PPP Models for Urban Development
PPP Models for Urban Development
Structure
4.1 Introductions
4.2 Public Private Partnership: Meaning, Objectives and Importance
4.3 Types of Public Private Partnerships
4.4 PPP in the International Arena
4.5 PPP in India
4.6 Let Us Sum Up
4.7 References and Selected Readings
4.8 Check Your Progress – Possible Answers
4.1 INTRODUCTION
PPP models have been applied in many countries around the world and some
infrastructure sectors are more conductive to PPP than others. In which, the power
sector and transport sector have received most PPP model. There are ranges of
reasons including better potential for cost recovery, higher political commitment
due to the sector’s importance for country economic growth etc. Nevertheless,
this does not mean that PPP in other sectors is without prospects. With appropriate
modalities, support for capacity development, and political commitment to sector
reform, PPP is feasible in others sectors as well.
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Participatory Urban
Development 4.2 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP:
MEANING, OBJECTIVES AND IMPORTANCE
4.2.1 Definition of Public Private Partnership (PPP)
PPP are collective efforts, between public and private sectors, with clearly
identified partnership structures, shared objectives and specified performance
indicators. According to UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe) PPP refers to innovative methods used by the public sector to contract
with the private sector who bring their capital and their ability to deliver projects
on time and to budget while the public sector retains the responsibility to provide
these services to the public in a way that benefits the public and delivers economic
development as an improvement in the quality of life. The Canadian Council for
Public Private Partnership defines PPP as a co-operative venture between the
public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets
clearly defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks
and rewards.
The urban areas differ in their characteristics and problems from country to
68 country. However one thing that is common to the urban areas across the globe
is that the finances needed for different urban development projects are too high Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
to be provided by the public sector alone. Taking this into consideration, many
nations are exploring the possibility of PPP for large scale investments in
providing the basic infrastructure to the urban multitude. Traditionally the role
of private sector was limited to providing skilled labour under short term contracts
with the delivery of service being the sole responsibility of the public sector.
However a PPP allows a private consortium to assume risk
Whole of Life-Cycle
Public-private partnerships combine two or more of the project’s phases in a
single bundle for the private consortium to deliver over the long-term. This creates
economies of scale by motivating the private sector to organize its activities in a
way that drives efficiencies and maximizes returns on investments.
Output-Based Contracts
Public-private partnership projects typically adopt an output-focused contract
which links payments to performance. This specifies project results in terms of
the quality delivered, rather than how assets or services are provided.
Risk sharing
Public-private partnerships are designed so that risk is transferred between the
public and private sectors, allocating particular project risk to the partner best
able to manage that risk cost-effectively.
Second, the long-term and inclusive nature of a PPP contract requires that each
partner spend considerable time and resources on outside experts to help anticipate
and oversee all possible future contingencies. This can be very costly, particularly
for a public agency inexperienced with the private sector and requiring additional
help to protect the public interest. Last, while the private financing element of
the partnership is one of the most important incentive drivers for the private
partner, the price of financing can result in higher capital costs ranging between
1 and 3 percent. Unless cost savings generated by the private consortium outweigh
the added cost of private loan financing, a PPP project may not deliver cost
savings.
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Loss of Accountability Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
Partnerships are typically governed by a complex web of contracts which extend
responsibility over the provision of housing and other urban service to a wide
range of partners. If not clearly defined, contracts can overlap roles and
responsibilities and blur lines of accountability for the public taxpayer.
Mitigating Risk
The more complex the urban project and the more people involved the higher
and more varied the risk becomes. Although a carefully structured PPP manages
risk through a well-defined contractual agreement, some risk is unforeseen and
therefore difficult to mitigate. In the case of such unexpected risk (or project
failure), oftentimes it is the public authority that is left to not only pay for the
failure of the risk, but also the emerging costs.
After reading this section, you would have gained some idea about public private
partnership. Now you should be able to answer the questions given in Check
Your Progress 1.
b) Maintenance management
Assets maintenance contracts are very popular with transport operators.
Sometimes equipment vendors/suppliers can also be engaged for the
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maintenance of assets procured from them.
c) Operational management Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
Management contracts of major transport facilities such as a port or airport
may be useful when local manpower or expertise in running the facility is
limited or when inaugurating a new operation. Management contracts are
also quite common in the transport sector for providing some of the non-
transport elements of transport operations such as the ticketing system of
public transport and reservation systems. Operational management of urban
transport services can also be contracted out to the private sector. In the
simplest type of contract, the private operator is paid a fixed fee for
performing managerial tasks. More complex contracts may offer greater
incentives for efficiency improvement by defining performance targets and
the fee is based in part on their fulfilment.
2) Turnkey: Turnkey is a traditional public sector procurement model for
infrastructure facilities. Generally, a private contractor is selected through a
bidding process. The private contractor designs and builds a facility for a
fixed fee, rate or total cost, which is one of the key criteria in selecting the
winning bid. The contractor assumes risks involved in the design and
construction phases. The scale of investment by the private sector is generally
low and for a short-term. Typically, in this type of arrangement there is no
strong incentive for early completion of a project. This type of private sector
participation is also known as Design-Build.
3) Lease: In this category of arrangement an operator (the leaseholder) is
responsible for operating and maintaining the infrastructure facility and
services, but generally the operator is not required to make any large
investment. However, often this model is applied in combination with other
models such as build-rehabilitate-operate-transfer. In such a case, the contract
period is generally much longer and the private sector is required to make a
significant level of investment.
The arrangements in an afterimage and a lease are very similar. The difference
between them is technical. Under a lease, the operator retains revenue
collected from customers/users of the facility and makes a specified lease
fee payment to the contracting authority. Under an affermage, the operator
and the contracting authority share revenue from customers/users. Following
Figure shows the typical structure of an affermage/lease contract. In the
affermage/lease types of arrangements, the operator takes lease of both
infrastructure and equipment from the government for an agreed period of
time. Generally, the government maintains the responsibility for investment
and thus bears investment risks. The operational risks are transferred to the
operator. However, as part of lease, some assets may be transferred on a
permanent basis for a period which extends over the economic life of assets.
Fixed facilities and land are leased out for a longer period than for mobile
assets. Land to be developed by the leaseholder is usually transferred for a
period of 15-30 years.
It may be noted here that if the assets transferred to the private sector under
a lease agreement are constrained in their use to a specific function or service,
the value of assets is dependent upon the revenue potential of that function
or service. If assets are transferred to the private sector without restrictions
of use, the asset value is associated with the optimum use of the assets and
the revenues that they can generate. 73
Participatory Urban 4) Concessions: In this form of PPP, the Government defines and grants specific
Development
rights to an entity (usually a private company) to build and operate a facility
for a fixed period of time. The Government may retain the ultimate ownership
of the facility and/or right to supply the services. In concessions, payments
can take place both ways: concessionaire pays to government for the
concession rights and the government may also pay the concessionaire, which
it provides under the agreement to meet certain specific conditions. Usually
such payments by government may be necessary to make projects
commercially viable and/or reduce the level of commercial risk taken by
the private sector, particularly in the initial years of a PPP programme in a
country when the private sector may not have enough confidence in
undertaking such a commercial venture. Typical concession periods range
between 5 to 50 years. It may be noted that in a concession model of PPP, an
SPV may not always be necessary.
Concessions may be awarded to a concessionaire under two types of
contractual arrangements:
a) Franchise
b) BOT type of contracts
a) Franchise
Under a franchise arrangement the concessionaire provide services that are
fully specified by the franchising authority. The private sector carries
commercial risks and may be required to make investments. This form of
private sector participation is historically popular in providing urban bus or
rail services. Franchise can be used for routes or groups of routes over a
contiguous area.
b) Build-Operate-Transfer
In a Build-Operate-Transfer or BOT (and its other variants namely Build-
Transfer- Operate (BTO), Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer (BROT),
Build-Lease-Transfer (BLT)) type of arrangement, the concessionaire
undertakes investments and operates the facility for a fixed period of time
after which the ownership reverts back to the public sector. In this type of
arrangement, operating and investment risks can be substantially transferred
to the concessionaire. However, in a BOT type of model the government
has explicit and implicit contingent liabilities that may arise due to loan
guarantees provided and default of a sub-sovereign government and public
or private entity on non-guaranteed loans. By retaining ultimate ownership,
the government controls policy and can allocate risks to those parties best
suited to bear them or remove them.
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Under the Build-Rehabilitate-Operate-Transfer arrangement, a private Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
developer builds an add-on to an existing facility or completes a partially
built facility and rehabilitates existing assets, then operates and maintains
the facility at its own risk for the contract period. BROT is a popular form
of PPP in the water sector. A key distinction between a franchise and BOT
type of concession is that, in a franchise the authority is in the lead in
specifying the level of service and is prepared to make payments for doing
so, whilst in the BOT type the authority imposes a few basic requirements
and may have no direct financial responsibility.
In the PFI model, asset ownership at the end of the contract period may or
may not be transferred to the public sector. The PFI model also has many
variants. The annuity model for financing of national highways in India is
an example of the PFI model. Under this arrangement a selected private
bidder is awarded a contract to develop a section of the highway and to
maintain it over the whole contract period. The private bidder is compensated
with fixed semi-annual payments for his investments in the project. In this
approach the concessionaire does not need to bear the commercial risks
involved with project operation.
Apart from building economic infrastructure, the PFI model has been used
also for developing social infrastructure such as school and hospital
buildings, which do not generate direct “revenues”.
c) Divestiture
This third type of privatization is clear from its very name. In this form a
private entity buys an equity stake in a state-owned enterprise. However,
the private stake may or may not imply private management of the enterprise.
True privatization, however, involves a transfer of deed of title from the
public sector to a private undertaking. This may be done either through
outright sale or through public floatation of shares of a previously
corporatized state enterprise.
The following case studies illustrate examples of European cities that have taken
advantage of the variety of PPP models to launch successful renewable energy
systems:
London
Woking Borough Council’s Thameswey Energy Limited
The Woking Borough Council, a public authority based outside of London,
established Thameswey Energy Limited in 1999 as an Energy Service
Company (ESCo) that owns, operates, and manages the heat, electricity, and
water supply in the borough. Thameswey is a PPP between the Borough
Council and Xergi Limited, a Danish energy company which owns 10% of
the shares. By utilizing the PPP model, Woking was able to surpass
government controls on local government spending, establish a Combined
Heat and Power (CHP) plant, and build a private wire renewable energy
system and fuel cell CHP system. The private system also allows the Borough
to save on fees associated with accessing the national power grid, to which it
is connected as a back-up [Link]
The benefits of the CHP system are considerable. From 1990 to 2004, the
Borough experienced a 48.6% reduction in energy consumption and a 17.23%
reduction in CO2 emissions from 2002. Additionally, all residents have
received free or subsidised insulation, allowing the Borough to save 91,270
tonnes of energy per year. The Borough credits its success to the technical,
financial, and commercial innovation gained by working in partnership with
the private sector, and has proven how a PPP model can provide additional
flexibility and capital in what would otherwise be a strict planning
environment.
The Initiative took place from 1996 to 1999. The facilitator, or “catalyst” (the
two projects) contacted soap producers from five Central American countries—
Guatemala, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Four companies
eventually launched handwashing promotion campaigns in 1998 in the first three
countries. Ministries of health and education, media companies, UNICEF,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and foundations also joined the
partnership. The campaign consisted of radio and television advertisements,
posters and flyers distributed by sales personnel and through mobile units to
communities; school, municipal, and health centre programs; distribution of soap
samples; promotional events; and print advertisements. According to a follow-
up assessment, ten percent of the women surveyed improved their handwashing
behaviour. Based on observed relationships between handwashing behaviour
and diarrhoea in these studies and supporting scientific literature, one can also
estimate that over the course of the intervention there was an overall reduction
in diarrheal prevalence of about 4.5 percent among children under five.
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A total of 56 road projects entailing investment of 852.84 crores have already Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
been completed on BOT format of PPP, out of which 34 road projects entailing
investment of 288.04 crores have already recovered investment, through toll,
and transferred back to the Government. Other 22 road projects involving
investment of 564.80 crores are being build/operated on BOT format of PPP.
These PPP schools will be run by the private sector autonomously. The private
partner(s) will bear the entire capital cost. Government will provide capital
assistance at the rate of 500Rs. per sq ft of constructed area subject to maximum
of 5.0 million Rs. to be paid depending upon the progress of construction and
use of own funds by the private developer. The private partner will have full
independence in operational matters such as teacher recruitment and running of
schools. PPP schools will have to attain a high performance benchmark apart
from seeking an affiliation with either the State Board or the CBSE.
Expression of interest was invited from various private providers operating similar
services and the providers were selected through a process of technical evaluation.
The partnership was formalized through a signed Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) and rates were fixed at which the charges would be reimbursed. Initially,
the charges were paid by users (patients). However, when the decision was taken
to provide free treatment to all patients coming to government hospitals, the
MoU was amended and the charges were being paid by the Government.
In the hospital, sterilisation, spacing and abortion services are provided free of
cost to patients, while deliveries, operations and diagnostic tests are charged at
concessionary rates.
The initial contract was for one year (2002-2003). Government of Assam reviewed
the performance after one year and renewed the contract. To build up the referral
system, the Government of Assam also proposed to upgrade three or 4 health
posts/urban family welfare centres to secondary hospitals in the urban limits of
Guwahati, within or near the slum areas.
The PPP initiative has had significant successes. Apart from direct provision of
services, it has induced replication in the public sector. The secondary/ referral
system is being strengthened with marginal investment since the staffs are already
available. The MMH management has started a programme of RCH camps in
peri-urban areas at their own cost. Other private and trust hospitals in the city are
80 expressing interest in joining this initiative.
6) PPP for Improving Conditions of the Slums in Ahmedabad Public Private Partnership
for Urban Development
Officially incepted in 1995, Ahmedabad’s Slum Networking Program commenced
as an adaptation of the DFID funded Indore Habitat Project. The program
continues to exist as a partnership, though the nature of the partnership has
evolved.
In 1995, approximately 3 million people dwelled in Ahmadabad, 40% of whom
were considered slum dwellers. Himanshu Parikh, the sanitation infrastructure
engineer of the Indore Habitat Project, garnered the support of Arvind Mills,
emerging as a global corporation with headquarters in the city, and the Ahmadabad
Municipal Corporation (AMC) to turn the venture into a citywide pilot project,
beginning with the up gradation of 4 slums, 3,300 households, amounting to
approximately 22,000 people. Three objectives emerged from the partnership 1)
to improve the physical and non-physical infrastructure facilities within selected
slum areas; 2) to facilitate the process of community development; and 3) to
develop a city level organization for slum networking and infrastructure
improvement. In addition to the physical upgrading components, which included
the implementation of roads and pavers, storm water, waste water, individual
water supply, individual toilets and landscaping, the project also included a social
component, including the organization of community groups (for woman and
children), educational activities for pre-school aged children, and developing
linkages to the formal sector via vocational training and access to finance for
starting up businesses. SAATH, an NGO that had been working with slums since
1989, developed a strategy with SHARDA Trust, the implementing agency chosen
by Arvind for carrying out the social component of the program. Although AMC
passed a resolution to formalize the project, the language was extremely vague
and written in such a way that most of the burden was placed on Arvind Mills.
Further, indicative of the organic nature of this network partnership, no contracts
were written between actors.
To avoid the burden falling on any single entity, cost sharing of the pilot was
split quite evenly between the public sector, AMC, 40%; the private sector, Arvind
Mills, 27%; community members, 27%; and 4% from SAATH who assumed
responsibility for the community development component of the program.
The project proved successful on several fronts: first, implementation of physical
infrastructure (roads, sewage, storm drains, and water supply) occurred in a timely,
cost-effective manner, and remained within the budget. Second, largely with the
help of SAATH, community involvement occurred at every juncture of this
process, from design to payment of contractors. The community even established
a “community corpus” of Rs 100 per household fund to ensure maintenance of
the infrastructure. Lastly, SHARDA Trust convinced SEWA bank to provide and
underwrote all loans taken by project participants who did not posses upfront
funds to ensure that the project would for household financing reasons.
Where the project proved less successful was 1) bringing the project to scale –
the impact of 181 households is much smaller than that of 3,300 households; 2)
administrative delays due to miscommunication at AMC, resulting in a 450 day
response time in some cases (and 3) community development, seemingly due to
mismatched values and expectations between SHARDA Trust and SAATH.
Whereas Improving Slum Conditions with Public Private Partnerships SHARDA
Trust seemed to expect greater skills development training, SAATH focused the
majority of community development efforts on public health. 81
Participatory Urban These missed opportunities speak to the challenges faced in maintaining alliances.
Development
AMC did not feel it was treated as an equal partner, while SAATH felt that
SHARDA Trust was unduly pressuring the organization to achieve results. While
the organic nature of this partnership allowed for greater participation amongst
various entities, namely the community members and NGOs, lack of clearly
delineated roles prohibited more effective action to take place. That no legal
agreement existed between the actors essentially ensured mismatched
expectations. Clearly AMC’s resolution, which relegated the City to a facilitator
role, was either mis-communicated or not fully embraced by the many
bureaucracies within AMC.
After reading this section, you would have gained some idea about different
models of PPP. Now you should be able to answer the questions given in Check
Your Progress 2.
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