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Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code with reference to Jurisdiction

under Various Special Enactments

by
Sri [Link] Kamal,
Civil Judge (Junior Division),
Lakkireddipalli

INTRODUCTION
Jurisdiction derived from the Latin word “jurisdictio”, Juris meaning "law"
and dictio meaning "to speak" is the practical authority granted to a formally
constituted legal body to deal with and make pronouncements on legal matters
and, by implication, to administer justice within a defined area of responsibility.
The term is also used to denote the geographical area or subject-matter to which
such authority applies.
Jurisdiction draws its substance from public international law, conflict of
laws, constitutional law and the powers of the executive and legislative branches of
government to allocate resources to best serve the needs of its native society.
The word jurisdiction signifies the scope of power and authority Jurisdiction
is the extant of the power which is conferred upon the court by its constitution to
try a proceeding .It is a power of a court to hear and determine a cause, to
adjudicate or exercise judicial power.
In the year 1928, the Calcutta High Court attempted to explain the meaning
of the term jurisdiction in the case of Hriday Nath Roy v. Akhil Chandra Roy,
the court stated: "jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine a
cause, to adjudicate and exercise judicial powers in relation to it." It went further
and demarcated three different categories of jurisdictions:

1. Subject matter jurisdiction:

Subject matter implies the main or the fundamental matter of a particular
nature which is under question subject matter jurisdiction essentially states
whether the court has the authority to try the subject matter in question. If
primarily specifies whether the courts are allowed to try matters of a certain
nature. If not, then the courts cannot try that particular case.

2. Pecuniary jurisdiction:
Pecuniary implies related to capital. It means of a certain monetary value. A
court can have certain financial limitations which the courts should adhere to and
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beyond which the courts cannot try the matter. The primary aim of setting a
pecuniary Jurisdiction is to preclude the higher courts from getting burdened and at
the same time extend help to the parties.

3. Territorial jurisdiction:
Also known as local jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction lays down the
geographical limits of a court's authority. It ensures that such limits of courts are
clarified clearly and specifically. No court is authorized to try matters which exist
beyond their respective territorial limit.
Apart from the above three classifications, jurisdictions are also divided on
the basis of "original", and "appellate Jurisdiction or "exclusive" and "concurrent
jurisdiction" Additionally, the jurisdiction of the court is not decided on the
arguments of the defense but on the basis of the allegations made in the
complaint. An order passed by court lacking jurisdiction is nullified and is
unenforceable.
The maxim "Ubi Jud Ibi Remedium" (where ever there is a right there is a
remedy), it is a fundamental principle of law. Any person having a right has a
corresponding remedy to institute suits in a court unless the jurisdiction of the
court is barred. Whenever the object of the proceedings is the enforcement of civil
rights, a civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit independently.
Section 9 of C.P.C deals with jurisdiction of civil courts to try cases which are
civil in nature and which arises out of civil dispute subjected to bar of cognizance to
try those cases.
Disputes may either be of a civil nature or not of a civil nature. This section
only empowers a court to entertain actions of a civil nature. Any proceeding which
involves the assertion or enforcement of a civil right is a civil proceeding. A civil
proceeding is a process for recovery of individual right or redress of individual
rights. Civil courts have jurisdiction over all suits of a civil nature, unless their
cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A suit of a civil nature is a
proceeding, the object of which is enforcement of rights and obligations of citizens.
In Section 9 of the C.P.C, it states that “the Courts shall (subject to the
provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil
nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or
impliedly barred.” Here, the term “expressly barred” refers to situations where a
specific law or statute explicitly states that a particular type of suit cannot be heard
by the courts.
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Expressly or impliedly barred:

1. Suits expressly barred - A suit barred by an enactment for the time being in
force is said to be expressly barred. A competent legislature can bar jurisdiction of
civil courts with respect to a particular class of suits of a civil nature, provided that,
in doing so, it keeps itself within the field of legislation conferred on it and does not
contravene any provision of the Constitution. Hence, a suit is said to expressly
barred when it is prohibited by the statute for the time being in force.

2. Suits impliedly barred - A suit barred by general principles of law is said to be

impliedly barred. Where the statute provides a specific remedy, it deprives the
person of a remedy of any other form. Similarly, even civil suits are barred from
the cognizance of a civil court on the ground of public policy. A suit is said to be
impliedly barred when it is said to be excluded by general principles of law. When a
specific remedy is given by statute, it, therefore, denies a person who requires a
remedy of any different form than is given by statute.
SUMMARY:
Section 9 of the C.P.C. provides that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to
try all suits of a civil nature unless their jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred
by a specific statute. This section ensures that individuals have the right to
approach civil courts for the enforcement of their civil rights. However, if a law
explicitly or implicitly restricts the civil court’s jurisdiction in certain matters (e.g.
tribunals or special forums), then the civil court cannot entertain such cases.
Key Points:
i. Grants civil courts broad jurisdiction over civil matters.
ii. Excludes cases where jurisdiction is barred by law.
iii. Ensures protection and enforcement of civil rights.
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, says that civil courts have the
authority to hear all suits of a civil nature unless a specific law says otherwise. In
simple terms, if someone’s civil rights like property, contracts, or personal rights
are affected, they can approach a civil court, unless there's a law that clearly says
a civil court can’t deal with that kind of issue.
The Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (C.P.C) lays down the procedural framework
for civil litigation in India. Section 9 of the C.P.C is a foundational provision that
grants jurisdiction to civil courts to adjudicate civil disputes. It embodies the
principle Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium – Where there is a right, there is a remedy.
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2. Suits of Civil Nature:

The term “civil nature” is not defined in the C.P.C, but generally, it includes
suits pertaining to private rights such as property rights, contracts, torts, service
matters, etc. Explanation I & II (added in the 1976 Amendment) broaden the
scope:
 Explanation I: A suit where the right to property or to an office is contested
is a suit of civil nature even if it involves religious rites.
 Explanation II: It is immaterial whether any fees are attached to the office
or not.

3. Bar of Jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction can be expressly barred by specific statutes (e.g., Consumer Protection
Act, Industrial Disputes Act). It can also be impliedly barred when special tribunals
or authorities are designated to handle particular matters.
For example, if there is a specific statute or law that prohibits a court from
hearing a particular type of suit, such as a suit involving a matter that falls under
the exclusive jurisdiction of a specialized tribunal, then the court’s jurisdiction may
be expressly barred. On the other hand, if there is a legal principle or doctrine that
suggests that a court should not entertain a certain type of suit, even if there is no
explicit provision, then the court’s jurisdiction may be impliedly barred.
Section 9 of the C.P.C is an important provision that establishes the general
rule of jurisdiction for civil courts in India and serves as a basis for determining
whether a court has the authority to hear a particular civil suit or not.

LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
If the civil suit desires to have jurisdiction, two requirements must be met:
 The conflict must be of a civil nature, and
 The courts ability to hear such matters is not barred.
1. Although the term “civil” is not defined anywhere in the Civil Procedure
Code, it generally refers to the remedies that relate to an individual’s
rights as opposed to criminal or political rights.
2. The term “civil nature” refers to a citizen’s personal freedoms and
responsibilities. A lawsuit that has caste or religion as its main issue is
not protected. Whether or not there are expenses involved or the case is
associated with a specific party, a lawsuit involving a religious office is
maintainable.
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3. The word “shall” makes it necessary for the courts to consider a case if it
fits the section’s definition. The expression “nature” refers to its intrinsic
characteristics, such as its sort, kind, and character. Examples of civil
lawsuits include those involving property, the right of worship, the
disruption of religious processions, and damages for civil wrongs.

SECTION 9 - SCOPE AND APPLICATION:

Suits of civil nature are instituted and tried by the civil courts. The court
means that apart from having the trappings of some judicial tribunal should also
have the capacity and the power to give the definitive judgment which is finality
and has authority, which is the essential of the judicial pronouncements. Section 9
of the C.P.C gives the power to the Civil Courts to try the suits which are of civil
nature and are not either expressly or impliedly barred by any other law. Hence, a
civil court can try a case if -
 The suit in the question is of a civil nature:
The cognizance of the suit is not expressly or impliedly barred by any other
statute. The definition of the civil suit is not enunciated anywhere in the Code. It
can be said that a suit which is not criminal in nature is a civil suit. A suit that
determines the civil rights of the person can be termed as the civil suit. A
proceeding which addresses the redressal of the private rights is a civil action. It
was held in the case of Dhruv Green Field vs. Hukam Singh, AIR 2002 SC 2841
Hon’ble Supreme court held that whenever a special statute provides for the
exclusion of the civil courts to entertain a suit then it should be construed strictly
but in a case where a civil court has the power grant relief to one of the part of the
suit then it has the jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.
In Union of India v. Delhi High Court Bar Assn, AIR 2002 SC 1479
Hon’ble Supreme court held that it is not an absolute right given to anyone to
decide that a case needs to be determined and entertained by the Civil Court only.
Whenever a statute is silent whether the dispute is of the civil nature or not then it
cannot take away the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try such matters merely on
this issue.

CLASSES OF SUITS:
Suits may be divided into two classes –
1) Those of a civil nature and
2) Those not of a civil nature.
It is only the former suits that a Civil court has jurisdiction to entertain. A
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Civil court has no jurisdiction to try suits which are not of a civil nature.

Suits of Civil Nature

A suit is of a civil nature if the principal question therein relates to a civil or
legal right. Explanation to the section specifies that if the principal or only question
in the suit is a caste question or a question relating to religious rites of ceremonies,
the suit is not of a civil nature for it deals not with the rights of the citizen but with
matters that are purely social. However, when
1) A caste question or a question relating to religious rites or ceremonies is not the
principal question in the suit, but is merely a subsidiary question and
2) The principal question is of a civil nature eg a question as to any right to
property or to an office or to any other civil right and
3) The principal question, which is of a civil nature, cannot be determined without
deciding the caste question or the question relating to religious rites or
ceremonies, the court has the power to decide the caste question or the
question relating to religious rites or ceremonies, to enable it to decide the
principal question. “Sarda Kunwar v Gajanand AIR 1942 All 320;
Thiruvenkata Ramanuja v Venkatacharlu AIR 1947 PC 53 : 73 IA 156 :
1947 ILR Mad 436 : 229 IC 380 ; Lalji v Walji (1895) ILR 19 Bom 507; Pragji
v Govind (1887) ILR 11 Bom 534; Ramakrishna v Gangadhar AIR 1968 Ori
26”. It is upon this principle that Explanation I to the section is based.
The bar may be provided explicitly or impliedly to file civil suit. A bar is said
to be an explicit bar when it is clearly provided in the statute that the civil courts
will be barred from trying this kind of suit. An implied bar is when the statute is
providing a legal remedy to the aggrieved party in the form of an appeal, this is an
implied bar on the Section 9 of the C.P.C that such a case cannot be tried by the
civil court.
An inherent lack of jurisdiction is a case when the court has no jurisdiction
to try the case so the decree passed in such a case will be a nullity. Whether the
court has jurisdiction or not can be decided once the issues are framed and the
arguments are advanced. It was held by the court in the case of Mathura Prasad
Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dosibai N.B. Jeejebhoy, AIR 1971, SC 2355 where a decision
is given by the court when the court had no jurisdiction then it would not be
considered as the res judicata in the subsequent proceeding in the same matter in
issue between the same parties.
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In a case where more than one court has jurisdiction to try a case then an
agreement can be made between the parties to submit the dispute to one of the
courts and such an agreement will not be considered as against the public policy.
In other words it can be said that the theory of jurisdiction as enunciated
under Section 9 of the C.P.C was discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of PMA Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthane, AIR 1995 SC 2001 as follow:
The phrases used in the Section 9 of the C.P.C have both the positive and
negative intent. Section 9 is divided into two parts wherein one part talks about the
jurisdiction to try the civil cases and the other part talks about the suit that are
impliedly and expressly barred to be tried by the civil courts.
The use of word shall in the section denote that the law envisaged in the
provision must be follows scrupulously. After reading the concept underlying
Section 9 of CPC, we can say that the civil court tries only suits of civil nature. And
the cases which are not of civil nature or the suits which are expressly or impliedly
barred are tried either in tribunals or councils or special courts specified under any
enactment.
The questions purely relating to caste or religious ceremonies are decided by
the community or religious heads like priests, spiritual heads, etc. On the other
side, questions that are political in nature are decided by public administrative
authorities.
When there is no dispute as to the nature of the suits instituted in the civil
court being civil in nature but while researching the researcher found out that there
are lot of sham plaints that are presented before the court which in turn burden the
court as well as cause prejudice to another party. According to Order VII Rule 11
there is a remedy which empowers the court to dismiss a suit at the threshold even
without recording the evidences, conducting trial if the court is satisfied that if it
falls under any of the grounds contained in this provision.
The courts are free to reject the vexatious plaints in order to save the time
of the courts as the judicial time is precious. The power which has been given to
the court under Order 7 Rule 11 is mandatory in nature and can be exercised at
any time and at any stage of the suit. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent
case of Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, AIR 2020 SC 3310 has
dismissed an appeal against the order of the lower court and upheld the order of
the lower court which rejected the plaint at the threshold because it was found that
institution of the plaint by the plaintiff was nothing but a clear abuse of process of
law and was also bereft of any merit.
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The litigants have the choice to seek the rejection of the plaint at the
threshold when the suit fails in disclosing a cause of action which is valid in eyes of
law, or is barred by any law or the reliefs which are sought and prayed are un-
remediable and defective and not in the line of Order VII Rule 11. Litigants need to
be careful that the courts while exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
cannot go into the merit of the case and the court makes it decision and
determination only by scrutinizing the averments that are made out in the plaint
which is presumed to be true. The courts also need to be very cautious while
exercising their powers under the said Order as the plaint that prima facie provides
for a cause of action is not to be rejected at the threshold.

Jurisdiction Of Civil Court Under Civil Procedure Code

Section 9 of C.P.C deals with the jurisdiction of civil courts in India. It says
that the courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction
to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred.
 Explanation I- a suit in which the right to property or to an office is
contested is a suit or a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may
depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or
ceremonies.
 Explanation II- for the purpose of this section, it is immaterial whether or
not any fees are attached to the office referred to in explanation I or
whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.

Conditions
A civil court has jurisdiction to try a suit if two conditions are fulfilled:
1. The suit must be of a civil nature;
2. The cognizance of such a suit should not have been expressly or impliedly
barred.
(a) Suit of civil nature:-
i. meaning:- in order that a civil court may have jurisdiction to try a suit, the
first condition which must be satisfied is that the suit must be of a civil nature?
The word ‘civil’ has not been defined in the code. But according to the
dictionary meaning, it pertains to private rights and remedies of a citizen as
distinguished from criminal, political, etc. the word ‘nature’ has been defined as
‘the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character;
sort, kind, character’’. It is thus wider in content. The expression ‘civil nature’ is
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wider than the expression ‘civil proceedings’. Thus, a suit is of a civil is of a

nature if the principal question therein relates to the determination of a civil
right and enforcement thereof. It is not the status of the parties to the suit, but
the subject matter of it which determines whether or not the suit is of a civil
nature.

ii. Nature and scope- the expression “suit of a civil nature” will cover private
rights and obligations of a citizen. Political and religious questions are not
covered by that expression. A suit in which the principal question relates to
caste or religion is not a suit of a civil nature. But if the principal question in a
suit is of a civil nature (the right to property or to an office) and the
adjudication incidentally involves the determination relating to a caste question
or to religious rights and ceremonies, it does not cease to be a suit of a civil
nature and the jurisdiction of a civil court is not barred. The court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those questions also in order to decide the
principal question which is of a civil nature. Explanation II has been added by
the amendment act of 1976. before this explanation, there was a divergence of
judicial opinion as to whether a suit relating to a religious office to which no
fees or emoluments were attached can be said to be a suit of a civil nature. But
the legal position has now been clarified by explanation II which specifically
provides that a suit relating to a religious office is maintainable whether or not
it carries any fees or whether or not it is attached to a particular place.

iii. Doctrine explained- explaining the concept of jurisdiction of civil courts

under Section 9, in PMA Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court stated: “the expensive nature of the section is demonstrated by
use of phraseology both positive and negative. The earlier part opens the door
widely and latter debars entry to only those which are expressly or impliedly
barred. The two explanations, one existing from inception and later added in 1976,
bring out clearly the legislative intention of extending operation of the section to
religious matters where right to property or office is involved irrespective of
whether any fee is attached to the office or not. The language used is simple but
explicit and clear. It is structured on the basic of a civilized jurisprudence that
absence of machinery for enforcement of right renders it nugatory. The heading
which is normally a key to the section brings out unequivocally that all civil suits are
cognizable unless bared. What is meant by it is explained further by widening the
ambit of the section by use of the word ‘shall’ and the expression ‘all suits of a civil
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nature unless expressly or impliedly barred’. Each word and expression casts an
obligation on the court to exercise jurisdiction for enforcement of rights. The word
shall make it mandatory. No court can refuse to entertain a suit if it is of the
description mentioned in the section. That is amplified by the use of the expression.
‘all suits of civil nature’. The word civil according to the dictionary means, relating
to the citizen as an individual; civil rights’ In Black’s legal dictionary it is defined as,
‘relating to provide rights and remedies sought by civil actions as contrasted with
criminal proceedings’. In law it is understood as an antonym of criminal. Historically
the two broad classifications were civil and criminal. Revenue, tax and company etc.
were added to it later. But they too pertain to the larger family of civil. There is
thus no doubt about the width of the word civil. Its width has been stretched further
by using the word nature along with it. That is even those suits are cognizable
which are not only civil but are even of civil nature. The word ‘nature’ has defined
as ‘the fundamental qualities of a person or thing; identity or essential character,
sort;kind;character’. It is thus wider in content. The word ‘civil nature’ is wider that
the word ‘civil proceeding’. The section would, therefore, be available in every case
where the dispute was of the characteristics of affecting one’s rights which are not
only civil but of civil nature.”

iv. Test: a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a

suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on
the decision of a question as to religious rites or ceremonies.

v. Suits of civil nature: illustrations- the following are suits of a civil nature.
1. Suits relating to rights to property;
2. Suits relating to rights of worship;
3. Suits relating to taking out of religious procession;
4. Suits relating to right to share in offerings;
5. Suits for damages for civil wrongs;
6. Suits for specific performance of contracts or for damages for breach of
contracts;
7. Suits for specific relief’s;
8. Suits for restitution of conjugal rights;
9. Suits for dissolution of marriages;
10. Suits for rent;
11. Suits for or on account;
12. Suits for rights of franchise;
13. Suits for rights to hereditary offices;
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14. Suits for rights to Yajmanvritis;

15. Suits against wrongful dismissal from service and for salaries, etc.
16. Suits not of civil nature- illustrations- the following are not suits of a civil
nature;
17. Suits involving principally caste questions;
18. Suits involving purely religious rites or ceremonies;
19. Suits for upholding mere dignity or honor;
20. Suits for recovery of voluntary payments or offerings;
21. Suits against expulsions from caste, etc.

(b) Cognizance not barred as stated above, a litigant having a grievance of a civil
nature has a right to institute a civil suit unless its cognizance is barred, either
expressly or impliedly.
i. Suits expressly barred- a suit is said to be ‘expressly barred ’ when it is barred
by any enactment for the time being in force. It is open to a competent
legislature to bar jurisdiction of civil courts with respect to a particular class of
suits of a civil nature, provided that, in doing so, it keeps itself within the field
of legislation conferred on it and does not contravene any provision of the
constitution. But every presumption should be made in favor of the jurisdiction
of a civil court and the provision of exclusion of jurisdiction of a court must be
strictly construed. If there is any doubt about the ousting of jurisdiction of a
civil court, the court will lean to an interpretation which would maintain the
jurisdiction. Thus, matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue
courts or under the code of criminal procedure or matters dealt with by special
tribunals under the relevant statutes e.g. by industrial tribunal, income tax
tribunal, revenue tribunal, electronic tribunal, rent tribunal, cooperative
tribunal, motor accident claims tribunal, etc. or by domestic tribunals, Bar
Council, Medical Council, university, club etc. are expressly barred from the
cognizance of a civil court. But if the remedy provided by a statute is not
adequate and all questions cannot be decided by a special tribunal, the
jurisdiction of a civil court is not barred. Similarly, when a court of limited
jurisdiction prima facie and incidentally states something, the jurisdiction of a
civil court to finally decide the time is not ousted.
ii. Suits impliedly barred- a suit is said to be impliedly barred when it is barred by
general principles of law. Where a specific remedy is given by a statute, it
thereby deprives the person who insists upon a remedy of any other form than
that given by the statute. Where an act creates an obligation and enforces its
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performance in a specified manner, that performance cannot be enforced in any

other manner. Similarly, certain suits, though of a civil nature, are barred from
thee cognizance of a civil court on the ground of public policy. “the principle
underlying is that a court ought not to countenance matters which are injurious
to and against the public weal.” Thus, no suit shall lie for recovery of costs
incurred in criminal prosecution or for enforcement of a right upon a contract hit
by section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872; or against any judge for acts
done in the course of his duties. Likewise, political questions belong to the
domain of public administrative law and are outside the jurisdiction of civil
courts. A civil court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes of a political
nature. Who may decide? It is well settled that a civil court has inherited power
to decide its own jurisdiction. Presumption as to jurisdiction In dealing with the
question whether a civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain a suit is barred or not, it
is necessary to bear in mind that every presumption should be made in favor of
the jurisdiction of a civil court. The exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court to
entertain civil causes should not be readily inferred unless the relevant statute
contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a necessary and
inevitable implication of the nature.

Exclusion of jurisdiction:
A litigation having a grievance of a civil nature has, independent of any
statute, a right to institute a suit in a civil court unless its cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred. The exclusion of the jurisdiction of a civil court is not
to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be clear. Again, even when the
jurisdiction of a civil court is barred, either expressly or by necessary implication, it
cannot be said that the jurisdiction is altogether excluded.
A court has jurisdiction to examine whether the provisions of the act and the
rules made there under have or have not been complied with, or the order is
contrary to law, malafide, ultra vires, perverse, arbitrary, ‘purported’, violative of
the principles of natural justice, or is based on ‘no evidence’ and so on. In all these
cases, the order cannot be said to be under the act but is de hors the act and the
jurisdiction of a civil court is not ousted.
Who may decide? It is well settled that a civil court has inherited power to
decide its own jurisdiction.
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Presumption as to jurisdiction
In dealing with the question whether a civil court’s jurisdiction to entertain a
suit is barred or not, it is necessary to bear in mind that every presumption should
be made in favor of the jurisdiction of a civil court. The exclusion of jurisdiction of a
civil court to entertain civil causes should not be readily inferred unless the
relevant statute contains an express provision to that effect, or leads to a
necessary and inevitable implication of the nature.
Burden of proof
It is well- settled that it is for the party who seeks to oust the jurisdiction of
a civil court to establish it. It is equally well settled that a statute ousting the
jurisdiction of a civil court must be strictly construed. Where such a contention is
raised, it has to be determined in the light of the words used in the statute, the
scheme of the relevant provisions and the object and purpose of the enactment. In
the case of a doubt as to jurisdiction, the court should lean towards the assumption
of jurisdiction. A civil court has inherent power to decide the question of its own
jurisdiction; although as a result of such inquiry it may turn out that it has no
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
In the leading decision of Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., the Privy
Council rightly observed: “it is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
civil court is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly
expressed or clearly implied. It is also well established that even if jurisdiction is so
excluded the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of
the act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. ”
It is respectfully submitted that the following observations of Subba Rao, J.
(as he then was) in the leading case of Radha Kishan v. Ludhiyana Municipality
lay down the correct legal position regarding jurisdiction of civil courts and require
to be produced: “under section 9 of the civil procedure code the court shall have
jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is
either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore, expressly or by necessary
implication can bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of a particular matter.
The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said
matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts.
The statute may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil
courts; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it creates liability not
existing before and gives a special and particular remedy for the aggrieved party,
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the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the
statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had.
Even in such cases, the civil court’s jurisdiction is not completely ousted. A
suit in a civil court will always lie to question the order of a tribunal created by
statute, even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication, made final, if the
said tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the act but in violation of its
provisions.”
Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court: Principles from the above discussion it
is clear that the jurisdiction of civil courts is all- embracing except to the extent it is
excluded by law or by clear intendment arising from such law.
In the classic decision of Dhulabhai v. State of M.P., after considering a
number of cases, Hidyatullah, C.J. summarized the following principles relating to
the exclusion of jurisdiction of civil courts:
a) Where a statute gives finality to orders of special tribunals, the civil courts
jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do
what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however,
does not exclude those cases where the provisions of a particular act have
not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity
with fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
b) Where there is an express bar of jurisdiction of a court, an examination of
the scheme of a particular act to find the adequate or sufficiency of the
remedies provided may be relevant but this is not decisive for sustaining the
jurisdiction of a civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the
examination of the remedies and the scheme of a particular act to find out
the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be
decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if a statute creates a
special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or
liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by tribunals so constituted, and whether
remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by
the said statute or not.
c) Challenge to the provisions of a particular act as ultra vires cannot be
brought before tribunals constituted under that act. Even the high court
cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from decisions of
tribunals.
 15

d) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality

of any provisions is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may
include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed
by the limitation act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit.
e) Where the particular act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in
excess of constitutional limits or is illegally collected, a suit lies.
f) Questions of the correctness of an assessment, apart from its
constitutionality, are for the decision of the authorized and a civil suit does
not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an
express prohibition in a particular act. In either case, the scheme of a
particular act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
g) An exclusion of jurisdiction of a civil court is not readily to be inferred unless
the conditions above set down apply. The above principles enunciated are
relevant in deciding the correctness or otherwise of assessment orders made
under taxing statutes. In Premier Automobiles v. K.S. Wadke, the
Hon’ble supreme court laid down the following principles as applicable to the
jurisdiction of a civil court in relation to industrial disputes:
h) If a dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of
any other right under the act, the remedy lies only in a civil court.
i) If a dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the
general or common law and not under the act, the jurisdiction of a civil court
is alternative, leaving it to the election of a suitor or person concerned to
choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a
particular remedy.
j) If an industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation
created under the act, then the only remedy available to suitor is to get
adjudication under the act.
k) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the act
such as chapter V- A, then the remedy for its enforcement is either section
33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be. Again, in
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. Vs. Krishna Kant, after
considering various leading decisions on the point, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court summarized the principles applicable to industrial disputes thus:
1. Where a dispute arises from the general law of contract, i.e., where
relief’s are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed
in a civil court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a
 16

dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of

section 2(k) or section 2-A of the industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
2. Where, however, a dispute involves recognition, observance or
enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the industrial
Dispute Act, the only remedy is to approach the famous created by the
said act.
3. Similarly, where a dispute involves the recognition, observance or
enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments, like the
industrial employment (standing order) act, 1946- which can be called
“sister enactments’ to the industrial dispute act- and which do not provide
a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to
approach the forums created by the industrial dispute act provided they
constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of section 2(k) and
section 2-A of the industrial dispute act or where such enactments says
that such dispute shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by
the industrial disputes act. Otherwise, recourse to a civil court is open.
4. It is not correct to say that remedies provided by the industrial disputes
act are not equally effective for the reason that access to a forum
depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate government.
The power to make a reference conferred upon the government is to be
exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence is not
unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute
raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power
to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the
government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie
frivolous, not meriting adjudication.
5. Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to parliament
and state legislature to make a provision enabling a workman to approach
the labor court- i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the
government- in case of industrial dispute covered by section 2-A of the
industrial disputes act. This would go a long way in removing the
misgiving with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by
the industrial disputes act.
6. The certified standing orders framed in accordance with the industrial
dispute act and its sister enactment is to provide an alternative dispute-
resolution mechanism to workmen, a mechanism which is speedy,
 17

inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural

laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts.
Indeed, the powers of courts and tribunals under the industrial disputes
act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as
they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an
industrial dispute.

Very recently, in Chandrakant Tukaram v. Municipla Corporation of

Ahmedabad, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the principles laid down in
earlier decisions and stated: “it cannot be disputed that the procedure followed by
civil courts are too lengthy and, consequently, are not an efficacious forum for
resolving the industrial disputes speedily. The power of the industrial courts also is
wide and such forums are empowered to grant adequate relief as they just and
appropriate. It is in the interest of the workmen that their disputes, including the
dispute of illegal termination, are adjudicated upon by an industrial forum.
Members of a religious body possess the right to conduct a religious
procession with its appropriate observances along a highway and a suit will lie
against those who prevent the procession and its observances. The worshipers in a
mosque or a temple that abuts on a high road could not compel the processionists
to intermit their worship while passing the mosque or temple on the ground that
continuous worship was conducted there. But, no single sect can claim the
exclusive use of the highway for their worship. Chandu Sajan patel v Nyahal
Chand 52 BLR 214: 1950 ILR Bom 192; Sangabasavaswami v Mahanta swami
1946 ILR Bom 437: 48 BLR 100 : AIR 1946 Bom 353.

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Land Acquisition:

In State of Bihar Vs Dhirendra Kumar and others - 1995 (3) ALT(D.N.)
8.2 (D.B.), it was held that under Sections 4(1), 6, and 9 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, and Section 9 and Order 39 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908,
civil courts lack jurisdiction to question the validity or legality of notifications issued
under the Land Acquisition Act, as this authority is exclusively vested in the High
Court.

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts under the Madras Minor Inams Act:

In [Link] Naicker Vs E. Elumalai Naicker - 1995 (3) ALT(D.N.) 52.1
(D.B.), it was held that under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and the
Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, civil courts
 18

retain jurisdiction to determine the title to minor inam lands that were abolished
under the Act, as well as to assess whether a lessor has the right to evict a lessee
from those lands, as the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of civil courts in such
matters.

Suit for Declaration of Scheduled Tribe Status:

In State of Tamil Nadu and others Vs A. Gurusamy - 1997 (2) ALT(D.N.)
14.2 (D.B.), it was held that under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, a
suit for a declaration that the respondent belongs to the Scheduled Tribe
"Kattunaicken" in Tamil Nadu is maintainable, affirming the jurisdiction of civil
courts to adjudicate on matters concerning the status of individuals in relation to
scheduled tribes.

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts and Land Tribunal Orders:

In Balawwa and another Vs Hasanbi and others - 2001 (1)
ALT(D.N.)(SC) 18.2 (D.B.), The Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed the jurisdiction
of civil courts in the context of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, specifically
Sections 48 and 48-A. The case involved a dispute over the title of two out of four
landed properties, where the defendants claimed exclusive rights based on an
order from the Land Tribunal. The trial court granted a decree for partition, which
was partially upheld by the lower appellate court but reversed regarding the landed
properties, citing the Tribunal's order as conferring exclusive title. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court reversed the lower appellate court's decision, asserting that the
jurisdiction of civil courts is not ousted by the Tribunal's orders unless the relief
sought could be granted by the Tribunal under the special statute. The Court
concluded that the Tribunal's jurisdiction was limited to declaring occupancy rights
and did not extend to ousting civil court jurisdiction regarding partition claims,
thereby affirming the plaintiff's right to a share in the property.

Suit for Recovery of Amounts and Limitation

In Wipro Products Ltd. and another Vs Akbar S Noorani - 2013 (6) ALT
421 (D.B.), the court addressed a suit filed by the plaintiff, a trader in edible oils,
for recovery of various amounts totaling Rs.14,10,000/- arising from business
transactions with the defendants, manufacturers of edible oils. The plaintiff's claims
included Rs.1,10,000/- as a stockist deposit, Rs.3 lakhs for goodwill, Rs.3 lakhs for
breach of contract, and Rs.7 lakhs for malicious prosecution. The trial court
partially decreed the suit, allowing only the claim for the deposit, while dismissing
 19

the other claims as barred by limitation. The appeals from both parties were
dismissed, with the court noting that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the
criminal complaint against him was false or motivated by malice, and that the
claims for goodwill and damages were filed too late, originating from events in
1980 but not pursued until 1987. The court upheld the trial court's judgment,
affirming the refund of the deposit while rejecting the defendants' counterclaim due
to lack of timely action.

Jurisdiction of Civil Courts in Temple Management Dispute:

In Sahebgouda (dead) by LRs and others Vs Ogeppa and others -
2003 (5) ALT(D.N.)(SC) 1.2 (D.B.), the Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed a suit
concerning the appellants' claim to be ancestral pujaris of a temple, seeking a
declaration of their rights and an injunction against the respondents. The trial court
partially decreed the suit, affirming the puja rights of both parties, but the High
Court later ruled that the jurisdiction of civil courts was barred under Section 80 of
the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The Hon’ble Supreme Court overturned this
decision, stating that the bar in Section 80 specifically applies to questions that
must be decided by an officer or authority under the Act, which did not encompass
the issues at hand. The Court found the High Court's interpretation erroneous, set
aside its judgment, and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988

Section 4 of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988, bars the suit to
enforce any right in respect of benami property. The section is prospective and
does not affect suit or other proceedings pending on the date of its enforcement
(19.5.1988) vide Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan AIR 1996 SC
238.
However, the Act does not prohibit such suit, defence or plea if property is
purchased by a person in favour of his wife or unmarried daughter vide Nand
Kishore Mehra v. Sushila Mehra AIR 1995 SC 2145 and Rebti Devi v. Ram
Dutt AIR 1998 SC 310.
In C. Gangacharan v. C. Narayanan, AIR 2000 SC 589, supra, it has also
been held that suit for possession on the plea that plaintiff sent money to
defendant from abroad to purchase property in plaintiff‘s name but defendant
purchased in his own name is not barred by the Act as the suit is against trustee.
Similarly in P.V.G. Raj Reddy v. P.N. Reddy, AIR 2015 SC 2485 it has
been held that suit for declaration, cancellation of sale deed and for possession on
 20

the plea that plaintiffs sent money to defendants from abroad for purchasing
property in plaintiff‘s name but defendants purchased one property in the name of
their close relation and the other jointly in the names of plaintiff‘s son and son of
defendants 1 and 2 is not barred by the Act.

Public Money Recovery:

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act (RDDB Act)
1993, by virtue of its Section 18 prohibits the Civil Court to exercise any
jurisdiction in relation to the matters specified in Section 17.
It has been held in Bhanu Construction Company v. Andhra Bank, AIR
2001 SC 477 that under Section 18 of the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
stands barred from the appointed date which is the date on which Tribunal was
constituted and not the date on which the Act was passed.

SERVICE MATTERS
The jurisdiction of all Courts (including Civil Court) except of Hon’ble
Supreme Court or Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal is barred by Section 28 of
Administrative Tribunals Act 1985 in respect of Government employees‘ service
matters as defined under section 3(q) and not excepted by section 2 of the Act.
However the Hon’ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India, AIR
1997 SC 1125 (7 judges) has held that even though at the initial stage even
jurisdiction of High Court under articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution (writ
petition) is barred but against judgment or order passed by the Tribunal, High
Court can entertain writ petition, which must be heard by Division Bench.
Corporations:
I. State Road Transport Corporation: In Mafatlal Narandas Barot v J. D.
Rathod, Divisional Controller, State Transport Mehsana, AIR 1966 SC
1364 (CB) it was held that a terminated employee of SRTC could approach
the High Court through writ petition against his termination order, and he
could be granted relief of reinstatement if termination was against
mandatory provision of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 or the Rules or
Regulations framed thereunder.
II. (Rajasthan) State Electricity Board : In Rajasthan State Electricity Board
v. Mohan Lal AIR 1967 SC 1857 (CB) it was held that writ petition by an
employee of the Electricity Board for promotion is maintainable as Electricity
Board is a corporation, hence, statutory body and included in the definition
of State under Article 12 of the Constitution.
 21

Companies:
I. Bharat Petroleum Corporation: In Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India,
AIR 1981 SC 212 it was held that the corporation was a Government
company, hence, State within the meaning of Article 12, writ petition filed
before the Hon’ble Supreme court for enforcement of pension scheme and
payment of pension was held to be maintainable.
II. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation v. B.N. Gangoli AIR
1986 SC 1571 it was held that though the corporation was a Government
company under section 617 of Companies Act but was State within the
meaning of Article 12, hence, writ petition by its terminated employee for
reinstatement was maintainable. The company, apart from being a
Government company was also wholly owned by the Central Government
and two State.

Societies controlled or dominated by Government:

Initially even the societies constituted, managed, controlled and financed by
the Government were also considered to be non-statutory bodies. Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) being such a society was held to be non-
statutory body in Sabhajit Tiwari v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329
(Constitution Bench). In that case an employee of CSIR had filed a writ petition
under article 32 of the Constitution before the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking pay
parity with new entrants under articles 14 and 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held
that the CSIR being only a registered society was not an authority under Article 12
hence it was not subject to fundamental rights. This authority has been overruled
by P.K. Biswas 2002 (5) SCC 111 supra and it has been held that CSIR is authority
under article 12 and amenable to writ jurisdiction. In this case an employee had
challenged his termination (on what ground is not clear) through writ petition
before High Court which had been held to be not maintainable by the High Court in
view of Sabhajit Tiwari (1975) supra. Even before it was overruled, Sabhajit Tiwari
(1975) had constantly pricked the conscience of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It was
explained, distinguished, criticized and watered down in Ramana (1979), Ajay
Hasia (1981), Som Prakash Rekhi (1981) and P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (1984), infra
as discussed in paras 24 to 32 of P.K. Biswas, (2002)supra.
 22

Labour Matters:
In respect of labour matters, suit is not maintainable if grievance is made
regarding violation of rights which are created by Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (or
U.P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947) or sister laws like Industrial Employment
(standing orders) Act 1946 This aspect has been considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme court in several authorities including Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S.
Wadke of Bombay, AIR 1975 SC 2238:1976(1) SCC 496.

Waqf Act 1995

[Link] 6 and 7 of the Act provide for determination of certain disputes
regarding waqf only by the Waqf Tribunal. Section 83 provides for the constitution
of Tribunals and matters cognizable by them.
[Link] of Waqf, West Bengal v. Anis Fatma Begum, 2010 (14) SCC 588
(Waqf Tribunal has got exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the questions relating to
demarcation of waqf property).
3.A.J.P.P. Committee v. P.V. Ibrahim Haji, AIR 2013 SC 3530 (Dispute with
regard to management and peaceful enjoyment of Mosque and Madarsa and assets
relating to waqf is to be decided by the Tribunal and not Civil Court)

Tax Matters
It has been held in Commissioner, Income Tax v. Parmeshwari Devi
Sultania, AIR 1998 SC 1276 that Section 293 of Income Tax Act provides a
specific bar against suits by providing that ―no suit shall be brought in any civil
court to set aside or modify any proceeding taken or order made under this Act.

Damages for Malicious Prosecution

Suit for damages for malicious prosecution on the ground that temporary
injunction in the earlier suit instituted by the defendant was wrongly obtained is
maintainable.
In this regard Section 95 C.P.C. which provides that in such situation, in that
very suit, defendant may, on his application, be awarded compensation of a
maximum amount of Rs.50,000/- (prior to 1999-2002 amendment it was only one
thousand) is no bar to fresh suit for compensation by the defendant and in such
suit the maximum limit of damages prescribed under Section 95 also does not
apply Bank of India v. L. Dass AIR 2000 SC 1172.
 23

Declaration regarding membership of Scheduled Caste or Tribe:

In State of Tamil Nadu v. A. Gurusamy AIR 1997 SC 1199 it has been
held that civil court has got no jurisdiction to declare that a person (plaintiff) is
member of a particular Schedule Tribe (or caste).

Election of M.P., M.L.A.:

Under Representation of People Act 1951, election of M.P. or M.L.A. can be
challenged only before the High court and it is provided under Section 70 of the Act
as follows:-
No civil court shall have jurisdiction to question the legality of any action
taken or of any decision given by the Returning Officer or by any other person
appointed under this Act in connection with an election.

Land Acquisition:
Civil Court has got no jurisdiction to decide the validity or legality of Sections
4 and 6 notifications of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 through which land is acquired,
vide Shri Girish Vyas v. State of Maharastra AIR 2012 SC 2043 (para 98)
placing reliance upon State of Bihar v. Dhirendra Kumar AIR 1995 SC 1955.
Similar view has been taken in Laxmi Chand v Gram Panchayat, Kararia, AIR
1996 SC 523. Similar will be the position in respect of corresponding sections of
new land acquisition Act i.e. Sections 11, 12 and 19 of Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

Family Courts:
The Family Courts Act 1984 confers jurisdiction upon a family court in
respect of matrimonial disputes defined under Explanation to Section 7(1)
Explanation to Section 7(1) and sub section (2) of Section 7

Motor Vehicles Act:

Claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving death of or bodily
injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles or damages to any
property of a third party so arising may be instituted before Claims Tribunal
constituted under Motor Vehicles Act 1988, by virtue of Sections 165 and 166
thereof.

Section 175 of the Act provides as under:

Where any Claims Tribunal has been constituted for any area, no Civil Court
shall have jurisdiction to entertain any question relating to any claim for
 24

compensation which may be adjudicated upon by the Claims Tribunal for that area
and no injunction in respect of any action taken or to be taken by or before the
claims tribunal in respect of claim for compensation shall be granted by the Civil
Court.

Partnership Act
Section 69 of Partnership Act 1932, bars certain suits by or against
unregistered firms.

Payment of Wages Act

Under Section 15 of Payment of Wages Act 1936 claims arising out of the
deduction from the wages or delay in payment of wages are to be made before the
authority constituted for the said purpose under the said Section. Section 22 of the
Act provides that no court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or of
any deduction from wages.

Religious Matters:
In Ugam Singh v. Kesrimal AIR 1971 SC 2540 it has been held that ―it is
clear therefore that a right to worship is a civil right, interference with which raises
a dispute of a civil nature.
In P.M.A. Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma AIR 1995 SC 2001 it has been
held that ex-communication by a Christian religious authority can be challenged
through suit. In this authority, in the judgment by justice R.M. Sahai, the aspect of
maintainability of suit in religious matters has been thoroughly examined in paras
27 to 35 and reference has also been made to Article 25 of the Constitution which
guarantees freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess practice and
propagate religion to every person.

Conclusion:
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code is like the entry gate to the civil courts.
It opens the door for all civil disputes unless a special law locks that door—either
clearly (expressly) or indirectly (impliedly). In today’s legal system, many special
laws like SARFAESI, RERA, and the Consumer Act have created their own forums
and remedies. But this does not mean civil courts are powerless in every case.
Civil courts can still help when:-
 There is fraud or misuse of power
 Your ownership or basic rights are affected
 25

 The special law does not give a full solution

We must always ask:

1. What is the nature of the dispute?
2. Is there any special law covering it?
3. Does that law say civil courts are barred?
4. If barred, is there any exception—like fraud, title dispute, or lack of remedy?

We must be very careful before saying “you can’t come here.” The default rule is:
"If in doubt, the civil court will help, unless clearly excluded.”

Hence, Civil court is the general doctor. But if a specialist (special law) is
available and working well, one has to use that first. But if that specialist is unfair,
or missing, go back to the general doctor — the civil court.

"Jurisdiction is not just about power, it is about justice and

justice should never be blocked without a valid reason.”

***