Mapping a U.S.
Strategy To Counter China’s CPEC Clout
A security personnel stands guard near charred truck containers torched by armed separatist group
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) at central Bolan district in Balochistan province on January 30,
2024. At least six militants were killed in an overnight gun battle with security forces in western
Pakistan’s Balochistan province, an official said on January 30.
As China continues to prioritize the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) within its
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) framework and its regional ambitions, it becomes evident that
Beijing is committed to its strategic regional connectivity objectives as a rising great power.
Consequently, U.S. foreign policy should place a higher priority on addressing China’s
influence in regional connectivity projects. The U.S. should develop a containment-based
strategy and design infrastructure and connectivity initiatives to serve as significant strategic
tools in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, all developments related to the CPEC should be
closely monitored, taking into account the evolving dynamics between China and Pakistan.
The CPEC, launched in 2015, represents the most expensive and ambitious connectivity
initiative under China’s BRI, with an original estimated cost of $62 billion. The corridor
spans approximately 3,000 kilometers (about 1,860 miles), commencing in China’s
northwestern Xinjiang province and passing through Pakistani territory before reaching the
Arabian Sea at the port city of Gwadar in Balochistan.
Over the past decade, the CPEC has come to mean different things for primary stakeholders
China and Pakistan, as well as for the broader international community. For China, the project
is a strategic move aimed at mitigating the “Malacca Dilemma,” a term describing the
potential vulnerability posed by disruptions to China’s access to the Indian Ocean through the
South China Sea in case of geopolitical tensions. “It also serves China as a critical conduit for
reinforcing economic ties and expanding cooperation with the Persian Gulf region, an area
where China’s economic engagement has intensified in recent years.”
Furthermore, as the flagship project of the BRI, the CPEC serves as a cornerstone of China’s
international image, reflecting its dedication to global infrastructure development and
elevating its prestige within its expansive investment portfolio. Beijing has strategically
framed the CPEC as a symbol of China’s emergence as a major global player, showcasing its
role in advancing globalization over the past two decades and sharing its sustained economic
growth with the Global South.
Meanwhile, Pakistan sees the CPEC as a transformative initiative with the potential to
revitalize its national economy, which is plagued by chronic financial instability and a
significant shortfall in foreign investment. The host country also perceives the project as a
vital geostrategic asset, offering Pakistan a competitive edge over its regional adversary, India.
Within the broader context of the international community, CPEC plays a pivotal role in
China’s strategic posture in relation to the United States; connectivity projects are
increasingly central to Beijing’s strategy to avoid encirclement by pro-Washington allies.
These connectivity projects not only establish critical infrastructure and trade routes but also
deepen economic dependency on Beijing, particularly through the accumulation of debt by
participating countries. This economic leverage provides China with strategic influence over
key regional actors, limiting their capacity to align with U.S.-led initiatives. By fostering both
physical and financial ties, China is able to hedge against efforts by the U.S. and its allies to
contain or encircle it, creating a buffer of indebted states reliant on Chinese investment.
Despite the opportunities presented by CPEC, the project is not without significant risks.
Persistent security challenges within Pakistan, coupled with financial constraints and a series
of domestic political impediments, have tempered China’s enthusiasm for the project. These
factors have compelled Beijing to adopt a more cautious approach. The growing anti-China
sentiment in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, fueled by local grievances over the perceived
exploitation of natural resources as in the case of Reko-Diq gold mines and environmental
degradation related to Chinese-led projects, is exacerbated by the escalating activities of the
Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), alongside the destabilizing actions of militant groups
such as ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K), Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and Tehrik-i-Jihad
Pakistan (TJP). ’
In light of Pakistan’s negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for additional
bailout programs, the country’s mounting external debt has further intensified concerns about
the CPEC’s sustainability. Moreover, alleged bureaucratic inefficiency and internal political
strife fueled by regional rivalries have hindered the socioeconomic development of restive
Balochistan, adding another layer of complexity to the situation.
The CPEC’s multifaceted nature and potential trajectory hold significant implications for U.S.
foreign policy. As China deepens its economic and security ties with Pakistan through the
project, it expands its influence in a region where U.S. interests, including regional stability,
counterterrorism efforts, and the security of sea lanes, are at stake. If China were to gain
unchecked dominance in South Asia, it could undermine U.S. alliances, weaken U.S.
influence in global trade corridors, and potentially reshape the balance of power in favor of
itself. Washington’s response to this risk should include the development of alternative
connectivity projects within the framework of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment, (PGII), close monitoring of the CPEC’s progress, and a focus on the
socioeconomic and human rights issues in Balochistan, ensuring that these concerns are
addressed in accordance with international norms and principles.
Main Challenges Ahead for CPEC
1. Security
Security concerns are a significant challenge to the implementation of CPEC infrastructure
projects. Although attacks targeting Chinese workers, engineers, and project facilities are
most concentrated in Pakistan’s southern and southwestern regions, particularly around
Gwadar Port, incidents contributing to the overall sense of insecurity have occurred across the
country. For example, during a series of attacks in March 2024, Chinese workers in
Balochistan were targeted, and a suicide bomber rammed a convoy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
province, killing five Chinese engineers. Attacks by the BLA and other groups in Balochistan
are also hampering the construction and operation of CPEC infrastructure projects. Most
recently, security concerns prompted a delay in the launch of a Chinese-funded airport in
Balochistan.
These security threats, primarily attributed by Pakistani officials to the BLA, TTP, TJP, and
ISIS-K, are largely fueled by ubiquitous anti-China sentiment in Balochistan. These groups
perceive Chinese investments (the CPEC, in this case) as exploitative on the grounds that the
Balochi people allegedly have not benefitted from socioeconomic development or
improvement in their living conditions. In response, Beijing has demanded the Pakistani
government conduct thorough investigations and increase security measures. Islamabad has
repeatedly assured Beijing that attacks will not undermine Sino-Pakistani relations,
emphasizing that bilateral ties remain resilient despite them. Also, Beijing has engaged with
the Afghan Taliban to use it as a source of detente. The key motivation behind this move is
that the Afghan Taliban, while primarily focused on Afghanistan, has historically had ties
with militant groups like the TTP and TJP. These groups, although operating separately, share
ideological commonalities and occasionally cooperate or overlap in activities. Another reason
behind Beijing’s increasing engagement with Kabul, aside from this primary security issue, is
its pursuit of a role as an influential actor in the region from which the U.S. has withdrawn,
and as a foreign investor aiming for access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources.
Moreover, the issue of inequitable benefit distribution from the CPEC is generating
significant socioeconomic concerns and engendering feelings of marginalization and
exploitation among the ethnic Baloch in Balochistan. The BLA-led separatist movement has
consequently targeted CPEC infrastructure, facilities, and personnel from both Pakistan and
China. Additionally, protests organized by the Baloch Yakjehti Committee around Gwadar,
addressing issues such as enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, have led to
security force interventions and the arrest of human rights activists like Sammi Deen Baloch.
To safeguard CPEC investments and protect Chinese personnel, Pakistan has established a
security force with over 10,000 members under the 34th Light Infantry Division in 2016 and
then added the 44th Light Infantry Division as the second tasked unit in 2020. However, if
Beijing deems Islamabad’s efforts to secure the region as inadequate, it may request the
deployment of Chinese security forces to protect CPEC assets – an option that Pakistani
officials have consistently denied yet has been the subject of media discussion in recent years.
Although fulfilling China’s request to bring its security forces to the CPEC region may
backfire by increasing anti-Chinese sentiment, Beijing’s calculation may be to motivate
Islamabad to take a more repressive position by tightening security measures.
Beyond the risk to China’s investments, the security threats emerging along the CPEC route,
particularly in regions like Balochistan, threaten regional stability, a key U.S. concern.
Unchecked militancy and unrest could destabilize Pakistan, complicating U.S.
counterterrorism efforts and undermining its interests in South Asia. Therefore, the U.S. must
focus on strengthening regional security cooperation and providing military aid and
intelligence-sharing mechanisms to help Pakistan counter these threats. This would allow the
U.S. to maintain a foothold in the region while reducing the likelihood that China could gain
excessive security influence through its CPEC-related investments.
2. Financial Setbacks
Another major impediment to the CPEC is the deepening economic crisis that has enveloped
Pakistan. Balance of payments, persistent budget deficits, high inflation, and the depreciation
of the rupee have contributed to a spiraling financial crisis. In July, following negotiations
with the IMF, Pakistan secured a $7 billion loan. More recently, Pakistan obtained approval
from its creditors – including Saudi Arabia, China, and the United Arab Emirates – for the
rollover of $12 billion in external debt. Despite the IMF’s projections suggesting a potential
decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which currently stands at approximately 70%, concerns
remain given the country’s external debt of around $130 billion and the ongoing depreciation
of the rupee against the U.S. dollar. Foreign exchange reserves amount to approximately $8
billion, which is adequate to cover only two months of imports. Also, the IMF warned that the
increasing reliance on Chinese loans could be detrimental to the national economy.
In response to the conditions stipulated in the Stand-By Arrangements with the IMF,
measures have been implemented to restore fiscal balance and stability, including substantial
increases in taxation. Specifically, direct taxes such as income tax and corporate income tax,
have been raised by 48% and indirect taxes, collected from sales, by 35%. These measures are
likely to have a significant impact on public purchasing power and are a source of
considerable public discontent.
Given the current financial context, projecting an optimistic future for the CPEC is hard. This
project, being the most expensive within the BRI, relies on Chinese funding to complete a
complex infrastructure network including highways, tunnels, railways, ports, and other
complementary parts. However, China has shown reluctance to provide new loans for
infrastructure modernization within Pakistan or for the construction of new highways and
railways. Consequently, Pakistan’s Executive Committee of the National Economic Council
has deferred approval of the $6.7 billion required for the ML-1 railway project – an essential
component of the CPEC connecting Peshawar and Karachi. Instead, a phased approach has
been adopted, with approval granted only for the initial phase requiring $1.1 billion. The
initial target date for completing the entire ML-1 project had been June 2023, but this
deadline was not met. This example underscores the constraints the current financial
conditions impose on the completion of such projects.
Moreover, the thought that CPEC projects would generate 2.2 million jobs by 2030 is
currently far from reality, with only approximately 236,000 jobs created to date, of which
155,000 are held by Pakistanis. Additionally, the financial challenges are contributing to a
decline in business and investment confidence within the country. According to Gallup’s
Business Confidence Index survey for the second quarter of 2024, perceptions of the current
business environment, future business prospects, and the country’s overall direction have
deteriorated compared to the first quarter. Specifically, 55% of businesses have reported a
worsening of the current conditions, the index shows. This decline in confidence adversely
impacts the potential to attract domestic investment into the special economic zones planned
around Gwadar as part of the CPEC.
The financial burden imposed on Pakistan by CPEC projects – especially through Chinese
loan indebtedness – risks pushing the country into a debt trap, wherein high levels of debt
repayment obligations stipulated by the creditor could lead to economic instability and reduce
a debtor’s financial autonomy. Such instability would not only undermine Pakistan’s
economic independence but also drive it further into Beijing’s sphere of influence, reducing
U.S. leverage in the region. To counter this, the U.S. should provide economic alternatives,
such as debt restructuring support or investments in sustainable, high-return sectors like
renewable energy. By offering financial solutions that promote long-term growth and stability,
the U.S. can help Pakistan avoid economic overreliance on China.
3. Domestic Factors
Domestic political and social challenges pose an additional impediment to the CPEC. The
evolving political landscape, characterized by shifting governments and coalitions, has led to
differing views of the project among Pakistan’s leaders. For instance, while the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government under Nawaz Sharif made initial strides toward
Chinese contracts for investments in the project and some progress on building it in 2015, the
subsequent Pakistani Tehreek-e-Insaf government led by Imran Khan encountered various
issues, including project reassessments and delays, primarily due to transparency concerns.
The PML-N government faced allegations of corruption and bribery, with claims that CPEC
project tenders were awarded unfairly to Chinese firms, often accompanied by tax breaks.
After Saudi Arabia declined to provide favorable bailout support, Khan’s government
adjusted its stance on the project, establishing the CPEC Authority via ordinance to expedite
project implementation. This response underscores a lack of domestic political consensus and
shifting perceptions regarding the alignment of the CPEC with Pakistan’s national interests,
revealing that support for the project by governments may sometimes be driven more by
financial necessities than by genuine enthusiasm.
The socioeconomic issues arising from political disputes and the Baloch population’s doubts
regarding the advantages of the CPEC represent major obstacles to the project’s progress.
Considering the assertions that the media narrative in both Pakistan and China and the
information flow around the project are swiftly and reactively managed to be pro-CPEC,
political disagreements surrounding it may not be widely known to the general public.
However, the contrasting approaches taken by the Khan and Sharif governments highlight this
divide.
The domestic political and social challenges surrounding the CPEC, particularly the lack of
government consensus and transparency concerns, pose a significant threat to the project’s
long-term success. These difficulties provide a unique opportunity for the U.S. to engage
diplomatically. By emphasizing transparency and anticorruption measures and public
accountability, the U.S. can position itself as an advocate for good governance in Pakistan.
This approach would not only contrast with China’s model of opaque deals but also resonate
with the segments of Pakistani society and political factions skeptical of the CPEC’s
alignment with national interests. Furthermore, the U.S. can leverage these domestic tensions
to build diplomatic capital by offering assistance in institutional capacity-building, helping
Pakistan create more transparent regulatory frameworks, and fostering dialogue around
inclusive economic development.
By aligning with local concerns and advocating for greater domestic accountability,
Washington could strengthen ties with Pakistan while diplomatically highlighting the risks of
overreliance on China. This would not only provide an alternative narrative to China’s
growing influence but also allow the U.S. to expand its diplomatic engagement in a way that
addresses Pakistan’s internal governance challenges while indirectly countering Beijing’s
hold on the country.
How Could China Progress on CPEC?
Given the geostrategic importance and global significance of the CPEC, it is improbable that
China would fully abandon the project or adopt an aggressive stance that disregards pressing
issues in favor of simply completing the infrastructure. A complete withdrawal from the
project is contrary to China’s geopolitical interests associated with the CPEC, such as
escaping the Malacca Dilemma and gaining direct access to Gulf markets. Moreover,
withdrawal from the CPEC would damage China’s reputation in developing countries as it
symbolizes the value of the BRI as a whole. On the other hand, the possibility that Beijing
would aggressively pursue the project is equally unlikely, as China cannot ignore continued
security risks to Chinese nationals and the infrastructural projects themselves. Instead, in light
of ongoing the security concerns, Pakistan’s financial setbacks, and domestic challenges,
China is likely to pursue a strategy of cautious, moderate progress. This approach aligns with
a broader shift in the BRI, moving from an initial focus on large-scale projects to a more
strategic, phased, and effective method.
Regarding security policy, significant issues in Pakistan have not been resolved to Beijing’s
satisfaction. Tackling the strong anti-China sentiment among the Baloch population is
particularly difficult. The Pakistani security forces, primarily made up of civilian police, have
struggled due to training gaps and coordination challenges, proving insufficient for the task of
tackling the insurgency and assuaging China’s concerns. Consequently, Beijing may
increasingly demand the deployment of specialized units from the People’s Liberation Army
to Gwadar. Following the assassination of three Chinese teachers by the BLA in Karachi
University in 2022, Islamabad allowed Chinese investigators to enter the country for the first
time. Continued attacks could lead to increased pressure on Islamabad, highlighting the need
for effective security measures.
China will also likely pursue a financial recalibration strategy. Given Pakistan’s significant
external debt burden and engagement with the IMF, China will adopt a dual approach. An
open-door policy for new stakeholders in CPEC projects has been in place for several years,
with recent agreements with Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for
investments exceeding $28 billion reflecting this strategy. Pakistan has established the Special
Investment Facilitation Council to facilitate such investments. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s
visit to Riyadh in December 2023 and increased economic engagement with the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) have accelerated this investment trend. Additionally, the
evaluation of the ML-1 railway network in separate phases rather than a single bid
underscores China’s strategic shift from a holistic approach to CPEC projects to a more
incremental one, mirroring its changing approach to other BRI projects in general. This
phased approach aims to mitigate financial constraints by progressing in smaller, more
manageable steps.
Diplomatically, China’s CPEC strategy will focus on three primary objectives. First, it will
exert pressure on Islamabad to address domestic issues, including the Baloch separatist
movement. This may involve deviating from China’s traditional noninterference principle to
ensure that CPEC benefits are equitably distributed and aligned with welfare needs. In
practice, this could mean encouraging Pakistan to allocate a greater share of CPEC
investments to Balochistan by funding local infrastructure projects, revising local tax policies
in a fairer way, creating job opportunities, and improving access to essential services like
healthcare and education. Despite China’s initiatives near Gwardar such as the China-
Pakistan Friendship Hospital and a desalination facility, combating anti-China sentiment will
require significant effort from Pakistan, which must address these issues through fair social
welfare policies such as equitable distribution of resources, targeted investments in education
and healthcare for underserved communities, fair taxation policies, and job creation initiatives
specifically aimed at reducing unemployment.
Secondly, China will seek pragmatic engagement with the Afghan Taliban to preempt
disruptive actions by affiliated groups like the TTP and TJP. This includes demonstrating
goodwill in critical sectors such as energy and infrastructure, integrating the Taliban into the
BRI, securing mining rights, and exerting diplomatic pressure on the Pakistani Taliban to
prevent attacks on CPEC investments. This approach is likely to prompt concerns in the U.S.,
as China’s involvement bolsters Beijing’s role as a power broker in Afghanistan and also
challenges the U.S. by creating an alternative model of influence over regional militant
activities. Washington may not immediately react to Beijing’s growing engagement with
Kabul as it must first ascertain the limits and scope of China’s diplomatic communication
with Afghan leaders. It is highly probable that the primary factor driving China’s engagement
is, as previously indicated, a pursuit of detente in security matters coupled with an ambition to
expand economic cooperation in order to access Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. The U.S.
response depends ultimately on these factors.
China also likely will enhance diplomatic relations with the GCC to attract new investors for
CPEC, addressing financial challenges and reducing its investment burden by engaging
alternative partners. China’s diplomatic strategy will involve continuous dialogue to address
security concerns, especially regarding allegations of attacks originating from Afghan
territory and pressure on Islamabad to improve transparency and address domestic issues.
Despite potential challenges, China will seek to ensure the CPEC maintains its intended
global image and prestige.
Lastly, managing the media narrative around the CPEC will be a key element of China’s
strategy. Due to the symbolic significance of the project within the broader BRI framework,
China will seek to avoid any narrative of failure that could harm its reputation. Maintaining a
positive portrayal of the CPEC’s progress is a priority for both China and Pakistan. To
achieve this, the countries are planning a joint effort called the China-Pakistan Information
Corridor to manage information and media narratives, hoping to ensure the project continues
to be perceived positively, a crucial goal for China’s global image and the prestige of the BRI.
The U.S. Response
In light of China’s multifaceted strategy regarding the CPEC and the security, financial, and
domestic problems influencing this strategy the following recommendations are proposed for
formulating a U.S. approach:
1. Monitoring the CPEC’s Progress
It is crucial for the U.S. to implement a comprehensive framework for monitoring the CPEC.
While current U.S. initiatives, such as diplomatic engagement and economic aid, aim to
counterbalance China’s influence, a new comprehensive framework would differ by focusing
on real-time, multidomain intelligence-gathering, economic impact assessments, and local
partnerships. This framework would track the project’s progress, assess its impact on U.S.
allies in the region, and identify opportunities to counter China’s strategic foothold in South
Asia. Unlike the Blue Dot Network, which promotes infrastructure development through
transparent, high-quality standards, this framework would center on preventing the CPEC
from becoming a tool for expanding Chinese influence and economic dominance. This
framework should encompass assessing the current phase of each infrastructure investment
under the CPEC, evaluating the terms of the loan packages provided by China for financing,
and comparing sub-projects with their respective deadlines.
Additionally, it is important to analyze the nature of China’s diplomatic engagement with the
Afghan Taliban, including any transactional elements in relations with Kabul to alleviate the
security-related challenges of the CPEC. Furthermore, monitoring should examine whether
the GCC investment interest translates into tangible investment actions, such as Saudi
Arabia’s stated interest in a $10 billion refinery project in Gwadar. Finally, scrutiny should be
applied to ensure that Pakistan’s adherence to IMF loan conditions focuses on addressing
structural issues through sustainable policies rather than merely financing CPEC projects.
2. Focusing on Interconnectivity and Trade Corridors
An essential component of the U.S. strategy regarding the CPEC should be the development
of a robust connectivity strategy that recognizes the increasing significance of trade corridors
in global geopolitics. The PGII stands out as a pivotal initiative, providing a framework for
economic cooperation and fostering long-term dialogue. This is another way of diplomatic
business that strengthens multilateralism.
Accordingly, Washington’s approach to connectivity must prioritize inclusivity, crafting an
appeal capable of attracting regional states that currently maintain strong ties with China. For
instance, the deepening relationship between China and Pakistan through CPEC could strain
U.S.-Pakistani relations, driving Islamabad closer to Beijing. To counter this, the U.S. should
deploy connectivity projects that offer viable alternatives to Pakistan. A project like a U.S.-
Pakistan renewable energy corridor – facilitating the development of solar and wind farms or
smart city development using eco-friendly infrastructure – could address Pakistan’s energy
needs, offering sustainable solutions that the CPEC has yet to prioritize. Additionally, U.S.-
backed investments in digital infrastructure, including fiber optic networks and 5G, would
position the U.S. as a technology partner, further distinguishing it from the CPEC’s heavy
emphasis on traditional infrastructure. In fact, one of the investment lines that Pakistan could
not negotiate with China within the scope of the CPEC’s upgrade was related to information
technology and connected technology infrastructure. Therefore, in the connectivity and
investment strategy to be developed by the U.S., the appeal of such areas in the Pakistani
perspective would be an important advantage compared to the conventional investments in
CPEC’s infrastructure.
India’s involvement in the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor illustrates this
dynamic; while India has benefited from substantial U.S. support for the project, it has
simultaneously maintained strategic engagements with Iran through the Chabahar Port and the
International North-South Transport Corridor. Despite facing sanctions warnings from the
U.S., India has continued its engagement with Iran, balancing multiple alliances.
Conversely, without a clear connectivity framework from the U.S., Pakistan may feel
compelled to rely exclusively on China’s proposals, further entrenching the China-Pakistan
relationship through the CPEC. To mitigate this risk, Washington must ensure that Pakistan is
actively included in regional connectivity networks and is aware of viable alternatives to
Chinese initiatives such as U.S.-led infrastructure projects under the PGII. These could
include initiatives like the development of renewable energy corridors, digital infrastructure
partnerships in fiber optics and 5G, or investments in transportation networks linking Pakistan
to Central Asia. Additionally, the U.S. could collaborate with multilateral development banks
to offer financing options that prioritize sustainability and transparency, providing attractive,
long-term alternatives to Chinese loans under the BRI.
3. Countering Pro-CPEC Propaganda
China’s tight control over the media narrative surrounding the CPEC has enabled it to
systematically construct and promote a public perception of the project as promising and
inevitable. While alternative information sources help counter the disinformation generated
by this narrative, it is important to acknowledge that this message still resonates with certain
audiences, some of which might be among the participant nations of the BRI. Notably, China
and Pakistan are working on an initiative called the China-Pakistan Information Corridor to
institutionalize and further tighten control over the CPEC narrative. Through this, both
countries aim to communicate that the significant obstacles facing the project will not impede
its progress and that the project will continue at all costs. Given the strategic importance of
the BRI for China, and the critical role that the CPEC plays within it, Beijing is committed to
perpetuating a strong image of the project.
In response, the U.S. strategy should focus on countering this blatantly pro-CPEC narrative
by promoting platforms that expose the true challenges of the project – particularly the risks
of dependency it may create and the difficulties it faces. Also, the U.S. should prioritize that
acute socioeconomic problems in Balochistan are widely reflected in media so that the
Chinese model of bringing prosperity through economic engagement without properly
addressing human rights and social welfare needs has no appeal in the global public opinion.
It is crucial to understand that CPEC is not just a symbol of actual progress for Beijing but
also a potent media tool. By developing a counternarrative that emphasizes the substantial
challenges CPEC encounters, especially in terms of security and financial setbacks, rather
than solely focusing on its potential, the U.S. can contribute to a more realistic and balanced
understanding of the project.