AT: Escalation

AT: UQ---2AC
Current deterrence doesn’t cut it
A---INTELLIGENCE---prefer consensus from multiple countries.
Isabel van Brugen, 5-2-2025, Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur. Her
focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war. Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously
worked with news outlets including the Daily Express, The Times, Harper's BAZAAR, and Grazia. She has
an M.A. in Newspaper Journalism at City, University of London, and a B.A. in Russian language at Queen
Mary, University of London. Languages: English, Russian. "Four Signs Russia Could Be Preparing for War
With NATO", [Link], [Link] [Link]
nato-2067095 DSL
German, Lithuanian, and Danish Intelligence Warnings

Germany's intelligence community has sounded the alarm that Russia's ambitions go beyond Ukraine.
A report by Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in March warned that Putin is preparing for a conflict with NATO.

According to the BND assessment, Russia could be fully ready for a "large-scale conventional war" by 2030.

"Russia sees itself in a systemic conflict with the West and is prepared to implement its imperialistic goals through military force, even beyond
Ukraine," the report said.

Meanwhile, Lithuania's intelligence service, VSD, assessed that while Moscow may not yet be ready to launch a full-
scale attack on the alliance, it may attempt to "test NATO" with a limited military operation against one or more
member states to gauge how seriously the bloc will uphold its collective defense obligations.

An attack by Russia on any NATO member would trigger Article 5 of the alliance's charter, which states that a strike on one member state would
be met with a collective response.

The Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS) also warned in February that Russia could be ready to wage a "large-
scale war" in Europe within the next five years. While "there is currently no threat of a regular military attack on the Kingdom," it is likely that
the "military threat from Russia will increase over the coming years," it said.

B---MILITARY SPENDING. Russia’s spending uniquely surpassed Europe’s this year.

Isabel van Brugen, 5-2-2025, Isabel van Brugen is a Newsweek Reporter based in Kuala Lumpur. Her
focus is reporting on the Russia-Ukraine war. Isabel joined Newsweek in 2021 and had previously
worked with news outlets including the Daily Express, The Times, Harper's BAZAAR, and Grazia. She has
an M.A. in Newspaper Journalism at City, University of London, and a B.A. in Russian language at Queen
Mary, University of London. Languages: English, Russian. "Four Signs Russia Could Be Preparing for War
With NATO", [Link], [Link] [Link]
nato-2067095 DSL

Four Signs Russia Could Be Preparing for War With NATO

<<<Text condensed>>>
Russian Military Moves Russia is expanding its military presence along its borders with Finland and Norway in preparation for a potential face off with the military alliance, the Wall Street Journal reported Monday. The Kremlin is planning to establish a new army headquarters in the
Russian city of Petrozavodsk, about 100 miles east of the Finnish border, which will oversee tens of thousands of troops over the next several years. Many of these troops will be deployed to the area after the Ukraine war ends. At the same time, Russia is ramping up military recruitment
and accelerating weapons production. Russian military experts told the newspaper that the buildup along the Finnish border is likely part of President Vladimir Putin's broader preparations for a possible conflict with NATO. Read "When the troops are back [from Ukraine], they will be
looking over the border at a country they consider an adversary," said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow-based defense think tank. "The logic of the last decade shows we're expecting some conflict with NATO." There are
indications that Russia is starting to hold back recently produced equipment from deployment to Ukraine, and is instead reallocating some personnel to other regions, including the Baltics and Nordics, Edward Arnold, senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank,
told Newsweek. "However, this activity is far from a build-up," Arnold said. "Many of the units usually stationed in the north have become combat ineffective while fighting in Ukraine, so this Russian activity is rebalancing and recapitalising lost forces. It does therefore indicate that Russia
is already starting to look 'beyond Ukraine'." German, Lithuanian, and Danish Intelligence Warnings Germany's intelligence community has sounded the alarm that Russia's ambitions go beyond Ukraine. A report by Germany's Federal Intelligence Service (BND) in March warned that Putin
is preparing for a conflict with NATO. According to the BND assessment, Russia could be fully ready for a "large-scale conventional war" by 2030. "Russia sees itself in a systemic conflict with the West and is prepared to implement its imperialistic goals through military force, even beyond
Ukraine," the report said. Meanwhile, Lithuania's intelligence service, VSD, assessed that while Moscow may not yet be ready to launch a full-scale attack on the alliance, it may attempt to "test NATO" with a limited military operation against one or more member states to gauge how
seriously the bloc will uphold its collective defense obligations. An attack by Russia on any NATO member would trigger Article 5 of the alliance's charter, which states that a strike on one member state would be met with a collective response. The Danish Defense Intelligence Service
(DDIS) also warned in February that Russia could be ready to wage a "large-scale war" in Europe within the next five years. While "there is currently no threat of a regular military attack on the Kingdom," it is likely that the "military threat from Russia will increase over the coming years," it
said.

<<<None omitted>>>

Ramped Up Military Spendigng

Russia's military spending is increasing at a record pace, with expenditures expected to reach around
120 billion euros in 2025—more than 6 percent of the country's GDP. That's compared to 3.6 percent
prior to the war.

The Russian army is also set to expand to 1.5 million troops, while the volume of weapons and
equipment stationed along the NATO border is expected to grow by 30–50 percent, according to
BILD's Russia edition.

According to a Military Balance report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies released
February, Russia's military expenditure has surpassed Europe.

Assurances fail to protect European allies.

Taussig 25, Torrey Taussig, director and senior fellow at the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the
Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She was previously a director for European
affairs on the National Security Council and the Department of Defense coordinator for the 2024 NATO
Summit, Atlantic Council, 6-27-2025 ["Four fundamental questions the NATO Summit did not answer,"
available on: [Link]
nato-summit-did-not-answer/, accessed: 6-28-2025]rrf
How committed is the United States to European security?¶ The first unknown is the United States’ political and military commitment to the
transatlantic relationship. Despite reassuring comments from Trump at the close of the summit, several
instances have highlighted this administration’s deep antipathy toward its European allies and partners.
Trump has a long track record of skepticism toward multilateral institutions, including NATO. He has also
said that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia should “do whatever the hell they want” to those
allies that do not pay enough for their defense. And he has repeatedly questioned whether the United States should live up to
its Article 5 collective defense commitments.¶ More recent examples include Trump’s pause of US military assistance
and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, Vice President JD Vance’s scathing speech at the Munich Security
Conference in February, and the infamous “Signalgate” text exchange, in which Vance and Secretary of
Defense Pete Hegseth called Europeans “free-loaders” and “pathetic.” As a result, it’s no surprise that European
leaders have indicated that Trump’s second arrival in the White House has ushered in a new era for the transatlantic relationship, in which
Europeans cannot fully trust or rely on the United States.¶ The United States’ conventional military commitment to
Europe is also in question. At this year’s summit, allies agreed to new capability targets to meet requirements outlined in NATO’s defense plans.
However, these decisions were taken before the United States Department of Defense has completed its Global Posture Review, which is
expected later this year. This review will assess and then recommend where the United States should locate its troops and capabilities around
the world.¶ Early indications are that the United States will look to shift a significant number of troops and
capabilities out of Europe and into theaters the administration deems more critical to US national
security, including the Indo-Pacific and the Middle East. While any changes to the United States’ conventional force posture
in Europe won’t change the overall capabilities that NATO needs to deter and defend, a large-scale shift could overwhelm
European allies that have not planned for an abrupt and significant drawdown.
 AT: US Retrenchment---2AC
LT. AFF leads to better cooperation with the US. Europe is finally viewed as an equal.
Adérito Vicente 24 (PHD in political science with a focus on international relations, European foreign
and security policy, nuclear politics, and transatlantic relations. Holds positions as an Assistant Professor
of International Relations at Lusíada University of Porto, a Non-Resident Fellow at the Odesa Center for
Nonproliferation (OdCNP), Odesa I.I. Mechnikov National University, an External Researcher at the
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies (WMCES) and a PhD Researcher at Political Observatory
(Observatório Político). 2024, “Why Europe Needs a Nuclear Deterrent,” Martens Centre.
[Link] Date
Accessed 6-28-2025//Josh Escayg

Thus, a
European nuclear deterrent could bolster European security and regional stability by supplementing
NATO and diversifying deterrence options, reducing reliance on the US. This could foster a more
balanced ‘partnership of equals’ in which Europe actively contributes to its security. 25 Furthermore, a
European deterrent could grant greater control over security policy, allowing Europe to make independent decisions aligned with its interests
while also enhancing its bargaining power in international negotiations. Additionally, the European clause,
uncontested by the three NPT depositary states (the US, the UK and Russia), provides a legal framework within the non-proliferation and
disarmament regime for a European nuclear deterrent.

LT. Trump would recommit because he has interest in maintaining influence in the
region.

Prefer it—their Erlanger evidence gives 0 warrant as to why Trump would pull out.
Don’t allow them to give analytical explanations later.

LT. Nuclear sharing shows European resolve and is inherently more credible than U.S.
commitments.
Meier 25, Anton Meier, Conflict Researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict
Research (HIIK), Geopolitical Monitor, 7-3-2025 ["“Paris for Berlin” Is Better: A Case for Strengthening
Europe’s Nuclear Deterrence," available on: [Link]
better-a-case-for-strengthening-europes-nuclear-deterrence/, accessed: 7-3-2025]rrf [edited language]

It is often argued that American commitment is misjudged and that, in reality, the bipartisan support
for NATO and extended nuclear deterrence is steadfast. This might be the case, or it might not. But
certainty is equally essential for nuclear deterrence as credibility and capabilities are. Due to the
unpredictability of the current US administration, the resolve of the United States is as ambiguous as
French doctrine. Domestic political instability is a valid concern for extended deterrence , be it by
France or the United States. Political will is never guaranteed. But doctrines can evolve as well. The point
is not to build a flawless system, but a credible and adaptive one. ¶ While there is no unified European nuclear arsenal, this does not preclude
the development of a more formalised collective nuclear deterrence posture. Currently,
France and the United Kingdom do
not offer extended deterrence like the United States does. But this can change. A framework in which
France and the UK explicitly extend their nuclear umbrellas to European allies, through doctrine, joint
exercises, and nuclear sharing arrangements, would not only strengthen deterrence itself but also
provide an urgently needed political signal of European resolve. Of course, the fundamental commitment issue of
extended deterrence remains: would a state really sacrifice one of its own cities for the sake of an ally? The answer becomes less abstract
when the trade-off is “Paris-for-Berlin” or “London-for-Warsaw,” rather than “New York-for-Paris.” The psychological and political calculus
shifts dramatically when nuclear escalation unfolds on one’s own continent. The proximity of European capitals
geographically, but also politically and socially, means that any nuclear aggression would inevitably
affect all of Europe, regardless of initial targets. Therefore, extended deterrence offered by a
European state will inherently be more credible than anything the U nited States can offer.¶ The Curse of
Geography¶ As President Macron rightly noted, it is unimaginable that a threat to one European ally
would not also be a threat to France, or the United Kingdom . This is not a rhetorical figure but a
geographic reality. Unlike the United States, Europe is compact and densely interconnected. A nuclear strike
anywhere in Europe would have political, environmental, and humanitarian consequences across
borders. In this context, European extended deterrence should be considered significantly more
credible than what the United States offers.¶ Additionally, the close proximity makes lower-yield or
“tactical” nuclear war not merely undesirable, but strategically [self-destructive] suicidal. Europe cannot
afford to fight a nuclear war on its own soil. This makes the development of a distinctly European
nuclear doctrine essential. While such a doctrine does not yet exist, the debate must begin. It should be shaped by a clear rejection
of nuclear warfighting and guided by the need for credible deterrence through the threat of unacceptable retaliation. The shared
geography, history, and increasing sense of political identity among Europeans, despite all internal
disagreements, provide a basis for this doctrine that is stronger than outside observers often assume.

AT: First Strike---2AC

NL. First strike requires literally 100% preordained certainty which is impossible.
Kroenig ’18 [Matthew; 2018; Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Former Special Government Employee and Senior
Policy Adviser to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and
Capability/Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Director of the Global Strategy Initiative and Deputy
Director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council; Oxford University
Press; The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, “Strategic Stability,”
Ch. 6]

To be sure, if a nuclear war were preordained to occur with 100% certainty, then an inferior state might
have good reason to go first, but the risk of nuclear war is never certain. Indeed, the risk of nuclear
war is in the control of both states. To avoid any risk of nuclear conflict, all they must do is capitulate.
While an unattractive option, it is more desirable than intentionally launching a devastating nuclear war
that it is bound to lose. Indeed, even the highly stylized game theoretic model in chapter 1, which relies on a spontaneous risk
of nuclear war, assumes that states can avoid any further risk of catastrophe by submitting at any stage
of the crisis.

NL. France and the UK are coordinating on nuclear weapons---that should’ve triggered
their link.
David Sheppard & Leila Abboud 25 , 7-9-2025, "UK and France vow to co-ordinate nuclear weapons
for first time", [Link] Amartya R.

The UK and France have pledged for the first time to co-ordinate the use of their nuclear weapons,
saying they would jointly respond to protect Europe from any “extreme threat”.

The announcement by Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, during a state visit by the
French president to Britain, marks a significant step-up in co-operation between Europe’s two nuclear
powers as they seek to respond to a growing threat from Russia.
It also comes as President Donald Trump has cast doubt on US commitment to collective defence on the continent, prompting interest in some
European countries, including Germany, for London and Paris to extend their nuclear umbrella.

The UK government said on Wednesday the agreement with France meant “for the first time that the respective deterrents of both countries
are independent but can be co-ordinated”.

“There is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by both nations ,” the UK
added. “As such, any adversary threatening the vital interests of Britain or France could be confronted
by the strength of the nuclear forces of both nations.”

NO TIMEFRAME WEIGHING. First strike requires going through several political

processes and services and is likely to be stopped by intervening actors since multiple
people confirm orders and generals know it is the end. Nothing is immediate.

AT: Provocation---2AC
NL. Their evidence never indicates Russia responds on a nuclear scale and doesn’t
warrant out how Russia would respond. Don’t allow them to go for this link and weigh
and extinction impact

NL. France can already cause unacceptable damage so building up capabilities isn’t
necessary.

LT. Affirming solves rapid French escalation through diversification.

Majcin 25 (Juraj Majcin is a highly qualified Slovak policy analyst with a BA in International Relations
from the University of Geneva and an MA/LLM in International Law from the Geneva Graduate Institute.
He currently serves at EPC, focusing on European and transatlantic security, defense cooperation,
cybersecurity, and countering hybrid threats. 6.23.25, “From umbrella to arsenal: boosting Europe’s
nuclear deterrence”, European Policy Centre,
[Link] //
DSL
STEPS: LEVERAGING EXISTING CAPABILITIES Since neither France nor the United Kingdom has yet signalled any significant changes to their
strategic nuclear posture, this section focuses primarily on France’s
tactical (sub-strategic) air-launched forces, which
offer greater flexibility for signalling, forward deployment, and cooperation with European partners.
These more agile capabilities position France as the most likely candidate to take further steps toward a European-led nuclear posture. To
extend its nuclear deterrent to encompass broader European defence, France
must begin with incremental but
symbolically powerful steps—especially those that send clear signals to Moscow. One such step is the
geographic expansion of France’s nuclear exercises to NATO’s eastern and northern flanks, with active
participation from European allies. A strong precedent was set during the Pegasus 2025 exercise in the
High North, which featured French nuclear-capable Rafale jets operating alongside Swedish Gripens. 29
Similarly, Italy’s involvement by contributing a refuelling aircraft to France’s quarterly Operation Poker nuclear drills in 202230 illustrates the
potential for allied cooperation. On the institutional level, it is important that France pursue a structured dialogue on nuclear posture with its
NATO allies. The most obvious option is for France to join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), a move historically seen as controversial in
Paris31 due to concerns regarding the independence of France’s nuclear arsenal. Alternatively, France, possibly alongside the United Kingdom
and other interested allies, could establish a dedicated multilateral European forum for nuclear planning and information-sharing. However, the
coexistence of two overlapping frameworks— NATO’s
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and a Frenchled bilateral or
multilateral structure—risks creating duplication and policy inconsistencies that could undermine the
coherence of NATO’s overall nuclear planning. In this context, France’s integration into the NPG may
represent the most effective and strategically sound approach. To reinforce its commitment, France
could consider building storage facilities for its ASMP-A cruise missiles and future ASN4G hypersonic
nuclear missiles on allied territory, such as in Sweden or Poland. While this would fall short of formal forward deployment, the creation of such infrastructure, combined
with the training of local non-French personnel in loading procedures for Rafale jets, would send a strong deterrent signal. This would not only enhance symbolic reassurance for allies, but also give France greater flexibility to pre-position nuclear-capable Rafale aircraft, thereby expanding
its options for nuclear signalling toward Moscow. Furthermore, periodic drills and exercises involving the deployment of French aircraft and equipment, whether carrying dummy rounds or real weapons, on allied territory would deepen operational integration. These exercises could
include practice runs for mounting weapons, aircraft take-offs, and dispersal procedures. Coupled with a regular rotation of French nuclearcapable aircraft through these sites, this approach would establish a credible and flexible deterrence posture that keeps Russia uncertain while
avoiding the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons outside of France. Since arrangements such as constructing storage facilities for nuclear missiles or training personnel would require substantial financial investment, host nations should be prepared to provide the necessary funding.
Such a commitment would demonstrate the host country’s long-term strategic alignment with France as a deploying state, as well as its willingness to share the financial burdens associated with extending the nuclear umbrella. THE NEXT BIG STEP: GROUND-BASED STRIKE CAPABILITIES
Effectively deterring Russia’s vast and diverse nuclear arsenal without the United States will demand more than the current capabilities of France and the United Kingdom. To establish a credible deterrent, both nations will need to undertake significant modernisation and expansion of
their nuclear forces. This includes not only increasing the number of warheads but also investing in the development and deployment of new, more flexible delivery systems. While the air-launched cruise missiles remain backbone of France’s airborne nuclear deterrent, mobile
groundlaunched cruise or ballistic missile systems would provide clear operational advantages to deter Russia’s growing tactical arsenal. Mobile land-based missiles can be launched rapidly from within defended territory, ensuring a prompt and reliable second-strike capability. Their
mobility makes them harder to detect and neutralize, offering a persistent and resilient deterrent with proportionate, low-yield strike options. Given the high cost, the development of groundlaunched nuclear-capable missile systems would require significant investment from France
and/or its allies. With Paris already dedicating roughly 15% of its annual defence budget to nuclear deterrence,32 such capabilities (particularly the delivery vehicles) could be funded through strategic partnerships. The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties already provide a framework for
bilateral cooperation with the United Kingdom in this domain and could be expanded to support joint development of a ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile. France’s role would be key as, aside from ArianeGroup, no other major European defence firm is able to produce ballistic
missiles beyond short-range systems.33 In the case of cruise missiles, MBDA already produces the Storm Shadow/SCALP missile operated by both the UK and France, as well as France’s already mentioned nuclear tipped ASMP-A, and could also play a central role. Alternatively, a broader
European effort could be envisioned. The European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA), launched at the July 2024 NATO Summit by France, Germany, Italy, and Poland, and later joined by Sweden and the United Kingdom, aims to deliver a European-made long-range strike capability with
a range of 1,000 to 2,000 kilometres.34 However, as ELSA focuses on conventional strike systems, it remains unclear whether the platform designs under consideration could also be adapted for nuclear payloads. Participating states should consider incorporating requirements for
potential nuclear compatibility as an additional pillar of the ELSA initiative. CONCLUSION Without the United States, Europe’s nuclear deterrent pales in comparison to the vast and varied arsenal that Moscow commands. Recent history has shown that, unlike NATO, Russia does not
hesitate to use nuclear threats as instruments of coercion. Recent history has shown that, unlike NATO, Russia does not hesitate to use nuclear threats as instruments of coercion. While nuclear weapons alone do not guarantee deterrence, effective deterrence against a nucleararmed
adversary is impossible without credible nuclear capabilities of one’s own. Yet, given the political and legal constraints, particularly those enshrined in the international non-proliferation regime, the creation of a unified European nuclear force remains unrealistic. What is realistic, and
urgently needed, is a strategic shift by France and the United Kingdom. Understandably, concerns may arise about how Russia would react to the deployment of new nuclear capabilities in Europe. However, it is important to remember that the Western response to Russian aggression—
whether in Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, or Ukraine in 2022—has consistently been reactive, measured, and far from escalatory. Russia has, in turn, interpreted these Western responses as weakness, and continued its aggression. It is important to remember that the Western
response to Russian aggression— whether in Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, or Ukraine in 2022—has consistently been reactive, measured, and far from escalatory. The essence of Cold War nuclear diplomacy was not escalation management, but balance: responding in kind to preserve
stability. With Russia having withdrawn from the INF Treaty, developed new intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and now preparing to deploy the Oreshnik system on NATO’s doorstep, it is imperative that European allies respond adequately. Failure to do so, especially in the event of

reduced US commitment, risks creating a dangerous nuclear asymmetry on the continent that Moscow will undoubtedly seek to exploit.

NL. Their evidence saying France fails doesn’t make sense. Even if it’s only responsive,
we only need to win unacceptable damage to win deterrence.

AT: Signaling Fails---2AC

Affirming boosts NATO credibility---that strengthens security guarantees which solves.
Verstraete 24 , Wannes Verstraete is a PhD Researcher and Teaching Assistant at the Political Science
Department of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), specialising in deterrence and arms control, and is an
Associate Fellow at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations. He holds an MA in Political
Science from the University of Ghent and an MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from the
University of Antwerp. He previously did internships at the Security Policy Directorate of the Belgian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021) and the Belgian Chamber of Representatives (2018). 2-13-2024,
"Strengthening the Political Credibility of NATO Extended Nuclear Deterrence", Egmont Royal Institute
for International Relations, [Link]
nato-extended-nuclear-deterrence/ doa 6/28/25 aa
A European dialogue on nuclear strategy The last alternative options to mitigate the political credibility challenge are
expanding information sharing, planning and consultations on nuclear weapons issues within NATO (especially
in the NPG), but also creating a separate European dialogue on nuclear strategy (in or outside of
NATO). French President Macron said in 2020: “I would like strategic dialogue to develop with our European partners, which are ready for it,
on the role played by France’s nuclear deterrence in our collective security”.27 Comparably, such a dialogue could also be situated within
NATO. European member states that are part of the NPG could, for instance, informally discuss nuclear strategy issues that are related to the
European theatre. The
major problem with this idea is of course that France does not participate in the NPG
and stated that it will remain outside of the NPG in the future. Nevertheless, a
possible French accession to the NPG would
considerably strengthen the European voice and solidarity within the Alliance on nuclear matters. This
could be the first step toward a European nuclear pillar within NATO and could also mitigate the
political credibility issue because all the European allies would engage (formally) on equal footing in a
dialogue on nuclear deterrence regarding their own region. CONCLUSION As a result of the deteriorating
security environment, NATO needs to maintain a credible nuclear strategy. As arises from the discussion of the
alternatives, the following elements are key to mitigating the political credibility challenge related to extended nuclear deterrence. The sharing
of responsibilities and risks between nuclear and non-nuclear allies is a crucial element in this regard. For instance, increased participation and
national contributions by non-nuclear allies regarding CSNO would result in greater trust amongst the allies – crucial for reassurance – given
they would play a more active role in the successful execution of the nuclear mission. Subsequently, the importance of communication was also
mentioned. Concerning external communication, the capitals of non-nuclear allies should pursue a more active declaratory policy that
reinforces the nuclear messaging for the Alliance. Regarding internal communication, increased information sharing, planning, consultation, and
dialogue between European allies would facilitate the creation of a shared threat perception regarding the nuclear landscape in the region. Due
to the more dangerous future ahead, NATO
should thus proactively address uncertainties that could harm the
credibility of the Alliance’s nuclear strategy by strengthening the role of European allies.

AT: Cohesion
On civil war. Their evidence says it’s inevitable, since either party winning causes
backlash. Also no internal link to NUCLEAR war, which is what their impact ev is about.
The card is inserted for reference
Ulrik Franke, 6-28-2024, "What France’s Surprise Elections Could Mean for Its Relations with the
World", [Link]
relations-with-the-world/ [Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign
Relations, based in Paris. She works on European defense questions, in particular Franco-German
cooperation, and researches the use of new technologies in warfare.] DOA: 7/10/2025 //RRM

///What appears certain is that with a new French government, whether it is right-wing, left-wing, or from a centrist minority, France will lose any ability to take
on leadership roles in foreign and defense policy. This, incidentally, might even happen if Macron magically wins a majority or if, in a case of no majority for any
side, a technocratic government is put in place: France is facing budgetary trouble as it has been running budget deficits in excess of E.U. limits, for which the
European Union might impose financial penalties. Theincreasingly polarized French political landscape could also lead to
further unrest — Macron has warned of the risk of a “civil war” following a right-wing or left-wing
victory at the election. While these statements seem unhelpful in the currently heated climate, one cannot exclude the possibility of
protests, including violent ones, following the election. Any future government might thus struggle to lead initiatives on
foreign policy, given the challenges on the domestic front.

EU unity is rapidly declining.

Youngs 25 [Richard Youngs; Senior fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program, based
@ Carnegie Europe. 4-10-2025, "A Turning Point, or Not? Principles for a New European Order,"
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [Link]
turning-point-or-not-principles-for-a-new-european-order?lang=en, DOA: 7-10-2025] shaan
So, if the minimalist reading is that European governments need to heed Trump’s insistence that they boost defense spending, the maximalist
interpretation is that the region faces a deeper structural challenge that embodies major shifts in global order and power balances—and
therefore requires more qualitative change in the organization of the European order. While the reshaping of the global order
ritually elicits a straightforward plea for more EU unity, it might more convincingly invite a deeper refounding of the
processes that sustain the European order.

The depth of international change suggests that European governments need to work back from a wider vision of a future global order and fit
the institutions of the European order around it. This approach would be an inversion
of the current one of retrofitting
processes and structures that were designed for fundamentally different aims and times. It would recognize
that current efforts to salvage the transatlantic alliance rest on a fragile hope that deflects European governments from deeper underlying
trends—that Trump is a symptom as much as a cause of today’s turning point. If the emerging era undercuts core principles of justice in
international relations, the ramifications are likely to be far-reaching to the extent that the current European architecture was based on just
these premises.

The EU Level

A standard European response to any crisis is that the most necessary priority is to deepen EU integration. Yet, this looks increasingly
problematic. The fact that the EU
did not reform itself deeply in response to any other crisis in recent years—the
eurozone crisis, the pandemic, the 2022 invasion—has contributed to citizen grievances that now drive a second wave of
nationalist populism. Each time the EU pushes such reform down the road by agreeing on notable steps
forward in one or two policy areas, but without updating the basic shape of the European project, these
underlying problems, strains, and divergences deepen.

The route toward completing European political union looks even harder now because a schism has
opened not only between Europe, on the one hand, and the United States and other illiberal powers, on
the other, but also between the liberal and illiberal camps within Europe. In fact, the European hard
right itself seems to be pulled in different directions: Its identity strand is aligned with Trump, while its
nationalist strand bristles at U.S. actions against European interests.

Populists win now

Bremmer 25, Ian Bremmer, foreign affairs columnist and editor-at-large at TIME. He is the president
of Eurasia Group, a political-risk consultancy, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing
intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs, TIME, 7-11-2025 ["Why Europe's Far Right Will
Keep Gaining Ground," available on: [Link]
accessed: 7-11-2025]rrf

The 2015 migrant crisis still hangs over Europe. The more than 1.3 million migrants—particularly from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq—who
claimed asylum that year has been a boon for grievance-driven European populism and its most talented practitioners. The upshot is a cultural
and economic anxiety that has transformed the continent’s political landscape.¶ And yet, the first 10 years of the far right’s rise have amounted
to a “yes, but” decade. In Germany, the Alternative for Germany party has steadily expanded its regional and federal influence, but all other
major parties still treat political collaboration with it as taboo. In France, the populist Marine Le Pen has shown she can reach the second round
of presidential elections, but has been unable to claim victory. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni in 2022 became the first anti-immigrant populist to win a
big European election, but her strong cooperation with Brussels and consistent support for Ukraine has helped her defy far-right stereotypes. In
the U.K., Brexit champion Nigel Farage might now be polling in first place, but that’s still some distance from winning the next general elections
in 2029.¶ Centrist governments have also emerged this year after elections in Germany and Romania, despite a rise in support for the far right.
Meanwhile, the Dutch government, led by the far-right Party for Freedom, collapsed in June, and the Austrian Freedom Party has failed to form
a ruling coalition despite winning elections in September.¶ For now, E.U. institutions are holding up fine. Pro-E.U. parties continue to dominate
politics in Brussels and the risk that Euroskeptics can create gridlock remains low. In the European Parliament, the centrist coalition that backed
Ursula von der Leyen for a second term as European Commission President will hold together despite growing tensions. In the European
Council, just four of 27 members (Hungary, Slovakia, Italy, and the Czech Republic) are led by nationalist governments. But Brussels has finally
managed to limit the ability of far-right governments to shift E.U. policies, and Meloni and Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala cooperate closely
with von der Leyen.¶ All
that said, the next few years will offer big opportunities from Europe’s anti-migrant,
Euroskeptic far right. Questions about economic resilience and stubbornly high prices remain the main
sources of economic anxiety for voters. Even as immigration policies have been tightened and the
number of asylum seekers in Europe has fallen, the long-term presence of migrants amid stagnating
economies will continue to feed voter anger. The economic pressures applied by Donald Trump’s trade
war compound public frustration with their current governments. In short, there’s no reason to believe
far-right parties and politicians will fall silent or fail to score future political gains at the expense of
beleaguered centrist establishments.¶ Two years from now, far-right parties will have their best-ever
shot at capitalizing on mounting voter anger with national elections in France, Italy, Spain, and Poland.
In France, though Le Pen is currently barred from seeking the presidency following an embezzlement
conviction in March, her National Rally party could finally sweep to power in the heart of Europe . In Italy,
Meloni will face pressure to adopt more Euroskeptic positions on high-profile issues in the run-up to
elections. In Spain, the center-right Popular Party will likely lead the next government but could be
forced to welcome the far-right Vox into a coalition for the first time. In Poland, steadily eroding support
for Prime Minister Donald Tusk could pave the way for a return of right-wing nationalist parties to power
there. The far-right Karol Nawrocki has already prevailed in the June presidential elections, and he will
take office in August.¶ Taken together, these developments would shift the balance of power in the
populists’ favor, transforming how the E.U. defines its values and its interests. The potential fallout—whether on
the rule of law, security and economic matters, internal borders, dealing with an expansionist Russia, or even the future of the E.U. itself—
remains grave.

LT. The AFF increases cohesion.

Mammadov 25 [Ali Mammadov; Ph.D. researcher @ George Mason University’s Schar School of
Policy and Government, 6-12-2025, "If America Abandons Europe, Will the Continent Fragment or
Unify?," War on the Rocks, [Link]
continent-fragment-or-unify/, DOA: 7-10-2025] shaan
Europe Left Alone Yet More United

In the first scenario, European

NATO member states respond to a sustained American withdrawal by
expanding their security capacities through a range of measures, including the formation of new
partnerships, the enlargement of their armed forces, and the strengthening of domestic defense industries. Unlike more ambiguous past
episodes, Washington is now making its intentions clear through concrete actions — systematically
withdrawing from Europe and signaling that it no longer considers the continent a strategic priority by
either de jure or de facto dismissal of security agreements. In an effort to concentrate on countering China and driving a
wedge between Beijing and Moscow, Washington either intensifies cooperation with Moscow or begins clearly recognizing a Russian sphere of
influence in its immediate neighborhood. These moves send a message that the U.S.-European alliance is no longer a U.S. priority, and the
United States is not likely to be positioned to come to Europe’s defense in the event of Russian aggression — or be willing to do so.

European leaders come to recognize that their only viable path forward lies in developing a more unified
and strategically coherent security architecture. In the absence of U.S. leadership, previously peripheral actors become more
central. The United Kingdom, despite no longer being part of the European Union, takes an important role by mobilizing support from
Commonwealth countries such as Canada and Australia to contribute to European security initiatives. At the same time, the United Kingdom
maintains close ties with the United States and increasingly acts as a bridge between the two sides of the Atlantic.
France leads the initiative to reshape Europe’s defense posture, with Germany — initially cautious —
joining as the urgency of the situation becomes clear. Over time, countries like Norway, already closely aligned with the
European Union, move toward full membership, further consolidating the European defense framework. The European
Security Council evolves into a more robust and active institution, increasingly taking on strategic
coordination responsibilities.

To compensate for the loss of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, France

and the United Kingdom jointly develop a European
nuclear deterrent framework, offering protection to E.U. and partner states in the new security
environment.

Although Europe’s overall military capacity remains limited, a significant degree of deterrence is achieved through intensified
cooperation and an unprecedented level of political unity. Major defense capabilities are developed and strategically
positioned, with a particular focus on bolstering troop presence and military infrastructure in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe to deter
potential Russian aggression.

As confidence in NATO declines, several European countries reduce their contributions to the alliance and begin to question its relevance
altogether. Some even consider formally withdrawing or adopting a more passive role, viewing continued alignment with the United States as a
constraint on foreign policy — particularly in relation to China. Over time, Western European states begin reassessing their broader strategic
priorities, seeking to balance multiple global challenges, while Eastern European countries continue to view Russia as the principal and
immediate threat.

Despite occasional disagreements from states such as Hungary and Slovakia, Europe
manages to maintain a degree of
cohesion. This growing unity fosters the emergence of a distinct European identity in international
affairs, defined by the capacity to pursue independent strategic objectives . As a result, Europe increasingly positions
itself as a global power, balancing between the United States and China, while also independently
cultivating partnerships with emerging actors such as India and various Central Asian states.
The End of European Multilateralism

This scenario builds on the core premise that Europe’s transformation from a continent of conflict to a liberal success story was made possible in large part by long-standing U.S. security guarantees.

As in the previous scenarios, the initial response to a U.S. withdrawal is a concerted European effort to increase defense capacity. The United Kingdom becomes more deeply engaged in continental security and shares a leadership role with France, while Germany accelerates its
rearmament and begins to close the capability gap. In the early phase, this cooperative momentum holds. Faced with the shared urgency of deterring immediate threats, particularly from Russia, European states coordinate military investments, intelligence sharing, and regional force
deployments with relatively little friction.

Over time, however, as national capacities grow and the immediate sense of unity fades, underlying tensions begin to resurface. France — long invested in shaping Europe’s strategic direction — grows uneasy about the prominent role of the United Kingdom, a non-E.U. member, in
continental security affairs. The United Kingdom, for its part, remains committed to a strong presence in Europe and shows little interest in deferring to E.U. leadership. Rising militarization, combined with the ascent of right-wing political forces across the continent, brings renewed focus
to questions of national status, strategic autonomy, and geopolitical influence.

Germany, having rapidly expanded its defense capabilities, begins to assert that its growing role warrants greater strategic influence — particularly in decisions traditionally shaped by Franco-British leadership. The inclusive and consensus-driven model of European multilateralism begins
to erode, giving way to new patterns of fragmentation, rivalry, and regional alignment.

In this increasingly competitive environment, European states begin prioritizing bilateral, interest-driven partnerships — both among themselves and with external actors. With multilateral institutions losing coherence, states pursue transactional arrangements tailored to their own
security and strategic needs. Confronted with prolonged uncertainty and lacking a credible collective deterrent, some Eastern European countries — particularly those geographically vulnerable or politically divided — may even adopt a bandwagoning approach by seeking limited
accommodation with Russia. Meanwhile, other states on the periphery, such as Poland, the Baltic countries, or Finland, strengthen bilateral defense ties with like-minded partners in an effort to resist Russian influence as much as possible.

Rising uncertainty and deepening divisions bring long-suppressed historical tensions back to the surface, particularly territorial disputes and ethnic grievances. In the Balkans, the unresolved Kosovar–Serbian issue reignites, with Russia openly supporting Serbian claims and emboldening
nationalist elements. Across Central and Eastern Europe, the resurgence of nationalism prompts Hungary to pursue a more assertive policy aimed at “protecting Hungarian-speaking populations” in Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia, fueling regional friction. Russia intensifies its hybrid
operations across the Baltics, the Balkans, and Moldova, justifying its actions by invoking the need to defend “Russian-speaking minorities” in these areas. Meanwhile, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the absence of a robust deterrent framework encourages Turkey to escalate its
involvement in Cyprus, raising the risk of a direct confrontation with Greece.

What Europe Needs to Do to Achieve Unity and Avoid Fragmentation

Whether Europe moves toward strategic unity or drifts into fragmentation will depend not only on the
trajectory of U.S. disengagement, but also on Europe’s ability to confront internal divisions and respond pragmatically to a more
fluid global order. While the United States has not fully withdrawn from Europe, its long-term commitment appears increasingly uncertain. The
challenge for Europe is not to replace U.S. leadership outright, but to build the resilience
and internal coordination needed to
manage growing security responsibilities amid shifting global alignments.
Strategic autonomy, even in a limited form, will likely face considerable headwinds. Europe is internally divided by geography, threat
perception, and political will — and also constrained by structural factors. Defense spending remains uneven, energy dependence is
unresolved, and aging populations place pressure on budgets and manpower alike. The capacity to project power independently — especially in
nuclear terms — remains far below that of the United States or Russia.

In light of these realities, near-term efforts may center more on practical coordination. Joint
procurement in key areas such as
missile defense, cyber capabilities, and logistics may offer more immediate gains. Enhanced interoperability
among command structures, particularly across eastern and western members, could reduce duplication and build trust
incrementally. A loose leadership framework — anchored in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom — may serve as a useful starting
point, especially if it includes participation from Poland, Italy, and the Nordics.

Externally, Europe will likely continue to hedge. Deeper partnerships with Japan, Australia, ASEAN, and others could help reduce exposure to
overdependence on any one actor, particularly China. The relationship with Turkey will remain complicated, yet strategically indispensable,
especially given its position as a NATO ally and its independent regional posture.

The path toward autonomy will not be quick or comprehensive. It will be shaped less by quick solutions than by incremental adaptation, flexible
coalitions, and shared burdens where feasible. Europe’s ability to coordinate within these constraints may determine not only the future of its
unity — but its relevance in a world of dispersed power and conditional alignments.

No impact to EU Populism---majority can’t win, mimic moderates, or are politically

excluded.
Moravcsik 20 [Andrew Moravcsik; Professor of politics and director of the European Union Program
@ Princeton University, 10-11-2020, "Why Europe Wins," FOREIGN POLICY,
[Link] DOA: 7-
12-2025] shaan

Over the past two decades, extreme-right

populist parties with anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant, anti-terrorist, and anti-Europe appeal
have increased their vote shares across Europe. They now participate in government in six countries. In
Britain, they spearheaded Brexit. And in the last two decades, scholars—and, it seems, journalists—have written more about
extreme-right populist parties than all other European parties combined.

Leading foreign-policy pundits argue that homegrown extremism in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere—and not
rising great-power challengers—now poses the greatest threat to the post-Cold War liberal international order. In Europe,
many fear that extremist governments might win more EU exit referendums or join Trump and Putin in adopting
protectionist and pro-Russia stances.

Yet this proved to be journalistic hype. Rather than panicking over populist threats, European leaders
calmly drained their energy by dampening migration and terrorism and hanging tough in negotiations with Britain—to
which they can now add the political benefit of managing the coronavirus pandemic well. Today, European
unity—in any case, a practical necessity for small and highly interdependent states—is more popular than at any time in
recent history.

In fact, populists were never as powerful as headlines made them seem. Consider the case of Marine Le Pen,
who heads the French extreme-right National Rally party. When she ran for the French presidency in 2017, newspapers across the
globe proclaimed, as one New York Times article put it, that “the next president of France will be Marine Le Pen” and
speculated what her administration would do once in office. Yet her campaign was clearly hopeless from the start. All of
her potential rivals, polls showed, could defeat her by comfortable double-digit margins, and Emmanuel
Macron eventually did so by winning twice as many votes. Today, the National Rally holds just seven of 577 seats in the National Assembly.
Outside of Britain, extreme Euroskepticism enjoys scant support.

The impotence of the extreme-right in France is no exception. Outside of Britain, extreme

Euroskepticism enjoys scant support. Of 27 EU members (plus Britain), 12 have no extreme-right or Euroskeptic
party at all or none that scores above 10 percent in national elections. In 10 more countries, including France and Germany, other
parties consistently exclude extremists from government coalitions. In three more—Latvia, Estonia, and Bulgaria—
extremists participate only as minority coalition partners, which reduces their influence close to zero.
Only in Britain, Hungary, and Poland does an extreme-right or Euroskeptic party actually lead the government. Of course, their extremism
poses threats to the quality of democracy and rule of law, as in the United States, but their effect on
foreign policy is slight. Migration is the only EU issue on which policy has moved in a direction extremists favor—but this, as we have
seen, is only because the position held by extremists happens to be that of large majorities of moderate voters in nearly every country.
Otherwise, Poland and Hungary, both of which are among the biggest beneficiaries of EU policies and have exceptionally pro-EU populations,
follow their neighbors on nearly every aspect of external policy, from sanctions on Russia to
development aid to Africa—dissenting occasionally only on symbolic declarations. That leaves Brexit as the only
major Euroskeptic achievement of a populist party in recent years.

Yet Brexit is, at best, an exception that proves the rule. That it happened at all reflects a perfect storm of astonishingly unlikely circumstances
unrepeatable elsewhere. Britain is the only European country where Euroskepticism attracts more than a tiny fringe of the electorate. Even so,
Brexit could happen only because a prime minister overruled his advisors to call an unnecessary referendum, which happened to fall at the only
brief moment in the last five years when a majority of Britons opposed EU membership. Brexit was later ratified by an election in which a 44
percent vote share gave Boris Johnson a comfortable majority: Without Britain’s electoral institutions, the most biased in Europe, a pro-EU
majority would have ruled instead.

Today, Brexit remains stalled. Britain is much smaller and dependent on Europe’s good will to gain access for nearly half of its exports,
particularly of services like banking. This allows Europe to take a tough stance in negotiations over the terms of the U.K. withdrawal. British
Brexiteers once hoped that Trump would bail them out with a quick trade agreement. Yet U.S.-U.K. negotiations have gone nowhere after the
United States badgered the British about agricultural imports and aircraft subsidies. Trump embarrasses prime ministers on his visits, remains
unpopular among the British public, and is struggling to be reelected. Britain is running out of options.

These realities, combined with the more general lack of support for their Euroskeptic views, have led
populists elsewhere to moderate their ideas rather than follow London’s lead. Five years ago, 15 extreme-right
parties, including Le Pen’s National Rally, advocated a Brexit-style withdrawal from the EU or the eurozone. Today none do. Even so, the most
worrisome populist challenger in Europe, Matteo Salvini of the League party, is hemorrhaging popular support to the Brothers of Italy, a new
and less Euroskeptic right-wing party. The wave of populist Euroskepticism seems to have crested.

Commitments are durable – prefer decades of commitment despite changing political

dynamics
Lucy Rand et al, 10-xx-2024, Lindsay Rand, PhD is a postdoctoral fellow at the Stanford Center for
International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and a Fellow at CISSM. She completed her PhD in
international security and economic policy at the UMD School of Public Policy in 2023. Prior to CISAC,
Lindsay was a Stanton predoctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. "Nuclear Sharing in Europe", No Publication,
[Link]
4499393c5a-1729169144/[Link] DOA 7.2.2025//flin

Trends in Nuclear Sharing Through comparing different cases of nuclear sharing arrangements, several trends emerge. First, nuclear
sharing
arrangements tend to be very durable. Most Western countries that have instituted a nuclear sharing
arrangement have held on to the practice for 70 years, despite drastic transformations in threat
environments, changes in government and, at times, tense bilateral relations with the United States.
Although nuclear sharing arrangements may be motivated by contemporary geopolitics , this sticking power

imposes a long-term commitment that must be considered when deliberating on the costs and
benefits of a nuclear sharing arrangement.