Chapter V

INTERPRETAITON OF WORDS AND PHRASES

5.01. Generally (Simplified Explanation)

When a law uses a word or phrase, it can have different kinds of meanings — ordinary,
technical, legal, or even commercial. Sometimes, the law itself defines the word, or the courts
have already given it a specific meaning in past cases. The main goal in interpreting any word or
phrase in a law is to find out what the lawmakers really meant when they wrote it.

To do that, we first look at the whole law itself, not just one part. We also consider other related
information that can help reveal the lawmakers’ true intention. This means we should not focus
only on a single sentence or section but must read the law as a whole to understand its full
purpose.

In the case Hon. Secretary Vincent Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines
(G.R. No. 159149, August 28, 2007), the Supreme Court explained that using general terms in a
law does not make it unclear or invalid — as long as the meaning of those terms can be
understood from the entire law. Lawmakers are not required to define every single word, as long
as their main purpose can be understood.

In that case, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued a circular based on B.P. Blg. 33 (as
amended). The Court said the DOE did not go beyond its power; it only added details on how
the law should be implemented. The penalties in the circular, which were based on each LPG
cylinder, were valid and not excessive because they were still within the limits set by the law.

If the same penalty were applied no matter how many LPG cylinders were involved, it would be
unfair and unreasonable. The Court also emphasized that the equal protection clause means that
everyone should be treated the same way under the same conditions — both in the benefits they
get and in the punishments they face.

In short:

• Words in laws must be interpreted based on what lawmakers intended.

• We should read the law as a whole to get its true meaning.
• General terms don’t make a law invalid if their meaning is clear from the whole context.
• Agencies can issue rules to implement a law, as long as they stay within its limits.
• Equal treatment under the law means penalties and benefits must be fair and consistent
for everyone.

5.02. Statutory Definition (Simplified Explanation)

Sometimes, a law itself gives a specific definition for certain words or phrases used in it. When
this happens, that legal definition must be followed, even if the word usually has a different
meaning in everyday language.

In other words, if the law defines a term, that definition controls — we can’t give the word
another meaning through interpretation. When lawmakers choose to define a word, they are not
taking over the court’s role of interpreting laws; rather, they are just setting a rule that becomes
part of the law itself.

Normally, a word is interpreted according to its common or well-known meaning, but if the law
provides its own definition, that definition must be used when applying the law.

Example 1:
In Republic Act No. 1161, the word “compensation” was originally defined as all
pay except bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay. But when the law was later amended and
those exceptions were removed, the new version meant that bonuses and overtime pay were
now included as part of compensation. The Court said this change clearly showed that
lawmakers intended to include them. Any old court rulings or interpretations had to give way to
the new definition.

Example 2:
In another case, someone was charged for practicing chiropractic without a medical license.
Even though “chiropractic” might not normally mean “medicine,” the law defined “practice of
medicine” in a way that included chiropractic methods. Therefore, the person was criminally
liable for violating the medical law.

Example 3:
A similar issue arose with the term “immigrant.” Normally, it means someone who comes to
live permanently in a country. But under the Philippine Immigration Act, “immigrant” was
legally defined as any alien coming into the Philippines, unless classified as a non-
immigrant. So, even temporary visitors could fall under this term unless they met an exception
stated by the law.

Finally, the Court said that when interpreting these definitions, we should not read them as
isolated parts. The definitions must fit harmoniously with the rest of the law, so that all words
and sections work together as one complete and consistent piece.

In short:

• When a law defines a term, that legal definition must be followed.

• Lawmakers can define words as part of their power to create laws, not to replace courts.
• Old meanings or court rulings give way if the law is amended with a new definition.
• Words in a law should always be understood in connection with the whole law, not
separately.
• The goal is to make all parts of the law work together smoothly and consistently.
5.03. Qualification of Rule (Simplified Explanation)

When a law gives a specific definition of a word or term and says it applies “as used in this
Act,” that definition only applies to that particular law. It does not automatically apply to
other laws or to events that happened before the law was passed.

In simple terms, each law’s definition is only valid within that law — it cannot control how the
same word is understood in other statutes unless they share the same context or purpose.

However, there are exceptions to this rule. The definition given by the law can be ignored if
following it would:

• make parts of the law contradictory or nonsensical,

• destroy one of the main purposes of the law, or
• become illogical because the situation or facts have changed since the law was enacted.

Example:
Under Republic Act No. 4166 and Executive Orders 900 and 901, the term “sugarcane
planter” was defined as a landowner who had sugar quotas in a specific sugar mill district. This
meant that “emergency,” “non-quota,” or “accommodation” planters were not considered
sugarcane planters because they had no quotas.

But in 1955, the sugar quota system was abolished. Because of this change, the Court said it
would no longer make sense to keep using that old definition — it had already lost its purpose.

However, in another case, the Court clarified that if the law itself has not been changed, then
its original definition must still be followed, no matter how the situation has evolved, until the
legislature itself decides to amend it.

In short:

• A definition in one law applies only to that law, not automatically to others.
• It can be set aside if using it causes confusion, contradiction, or no longer makes sense.
• If the law stays the same, the original definition remains valid until lawmakers amend
it.
• Courts cannot change the meaning just because circumstances have changed — only
Congress can do that through new legislation.

5.04. Words Construed in Their Ordinary Sense (Simplified Explanation)

As a general rule, when interpreting words and phrases in a law, they should be understood in
their plain, ordinary, and commonly used meaning, unless the lawmakers clearly meant
otherwise. Words should be read naturally — not forced, complicated, or given unusual
meanings — because lawmakers are presumed to know what words mean and how grammar
works.

This means that the ordinary and grammatical reading of a law is usually the correct one,
unless there is a strong reason to think that the lawmakers intended something else.

Example 1:
In a law that gives tax exemptions for imported materials used in making local products that are
exported, the phrase “forming part thereof” does not mean that the imported materials must
physically mix or chemically combine with the local product. Instead, in its ordinary meaning, it
simply means that the imported material is necessary to help produce or export the final product.

Example 2:
If the word “business” is used in a tax law without any special definition, it should be
understood in its usual sense — an activity done for profit or livelihood. So, a social club that
sells liquor only to its members for limited use and without the intent to earn profit is not
engaged in business in the ordinary meaning of the term.

Example 3:
The phrase “present value” in a law about retirement benefits was interpreted in its ordinary,
not technical, sense. The Court ruled that “present value” simply meant the full lump-sum
amount that a retiree aged 65 or above should receive without any deduction — since the law’s
purpose was to provide financial support to elderly retirees.

Example 4:
When a law said that “persons who were retired and paid gratuity” could choose another form
of retirement pay, it referred only to those who had already retired when the law took effect —
not those who would retire later. The Court based this interpretation on the plain and
grammatical meaning of the words.

Example 5:
In Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the issue was whether
a transferee of a forest concession was responsible for the illegal acts of the former owner
(transferor). The law said, “the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the
transferor.” The Supreme Court ruled that “obligations” should be understood in its ordinary
business sense, referring only to normal business responsibilities — not to illegal acts. Crimes
or violations are personal to the one who committed them.

Example 6:
In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the question was whether the
word “lumber” is included in the word “timber” under a law that penalizes cutting or
possessing timber without a license. The Court ruled yes, because in its ordinary meaning,
lumber is simply processed timber. Even though the law didn’t define the term, dictionaries and
the general use of the word made it clear that lumber and timber are related — lumber being
timber prepared for market.
The Court quoted the Latin maxim:

“Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus”

(“When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”)

This means that if the law makes no difference between raw and processed timber, the courts
should not make a distinction either.

In short:

• Words in a law should be understood in their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the
law clearly says otherwise.
• Courts assume lawmakers knew what they meant and used words correctly.
• Technical or narrow meanings should not be used if the ordinary one makes sense.
• The goal is to interpret the law logically and fairly, avoiding confusion or absurd results.
• The phrase “when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish” reminds us to
stick to what the law plainly says.

5.05. General Words Construed Generally (Simplified Explanation)

When a law uses a general word, it should be understood in its broad and ordinary sense,
unless it is very clear that the lawmakers wanted to give it a narrow or special meaning.

This rule is captured in the Latin maxims:

• “Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda” — general words are to be understood

generally.
• “Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum” — a general statement is to be
interpreted in a general way.

In simple terms, if the law speaks generally, it should be understood generally — unless
there’s strong evidence that lawmakers meant to limit or narrow it.

If a word in a law can have both a broad meaning and a narrow meaning, the broad
meaning should be used — unless the law’s context or subject clearly shows that a limited
meaning was intended.

For example, if a law uses a wide term like “vehicle,” it should normally include all kinds of
vehicles — cars, trucks, motorcycles, etc. — unless the law itself makes it clear that it only refers
to a specific type (like “motor vehicles only”).

In short, the courts should not restrict the meaning of a general word unless the law clearly
tells them to. If lawmakers wanted a word to have a limited meaning, they could have written it
that way. Since they didn’t, it is presumed that they intended the word to have its full, general
meaning.

In short:

• General words are understood broadly and in their usual sense.

• The broader meaning applies unless the law clearly limits it.
• Courts should not narrow a word’s meaning without strong reason.
• If lawmakers wanted to restrict a word, they would have done so — their silence means
they did not intend to limit it.

5.06. Application of the Rule (Simplified Explanation)

The rule “generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda” — which means general words
should be understood in their general sense — is best explained through examples.

This principle tells us that when a law uses a general word, we should interpret it broadly,
unless the law clearly says otherwise.

Example 1: “Foreigner”
In the Election Code, foreigners are prohibited from donating campaign funds. The word
“foreigner” includes both individuals and corporations that are foreign. This is because in law,
the word “person” can refer not only to human beings (natural persons) but also
to corporations (juridical or artificial persons), unless the law specifically limits it. So, a foreign
corporation donating campaign funds would still violate the law.

Example 2: “Judge”
When the law uses the word “judge” without any qualifying phrase (like “municipal judge” or
“trial court judge”), it should be understood in its broad, general sense, meaning it includes all
kinds of judges — from those in lower courts up to justices of the Supreme Court.

Example 3: “Government”
When the law uses the term “government” without any restriction, it should be
understood generally to include all branches and forms of government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs).

However, if the law specifically says “National Government,” that term refers only to the
central government, which includes:

• the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments, and

• constitutional bodies (like COMELEC or COA).

Therefore, the “National Government” is not the same as “The Government of the Republic
of the Philippines,” which covers a wider scope — including local governments
(LGUs) and GOCCs.
Example 4: “Product of the Philippines”
This phrase should be taken in its ordinary meaning — anything that is produced or
manufactured in the country. So even if bran (ipa) or pollard (darak) come from imported
wheat, once they are processed and produced locally, they are still considered “products of the
Philippines.”

In short:

• General words in laws are understood broadly unless clearly limited.

• “Foreigner” includes both individuals and corporations.
• “Judge” includes all judges unless the law specifies otherwise.
• “Government” can include the whole government system, while “National Government”
refers only to the central government.
• “Products of the Philippines” means anything made or produced in the country, even
from imported materials.

5.07. Generic Term Includes Things That Arise Thereafter

When a law uses a word that has a general meaning, it should be interpreted to include not only
the situations that existed when the law was passed but also those that may happen in the
future, unless the law clearly says otherwise. This is known as progressive interpretation.

The purpose of this rule is to make sure that laws remain relevant and effective even as time
changes. It prevents laws from becoming outdated or useless when new situations arise that were
not present when the law was first made.

For example, when the legislature writes a law using general language, it usually means it
should apply to all cases that fall under its general intent and policy, not just the specific
cases that existed during its passage. Therefore, a statute written in broad terms can apply to new
situations or subjects that later develop, as long as they are still connected to the law’s main
purpose.

This means that laws written in general and comprehensive terms will cover all persons,
subjects, or businesses that fit within their scope—even those that only came into
existence after the law was enacted.

For instance:

• The phrase “articles of prohibited importation” in the Tariff and Customs Code
includes not only items that were already banned when the law was made but also any
goods that become prohibited later under new laws.
• Likewise, when a law mentions “any election,” it covers not just elections existing at
that time but also future elections, such as the election of delegates to a constitutional
convention.
5.08. Words with Commercial or Trade Meaning

Words or phrases that are commonly used by merchants or traders often have special
meanings in the business or commercial world. When such words appear in a law, they should be
interpreted according to their trade or commercial meaning, not their ordinary or dictionary
definition—unless the law clearly shows a different intent.

In short, if a law uses a business-related term, it is presumed that lawmakers meant it to have
the same meaning that business people or traders usually give it. This rule is especially
important in tariff laws, tax laws, and laws on commerce, since these laws directly affect
importers, traders, and those involved in business.

For example:

• The phrase “dispose of” normally means to part with or give something away. But in
commercial terms, it means “to sell.” So, if a tax law says that no tax shall be collected
on goods that were “disposed of” before it took effect, it means goods that were
sold before the law started.
• The phrase “gross value in money” also has a specific business meaning—it refers to
the gross selling price, or the total amount of money paid by the buyer to the seller for a
product. Thus, when this phrase appears in a law, it should be understood in that
commercial sense.

5.09. Words with Technical or Legal Meaning

Words that have a technical or legal meaning should be understood in that sense when used in a
statute. If a word has already been used in court decisions or legal practice with a specific
meaning, it is presumed that lawmakers intended to use it in the same legal or technical way,
unless there is a clear indication that they meant otherwise.

In short, if a term already has a recognized legal definition, it must be interpreted based on that
meaning—not its ordinary or everyday sense.

For example:

• Under Rule 59, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, the phrase “proper action” was
interpreted to mean an independent case or suit filed in court, not just an “intervention”
in an existing case. The term “action” has a technical meaning—it refers to a case that
starts a legal proceeding (by filing a complaint, issuing summons, etc.), not just a step
taken within an ongoing case.
• In criminal law, the word “acquitted” has a strict legal meaning. A case that
is dismissed is not the same as being acquitted. A dismissal simply ends the case but
does not declare the accused “not guilty,” except if it happens after the prosecution has
presented all its evidence and the court finds it insufficient.
 • The phrase “previously convicted” under the Probation Law refers to a conviction by
final judgment, not the date when the crime was committed. So, if a person is convicted
of several crimes on the same date (even if the crimes were committed on different days),
that person is not disqualified from probation under this rule.

In summary, words that have specialized meanings in law must be understood in their legal
sense, not in their everyday meaning, unless the law clearly intends otherwise.

5.10. How Identical Terms in the Same Statute Are Construed

As a general rule, when a word or phrase is repeatedly used in a law, it is presumed to have
the same meaningthroughout the entire statute. The same term should not be interpreted
differently in another part of the same law unlessthe context clearly shows that the legislature
intended a different meaning.

This rule is based on the idea that lawmakers use words consistently within the same law. If a
word is given a certain sense in one section, it is presumed to have that same sense everywhere
else in the statute—especially if the word has a technical meaning or has already been defined
within the law itself.

For example:

• A law once classified riceland based on its average harvest for the last three years. In
another part of the same law, the term “year” was again used when referring to the
“average harvest of the three preceding years.” The court ruled that “year” must have
the same meaning in both parts—that is, an agricultural year (one crop cycle), not a
calendar year. So, if two crops were produced in one calendar year, that counts as two
agricultural years.
• Likewise, in the 1935 Constitution, the phrase “agricultural land” appears in two
different provisions—one about public agricultural land and another about private
agricultural land. Both terms were interpreted to have the same meaning, since both
deal with the national policy of prohibiting the transfer of agricultural lands to
foreigners.

In short, identical terms in the same law are presumed to mean the same thing, unless there
is a clear reason to interpret them differently.
5.11. Meaning of Word Qualified by Purpose of Statute

The meaning of a word or phrase in a law can depend on the purpose for which the law was
made. In other words, how a word is understood—whether in its ordinary, legal, technical, or
even commercial sense—should always be guided by the goal or intent of the legislature.

When a word or phrase can be interpreted in more than one way, the interpretation that best
fulfills the purpose of the law should be adopted. The courts must choose the meaning that
helps carry out what the lawmakers intended, rather than one that would make the law useless or
contradict its purpose.

If giving a word its literal or technical meaning would prevent the law from achieving its
purpose, the court can disregard the literal meaning and instead adopt an interpretation that
will promote and realize the true intent behind the statute.

In short, the purpose of the law controls the meaning of its words—the court must interpret
every term in a way that helps fulfill what the law was meant to accomplish.

5.12. Word or Phrase Construed in Relation to Other Provisions

A word, phrase, or provision in a law should never be interpreted by itself alone. Instead, it
must be understood in relation to the other parts of the same law. This rule is connected to the
principle that a statute should be read as a whole, and every part of it should be given meaning
and effect.

For example, in Claudio v. COMELEC, the issue was how to interpret the word “recall” in
the Local Government Code. The question was whether the one-year limitation on recall
includes all recall proceedings (like the preparatory recall assembly) or just the recall election
itself. The Supreme Court ruled that “recall” refers only to the recall election, not the earlier
steps, after reading it in relation to other provisions of the Code. The Court reasoned that the
people’s power in recall is not to start the proceedings, but to vote in the recall election.

The same rule was applied in Garcia v. COMELEC. The issue was whether a resolution passed
by a municipal council can be the subject of an initiative and referendum. The Local
Government Code defined local initiative as the process of proposing or enacting an ordinance,
but the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6735 also mention resolutions as valid subjects. The
Supreme Court said that laws must be interpreted together and harmoniously with the
Constitution. Therefore, both ordinances and resolutions can be covered by local initiative
because that interpretation supports the intent of the law—to allow the people to directly
participate in lawmaking.

Another example is when the Corporation Law allowed a dissolved corporation to transfer its
properties to a “trustee.”The word “trustee” was interpreted in a general sense, not strictly as a
legally appointed one, to include a lawyer managing the company’s cases. This broader
interpretation prevented injustice and helped fulfill the purpose of the law.

Similarly, in interpreting the term “regular courts” under R.A. No. 6975, the Court said it
means civil courts like the Sandiganbayan, and not courts-martial. This is because the purpose of
the law was to transfer jurisdiction over police cases from military courts to the judicial system.

Courts also apply this rule when giving words a broader or more practical meaning to achieve the
intent of the law. For instance, the phrase “agricultural products” was interpreted to include not
just crops but also animals, fish, and other farm produce, since the purpose of the law was to
promote agricultural development. Likewise, the term “consumption”in a tax law was given
a broad meaning to include goods sold for any kind of use, not just total destruction, because
that interpretation supported the law’s purpose of taxing all commercial activities.

Lastly, in Motoomul v. Dela Paz, the issue was whether the word “court” in R.A. No. 5434
referred to the trial court or the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that it referred to
the trial court, because that interpretation aligned with the purpose of the law—to ensure the
speedy execution of decisions and prevent appeals from delaying justice.

In short, words or provisions must always be read in connection with the rest of the law and
interpreted in a way that supports, not defeats, the law’s purpose. Courts avoid interpretations
that isolate a single word or phrase and instead aim to give life to the entire statute as intended by
the legislature.

5.13. Meaning of Term Dictated by Context

Normally, when interpreting a law, words are given their usual and commonly understood
meaning. However, this rule is not absolute. Sometimes, the context in which the word or
phrase appears can give it a different meaning. In short, a word should be
understood according to how it is used in the law itself. This principle is expressed in Latin
as “Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam,” which means “words are to be understood
according to the subject matter.”

For example, in a law that says the “family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for nonpayment of debts,” the word “debts” should
be understood in a broad sense — not just referring to unpaid loans, but to all kinds of
obligations in general. This is because the context shows that “debts” is meant to cover every
form of financial obligation.

Another example is when a law classifies all lands into timber, mineral, and agricultural. In
this context, “agricultural” doesn’t just mean land used for farming. It is used in a broad sense to
include all lands that are neither timber nor mineral.
The context can also expand the meaning of a word that would normally have a limited
definition. For instance, a statute once stated that the “riparian owner” (or owner of land beside
water) has the preference to apply for foreshore lands, marshy lands, or lands covered with
water. Technically, “riparian” applies only to rivers. But because the law also
mentioned foreshore and marshy lands, the term was interpreted in a wider sense —
meaning any property beside a body of water, not just rivers.

On the other hand, context can also narrow the meaning of a broad word. For example, in
the Anti-Subversion Act, the word “overthrow” could have a peaceful meaning, like peacefully
replacing a government. But since the law specifically mentions “knowingly, willfully, and by
overt acts,” the context makes it clear that “overthrow” here means by force or violence, not
peacefully.

Finally, a word can even have different meanings in different parts of the same law, depending
on how it is used. For instance, if a municipal ordinance says that “any owner or manager of
fishponds” must pay tax per hectare, but it turns out that the government actually owns the
fishponds and just leases them to private operators — the word “owner” cannot include the
government. This is because the government is immune from taxes. Instead, the word
“manager” applies to the private operator who is running the fishpond and is the one liable for
the tax.

In summary, context is key in understanding the real meaning of words in a statute. Courts
always consider how and where a word is used before deciding what it truly means — whether
to give it a broad, limited, or special interpretation — so that the law’s intent is properly carried
out.

5.14. Where the Law Does Not Distinguish

This rule is based on the Latin maxim “Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemus,” which means “When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.”

In simple terms, if the law says something in general terms without making any distinction or
exception, then the courts must not create one. The courts should apply the law as it is written,
not as they think it should be. Their duty is to interpret the law, not to modify or add to it.

This principle is connected to the idea that general words should be given their full and
natural meaning. Courts cannot divide or limit the scope of a general term unless the law itself
clearly provides a reason to do so. In short, if the law is general, it applies generally.

Another related rule is that when the law does not make any exception, the courts cannot create
exceptions — unless there is a clear and compelling reason within the law that justifies it.
The purpose of this rule is to respect the intent of the legislature and to avoid making
interpretations that go beyond what the law actually says.
For example, if a law provides one rule for a certain group of cases, courts should not assume
that a different rule applies to similar cases unless the law itself shows that intention. Otherwise,
it would look like the court is making up distinctions that the legislature never intended.

This principle assumes that when lawmakers write a law in broad and general terms,
they intentionally did not want to make any distinctions or limitations. However, if there
are clear facts or circumstances showing that the legislature did intend a distinction, then the
courts can recognize it — not because they are adding something new, but because they
are fulfilling legislative intent.

A good example of this rule can be found in Guerrero v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 137004, July
26, 2000). The issue was about the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and
its power to judge the qualifications of its members.

The petitioner argued that the HRET’s jurisdiction was limited only to the constitutional
qualifications under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, and not to statutory
qualifications (like filing a certificate of candidacy under the Omnibus Election Code). But the
Supreme Court disagreed.

The Court said that the Constitution uses the general word “qualifications” — and since it does
not distinguish between constitutional and statutory qualifications, the courts should not make
a distinction either. To do so would be to narrow down the scope of the law without any legal
basis.

The Court also ruled that when questions arise about the validity of a proclamation of a
winning candidate who has already taken office, such issues fall under the HRET’s
authority — not the COMELEC’s. This avoids conflicting decisions between two constitutional
bodies and respects the people’s mandate.

In summary, the rule “ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus” reminds us that
courts must apply the law equally and consistently, without creating unnecessary distinctions or
exceptions. The law must be applied as written, unless there is a clear intent from the legislature
to treat certain cases differently.

5.15. Illustration of the Rule

This section provides several examples of how the rule “ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemus” (when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish) is applied
in real cases.

In simple terms, when a law uses general words, it must be applied generally to all
situations covered by those words — unless the law itself clearly makes a distinction or
exception. Courts cannot make their own interpretations to add limitations that the law never
intended.
Here are some examples to illustrate the rule:

1. Unlawful Detainer (Land Possession)

When a law gives the right to bring an unlawful detainer case for the possession of “any
land,” the phrase includes all kinds of land — agricultural, residential, or mineral. The
court cannot limit it to either public or private land because the law did not make any
distinction.
2. Authority of the Director of Lands
When a law allows the Director of Lands to cancel land patents over public lands, it
applies even to lands already given to local governments, since the law did not
specify otherwise.
3. Tax Exemptions for Government Property
If a statute exempts “properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines” from taxes,
the exemption covers all government properties, whether used for political purposes or
commercial activities, since the law made no difference between the two.
4. Formalities Required by Law
If the law requires certain formalities for an act to be valid, all formalities are
considered essential. Courts cannot say that some are minor or unimportant — the law
treats them equally.
5. Food and Toothpaste Ingredients
If a law mentions “stabilizers and flavors used in preparation of food” without
limiting their use, then the same rule applies even to those used in toothpaste or dental
cream, because no distinction was made.
6. Redemption of Homestead Property
When a law allows redemption within five years from its “conveyance,” the word
includes both voluntary and involuntary conveyances, since the law did not specify
one type only.
7. Leave with Pay
If an employee is granted “leaves of absence with pay,” the phrase means full pay and
applies to all types of leave(not just vacation or sick leaves) because the law did not
limit the kind of leave covered.
8. COMELEC’s Authority on Pre-Proclamation Controversies
When the law says COMELEC is the “sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies,” it includes all levels of elections — national, provincial, city, and
municipal — since no limitation was provided.
9. Counter Bond to Secure “Any Judgment”
The phrase “any judgment” in the Rules includes both final judgments and
those pending appeal, because the Rules did not make a distinction.
10. Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200)
The law makes it illegal for any person to record a private communication without
consent. The word “any” shows that the rule applies to everyone, whether the person is a
participant in the conversation or not. The court ruled that since the law made no
distinction, none should be made.
11. Tax on Cigarettes (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co. v. CIR)
The issue was whether filter cigarettes should be taxed differently from non-filter ones.
 The court said no — the law did not distinguish between the two, so both are taxed the
same way.
12. Naturalization Case (Tiu San v. Republic)
The law states that an applicant cannot take the oath of citizenship if convicted of “any
offense.” The court said this includes both mala in se (inherently wrong) and mala
prohibita (prohibited by law) crimes, since the law made no distinction.
13. Leave Credits (Peralta v. CSC)
The law granting vacation and sick leave with full pay did not distinguish between
employees who have leave credits and those who don’t. Thus, all employees are entitled
to the same benefit.
14. Election Statement of Contributions (R.A. 7166)
The law requires “every candidate” to file a statement of contributions and expenses.
The term covers both those who continued their campaign and those who withdrew,
since the law didn’t exclude anyone.
15. When Distinction Exists (B.P. Blg. 697 – Elective vs. Appointive Officials)
In this case, the court recognized that the law did make a distinction — appointive
officials automatically resign when they file for candidacy, while elective officials are
only on forced leave. Here, the distinction was clear in the text, so the court followed it.
16. SK Age Requirement (Garvida v. Sales, Jr.)
The law set different age limits for SK members and SK officials. Members must not be
over 21 years old (no reference to election day), but elective SK officials must not be
over 21 on election day. The court respected this distinction because it was clearly
intended by the law.
17. Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22 – Alonto v. People)
The court ruled that B.P. 22 applies even to checks issued as guarantees, since the law
made no distinctionbetween checks given as payment or as security for payment.
18. Use of Barangay Facilities (United BF Homeowners v. Barangay Chairman)
The issue was whether barangay halls and facilities mentioned in the Local Government
Code applied only to public spaces. The court ruled that it applies to all multipurpose
halls, even those in private subdivisions, because the law did not distinguish.

In short, these cases show that when the law is written in general terms, it applies to all
situations falling under those terms, and courts must not create exceptions that the law itself
didn’t intend.

5.16. Disjunctive and Conjunctive Words

The word “or” usually means a choice between two or more things — it separates ideas and
shows that each one is independent from the other. For example, in a law that punishes anyone
who “brings into, lands, conceals, or harbors” an illegal alien, each of those acts (bring, land,
conceal, harbor) is a separate violation.
In the same way, if a tax law says it applies to the “proprietor, lessee, or operator” of an
amusement place, it means that only one of them (depending on the case) is liable to pay the tax
— not all of them together.

Sometimes, however, “or” may be interpreted differently depending on the context. For
example:

• It can mean “and” if the law intends both actions to happen together. In the Rules of
Court, the phrase “preliminary examination or investigation” means that a judge can do
both stages, so “or” here acts like “and.”
• It can also mean “that is to say” when it’s used to explain something. For instance, when
an ordinance taxes goods based on “gross value in money or actual market value,” the
word “or” just clarifies that both mean the same thing.
• In some cases, “or” means successively, like in Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which allows only certain people (the offended woman, her parents, grandparents,
or guardian) to file cases for crimes like rape or seduction. The right to file the case
belongs to them one after another, not all at the same time.

Meanwhile, the word “and” means together with or combined with. It joins ideas or
requirements that must all be present. However, there are rare times when “and” can be
interpreted as “or,” especially if taking it literally would go against what the law really means.

For example, in Rumarate v. Hernandez, the law used the phrase “possession and
occupation.” The Court explained that possession is a broad term (it includes just claiming
ownership), but by adding occupation, the law meant actual, physical control of the land — not
just claiming it. So, the word “and” here limited the meaning of possession.

Lastly, the combined term “and/or” is used when the law wants to cover both possibilities — it
can mean either both together (and) or separately (or) — depending on what best fits the purpose
of the law.

B. ASSOCIATED WORDS

5.17. Noscitur a Sociis

The Latin maxim “noscitur a sociis” means “a word is known by the company it keeps.” In
simple terms, when a word or phrase in a law seems unclear or can have different meanings, its
true meaning can be understood by looking at the other words that surround it.

This rule helps interpret laws more accurately. If one word is vague, we can look at the words
that come before or after it to figure out what the law really means. In other words, the meaning
of a word is influenced by the context and by the words it is grouped with.
For example, if a law lists several words that all belong to the same category, then any other
word in that list should be interpreted in the same way. So, if most of the words in a sentence are
used in their ordinary sense, the rest should also be understood in their ordinary meaning—
unless it’s clear that the law intended a more technical or specific sense.

This also means that when a word can have both a broad and a narrow meaning, we should
choose the meaning that matches the sense of the words around it. A general word may take on a
limited meaning if the surrounding words show that the law is referring to something specific.

In short, under noscitur a sociis, a word’s meaning should not be taken alone or in isolation.
Instead, it should be interpreted in connection with the other words used with it, so that the entire
provision makes sense as a whole.

5.18. Application of the Rule

The rule of noscitur a sociis means that the meaning of a word can be determined by the words
that accompany it. This section explains how the Supreme Court applied this rule in several cases
to make the meaning of certain terms clearer and more consistent with the law’s intent.

First example:
In Section 13(3), Article XI of the Constitution, the Ombudsman is given the power to
“recommend removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution” of a public official.
The word “suspension” here could mean either a preventive measure (to stop someone
temporarily while an investigation is ongoing) or a punitive measure (a penalty after being found
guilty).
Applying noscitur a sociis, the Court said that “suspension” should be understood as a penalty,
because the other words around it (removal, demotion, fine, censure) are all punishments in
administrative cases. So, the word “suspension” should be read in the same context—as a
punishment, not as prevention.

Second example:
Under Section 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units can “prevent or
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” The term “gambling” here should be
interpreted as illegal gambling, not legal gambling authorized by law (like Lotto or
Sweepstakes). This is because “gambling” is mentioned together with the words “prohibited
games of chance,” meaning the law only refers to unlawful gambling.
Third example:
In Carandang v. Santiago, the issue was whether a person can file a separate civil case for
damages due to physical injuries even if a criminal case for frustrated homicide is still
pending. The Court ruled yes, explaining that in Article 33 of the Civil Code, the words
“defamation,” “fraud,” and “physical injuries” are used in their ordinary sense, not as specific
crimes under the Revised Penal Code. Since the other two words (defamation and fraud) are
general, “physical injuries” should also be understood in a general sense (meaning any bodily
harm), not just the crime called “physical injuries.”

Fourth example:
In Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, the question was whether the word “processes” in
General MacArthur’s 1944 proclamation includes judicial processes. The Court said no,
because “processes” was listed together with “laws” and “regulations,” which all refer
to executive acts, not judicial proceedings. Thus, based on the company it keeps, “processes”
meant executive orders or acts, not court proceedings.

Fifth example:
In another case involving Republic Act No. 1394, the law mentioned “machinery and/or raw
materials to be used by new and necessary industry; machinery, equipment, accessories, and
spare parts, for use of industries, miners, mining enterprises, planters, and farmers.”
The question was what the term “industries” means. The Court ruled that it should not be taken
in its broad sense but rather limited to productive activities like mining, planting, and
farming, since those are the words surrounding it. Reading it broadly would make the law
inconsistent.

Sixth example:
In a libel case, someone claimed that speaking through a loudspeaker or amplifier was the
same as committing libel “through radio,” which is covered by law. The Court disagreed, saying
that “radio” should be read together with the other words like “writing, printing, painting,” etc.,
which all have a permanent form. Since amplified speech is temporary and not recorded, it
cannot be considered libel through “radio.”

Seventh example:
In the Postal Law, unmailable items included “any lottery, gift, enterprise, or scheme for the
distribution of money or property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind.” The Court said that
“gift enterprise” and “scheme” should be understood the same way as “lottery”—meaning they
all require payment or consideration to join.
Eighth example:
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, the issue was whether an employee’s claim for a cash
reward from his employer falls under the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. The law gave labor
arbiters authority over “all money claims of workers.” The Court ruled that this phrase should be
read together with the other parts of the same law, which all relate to employment disputes.
Therefore, the rule of noscitur a sociis means that “money claims” refer only to claims
connected to employment, not just any type of money claim.

Ninth example:
In Ebarle v. Sucaldito, the question was whether Executive Order No. 265, which deals with
complaints against government officials, also applies to criminal cases. The Court said no,
because the order talks about administrative remedies and mentions “court action” only after
administrative remedies are exhausted. This shows it refers to civil suits, not criminal cases.

Tenth example:
In Motoomul v. Dela Paz, the issue was whether the word “court” in Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 5434 referred to the Court of Appeals or the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Court
ruled that since “court” was mentioned alongside administrative bodies like the Secretary of
Labor, Securities and Exchange Commission, and Civil Aeronautics Board, it must refer to
the Court of Agrarian Relations, which belongs to the same group—not the Court of Appeals.

In summary:
The rule of noscitur a sociis helps avoid confusion by interpreting a word based on the meaning
of the words that go with it. This ensures that every part of the law is consistent and makes sense
as a whole.

5.19. Ejusdem Generis

The rule of ejusdem generis means “of the same kind or class.” It is a principle in statutory
construction that helps us understand the meaning of general words that come after specific ones
in a law.

Normally, general words in a statute are understood in their broad or common meaning. But if
those general words are used together with specific ones, they will not be interpreted too broadly.
Instead, they will be limited only to things that are similar in nature to the specific words
mentioned.
For example, if a law says “cars, trucks, motorcycles, and other vehicles”, the phrase “other
vehicles” will not include airplanes or boats. It will only include things of the same kind or
class as cars, trucks, and motorcycles — meaning land vehicles.

This is the main idea of ejusdem generis — when specific examples are followed by general
terms, those general terms should be interpreted to cover only items similar to the ones
specifically listed.

The purpose of this rule is to give meaning to both the specific and general words used in the
law. The specific words show what kind or class the law is referring to, while the general words
extend that meaning to include other similar things that belong to the same class, even if they’re
not directly mentioned.

The rule also assumes that if lawmakers really wanted to include everything in a general sense,
they wouldn’t have bothered listing specific examples at all. By naming specific things first, the
legislators clearly intended to limit the meaning of the general term to that particular category.

In short, ejusdem generis prevents overly broad interpretations by making sure that general
words in a law are understood only in relation to the same kind or class as the specific words
listed before or after them.

5.20. Illustration of the Rule of Ejusdem Generis

The rule of ejusdem generis can be better understood through several examples showing how it
is applied in actual cases.

Basically, this rule says that when general words follow specific ones in a law, those general
words should only include things that are of the same kind or class as the specific ones
mentioned. It prevents laws from being interpreted too broadly.

For example, if a law prohibits the giving of “pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, and the like” as campaign materials, the phrase “and the like” only covers items
similar to the ones listed—simple, tangible giveaway items. It doesn’t include taped jingles or
songs since those are not of the same kind.
Another example: a law mentions “dynamos, generators, exciters, and other machinery for
the generation of electricity.” Here, “other machinery” means only machinery similar to
dynamos or generators, not unrelated machines like turbines or pumps.

The same idea applies when a law talks about the vice mayor taking over the duties of the mayor
during the “absence, suspension, or other temporary disability” of the mayor. The word
“absence” should be interpreted like the others—it refers to a situation where the mayor cannot
perform his duties, not just being physically away.

Also, when a law says that a public official can be suspended or removed for “neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption, or other forms of maladministration,” the phrase “other forms” only
refers to wrongdoings related to official duties, not personal misconduct.

In Cu Unjieng Sons, Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, the issue was whether war losses could be
considered “compensated for by insurance or otherwise.” The Supreme Court ruled that the word
“otherwise” must be understood in the same sense as “insurance”—meaning it must involve
legal or contractual compensation, not just promises from officials. This shows how general
terms are limited to the same class as the specific words before them.

In Cebu Institute of Technology v. Ople, the question was whether teachers hired on contract
are exempt from service incentive leave. The rule mentioned “field personnel and other
employees on task or contract basis.” The Court said the phrase “on task or contract basis”
should be interpreted like “field personnel”—referring to workers whose performance is
unsupervised. Since teachers are supervised, they are not exempt.

In another case, Cagayan Valley Enterprises v. Court of Appeals, the law protected bottles
used for “soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages.”
The Court ruled that “other lawful beverages” included hard liquor because the law’s intent was
to protect all types of marked beverage containers, not just soft drinks or milk bottles.

In National Power Corp. v. Angas, the law mentioned “loan or forbearance of any money,
goods, or credits, and the rate allowed in judgments.” The Court ruled that the word “judgments”
refers only to those related to loans or forbearance, not all kinds of judgments.

Similarly, in Republic v. Migrino, the law authorized the PCGG to investigate the former
President’s “subordinates and close associates.” The Court ruled that the term “subordinates”
refers only to those who had close personal ties with the President, not every government
employee who served during his administration.
In short, the rule of ejusdem generis teaches that when general terms follow specific ones, the
general terms should be limited to the same class or kind as the specific examples given. This
avoids overly broad or unintended interpretations of the law.

5.21 Limitations of Ejusdem Generis (Simplified Explanation)

The rule of ejusdem generis means that when a law lists specific words followed by a general
word, the general word should be understood to include only things of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.

However, this rule is not absolute — it only applies when certain conditions are met, and it
cannot be used if doing so would go against the true intention of the law.

Conditions for Ejusdem Generis to Apply

For this rule to work, the following must be present:

1. The law lists specific words followed by a general term.

2. The specific words belong to the same kind or class.
3. The enumeration is not exhaustive (it’s not just giving all examples).
4. There is no sign that lawmakers intended the general word to have a broader meaning.

If any of these are missing, ejusdem generis does not apply.

When Ejusdem Generis Does Not Apply

1. When the enumeration is not of the same class

o If the listed items are too different from each other, there’s no common category.
o Example: “stabilizers and flavors” used with many unrelated products. Here,
“flavors” shouldn’t be limited to food only — it can include items used in
toothpaste.
2. When the enumeration is exhaustive
o If all possible examples are already covered, the general term must refer
to something beyond those specific words.
o Example: The phrase “action, suit, or other proceeding” — since “action” and
“suit” already cover all judicial processes, “other proceeding” must refer to non-
judicial proceedings, like public notices or sales of property.
3. When the general word comes first
o If the law says “containers, such as casks, metal, or glass receptacles,” the
examples don’t limit the general term “containers.”
 oSo, even jute bags are included.
4. When it defeats legislative intent
o The rule must not be applied if it will go against the purpose of the law.
o Ejusdem generis is only an aid to interpret the law — not something that should
change its meaning.

Illustrative Cases

⚖ Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Express

(G.R. No. 152609, June 29, 2005)
Facts:
The issue was about the phrase “and other similar services” found in a tax regulation listing
services like project studies, information services, engineering, and architectural designs. The
question was whether this phrase was limited only to those services mentioned.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court said ejusdem generis does not apply here. The listed services (project
studies, information, engineering, architectural design) are not of the same kind — each one
involves different skills and fields.

• Project studies → deals with business or investments.

• Information services → deals with data or tech.
• Engineering and architectural design → deals with technical creativity.

Since these are not of the same class, the general term “and other similar services” must be
understood broadly, to include all kinds of professional or technical services — not just those
related to the examples given.

✅ Key Point:
Ejusdem generis only applies when the words listed belong to the same class. If not, the general
term should be taken broadly.

⚖ Garcia v. Social Security Commission (G.R. No. 170735,

Dec. 17, 2000)
Facts:
Under the Social Security Law, Section 28(f) imposes penalties on the “managing head,
directors, or partners” of a company for violations.
Garcia argued that since the law mentioned “managing head,” the other words “directors or
partners” should also mean “managing” directors or “managing” partners — applying ejusdem
generis.

Ruling:
The Court rejected the argument. The law was clear and unambiguous — it
penalized all directors and partners, not just managing ones.

There was no need to use the rule of ejusdem generis because the provision already expressed
a clear intent.

✅ Key Point:
Don’t apply ejusdem generis if the law is clear. Rules of construction are used only when the
meaning is doubtful or ambiguous.

⚖ U.S. v. Santo Niño

Facts:
A law prohibited carrying “bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon.” The
accused was caught carrying an unlicensed revolver, and he argued that the phrase “other deadly
weapon” only referred to bladed weapons like those listed.

Ruling:
The Court said no — the legislative intent was clearly to prohibit all kinds of deadly weapons,
not just knives or daggers.
If we apply ejusdem generis strictly, a gun wouldn’t be included, which defeats the purpose of
the law (to prevent people from carrying any concealed deadly weapon).

✅ Key Point:
Don’t apply ejusdem generis when it would defeat the intent of the law. The purpose was public
safety, so “other deadly weapon” includes firearms.

⚖ Cagayan Valley Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
A law (R.A. No. 623, as amended) protected registered bottles used for “soda water, mineral or
aerated waters, cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages.”
The issue was whether hard liquor bottles were included in “other lawful beverages.”

Ruling:
The Court said yes — hard liquor is included.
The title of the law shows that the intent was to protect all kinds of beverage containers, not
just soft drinks or milk.
If the Court applied ejusdem generis, “other lawful beverages” would only refer to non-
alcoholic drinks — which would go against legislative intent.

✅ Key Point:
When the legislative intent is broad, the general term should be read broadly, not restricted by
ejusdem generis.

⚖ Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Social Security

Commission
Facts:
The Social Security Law defined “employer” as “any person, natural or juridical, who carries on
any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind.”
The Church argued that it should not be included because it is a religious and non-
profit institution. They claimed that by ejusdem generis, the phrase “activity of any kind”
should be limited to those for profit, since the earlier words (“trade, business, industry”) imply
commercial activity.

Ruling:
The Court disagreed. The definition of “employer” was clear and comprehensive — it
covers anyone who employs another, regardless of profit.
Ejusdem generis applies only when the law is uncertain. In this case, the meaning was clear, so
the Church was still considered an “employer” under the law.

✅ Key Point:
You cannot use ejusdem generis to exclude something clearly included in the law’s wording.

5.22. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Meaning of the Phrase (in Simplest Terms):

The Latin phrase expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of others.”
In simpler terms, when the law specifically mentions certain things, it means that anything not
mentioned is not included or allowed.

Simplified Explanation:
This rule in statutory construction means that if a law or provision lists specific items, persons, or
situations, it is understood that those not listed are excluded.
The logic behind this is that lawmakers intentionally mentioned certain things to limit the scope
of the law. If they wanted to include more, they would have written them down.

For example, if a law says, “Only teachers, nurses, and engineers can apply for this scholarship,”
it means that doctors, lawyers, and other professions are automatically excluded, even if the
law didn’t say so directly.

Other Forms of the Rule:

1. Expressum facit cessare tacitum –

“What is expressed puts an end to what is implied.”
→ Meaning: If the law already says something clearly, we cannot assume it means
something else that wasn’t stated.
2. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis –
“The exception confirms the rule in cases not excepted.”
→ Meaning: If the law makes an exception for some cases, then all other cases are
covered by the general rule.

Purpose of the Rule:

This rule is used to restrict interpretation and prevent adding things that the lawmakers never
meant to include.
It is based on logic — if the legislators took the time to specify something, it means they did not
intend to include other things outside of that list.

Example Case 1: Parayno v. Jovellanos (G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006)

Facts:
A zoning ordinance made a distinction between “gasoline filling station” and “gasoline service
station.”

• A filling station only sold gasoline and oil.

• A service station offered repairs, maintenance, and sold car accessories.

Ruling:
The Court said that these two terms are not the same.
Since the ordinance clearly listed them separately, the rule of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius applied — the express mention of one excludes the other.
So, a service station cannot automatically be treated as a filling station, because the law
specifically differentiated them.

Example Case 2: San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue (G.R. No. 147949, June 22, 2006)

Facts:
San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. claimed it was exempt from paying certain taxes because it
exported coconut oil products.

Ruling:
The Court ruled against the company.
The law clearly stated that only the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products,
and desiccated coconutsby the manufacturer or miller was tax-exempt.

Because San Pablo’s situation was not listed in the law, the exemption did not apply to them.

Application of the Rule:

The Court said that since the law enumerated specific items, everything not
mentioned was excluded.
This follows the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

When the Rule Does NOT Apply:

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres (G.R. No. 132527, July 29, 2005), the
Court said that this rule does not apply when the law uses words by way of example, such as
“such as” or “like.”

Example:
If a law says, “The program gives benefits such as free training, tax exemption, and housing aid,”
—
the phrase “such as” means these are just examples, not the only benefits allowed.

Hence, the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be used to limit the meaning.

5.23. Negative-Opposite Doctrine (Argumentum a Contrario)

Meaning of the Phrase (in Simplest Terms):

The negative-opposite doctrine or argumentum a contrario means “what is not included is
excluded.”
In simple terms, if the law says something applies only to certain cases or people, it means
it does not apply to others not mentioned.

Simplified Explanation:

This doctrine is closely related to expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

It means that if a law expressly provides a rule for one situation, it implies the opposite for
situations not covered by that law.

So, when a statute gives a privilege or rule to one group, we cannot extend that same privilege
to others unless the law clearly says so.
The idea is: what is affirmed in one case is denied in the opposite case.

For example:
If the law says, “Senior citizens are exempt from paying public transportation fares,” it
means non-senior citizens are not exempt.

Example Case: Chung Fook v. White

Facts:
A U.S. law said that the wife of a naturalized American citizen who has a contagious
disease is exempt from detentionin a hospital.
However, the wife of a native-born American (not naturalized) was detained for treatment, and
her husband filed a petition to release her.

Ruling:
The court denied the petition, saying the law only applies to the wife of a naturalized citizen —
not to the wife of a native-born one.
The court applied the negative-opposite doctrine, reasoning that since the law specifically
mentioned “naturalized citizens,” it means others (native-born citizens) were excluded.

In simple words:
Because the law gave the exemption to one group, the court assumed it was not meant for the
other group.

Criticism of the Ruling:

The decision was criticized for being too mechanical and unfair.
By following the rule too strictly, the court created injustice — favoring naturalized citizens
over native-born ones.
Critics said the court should have used the doctrine of necessary implication, which allows
courts to extend the law’s meaning when it’s reasonable to assume that the legislature did not
intend discrimination.

In this case, since both naturalized and native-born Americans are citizens, the law should
have been interpreted equally for both.

Purpose of the Doctrine:

The negative-opposite doctrine helps courts determine what the law does not cover by inferring
the opposite meaning of what is expressly stated.
However, it should be applied with caution, because a strict reading can lead to unfair or
unreasonable results.

5.24. Application of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Meaning of the Latin Maxim (in Simple Terms):

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “the express mention of one thing implies the
exclusion of others.”

In simple words, if the law lists specific things or persons, then it excludes all others not
mentioned.
The idea is: “If the legislature wanted to include more, it would have said so.”

Simplified Explanation:

This rule is often used when interpreting laws that:

• Grant powers or rights,

• Impose duties, penalties, or restrictions, or
• Create special privileges.

If the law names certain people, acts, or conditions, the court presumes that only those
specifically mentioned are included, and everything else is excluded.
Courts are not allowed to add or insert what the law does not say — doing so would
be legislating, not interpreting.
Examples and Cases Explained

🧑⚖ 1. Quo Warranto Actions

If a law says only certain people (like the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor) can file
a quo warranto case,
→ then no one else may do so.
This is because the law specifically designates who has the authority.

🧑⚖ 2. Libel Preliminary Investigation

When the law says that preliminary investigations in libel cases may only be conducted by
the provincial or city fiscal,
→ it means other municipal courts cannot conduct them.
The mention of specific authorities excludes all others.

🧑⚖ 3. Crimes That Cannot Be Prosecuted De Oficio

The law lists crimes that cannot be filed without a complaint — adultery, concubinage,
seduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness.
→ This means all other crimes (like slander) can be prosecuted de oficio (even without a
private complaint).

🧑⚖ 4. City’s Power to Sell Land

If a law allows a city to sell or lease only the northern portion of a reclaimed area,
→ it means the southern portion cannot be sold.
The specific mention of the northern area excludes the southern one.

🧑⚖ 5. Labor Code Example

The Labor Code says money claims before its effectivity must be filed within one year.
→ Therefore, non-money labor cases (like reinstatement) are excluded from that one-year rule.
🧑⚖ 6. Declaratory Relief

The law allows declaratory relief only when it involves a deed, will, contract, or statute.
→ So, cases involving other matters are excluded from declaratory relief.

🧑⚖ 7. City Barrios Enumeration

When a law lists the barrios included in a city,

→ any barrio not mentioned is excluded — meaning it’s not part of the city.

🧑⚖ 8. Taxes Against Estates

The law requires money claims against a deceased person to be filed within a period,
→ but since taxes are not listed, they are excluded from the rule — meaning the government can
still collect taxes even if not filed within the period.

🧑⚖ 9. Change of Municipality to City

If the law says only the mayor, vice-mayor, and councilors will remain in office,
→ it implies that other municipal officials are abolished when the city is created.

🧑⚖ 10. Legal Redemption Between Co-owners

If the Civil Code says that notice of sale must be made in writing by the vendor,
→ it means notice by the buyer (vendee) is invalid, since only the seller was mentioned.

🧑⚖ 11. Local Autonomy Act (Taxing Powers)

The law gives local governments broad taxing power, except for specific exclusions.
→ So, if a subject (like silica mining) is not excluded, it is included in the city’s power to tax.
🧑⚖ 12. Probation Law

The Probation Law lists specific disqualified persons.

→ Those not mentioned are qualified to avail of probation.

🧑⚖ 13. Competitive and Non-Competitive Government Positions

If the law says secretaries of mayors are non-competitive,

→ it means assistant secretaries are competitive, since they’re not included in the list.

🧑⚖ 14. Port of Kilawan Case

The port was not listed among national ports,

→ so the Court ruled it is a municipal port, following the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius.

🧑⚖ 15. Insurance Case – Murder Not Excluded

The insurance policy listed 10 specific situations where the insurer isn’t liable —
but murder was not one of them.
→ Therefore, the Court said the insurer must pay, since the exclusion list didn’t include murder.
What’s not mentioned is not excluded.

🧑⚖ 16. Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos (1996)

The issue: whether religious solicitations needed a permit under a law covering “charitable or
public welfare purposes.”
The Court said no, because “charitable” and “religious” were treated separately in the
Constitution.
→ Since the law mentioned only “charitable,” it excluded “religious.”
Express mention of one excludes the other.

🧑⚖ 17. Lopez v. Court of Appeals (2002) – Ombudsman Decision

Issue: Are suspensions of more than one month immediately executory pending appeal?
The Court said no.
Section 27 of R.A. 6770 says only penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension not
more than one month are immediately executory.
→ Therefore, suspensions exceeding one month are not immediately executory.

This follows the principle that what is mentioned (short suspensions) excludes what is not
(longer suspensions).

5.25. Limitations of the Rule of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius means “the express mention of one thing excludes
others.” But this rule is not absolute — it’s only a tool to understand what lawmakers meant,
not a strict law that must always be followed.

It cannot be applied blindly if it goes against the true intent or purpose of the legislature. In
short, the rule helps interpret laws, but it must yield whenever applying it would cause injustice,
unfairness, or absurd results.

1. The Rule Is Not Always Exclusive

Sometimes, even if a law lists certain things, it doesn’t mean everything not listed is
automatically excluded.
For example, in one case, a rule listed some procedures that apply in municipal trial courts. Even
if a particular provision (like the rule that considers the date of mailing as the filing date) was not
listed, the Court still allowed it to apply. The reason: the list was not meant to be exclusive, and
excluding that provision would have caused confusion and inconsistency in the court system.

Simplified: Just because something isn’t mentioned doesn’t mean it’s not allowed — especially
if excluding it would go against the purpose of having uniform rules in all courts.

2. When Enumeration Is Just by Example

The rule also doesn’t apply when a law lists things by way of example, not to limit them.
For instance, a law listed five examples of “unprofessional conduct” by a doctor. One doctor
prescribed opium to a patient who didn’t need it, and his lawyer argued that it’s not in the list, so
it’s not punishable. The Court disagreed.
It said those five instances were just examples, not the only possible kinds of “unprofessional
conduct.” If the law was interpreted narrowly, it would defeat the main purpose of regulating
doctors’ conduct.
Simplified: If the law gives examples, it doesn’t mean only those examples apply. The court
looks at the purpose behind the law.

3. The Rule Should Not Cause Injustice or Violate Equal Protection

The rule shouldn’t be applied if it would result in unfair treatment or discrimination.

For example, if a law seems to include certain persons but exclude others without a valid reason,
the court can reject the rule to avoid violating the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The goal is to make sure the law is applied fairly and in line with justice, not just technically.

4. The Rule Should Not Lead to Inconvenience or Public Harm

The rule should also be disregarded if applying it would cause hardship or harm to the
public.

Example:
A law says that the municipal council must be presided over by the mayor, and if the mayor
cannot attend, the vice-mayor or the councilor with the highest votes will preside.
Technically, if all three refuse to attend, the rule would mean the council can’t meet.
But the Court rejected that interpretation because it would stop the council from
functioning and allow those officials to boycott sessions.
So, the Court ruled that in such cases, the next councilor may preside.

Simplified: The law should not be read in a way that allows public officials to stop the
government from functioning.

5. The Real Test: Legislative Intent

The final test is always what the legislature intended.

If lawmakers clearly meant the enumeration to be exclusive, the rule applies. But if the intent
was broader, the rule must not be used to limit it.

6. Case: San Pablo Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

(2006)

Issue: Is San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) exempt from paying tax on its exported
goods?
Ruling: The Supreme Court said no.
The law clearly stated that the tax exemption applied only to exports of rope, coconut oil, palm
oil, copra by-products, and desiccated coconuts by the factory owner or miller.
SPMC wasn’t in that category, so it couldn’t claim the exemption.

The Court explained that tax exemptions must be strictly interpreted, and anything not
expressly included is excluded.
They applied the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius here because the legislature clearly
listed who was exempt — and SPMC wasn’t among them.

Simplified: When the law clearly lists who is exempt from taxes, others not listed can’t claim
exemption.

7. Case: Coconut Oil Refiners Assn. Inc. v. Torres (2005)

Issue: The law mentioned “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital, and
equipment” as incentives for freeport zone operators. Does this mean these are
the only incentives allowed?

Ruling: The Court said no.

The phrase “such as” showed that the list was only giving examples of incentives, not limiting
them.
Thus, the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply when the words are used by
way of example.

Simplified: When the law uses phrases like “such as,” the list is not exclusive — it’s just an
illustration of possible examples.

5.26. Doctrine of Casus Omissus

The Doctrine of Casus Omissus is a rule in statutory construction which means that a person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a law is presumed to have been intentionally
omitted by the legislature. The Latin phrase “casus omissus pro omisso habendus
est” translates to a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted.

In simpler terms, if a certain situation or subject is not mentioned in the law, the courts cannot
add or include it through interpretation — even if it seems like it was left out by mistake. The
courts must follow what the law explicitly states, not what it might have meant to say.

However, this rule applies only when it is clear that the omission was intentional. If the
legislative intent shows that the omission was not meant to exclude a particular person or thing,
then the court may “fill in the gap” to give effect to the true purpose of the law — as long as it
doesn’t contradict the wording of the statute.
📘 Example:
Suppose a law provides that “students from public schools are entitled to a free monthly
allowance.” If the law doesn’t mention private school students, the court cannot assume that
they should also be covered, because they were omittedfrom the enumeration. This is casus
omissus — what is not included is presumed to be intentionally excluded.

But if it can be proven that the legislature truly intended to include all students regardless of
school type, and the omission was clearly unintentional, the court may interpret the law more
broadly to carry out that intent.

📚 Case Illustration:
In People v. Manantan (G.R. No. L-14129, 1960), the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
casus omissus. The law specified certain government officials required to file a statement of
assets and liabilities. Since the accused did not belong to the category expressly mentioned, the
Court ruled that he could not be held liable — because his position was omittedfrom the law’s
enumeration.

5.27. Doctrine of Last Antecedent

The Doctrine of Last Antecedent is a rule in statutory construction that provides that qualifying
words or phrases should be applied only to the word or phrase immediately preceding
them, unless the context of the law clearly shows a different intention.

In simpler terms, when a sentence in a law lists several things followed by a qualifier (a word or
phrase that limits or describes), that qualifier is presumed to modify only the last item mentioned
— not all the previous ones — unless the law indicates otherwise.

This rule is expressed in the Latin maxim “ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi
impediatur sententia,” which means “a relative word or phrase refers to its nearest antecedent,
unless the sense of the sentence prevents it.”

📘 Example:
Suppose a law states:

“The privilege is granted to teachers, students, and parents residing in the municipality.”

According to the Doctrine of Last Antecedent, the phrase “residing in the

municipality” applies only to “parents” — the last group mentioned — and not
to teachers and students, unless there’s clear legislative intent showing it should apply to all.

However, if a comma separates the phrase — like this:

“The privilege is granted to teachers, students, and parents, residing in the municipality.”
The comma indicates that “residing in the municipality” could apply to all three groups,
because the separation suggests a broader connection.

📚 Case Illustration:
In People v. Manantan (G.R. No. L-14129, 1960), the Supreme Court applied the Doctrine of
Last Antecedent in interpreting a statute concerning the filing of statements of assets and
liabilities. The modifying clause was held to refer only to the nearest antecedent and not to the
entire preceding phrase, since there was no comma indicating a wider application.

5.28. Illustration of the Doctrine of Last Antecedent

This section demonstrates how the Doctrine of Last Antecedent is applied in real cases to
clarify which part of a statute a qualifying phrase actually modifies. The doctrine states that a
qualifying or limiting phrase refers only to its immediate or last antecedent, unless the
context clearly shows a different intention.

📘 First Example — Definition of “Tenant” under the Law

A law defined “tenant” as a person who personally cultivates another’s land with the help of
his “immediate farm household.” The phrase “immediate farm household” was further defined
as:

“Members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether related or not,
who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help operate the farm enterprise.”

In this definition, the question arose: does “who are dependent upon him for support” apply
to “members of the family of the tenant” as well?

Applying the Doctrine of Last Antecedent, the court ruled no. The qualifying phrase “who are
dependent upon him for support” refers only to its immediate antecedent — “such other person
or persons, whether related or not.”

Thus, members of the family of the tenant (like his son, son-in-law, or grandson)
are included even if they live separately or are not financially dependent on him. The Court
explained that this interpretation also aligns with the unity of the Filipino family, which the law
seeks to protect.

📘 Second Example — Florentino v. Philippine National Bank

In this case, the issue was whether holders of backpay certificates could compel government-
owned banks to accept these certificates as payment for debts.

The law stated that:

The holder of a backpay certificate may apply it as payment of obligations “subsisting at the time
of the approval of this act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the government or to
any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the
government, or to any citizen of the Philippines or to any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines, who may be willing to accept the same for such
settlement.”

The Philippine National Bank (PNB) argued that the phrase “who may be willing to accept the
same for such settlement”applies to all entities listed, including government-owned banks —
meaning it had discretion to refuse acceptance.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed. Applying the Doctrine of Last Antecedent, it ruled
that the qualifying phrase “who may be willing to accept the same for such settlement” applies
only to its last antecedent — “any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines.”

The presence of a comma before the phrase “or to any citizen…” separated it from the previous
list, indicating that the qualifier applies only to the last part of the sentence, not the entire
enumeration.

✅ Therefore, holders of backpay certificates can compel government-owned banks like PNB
to accept the certificates as payment, since the phrase limiting acceptance does not apply to
them.

👉 In summary:
The Doctrine of Last Antecedent is applied to avoid confusion about which part of a statute a
modifying phrase refers to. Courts presume that qualifiers apply only to the nearest word or
phrase before them, unless there is clear legislative intent or punctuation (like commas) that
indicate a broader application.

5.29. Qualification of the Doctrine of Last Antecedent

This section explains that the Doctrine of Last Antecedent is not absolute — it has exceptions.
The doctrine is only a guide or tool to help interpret laws, and it can be disregarded when
the legislative intent clearly shows that a qualifying phrase should apply to all parts of a
sentence or provision, not just the last one.

📘 Simplified Explanation:
The Doctrine of Last Antecedent normally means that a qualifying phrase or clause modifies
only the nearest (or last) word or phrase before it.

However, if the law clearly intends for the qualifier to apply to all of the listed items, then the
court must interpret it that way. Even a slight indication of such intent is enough to extend the
modifying phrase to the whole enumeration.

Also, the doctrine does not apply if the phrase is not meant to qualify any antecedent at all —
meaning it stands independently and applies to the entire sentence.
📘 Example Case — On Subdivision or Condominium Plans:
In one case, the law used the phrase:

“Facilities, improvements, infrastructures, and other forms of development, which are offered
and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans.”

Here, the question was: does the phrase “which are offered and indicated in the approved
subdivision or condominium plans” refer only to “other forms of development,” or does it also
include “facilities, improvements, and infrastructures”?

The Court ruled that the phrase applies to all — facilities, improvements,
infrastructures, and other forms of development.

Why? Because of the word “and.”

The word “and” is a conjunction that connects and unites all the listed items. It
does not separate them. This shows that the intention of the law was to apply the qualifier
— “which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans” —
to every item mentioned before it.

✅ In summary:

• The Doctrine of Last Antecedent is not rigid; it yields when the context or intent shows
the phrase should apply to all antecedents.
• Even a small clue in the wording or structure can show that broader intent.
• The use of conjunctions like “and” can signal that the lawmaker intended a collective
application, not a limited one.

.30. Reddendo Singula Singulis

The rule of reddendo singula singulis is another variation of the Doctrine of Last
Antecedent. The Latin phrase means “referring each to each” — or in simpler terms, each
word or phrase in a sentence should be applied to the part of the sentence that it most
appropriately fits.

📘 Simplified Explanation:
The rule tells us that each phrase, word, or clause in a law should be matched with or applied
to the specific part it logically and contextually belongs to. This helps avoid confusion and
ensures that the law is read distributively — meaning every word is interpreted in connection
with its correct subject.

In short:
➡ Each part of a sentence should be applied to its proper subject.
➡ Courts use this rule to assign meaning correctly when multiple clauses or objects appear in
one provision.

⚖ Case Applications

1. People v. Tamani
The issue: When should the 15-day appeal period in a criminal case start — from
the promulgation of judgment or from notice of judgment?

Section 6, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court states:

“An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment
or order appealed from.”

There was confusion because of the phrase “promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order.”
Using reddendo singula singulis, the Court interpreted the provision as follows:

• “Promulgation” refers to judgment, and

• “Notice” refers to order.

✅ Meaning: The 15-day period is counted from the promulgation of the judgment, not from
receipt of notice.

This interpretation applied each word to its proper pair — “promulgation” with “judgment” and
“notice” with “order.”

2. Case on Aliens in Nationalized Businesses

The issue: Whether a Chinese worker holding a non-managerial position in a nationalized
retail business was violating the law prohibiting aliens from working in such enterprises.

The law prohibited aliens from intervening “in the management, operation, administration, or
control thereof, whether as an officer, employee, or laborer.”

The Court applied reddendo singula singulis and ruled that the words should be distributed
accordingly:

• The terms “management, operation, administration, or control” correspond to the

positions of “officer, employee, or laborer.”

✅ Meaning: The prohibition applies to all levels of work, including laborers — not just those
in managerial roles.
Thus, even a non-control or ordinary employee position held by an alien was still covered by
the prohibition.

3. Amadora v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)

The issue: Whether teachers or heads of schools are liable for the acts of students under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, which provides:

“Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by
their pupils, students, or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.”

Using reddendo singula singulis, the Supreme Court interpreted the provision distributively:

• The word “teachers” applies to “pupils and students.”

• The phrase “heads of establishments of arts and trades” applies to “apprentices.”

✅ Meaning:

• In academic schools, the teacher is liable for the acts of students.

• In technical or vocational schools, the head of the establishment (not the teacher) is
liable for the acts of apprentices.

This case perfectly demonstrates how the Court assigns each phrase to its correct subject,
ensuring the law is applied logically.

📘 In Summary:
The Doctrine of Reddendo Singula Singulis ensures clarity and fairness in legal interpretation
by:

• Matching each clause or word to its proper object;

• Preventing misinterpretation when several phrases are joined together; and
• Ensuring each part of the law is read in its proper place and context.

✅ Key Takeaway:
Each phrase in a statute must be read in connection with the part it most naturally relates
to. This prevents confusion, aligns with legislative intent, and preserves logical interpretation of
the law.
 C. PROVISIONS, EXCEPTIONS AND SAVING CLAUSE

5.31. Provisos, Generally (Simplified Explanation)

A proviso is a clause in a law that serves to limit or qualify the general rule stated in the main
part of the law. In simple terms, it acts like an exception or condition that prevents the law from
being applied too broadly or misunderstood.

Usually, a proviso is found at the end of a section and often starts with the
word “Provided” (for example, “Provided, that…”). However, even if it doesn’t use that exact
word—like when it says “but nothing herein…”—it can still be a proviso if it serves the same
purpose.

The important thing is not the word used, but the intention behind it. If the clause is meant
to limit, restrict, or clarify the meaning of a law, then it functions as a proviso, no matter how it
is worded.

In short:
A proviso is a statement added to a law to make exceptions, set limits, or prevent
misunderstandings about how the law should be applied.

5.32. Proviso May Enlarge Scope of Law (Simplified Explanation)

Normally, a proviso is meant to limit or restrict the meaning of a law. However, sometimes
lawmakers don’t use it correctly or clearly, and this causes confusion or ambiguity. When that
happens, it becomes the court’s job to figure out what the legislature truly intended, even if
that means the proviso ends up expanding the scope of the law instead of limiting it.

In short, while a proviso is usually used to narrow down a rule, it can sometimes broaden it,
depending on the law’s wording and intent.

Example:
A law says:

“It is unlawful to carry concealed any knife, dagger, or other deadly weapon: Provided, That
this shall not apply to licensed firearms.”

At first glance, the phrase “other deadly weapon” might not seem to include firearms. But
because the proviso specifically mentions licensed firearms as an exception,
it implies that unlicensed firearms are included in the prohibition.

So in this case, instead of limiting the law, the proviso actually expanded it — showing that the
law also covers unlicensed firearms as “deadly weapons.”
In short:
A proviso can sometimes make a law broader in meaning instead of narrower, depending on
how the legislature wrote it and what their intent was.

5.33. Proviso as Additional Legislation (Simplified Explanation)

A proviso usually serves to limit or make exceptions to the general rule in a law. However,
there are times when a proviso can also act as a form of additional legislation — meaning it
introduces a new rule or provision rather than just limiting an existing one.

In some cases, the main section of a law clearly expresses a general purpose that applies to
several parts or subdivisions. If a proviso is attached to just one of those parts, it must still be
understood in relation to the main purpose of the whole section. If the proviso were read
separately, it might appear to say something opposite to the intent of the law, but when
read together with the main provision, its real meaning becomes clear.

In short:
While a proviso usually restricts the scope of a law, it can sometimes add a new rule or
clarification. Its meaning must always be interpreted in connection with the rest of the law,
not in isolation.

5.34. What Proviso Qualifies (Simplified Explanation)

The general rule is that a proviso only applies to or modifies the part of the law that comes
right before it, not the entire law or other sections. In other words, a proviso is meant to limit or
qualify only the specific clause it directly follows, unless it is very clear that the legislature
wanted it to cover a wider part of the law.

This means that when interpreting a proviso, it should be read together with the sentence or
section it is attached to, not separately or in relation to other parts of the law.

Example 1 (Republic Act No. 426):

The law stated that only the Import Control Commission could allocate import
quotas, “Provided, That the Philippine Rehabilitation and Trade Administration shall have
exclusive power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour
among importers.”

Some argued that this meant wheat flour was excluded from the entire law. But the Court said
no — the proviso only referred to the clause immediately before it. It simply meant that
the allocation of wheat flour was given to a different agency, not that wheat flour was
excluded from the law.
Example 2 (Flores v. Miranda):
A section of the law said it was unlawful to sell or transfer a public service vehicle without
approval, “Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent
the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its approval or to prevent the
sale of property in the ordinary course of business.”

The Court explained that this proviso did not mean a vehicle could be sold without approval. It
only meant the sale could be negotiated, not completed, and it only applied to ordinary
business transactions, like selling old or junked equipment.

Example 3 (Mercado Sr. v. NLRC):

A law defined both project employees and casual employees, and included a proviso:

“Provided, That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service… shall be
considered a regular employee…”

The Court ruled that this proviso applied only to casual employees, because it was attached to
the paragraph about casual employment, not to the earlier one about project employment.

5.35. Exception to the Rule (Simplified Explanation)

Normally, a proviso only applies to or modifies the part of the law that comes right before it.
However, this rule has an exception — when it is clear that the legislature intended the proviso
to apply to more than just the preceding clause.

If the lawmakers clearly meant the proviso to affect earlier parts of the law or even the entire
statute as a whole, then the proviso should be interpreted that way. The main goal is to make
sure that the true intent of the law is followed, even if it means extending the reach of the
proviso beyond the usual limit.

In short:
A proviso usually limits only the statement right before it — unless it’s clear that lawmakers
intended it to apply to other parts or the whole law. In that case, it must be interpreted more
broadly to carry out what the legislature truly intended.

5.36. Repugnancy Between Proviso and Main Provision (Simplified Explanation)

A proviso should always be interpreted in a way that it agrees with and supports the main part
of the law — not in a way that would contradict, cancel, or destroy it. The goal is to make the
proviso and the main provision work together harmoniously.

However, if there is a clear and unavoidable conflict between the proviso and the main
provision — meaning they cannot both be followed — then the part that comes later in the
law will usually prevail. This is because it is considered the latest expression of the
legislature’s intent.

But this rule will not apply if following it would destroy the meaning or purpose of the whole
law, or if there is clear evidence that the legislature intended otherwise.

In short:
A proviso should be read so it fits and harmonizes with the main law. But if they
directly contradict each other, the later part (usually the proviso) will prevail — unless doing
so would go against the true intent or purpose of the entire law.

5.37. Exceptions, Generally (Simplified Explanation)

An exception is a clause in a law that excludes or exempts something that would normally be
covered by the general rule. In short, it’s a way of removing something from the operation of
the law through specific wording.

Exceptions are usually introduced by words like “except,” “unless otherwise,” or “shall not
apply.” However, even if these exact words are not used, a clause can still be considered an
exception if it clearly takes something out of the general rule’s coverage.

The purpose of an exception is to make clear what does not apply under the law — but it
should not change, weaken, or dominate the general rule. In fact, having an exception confirms
that the general rule exists and applies to everything else not mentioned.

It’s also a settled rule that when a law lists specific exceptions, this means that only those
exceptions apply — and anything not mentioned is included in the general rule. This idea
follows the Latin maxim “exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis,” which
means “the exception confirms the rule in cases not excepted.”

Finally, exceptions should be interpreted strictly but fairly. Courts should not extend an
exception beyond what the law clearly says, nor should they create new exceptions that the
legislature did not include.

In short:
An exception is a part of the law that excludes specific cases from the general rule. It must
be clearly stated, applied only as far as the wording allows, and anything not expressly
excepted remains covered by the general rule.
5.38. Exception and Proviso Distinguished (Simplified Explanation)

An exception and a proviso may seem similar, but they have different purposes in a law.

An exception completely removes or exempts something from the coverage of a law. It does
this absolutely — meaning that the excluded part is not affected by the law at all. It is usually
found within the main part (enacting clause) of the law and directly states that a certain person,
thing, or situation does not fall under the rule.

A proviso, on the other hand, does not totally remove something from the law. Instead, it
allows or defeats the law’s application under certain conditions. In short, an
exception excludes absolutely, while a proviso limits or qualifies conditionally.

To put it simply:

• Exception = “This rule does not apply to this at all.”

• Proviso = “This rule applies, but only if or unless certain conditions are met.”

However, there is a slight overlap between the two. Sometimes, a proviso can also function as
an exception when it serves to exclude something from the main rule.

In short:
An exception totally removes a case from the law’s coverage, while a proviso limits or modifies
the law’s effect depending on conditions. Both may restrict a law’s scope, but an exception does
so absolutely, and a proviso does so conditionally.

.39. Illustration of Exception (Simplified Explanation)

This section explains how an exception works by giving examples from different court cases.

In general, an exception means that a certain person, thing, or situation is not covered by the
general rule of the law— even if it would normally be included.

Example 1: Manila Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Employees’ Association

Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 says that no employer shall force an employee to
work on Sundays or legal holidays, unless the employee is paid an additional 25% of regular
pay. But the law also says:

“Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing public
service such as supplying gas, electricity, water, transportation, or communication.”
The question was whether Meralco, being a public utility, still had to pay extra to employees
working on Sundays and holidays.

The Court ruled no, because the second part of the section is an exception, not a proviso.
It exempts public utilitiesfrom the rule entirely. Since Meralco provides electricity and
transportation, it is excluded from the law’s coverage — it can require employees to work on
those days without extra pay.

Even though the clause starts with “provided,” it functions as an exception, because
it completely removes public utilities from the general rule.

Example 2: Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Article VI, Section 26(2) of the 1987 Constitution states that no bill can become law unless:

1. It has passed three readings on separate days, and

2. Printed copies in its final form have been distributed three days before its passage,

“except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency.”

The question was whether this exception applies only to the distribution requirement, or also
to the three readings.

The Court ruled that the exception applies to both conditions. This means if the President
certifies a bill as urgent, it can be passed without the three readings on separate
days and without waiting three days after distribution — both requirements can be skipped to
meet an emergency.

Example 3: Pendon v. Diasnes

The issue was whether a person convicted of a crime against property but later granted
absolute pardon could still vote.

The law said:

• A person cannot vote if he was sentenced to one year or more of imprisonment, unless
given plenary pardon; or
• A person convicted of any crime against property cannot vote.

The Court explained that the law contains two exceptions:

1. Those sentenced to less than one year, and

2. Those granted absolute pardon.
But the second clause creates another exception — those convicted of crimes against
property still cannot vote unless they are specifically pardoned.

So, an absolute pardon restores voting rights, but if the crime was against property, the pardon
is still needed regardless of sentence length.

Example 4: Gorospe v. Court of Appeals

This case dealt with service of registered mail under Rule 27, Section 8 of the Rules of Court:

“Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to
claim his mail from the post office within five days, service shall take effect after such time.”

The Court ruled that service is considered complete five days after the first notice, even if the
person actually received the mail months later.

Here, the second part of the sentence (after the semicolon and introduced by “but”) acts as
an exception to the first rule — it creates a special rule for unclaimed mail.

In short:
An exception is a clause that removes certain cases from the general rule. It may start with
words like “except,” “unless,” or even “provided,” depending on how it’s written. The key is
its effect — if it completely excludes something from the law’s application, it is an exception,
not just a limitation.

5.40. Saving Clause (Simplified Summary and Explanation)

A saving clause is a part of a law that serves to protect or preserve certain rights, actions, or
situations from being affected by the new law. In simple terms, it “saves” something from being
lost or cancelled when a new law is passed that replaces or repeals an old one.

For example, if an old law is repealed and replaced with a new one, a saving clause might state
that any offenses committed or cases already filed under the old law will still be valid and
continue under the old rules. This means that even if the law changes, the government can still
prosecute crimes or continue legal actions that happened before the change.

When interpreting a saving clause, courts always look at the intent of the legislature—that
is, why lawmakers included the clause in the first place. If the goal is to protect existing rights or
pending cases, the clause should be interpreted liberally (broadly). But if it’s meant to limit
something strictly, it should be interpreted narrowly.
In short:
A saving clause prevents injustice or confusion that might arise when a new law replaces an old
one, by keeping certain rights, actions, or prosecutions under the old law still effective.

Example:
If Congress passes a new criminal law and repeals the old one, the saving clause can state:

“All cases pending under the old law shall continue and be prosecuted as if this new law had not
been enacted.”

This means offenders cannot escape liability just because the law has changed.