling and band- anisms, such as handoff techniques integrat-
width allocation using equivalent bandwidth ing mobile agents, multicast, and buffering,
estimation. Hachimi et al. [87] suggest a method mitigate transition delays in wireless net-
for optimal bandwidth reservation in SIP-based works, ensuring seamless service continuity
MPLS networks, using traffic prediction to [94]. Packet recovery techniques, like QPPR,
avoid excessive renegotiations. Guenkova-Luy leverage algebraic consistency for error esti-
et al. [88] present a SIP-based middleware for mation, improving throughput by 26.64% in
managing multiple concurrent applications on lossy environments while minimising retrans-
a single device, enabling prioritisation and cen- mission overhead [95, 96]. Fast-recovery mech-
tralised resource coordination. Mendes et al. anisms in packet-switched networks enhance
introduce a signalling protocol for fair band- data plane resilience using link-layer, IP-based,
width distribution among scalable multimedia BGP, MPLS, and software-defined network
sessions in a multicast environment, allocating techniques, reducing failure impact [97]. Addi-
resources based on audience size [89]. These ap- tionally, session recovery in SIP-based NEMO
proaches aim to enhance QoS, optimise resource optimises reconnection time by utilising parent
utilisation, and improve fairness in bandwidth

14
 node IP addresses, reducing service interrup- the ANT framework, enhance video stream-
tion by 35% [98]. These strategies collectively ing by dynamically switching encoding models
enhance SIP communication reliability, ensur- based on real-time conditions [107]. Further-
ing robust QoS in dynamic and mobile network more, adaptive resource allocation in wireless
environments. environments employs call-admission control
• Traffic prioritisation and differentiation: and resource-reservation strategies to maintain
Traffic prioritisation and differentiation in SIP stringent latency and reliability requirements.
are essential for ensuring optimal QoS in VoIP In 5G-TSN networks, dynamic QoS mapping
and multimedia communication systems [99]. and scheduling algorithms, such as IKC-RQM
Research has demonstrated that implementing and ASPS [108], ensure deterministic commu-
SIP message differentiation algorithms, such as nication for time-sensitive applications. Collec-
those tested on the Kamailio SIP server, can sig- tively, these adaptive QoS strategies leverage
nificantly enhance session control performance advanced networking technologies and intelli-
[99]. A three-priority classification of SIP mes- gent decision-making frameworks to maintain
sages has been shown to reduce RRD, SRD, seamless, high-quality multimedia service deliv-
and SDD, alleviating overload in the IMS [100]. ery across diverse and evolving network infras-
Additionally, advanced flow management sys- tructures.
tems like the FEFM framework integrate rate • Support for Real-Time Communication:
limiting, message scheduling, and admission SIP is a widely used signalling protocol that en-
control to optimise service differentiation while ables real-time multimedia communication over
preventing overload [101]. These systems em- IP networks, supporting applications such as
ploy response time prediction and multi-queue VoIP, video conferencing, and instant messaging
scheduling to improve performance, reduce call [109]. Its integration with XMPP [110] enhances
rejection rates, and eliminate retransmission communication by combining SIP’s telephony
issues, ensuring balanced throughput and ad- capabilities with XMPP’s instant messaging
herence to SLAs [102]. Collectively, these priori- and presence features, while WebRTC integra-
tisation and differentiation techniques enhance tion facilitates seamless browser-based audio
the efficiency and reliability of SIP-based com- and video communication [111]. To support mo-
munication systems, making them crucial for bility, SIP extensions address challenges like
maintaining high QoS standards in demanding handoff latency, with solutions such as PAR-
network environments. SIP [112] and MobSIP [113], which optimise
• Adaptive QoS Mechanisms for Dynamic session continuity and application-layer han-
Network Conditions: Adaptive QoS mech- dover [114]. Additionally, SIP underpins con-
anisms in SIP-based multimedia applications verged communication platforms, integrating
dynamically optimise transmission quality in voice, video, messaging, and conferencing ser-
fluctuating network conditions. The integra- vices, often via open-source frameworks and
tion of SDN and OpenFlow enhances SIP QoS SIP APIs, to enable seamless, scalable, and
by enabling real-time traffic adaptation beyond feature-rich multimedia interactions.
static SLAs [103]. Adaptive video streaming • Compliance with Network Performance
techniques adjust H.264 encoding parameters Standards: Compliance with Network Per-
based on SIP/SDP signalling, ensuring optimal formance Standards in SIP varies depending
bandwidth utilisation and synchronisation with on the deployment environment, with stud-
network conditions [104]. In broadband access ies indicating that SIP can meet ITU-T and
networks, SIP leverages DiffServ to efficiently RFC requirements under controlled conditions,
translate QoS parameters into IP classes, sim- such as wired LAN, while facing challenges in
plifying QoS enforcement compared to IntServ wireless networks due to scalability and QoS
models [105, 106]. Protocol selection and data limitations [115]. SIP performance is assessed
buffering techniques enable SIP-based multime- using standardised metrics defined in RFC 6076
dia transmissions to seamlessly adapt across [116], ensuring consistency across implementa-
wired and wireless networks, while reinforce- tions [117]. At the same time, ITU-T standards
ment learning-driven ABR algorithms, such as establish specific QoS benchmarks that SIP over

15
 Wi-Fi often struggles to meet. Security and result in echo, audio clipping, or call drops
identity management remain critical, with RFC [125]. Clock drift and lack of synchronisation in
4474 [118] recommending RSA for authentica- multi-party conferencing further disrupt media
tion, though ECC has demonstrated superior consistency [127].
efficiency, suggesting a potential shift in secu- • Packet Loss and Unreliable Data Trans-
rity standards [119]. Despite advancements in mission: Packet loss in SIP-based communica-
SIP performance and security, compliance with tion systems arises due to various network con-
these standards remains challenging, particu- ditions, significantly impacting QoS-sensitive
larly in dynamic and wireless environments, ne- applications like VoIP and video streaming
cessitating continued research and optimisation [128]. Handoff delays in heterogeneous wireless
for reliable and scalable SIP-based communica- networks for real-time applications can intro-
tion [120]. duce undesirable latencies during mobility tran-
sitions [129, 130]. Additionally, network conges-
4.1.2 Challenges tion and link failures in IP-based infrastructures
pose challenges in differentiating signalling and
Despite SIP’s ability to manage real-time commu-
media flow packets, causing packet loss and de-
nication, several QoS challenges persist:
lays that degrade SIP signalling reachability
and overall QoS [131, 132].
• Network Congestion and Bandwidth
• Scalability Constraints in Large-Scale
Limitations: As SIP networks scale, they be-
Deployments: Traditional SIP architectures
come increasingly susceptible to overload and
often depend on centralised management, where
congestion, potentially leading to performance
conference control functions are handled by
degradation and collapse due to congestion. SIP
centralised servers, limiting scalability [133].
servers often experience overload when process-
A distributed management approach enhances
ing capacity is exceeded, exacerbated by ineffec-
scalability by decentralising media processing,
tive overload control mechanisms, resulting in
participant membership control, and authori-
low throughput and high retransmission rates
sation functions [134]. Additionally, high SIP
[121, 122, 123]. Overload propagation across
signalling traffic can lead to system overload,
interconnected SIP servers further complicates
degrading performance and scalability [135].
recovery once congestion occurs [122]. This con- • Security Concerns in QoS Implementa-
gestion adversely affects call setup delays, ses-
tion: Security concerns in the implementation
sion quality, and overall network responsiveness,
of QoS in SIP arise due to inherent protocol vul-
particularly during peak usage or flash crowds.
nerabilities and the trade-off between security
Additionally, limited bandwidth in heteroge-
measures and service quality [136]. SIP, a sig-
neous network environments, such as wireless
nalling protocol for real-time communication, is
or mobile networks, constrains the transport of
susceptible to threats such as message intercep-
SIP signalling and media traffic, amplifying la-
tion and modification, exploiting its text-based
tency and jitter [124]. These impairments hinder
structure to compromise data integrity and dis-
the ability of SIP to meet QoS requirements for
rupt services [137, 138]. Additionally, security
time-sensitive applications like VoIP and video
mechanisms like authentication and encryption
conferencing.
introduce processing overhead, leading to in-
• Synchronisation Issues: High latency and
creased latency and degraded QoS, affecting
synchronisation issues in SIP can degrade VoIP
user experience [139]. The implementation of
performance, requiring robust mitigation strate-
IDPS is crucial in VoIP environments to miti-
gies [125]. Jitter and buffering from variable
gate security risks while ensuring uninterrupted
packet arrival can be reduced with an enhanced
legitimate traffic flow, maintaining both net-
de-jitter buffer, cutting latency by up to one-
work security and QoS [140].
third. Server overload and retransmissions also • QoS Degradation Due to Network Fail-
cause latency spikes, delaying SIP signalling,
ures and Overhead: QoS degradation in SIP
media negotiation, and session maintenance
networks arises from multiple factors, including
[126]. Even minor synchronisation lapses can
network failures and signalling overhead, which

16
 significantly impact real-time applications like 4.2 Security and Privacy
VoIP and video streaming. Handoff delays and
SIP is vulnerable to numerous security threats, ne-
packet loss during SIP-based mobility transi-
cessitating robust security and privacy measures.
tions disrupt session continuity, leading to de-
Security aspects mainly focus on authentication,
graded service quality [130]. Network congestion
confidentiality, and integrity. The following are the
and bandwidth limitations exacerbate latency
key features, challenges and mitigation aspects of
and packet loss, further impairing communica-
security and privacy in SIP:
tion reliability [141, 142]. Additionally, codec
performance plays a critical role, as different
4.2.1 Features
codecs introduce varying levels of delay, jitter,
and packet loss, affecting overall SIP session • E2EE and Message Integrity Protection:
quality [143, 78]. Moreover, the overhead from E2EE is essential for securing SIP commu-
SIP signalling, including authentication and ses- nications, ensuring data confidentiality from
sion management, increases processing load, origin to destination. Various methods have
contributing to delays and reduced network ef- been proposed to enhance SIP security, in-
ficiency [144, 31]. Addressing these challenges cluding S/MIME-based encryption, which inte-
requires optimised resource management, effi- grates S/MIME into SIP user agents to encrypt
cient signalling mechanisms, and adaptive QoS message bodies and ensure integrity and non-
strategies to maintain high service reliability. repudiation [148]. Hybrid encryption techniques
• Lack of Uniform QoS Policies Across combine cryptographic methods, such as public-
Networks: Inconsistent QoS policies across key encryption, requiring users to utilise key
networks result in resource allocation variabil- pairs for secure messaging [149, 150]. Addition-
ity, affecting service quality and necessitating ally, message integrity protection mechanisms
enhanced SIP protocols for better DiffServ inte- play a vital role in securing SIP signalling. The
gration [31, 144, 145]. Handoff delays and packet S-SIP protocol enhances security by introducing
loss in SIP-based mobility further degrade per- mutual authentication and key management,
formance, especially in latency-sensitive appli- ensuring integrity and confidentiality in SIP
cations like VoIP [130, 145], due to the ab- communications [151]. Furthermore, application
sence of uniform QoS policies. Scalability is- gateways and data encryption leverage symmet-
sues in resource management pose challenges ric encryption to protect SIP device configura-
in SIP-based NGN frameworks [146], as exist- tions, restricting access to authenticated clients
ing mechanisms struggle with large-scale traffic [152].
and lack integrated resource coordination [145]. • Authentication and Authorisation Mech-
Moreover, traditional SLA-based QoS enforce- anisms: SIP is essential in multimedia com-
ment lacks adaptability to dynamic network munications, particularly for VoIP systems,
conditions, prompting the use of solutions like as it manages session initiation, maintenance,
OpenFlow for real-time SIP session-based QoS and termination. However, SIP’s security re-
adjustments. Finally, the interplay between se- mains a critical concern due to authentication
curity and QoS remains complex, as security and authorisation vulnerabilities. Traditional
measures often introduce performance trade- HTTP Digest Authentication is widely used
offs, further exacerbated by the absence of but susceptible to attacks such as password
standardised enforcement [147]. guessing and server spoofing, relying on pre-
configured user credentials, which can be in-
A summarised form of features and issues secure and inefficient [153, 154]. To enhance
associated with QoS is given in Table 6. Poten- security, TF-SIP integrates multiple authenti-
tial countermeasures, their limitations and open cation factors, improving resistance to attacks
issues/gaps are also highlighted. while slightly increasing storage requirements
[153]. ECC offers a more efficient alternative,
reducing key sizes and computational overhead
compared to traditional methods [155]. Ad-
ditionally, chaos-based cryptography leverages

17
 the randomness of chaotic sequences to mit- decentralised conferencing and SIP forking. To
igate risks like offline password guessing and strengthen security, double encryption mecha-
server spoofing. For authorisation, third-party nisms leverage AEAD, providing both hop-by-
token-based mechanisms such as OAuth 2.0 and hop and end-to-end protection while allowing
OpenID Connect separate authentication from intermediaries to modify RTP packet param-
SIP network elements, improving security and eters as needed [162, 163]. OSRTP facilitates
flexibility [156]. Furthermore, blockchain-based encrypted media exchange in mixed-security
authorisation introduces a decentralised iden- environments, ensuring backwards compatibil-
tity model using smart contracts on platforms ity with both secure and non-secure systems
like Ethereum, enhancing trust, accountability, [164]. Performance assessments indicate that
and user privacy while addressing scalability SRTP imposes minimal overhead on VoIP, with
challenges in centralised solutions [157]. a negligible impact on voice quality and only
• Secure SIPS with TLS/DTLS: Securing slight increases in packet size and latency, al-
SIP signalling is crucial for protecting voice and though authentication processing remains more
multimedia data over IP networks. TLS and resource-intensive than encryption [165].
DTLS are widely recommended to safeguard • RBAC and User Authentication: SIP au-
SIP signalling from security threats. However, thentication and access control are critical for
implementing TLS can introduce significant securing VoIP, video calls, and real-time com-
performance overhead, with studies indicating munication against unauthorised access, fraud,
that SIP-over-TLS reduces server performance and SIP hijacking [166]. Authentication mecha-
by up to 17 times compared to SIP-over-UDP, nisms such as Digest Authentication, which em-
primarily due to the computational cost of RSA ploys an MD5-based challenge-response mech-
operations during session negotiation [158, 14]. anism, provide basic security but are vulnera-
Additionally, SIP-over-TLS exhibits four times ble to brute force and MITM attacks without
lower peak throughput than SIP-over-UDP 22. TLS encryption [167]. Secure Authentication
To mitigate these performance constraints, op- methods like TLS and SRTP encrypt SIP sig-
timising secure connection persistence and ef- nalling and media streams, enhancing secu-
ficiently managing server resources is essential, rity beyond digest authentication [168]. Token-
as the primary bottleneck arises from TLS Based Authentication (OAuth 2.0, JWT) in-
handshake overhead, rather than symmetric tegrates with identity providers (e.g., Google,
encryption costs like AES [158, 14]. Despite Microsoft), reducing reliance on password-based
performance concerns, TLS and DTLS enhance authentication, while mTLS Authentication en-
security by encrypting SIP signalling, ensuring sures bidirectional certificate-based authenti-
confidentiality and integrity, as recommended cation, commonly used in enterprise SIP de-
by SIP RFCs [159]. However, these proto- ployments [169]. In addition to authentica-
cols do not inherently provide non-repudiation, tion, RBAC enforces role-specific permissions
prompting proposals for SIP header modifica- for users, agents, administrators, and proxies,
tions that allow user agents to sign SIP mes- regulating SIP functions such as call initia-
sages using X.509 certificates, thereby enabling tion, registration, and message routing [170].
verifiable message authentication [159, 160]. RBAC policies are enforced through ACLs in
• Media Encryption with SRTP: SRTP is SIP servers (e.g., Asterisk, Kamailio) and SIP
an extension of the RTP that ensures confi- proxies, filtering requests based on predefined
dentiality, integrity, and replay protection for roles. Implementing RBAC and authentication
media streams in VoIP and other real-time ap- involves configuring SIP Digest Authentication,
plications, often used alongside the SIP for securing communication with TLS/SRTP, inte-
secure media transport. SRTP employs sym- grating OAuth/JWT for identity management,
metric key exchange, typically embedded within defining role-based policies, and enforcing them
SIP INVITE messages using the SDP, with through SIP proxies and SBCs [171]. Effec-
TLS offering additional security, though expos- tive monitoring and auditing mechanisms log
ing session keys to SIP servers [161]. The EKT authentication attempts, detect brute force at-
extension enhances key distribution, enabling tacks, and analyse SIP traffic for anomalies. By

18
 combining strong authentication with RBAC, networks like Tor and I2P [178]. To further
SIP systems prevent unauthorised access, mit- enhance privacy, a privacy service role has been
igate fraud, enhance security compliance (e.g., proposed for SIP intermediaries, allowing users
GDPR, HIPAA), and simplify user management to define privacy requirements that protect
in large-scale deployments. personal identity information in SIP messages
• DoS and SIP Flooding Prevention Mech- [179]. Additionally, the Mist framework has
anisms: Flooding pose severe threats to SIP- been adapted for SIP to ensure anonymity by
based VoIP systems, disrupting real-time com- unlinking communication parties, particularly
munication by overwhelming servers with ex- in complex SIP networks spanning multiple do-
cessive requests, leading to service degradation mains and streaming services [180, 181]. These
or failure. Common attacks include DNS flood- strategies collectively enhance SIP’s security,
ing, where SIP servers are bombarded with addressing vulnerabilities while maintaining
irresolvable domain name requests, exhausting efficient communication.
resources [172], flooding-based DoS, which ex- • Secure Storage and Transmission of Cre-
ploits SIP’s dependence on the TCP/IP stack dentials: SIP is vulnerable to user imperson-
and its inherent IP vulnerabilities [173], and ation, password guessing, and session exposure
SIP message flooding, where attackers over- attacks, with existing authentication mecha-
load servers with excessive SIP requests or nisms, such as HTTP digest authentication,
malformed message sequences [174, 175]. To proving inadequate, especially in interdomain
counter these threats, DADP employs a non- contexts [151, 182]. To address these vulnerabil-
blocking DNS cache to mitigate DNS flooding ities, several enhanced authentication protocols
[172], while autonomous defence mechanisms have been proposed. SSIP introduces A-SIP
analyse and counteract attacks in real time, for mutual authentication and KP-SIP for key
reducing response latency [173]. Additionally, management, improving security and perfor-
SIP-aware firewalls apply rule-based filtering mance [151]. TF-SIP enhances security while
to detect and block spoofing and flooding at- maintaining low communication and computa-
tempts [174], and whitelist-based schemes use tion costs, though it requires additional storage
Bloom filters to differentiate legitimate users [153]. ECC-based schemes further strengthen
from attackers, enhancing detection accuracy authentication, offering resistance to user im-
[176]. These mitigation strategies collectively personation and password-based attacks [183,
enhance the resilience of SIP networks against 3]. Additionally, ensuring user anonymity and
DoS and flooding attacks. secure key exchange is crucial, with anonymity-
• Privacy Protection and Anonymity preserving schemes leveraging chaotic maps
Mechanisms: Privacy protection and to reduce computational overhead [184, 185].
anonymity in SIP are critical due to its Password-based authenticated key exchange
widespread use in multimedia communication. protocols further enhance SIP security by en-
Several mechanisms address these concerns by abling strong authentication without excessive
securing user identities and ensuring confiden- computational costs [186]. These advancements
tial message exchanges. ECC-based mutual collectively strengthen SIP’s security, address-
authentication strengthens SIP anonymity by ing its fundamental weaknesses while maintain-
mitigating server and user masquerading at- ing efficiency.
tacks through enhanced security protocols [177].
The PrivaSIP framework leverages asymmet- 4.2.2 Challenges
ric and symmetric cryptography to safeguard
• Vulnerability to MITM Attacks: The SIP
caller and callee identities in multidomain
in VoIP systems is inherently vulnerable to
environments without introducing significant
MITM attacks, compromising both confiden-
delays [28]. Similarly, OnionSIP, employing
tiality and data integrity due to its reliance
onion routing, encrypts SIP message fields to
on IP networks [187]. These attacks enable ad-
prevent exposure to intermediaries and eaves-
versaries to intercept, alter, or inject malicious
droppers, offering an alternative to anonymity

19
 data into SIP-based communications, poten- [202, 34, 203]. Insufficient data validation fur-
tially leading to DoS or impersonation threats ther enables Caller ID spoofing, intensifying
[188]. Furthermore, security protocols such as security concerns [204]. Call interception can
ZRTP, which employs Diffie-Hellman key ex- occur through both network and application
change to secure VoIP media streams, remain layer attacks, exploiting the broadcast nature
susceptible to MITM exploitation despite built- of VoIP and the availability of traffic intercep-
in countermeasures, particularly when sophisti- tion tools [202]. These authorised parties access
cated attack techniques are used [189]. call content or inject malicious data. Addition-
• Weaknesses in Authentication and Key ally, techniques such as session hijacking and
Management: The SIP is essential for man- media injection threaten the confidentiality and
aging multimedia communication sessions, but integrity of SIP communications, undermining
remains vulnerable to authentication and key trust in the system [205, 34].
management threats. Studies highlight key • Privacy Concerns in Caller Identification
weaknesses, including the lack of mutual au- and Location Tracking: Privacy concerns in
thentication, exposing systems to imperson- caller identification and location tracking within
ation attacks [190, 191], and user anonymity the SIP arise due to its open architecture,
issues, which enable trace and impersonation making it susceptible to caller-ID spoofing and
attacks [184, 190, 192]. Additionally, SIP pro- unauthorised location tracking. Caller identity
tocols are susceptible to known attacks such as protection remains a critical issue, with cryp-
server spoofing, impersonation, and DoS [193, tographic solutions like PrivaSIP designed to
194, 195]. While security enhancements are nec- secure caller and callee identities in multido-
essary, they often introduce computational over- main environments, ensuring privacy even in
head, posing a trade-off between security and untrusted domains [28, 28]. To counter caller-
performance efficiency [196, 123]. Consequently, ID spoofing, blockchain-based authentication
addressing these vulnerabilities requires robust, and MAC address-based verification techniques
efficient, and scalable authentication and key have been developed to enhance identity in-
management mechanisms. tegrity [206, 204]. However, location tracking
• Susceptibility to SIP Flooding, SPIT, limitations persist, as SIP lacks built-in mecha-
and Robocalls: SIP-based VoIP networks nisms for precise geolocation, posing challenges
are highly susceptible to security threats such for emergency services and security applications
as SIP flooding, SPIT, and robocalls, leading [207]. The broader privacy vs. transparency de-
to DoS attacks and unsolicited communica- bate complicates regulatory considerations, as
tions [197]. SIP flooding exploits the protocol’s caller-ID can either enhance safety or com-
openness, allowing attackers to overwhelm SIP promise individual privacy depending on its
servers with excessive requests, resulting in DoS implementation [208]. Consequently, balancing
or distributed DoS attacks. Real-time attack privacy protection with the need for account-
classification systems analysing packet-based ability remains a key challenge in SIP-based
features offer higher accuracy compared to flow- communication, necessitating further research
based methods [198], while linear SVM clas- and policy refinement [209].
sifiers effectively detect SIP flooding by map- • Lack of Uniform Security Standards
ping SIP messages into high-dimensional spaces Across Networks: The SIP is a widely
[199]. SPIT, involving bulk unsolicited messages adopted signalling protocol for multimedia com-
or calls, is another major VoIP security risk munication, but its security remains a criti-
[200]. cal challenge due to the absence of uniform
• Eavesdropping and Call Interception standards across networks. Authentication and
Risks: SIP security vulnerabilities expose sys- integrity mechanisms are essential to prevent
tems to significant risks, including eavesdrop- unauthorised access and ensure message au-
ping and call interception [201]. Weaknesses in thenticity, yet vulnerabilities such as pass-
SIP authentication mechanisms allow attackers word guessing and stolen-verifier attacks persist
to intercept and manipulate communications, [151, 3, 31]. Confidentiality is another concern,
leading to unauthorised access to sensitive data as many protocols fail to adequately encrypt

20
 media flows, leaving communications suscep- and competing standards. The following are the
tible to interception [210, 211]. A persistent key aspects of SIP interoperability and compli-
performance-security trade-off exists in authen- ance with standards, drawing insights from the
tication and key agreement schemes, with many provided research:
struggling to provide robust security without
degrading system efficiency [212]. Additionally,
SIP security solutions must support mobility
4.3.1 Features
across heterogeneous networks, a requirement
often overlooked in current standards [210]. • Multiple Transport Protocols Support:
The emergence of peer-to-peer SIP networks The SIP operates over multiple transport proto-
improves robustness but introduces new risks, cols, including UDP, TCP, and SCTP, each with
such as securing user registration and location distinct trade-offs. UDP, widely used for SIP
lookup [213]. Addressing these challenges is cru- due to its low overhead, lacks reliability, lead-
cial for ensuring secure and efficient SIP-based ing to message loss and out-of-sequence delivery,
communication systems. necessitating retransmissions and reordering,
• Security Risks from Proprietary or Non- which can degrade performance [218, 219]. TCP,
Standard Implementations: Proprietary or while ensuring reliable and ordered message de-
non-standard implementations of the SIP in- livery, introduces latency due to its connection-
troduce security vulnerabilities that standard oriented nature, making it less ideal for real-
mechanisms may not address, exposing systems time communication [220, 221]. SCTP, designed
to various threats. DoS attacks exploit flaws for signalling transport, offers advanced features
in SIP parsers and signalling applications, dis- such as multi-streaming and multi-homing, en-
rupting service availability [214]. Information hancing reliability and scalability, though its
leakage enables attackers to fingerprint devices impact on SIP server performance varies based
and exploit known vulnerabilities, even without on network conditions [222, 219, 9, 223]. Com-
explicit software version disclosure [215]. Mal- parative studies using ns-2 network simulations
formed message attacks arise from implemen- suggest that SCTP can outperform TCP and
tation errors, causing instability when process- UDP in reliability, yet its effect on data transfer
ing non-standard SIP messages [216]. DRDoS latency and scalability remains an area of active
attacks exploit SIP vulnerabilities to amplify research [224, 220].
traffic and overwhelm target servers [217]. Addi- • Backwards compatibility with legacy: SIP
tionally, authentication and privacy weaknesses systems are crucial for seamless integration as
in non-standard implementations can lead to new technologies emerge, ensuring interoper-
unauthorised access and identity exposure [31, ability across different network environments.
28]. SIP, widely used for initiating and managing
real-time IP-based sessions, maintains back-
A summarised form of features and issues asso- wards compatibility through several mecha-
ciated with Security and Privacy is given in Table nisms. The multipart/alternative approach in
7. Potential countermeasures, their limitations SIP enables a smooth transition from tradi-
and open issues/gaps are also highlighted. tional SDP to advanced formats like SDPng
or encrypted SDP while preserving legacy sup-
4.3 Interoperability and port [225]. ALEX enhances dual-stack interop-
erability and scalability, allowing direct com-
Compliance with Standards munication between peers while maintaining
Interoperability and compliance with standards compatibility with traditional SIP implementa-
in SIP are critical for ensuring seamless com- tions [226]. A P2P SIP registration and resource
munication across different systems and devices. discovery model eliminates reliance on central
Despite SIP’s widespread adoption and its role servers, enabling P2P-enabled peers to interact
in enabling real-time communications, achieving with conventional SIP entities without disrupt-
full interoperability remains a challenge due to ing existing functionality [227, 228]. Further-
various factors, including proprietary extensions more, SIP enhancements for QoS interworking

21
 ensure compatibility with QoS-enabled IP net- module for detecting malformed message at-
works, preserving interoperability while meeting tacks highlights the need for continuous security
modern performance requirements [229, 230, enhancements within SIP frameworks [239].
31]. These mechanisms collectively enable SIP • Standardised SIP Protocols for Seam-
to evolve while maintaining seamless backwards less Vendor Interoperability: SIP faces chal-
compatibility with legacy systems. lenges due to vendor-specific extensions be-
• Integration with Various Communication yond baseline IETF standards [240, 241]. While
Technologies The integration of VoIP, We- events like SIPit demonstrate interoperability
bRTC, and 5G with the SIP is essential for success, proprietary modifications often stem
advancing real-time multimedia communication from commercial motives rather than techni-
by ensuring seamless interoperability across di- cal necessity [240]. To mitigate these issues,
verse platforms and devices. WebRTC-SIP inte- frameworks such as BLISS aim to standardise
gration enhances web-based collaboration and advanced feature implementation across ven-
e-learning but requires addressing signalling dors, promoting seamless operation [242, 243].
complexities, multimedia conferencing, and se- Technological advancements like SDN and NFV
curity concerns, with encryption standards and further enhance SIP networks by optimising
technologies like Kurento extending WebRTC’s routing efficiency and resource management
capabilities [231, 232, 233]. SIP’s role in VoIP is through control and data plane separation, as
pivotal, offering a standardised mechanism for exemplified in the OpenSIP framework [244].
establishing, modifying, and terminating ses- Additionally, SIP-driven mobility management
sions, thereby replacing traditional PSTN sys- solutions support seamless handovers in hetero-
tems due to its efficiency and cost-effectiveness geneous networks, crucial for maintaining QoS
[234, 150, 235]. In 5G networks, SIP supports in real-time applications like VoIP [245, 130,
mobility management through techniques such 246].
as shadow registration, which minimises inter- • Compliance with SIP Protocol Stan-
domain handoff delays for improved user expe- dards: The SIP is a signalling protocol used
rience [236]. However, security vulnerabilities in to establish, manage, and terminate real-time
SIP-based VoIP necessitate robust encryption multimedia sessions, including voice, video, and
and authentication frameworks, including dig- messaging applications, with RFC 3261 en-
ital signatures, to mitigate threats [150, 237]. suring interoperability and security in VoIP
Performance comparisons indicate WebRTC ex- and multimedia communication systems. To en-
cels in video quality, while SIP ensures superior hance security, RFC 3261 defines authentication
audio communication, making protocol selec- via HTTP digest authentication, hop-by-hop se-
tion critical based on application requirements curity through TLS, and E2EE using S/MIME,
[238]. with later updates replacing 3DES with AES to
• Extensible SIP Headers and Methods for strengthen encryption [247, 179]. SIP, developed
Custom Implementations: SIP is a widely by the IETF, differs from ITU-T’s H.323, which
used application-layer signalling protocol for es- prioritises supplementary services and PSTN
tablishing, managing, and terminating real-time interoperability, leading to potential compat-
sessions over IP networks. To accommodate ibility challenges, though interworking mech-
evolving requirements, SIP supports extensible anisms facilitate communication across these
headers and methods that enable custom im- protocols [248]. SIP’s adaptability is further
plementations and enhanced functionality. Pro- demonstrated through extensions such as event
gramming tools such as SIP CPL, SIP CGI, notification, enabling SIP nodes to subscribe to
SIP Servlets, and JAIN APIs facilitate protocol remote notifications, and updates introducing
extensions, allowing for service customisation identity authentication mechanisms to ensure
and integration [233]. Additionally, security re- secure peer-to-peer communication [249]. Some
mains a critical concern, as SIP-based services of the RFC compliance standards are listed in
are susceptible to attacks like DoS. The develop- the Table 5 with continuous modification on
ment of an open-source extensible SDP parser SIP features, and their achieved milestones.

22
 Table 5: Key RFCs related to SIP compliance
RFC Number Title Description Year Milestone
RFC 2543 [250] SIP: Session Initiation The first SIP specification, defining basic 1999 Birth of SIP
Protocol signalling for call setup and termination.
RFC 3261 [251] SIP: Session Initiation Replaced RFC 2543; established SIP as 2002 SIP Becomes a
Protocol an application-layer control protocol for Core Protocol
multimedia sessions.
RFC 3265 [252] Session Initiation Protocol Defined the SIP event notification frame- 2002 SIP Event
(SIP)-Specific Event work for subscriptions and notifications. Notification
Notification.
RFC 3311 [253] The Session Initiation Introduced the UPDATE method to 2002 SIP UPDATE
Protocol (SIP) UPDATE modify session parameters before a call is Method
Method connected.
RFC 3323 [254] A Privacy Mechanism for Specified privacy mechanisms for SIP 2002 SIP Privacy
the Session Initiation communications. Mechanisms
Protocol (SIP)
RFC 3325 [255] Private Extensions to SIP Defined identity assertion mechanisms 2002 Asserted
for Asserted Identity within trusted SIP networks. Identity in
within Trusted Networks Trusted
Networks
RFC 3428 [256] Session Initiation Protocol Extended SIP for instant messaging using 2002 SIP Instant
(SIP) Extension for the MESSAGE method. Messaging
Instant Messaging
RFC 3856 [257] A Presence Event Package Defined presence information delivery in 2004 SIP Presence
for the Session Initiation SIP. Notification
Protocol (SIP)
RFC 3891 [258] The Session Initiation Introduced the R̈eplacesḧeader for call 2004 Call Transfer
Protocol (SIP) transfers and attended call transfers. Mechanism
RFC 3892 [259] The Session Initiation Provided a mechanism for tracking the 2004 SIP Call
Protocol (SIP) initiator of a call transfer. Referral
Referred-By Mechanism
RFC 4474 [260] Enhancements for Improved caller identity authentication 2006 Caller Identity
Authenticated Identity in SIP messages. Authentication
Management in SIP
RFC 4916 [261] Connected Identity in the Enhanced identity management for call 2007 Connected
Session Initiation Protocol redirection and transfers. Identity in SIP
(SIP)
RFC 5626 [262] Managing Client-Initiated Defined mechanisms for persistent con- 2009 NAT Traversal
Connections in SIP . nections in SIP networks. in SIP
RFC 5627 [263] Obtaining and Using Standardised globally routable user agent 2009 Globally
Globally Routable User URIs (GRUUs) for SIP . Routable User
Agent URIs (GRUUs) in Agent URIs
SIP (GRUUs)
RFC 5763 [264] Framework for Defined SIP signalling for establishing 2010 Secure Media
Establishing a Secure SRTP-based secure media streams. Transport
Real-time Transport
Protocol (SRTP) Security
Context
RFC 5764 [265] Datagram Transport Layer Introduced DTLS for securing SIP sig- 2010 DTLS for
Security (DTLS) nalling. Secure SIP
Extension to SIP Communication
RFC 6026 [266] Correct Transaction Provided clarifications for handling mul- 2010 Correct
Handling for 2xx tiple 2xx responses. Handling of 2xx
Responses to SIP INVITE Responses
Requests
RFC 6665 [267] SIP-Specific Event Updated the SIP event notification 2012 Updated SIP
Notification framework. Event
Notification
Framework
RFC 7315 [268] Private Header (P-Header) Defined private header extensions for SIP 2014 SIP Private
Extensions to SIP used in network-specific applications. Header
Extensions
RFC 8224 [269] Authenticated Identity Revised SIP identity authentication 2018 STIR/SHAKEN
Management in SIP mechanisms. Caller ID
Authentication

23
• Adherence to Security and Authentica- IETF to enable fair performance comparisons
tion Standards: Adherence to security and [281, 282]. Additionally, security vulnerabilities
authentication standards such as GDPR and arise from differences in SIP implementations,
HIPAA is critical for protecting sensitive data, making some systems more susceptible to at-
particularly in healthcare and data management tacks such as fingerprinting and DoS exploits,
sectors, as these regulations impose stringent with robustness testing revealing gaps in secure
privacy and security requirements. Ensuring operation under stress [215, 283, 284].
compliance necessitates robust authentication • Complexity in Implementing and Main-
mechanisms, including symmetric/asymmetric taining SIP Extensions: Implementing and
key schemes and digital signatures, to secure maintaining SIP extensions is inherently com-
electronic health records [270]. GDPR man- plex due to the diverse functionalities they
dates stronger authentication protocols, with introduce, requiring careful consideration of in-
MFA recommended for both frameworks to teroperability, security, system integration, and
mitigate cyber threats [271, 272]. Crypto- scalability. SIP extensions must seamlessly inte-
graphic solutions, such as certificateless-based grate with existing infrastructure while ensur-
key agreements and hybrid public key infras- ing compatibility with other network protocols,
tructures, enhance secure data exchange and as seen with the SIPBIO extension for bio-
storage while maintaining regulatory compli- metric authentication, which demands precise
ance [273, 274]. Blockchain-based frameworks alignment with SIP message structures to pre-
further support GDPR compliance by ensuring serve session integrity [203]. Similarly, payment-
transparent data management and auditability, supporting extensions must embed transac-
aligning with semantic consistency and integrity tional data into SIP requests without disrupting
requirements [275]. However, compliance im- core protocol operations [285]. Security chal-
plementation remains complex, particularly for lenges arise from the need for robust authenti-
multinational organisations, necessitating auto- cation and encryption, with methods like [286]
mated tools and standardised security controls simplifying certificate management but still re-
to streamline adherence, especially for small and flecting the intricacies of securing SIP communi-
medium-sized enterprises [276, 277, 278, 279]. cations. Extending authentication mechanisms
Despite these challenges, meeting GDPR and to incorporate diverse credential storage for-
HIPAA requirements is essential for mitigat- mats further complicates security implementa-
ing risks, ensuring data integrity, and upholding tion [287]. System integration is another critical
privacy standards. challenge, particularly for extensions like the
SIP Handover Extension, which ensures ses-
4.3.2 Challenges sion continuity across heterogeneous networks
without additional infrastructure [288]. Addi-
• Variability in SIP Implementations
tionally, service-oriented extensions, such as
Across Vendors: Variability in SIP imple-
those in the eXtensible Service Protocol, shift
mentations across vendors presents significant
integration to endpoint devices, increasing ar-
challenges in interoperability, performance, and
chitectural complexity [289]. Scalability remains
security, despite SIP’s role as a standardised
a key concern, as extensions like the SIP-
signalling protocol for real-time IP-based com-
based Message Notification Mechanism must
munication. SIP’s extensibility allows vendors
efficiently handle high traffic loads in mod-
to introduce proprietary enhancements, often
ern networks without introducing performance
leading to interoperability issues that necessi-
bottlenecks [290]. While SIP extensions signifi-
tate ongoing standardisation efforts to ensure
cantly enhance protocol capabilities, addressing
seamless integration across different implemen-
their associated challenges requires a deep un-
tations [241, 280]. Performance inconsistencies
derstanding of SIP’s foundational architecture
further complicate adoption, as variations in
and the specific operational needs of each ex-
network infrastructure and vendor-specific
tension.
optimisations impact signalling efficiency, ne-
cessitating standardised benchmarking by the

24
• Performance Overhead Due to Proto- SIPBIO for biometric interactions, requiring ex-
col Compliance Requirements: The perfor- tensive use-case validation and formal processes
mance overhead associated with protocol com- [203]. The protocol’s development also relies
pliance in the SIP poses a significant challenge, on numerous RFCs and drafts, necessitating
particularly when implementing security mea- agreement among diverse stakeholders, which
sures. Studies indicate that while securing SIP prolongs discussions and decision-making [293].
is crucial for VoIP protection, it introduces Technological advancements often outpace stan-
substantial computational costs, notably with dardisation efforts, requiring continuous revi-
TLS, which can reduce performance by up to sions to keep SIP relevant, further delaying new
17 times due to RSA operations during session implementations [47]. However, while these de-
negotiation [158, 14]. The choice of transport lays may slow innovation, they ensure thorough
protocol further influences performance, with vetting, leading to more robust and reliable
UDP-based security implementations generally SIP-based solutions [294].
outperforming TCP-based alternatives [291]. • Compliance Gaps in Emerging Technolo-
Additionally, SIP servers require adequate re- gies: Compliance gaps in the SIP within emerg-
source provisioning to handle security-related ing technologies like 5G, AI, and IoT stem from
overhead, which varies based on deployment security vulnerabilities and inadequate regula-
configurations [14]. tory frameworks, necessitating significant adap-
• Interoperability Issues Between Propri- tations. SIP is particularly vulnerable to attacks
etary and Open-Standard SIP Systems: such as DDoS and scanning in IoT environments
Interoperability challenges between proprietary where devices are often compromised [295, 296].
and open-standard SIP systems remain a criti- Traditional authentication methods, like HTTP
cal issue in VoIP due to inconsistencies in proto- digest, fail to provide adequate protection, high-
col adherence and functionality across vendors. lighting the need for advanced identity-based
Variability in SIP implementations leads to dis- authenticated key agreements [297]. AI inte-
crepancies in how systems interpret and execute gration enhances SIP security, as demonstrated
SIP standards, with proprietary solutions often by AI-based threat detection systems in 5G
introducing unique features that conflict with networks. At the same time, platforms like
open standards [18, 292]. Technical limitations, AIoTtalk showcase SIP’s potential in manag-
such as inadequate support for advanced fea- ing heterogeneous AIoT applications but lack
tures like deep packet inspection, further com- a comprehensive compliance framework [298].
plicate seamless communication, despite mid- Regulatory compliance remains a challenge,
dleware solutions attempting to bridge these particularly in emerging markets, where inad-
gaps [244, 292]. These interoperability issues re- equate infrastructure and high implementation
sult in service disruptions, increased costs, and costs hinder digital innovation adoption [299]. A
reduced user satisfaction, necessitating rigorous conceptual framework integrating digital com-
testing and validation methodologies to identify pliance tools is essential for streamlining reg-
and mitigate compatibility problems [18]. While ulatory processes and ensuring transparency.
proprietary systems may enhance functional- While SIP holds promise for advanced 5G and
ity, their lack of alignment with standard SIP IoT applications, its security and compliance
protocols underscores the need for standardised mechanisms require substantial enhancements
solutions to ensure efficient and reliable VoIP to mitigate risks and ensure reliability in these
communication. evolving technological ecosystems.
• Standardisation Delays for New Features • Regulatory and Legal Challenges in
and Extensions: Standardisation delays in Multi-Network Deployments: The deploy-
the SIP arise due to integration complexity, ment of SIP in multi-network environments
stakeholder consensus, and the rapid evolution presents substantial regulatory and legal chal-
of technology, hindering the timely adoption lenges due to jurisdictional differences, security
of new features. SIP’s broad multimedia sup- concerns, and compliance complexities. Regu-
port complicates incorporating extensions like latory jurisdiction issues arise from navigating
conflicting state and federal VoIP regulations,

25
 often requiring providers to comply with mul- distributing requests across server nodes to re-
tiple legal frameworks, increasing operational duce jitter and system overload [304]. Failover
costs [300]. Security and legal compliance con- mechanisms further ensure service continuity by
cerns stem from vulnerabilities such as DoS maintaining state statistics and rerouting re-
and MITM attacks, necessitating stringent se- quests during server failures [305]. While these
curity protocols to prevent breaches that could strategies enhance SIP performance, challenges
lead to legal repercussions [301]. Additionally, persist in handling unpredictable traffic pat-
coordination among regulatory objectives is dif- terns and ensuring resilience against failures,
ficult as service providers must balance diverse necessitating further research to refine these ap-
regulatory requirements while ensuring interop- proaches for evolving real-time communication
erability across networks, further complicating demands.
infrastructure management [63]. Moreover, the • Distributed Architecture: A distributed ar-
rapid evolution of technology often outpaces chitecture is essential for ensuring fault tol-
regulatory frameworks, creating a gap where erance and high availability in SIP systems,
outdated policies fail to address emerging SIP employing strategies like replication, clustering,
deployment challenges, fostering both innova- and failover mechanisms to enhance resilience
tion opportunities and risks of non-compliance. and service continuity. Replication techniques
such as active and passive replication optimise
A summarised form of features and issues asso- call management while minimising overhead
ciated with Interoperability and Compliance with [306], and monitoring-based management im-
Standards is given in Table 8. Potential counter- proves dependability by leveraging real-time
measures, their limitations and open issues/gaps network data [306]. Clustering solutions, in-
are also highlighted. cluding an abstract cluster architecture, de-
fine essential components of the SIP server for
4.4 Scalability and Reliability scalability and robustness, with comparative
analyses of vendor implementations that offer
Scalability and reliability are critical aspects of
insight into failure management and efficiency
the SIP in supporting robust and efficient Internet
[307]. Failover mechanisms improve reliability,
telephony services. SIP’s ability to handle large
where database access strategies like Write-
volumes of calls and maintain service continuity
Through and Write-Back enhance SIP/IMS call
in the face of failures is essential for its adoption
setup success rates [154], and automatic failover
by large carriers. The following are the key fea-
techniques mitigate most component failures.
tures, challenges and mitigation aspects regarding
However, some inherent issues remain [308]. De-
scalability and reliability in SIP:
spite these advancements, challenges like DNS
caching limitations and static configurations
4.4.1 Features
persist, highlighting the need for continued re-
• Efficient Load Balancing and Resource search and innovation in SIP architectures.
Allocation: Efficient load balancing and re- • Session Redundancy, Failover Support,
source allocation in SIP systems are essential and Disaster Recovery: Session redundancy,
for optimising performance in real-time commu- failover support, and disaster recovery are es-
nication applications. Various strategies have sential for maintaining communication continu-
been proposed, including dynamic resource al- ity in SIP-based multimedia systems. Session
location using HMM to predict SIP traffic redundancy enhances service availability by re-
fluctuations and adjust resources accordingly, ducing SIP attempts on session border con-
enhancing QoS in VoIP systems [302]. The SIP- trollers [309] and enables rapid recovery through
CMU mechanism improves bandwidth and CPU active session data storage, allowing seamless
efficiency by distributing SIP calls based on failover to a backup SIP server upon primary
real-time memory utilisation monitored via a server failure [310]. Failover support is facili-
NoSQL cache system [303]. Additionally, an tated by SIP survivability agents that moni-
improved dynamic load-balancing algorithm as- tor transactions and take over during remote
signs weights to SIP transactions, efficiently

26
 service disruptions, ensuring local connectiv- CPU resources [319]. To prevent server over-
ity [311], while load-balancing configurations load, adaptive window-based control algorithms
help distribute traffic and maintain availability regulate message generation without adding
under high-demand conditions [312]. Disaster computational complexity, and proactive over-
recovery mechanisms, such as session disaster load control mechanisms ensure stable service
recovery methods, enable automatic switching delivery during peak traffic periods [244]. Secu-
of storage mediums to prevent data loss [313], rity measures such as advanced defence mech-
and intervention role databases enhance sys- anisms against SIP-based DRDoS attacks help
tem resilience by applying predefined recovery reduce CPU strain and maintain system in-
rules [313]. Despite these mechanisms, achieving tegrity [320]. While these strategies enhance SIP
seamless transitions without service disruption performance, they introduce management com-
remains a challenge, particularly in large-scale plexities and require continuous adaptation to
SIP deployments. evolving network conditions, highlighting the
• Adaptive Traffic Management for Large- challenge of balancing optimisation with oper-
Scale Deployments: Adaptive traffic man- ational simplicity in high-traffic SIP environ-
agement in large-scale SIP deployments lever- ments.
ages advanced control methodologies to opti- • Scalability enhancements: Scalability en-
mise traffic flow and minimise congestion by hancements for cloud and virtualised SIP so-
dynamically responding to real-time network lutions are essential to managing growing
conditions. Key approaches include adaptive telecommunications demands. Various optimi-
traffic control systems, such as the SCOOT sation strategies, including virtualisation and
system, which adjusts signal parameters based dynamic scaling, have been proposed to improve
on sensor data but faces challenges during un- performance and resource allocation. The VLB-
expected disruptions [314], and decentralized CAC employs a linear programming model to
game-theoretic controllers, which optimize in- optimise call admission rates and resource man-
tersection signal timings using a Nash bargain- agement, mitigating overload issues in high-
ing framework, significantly improving travel traffic scenarios [234]. Similarly, the SipCloud
times and queue lengths in large-scale tests architecture enables dynamic scalability of SIP
[315]. Additionally, fog computing-based traf- proxies, allowing real-time resource adjustments
fic management enhances congestion control to maintain performance while minimising op-
through area-based management, where urban erational costs [307]. To enhance SIP trunking
regions are segmented for real-time coordinated services, cloud-based SBCs implement traffic
signal adjustments [316]. DTA models further optimisation and automated resource scaling,
optimise signal settings by forecasting demand, improving service quality and security amid in-
though practical implementation remains lim- creasing data volumes [318]. Additionally, the
ited [317]. Despite these advancements, chal- TaaS framework facilitates telecom service vir-
lenges persist in ensuring system reliability tualisation, ensuring long-lived session manage-
during unpredictable traffic fluctuations and in- ment with minimal disruption to existing ser-
tegrating adaptive mechanisms with existing vices [321]. Despite these advancements, main-
network infrastructure. taining consistent performance across diverse
• Optimised SIP Signalling for High-Traffic network conditions remains a challenge, necessi-
Environments: Optimising SIP signalling in tating further research to refine these solutions
high-traffic environments is essential for main- for real-world deployment.
taining service quality and efficiency. Key
strategies include resource allocation, overload 4.4.2 Challenges
control, and security enhancements, each ad-
• Bottlenecks in High-Traffic Scenarios and
dressing different aspects of SIP performance.
Load Balancing Complexities: High-traffic
Cloud-based SBCs dynamically scale resources
scenarios in SIP environments often result in
to optimise SIP trunking services [318], while
bottlenecks due to inefficient load balancing and
the SIP-CMU mechanism improves call distri-
resource allocation, impacting service reliability
bution by efficiently managing bandwidth and

27
 [303]. Poor resource management, particularly when SIP servers are overloaded, as they strug-
in CPU and bandwidth utilisation, can degrade gle to manage excessive signalling traffic, caus-
performance during peak loads; mechanisms like ing delays in call initiation, increased retrans-
SIP-CMU optimise resource distribution by al- missions, and a reduction in overall network
locating calls based on memory usage [319]. throughput [328]. These factors together signif-
Additionally, handling thousands of concur- icantly compromise QoS, particularly for time-
rent SIP calls can overwhelm single servers, sensitive applications.
necessitating load-balancing solutions that dis- • Single Points of Failure in Certain SIP
tribute traffic across multiple servers [322]. In Deployments: SPoF in System-In-Package de-
high-traffic scenarios, SIP environments face ployments can severely impact system relia-
significant bottlenecks, primarily due to inef- bility, arising from both hardware and soft-
ficient load balancing and resource allocation ware vulnerabilities. Hardware failures include
strategies. As call volume surges, poor resource SIP circuit defects, such as missing silver
management—especially in terms of CPU and paste adhesive, which can cause localised burn-
bandwidth utilisation—can lead to performance ing and power dissipation issues under high-
degradation, with delayed call setups, dropped temperature conditions [329]. Additionally, in-
calls, and increased latency [303]. Additionally, complete welding during manufacturing further
the inability of single servers to handle large increases failure risks, highlighting the impor-
volumes of concurrent SIP calls further exacer- tance of stringent quality control [329]. Software
bates the problem, reducing system reliability. and network failures also contribute to SPoF,
To maintain service continuity, load-balancing particularly in SIP proxy server clustering,
solutions that distribute traffic across multi- where a single dispatcher introduces a critical
ple servers are essential [323]. However, these failure point; this can be mitigated through a
solutions must be carefully designed to han- dual dispatcher setup and VRRP [330]. Fur-
dle dynamic load variations and ensure optimal thermore, deploying SIP/RTP services in Ku-
resource usage during peak traffic conditions. bernetes presents challenges due to its inherent
• Latency, Jitter, and Performance Degra- support for stateless services. This can lead to
dation in Congested Networks: Latency, disruptions if state and affinity are not prop-
jitter, and performance degradation are critical erly maintained [331]. Addressing these SPoF
challenges in SIP-based VoIP networks, particu- risks through robust design, redundancy mecha-
larly under high traffic and resource constraints. nisms, and enhanced orchestration strategies is
Latency, a key factor affecting voice quality, essential for ensuring reliable SIP deployments.
causes communication delays that disrupt user • Synchronisation Challenges in Dis-
experience and worsen network congestion due tributed SIP Components: Synchronisation
to retransmissions [324, 218]. Jitter, the varia- challenges in distributed SIP systems stem
tion in packet arrival times, leads to inconsistent from the difficulty of maintaining data consis-
voice quality, while performance degradation tency and efficient resource management across
occurs when overloaded SIP servers increase re- multiple network nodes. Data synchronisation
transmissions and reduce throughput [325, 123, is particularly affected by dynamic topology
326]. In congested networks, these issues are am- changes, requiring adaptive methods to ensure
plified as high traffic volumes place additional accurate user route data distribution [332].
strain on network resources. Latency, caused Broadcast mechanisms help update neighbour-
by network congestion or routing inefficiencies, ing nodes by disseminating state changes at
further disrupts real-time communication, lead- regular intervals. Thread synchronisation in
ing to delays in message delivery and overall SIP servlets introduces additional complexity,
call setup [327]. Jitter, a natural consequence of as multi-threading issues necessitate resource
variable network conditions, causes packet ar- locking, which, if mismanaged, can lead to
rival times to fluctuate, resulting in distorted or performance degradation or deadlocks [333].
garbled voice communication. Moreover, perfor- Moreover, the tight integration of synchronisa-
mance degradation becomes more pronounced tion and business logic complicates application

28
 maintenance, underscoring the need for struc- processing power and memory. The increase in
tured synchronisation frameworks [334]. In message traffic further exacerbates this issue, as
multimedia, synchronisation and temporal inte- proxies become overwhelmed with handling si-
gration are critical for maintaining consistency multaneous requests, causing delays and packet
across different media types, particularly when loss [341]. This not only impacts service qual-
random communication delays arise [335]. ity, including voice clarity and call stability, but
• Security Risks in Highly Scalable SIP Ar- also significantly increases operational costs due
chitectures: Highly scalable SIP architectures to the need for additional resources and infras-
are increasingly susceptible to sophisticated cy- tructure to maintain system performance and
ber threats, necessitating robust security mea- reliability [135].
sures. Authentication weaknesses in SIP, such as
Caller ID spoofing and unauthorised access, ex- A summarised form of features and issues asso-
pose systems to exploitation [204, 34]. Addition- ciated with Scalability and Reliability is given in
ally, eavesdropping and call interception pose Table 9. Potential countermeasures, their limita-
significant privacy risks due to protocol vulner- tions, and open issues/gaps are also highlighted.
abilities [34, 336]. SIP is also prone to DoS at-
tacks, which can disrupt service by overwhelm- 5 SIP Deployment in
ing networks with traffic [301], while MitM
attacks compromise data integrity by intercept- Healthcare: A Case Study
ing and altering communications [337]. In highly The healthcare industry is rapidly evolving, driven
scalable SIP architectures, the expanding attack by technological advancements that aim to im-
surface as systems grow makes them vulnerable prove patient care, operational efficiency, and
to a wider range of cyber threats. As the number global accessibility. With the increasing demand
of endpoints and distributed servers increases, for telemedicine, remote patient monitoring, and
ensuring consistent and secure authentication real-time emergency services, healthcare systems
across all nodes becomes challenging, leaving are integrating IoT devices and advanced com-
systems open to unauthorised access and ex- munication protocols to offer seamless, secure,
ploitation [338]. Moreover, SIP’s reliance on and high-quality services. To meet these de-
plaintext protocols for signalling further exposes mands, healthcare organisations are adopting ro-
it to interception and tampering. In large de- bust communication infrastructures that ensure
ployments, defending against DDoS attacks and low-latency interactions, data security, compliance
MitM threats becomes more complex, as attack- with regulatory standards, and scalability. Among
ers can target multiple points in the system, these, the SIP has emerged as a critical enabler,
leading to both service disruptions and data facilitating interoperable and reliable multimedia
breaches. communication across geographically distributed
• Increased Overhead and Resource Man-
healthcare units.
agement Constraints: Increased overhead
and resource management constraints in SIP
systems stem from traditional configurations
that struggle to efficiently support growing
VoIP demands [339]. Ineffective routing in SIP
proxies often leads to suboptimal call paths,
increasing latency and resource consumption,
while high message volumes can overload prox-
ies, degrading service quality and raising oper-
ational costs [340]. As SIP systems scale to ac-
commodate growing VoIP traffic, the overhead
from traditional architectures becomes more
pronounced. Inefficient routing mechanisms in
SIP proxies lead to longer call setup times and
result in higher resource usage, particularly in

29
30

Figure 8: SIP implementation in Healthcare Communication: Case Study

 The multinational health organisation in our making it a central technology in supporting re-
case study has implemented an IoT-integrated mote work, education, and healthcare. That same
SIP-based communication architecture to enhance year, research into blockchain integration within
its telemedicine services, emergency response sys- SIP systems began, exploring its potential for
tems, and interoperability with global healthcare decentralised authentication and encryption to en-
partners, as shown in Figure 8. The architecture hance security, transparency, and decentralisation
leverages several SIP-enabled network elements in SIP communications. Additionally, the con-
to ensure QoS, security, compliance, and scalabil- cept of Next-Generation SIP and network slicing
ity. Each component addresses specific challenges emerged, focusing on optimising SIP for low-
in healthcare communication, ensuring patient latency, mission-critical communication within 5G
safety, regulatory adherence, and seamless service network slices. This ensured SIP could support
delivery. The integration of SIP in healthcare com- high-priority applications such as healthcare and
munication systems presents several challenges. emergency services.
The following Table 10 provides a comprehensive In 2019, AI and ML were integrated into SIP, en-
mapping of these challenges to specific network el- abling advanced capabilities like automated tran-
ements and their corresponding countermeasures: scription, sentiment analysis, and dynamic call
routing. This innovation improved automation,
enhanced user experiences, and made communi-
cation systems more intelligent. The most recent
6 Emerging Trends and development in SIP technology occurred in 2023,
Potential Future Directions when SIP was integrated into 5G core networks
to support real-time communication. This op-
In the past decade, SIP has seen a major paradigm timisation ensured low-latency, high-bandwidth
shift in research, with major milestones shaping SIP communication, facilitating next-generation
the future of SIP research, as seen in Figure 9. applications in AR, VR, IoT, and autonomous
SIP security saw a major advancement in 2013 vehicles.
with the introduction of SIP-TLS and SRTP, On further analysis of the recent state of re-
enhancing security in SIP communications and search in SIP, the evolution of technology from
making it a viable option for sensitive indus- 2015 till recent highlights several emerging trends
tries such as finance and healthcare. The following that continue to shape the future of digital com-
year, RFC 7118 defined SIP over WebSockets, im- munication, security, and computing. Early dis-
proving compatibility with web-based applications cussions in 2015 focused on foundational elements
and enabling SIP signalling through WebSockets, such as protocols, DoS attacks, architecture, and
which optimised real-time communication in web servers, indicating a strong emphasis on network
environments. In 2015, SIP was integrated with stability and cybersecurity. As technology ad-
WebRTC, allowing browser-based communication vanced, 2016 saw a shift toward internet protocols,
without the need for plugins. This simplified de- authentication, internet telephony, and cryptogra-
ployment and increased accessibility for SIP-based phy, emphasising the need for secure and scalable
communication in modern browsers. In the same communication frameworks.
year, SIP adoption expanded into IoT communi- By 2017, the focus expanded to broader concerns
cation, particularly in smart homes and industrial like security, quality of service, and cloud comput-
settings, enabling real-time communication in IoT ing, marking the rise of more efficient and flexible
systems and fostering smarter and interconnected digital infrastructures. The increasing adoption
devices. of SIP, the IoT, and network security in 2018
By 2016, the widespread adoption of UCaaS led signalled the growing demand for interconnected
to the integration of SIP into cloud environments. systems and reliable communication technologies.
This transition allowed businesses to implement VoIP became a crucial trend in 2019, reinforcing
more flexible, cost-efficient, and scalable SIP so- the shift toward internet-based telephony solu-
lutions, reducing their dependence on on-premises tions.
infrastructure. The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020
accelerated the use of SIP for video conferencing,

31
 Figure 9: Paradigm Shift in SIP Research and its Impact

The most recent developments since 2015 high- RQ 1: How has SIP research evolved,
light the rapid integration of advanced technolo- and what are the major research areas and
gies such as ML, deep learning, blockchain, and 5G prominent research themes in SIP?
mobile communication systems. These innovations Answer: The major themes in SIP research
are expected to drive future research into AI- include Networking & Communication, where
powered automation, decentralised security mod- SIP serves as a foundation for real-time communi-
els, and ultra-fast connectivity as highlighted in cation over IP-based networks, supporting VoIP,
Figure 10. As these trends continue to evolve, mobile communication, and wireless networking.
future research will likely focus on enhancing Studies focus on SIP’s role in internet telephony,
AI-driven communication, improving blockchain signalling protocols, and transport mechanisms.
security in telecommunication, and optimising 5G Security & Privacy in SIP is another cru-
networks for next-generation applications in ar- cial area, addressing vulnerabilities such as DoS
eas such as smart cities, autonomous systems, and attacks, identity spoofing, and unauthorised ac-
immersive digital experiences. cess. Research in this domain explores authenti-
cation mechanisms, cryptographic solutions, and
7 Discussion privacy-preserving techniques to enhance SIP se-
curity in VoIP and multimedia applications. QoS
The comprehensive survey on the SIP has high- & Performance Optimisation research aims to
lighted its pivotal role in modern communication improve network reliability by minimising latency,
networks. The paper highlights the components, jitter, and packet loss while optimising bandwidth
fundamental working and architecture of SIP. The and handover mechanisms. In SIP in Multi-
paper covers key features, associated challenges media & Streaming, studies focus on SIP’s
and corresponding mitigation mechanisms. While role in video conferencing, adaptive streaming,
highlighting these aspects paper progressively ad- and integration with IMS frameworks, ensuring
dresses the research questions. Hence, answers to interoperability with next-generation multimedia
the research questions from this study can be
summarised as follows:

32
 Figure 10: Recent Trending Topics

services. The computing infrastructure support- and what are the major challenges and
ing SIP-based networks is a key research focus emerging solutions?
under SIP in Computing & Architecture, Answer: The key QoS features in SIP play
which investigates cloud-based SIP deployments, a pivotal role in enhancing communication per-
distributed architectures, and peer-to-peer net- formance across various network environments.
working to enhance scalability and resilience. Fi- Features such as bandwidth management,
nally, SIP in Emerging Technologies explores latency control, packet loss recovery,
the integration of AI, blockchain, and SDN with traffic prioritisation, and adaptive QoS
SIP, enabling predictive traffic management, de- mechanisms contribute to maintaining reliable,
centralised authentication, and intelligent QoS real-time voice and multimedia communication.
adjustments. However, each of these features faces specific
Prominent researchers in SIP include challenges. For instance, bandwidth allocation
Henning Schulzrinne, Georgios Kam- strategies using models like HMM and advanced
bourakis, Vijay K. Gurbani, and Dimitris queuing methods are effective but may encounter
Geneiatakis . Leading publication sources in issues like high computational complexity, scal-
this domain include Computer Communica- ability limitations, and dynamic traffic handling
tions, Computer Networks, and the Bell difficulties. Latency control techniques, such
Labs Technical Journal , among others. The as adaptive jitter buffering and synchronisation
evolution of SIP research continues to focus on contracts, minimise delays and ensure smoother
enhancing security, performance, and integration communication but may struggle with integration
with emerging technologies, shaping the future of complexity and synchronisation overhead, espe-
real-time communication. cially in large-scale or dynamic networks. Packet
loss recovery mechanisms, including retrans-
RQ 2: How do the key QoS features mission strategies and adaptive timers, improve
in SIP impact communication performance, data reliability but may introduce additional pro-
cessing overhead, CPU usage, and dependency on

33
accurate network conditions. Furthermore, traf- must address challenges such as call latency, stor-
fic prioritisation solutions, such as SDN-based age overhead, and interoperability with legacy
frameworks and cluster replication architectures, systems. In summary, enhancing SIP-based com-
address scalability and congestion issues but munication security requires a layered, adaptive
face challenges related to hardware constraints, security framework incorporating encryption,
complexity, and vulnerability to advanced at- authentication, anomaly detection, and privacy-
tacks. Emerging solutions like ML-based QoS preserving techniques. While existing solutions
assessments and software-defined VoIP address critical vulnerabilities, ongoing research
frameworks offer promising adaptability and is essential to optimise performance, scalability,
dynamic control, but also bring challenges like and adaptability to evolving threats.
dependency on accurate data, implementation
complexity, and computational overhead. RQ 4: How can SIP be enhanced to im-
prove interoperability across heterogeneous
RQ 3: How can security and privacy in networks, ensure extensibility for emerging
SIP-based communication be enhanced to communication technologies, and address
mitigate emerging threats, address vulner- the challenges posed by existing regulatory
abilities, and ensure robust authentication, and technical standards of implementation,
encryption, and intrusion detection mecha- security, and global compliance for seamless
nisms? integration?
Answer: SIP-based communication security Answer: To enhance SIP’s interoperability
is fortified through the integration of E2EE across heterogeneous networks while ensur-
techniques like hybrid cryptographic schemes, ing extensibility for emerging communication
SRTP media encryption, and multilayered onion- technologies, a multi-faceted approach is essen-
routing methods, effectively countering threats tial. Implementing support for multiple
like eavesdropping, call interception, and MITM transport protocols mitigates variability in
attacks. However, these solutions introduce chal- SIP implementations but requires optimisation
lenges such as increased latency, compatibility methods such as ML-based quality assessments
issues, and computational overhead, requiring to counter performance degradation and secu-
balanced deployment strategies. For authenti- rity vulnerabilities. Backwards compatibility
cation and authorisation, blockchain-based with legacy SIP systems can be strengthened
mechanisms and MAC address validation through improved SIP authentication protocols
techniques strengthen identity verification, and secure key agreement techniques, although
ensuring that only authorised entities access challenges related to computational overhead and
healthcare communication channels. Despite scalability persist. Integrating SIP with var-
these measures, challenges related to scalabil- ious communication technologies demands
ity, latency, and regulatory compliance persist, robust architectures like SIP-based B2BUA and
necessitating ongoing optimisation. Intrusion mobile network gateways, which facilitate seam-
detection and DoS prevention are achieved less interaction but introduce added complexity
through advanced ML-based anomaly detection, and maintenance overhead. Extensibility concerns
hybrid deep learning models, and Dendritic Cell tied to SIP headers and methods can be ad-
Algorithms, enhancing resilience against SIP dressed using virtualisation and IPv6 transition
flooding, SPIT, and DDoS attacks. Nonetheless, strategies, though they may incur performance
the accuracy of these methods depends on data trade-offs. To ensure standardised interoperabil-
preprocessing and may lead to false positives or ity, blockchain-based authentication and
require extensive computational resources. Addi- distributed SIP systems enhance security and
tionally, role-based access control combined verification, while refinement of open standards
with blockchain-based Caller-ID authenti- fosters broader compliance. Despite these ad-
cation helps mitigate privacy risks associated vancements, challenges related to performance,
with caller identification and location tracking. regulatory compliance, and legacy system inte-
Despite offering robust protection, these measures gration continue to pose hurdles. Therefore, a

34
combination of optimised SIP proxies, se- RQ 6: How can the SIP protocol and
cure models, and continuous refinement of its associated network elements be effec-
protocols is vital to achieving seamless, secure, tively deployed to ensure scalable, secure,
and extensible SIP implementation in global and interoperable multimedia communica-
healthcare and telecommunication environments. tion in telemedicine while addressing the
challenges of QoS, security, compliance, and
RQ 5: How can SIP be adapted to reliability in healthcare settings?
support large-scale deployments while ef- Answer: To ensure scalable, secure, and
fectively addressing challenges such as net- interoperable multimedia communication in
work congestion, fault tolerance, and high telemedicine, the SIP protocol and its associ-
availability in modern communication envi- ated network elements are strategically deployed
ronments? to address challenges related to QoS, security,
Answer: To efficiently support large-scale compliance, and reliability. SIP elements such as
SIP deployments while addressing challenges SDN Controllers, SIP Traffic Routers, and
such as network congestion, fault tolerance, and Load Balancers dynamically manage traffic,
high availability, a combination of distributed, prioritise telemedicine and emergency services,
adaptive, and intelligent techniques is essential. and allocate bandwidth to ensure low-latency,
Load balancing and resource-allocation issues high-quality communication. Security is rein-
in high-traffic scenarios can be mitigated using forced through SBCs, firewalls, and encryption
distributed adaptive window-based over- mechanisms (TLS/SRTP) enforced by Media
load control algorithms and window-based Gateways, which protect sensitive patient data
holonic multi-agent systems; however, these and prevent unauthorised access. For interoper-
solutions require precise parameter tuning and ability and regulatory compliance, elements like
may face scalability limits. For fault tolerance, E911 Gateways, Inter-Carrier SIP Gate-
distributed architectures like High Availability ways, and WebRTC Gateways enable seamless
Daemons and domain name resolution- communication across diverse carriers, interna-
based load balancers ensure redundancy tional networks, and browser-based platforms.
but may introduce additional setup complexity Scalability and reliability are achieved via cloud-
and single-point vulnerabilities. Synchronisa- based global load balancers, distributed
tion frameworks, such as SNeF4SS, enhance SIP proxies, and failover mechanisms that
session redundancy and failover support, al- ensure continuous service expansion and high
though they rely on accurate synchronisation and availability. Together, these SIP-enabled solutions
may face adaptability challenges. Adaptive traffic provide an integrated, efficient framework sup-
management strategies like enhanced de-jitter porting the evolving demands of telemedicine and
buffers and mathematical modelling improve healthcare communication.
latency and congestion handling, but may suffer
under extreme load conditions. Security risks in RQ 7: What open issues indicate poten-
scalable SIP systems are addressed using SIP- tial future research directions to improve
aware firewalls and VoIP defenders, though its security, performance, and adaptabil-
they are resource-intensive. Finally, SDN-based ity in next-generation communication net-
centralised frameworks and DEOC methods works?
optimise SIP scalability and resource manage- Answer: Despite significant progress in SIP
ment in cloud environments, although integration technology, several open challenges highlight crit-
complexity and dynamic feedback dependencies ical areas for future research to enhance security,
persist. Emerging solutions leveraging AI/ML, performance, and adaptability in next-generation
blockchain, and self-healing mechanisms are communication networks. One key issue is scal-
critical to overcoming these limitations and en- ability and dynamic network management,
hancing SIP scalability and reliability in modern
communication networks.

35
particularly in large-scale, high-traffic SIP net- in enabling real-time multimedia communication
works. Future research could focus on leverag- across heterogeneous networks has been high-
ing AI/ML for predictive resource man- lighted, emphasising its flexibility, scalability, and
agement, edge computing for latency re- interoperability. Through a detailed literature re-
duction, and blockchain-based autoscaling view and quantitative bibliometric analysis, the
to enhance efficiency and reliability. Security study has systematically addressed critical issues
vulnerabilities remain significant concerns, in- related to QoS, security and privacy, scalabil-
cluding susceptibility to MAC spoofing, MITM ity, interoperability, and compliance with global
attacks, outdated authentication methods, and standards.
high computational costs for security enforce- The survey has underscored key challenges
ment. Research could explore blockchain-based such as network congestion, authentication vul-
authentication, lightweight cryptographic nerabilities, interoperability constraints, and scal-
techniques, and AI-driven attack detection ability limitations in large-scale deployments. For
to improve resilience while maintaining perfor- each identified challenge, SIP-enabled solutions
mance. and optimisation strategies, including adaptive
Performance bottlenecks arising from encryp- QoS mechanisms, advanced encryption protocols,
tion overhead, interoperability challenges session management techniques, and traffic engi-
between proprietary and open SIP stan- neering methods, have been explored. Addition-
dards, and heavy reliance on SIP infrastruc- ally, emerging technologies such as blockchain,
ture in mobile networks necessitate solutions AI, and SDN have been identified as promis-
like standardised SIP extensions, AI-driven ing enablers for enhancing SIP’s capabilities in
synchronisation for improved efficiency, and next-generation communication environments.
seamless IPv4 to IPv6 transitions. Latency This study has also provided practical in-
and performance trade-offs, driven by com- sights through a healthcare-focused case study,
putational overhead, delays in real-time threat demonstrating how SIP elements can be deployed
detection, and congestion inefficiencies, require to address specific requirements of telemedicine
solutions such as automated failover mech- systems. Furthermore, open research challenges
anisms, AI-based traffic optimisation, and have been outlined, suggesting future research di-
energy-efficient edge computing to enhance rections aimed at strengthening SIP’s security,
real-time communication quality. adaptability, and performance.
The lack of uniform SIP standards across Overall, this survey contributes to the SIP
vendors and regulatory barriers compli- research community by offering a structured refer-
cate widespread adoption. Research should focus ence for researchers, developers, and practitioners,
on industry-wide protocol standardisation, facilitating informed decision-making and guiding
blockchain for QoS validation, and enhanced future advancements in SIP-based communication
regulatory frameworks to ensure compliance systems.
across multi-network environments. Lastly, re-
source constraints and energy efficiency con- 9 Acknowledgement
cerns, particularly in cloud-based deployments,
demand advances in lightweight cryptographic The authors would like to express sincere grat-
protocols, AI-driven anomaly detection, and itude to the Defence Research and De-
self-healing, decentralised mechanisms to velopment Organisation-Software Analy-
enhance energy efficiency and sustainability in sis Group (DRDO-SAG) for the sponsor-
SIP-based systems. ship and support throughout the research. This
research is supported under Project NAVKI-
8 Conclusion RAN (SAF/4600/TCID/CARS/C-70). The au-
thors also acknowledge the anonymous reviewers
This comprehensive survey has provided an in- in advance for their constructive feedback and
depth analysis of the SIP, focusing on its core suggestions.
features, associated challenges, existing solutions,
and emerging research trends. SIP’s pivotal role

36
 Table 6: QoS in SIP: Features, Issues, Countermeasures, Limitations, and Open Challenges
Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

A dynamic resource allocation strategy • Data Dependency • Traffic modelling dependency

Bandwidth Network
for VoIP systems using the HMM [342] • Limited Generalisation • Implementation & routing complexity
Allocation congestion and
and bandwidth • Scalability & dynamic network chal-
Management limitations lenges
Multi-faceted SIP signalling optimization • Increased computational overhead • Computational & caching overhead
approach [343] • Potential latency in message caching mechanisms • Latency & performance trade-offs
• Complexity in implementing intelligent routing algo-
rithms

Advanced Smart Priority Queuing Strat- • Increased complexity in implementation

egy (Priority Queuing Strategy for Self- • Limited scalability for extreme burst scenarios
Overload Control in SIP Servers) [344]

Adaptive jitter buffering [345, 346, 347] • Dataset Specificity • Dataset specificity & testing limita-
Latency Synchronization
• Fixed Reduction Factor Comparison
Control and issues tions
• Dynamic Network Conditions • High computational & synchronization
Minimization
overhead
• Latency in complex topologies
Synchronisation Contracts (On Mecha- • Complexity in implementation • Trade-offs in real-time performance
nisms for Deadlock Avoidance in SIP • Limited scalability for large systems • Legacy system compatibility issues
37

Servlet Containers [348]

Multi-faceted SIP signalling optimization

• Potential latency in complex topologies
approach [343]
• Challenges in integration with legacy systems

Link-local retransmission [349]

• Focus on Packet Corruption •
Packet Loss Packet loss and Packet corruption & routing limits
• Routing Limitations •
Reduction unreliable data High retransmission & CPU usage
and Recovery transmission • Dependency on network conditions
Mechanisms Adaptive Timer T1 for SIP invite mes- • Limited protocol & scenario coverage
• Dependency on accurate network delay estimation • Lack of real-world validation
sage retransmission [234]
• Limited effectiveness in high-loss environments
• Potential for increased CPU and bandwidth usage

Performance evaluation of SIP and H.323

• Focuses only on SIP and H.323 protocols
protocols using QualNet simulator [350]
• Results may vary with different codecs or simulators
• Limited scalability analysis

Cluster-based replication architecture • Limited Scope of Implementation •

Traffic Scalability Limited implementation scope
utilising multiple redundant servers for • Hardware and Resource Constraints •
Prioritization constraints in Hardware & resource constraints
and Differen- large-scale failover and resource distribution [351] • Potential single points of failure
tiation deployments • Lack of real-world testing
Multi-faceted SIP signaling optimization • Scalability issues in large systems
• Potential scalability challenges in large systems
[343]
 Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

SDN-based framework integrating lin-

• Implementation Complexity
ear programming models and autoscaling
• Dynamic Traffic Handling
techniques [352]

Adaptive QoS Security Extracting features from SIP messages • Dynamic Network Changes updates • Complexity of network threats
Mechanisms Concerns in and using an SVM classifier to assess • Practical implementation challenges
• Dependence on SIP Features
for Dynamic QoS network quality • High SDN controller dependency
Networks Implementation [353] • Scalability & real-time inefficiencies
Software-Defined VoIP Framework [354] • Frequent updates required for evolving
• High dependency on SDN controller threats
• Limited scalability for large networks

Incorporating the MAC address into SIP

• Man-in-the-Middle Vulnerability
messages (e.g., INVITE and REGISTER
• Manual Data Entry
requests) [204]

QoS-aware routing (Class-Based • Complexity of Implementation •

Support for QoS Implementation complexity
Weighted Fair Queuing) [355] • Resource Allocation in Mixed-Traffic Environments •
Real-Time Degradation Resource allocation issues
• Dependency on Accurate Traffic Classification •
Communica- Due to Network Scalability & performance trade-offs
tion Failures and • Cryptographic vulnerabilities
Overhead • High computational cost
Centralised overload control framework • Single Point of Failure • Limited generalizability
using SDN [356] • Limited scalability due to the centralised nature of the • Data privacy concerns
SDN
38

• Implementation Complexity

Machine Learning-Based Call Failure • Dependency on accurate SIP traces.

Prediction Model [357] • Limited generalizability to other network types.
• Potential data privacy concerns

Joint optimization of Smart Policy Rout- • Dependency on Accurate Measurements • Limited Adaptability to Unforeseen
Compliance Lack of uniform
ing and QoS policies [358] • Potential Latency in Updates
with Network QoS policies Network Conditions
Performance across networks • Generalisation Across Diverse Net-
Standards Dynamic resource allocation using HMM work Environments
• Relies heavily on accurate data collection and prepro- • High Computational Resource Re-
[342]
cessing quirements
• Limited adaptability to unforeseen network conditions • Real-Time Detection Delays
• May not generalise well across diverse network environ- • Latency in Updates
ments

Deep Learning-Based Detection and Mit-

• High computational resource requirements
igation Model [359]
• Dependency on dataset quality and relevance
• Potential delays in real-time detection
 Table 7: Security and Privacy in SIP: Features, Issues, Countermeasures, Limitations, and Open Challenges
Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

Hybrid security approach [360] • Compatibility

End-to-End Vulnerability to • Limited Scope • Interoperability Limitations Across
Encryption MITM Attacks • Adaptability to Evolving Threats Diverse Systems
and Message • Restricted Capability in Handling
Integrity Emerging Threat Variants
Protection HMM-based dynamic behaviour analysis • Potential false positives in detection. • Inaccuracy in Threat Identification
and anomaly detection [361] • Limited adaptability to novel attack patterns. Due to False Alarms
• Increased latency due to encryption processes. • Heavy Computational Load During
• Dependency on accurate data preprocessing. Model Training
• Increased Delay Introduced by Secu-
rity Processing Steps
Malicious Variational Decoder [361] • Requires calibration for black-box encoders.
• Limited by perturbation budget constraints.
• Dependency on shadow models for black-box attacks.
• Potential for posterior collapse in VAEs.
• High computational overhead for training.

Blockchain-Based Authentication [217] • Integration with Existing Infrastructure.

Authentication Weaknesses in • • Challenges in Seamless Integration
[362] Latency Concerns
and Authentication • Complex Call Scenarios with Legacy Systems
Authorization and Key • • Delays Impacting Time-Sensitive
Regulatory and Compliance Issues
Mechanisms Management • Potential for False Positives Communications
• Complexity in Managing Diverse Call
Flows
39

End-to-end encryption using symmetric

• Multicore dependency for efficiency. • Compliance and Regulatory Align-
key cryptography [363] ment Issues
• Security vulnerability without HTTPS.
• Requires user-managed keys. • Risk of Incorrect Threat Detection

SPIT, Robocalls Zero-trust approach • Interoperability Challenges

SIPS with Suscepti-bility • • Interoperability Across Diverse SIP
[364] Security Risks
TLS/DTLS to SIP Flooding • Adoption and Compliance Implementations
• • Persistent Security Vulnerabilities in
Compatibility with Legacy Systems
SIP Signalling
• Barriers to Widespread Adoption and
Dendritic Cell Algorithm [365] • Costly implementation. Regulatory Compliance
• Potential for false positives/negatives. • High Implementation Costs and
• Requires additional metrics for improved accuracy. Legacy System Constraints
• Detection Accuracy Issues Including
False Positives/Negatives
Multistage SPIT Detector [366] • Increased response time for callers.
• Dependency on accurate social relationship data.
• Potential false positives in SPIT detection.
• Challenges in detecting highly adaptive spammers.

Caller ID Verification [367] • Performance Overhead

• Compatibility Issues
 Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

Multilayered encryption scheme inspired • Increased computation load from encryption layers.
Media Eavesdropping • • Performance and Computational
by onion routing for SIP privacy Potential delays in call setup.
Encryption and Call [178] • Vulnerable to advanced traffic analysis techniques. Overhead
with SRTP Interception • • Compatibility with Heterogeneous
Depends on keys/certificates for encryption.
Risks Systems
• Latency in Call Establishment
XTR Cryptography with Partial Encryp- • Dependency on specific cryptographic parameters. • Encryption Key Management
tion Scheme [368] • Potential vulnerabilities in dynamic environments. • Susceptibility to Advanced Traffic
Analysis
Blockchain-Based Caller-ID Authentica- • Potential latency in real-time communication. • Latency in Real-Time Communication
Role-Based Privacy tion [217] • Depends on compliance and ISP cooperation.
Access Concerns in • Dependence on Regulatory and ISP
• Challenges in advanced call routing.
Control Caller Coordination
Identification • Complex Call Flow Management
• Network Compatibility Limitations
and Location Caller ID Verification [369] • Relies on the caller’s cooperation. • Real-Time Data Processing Challenges
Tracking • May increase call connection delay.
• Limited by network compatibility.
• Potential cost implications for users.

Privacy-Preserving Analytics for Data • Depend on secure multiparty computation protocols.

Markets Using MPC [370] • Potential challenges in real-time data processing.

Machine Learning-Based Anomaly De- • Data Imbalance • Data Imbalance in Training Models
DoS and SIP Flooding-Based tection [231, 371] • Latency and Jitter • Latency and Jitter in Communication
40

Flooding Anomalies • Dimensionality Reduction

Prevention • Limited Interpretability of Detection
• Interpretability Models
• Threshold Dependency in Rule-Based
• Potential false positives in detection. Systems
IDPS using zero watermarking and hy- • Lack of Real-Time Adaptability
brid anomaly detection [372] • Dependency on predefined rules and thresholds.

Hybrid Deep Learning and Entropy- • Fixed thresholds may reduce accuracy.
Based Model [373] • Limited real-time adaptability

Use of MAC address for Caller ID valida- • Vulnerable to MAC address spoofing. • MAC and IP Spoofing Vulnerabilities
Secure Security Risks tion [204] • Manual data entry required for MAC and IP addresses.
Storage and from • Manual Configuration Overhead
• Ineffective against man-in-the-middle attacks. • Limited Protection Scope in LAN En-
Transmission Proprietary or • Limited to organisational LAN environments.
of Credentials Non-Standard vironments
Implementa- • Dependency on Proprietary Protocols
tions Field Fuzz Framework [374] • Inefficient Fuzzing Mechanisms
• Requires extensive reverse engineering.
• Dependency on proprietary protocols.
• Potential inefficiency in fuzzing speed.
 Table 8: Interoperability and Compliance in SIP: Features, Issues, Countermeasures, Limitations, and Open Challenges
Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

SIP Signalling Performance Enhance- • Limited scalability due to node mobility. • Non-uniform SIP standards across
Support for Variability in
ment over MANET [375] • Potential single point of failure in certain configura-
Multiple SIP Implemen- vendors.
Transport tations Across tions. • Different SIP integration complexity
• Security vulnerabilities in peer-to-peer setups. • Degraded performance in dynamic net-
Protocols Vendors
works
• Security issues due to interoperability
Machine Learning-Based Video Quality • Limited scalability for multiple parallel calls. Gaps
Assessment Algorithm [376] • High processing power demand on a single server. • High computational overhead for
• Increased packet loss with more simultaneous calls. maintaining QoS in real-time
• Quality degradation in video calls under heavy load. communication.

SIP Secure Model [78] • It lacks built-in encryption. • Difficulty

Backward Adherence to in maintaining secu-
• Vulnerable to spoofing and hijacking.
Compatibility Security and rity while ensuring legacy system
• It is Susceptible to DoS attacks.
with Legacy Authentication compatibility.
• Limited protection against eavesdropping. • Increased risk of attacks due to out-
SIP Systems Standards
• Challenges in ensuring interoperability. dated authentication mechanisms.
• Scalability challenges in handling
large-scale secure SIP deployments.
Improved SIP Authentication Protocol • Vulnerable to privileged insider attacks. • Performance bottlenecks due to en-
[377] • Susceptible to DoS attacks. cryption overhead.
• Risk of session-specific ephemeral secret leakage. • Complexity in integrating advanced
• Requires strict time synchronisation, impractical in
41

cryptographic protocols with legacy

real-world scenarios. SIP systems.

Integration of SIP and ECMQV protocol • High computational cost for key agreements.
[237] • Vulnerable to network latency issues.
• Dependency on secure certificate management.

Robustness Testing [378] • Limited input space coverage. • Difficulty in ensuring seamless SIP in-
Integration Complexity in
• Ambiguities in observed failure modes.
with Various Implementing tegration across different technologies.
• Dependency on specific instrumentation methods. • Increased maintenance complexity due
Communica- and
• Potential for incomplete vulnerability identification.
tion Maintaining SIP to diverse communication frameworks.
Technologies • Performance degradation under high-
traffic conditions.
SIP-based B2BUA architecture [379, 380, • Complexity in implementation and maintenance. • High dependency on SIP infrastruc-
381] • Dependency on specific software frameworks. ture for mobile network compatibility.
• Security risks in cross-network SIP im-
plementations.
Push Mechanism via SIP-based Mobile • Increased implementation costs due to additional
Network Gateway [382] servers
• High dependency on SIP infrastructure.
• Energy and cost inefficiency during idle periods.
• Potential timeout issues in push procedures.
 Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

Virtualization and Parallelization Tech- • Increased overhead due to virtualisation.

Extensible Performance
niques [383] • Resource contention in parallel configurations.
SIP Headers Overhead Due
• Scalability issues with Java-based SIP stacks.
and Methods to Protocol
• Performance degradation potential in complex setups.
Compliance
Requirements

SIPv6 Transition Techniques [384] • Performance penalties during transition. • Performance trade-offs in SIP protocol
• Dependency on dual-stack or tunnelling mechanisms.
extensions.
• Complexity in optimising SIP for vir-
tualised environments.
Layered Queueing Network Model [385] • Requires expert knowledge for accurate implementa- • Transition challenges from IPv4 to
tion. IPv6 in SIP networks.
• Limited guidance for new technologies. • Scalability limitations in protocol-
• Labour-intensive data measurement process. compliant SIP applications.
• Potential inaccuracies due to estimation reliance. • Difficulty in accurately modelling SIP
performance for new technologies.
Caller-ID Verification using Blockchain- • Dependency on blockchain infrastructure.
Standardized Interoperability
• Limited adoption due to complexity. • Compatibility challenges between pro-
SIP Protocols Issues Between Based Authentication [386]
prietary and open SIP standards.
Proprietary and • Performance limitations in large-scale
Open-Standard
• High dependency on network reliability. SIP networks.
SIP Systems Distributed IP-based Telecommunication
System [387] • Complexity in managing distributed components. • Security concerns in distributed SIP
• Security concerns in distributed architecture. architectures.
• Regulatory and policy barriers to SIP
42

standardisation.
Open Standards Definition Refinement • Potential conflicts with existing industry norms. • Risks of reduced industry adoption
[388] • Risk of reduced participation from key stakeholders. due to protocol complexity.
• Challenges in balancing intellectual property rights and
accessibility.
• Possible hindrance to technological innovation.

Standardization A serverless, standards-based, P2P SIP • Relies on Distributed Hash Table for lookups, which
Compliance • Delays in adopting standardised SIP
with SIP Delays for New communication system [227] may face scalability issues.
• Limited redundancy and fault tolerance in certain extensions.
Protocol Features and
Extensions scenarios. • Security vulnerabilities in serverless
Standards
P2P SIP architectures.
• Scalability constraints in decentralised
Regulatory and Optimized SIP Proxy Design [389] • High computational overhead. SIP systems.
Legal • Limited scalability under heavy traffic. • Complexity in implementing SIP com-
Challenges in • Dependency on specific hardware configurations. pliance across multi-network environ-
Multi-Network • Complexity in implementation and maintenance. ments.
Deployments • Regulatory and policy barriers impact-
ing SIP standardisation.
 Table 9: Scalability and Reliability in SIP: Features, Issues, Countermeasures, Limitations, and Open Challenges
Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

Distributed Adaptive Window-Based • Relies on implicit feedback, causing delays in adjust-

Efficient Load Bottlenecks in • Real-time adaptability challenges in
Overload Control Algorithm [244] ment.
Balancing and High-Traffic • Limited to specific SIP message types. dynamic SIP environments.
Resource Scenarios and • May not effectively handle extreme overload scenarios. • Scalability issues when handling large-
Allocation Load Balancing • Requires precise parameter tuning. scale, distributed SIP networks.
Complexities • Need for accurate and efficient re-
source monitoring in high-traffic sce-
Window-based Holonic Multi-Agent Sys- • Dependency on accurate communication. narios.
tem for SIP Overload Control [390] • Delayed adaptation to network changes. • Integration complexity with cloud-
native and SDN-based architectures.

Load-Balanced Call Admission Con- • Dependency on real-time resource data.

troller [391] • Delays in feedback mechanisms.

High Availability Daemon for SIP and • Increased system setup complexity.
Distributed Single Points of • HAD itself may become a single point of failure. • Ensuring fault tolerance without intro-
RTP redundancy [392]
Architecture Failure in • Dependency on heartbeat timing for failover. ducing new single points of failure.
for Fault Certain SIP • Difficulty in scaling redundancy mech-
Tolerance Deployments anisms for high-traffic SIP networks.
Domain Name Resolution-Based Load • Increased probing overhead for frequent probing. • Challenges in seamless failover and
Balancer [393] • Misjudgment of server health in long probing intervals. real-time system recovery.
• Dependency on round-robin mode. • Incorporating decentralised and self-
• Limited scalability with growing server numbers. healing mechanisms for enhanced reli-
ability.
43

Fault Injection Assessment in FlexRay • High sensitivity to protocol-specific configurations.

Protocol [330] • Limited fault injection scope.
• Dependency on behavioural-level modelling.

Synchronization Negotiation Framework • Potential performance trade-offs.

Session Synchronization • Dependency on accurate synchronisation contracts. • AI-driven synchronisation for effi-
for SIP Servlets [394]
Redundancy Challenges in ciency.
and Failover Distributed SIP • Blockchain for secure authentication.
Support Components Scalable Three-Factor Authentication • Vulnerable to DoS attacks. • Lightweight cryptographic methods
Scheme [196] • Lacks user un-traceability. for energy-efficient security.
• Susceptible to password guessing. • Automated failover mechanisms for
real-time continuity.
• Standardised benchmarking for
Low-Power Pre-Synchronization ASIP
• Limited flexibility for future standards. failover performance.
for SDR Terminals [395]
• Complexity in achieving real-time performance.
• Challenges in power optimisation.

Performance Optimisation and Analysis • Sensitive to network delays and jitter.

Adaptive Performance • • AI/ML for traffic prediction.
using two extra variables to synchronise Limited scalability in high-traffic environments.
Traffic Degradation in • • Edge computing to reduce latency.
packet arrival and release timing [78] Dependency on codec efficiency.
Management Congested • • Blockchain for QoS validation.
Vulnerable to packet loss and congestion.
Networks • Optimised buffering for real-time SIP.
• Better congestion control models.
 Feature Issues Counter measures Limitations Open Challenges

Enhanced De-Jitter Buffer using two ex- • Increased latency for larger buffer sizes.
tra variables to synchronise packet arrival • Packet loss due to buffer overrun.
and release timing [396] • Synchronisation issues in packet arrival order.
• Codec-related delays persist.

Mathematical Modelling Using Poisson • Increased latency for large packet sizes.
Probability and Probability Distribution • Degraded voice quality beyond thresholds.
Theorems [397] • Limited effectiveness in high congestion.
• Dependency on accurate bandwidth control.

VoIP Defender to monitor, detect, anal- • High computational resource requirements.

Optimised SIP Security Risks yse and counter attacks [398] • Generic architecture. • AI/ML for attack detection to improve
Signalling in Highly speed & accuracy.
Scalable SIP • Blockchain-based authentication to
Architectures SIP-aware Application Layer Firewall • High resource demands. prevent tampering.
[174] • Limited scalability for large-scale attacks. • Lightweight cryptographic protocols
• Potential delays in legitimate traffic.
• for scalability.
Dependency on accurate attack detection.
• Automated anomaly detection to re-
duce false positives.
Scalable Three-Factor Authentication • Vulnerable to DoS attacks. • Standardised security benchmarking
Scheme [196] • Lacks user untraceability. for SIP resilience.
• Susceptible to password guessing.
• Prone to desynchronization issues.
44

SDN-Based Centralized Framework [399] • High implementation complexity.

Scalability Increased • Dependency on OpenFlow protocol. • Simplify SDN for SIP scalability.
Enhancements Overhead and • Potential scalability bottlenecks. • AI/ML for predictive resource man-
for Cloud SIP Resource agement.
Management • Blockchain for secure autoscaling.
Constraints SDN-based framework with autoscaling • Dependency on real-time resource monitoring. • Optimise energy use in cloud SIP.
and resource optimization [400] • Energy efficiency trade-offs under peak loads. • Benchmark SIP performance in the
cloud.
Distributed End-to-End Overload Con-
• Limited scalability under heavy traffic.
trol by applying control at the ingress
• Dependency on accurate feedback.
servers, closest to the traffic source [401]
• Potential inefficiency in dynamic networks.
 Table 10: SIP Implementation Strategies in Healthcare Scenario
Feature Requirement SIP Element SIP-Based Solutions and Benefits

SDN Controller Provides dynamic traffic prioritisation and bandwidth allocation.

QoS Telemedicine requires low-latency,
high-quality audio/video
communication. Global/Local SIP Traffic Router Prioritises telemedicine and emergency traffic using traffic engineering and
dynamic routing.

Cloud-Based Global Load Balancer Distributes load to minimise congestion and delay.

Emergency calls demand priority Global/Local SIP Proxy Server Coordinates with local proxies to maintain priority call handling policies
routing over routine traffic. globally. Implements call admission control, ensuring priority to emergency
services.

Dynamic resource management for 911 Gateway Provides dynamic traffic prioritisation and bandwidth allocation, enabling
high-priority services. emergency services, tele-healthcare, and PBX services.

SBC Enforces TLS and SRTP encryption, safeguarding signalling and media traffic.
Security & Transmission of sensitive patient data Also enforces user authentication, access control policies, and IP whitelisting
Privacy is vulnerable to interception and to restrict unauthorised access.
tampering.

Prevent external threats like DoS attacks, intrusions, and malware.

45

Firewalls & IDS/IPS Systems

SDN Controller Centralised RBAC; dynamically grants or restricts access based on user
Ensure authorized access to sensitive identity, device type, and session context.
telemedicine sessions.

PSTN Gateway (Authentication & Access Filters and allows only trusted/registered PSTN numbers to access healthcare
Control) communication systems.

Protect patient data confidentiality Media Gateway (TLS & SRTP Encryption) Enforces dynamic encryption policies (TLS/SRTP) and isolates critical data
and integrity during real-time streams via network slicing to prevent unauthorised access.
communication

E911 Gateway Automatically routes emergency calls to appropriate authorities based on the
Inter- Need to interface with emergency caller’s location.
operability services (E911 compliance).
&
Compliance VoIP Service Providers (FCC Compliance) Ensure smooth interoperability with telecom carriers as per regulatory norms.

Inter-carrier SIP Gateway Facilitates international collaboration by translating SIP signalling across
Connecting with global healthcare carriers.
units and clinics.

Global/Local SIP Proxy Server and Router Supports multi-region SIP compatibility.
 Feature Requirement SIP Element SIP-Based Solutions and Benefits

Browser-based Calling Supports web-based calling with global compliance and affordability.

Browser-based teleconsultations WebRTC Gateway Enables browser-to-SIP integration for video/audio calls via browsers without
without additional software. special clients.

Interconnecting multiple devices Media and PSTN Gateway with supporting Performs real-time transcoding and conversion between various codecs and
across locations. networks. protocols to ensure seamless interoperability.

Cloud-Based Global Load Balancer Dynamically scales traffic across multiple SIP proxies and media servers.
Scalability Expansion of telemedicine services
& across regions and countries.
Reliability Simplifies integration as the organisation expands globally.
Global SIP Proxy Server

SIP Routers Automatically reroute traffic if a node fails, ensuring service continuity.
High availability, redundancy, and
failover are required.
Local SIP Proxy Servers Support failover at the local level for uninterrupted services.

Media and PSTN Gateway with supporting Connects IP-based telemedicine platforms with traditional PSTN networks,
Scalable integration of multimedia and networks. ensuring accessibility in rural or low-tech areas.
VoIP devices.
46

WebRTC, 911, and Inter-Carrier SIP Enables scalable, device-agnostic integration across VoIP devices, with
Gateway seamless emergency call routing.
References available at: [Link] ietf. org/htm-
l/rfc2663 [08.12. 2010], 2006.
[1] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camar- [12] Tannu and M. Sharma, “Examining the role
illo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson, R. Sparks, of webrtc in enabling real-time communica-
M. Handley, and E. Schooler, “Rfc3261: Sip: tion security,” 2024 11th International Con-
session initiation protocol,” 2002. ference on Reliability, Infocom Technologies
[2] Y. W. L. D. Jinglin, “Session initiation and Optimization (Trends and Future Direc-
protocol (sip)-based media message trans- tions), ICRITO 2024, pp. 1–7, 2024.
mission method,” 2009. [13] A. Purohit, R. Kaushik, and M. K. Sharma,
[3] E. J. Yoon, K. Y. Yoo, C. Kim, Y. S. “5g and its impact on iot: A review,” Jour-
Hong, M. Jo, and H. H. Chen, “A secure nal of Nonlinear Analysis and Optimization,
and efficient SIP authentication scheme for vol. 14, pp. 31–42, 2023.
converged VoIP networks,” Computer Com- [14] C. Shen, E. Nahum, H. Schulzrinne, and
munications, vol. 33, pp. 1674–1681, sep C. P. Wright, “The impact of TLS on SIP
2010. server performance: Measurement and mod-
[4] I. Basicevic, M. Popovic, and I. Velikic, eling,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Net-
“Use of Finite State Machine Based Frame- working, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1217–1230, 2012.
work in Implementation of Communica- [15] A. L. Churchill and E. Liodakis, “Security
tion Protocols – A Case Study,” in 2010 analysis of real-time protocols: Sip, secured
Sixth Advanced International Conference sip, and srtp,” 2011.
on Telecommunications, pp. 161–166, may [16] P. Vesterinen, “User authentication in sip,”
2010. T-110.5290 Seminar on Network Security,
[5] N. P. Yerram, “Understanding sip and voip 2006.
: Fundamental technologies in modern com- [17] R. Sadiwala, “Analysis of security threats of
munication systems,” International Journal voip systems,” vol. 01, p. 34, 2018.
of Scientific Research in Computer Science, [18] A. Rao and H. Schulzrinne, “Real-world
Engineering and Information Technology, sip interoperability : Still an elusive quest,”
pp. 665–670, 2024. Electrical Engineering, pp. 1–5, 2007.
[6] H. Schulzrinne, X. Wu, S. Sidiroglou, and [19] W. Elleuch and A. C. Houle, “Sip-based
S. Berger, “Ubiquitous computing in home protocol for p2p large-scale multiparty
networks,” IEEE Communications Maga- voip (mvoip) conference support,” 2009 6th
zine, vol. 41, p. 128 – 135, 2003. Cited by: IEEE Consumer Communications and Net-
82. working Conference, CCNC 2009, pp. 1–5,
[7] M. Handley and V. Jacobson, “Rfc2327: 2009.
Sdp: Session description protocol,” 1998. [20] E. A. Abafe, Y. T. Bahta, and H. Jordaan,
[8] H. Schulzrinne and K. Arabshian, “Pro- “Exploring biblioshiny for historical assess-
viding emergency services in internet tele- ment of global research on sustainable use of
phony,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 6, water in agriculture,” Sustainability, vol. 14,
p. 39 – 47, 2002. Cited by: 17; All Open p. 10651, 2022.
Access, Green Open Access. [21] P. Srisusilawati, A. S. Rusydiana, Y. D. San-
[9] G. Camarillo, H. Schulzrinne, and R. Kan- rego, and N. Tubastuvi, “Biblioshiny r ap-
tola, “Signalling transport protocols,” Tech- plication on islamic microfinance research,”
nical Report, Dept. Computer Science, Library Philosophy and Practice, vol. 2021,
Columbia University, CUCS-002-02, pp. 1– pp. 1–24, 2021.
16, 2002. [22] H. Sinnreich and A. B. Johnston, Inter-
[10] D. Evans, “An introduction to unified net communications using SIP: Delivering
communications: Challenges and opportuni- VoIP and multimedia services with Session
ties,” Aslib Proceedings, vol. 56, pp. 308– Initiation Protocol. John Wiley & Sons,
314, 2004. 2012.
[11] W. Green, B. Lancaster, and J. Sladek, [23] S. Leggio, J. Manner, and K. Raatikainen,
“Over the top services,” Pipeline Magazine,

47
 “Wlc02-4: A secure sip-based instant mes- [34] U. U. Rehman and A. G. Abbasi, “Security
saging and presence framework for ad-hoc analysis of voip architecture for identify-
networks,” in IEEE Globecom 2006, pp. 1–6, ing sip vulnerabilities,” in 2014 Interna-
11 2006. tional Conference on Emerging Technologies
[24] J. D. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Ca- (ICET), pp. 87–93, 2014.
marillo, A. B. Johnston, J. Peterson, R. J. [35] G. Mishra, A. Gautam, S. Dharmaraja,
Sparks, M. Handley, and E. M. Schooler, and S. Kar, “Signaling Packet Aggregation
“Sip: Session initiation protocol,” RFC, and Compression in SIP Network: Model-
vol. 3261, pp. 1–269, 2002. ing and Performance Evaluation,” Wireless
[25] H. Schulzrinne and J. Rosenberg, “The ses- Personal Communications, vol. 110, no. 2,
sion initiation protocol: Internet-centric sig- pp. 651–676, 2020.
naling,” IEEE Communications magazine, [36] S. V. Subramanian and R. Dutta, “A study
vol. 38, no. 10, pp. 134–141, 2002. of performance and scalability metrics of a
[26] Q. Yi, “Session initiation protocol(sip):from SIP proxy server - A practical approach,”
ipv4 to ipv6,” Modern Electronic Technique, Journal of Computer and System Sciences,
2004. vol. 77, no. 5, pp. 884–897, 2011.
[27] V. K. Gurbani, L. J. Jagadeesan, and V. B. [37] M. Happenhofer, C. Egger, and P. Reichl,
Mendiratta, “Characterizing session initia- “Quality of signalling: A new concept for
tion protocol (sip) network performance and evaluating the performance of non-invite
reliability,” in International Service Avail- sip transactions,” 2010 22nd International
ability Symposium, 2005. Teletraffic Congress (lTC 22), pp. 1–8, 2010.
[28] G. Karopoulos, G. Kambourakis, S. Gritza- [38] M. Alshamrani and A. Ali, “Qos and per-
lis, and E. Konstantinou, “A framework for formance evaluation for sip-based voip over
identity privacy in sip,” Journal of Net- dmo,” 2017.
work and Computer Applications, vol. 33, [39] N. M. Edan, A. Al-Sherbaz, S. J. Turner,
pp. 16–28, 2010. and S. Ajit, “Performance evaluation of
[29] G. Karopoulos, G. Kambourakis, and qos using sip & iax2 vvoip protocols with
S. Gritzalis, “Privasip: Ad-hoc identity pri- codecs,” 2016 SAI Computing Conference
vacy in sip,” Computer Standards & Inter- (SAI), pp. 631–636, 2016.
faces, vol. 33, pp. 301–314, 2011. [40] F. G. Weber, W. F. Fuhrmann, U. Trick,
[30] S. A. Chaudhry, H. Naqvi, M. Sher, M. S. U. Bleimann, and B. V. Ghita, “A frame-
Farash, and M. U. Hassan, “An improved work for improved qos evaluation and con-
and provably secure privacy preserving au- trol in sip-based ngn,” in International Net-
thentication protocol for sip,” Peer-to-Peer work Conference, 2008.
Networking and Applications, vol. 10, pp. 1– [41] H. Hassan, J. Garcia, and O. Brun, “Session
15, 2017. based quality of service in sip networks,”
[31] S. Salsano and L. Veltri, “Qos control by 2006 2nd International Conference on In-
means of cops to support sip-based applica- formation & Communication Technologies,
tions,” IEEE Network, vol. 16, pp. 27–33, vol. 2, pp. 3251–3256, 2006.
2002. [42] M.-X. Chen, B.-Y. Lin, and W.-Y. Weng,
[32] W. Werapun, A. A. E. Kalam, B. Pail- “Supporting multimedia applications in
lassa, and J. Fasson, “Solution analysis for home networks using sip and slp,” 2010
sip security threats,” in 2009 International International Conference on Data Commu-
Conference on Multimedia Computing and nication Networking (DCNET), pp. 1–6,
Systems, pp. 174–180, 2009. 2010.
[33] D. Geneiatakis, G. Kambourakis, and [43] Y. Zhang and Y. Yuan, “Sip-based multime-
C. Lambrinoudakis, “Sip security: threats, dia conference system design and implemen-
vulnerabilities and countermeasures,” SIP tation,” 2010 International Conference On
Handbook: Services, Technologies, and Computer Design and Applications, vol. 3,
Security of Session Initiation Protocol, pp. V3–607–V3–610, 2010.
p. 9781315218939–28, 2018.

48
[44] S. D. Whitehead, “An evaluation of session vol. 31, pp. 15–28, 2018.
initiation protocol (sip) for use in streaming [55] N. Banerjee, S. K. Das, and A. Acharya,
media applications,” 2006. “Sip-based mobility architecture for next
[45] J. E. Lindquist, J. Maenpaa, X. Marjou, and generation wireless networks,” Third
P. Rajagopal, “Sip/sdp overlap with rtsp,” IEEE International Conference on Per-
2009. vasive Computing and Communications,
[46] D. Yang, H. Wang, C. Wang, and Y. Gao, pp. 181–190, 2005.
“Mpss: A multi-agents based p2p-sip real [56] T. Russell, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
time stream sharing system,” in Prima, controlling convergent networks. McGraw-
2006. Hill Osborne Media, 2008.
[47] C. Balakrishna and K. Al-Begain, “A reality [57] P. O. Abaev, “On sip session setup de-
check on sip-based streaming applications lay modeling in next generation networks,”
on the next generation mobile test net- International Congress on Ultra Modern
work,” 2008 3rd International Conference Telecommunications and Control Systems,
on Communication Systems Software and pp. 1125–1131, 2010.
Middleware and Workshops (COMSWARE [58] D. Pereira and R. Oliveira, “Detection of
’08), pp. 302–308, 2008. signaling vulnerabilities in session initiation
[48] A. Barbosa, J. L. Goncalves, A. N. Ribeiro, protocol,” in Doctoral Conference on Com-
and A. D. Costa, “Integration of sip protocol puting, Electrical and Industrial Systems,
in android media framework,” 2011 IEEE 2021.
EUROCON - International Conference on [59] D. Pereira and R. Oliveira, “Detection of ab-
Computer as a Tool, pp. 1–4, 2011. normal sip signaling patterns: A deep learn-
[49] D. Yang, H. Wang, Y. Zhao, and Y. Gao, ing comparison,” Comput., vol. 11, p. 27,
“A real-time streaming media file sharing 2022.
mechanism based on p2p and sip,” 2006 [60] R. Ferdous, R. L. Cigno, and A. Zorat,
First International Symposium on Perva- “Classification of sip messages by a syntax
sive Computing and Applications, pp. 731– filter and svms,” 2012 IEEE Global Com-
736, 2006. munications Conference (GLOBECOM),
[50] F. Hua-ming, “Research on sip architec- pp. 2714–2719, 2012.
ture,” Information Technology, 2008. [61] W. Nazih, Y. Hifny, W. S. Elkilani,
[51] H. Ma, B. Xu, H. Wan, and C. Li, “A H. Dhahri, and T. Abdelkader, “Counter-
hierarchical p2p architecture for sip com- ing ddos attacks in sip based voip networks
munication,” The 2007 International Con- using recurrent neural networks,” Sensors
ference on Next Generation Mobile Applica- (Basel, Switzerland), vol. 20, 2020.
tions, Services and Technologies (NGMAST [62] O. S. Younes, “A hybrid deep learning
2007), pp. 130–135, 2007. model for detecting ddos flooding attacks
[52] L. Fu, H. Qu, H. Chen, H. Wang, and in sip-based systems,” Comput. Networks,
X. Wang, “A hierarchical and heterogeneous vol. 240, p. 110146, 2024.
p2p-sip architecture,” 2008 Third Interna- [63] S. Chatterjee, B. Tulu, T. Abhichandani,
tional Conference on Pervasive Computing and H. Li, “Sip-based enterprise converged
and Applications, vol. 2, pp. 995–998, 2008. networks for voice/video-over-ip: Implemen-
[53] A. H. El-Mousa and S. A. Saidat, “The de- tation and evaluation of components,” IEEE
sign of a secure sip-based architecture for Journal on Selected Areas in Communica-
broadband service providers,” 2015 6th In- tions, vol. 23, pp. 1921–1933, 10 2005.
ternational Conference on Information and [64] D. Minoli, “Chapter 3 – basic voip signaling
Communication Systems (ICICS), pp. 89– and sip concepts,” 2006.
94, 2015. [65] M. Handley, H. Schulzrinne, E. M. Schooler,
[54] M. Azrour, M. Ouanan, and Y. Farhaoui, and J. D. Rosenberg, “Sip: Session initiation
“A new architecture to protect sip server protocol,” RFC, vol. 2543, pp. 1–151, 1999.
against flooding attack,” International [66] X. Wang, D. Jiang, and G. Cao, “The
Journal of Tomography and Simulation, design of master control system based on

49
 sip protocol,” in 2011 Second International Journal of Cloud Applications and Comput-
Conference on Digital Manufacturing & Au- ing (IJCAC), vol. 6, pp. 25–36, 2016.
tomation, pp. 1261–1265, 8 2011. [77] Q. Gaoli, “User registration method based
[67] R. Yasinovskyy, A. L. Alexander, A. L. Wi- on sip server and sip server,” 2017.
jesinha, and R. K. Karne, “Bare pc sip [78] M. Y. Arafat, M. M. Alam, and F. Ahmed,
user agent implementation and performance “Sip-based qos in ip telephony,” Journal of
for secure voip,” International Journal on Networks, vol. 9, pp. 3415–3426, 2014.
Advances in Telecommunications, vol. 5, [79] M.-X. Chen and T.-C. Tzeng, “Integrating
pp. 111–119, 2012. service discovery technologies in osgi plat-
[68] R. M. Perea, “Sip protocol operation,” 2008. form,” Computer Standards & Interfaces,
[69] H. Kaplan and V. Pascual, “A Taxonomy vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 271–279, 2011.
of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Back-to- [80] T. Lindgren, “A sip redirect server for man-
Back User Agents.” RFC 7092, Dec. 2013. aging a denial of service attack,” 2006.
[70] S. Qin, B. Cheng, C. Liu, J. Chen, and [81] Y. J. H. Y. Z. Peng, “Distributed session ini-
G. Tan, “User-agent based on applet ib ”’ pd tiation protocol (sip) redirection server and
” l,” 2010 3rd IEEE International Confer- construction method thereof,” 2013.
ence on Broadband Network and Multimedia [82] D. Sisalem, J. Kuthan, and S. Ehlert, “De-
Technology (IC-BNMT), pp. 780–784, 2010. nial of service attacks targeting a sip voip
[71] R. Krishnamurthy and G. N. Rouskas, “Per- infrastructure: attack scenarios and preven-
formance evaluation of multi-core, multi- tion mechanisms,” IEEE Network, vol. 20,
threaded sip proxy servers (sps),” 2016 no. 5, pp. 26–31, 2006.
IEEE International Conference on Commu- [83] R. Filali and M. Bouhdadi, “A mechani-
nications, ICC 2016, pp. 1–6, 2016. cally proved and an incremental develop-
[72] A. Akbar, S. M. Basha, and S. A. Sattar, ment of the session initiation protocol IN-
“A comparative study on load balancing VITE transaction,” Journal of Computer
algorithms for sip servers,” Advances in In- Networks and Communications, vol. 2014,
telligent Systems and Computing, vol. 435, 2014.
pp. 79–88, 2016. [84] G. C. A. J. J. P. R. S. M. H. E. S. J.
[73] W. Jiang, J. Lennox, S. Narayanan, R. H. Schulzrinne, “Sip : Session initiation
H. Schulzrinne, K. Singh, and X. Wu, “Inte- protocol,” Internet Engineering Task Force,
grating internet telephony services,” IEEE 2002.
Internet Computing, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 64 – [85] A. Johnston, “Network working group,”
72, 2002. 2003.
[74] D. Y. Yavas, I. Hokelek, and B. Gunsel, [86] H. Hassan, J. Garcia, and O. Brun, “Session
“Modeling of sip retransmission traffic under scheduling in sip based network,” in CCNC
lossy network conditions,” in 2017 IEEE In- 2006. 2006 3rd IEEE Consumer Communi-
ternational Black Sea Conference on Com- cations and Networking Conference, 2006.,
munications and Networking, BlackSeaCom vol. 2, pp. 1263–1267, 1 2006.
2017, vol. 2018-Janua, p. 1 – 5, 2018. Cited [87] M. E. L. Hachimi, B. Tremblay, M. Kadoch,
by: 0. and M. Bennani, “Dynamic bandwidth allo-
[75] A. Montazerolghaem, S. K. Shekofteh, M. H. cation in sip based mpls,” in 21st Interna-
Yaghmaee, and M. Naghibzadeh, “A load tional Conference on Advanced Information
scheduler for SIP proxy servers: design, im- Networking and Applications (AINA ’07),
plementation and evaluation of a history pp. 917–923, 5 2007.
weighted window approach,” International [88] T. Guenkova-Luy, H. Schmidt, A. Schorr,
Journal of Communication Systems, vol. 30, F. J. Hauck, and A. Kassler, “A session-
no. 3, pp. 1–19, 2017. initiation-protocol-based middleware
[76] M. Rasol, B. A. Kasasbeh, and F. A. Adwan, for multi-application management,” in
“An improved secure sip registration mech- 2007 IEEE International Conference on
anism to avoid voip threats,” International Communications, pp. 1582–1587, 6 2007.

50
[89] P. Mendes, H. Schulzrinne, and E. Mon- [100] J. Barakovic, A. Hidic, M. Hadzialic, and
teiro, “Signaling protocol for session-aware S. Baraković, “Simulation-based optimiza-
popularity-based resource allocation,” in tion of signaling procedures in ip multimedia
IFIP/IEEE International Conference on subsystem,” Proceedings of 15th Conference
Management of Multimedia and Mobile Net- of Open Innovations Association FRUCT,
works and Services, 2002. pp. 9–14, 2014.
[90] L. Le and G. Li, “Cross-layer mobility man- [101] J. Sun, H. Yu, and W. Zheng, “Flow
agement based on mobile ip and sip in management with service differentiation for
ims,” in 2007 International Conference on sip application servers,” The Third China-
Wireless Communications, Networking and Grid Annual Conference (chinagrid 2008),
Mobile Computing, WiCOM 2007, p. 803 – pp. 272–277, 2008.
806, 2007. Cited by: 17. [102] J. Sun, R. Tian, J. Hu, and B. Yang, “Rate-
[91] C. Shen, H. Schulzrinne, and E. Nahum, based sip flow management for sla satisfac-
“Session initiation protocol (sip) server over- tion,” 2009 IFIP/IEEE International Sym-
load control: Design and evaluation,” ArXiv, posium on Integrated Network Management,
vol. abs/0807.1160, 2008. pp. 125–128, 2009.
[92] C. Bormann, Z. Liu, R. Price, and G. Ca- [103] J. Pagé, C. Hubain, and J.-M. Dricot, “Dy-
marillo, “Applying signaling compression namic qos on sip sessions using openflow,”
(sigcomp) to the session initiation protocol EMERGING 2016, p. 57, 2016.
(sip),” RFC, vol. 5049, pp. 1–21, 2007. [104] B. Cheng, J. Yang, S. Wang, and J. Chen,
[93] F. Chahbour, N. Nouali, and K. Zeraou- “Adaptive video transmission control sys-
lia, “Fast handoff for hierarchical mobile sip tem based on reinforcement learning ap-
networks.,” in WEC (5), pp. 34–37, 2005. proach over heterogeneous networks,” IEEE
[94] C.-L. Chang and J. Yang, “The research Transactions on Automation Science and
of zero packet loss hand-off mechanism in Engineering, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 1104–1113,
sip-based wireless networks,” IEEE Interna- 2015.
tional Conference on Computer and Infor- [105] S. Park, “Indirect diffserv qos for sip in
mation Technology, pp. 804–808, 2008. broadband access networks,” pp. 859–866,
[95] V. Gholamian, H. K. Nazari, P. Pahlevani, 2007.
and F. H. P. Fitzek, “Accelerating partial [106] S. Park, “Sip qos support in broad-
packet recovery in rlnc,” IEEE Communica- band access networks,” Journal of
tions Letters, vol. 27, no. 10, pp. 2548–2552, KIISE:Information Networking, vol. 34,
2023. pp. 73–80, 2007.
[96] L. H. Chang, C. H. Sung, H. C. Chu, and [107] J. Yin, H. Chen, Y. Xu, Z. Ma, and X. Xu,
J. J. Liaw, “Design and implementation “Learning accurate network dynamics for
of the push-to-talk service in ¡i¿ad hoc¡/i¿ enhanced adaptive video streaming,” IEEE
voip network,” IET COMMUNICATIONS, Transactions on Broadcasting, 2024.
vol. 3, pp. 740–751, 5 2009. [108] Y. Cai, X. Zhang, S. Hu, and X. Wei,
[97] M. Chiesa, A. Kamisiński, J. Rak, “Dynamic qos mapping and adaptive semi-
G. Rétvári, and S. Schmid, “A survey of fast persistent scheduling in 5g-tsn integrated
recovery mechanisms in the data plane..” networks,” China Communications, vol. 20,
[98] C.-M. Huang, C.-H. Lee, and J.-R. Zheng, no. 4, pp. 340–355, 2023.
“A novel sip-based route optimization for [109] G. A. Naidu, P. Chandrasekhar, K. N. H.
network mobility,” IEEE Journal on se- Srinivas, and A. B. Pattan, “Implementa-
lected areas in communications, vol. 24, tion of voip using session initiation proto-
no. 9, pp. 1682–1691, 2006. col,” Networking and Communication Engi-
[99] J. B. Husić, S. Baraković, and S. Kasumović, neering, vol. 3, pp. 481–485, 2011.
“Studying the impact of sip message differ- [110] R. Shelat, N. Patel, and C. Bhatt, “A sur-
entiation on the quality of voip session con- vey of open source protocols xmpp and sip
trol procedures,” IETE Technical Review, for instant messaging system,” in Proceed-
vol. 38, pp. 499 – 510, 2020. ings of the Second International Conference

51
 on Information and Communication Tech- [121] J. Wang, J. Liao, T. Li, J. Wang, J. Wang,
nology for Competitive Strategies, pp. 1–4, and Q. Qi, “Probe-based end-to-end over-
2016. load control for networks of sip servers,”
[111] E. Ivov, P. Saint-Andre, and E. Marocco, Journal of Network and Computer Applica-
“Cusax: Combined use of the session ini- tions, vol. 41, pp. 114–125, 2014.
tiation protocol (sip) and the extensible [122] V. Hilt and I. Widjaja, “Controlling over-
messaging and presence protocol (xmpp),” load in networks of sip servers,” in 2008
RFC, vol. 7081, pp. 1–19, 2013. IEEE International Conference on Network
[112] W. Kim, M. Kim, K. Lee, C. Yu, and B. Lee, Protocols, pp. 83–93, 3 2008.
“Link layer sssisted mobility support using [123] G. Mishra, S. Dharmaraja, and S. Kar,
sip for real-time multimedia communica- “Performance analysis of sip signaling net-
tions,” in Proceedings of the Second Interna- work using hierarchical modeling,” in 2014
tional Workshop on Mobility Management Twentieth National Conference on Commu-
& Wireless Access Protocols, MobiWac ’04, nications (NCC), pp. 1–5, 3 2014.
(New York, NY, USA), p. 127–129, Associ- [124] S. Cirani, L. Davoli, M. Picone, and L. Vel-
ation for Computing Machinery, 2004. tri, “Performance evaluation of a sip-based
[113] D. G. Costa and S. V. Fialho, “Mobsip: A constrained peer-to-peer overlay,” 2014 In-
sip extension to support application layer ternational Conference on High Perfor-
handover in realtime multimedia communi- mance Computing & Simulation (HPCS),
cations with mobility requirements.,” Scien- pp. 432–435, 2014.
tia, vol. 20, no. 2, 2009. [125] A. Karim, E. Ahmed, S. Azam, B. Shan-
[114] W. Kim and H. Jeon, “Advanced resource mugam, and P. Ghosh, “Mitigating the la-
reservation using par-sip for real-time mul- tency induced delay in ip telephony through
timedia communication,” 2006 IEEE 63rd an enhanced de-jitter buffer,” Mobile Com-
Vehicular Technology Conference, vol. 1, puting and Sustainable Informatics, 2021.
pp. 324–328, 2006. [126] N. S. Awan, “Characterization of sip
[115] Melvi, A. Ulvan, O. Damayanti, and H. Pra- signaling-messages over opensips running on
noto, “The analysis of signalling process of multicore server,” No. 2012:327 in Trita-
the services in integrated,” 2016. ICT-EX, p. 41, 2012.
[116] D. Malas, “RFC 6076: Basic Tele- [127] P. Annaiyappa, J. Macpherson, and
phony SIP End-to-End Performance E. Cayeux, “Clock synchronization and
Metrics — [Link].” https: timestamping of data on acquisition at the
//[Link]/doc/html/rfc6076. wellsite: Guidelines and recommendations,”
[Accessed 08-05-2025]. SPE Drilling & Completion, 2023.
[117] D. Malas and A. Morton, “Basic telephony [128] Q. yun Dai and R. Lehnert, “Prediction
sip end-to-end performance metrics,” RFC, of video perceptual quality in the pres-
vol. 6076, pp. 1–27, 2011. ence of packet loss,” Proceedings of the 11th
[118] C. F. Jennings, “RFC 4474: Enhance- International Conference on Telecommuni-
ments for Authenticated Identity Man- cations, pp. 495–502, 2011.
agement in the Session Initiation Proto- [129] N. Banerjee, S. K. Das, and A. Acharya,
col (SIP) — [Link].” https:// “Sip-based mobility architecture for next
[Link]/doc/html/rfc4474. [Ac- generation wireless networks,” in Third
cessed 08-05-2025]. IEEE International Conference on Per-
[119] J. Peterson, C. Jennings, E. Rescorla, and vasive Computing and Communications,
C. Wendt, “Authenticated identity man- pp. 181–190, 3 2005.
agement in the session initiation protocol [130] N. Banerjee, A. Acharya, and S. K. Das,
(sip),” RFC, vol. 8224, pp. 1–46, 2018. “Seamless sip-based mobility for multimedia
[120] N. Banerjee, W. Wu, K. Basu, and S. K. applications,” IEEE NETWORK, vol. 20,
Das, “Analysis of sip-based mobility man- pp. 6–13, 2006.
agement in 4g wireless networks,” Comput. [131] J. Barakovic, H. Bajric, and M. Kos, “Pri-
Commun., vol. 27, pp. 697–707, 2004. ority transmission of sip signaling flows in

52
 case of link failure,” 2009 10th Interna- and prototype implementation,” 1st IEEE
tional Conference on Telecommunications, Workshop on VoIP Management and Secu-
pp. 389–396, 2009. rity, VoIP MaSe 2006, pp. 45–50, 2006.
[132] J. Barakovic, H. Bajric, and M. Kos, “Pri- [141] A. Indurkar, B. Patil, and V. K. Pathak,
ority transmission of sip signaling flows in “Performance failure detection and path
case of ip link congestion,” 2009 Second In- computation,” Proceedings - IEEE Interna-
ternational Conference on Communication tional Conference on Information Process-
Theory, Reliability, and Quality of Service, ing, ICIP 2015, pp. 90–95, 2016.
pp. 26–31, 2009. [142] I. A. Shoukat, A. Al-Dhelaan, and
[133] H.-G. Jo, K. soo Lee, and C.-S. Jang, “Effi- M. Iftikhar, “Recent triggers of congestion,
cient distributed conference architecture in transmission failures and qos degradation in
sip environment,” The Journal of the Korea packet switched networks,” Research Jour-
Contents Association, vol. 8, pp. 1–8, 2008. nal of Applied Sciences, Engineering and
[134] Y.-H. Cho, M.-S. Jeong, J.-W. Nah, W.- Technology, vol. 7, pp. 2599–2604, 2014.
H. Lee, and J.-T. Park, “Policy-based dis- [143] M. Ali, L. Liang, Z. Sun, and H. Cruick-
tributed management architecture for large- shank, “Evaluation of sip signaling and qos
scale enterprise conferencing service using for voip over satellite networks,” in 2009
sip,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in IEEE International Conference on Commu-
Communications, vol. 23, p. 1934 – 1949, nications, pp. 1–5, 3 2009.
2005. Cited by: 18. [144] E.-H. Cho, K.-S. Shin, and S.-J. Yoo, “Sip-
[135] M. Happenhofer, J. Fabini, C. Egger, and based qos support architecture and session
M. Hirschbichler, “An architectural and management in a combined intserv and diff-
evaluative review of implicit and explicit sip serv networks,” Computer Communications,
overload handling,” Int. J. Meas. Technol. vol. 29, pp. 2996–3009, 2006. Computer
Instrum. Eng., vol. 1, pp. 12–27, 2011. Communications.
[136] S. Kumari, F. Wu, X. Li, M. S. Farash, [145] A. Hakiri, P. Berthou, A. Gokhale, D. C.
Q. Jiang, M. K. Khan, and A. K. Das, “Sin- Schmidt, and G. Thierry, “Supporting sip-
gle round-trip sip authentication scheme based end-to-end data distribution service
with provable security for voice over inter- qos in wans,” Journal of Systems and Soft-
net protocol using smart card,” Multimedia ware, vol. 95, pp. 100–121, 2014.
Tools and Applications, vol. 75, pp. 17215 – [146] F. Weber, W. Fuhrmann, U. Trick,
17245, 2015. U. Bleimann, and B. Ghita, “A framework
[137] X. Wei, K. Sellal, and Y. Bouslimani, “Se- for improved qos evaluation and control in
curity implementation for a voip server,” sip-based ngn,” in Proceedings of the 7th
Proceedings - 2012 International Conference International Network Conference, INC
on Computer Science and Service System, 2008, p. 27 – 37, 2008. Cited by: 4.
CSSS 2012, pp. 983–985, 2012. [147] L. Veltri, S. Salsano, and G. Martiniello,
[138] F. Leitold, A. Medve, and L. Kovacs, “Wireless lan-3g integration: Unified mech-
“Sip security problems in ngm services,” anisms for secure authentication based on
in The 2007 International Conference on sip,” in 2006 IEEE International Confer-
Next Generation Mobile Applications, Ser- ence on Communications, vol. 5, pp. 2219–
vices and Technologies (NGMAST 2007), 2224, 6 2006.
pp. 241–246, 2007. [148] A. Steffen, D. Kaufmann, and A. Stricker,
[139] C. Callegari, R. G. Garroppo, S. Giordano, “Sip security,” in Lecture Notes in Infor-
and M. Pagano, “Security and delay issues matics (LNI), Proceedings - Series of the
in sip systems,” INTERNATIONAL JOUR- Gesellschaft fur Informatik (GI), vol. P-55,
NAL OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, p. 397 – 410, 2004. Cited by: 2.
vol. 22, pp. 1023–1044, 8 2009. [149] S. Pachala, C. Rupa, and L. Sumalatha, “An
[140] S. Niccolini, R. G. Garroppo, S. Giordano, improved security and privacy management
G. Risi, and S. Ventura, “Sip intrusion de- system for data in multi-cloud environments
tection and prevention: Recommendations

53
 using a hybrid approach,” Evolutionary In- to the session initiation protocol (sip) for
telligence, vol. 14, pp. 1117–1133, 2021. request history information,” 2014.
[150] F. Palmieri and U. Fiore, “Providing true [161] G. Brands and C. B. Roellgen, “Ephemeral
end-to-end security in converged voice over key exchange for peer-to-peer voice and
ip infrastructures,” Computers and Secu- video communication in realtime via real-
rity, vol. 28, pp. 433–449, 9 2009. time transport protocol 1 . rtp and the lack
[151] O. Younes and U. Albalawi, “Securing Ses- of peer-to-peer data encryption providing
sion Initiation Protocol,” Sensors, vol. 22, peer-to-peer authentication data encryption
dec 2022. and 2 . the rvb algorithm,” 2017.
[152] X. Chen and W. Fan, “Using end-to-end [162] C. Jennings, P. Jones, R. Barnes, and
data encryption to secure sip device config- A. B. Roach, “Double encryption procedures
uration,” Proceedings - 2013 IEEE Interna- for the secure real-time transport protocol
tional Conference on Granular Computing, (srtp),” pp. 1–18, 2020.
GrC 2013, pp. 58–63, 2013. [163] C. Jennings, J. Mattsson, D. McGrew,
[153] S. H. Islam, P. Vijayakumar, M. Z. A. D. Wing, and F. Andreasen, “Encrypted key
Bhuiyan, R. Amin, V. Rajeev, and transport for dtls and secure rtp,” pp. 1–22,
B. Balusamy, “A provably secure three- 2021.
factor session initiation protocol for [164] A. Hutton, R. Jesske, D. Telekom, and
multimedia big data communications,” T. Stach, “An opportunistic approach for se-
IEEE Internet of Things Journal, vol. 5, cure real-time transport protocol (osrtp),”
pp. 3408–3418, 3 2018. 2019.
[154] Z. Chen, J. Liang, and C. Wang, “A new se- [165] A. L. Alexander, A. L. Wijesinha, and
cure authentication mechanism for sip using R. Karne, “An evaluation of secure real-
chaos-based cryptography,” tech. rep., 2015. time transport protocol (srtp) performance
[155] A. Durlanik and I. Sogukpinar, “Sip authen- for voip,” NSS 2009 - Network and System
tication scheme using ecdh,” World Enfor- Security, pp. 95–101, 2009.
matika socity Transaction on Engineering [166] M. M. Naeem, I. Hussain, and M. M. S.
computing and technology, vol. 8, pp. 350– Missen, “A survey on registration hijack-
353, 2005. ing attack consequences and protection for
[156] R. Shekh-Yusef, C. Holmberg, and V. Pas- session initiation protocol (sip),” Comput.
cual, “Rfc 8898: Third-party token-based Networks, vol. 175, p. 107250, 2020.
authentication and authorization for session [167] V. Pascual and H. J. Abdelnur, “Sip digest
initiation protocol (sip),” 2020. authentication relay attack,” 2009.
[157] M. Abubakar, Z. Jaroucheh, A. A. Dubai, [168] S. V. Subramanian and R. Dutta, “Compar-
and B. Buchanan, “Blockchain-based au- ative study of secure vs. non-secure trans-
thentication and registration mechanism for port protocols on the sip proxy server per-
sip-based voip systems,” in 2021 5th Cyber formance: An experimental approach,” 2010
Security in Networking Conference, CSNet International Conference on Advances in
2021, p. 63 – 70, 2021. Cited by: 4. Recent Technologies in Communication and
[158] C. Shen and H. Schulzrinne, “On tcp-based Computing, pp. 301–305, 2010.
sip server overload control,” Proceedings [169] R. Shekh-Yusef, C. Holmberg, and V. Pas-
of IPTComm 2010 - Principles, Systems cual, “Third-party token-based authentica-
and Applications of IP Telecommunications, tion and authorization for session initiation
pp. 71–83, 2010. protocol (sip),” RFC, vol. 8898, pp. 1–15,
[159] S. E. Sawda, P. Urien, and R. E. Sawda, 2020.
“A trust communication with sip protocol,” [170] V. Ghit, ă, S. Costea, and N. Tapus, “Im-
in ACS/IEEE International Conference plementation of cryptographically enforced
on Computer Systems and Applications- rbac,” 2017.
AICCSA 2010, pp. 1–6, 2010. [171] S. Sadat, M. Nik, and M. Shahrabi, “Mutual
[160] M. Barnes and S. Schubert, “An extension

54
 sip authentication scheme based on ecc,” In- in sip,” IEEE International Symposium on
ternational Journal of Computer and Elec- Personal, Indoor and Mobile Radio Commu-
trical Engineering, vol. 6, pp. 196–200, 2014. nications, PIMRC, 2008.
[172] G. Zhang, S. Ehlert, T. Magedanz, and [181] I. Leontiadis, C. Delakouridis, L. Kazat-
D. Sisalem, “Denial of service attack and zopoulos, and G. F. Marias, “Anosip:
prevention on sip voip infrastructures using anonymizing the sip protocol,” in Proceed-
dns flooding,” Proceedings of the 1st Inter- ings of the First Workshop on Measurement,
national Conference on Principles, Systems Privacy, and Mobility, Association for Com-
and Applications of IP Telecommunications, puting Machinery, 2012.
IPTComm ’07, pp. 57–66, 2007. [182] C. J. E. R. P. J., “Authenticated iden-
[173] Y. Kim, Y. Kim, and N. Kang, “Multime- tity management in the session initiation
dia push-to-talk service over wireless mesh protocol (sip) the,” 2018.
networks,” in 2010 IEEE International Con- [183] H. Arshad and M. Nikooghadam, “An ef-
ference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, ficient and secure authentication and key
and Trustworthy Computing, pp. 408–412, 6 agreement scheme for session initiation pro-
2010. tocol using ecc,” Multimedia Tools and Ap-
[174] G. Ormazabal, S. Nagpal, E. Yardeni, and plications, vol. 75, p. 181 – 197, 2016. Cited
H. Schulzrinne, “Secure sip: A scalable pre- by: 88.
vention mechanism for dos attacks on sip [184] X. Y. Guo, D. Z. Sun, and Y. Yang, “An Im-
based voip systems,” in Principles, Systems proved Three-Factor Session Initiation Pro-
and Applications of IP Telecommunications. tocol Using Chebyshev Chaotic Map,” IEEE
Services and Security for Next Generation Access, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 111265–111277,
Networks: Second International Conference, 2020.
IPTComm 2008, Heidelberg, Germany, July [185] S. Kumari, M. Karuppiah, A. K. Das,
1-2, 2008. Revised Selected Papers, pp. 107– X. Li, F. Wu, and V. Gupta, “Design of
132, 2008. a secure anonymity-preserving authentica-
[175] S. Ehlert, D. Geneiatakis, and T. Magedanz, tion scheme for session initiation protocol
“Survey of network security systems to using elliptic curve cryptography,” Jour-
counter sip-based denial-of-service attacks,” nal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized
Computers & Security, vol. 29, pp. 225–243, Computing, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 643–653, 2018.
2010. [186] D. Mishra, A. K. Das, and S. Mukhopad-
[176] B. hee Roh, J. W. Kim, K.-Y. Ryu, and J.- hyay, “A secure and efficient ecc-based user
T. Ryu, “A whitelist-based countermeasure anonymity-preserving session initiation au-
scheme using a bloom filter against sip flood- thentication protocol using smart card,”
ing attacks,” Computers & Security, vol. 37, Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications,
pp. 46–61, 2013. vol. 9, p. 171 – 192, 2016. Cited by: 73.
[177] Z. Mehmood, G. Chen, J. Li, L. Li, and [187] M.-X. Chen and T.-C. Tzeng, “heteroge-
B. Alzahrani, “A robust ECC based mu- neous service location service architecture
tual authentication protocol with anonymity based on osgi technology,” in 2009 11th In-
for session initiation protocol,” PLoS ONE, ternational Conference on Advanced Com-
vol. 12, no. 10, 2017. munication Technology, vol. 03, pp. 1838–
[178] A. Fakis, G. Karopoulos, and G. Kam- 1843, 2 2009.
bourakis, “Onionsip: Preserving privacy in [188] M. Conti, N. Dragoni, and V. Lesyk, “A
sip with onion routing.,” J. Univers. Com- survey of man in the middle attacks,”
put. Sci., vol. 23, pp. 969–991, 2017. IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutori-
[179] J. Peterson and C. Jennings, “Rfc 4474: En- als, vol. 18, pp. 2027–2051, 2016.
hancements for authenticated identity man- [189] Y.-C. Jung, B.-K. Kim, and Y.-T. Kim,
agement in the session initiation protocol “Home/office intranet resource management
(sip),” 2006. for qos-guaranteed realtime stream ser-
[180] L. Kazatzopoulos, C. Delakouridis, and vice provisioning on ieee 802.11e wlan,”
G. F. Marias, “Poviding anonymity services in NOMS 2008 - 2008 IEEE Network

55
 Operations and Management Symposium, detection of attacks in sip based voip net-
pp. 959–962, 4 2008. works using linear l1-svm classifier,” Inter-
[190] V. Sureshkumar, R. Amin, and R. Anitha, national Journal of Computers, Communi-
“A robust mutual authentication scheme cations and Control, vol. 14, p. 518 – 529,
for session initiation protocol with key es- 2019. Cited by: 24.
tablishment,” Peer-to-Peer Networking and [200] G. F. Marias, S. Dritsas, M. Theoharidou,
Applications, vol. 11, p. 900 – 916, 2018. J. Mallios, and D. Gritzalis, “SIP vulner-
Cited by: 17. abilities and anti-SPIT mechanisms assess-
[191] B. B. Gupta, “Secure and efficient session ment,” Proceedings - International Con-
initiation protocol authentication scheme for ference on Computer Communications and
voip communications,” pp. 866–871, 2019. Networks, ICCCN, pp. 597–604, 2007.
[192] Y. Zhou and X. Chen, “An Anonymous [201] D. Endler and M. D. Collier, “Hacking ex-
and Efficient ECC-Based Authentication posed voip: Voice over ip security secrets &
Scheme for SIP,” Wireless Communications solutions,” 2006.
and Mobile Computing, vol. 2020, 2020. [202] M. Herculea, T. M. Blaga, and V. Dobrota,
[193] C. N. Lin, T. L. Lin, T. S. Chen, J. Chen, “Evaluation of security and countermea-
and W. J. Chen, “Voip communication qual- sures for a sip-based voip architecture,” 7th
ity and flow volume preference — a sip RoEduNet International Conference, RoE-
and red5 example,” in 2016 3rd Interna- duNet 2008, 2008.
tional Conference on Systems and Informat- [203] W. Perez, “Sipbio - biometrics sip extension
ics (ICSAI), pp. 782–786, 11 2016. by,” 2018.
[194] H. Tu, N. Kumar, N. Chilamkurti, and [204] H. Lema, F. Simba, and J. Mushi, “Security
S. Rho, “An improved authentication pro- enhancement of sip protocol in voip commu-
tocol for session initiation protocol using nication,” Journal of ICT Systems, vol. 1,
smart card,” Peer-to-Peer Networking and pp. 71–92, 2023.
Applications, vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 903–910, [205] D. Endler and M. Collier, Hacking exposed
2015. VoIP: voice over IP security secrets & solu-
[195] M. Azrour, M. Ouanan, and Y. Farhaoui, tions. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 2006.
“A new secure sip authentication scheme [206] I. M. Tas and S. Baktir, “A novel approach
based on elliptic curve cryptography,” Ad- for efficient mitigation against the sip-based
vances in Intelligent Systems and Comput- drdos attack,” Applied Sciences, vol. 13,
ing, vol. 640, p. 155 – 170, 2018. Cited by: no. 3, p. 1864, 2023.
5. [207] J. Costa-Requena and H. Tang, “Enhancing
[196] S. U. Jan, F. Qayum, and A. Khan, “Sip sip with spatial location for emergency call
issues and challenges – a scalable three services,” Proceedings Tenth International
factor authentication scheme,” Mehran Uni- Conference on Computer Communications
versity Research Journal of Engineering and and Networks (Cat. No.01EX495), pp. 326–
Technology, vol. 39, pp. 287–309, 2020. 333, 2001.
[197] I. Hussain, “Solving flooding and spit based [208] J. E. Katz, “Caller-id, privacy and so-
denial of service problems in voice over ip cial processes,” Telecommunications Policy,
communications,” 2013. vol. 14, pp. 372–411, 1990.
[198] M. A. Akbar and M. Farooq, “Secur- [209] L. T. Lee and R. L. Rose, “Caller id and the
ing sip-based voip infrastructure against meaning of privacy,” Information Society,
flooding attacks and spam over ip tele- vol. 10, pp. 247–265, 1994.
phony,” KNOWLEDGE AND INFORMA- [210] L. Zhang, H. Miyajima, and H. Hayashi,
TION SYSTEMS, vol. 38, pp. 491–510, 2 “An effective sip security solution for het-
2014. erogeneous mobile networks,” in 2009 IEEE
[199] W. Nazih, Y. Hifny, W. S. Elkilani, T. Ab- International Conference on Communica-
delkader, and H. M. Faheem, “Efficient tions, pp. 1–5, 3 2009.
[211] M. Boari, E. Lodolo, S. Monti, and S. Pasini,

56
 “Middleware for automatic dynamic recon- [223] G. Camarillo, R. Kantola, and
figuration of context-driven services,” Mi- H. Schulzrinne, “Evaluation of transport
croprocessors and Microsystems, vol. 32, protocols for the session initiation proto-
pp. 145–158, 2008. col,” IEEE Network, vol. 17, pp. 40–46,
[212] H. H. Kilinc and T. Yanik, “A survey of sip 2003.
authentication and key agreement schemes,” [224] K. Ono and H. Schulzrinne, “Have i met
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutori- you before? using cross-media relations to
als, vol. 16, pp. 1005–1023, 2014. reduce spit,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Inter-
[213] J. Seedorf, “Security challenges for peer-to- national Conference on Principles, Systems
peer sip,” IEEE Network, vol. 20, pp. 38–45, and Applications of IP Telecommunications,
2006. Association for Computing Machinery, 2009.
[214] D. Geneiatakis, T. Dagiuklas, G. Kam- [225] C. Jennings and D. A. Bryan, “P2p for
bourakis, C. Lambrinoudakis, S. Gritzalis, communications: beyond file sharing,” Busi-
K. S. Ehlert, and D. Sisalem, “Survey of ness Communications Review, vol. 36, no. 2,
security vulnerabilities in session initiation p. 36, 2006.
protocol,” IEEE Communications Surveys [226] M. Baldi, F. Risso, and L. Torrero, “Adding
& Tutorials, vol. 8, pp. 68–81, 2006. multi-homing and dual-stack support to the
[215] H. Yan, H. Zhang, K. Sripanidkulchai, Z.-Y. session initiation protocol,” GLOBECOM -
Shae, and D. Sah, “Information leak vul- IEEE Global Telecommunications Confer-
nerabilities in sip implementations,” IEEE ence, pp. 1890–1895, 2007.
Network, vol. 20, pp. 6–13, 2006. [227] D. A. Bryan and B. B. Lowekamp, “De-
[216] D. Geneiatakis, G. Kambourakis, T. Dag- centralizing sip: If you’re looking for a low-
iuklas, C. Lambrinoudakis, and S. Gritzalis, maintenance ip communications network,
“A framework for detecting malformed mes- peer-to-peer sip might be just the thing.,”
sages in sip networks,” in 2005 14th IEEE Queue, vol. 5, pp. 34–41, 3 2007.
Workshop on Local & Metropolitan Area [228] C. Jennings, R. Mahy, and F. Audet, “Man-
Networks, p. 5 pp.–5, 2005. aging client-initiated connections in the ses-
[217] I. M. Tas and S. Baktir, “Blockchain-Based sion initiation protocol (sip) the,” 2009.
Caller-ID Authentication (BBCA): A Novel [229] S. Giordano, M. Listanti, F. Mustacchio,
Solution to Prevent Spoofing Attacks in S. Niccolini, S. Salsano, and L. Veltri, “Dy-
VoIP/SIP Networks,” IEEE Access, vol. 12, namic resource configuration in diffserv net-
no. April, pp. 60123–60137, 2024. works: control plane mechanisms and per-
[218] M.-S. Zafar and M.-S. Gill, “Evaluation of formance evaluation of a traffic control api,”
udp and sctp for sip-t and tcp, udp and sctp Computer Networks, vol. 44, pp. 513–527,
with constant traffic,” 2009. 2004. QoS in Multiservice IP Networks.
[219] P. Gangurde, S. Waware, and N. Sarwade, [230] F. Zhihui, “Research on model of distance
“Simulation of tcp, udp and sctp with con- education system based on sip protocol,”
stant traffic for voip services,” Simulation, International Journal of Multimedia and
vol. 2, pp. 1245–1248, 2012. Ubiquitous Engineering, vol. 9, pp. 63–72,
[220] M. Lulling and J. Vaughan, “A simulation- 2014.
based performance evaluation of tahoe, reno [231] D. Pereira, R. Oliveira, and H. S. Kim,
and sack tcp as appropriate transport pro- “Abnormal Signaling SIP Dialogs Detection
tocols for sip,” Computer Communications, based on Deep Learning,” IEEE Vehicu-
vol. 27, pp. 1585–1593, 2004. lar Technology Conference, vol. 2021-April,
[221] V. K. Gurbani and R. Jain, “Transport no. 1, 2021.
protocol considerations for session initia- [232] M. Deshpande, “Integration of webrtc with
tion protocol networks,” Bell Labs Technical sip – current trends,” International Journal
Journal, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 83–97, 2004. of Innovations in Engineering and Technol-
[222] M. S. Zafar, Evaluation of UDP and SCTP ogy (IJIET), vol. 6, pp. 92–96, 2015.
for SIP-T and TCP , UDP and SCTP with [233] P. Segec and T. Kovacikova, “A survey
constant traffic. PhD thesis, 2008. of open source products for building a

57
 SIP communication platform,” Advances in Management, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 184–199,
Multimedia, vol. 2011, 2011. 2018.
[234] A. Montazerolghaem, M. H. Yaghmaee, [245] S. Salsano, A. Polidoro, and L. Veltri, “Ex-
A. Leon-Garcia, M. Naghibzadeh, and tending sip authentication to exploit user
F. Tashtarian, “A load-balanced call admis- credentials stored in existing authentication
sion controller for ims cloud computing,” databases,” in 2008 16th International Con-
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service ference on Software, Telecommunications
Management, vol. 13, p. 806 – 822, 2016. and Computer Networks, pp. 375–379, 2008.
Cited by: 27. [246] E. P. Edward and V. Sumathy, “Perfor-
[235] Y. An, H. Li, Y. Zhang, and L. Xu, “Evalu- mance analysis of a context aware cross layer
ating SIP-based VoIP communication qual- scheme for fast handoff in ims based inte-
ity and network security,” in Proceedings of grated wifi-wimax networks,” PERVASIVE
SPIE - The International Society for Optical AND MOBILE COMPUTING, vol. 17,
Engineering, vol. 13075, 2024. pp. 79–101, 2 2015.
[236] T. T. Kwon, M. Gerla, and S. Das, “Mo- [247] J. Choi, S. Jung, K. Bae, and H. Moon,
bility management for voip service: Mobile “A lightweight authentication and hop-by-
ip vs. sip,” IEEE Wireless Communications, hop security mechanism for sip network,”
vol. 9, pp. 66–75, 2002. in 2008 International Conference on Ad-
[237] W.-B. Hsieh and J.-S. Leu, “Implement- vanced Technologies for Communications,
ing a secure voip communication over sip- pp. 235–238, 10 2008.
based networks,” Wireless Networks, vol. 24, [248] K. Singh and H. Schulzrinne, “Failover, load
p. 2915 – 2926, 2018. Cited by: 10. sharing and server architecture in SIP tele-
[238] T. P. Fowdur, N. Ramkorun, and P. K. phony,” Computer Communications, vol. 30,
Chiniah, “Performance Analysis of We- pp. 927–942, mar 2007.
bRTC and SIP-based Audio and Video [249] A. B. Roach, “Sip-specific event notifica-
Communication Systems,” SN Computer tion,” p. 32, 2012.
Science, vol. 1, no. 6, 2020. [250] H. Schulzrinne, E. Schooler, and J. Rosen-
[239] Z. Tsiatsikas, G. Kambourakis, berg, “Sip: Session initiation protocol.”
D. Geneiatakis, and H. Wang, “The devil is [Link]
in the detail: Sdp-driven malformed message rfc2543, 1999. [Online].
attacks and mitigation in sip ecosystems,” [251] J. e. a. Rosenberg, “Sip: Session initiation
IEEE Access, vol. 7, p. 2401 – 2417, 2019. protocol.” [Link]
Cited by: 13. html/rfc3261, 2002. [Online].
[240] M. J. Steinmann, “Unified communications [252] A. B. Roach, “Session initiation protocol
with sip: Sip can provide realtime communi- (sip)-specific event notification.” https:
cations as a network service.,” Queue, vol. 5, //[Link]/doc/html/rfc3265,
pp. 50–55, 3 2007. 2002. [Online].
[241] M. Kolbehdari, “Session initiation protocol [253] J. Rosenberg, “The session initiation
(sip) evolution in converged communica- protocol (sip) update method.” https:
tions,” Intel Technology Journal, vol. 10, //[Link]/doc/html/rfc3311,
pp. 10–19, 2006. 2002. [Online].
[242] J. D. Rosenberg, “Basic level of interoper- [254] J. Peterson, “A privacy mechanism for the
ability for session initiation protocol (sip) session initiation protocol (sip).” https:
services (bliss) problem statement,” 2009. //[Link]/doc/html/rfc3323,
[243] A. Ligot and T. Froment, “Providing guid- 2002. [Online].
ance for session initiation protocol (sip) [255] C. Jennings, “Private extensions to sip for
services,” 2008. asserted identity within trusted networks.”
[244] A. Montazerolghaem, M. H. Y. Moghad- [Link]
dam, and A. Leon-Garcia, “OpenSIP: To- rfc3325, 2002. [Online].
ward software-defined SIP networking,” [256] B. Campbell, “Session initiation protocol
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service

58
 (sip) extension for instant messaging.” doc/html/rfc7315, 2014. [Online].
[Link] [269] J. E. R. Peterson and C. Jennings, “Au-
rfc3428, 2002. [Online]. thenticated identity management in the
[257] J. Rosenberg, “A presence event package for session initiation protocol (sip).” https:
the session initiation protocol (sip).” https: //[Link]/doc/html/rfc8224,
//[Link]/doc/html/rfc3856, 2018. [Online].
2004. [Online]. [270] J. L. Fernández-Alemán, I. C. Señor,
[258] R. Mahy, “The session initiation pro- P. Á. O. Lozoya, and A. Toval, “Security
tocol (sip) ”replaces” header.” https: and privacy in electronic health records:
//[Link]/doc/html/rfc3891, A systematic literature review,” Journal
2004. [Online]. of biomedical informatics, vol. 46, no. 3,
[259] R. Sparks, “The session initiation proto- pp. 541–562, 2013.
col (sip) referred-by mechanism.” https: [271] B. McDowell, “Three ways in which gdpr im-
//[Link]/doc/html/rfc3892, pacts authentication,” Computer Fraud and
2004. [Online]. Security, vol. 2019, pp. 9–12, 2019.
[260] J. C. J. Peterson, “Enhancements for au- [272] A. A. Alex-omiogbemi, W. Fargo, and
thenticated identity management in sip.” N. Carolina, “Conceptual framework for
[Link] advancing regulatory compliance and risk
rfc4474, 2006. [Online]. management in emerging markets through
[261] J. Elwell, “Connected identity in the digital innovation,” pp. 0–7, 2024.
session initiation protocol (sip).” https: [273] J. Hu, H. H. Chen, and T. W. Hou, “A
//[Link]/doc/html/rfc4916, hybrid public key infrastructure solution
2007. [Online]. (hpki) for hipaa privacy/security regula-
[262] C. Jennings, “Managing client-initiated con- tions,” Computer Standards and Interfaces,
nections in sip.” [Link] vol. 32, pp. 274–280, 2010.
org/doc/html/rfc5626, 2009. [Online]. [274] S. Ray and G. P. Biswas, “A certificate
[263] J. Rosenberg, “Obtaining and using glob- authority (ca)-based cryptographic solu-
ally routable user agent uris (gruus) tion for hipaa privacy/security regulations,”
in sip.” [Link] Journal of King Saud University - Com-
html/rfc5627, 2009. [Online]. puter and Information Sciences, vol. 26,
[264] J. Fischl, “Framework for establishing a pp. 170–180, 2014.
secure real-time transport protocol (srtp) [275] S. Wang, M. Delavar, M. A. Azad,
security context using datagram transport F. Nabizadeh, S. Smith, and F. Hao, “Spoof-
layer security (dtls).” [Link] ing Against Spoofing: Toward Caller ID
[Link]/doc/html/rfc5763, 2010. [Online]. Verification in Heterogeneous Telecommu-
[265] D. McGrew, “Datagram transport layer se- nication Systems,” ACM Transactions on
curity (dtls) extension to establish keys Privacy and Security, vol. 27, no. 1, 2023.
for the secure real-time transport pro- [276] A. Folorunso, I. U. Wada, B. Samuel, and
tocol (srtp).” [Link] V. Mohammed, “Security compliance and
doc/html/rfc5764, 2010. [Online]. its implication for cybersecurity,” World
[266] R. Sparks, “Correct transaction han- Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews,
dling for 2xx responses to sip invite 2024.
requests.” [Link] [277] F. Angermeir, J. Fischbach, F. Moyón, and
html/rfc6026, 2010. [Online]. D. Méndez, “Towards automated continuous
[267] A. B. Roach, “Sip-specific event noti- security compliance,” in International Sym-
fication.” [Link] posium on Empirical Software Engineering
html/rfc6665, 2012. [Online]. and Measurement, 2024.
[268] R. Jesske, “Private header (p-header) exten- [278] V. Agarwal, C. Butler, L. Degenaro, A. Ku-
sions to the session initiation protocol (sip) mar, A. D. Sailer, and G. Steinder,
for the 3gpp.” [Link] “Compliance-as-code for cybersecurity au-
tomation in hybrid cloud,” 2022 IEEE 15th

59
 International Conference on Cloud Comput- on Ultra Modern Telecommunications and
ing (CLOUD), pp. 427–437, 2022. Control Systems and Workshops (ICUMT),
[279] S. Vitla, “Identity management in global pp. 1–8, 2011.
compliance: Innovative implementation [289] M. Isomaki and S. Veikkolainen, “Guidelines
strategies in cybersecurity landscape,” and protocol extensions for combining sip
Journal of Engineering Research and based real-time media sessions with xmpp
Reports, 2025. based instant messaging and presence ser-
[280] J. Stanik, “A conversation with cullen jen- vice.,” 2009.
nings and doug wadkins: Getting the low- [290] X. ping Song, “Design and simulation of a
down on sip,” Queue, vol. 5, pp. 14–20, 3 sip-based message notification mechanism,”
2007. 2015.
[281] Y. Zhang, A. Clouet, O. S. Awotayo, [291] E.-C. Cha, H.-K. Choi, and S.-J. Cho, “Eval-
C. Davids, and V. K. Gurbani, “Benchmark- uation of security protocols for the session
ing the session initiation protocol (SIP),” initiation protocol,” in 2007 16th Interna-
in Proceedings - CQR 2015: 2015 IEEE In- tional Conference on Computer Communi-
ternational Workshop Technical Committee cations and Networks, pp. 611–616, 3 2007.
on Communications Quality and Reliability, [292] R. Kamal, M. H. Kamal, M. M. Monowar,
2015. and C. S. Hong, “A mobile middleware
[282] S. S. Gokhaie and J. Lu, “Signal- to solve interoperability problems in voip
ing performance of sip based voip: A streaming session,” International Journal of
measurement-based approach,” GLOBE- Communication Networks and Distributed
COM - IEEE Global Telecommunications Systems, vol. 8, p. 85 – 100, 2012. Cited by:
Conference, vol. 2, pp. 761–765, 2005. 1.
[283] C. Wieser, M. Laakso, and H. Schulzrinne, [293] K. Drage, “A process for handling essential
“Security testing of sip implementations,” corrections to the session initiation protocol
Communication, pp. 23–24, 2003. (sip),” draft-drage-sip-essential-correction-
[284] C. Wieser, M. Laakso, and H. Schulzrinne, 03. txt (work in progress), 2008.
“Sip robustness testing for large-scale use,” [294] M. Homayouni, M. Jahanbakhsh, S. V.
in Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI), Pro- Azhari, and A. Akbari, “Overload control
ceedings - Series of the Gesellschaft fur in sip servers: Evaluation and improve-
Informatik (GI), vol. P-58, p. 165 – 178, ment,” 2010 17th International Conference
2004. Cited by: 3. on Telecommunications, pp. 666–672, 2010.
[285] A. Ruiz-Martı́nez, J. A. Sánchez-Laguna, [295] A. Febro, H. Xiao, J. Spring, and B. Chris-
and A. F. Gómez-Skarmeta, “Sip extensions tianson, “Edge security for sip-enabled
to support (micro)payments,” Proceedings iot devices with p4,” Comput. Networks,
- International Conference on Advanced vol. 203, p. 108698, 2021.
Information Networking and Applications, [296] O. Sbai, B. Allaert, P. Sondi, and A. Med-
AINA, pp. 289–296, 2007. dahi, “Sip-ddos: Sip framework for ddos
[286] Y. Zhang, “Sip-based voip network and intrusion detection based on recurrent neu-
its interworking with the pstn,” Electronics ral networks,” in International Conference
and Communication Engineering Journal, on Machine Learning for Networking, 2023.
vol. 14, p. 273 – 282, 2002. Cited by: 29. [297] L. Ni, G. Chen, and J. Li, “A pairing-
[287] S. Salsano, A. Polidoro, and L. Veltri, “Ex- free identity-based authenticated key agree-
tending sip authentication to exploit user ment mechanism for sip,” Proceedings -
credentials stored in existing authentication 2011 International Conference on Network
databases,” 2008 16th International Confer- Computing and Information Security, NCIS
ence on Software, Telecommunications and 2011, vol. 1, pp. 209–217, 2011.
Computer Networks, pp. 375–379, 2008. [298] S. R. Yang, Y. C. Lin, P. Lin, and Y. Fang,
[288] E. S. Boysen and J. Flathagen, “Using sip “Aiottalk: A sip-based service platform for
for seamless handover in heterogeneous net- heterogeneous artificial intelligence of things
works,” 2011 3rd International Congress applications,” IEEE Internet of Things

60
 Journal, vol. 10, pp. 14167–14181, 2023. COMMUNICATION NETWORKS, vol. 5,
[299] A. A. Alex-omiogbemi, W. Fargo, and pp. 945–956, 9 2012.
N. Carolina, “Conceptual framework for [309] M. R. S. A. Saidat, “A design of an enhanced
advancing regulatory compliance and risk redundant sip model for securing SIP-based
management in emerging markets through networks,” in Proceedings of IEEE/ACS In-
digital innovation,” World Journal of Ad- ternational Conference on Computer Sys-
vanced Research and Reviews, pp. 0–7, 2024. tems and Applications, AICCSA, vol. 2019-
[300] D. A. Lyons, “The challenge of voip to Novem, 2019.
legacy federal and state regulatory regimes,” [310] T. Usui, N. Nishinaga, Y. Kitatsuji, and
Perspectives from Free State Foundation H. Yokota, “Restoring cscf by leveraging
Scholars, vol. 8, no. 9, 2013. feature of retransmission mechanism in ses-
[301] B. Basem, A. Z. Ghalwash, and R. A. Sadek, sion initiation protocol,” EMERGING 2011,
“Multilayer secured sip based voip architec- p. 56, 2011.
ture,” International Journal of Computer [311] K. Thomas, W. A. Gruver, D. Sabaz, and
Theory and Engineering, vol. 7, pp. 453–462, C. Ng, “A hybrid protocol architecture for
2015. peer-to-peer control based on sip and upnp,”
[302] T. Chakraborty, S. Ghosh, S. Barik, in 2009 IEEE International Systems Con-
S. Kar, and S. Chatterjee, “Voip-hdk – a ference Proceedings, p. 262 – 266, 2009.
novel channel allocation technique for qos Cited by: 1.
aware voip communication over heteroge- [312] A. Chauhan, N. Mahajan, H. Kumar, and
neous networks,” Procedia Computer Sci- S. Kaushal, “Framework for sip-based voip
ence, vol. 171, pp. 62–71, 2020. system with high availability and failover
[303] A. Al-Allawee, M. Mihoubi, P. Lorenz, and capabilities: A qualitative and quantitative
K. S. Abakar, “Efficient dispatcher mecha- analysis,” Advances in Intelligent Systems
nism for sip cluster based on memory utiliza- and Computing, vol. 1077, p. 273 – 286,
tion,” ICC 2023 - IEEE International Con- 2020. Cited by: 0.
ference on Communications, pp. 3370–3375, [313] A. Luo, C. Lin, K. Wang, L. Lei, and C. Liu,
2023. “Quality of protection analysis and perfor-
[304] K.-C. Lu, I.-H. Liu, K.-H. Chang, and J.-S. mance modeling in ip multimedia subsys-
Li, “Vowi-fi security threats: Address resolu- tem,” Computer Communications, vol. 32,
tion protocol attack and countermeasures,” pp. 1336–1345, 2009. Special Issue of Com-
IET Networks, vol. 13, p. 129 – 146, 2024. puter Communications on Heterogeneous
Cited by: 0. Networking for Quality, Reliability, Security,
[305] A. Kanta, I. Coisel, and M. Scanlon, “A and Robustness - Part I.
novel dictionary generation methodology for [314] J. Raphael, E. I. Sklar, and S. Maskell,
contextual-based password cracking,” IEEE “An empirical investigation of adaptive traf-
Access, vol. 10, pp. 59178–59188, 2022. fic control parameters,” in CEUR Workshop
[306] A. Costan, C. Dobre, F. Pop, C. Leordeanu, Proceedings, vol. 1678, CEUR-WS, 2016.
and V. Cristea, “A fault tolerance approach [315] H. M. Abdelghaffar and H. A. Rakha, “De-
for distributed systems using monitoring velopment and testing of a novel game theo-
based replication,” Proceedings - 2010 IEEE retic de-centralized traffic signal controller,”
6th International Conference on Intelligent IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Trans-
Computer Communication and Processing, portation Systems, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 231–
ICCP10, pp. 451–458, 2010. 242, 2019.
[307] J.-J. Kim and S.-P. Hong, “A method of risk [316] K. Gu, J. Hu, and W. Jia, “Adaptive area-
assessment for multi-factor authentication,” based traffic congestion control and man-
Journal of Information Processing Systems, agement scheme based on fog computing,”
vol. 7, pp. 187–198, 3 2011. IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Trans-
[308] S. hun Kim, S.-K. Kim, and J. H. Park, portation Systems, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1359–
“A voip system for mobility voice security 1373, 2022.
support using the vpn,” SECURITY AND

61
[317] K.-L. Chiu, Y.-S. Chen, and R.-H. Hwang, backpressure-based approach,” ACM SIG-
“Seamless session mobility scheme in het- COMM COMPUTER COMMUNICATION
erogeneous wireless networks,” INTERNA- REVIEW, vol. 40, pp. 399–400, 3 2010.
TIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICA- ACM SIGCOMM Conference 2010, New
TION SYSTEMS, vol. 24, pp. 789–809, 6 Delhi, INDIA, AUG 30-SEP 03, 2010.
2011. [327] I. D. D. Curcio and M. Lundan, “Sip call
[318] O. Pidpaly, “Improving sip trunking services setup delay in 3g networks,” Proceedings
with cloud-based sbc: Performance analy- ISCC 2002 Seventh International Sympo-
sis and optimisation strategies,” Bulletin sium on Computers and Communications,
of Cherkasy State Technological University, pp. 835–840, 2002.
vol. 28, pp. 36–49, 2023. [328] J. Yang, F. Huang, and S. Gou, “An opti-
[319] A. Al-Allawee, P. Lorenz, A. Abouaissa, and mized algorithm for overload control of sip
M. Abualhaj, “A performance evaluation of signaling network,” 2009 5th International
in-memory databases operations in session Conference on Wireless Communications,
initiation protocol,” Network, vol. 3, p. 1 – Networking and Mobile Computing, pp. 1–4,
14, 2023. Cited by: 3. 2009.
[320] I. M. Tas and S. Baktir, “A novel approach [329] B. Cui and Q. You, “Failure analysis for
for efficient mitigation against the sip-based sip ic eos fail,” Proceedings of the Interna-
drdos attack,” Applied Sciences, 2023. tional Symposium on the Physical and Fail-
[321] W.-K. Chiang, H.-J. Dai, and C. Luo, ure Analysis of Integrated Circuits, IPFA,
“Cross-layer handover for sip applica- vol. 2022-July, pp. 1–4, 2022.
tions based on media-independent pre- [330] Q. Wu and Y.-H. Wang, “Building web-
authentication with redirect tunneling,” base sip analyzer with ajax approach,” in
in 2012 Second International Conference 21st International Conference on Advanced
on Digital Information and Communica- Information Networking and Applications
tion Technology and it’s Applications (DIC- Workshops (AINAW’07), vol. 2, pp. 600–
TAP), pp. 348–353, 5 2012. 604, 5 2007.
[322] Y. Tong, X. Jia, B. Liang, and J. Feng, [331] Samridhi, R. Liscano, A. Azim, A. Z. Abe-
“5g message access platform based on load din, B. Pulito, and Y. K. Chang, “Failure
balancing,” ACM International Conference scenarios for sip/rtp services in container
Proceeding Series, pp. 515–519, 2022. orchestration clusters,” 2020 International
[323] H. Jiang, A. Iyengar, E. M. Nahum, W. Seg- Symposium on Networks, Computers and
muller, A. N. Tantawi, and C. P. Wright, Communications, ISNCC 2020, pp. 1–6,
“Design, implementation, and performance 2020.
of a load balancer for sip server clusters,” [332] I. ul Haq, J. Wang, Y. Zhu, and S. Maq-
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, bool, “A survey of authenticated key agree-
vol. 20, pp. 1190–1202, 2012. ment protocols for multi-server architec-
[324] A. O., J. S. N, N. C, and A. B. A, “Mod- ture,” Journal of Information Security and
elling the contributory effect of impairment Applications, vol. 55, p. 102639, 2020.
factors on voice transmitted over the in- [333] C.-M. Huang, C.-H. Lee, and P.-H. Tseng,
ternet,” International Journal of Computer “Multihomed sip-based network mobility
Applications, vol. 89, pp. 42–47, 2014. using ieee 802.21 media independent han-
[325] A. Mukhopadhyay, T. Chakraborty, S. Bhu- dover,” in 2009 IEEE International Confer-
nia, I. S. Misra, and S. K. Sanyal, “Study of ence on Communications, pp. 1–5, 6 2009.
enhanced voip performance under congested [334] Y. Huang, E. Cheung, L. Dillon, and
wireless network scenarios,” 2011 3rd In- K. Stirewalt, “A thread synchronization
ternational Conference on Communication model for sip servlet containers,” p. 7, 07
Systems and Networks, COMSNETS 2011, 2009.
2011. [335] A. M. Noll, “An inquiry into the privacy
[326] Y. Wang, “Sip overload control: A aspects of caller-id,” Telecommunications
Policy, vol. 16, no. 8, pp. 690–693, 1992.

62
[336] V. Srihari, P. Kalpana, and R. Anitha, “Se- [345] M. Cinque, R. D. Corte, and A. Pecchia,
curity aspects of sip based voip networks: “Micro2vec: Anomaly detection in microser-
A survey,” in Second International Confer- vices systems by mining numeric represen-
ence on Current Trends In Engineering and tations of computer logs,” Journal of Net-
Technology - ICCTET 2014, pp. 143–150, 7 work and Computer Applications, vol. 208,
2014. p. 103515, 2022.
[337] A. Bansal and A. R. Pais, “Mitigation [346] L. Zhao, F. Li, and M. Valero, “Hy-
of flooding based denial of service attack brid decentralized data analytics in edge-
against session initiation protocol based voip computing-empowered iot networks,” IEEE
system,” in Proceedings - 2015 IEEE In- Internet of Things Journal, vol. 8, pp. 7706–
ternational Conference on Computational 7716, 2021.
Intelligence and Communication Technol- [347] S. Thangam, M. Gurupriya, A. S. Re-
ogy, CICT 2015, p. 391 – 396, 2015. Cited vanth, D. Arun Joel, C. M. Shankar,
by: 7. and I. S. Koushik, “VoIP QoS Refinement
[338] B. B. Gupta and V. Prajapati, “An efficient through Call Sequencing using Adaptive
sip authentication scheme for multiserver in- Jitter Buffer Algorithm,” 2024 15th Inter-
frastructure,” in International Conference national Conference on Computing Com-
on Futuristic Trends in Networks and Com- munication and Networking Technologies,
puting Technologies, pp. 64–74, Springer, ICCCNT 2024, pp. 1–7, 2024.
2019. [348] Y. Huang, L. K. Dillon, and R. K. Stire-
[339] A. Montazerolghaem, M. H. Y. Moghad- walt, “On mechanisms for deadlock avoid-
dam, and A. Leon-Garcia, “Opensip: To- ance in sip servlet containers,” in Principles,
ward software-defined sip networking,” Systems and Applications of IP Telecom-
IEEE Transactions on Network and Service munications. Services and Security for Next
Management, vol. 15, pp. 184–199, 2017. Generation Networks: Second International
[340] A. Montazerolghaem, “Optimized software- Conference, IPTComm 2008, Heidelberg,
defined multimedia framework: networking Germany, July 1-2, 2008. Revised Selected
and computing resource management,” Papers, pp. 196–216, Springer, 2008.
Journal of Ambient Intelligence and [349] R. Joshi, C. H. Song, X. Z. Khooi, N. Bud-
Humanized Computing, vol. 14, no. 9, hdev, A. Mishra, M. C. Chan, and B. Leong,
pp. 12981–13001, 2023. “Masking corruption packet losses in dat-
[341] D. Y. Yavas, I. Hökelek, and B. Günsel, acenter networks with link-local retrans-
“Modeling of sip retransmission traffic under mission,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIG-
lossy network conditions,” 2017 IEEE Inter- COMM 2023 Conference, pp. 288–304,
national Black Sea Conference on Commu- 2023.
nications and Networking (BlackSeaCom), [350] M. S. Noori, R. K. Z. Sahbudin, M. S.
pp. 1–5, 2017. Abood, and M. M. Hamdi, “A performance
[342] Q. Wu, W. Zhang, and X. Wang, “A dy- evaluation of voice over ip protocols (sip and
namic resource allocation strategy for voip h.323) in wireless network,” Lecture Notes
systems based on sip,” in International in Networks and Systems, vol. 322, p. 381 –
Conference on Electronics, Electrical and 390, 2022. Cited by: 1.
Information Engineering (ICEEIE 2024), [351] M. Zafar and S. I. Cheema, “An efficient
vol. 13445, pp. 850–859, 2024. architecture for network information man-
[343] N. P. Dharuman and P. R. R. Thumati, “Sip agement,” in Proceedings - 3rd International
signaling optimization for distributed tele- Conference on Information and Computer
com systems,” Available at SSRN 5075303, Technologies, ICICT 2020, p. 462 – 468,
2024. 2020. Cited by: 1.
[344] K. K. Guduru, “Priority queuing strat- [352] A. Montazerolghaem, “Optimizing voip
egy for self-overload control in sip servers,” server resources using linear programming
Wireless Personal Communications, pp. 1– model and autoscaling technique: An sdn
21, 2024. approach,” Concurrency and Computation:

63
 Practice and Experience, vol. 33, no. 21, Technology, 2024.
p. e6424, 2021. [362] T. Jaiswal and N. R. Kidwai, “Security
[353] Y. An, H. Li, Y. Zhang, and L. Xu, “Evalu- in mobile ad hoc networks: Impact of at-
ating sip-based voip communication quality tacks and countermeasure approaches,” in
and network security,” in Second Interna- Soft Computing: Theories and Applications
tional Conference on Physics, Photonics, (R. Kumar, A. K. Verma, O. P. Verma, and
and Optical Engineering (ICPPOE 2023), T. Wadehra, eds.), (Singapore), pp. 105–
vol. 13075, pp. 149–155, SPIE, 2024. 116, Springer Nature Singapore, 2024.
[354] R. Gandotra and L. Perigo, “Sdvoip-a [363] D. S. Bhatti, S. Sidrat, S. Saleem, A. W. Ma-
software-defined voip framework for sip and lik, B. Suh, K.-I. Kim, and K.-C. Lee, “Per-
dynamic qos,” Computer Journal, vol. 64, formance analysis: Securing sip on multi-
p. 254 – 263, 2021. Cited by: 3. threaded/multi-core proxy server using pub-
[355] P. K. Deshmukh and D. T. Mane, “Qos- lic keys on diffie–hellman (dh) in single and
aware routing and resource allocation tech- multi-server queuing scenarios,” Plos one,
niques for enhanced network performance.,” vol. 19, no. 1, p. e0293626, 2024.
Journal of Electrical Systems, vol. 19, no. 2, [364] M. Fox, E. Hammad, W. Magnussen, and
2023. H. Schulzrinne, “Towards zero-trust voip
[356] A. Montazerolghaem, “Optimized software- architecture: A testbed implementation, ap-
defined multimedia framework: networking proach, and lessons learned,” in Proceedings
and computing resource management,” - 2023 IEEE Future Networks World Fo-
Journal of Ambient Intelligence and rum: Future Networks: Imagining the Net-
Humanized Computing, vol. 14, no. 9, work of the Future, FNWF 2023, Institute
pp. 12981–13001, 2023. of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.,
[357] A. Bahaa, M. Shehata, S. M. Gasser, and 2023.
M. S. El-Mahallawy, “Call Failure Predic- [365] S. Kamas and M. A. Aydın, “Spit detection
tion in IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) and prevention,” IU-Journal of Electrical
Networks,” Applied Sciences (Switzerland), & Electronics Engineering, vol. 17, no. 1,
vol. 12, no. 16, 2022. pp. 3249–3255, 2017.
[358] P. T. A. Quang, X. Gong, C. Liu, K. Li, [366] M. A. Azad and R. Morla, “Multistage
J. Leguay, X. Zhang, Y. Zhang, J. Li, spit detection in transit voip,” in Soft-
and K. Ye, “Routing and qos policy COM 2011, 19th International Conference
optimization in sd-wan,” arXiv preprint on Software, Telecommunications and Com-
arXiv:2209.12515, 2022. puter Networks, pp. 1–9, IEEE, 2011.
[359] N. Mahajan, A. Chauhan, H. Kumar, [367] Y.-H. Lu, S. H.-Y. Hsiao, C.-Y. Li, Y.-C.
S. Kaushal, and A. K. Sangaiah, “A deep Hsieh, P.-Y. Chou, Y.-Y. Li, T. Xie, and G.-
learning approach to detection and mitiga- H. Tu, “Insecurity of operational ims call
tion of distributed denial of service attacks systems: Vulnerabilities, attacks, and coun-
in high availability intelligent transport sys- termeasures,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on
tems,” Mobile Networks and Applications, Networking, vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 800–815,
vol. 27, p. 1423 – 1443, 2022. Cited by: 9. 2022.
[360] A. M. Ramly, Z. W. Ng, Y. Khamay- [368] N. Thuayabat and S. Tangwongsan, “A
seh, C. S. C. Kwan, A. Amphawan, and security model of voice eavesdropping pro-
T. K. Neo, “Review and Enhancement of tection over sip-based voip with xtr cryp-
VoIP Security: Identifying Vulnerabilities tography,” in 2015 12th International Joint
and Proposing Integrated Solutions,” Jour- Conference on Computer Science and Soft-
nal of Telecommunications and the Digital ware Engineering (JCSSE), pp. 207–211,
Economy, vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 109–136, 2024. IEEE, 2015.
[361] X. Wang, J. Lv, A. Shankar, C. Maple, [369] S. Wang, M. Delavar, M. A. Azad,
K. Li, and Q. Li, “Interpersonal communi- F. Nabizadeh, S. Smith, and F. Hao, “Spoof-
cation interconnection in media convergence ing against spoofing: Toward caller id verifi-
metaverse,” ACM Transactions on Internet cation in heterogeneous telecommunication

64
 systems,” ACM transactions on privacy and p. S11–S21, 2010. Special Issue: Hetero-
security, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 1–25, 2023. geneous Networks: Traffic Engineering and
[370] M. Hansen, E. Kosta, I. Nai-Fovino, and Performance Evaluation.
S. Fischer-Hübner, Privacy and Identity [379] M. Femminella and G. Reali, “A zero-
Management. The Smart Revolution: 12th configuration tracking system for first re-
IFIP WG 9.2, 9.5, 9.6/11.7, 11.6/SIG 9.2. sponders networks,” IEEE Systems Journal,
2 International Summer School, Ispra, Italy, vol. 11, p. 2917 – 2928, 2017. Cited by: 12.
September 4-8, 2017, Revised Selected Pa- [380] J.-M. Robert, H. Otrok, A. N. Quttoum, and
pers, vol. 526. Springer, 2018. R. Boukhris, “A distributed resource man-
[371] D. Pereira and R. Oliveira, “Detection of agement model for virtual private networks:
Abnormal SIP Signaling Patterns: A Deep Tit-for-tat strategies,” Computer Networks,
Learning Comparison,” Computers, vol. 11, vol. 56, pp. 927–939, 2012.
no. 2, pp. 1–17, 2022. [381] M. Chen, L. T. Yang, T. Kwon, L. Zhou,
[372] H. ASHRAF, A. Ullah, S. Tahira, and and M. Jo, “Itinerary planning for energy-
N. Jhanjhi, “Intrusion detection and preven- efficient agent communications in wireless
tion system for secure multimedia sharing in sensor networks,” 2011.
future internet,” 2024. [382] Y.-C. Tseng, J.-J. Chen, and Y.-L. Cheng,
[373] O. S. Younes, “A hybrid deep learning “Design and implementation of a sip-based
model for detecting DDoS flooding attacks mobile and vehicular wireless network with
in SIP-based systems,” Computer Networks, push mechanism,” IEEE Transaction ON
vol. 240, 2024. Vehicular Technology, vol. 56, pp. 3408–
[374] A. Bytes, P. H. N. Rajput, C. Doumanidis, 3420, 11 2007.
M. Maniatakos, J. Zhou, and N. O. Tippen- [383] M. Femminella, E. Maccherani, and G. Re-
hauer, “Fieldfuzz: In situ blackbox fuzzing ali, “Performance management of java-based
of proprietary industrial automation run- sip application servers,” in 12th IFIP/IEEE
times via the network,” in Proceedings of International Symposium on Integrated Net-
the 26th International Symposium on Re- work Management (IM 2011) and Work-
search in Attacks, Intrusions and Defenses, shops, pp. 493–500, IEEE, 2011.
pp. 499–512, 2023. [384] T. Hoeher, M. Petraschek, S. Tomic, and
[375] M. Alshamrani, H. Cruickshank, Z. Sun, M. Hirschbichler, “Evaluating performance
G. Ansa, and F. Alshahwan, “Sip signaling characteristics of sip over ipv6,” Journal of
implementations and performance enhance- Networks, vol. 2, pp. 40–50, 2007.
ment over manet: A survey,” International [385] G. Franks, D. Lau, and C. Hrischuk, “Per-
Journal of Advanced Computer Science and formance measurements and modeling of a
Applications, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 191–202, java-based session initiation protocol (sip)
2016. application server,” in Proceedings of the
[376] T. P. Fowdur, A. Domah, and L. Babooram, Joint ACM SIGSOFT Conference – QoSA
“Implementation and Performance Analysis and ACM SIGSOFT Symposium – IS-
of a SIP Enabled Softphone System with ARCS on Quality of Software Architectures
Machine Learning Based QoS Assessment,” – QoSA and Architecting Critical Systems
in 2023 Global Conference on Information – ISARCS, pp. 63–72, Association for Com-
Technologies and Communications, GCITC puting Machinery, 2011.
2023, 2023. [386] J.-F. Rey and C. Thyrland, “Sip technology
[377] M. Ul Hassan, S. A. Chaudhry, and A. Ir- in the enterprise,” Alcatel telecommunica-
shad, “An Improved SIP Authenticated Key tions review, no. 4, pp. 255–260, 2002.
Agreement Based on Dongqing et al.,” Wire- [387] C. A. Thompson, H. A. Latchman, N. An-
less Personal Communications, vol. 110, gelacos, and B. K. Pareek, “A distributed ip-
no. 4, pp. 2087–2107, 2020. based telecommunication system using sip,”
[378] N. M. Markovich and U. R. Krieger, “Sta- International journal of Computer Networks
tistical analysis and modeling of skype voip & Communications, vol. 5, pp. 121–136,
flows,” Computer Communications, vol. 33, 2013.

65
[388] N. L. Tsilas, “The threat to innovation, in- Computing and Sustainable Informatics:
teroperability, and government procurement Proceedings of ICMCSI 2021, pp. 1–16,
options from recently proposed definitions Springer, 2022.
of’open standards’,” International Journal [397] Y. Orlov, Y. Gaidamaka, and E. Zaripova,
of Communications L & Policy, vol. 11, “Approach to estimation of performance
2005. measures for sip server model with batch
[389] M. Cortes, J. O. Esteban, and H. Jun, arrivals,” in International Conference on
“Ise03-3: Towards stateless core: Improving Distributed Computer and Communication
sip proxy scalability,” in IEEE Globecom Networks, pp. 141–150, Springer, 2015.
2006, pp. 1–6, IEEE, 2006. [398] J. Fiedler, T. Kupka, S. Ehlert,
[390] M. Khazaei and N. Mozayani, “A dynamic T. Magedanz, and D. Sisalem, “Voip
distributed overload control mechanism in defender: highly scalable sip-based secu-
sip networks with holonic multi-agent sys- rity architecture,” in Proceedings of the
tems,” Telecommunication Systems, vol. 63, 1st international conference on Prin-
p. 437 – 455, 2016. Cited by: 8. ciples, systems and applications of IP
[391] A. Montazerolghaem, M. H. Y. Moghad- telecommunications, pp. 11–17, 2007.
dam, and F. Tashtarian, “Overload con- [399] A. Montazerolghaem, “Optimized software-
trol in SIP networks: A heuristic approach defined multimedia framework: networking
based on mathematical optimization,” in and computing resource management,”
Proceedings - IEEE Global Communications Journal of Ambient Intelligence and
Conference, GLOBECOM, 2015. Humanized Computing, vol. 14, no. 9,
[392] G. Kambourakis, D. Geneiatakis, S. Gritza- pp. 12981–13001, 2023.
lis, C. Lambrinoudakis, T. Dagiuklas, [400] A. Montazerolghaem, “Optimizing VoIP
S. Ehlert, and J. Fiedler, “High Availabil- server resources using linear programming
ity for SIP: Solutions and Real-Time Mea- model and autoscaling technique: An SDN
surement Performance Evaluation,” Inter- approach,” Concurrency and Computation:
national Journal of Disaster Recovery and Practice and Experience, vol. 33, no. 21,
Business Continuity, vol. 1, no. 1, 2010. 2021.
[393] J. S. Leu, H. C. Hsieh, and Y. C. Chen, “In- [401] J. Liao, J. Wang, T. Li, J. Wang, J. Wang,
expensive high availability solutions for the and X. Zhu, “A distributed end-to-end over-
SIP-based VoIP service,” Multimedia Tools load control mechanism for networks of
and Applications, vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 285–301, sip servers,” Computer Networks, vol. 56,
2011. pp. 2847–2868, 2012.
[394] W. M. Z. L. H. Rongjun, “Method for as-
sociating rtp (real-time transport protocol)
packets in sip (session initiation protocol)
session, device and system thereof,” 2009.
[395] T. Schuster, B. Bougard, P. Raghavan,
R. Priewasser, D. Novo, L. Van der Perre,
and F. Catthoor, “Design of a low power
pre-synchronization asip for multimode sdr
terminals,” in Embedded Computer Sys-
tems: Architectures, Modeling, and Simu-
lation (S. Vassiliadis, M. Bereković, and
T. D. Hämäläinen, eds.), (Berlin, Heidel-
berg), pp. 322–332, Springer Berlin Heidel-
berg, 2007.
[396] A. Karim, E. Ahmed, S. Azam, B. Shan-
mugam, and P. Ghosh, “Mitigating the la-
tency induced delay in ip telephony through
an enhanced de-jitter buffer,” in Mobile

66