1

J
Understanding Change
and Continuity in
Russia’s Foreign Policy

When political formulas, such as “national interest” or “national secu-

rity” gain popularity they need to be scrutinized with particular care.
They may not mean the same thing to different people. They may not
have any precise meaning at all.
―Arnold Wolfers1

T his chapter provides analytical tools for understanding the subject of

this book. It reviews Russia’s international behavior across history
and identifies several patterns of change and continuity in the country’s
foreign policy. Russia’s traditional foreign policy debates survived the fall
of the Soviet system, and Russia’s postcommunist behavior should there-
fore be understood in the historical context. The chapter offers a frame-
work for understanding Russian foreign policy, comparing and contrasting
it with some prominent analytical perspectives. My approach focuses on
Russia’s relations with the outside world, and it views Russia’s behavior
as particularly influenced by the development and behavior of Western
nations. What often determines Moscow’s foreign policy choices is
whether or not the West’s international actions are perceived by Russian
officials as accepting Russia as an equal and legitimate member of the
world. The chapter also develops standards for evaluating Russia’s for-
eign policy record. Finally, it orients the reader regarding the book’s
methodology and organizational structure.

1
2 Chapter 1

RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY:

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

Russia’s foreign policy was formed in different external contexts, while

responding to some similar sets of security challenges. This combination
provides Russia’s historical foreign policy with elements of change and
continuity.

Changing Contexts

At least since Peter the Great, Europe and—after World War II—the West
in general played an especially prominent role in creating for Russia the
system of meanings in which to defend international choices. To many
Russians, the West represented a superior civilization whose influences
were to be emulated or contained, but never ignored. Yet Western con-
texts were changing over time, presenting Russia with different policy
dilemmas. More specifically, different Wests have been associated
respectively with sovereign monarchy, the rise of a liberal political sys-
tem, and finally the consolidation of a liberal political system.
Sovereign monarchy emerged as a dominant political form in
seventeenth-­century Europe after the era of religious wars. It was the era
of increasingly secular sovereign statehood, and it was in this context that
Peter the Great assumed power in 1694. In the context of European secu-
larism, Peter introduced a new ideology of state patriotism, or loyalty to
the state—a sharp break with the religious autocratic Russia that had
emerged after the two-­centuries-­long rule by the Mongols. Despite oppo-
sition from the Eastern Orthodox Church, the czar decisively turned
Russia in the secular nationalist direction. Although religion was still
playing an important role, it was increasingly subjected to considerations
of the state. European international politics, and with it Russia’s interna-
tional politics, was becoming the politics of accumulating national power
rather than affirming religious values.
The liberal and egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 further
changed Europe by splitting it into progressive and antirevolutionary
camps. The era of the rising Europe of Enlightenment, constitutionalism,
and capitalism presented Russia with new international dilemmas. Rus-
sian rulers had to decide between the old monarch-­centered vision of
sovereignty and the new popular sovereignty, and this choice was then to
shape the nation’s international behavior. Some rulers—most prominently
Alexander II—attempted to yet again redefine the country’s identity in
line with the new European ideas of freedom and equality. Their moderate
foreign policies reflected the need for Russia to undergo considerable
domestic changes. Other rulers were fearful of the new Europe and sought
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 3

to defend the basic features of the old monarchic regime. Thus, Alexander
I insisted on the need to defend the status quo in the post-­Napoleonic
Europe and embraced antirevolutionary Germany and Austria, rather
than progressive France, as his role models. Alexander III also continued
policies of siding with European autocracies and repression at home.
As Europe was fighting its way through the crisis of rising liberal ideas,
some Russians began to advocate a break with both old and new Europe.
Alexander Herzen, for instance, grew disappointed with European con-
servative restorations of the 1840s and argued for Russia’s own, non-­
European way of “catching up” economically and socially. The Bolsheviks
pushed this line of thinking to its extreme and adopted a fundamentally
different political system and foreign policy. The Bolshevik revolution of
October 1917 reflected the crisis of European identity and the Russian
leadership’s inability to choose between the two Europes. The czar failed
to prevent the country from the nearing destruction, revolution, and civil
war. The rule of Nicholas II was symbolic in this respect. In 1904, he dis-
missed his finance minister, Count Sergei Witte, a proponent of the new
Europe and an economic reformer, and chose to sacrifice domestic
reforms to the goals of foreign policy expansionism by going to war
against Japan. By then entering World War I, Nicholas further brought
the European crisis closer to home and made it impossible to prevent the
spread of extremist Marxist ideas in Russia, a move which brought his
downfall in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In recognition of the West’s
world role, however, even the Bolsheviks sought to engage Western
nations and related to their technological and material power. The Bolshe-
viks’ concept of Soviet power and proletarian democracy was also a
response to egalitarian ideas of the French Revolution. Furthermore,
Bolsheviks’ foreign policy, after the early efforts to overthrow the “bour-
geois” governments in Europe, was that of rapprochement and pragmatic
cooperation with the West.
As Europe reemerged as a consolidated liberal-­democratic continent
after World War II, the Soviet rulers sought to preserve a connection
with the new West. The intercourse with the West grew stronger under
Nikita Khrushchev and then Mikhail Gorbachev. Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev’s famous de-­Stalinization speech at the XXth Communist
Party congress broke many taboos of the old thinking and was meant,
among other things, to bring Soviet Russia closer to Europe.2 Despite
Khrushchev’s removal, the impact of de-­ Stalinization proved to be
irreversible—a considerable part of a new intellectual generation now
referred to themselves as the “children of the XXth party congress” and
worked within and outside the establishment to bring Soviet Russia
closer to the West. The post-­Stalin period saw, in particular, growth of
specialized institutions in which researchers carefully analyzed Western
4 Chapter 1

viewpoints, such as those generated by American international relations

(IR) scholars.
Ultimately, the new Western influences contributed greatly to the dis-
course of human rights and democracy in the Soviet Union, creating the
environment for reformers and helping Gorbachev come to power.
Although he never meant for the socialist system to be replaced by that of
Western liberalism, Gorbachev proclaimed a new era in relationships
with the West and therefore greatly contributed to the new fundamental
change. In addition to Khrushchev’s policies of de-­ Stalinization and
peaceful coexistence, Gorbachev drew from ideas of Russian liberal-­
minded scientists, such as Vladimir Vernadski, Pyotr Kapitsa, and Andrei
Sakharov—all long-­term advocates of developing relationships with the
West. The leader of perestroika was also building on European social-­
democratic ideas, as well as American theories of transnationalism and
interdependence. The Soviet collapse of 1991 completed the process of the
country’s difficult adjustment to the new international context and laid
the groundwork for the establishment of Russia’s liberal foreign policy
orientation. The new liberal context continues to be highly contested in
Russia and will be shaped further by the country’s interaction with
Western nations. If the West remains a relatively consolidated liberal
entity with a clear and unambiguous message to the world, the new
liberal identity has a good chance of taking stronger root in post-­Soviet
Russia.

Three Schools of Foreign Policy Thinking

Although Russia’s foreign policy was a response to various international

contexts, it also displayed a remarkable degree of historical continuity.
Across the eras of monarchy and liberalism, Russia’s engagement with
the world followed several persistent patterns of thinking and behavior.
As a borderland nation in an uncertain, often volatile external environ-
ment, Russia had to continuously respond to similar challenges to its
security. These challenges included unrest in neighboring territories,
threats of external invasion, and difficulties in preserving internal state
integrity. Over time, the country has developed three distinct traditions,
or schools, of foreign policy thinking—Westernist, Statist, and Civiliza-
tionist. Throughout centuries, Westernizers, Statists, and Civilizationists
sought to present Russia’s international choices in ways consistent with
the schools’ historically established images of the country and the out-
side world.
Westernizers placed the emphasis on Russia’s similarity with the West
and viewed the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the
world. The early Westernizers sought to present Russia as a loyal member
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 5

in the family of European monarchies. Historically the emergence of this

school of thinking can be traced back to Peter the Great’s military West-
ernization. Peter was the first to admire the West for its technological
superiority and to raise the possibility of borrowing Western technology
to overcome Russia’s backwardness. Alexander I was more consistent in
defending the values of the old Europe and vigorously opposing the
spread of French egalitarian ideas. After the defeat of Napoleon, Alexan-
der championed the so-­called legitimist policies and established the Holy
Alliance with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary
activities on the Continent.
Liberal Westernizers identified with the Western values of constitu-
tional freedoms and political equality. After the era of great reforms and
Russia shifting its relations from Germany to France and Britain under
Alexander II, the czarist government seemed more willing to embrace the
new European values of constitutionalism. Pavel Milyukov, once a for-
eign minister and a leader of Russian liberals, took the most active pro-­
European position by insisting that Russia must stay in World War I as an
active member of the anti-­German coalition. To Milyukov, support for the
European allies—despite all the devastation that the war had brought to
Russia—was a matter of principle and the country’s identity orientation.
Westernizers within the Soviet system saw Russia as standing not too
far apart from European social democratic ideas. For instance, one of
Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking was that the Soviet Union had to
“purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or
“human,” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). In his foreign policy,
Gorbachev pursued the notion of mutual security with the West and pre-
sided over a series of revolutionary arms-­control agreements with the
United States, as well as over the Soviet military withdrawals from Europe
and the third world. By introducing the idea of a “common European
home,” Gorbachev meant to achieve Russian-­European integration based
on the principles of European social democracy.
Finally, the liberal Westernizers in post-­Soviet Russia argued for the
“natural” affinity of their country with the West based on such shared
values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. Liberal Western-
izers warned against relations with former Soviet allies and insisted that
only by building Western liberal institutions and joining the coalition of
what was frequently referred to as the community of “Western civilized
nations” would Russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its
economic and political backwardness. Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yeltsin’s
vision of “integration” and “strategic partnership with the West” assumed
that Russia would develop liberal democratic institutions and build a
market economy after the manner of the West. Throughout 2009–2012,
President Dmitri Medvedev advocated a new era of improving relations
6 Chapter 1

with the Western nations based on a common assessment of security

threats and greater openness in economic and political systems. He initi-
ated a new pan-­European security treaty and argued for liberalizing the
economic and political system in order to overcome Russia’s backward-
ness, corruption, and rigidity.
Statists have emphasized the state’s ability to govern and preserve the
social and political order. This is, arguably, the most influential school of
Russia’s foreign policy thinking. It is explicit in choosing values of power,
stability, and sovereignty over those of freedom and democracy. Critical
to Statism is the notion of external threats to Russia’s security. Ever since
the two-­centuries-­long conquest by the Mongols, Russians have devel-
oped a psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice
everything for independence and sovereignty. Multiple wars in Europe
and Asia further reinforced this mentality and provided Statism’s sup-
porters with extra justifications for their reasoning. For instance, when
justifying the need for rapid industrialization, the leader of the Soviet
state, Josef Stalin, famously framed his argument in terms of responding
to powerful external threats.

The history of the old Russia was the continual beating she suffered because
of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten
by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was
beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the English
and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat
her—for her backwardness. . . . We are fifty or a hundred years behind the
advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we
do it, or we shall be crushed.3

The Statists, however, are not inherently anti-­Western; they merely

seek the West’s recognition by putting emphasis on economic and mili-
tary capabilities. The Statists of the monarchical era valued Russia’s
autocratic structure of power, partly because such were the structures of
European monarchies as well. In foreign policy, Statists often trace their
intellectual and policy origins to Prince Alexander Gorchakov. Gorcha-
kov labored as Alexander II’s foreign minister to recover Russia’s lost
international positions after the defeat in the Crimean War. He pursued
the policy of “concentration” by developing a system of flexible alliances
and limiting Russia’s involvement in European affairs.4 Other Statists
trace their roots to Peter the Great. Unlike Westernizers emphasizing
Peter’s Europeanness, Statists relate to Peter’s military competitiveness. It
was state security and military competitiveness, they argue, that brought
about the czar’s notion of getting closer to Europe.
The socialist Statists insisted on the importance of the Communist Party’s
firm control over the society for the purpose of maintaining political order
and averting external “capitalist” threats. Within the Soviet leadership,
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 7

this school was always suspicious of efforts to activate political institutions

outside the party and opposed Gorbachev’s democratization reform. In
foreign policy, some Statists advocated relative accommodation with the
West, while others favored balancing strategies. Maksim Litvinov, for
instance, supported a “collective security” system in Europe in order to
prevent the rise of fascism. Nikita Khrushchev, too, wanted to break
taboos of isolationism and bring Soviet Russia closer to Europe. He also
called for a return to Lenin’s principles of “coexistence” with the capitalist
world, although he later slipped into several incidents of confrontation
with the West. Both Litvinov and Khrushchev saw themselves as support-
ers of the late Lenin’s course toward giving up the idea of the world revo-
lution and learning to live and trade with the potentially dangerous
capitalist world.
On the other hand, Stalin’s pact with Hitler, as well as Leonid Brezhnev’s
“correlation of forces” strategy, reflected the will to balance perceived
dangerous influences from the outside world. By signing the treaty of
friendship with Nazi Germany, Stalin hoped to isolate Russia from World
War II or at least to buy enough time to prepare for it. His successors
operated on a world scale and, with the “correlation of forces” doctrine,
they meant to respond to the perceived growing global influence of the
West. Both strategies meant to preserve Russia’s independence in world
affairs and had some elements of Gorchakov’s described strategy of con-
centration.
The liberal Statists of the post-­Soviet era no longer supported a single-­
party state, and they agreed with the importance of building a market
economy and political democracy. However, they were not ready to
sacrifice to these new values the historically tested notion of a strong
state, and they argued that liberal values should be established to
strengthen, not weaken, the state. The liberal Statists believed that Rus-
sia continued to be exposed to external threats and must remain a great
power capable of responding to those threats anywhere in the world.
Yet they proposed different strategies to achieve the great power status.
The distinction between Primakov’s and Putin’s policies is a case in
point. Both camps have at one point or another referred to Gorchakov
as their inspiration, and both viewed Russia’s greatness and strength
as key goals of their foreign policies. In their domestic policies, both
wanted to bring more order and control to social and political life. Pri-
makov sought to control big business. Putin continued in the same vein,
but also tightened his grip over the legislature, party building, regions,
and electronic media, while at the same time declaring his commitment
to the newly established political institutions and economic liberaliza-
tion. The critical foreign policy difference between the two, however, is
that Primakov was trying to rebuild the former Soviet Union and con-
tain the United States through a strategic alliance with China and India,
8 Chapter 1

whereas Putin emphasized bilateral relations in Russia’s periphery and

was ambitious to develop a partnership with the United States to deter
terrorism.
Finally, Civilizationists have always seen Russian values as different
from those of the West, and they have always attempted to spread Rus-
sian values abroad, outside the West. Their response to Russia’s security
dilemmas has been more aggressive than that of the more status quo–
oriented Statists. As a foreign policy philosophy, Civilizationism dates
back to Ivan IV’s (“Ivan the Terrible’s”) “gathering of Russian lands” after
the Mongol Yoke and to the dictum “Moscow is the third Rome,” which
was adopted under Ivan. Unlike Westernizers and Statists, Civilization-
ists have sought to challenge the Western system of values, insisting on
the cultural distinctiveness of Russia and Russia-­centered civilization.
Some representatives of this school advocated a firm commitment to
values of Orthodox Christianity, while others viewed Russia as a synthe-
sis of various religions.
The early Civilizationists advocated the identity of the “Russian empire.”
They recognized the constraints set by the West-­centered external context
and recommended that Russia expand beyond its eastern and southern
borders. Yet they were eager to defend what they saw as a cultural unity in
their outer area. For instance, in the nineteenth century, Civilizationists
defended the notion of Slavic unity, and their ideology of Pan-­Slavism
affected some of the czar’s foreign policy decisions.
The socialist Civilizationists went further and challenged the West in
a most direct fashion. The Lenin-­Trotski doctrine of the world revolution
was the Soviet version of Civilizationist thinking. Although it had died
as an official philosophy in 1921 with Lenin’s commitment to coexis-
tence with capitalism, many in the official and social circles remained
convinced of the virtues of the thinking. For example, in the late Soviet
and the post-­Soviet context, some hard-­line political and intellectual
movements often defend a widespread external expansion as the best
means of ensuring Russia’s security. The so-­called Eurasianists view
Russia as a constantly expanding land-­based empire in a struggle for
power against sea-­ based Atlanticism, associated especially with the
United States.5 Born out of the agony of two Europes, Soviet Russia saw
itself as superior to the “decadent” and “rotten” Western capitalist civi-
lization. Yet even the Soviet Civilizationists sought to justify their foreign
policy expansionism by the need to respond to the “global imperial
expansion” of the West. The expansionism therefore was seen by Russian
rulers as legitimate and permissible in the international context. It
remains to be seen which forms Russia’s post-­Soviet liberal Civilization-
ism might take.6
The continuity of Russian schools of foreign policy thinking in different
external contexts is summarized in table 1.1.
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 9

Table 1.1. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity

EXPLAINING CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

IN RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This section introduces various explanations of Russian foreign policy

and argues for the insufficiency of traditional approaches. In attempting
to address the shortcomings of these approaches, I offer a framework for
understanding Russian behavior as shaped by the nation’s interaction
with the West.
10 Chapter 1

The Insufficiency of Traditional Explanations

The most influential tradition of international thinking, commonly referred

to as realism, has focused on historical patterns and continuity in Russia’s
foreign policy. In particular, scholars have sought to explain Russia’s
consistent commitment to the status quo, as well as foreign policy expan-
sionism. Scholars in this tradition have often emphasized Russia’s
national interest as the driving force behind its international behavior.
Defining it as preservation and enhancement of power within the existing
international system, many scholars and statesmen alike saw national
interest as a geopolitically enduring reality, rather than something open
to interpretations. Other factors, such as ideology, the nature of govern-
ment, and political culture, mattered, too. Yet their role was to specify,
and sometimes to cover for, but never to contradict “genuine” national
interest. Realists have typically argued that the Soviet leaders, while
employing a revolutionary ideology and acting under a totalitarian sys-
tem of government, defended Russia’s traditional interests.

Soviet leaders did not act as though the demands of ideology and those of
the Russian national interest were in conflict. Lenin, in negotiating the Treaty
in Brest-­Litovsk, and Stalin, in negotiating the Nazi-­Soviet Pact and in the
wartime summit conferences, were constantly aware that their first priority
was to ensure the survival of the Russian state and to seek ways to enhance
its security. . . . When they had opportunities to expand, the territories that
interested them were identical to those that the tsars had sought, for identical
strategic reasons.7

Others have pointed to underlying consistencies in Soviet policy. For

instance, Nathan Leites, in his seminal study of Bolshevik ideology,
identified three rules guiding the Soviet behavior: “never risk already
conquered major positions for the sake of uncertain gains,” “anything less
than the exertion of maximum pressure is ineffective,” and “mastery in
the skill of retreating is as necessary as mastery in the skill of advancing.”8
For Western policymakers, realist studies implied the need to stay firm in
resisting Russia’s power aspirations, rather than to keep searching for
common solutions, and to apply what during the Cold War would be
called “containment.” As Winston Churchill put it in his famous “iron
curtain” speech, “There is nothing they [Russians] admire so much as
strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for . . .
military weakness.”9
More recent developments in realist thinking point to the structure of
the international system—namely, the absence of a legitimate authority
(anarchy)—as the central force that affects Russia’s international behav-
ior. For example, some realists have explained Russia’s liberal momentum
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 11

of the late 1980s–early 1990s and the searches for active accommodation
with the West by the Soviet defeat in the Cold War and the need to
respond to the emergence of an America-­centered global unipolar system.
In this perspective, Russia’s hegemonic policy in the former Soviet area
and a nonconfrontational engagement with the West is the only rational
strategy, given the fundamental weakness of Russia’s post–Cold War
capabilities.10 The new or structural realists continue to view power and
national interest as the underlying force of Russia’s international behav-
ior. Even when they employ factors other than power, such as perceptions
and domestic politics,11 they assign to these factors secondary roles rela-
tive to the role attributed to the structure of the international system.
Introducing perceptions and domestic politics therefore does not change
the overall thrust of the realist analysis, according to which the interna-
tional environment is anarchic in nature and states have a constant drive
for security and power (national interest).
By focusing on foreign policy continuity, realists employ a very narrow
perspective on “change,” limiting it to fluctuations of available power
capabilities. In the realist tradition, there is little room for foreign policy
patterns shaped by considerations other than power, such as indigenous
ideas or cultural beliefs. As a result, realists typically overlook and wrong-
fully interpret some far-­reaching changes in Russia’s foreign policy that
are potent for cooperation with Western nations. Realism seems to work
when the actual policies at play are of a zero-­sum nature, but it errs when
the zero-­sum reality is not in place. For example, in his engagement with
two leading realists, Robert English pointed to the inaccuracy of present-
ing Gorbachev as the overseer of the Soviet strategic retreat. He argued
that the origins of Gorbachev’s New Thinking dated back to the late 1950s
and 1960s and had to do with domestic changes and the revival of cultural
links to the West, not defense calculations and economic needs.12 If this
criticism is correct, realism is unable to account fully for Russia’s liberal
changes. It has a built-­in tendency to misrepresent the scope and the ori-
gins of Russia’s foreign policy changes. It follows that it is simply unfit for
fully understanding Russian liberal-­ minded statesmen, such as Pavel
Milyukov, Mikhail Gorbachev, or Andrei Kozyrev. Even when realists are
able to correctly identify the direction of Russia’s “realist” policymakers,
such as Primakov and Putin, their excessive emphasis on the international
structure of power makes them neglectful of important domestic/local
sources that often shape Russia’s foreign policy.13
A less prominent, but still influential, tradition in international rela-
tions concentrates on understanding foreign policy changes. Western
scholars working in this tradition have challenged the realist notion of
foreign policy continuity by pointing to such episodes as Khrushchev’s
early arms control efforts, the Soviet policies of détente, and Gorbachev’s
12 Chapter 1

sweeping international initiatives. Frequently referred to as liberals,

these scholars have also sought to undermine the concept of national
interest as something objective and geographically defined. In particu-
lar, they have pointed to considerable disagreements among state elites
regarding Russia’s international priorities and interests. They have also
identified multiple coalitions and interest groups with different foreign
policy agendas and ways to influence the policymaking process. Further-
more, they identified some learning curves in Russian/Soviet foreign
policymaking.14
The end of the Cold War produced new expectations of increasing
policy convergence across nations and pushed liberals toward developing
theories of foreign policy that would be more sensitive to the structure of
the international system. The liberal view of the international system is
principally different from that of the realists. Unlike realists, who empha-
size international anarchy and cyclical development, liberals have argued
the global and progressive ascendancy of Western political and economic
values. Francis Fukuyama pioneered the claim and insisted on the arrival
of “the universalization of Western Liberal democracy as the final form
of human government.”15 In this spirit, many scholars and policymakers
took the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to assert that economic
and political modernization, rather than geopolitically defined national
interest, should serve as the primary foreign policy goal. Theories on the
transition to a free-­market economy and pluralistic democracy became
dominant in academic and political discourse. Behind those theories lay a
deep conviction in the progressive nature of international relations and
the ability of market democratic institutions to turn the world into a more
peaceful and prosperous place.
Three different schools emerged in the liberal community to challenge
the realist outlook. One school promoted economic globalization and the
growing “common marketization” of international relations as a guaran-
tee of the diminution of the likelihood of large-­scale conflict between
states. Its supporters questioned the realist belief in the primacy of states
by insisting that in an increasingly “borderless world,” the state role will
be reduced to providing the necessary infrastructure for competitive
behavior in the global market.16 Another school concentrated on democ-
racy building as a guarantee for peace in international relations. In line
with the old ideas of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and U.S.
president Woodrow Wilson, this school embraced the proposition that
democracies are essentially peaceful in relations with one another, and
therefore democracy promotion will keep the peace in the world.17 Yet
another group argued the significance of various transnational ties—
transnational expert communities, political ideas, and social movements—
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 13

in challenging the realist notion of international anarchy.18 It was the

transnational ties, the scholars insisted, that had become especially impor-
tant in foreign policy formulation. The case of Mikhail Gorbachev’s leader-
ship has become especially important to liberals.19
The power of the liberal outlook was reflected in policy actions. Policy-
makers, such as U.S. president Bill Clinton, committed themselves to
transforming the world in line with the liberal internationalist ideas of
Kant and Wilson. The democratic peace theory became the official justifi-
cation of the United States’ foreign policy actions in the 1990s. Clinton’s
1994 national security strategy stated, “Our national security strategy is
based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deter-
ring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our
interests. The more that democracy and political and economic liberaliza-
tion take hold in the world, particularly in countries of geo-­strategic
importance to us, the safer our nation is likely to be and the more our
people are likely to prosper.”20 In their speeches, Clinton and his advisers
were arguing, just as Clinton’s senior adviser and top Russia expert
Strobe Talbott did, that “democracy . . . is the one big thing that we must
defend, sustain, and promote wherever possible, even as we deal with the
many other tasks that face us.”21
Despite the increased sophistication of its foreign policy analysis, liber-
alism is a limited guide in understanding Russia’s foreign policy. It can-
not offer a comprehensive theory of foreign policy because of its
unrealistic assumptions and selective focus. While rejecting the anarchy-­
based perspective as inaccurate, liberals produced a vision of an interna-
tional system that is restrictive in its own way. Unlike that of realists, the
liberal vision of foreign policy change is progressive and cumulative.
However, this vision does not account fully for conservative turns in
Russia’s foreign policy. Such turns are normally viewed as “setbacks”
that imply Russia’s future “return” to the track of progressive liberal
changes. For instance, in acknowledgment of scholars of Clinton’s Russia
policies, “for the Clinton team, Yeltsin the man was reform, while his
enemies represented regression and the possible return of communism.”22
It is not surprising that the Clinton White House miscalculated many of
Russia’s developments and often did not want to admit some obvious
facts. For instance, as late as the second half of 1993, American officials
believed that Russia’s transition was on track and, as a result, they were
completely unprepared for the nationalist victory in Russia’s December
1993 parliamentary election. When the extreme nationalist Vladimir
Zhirinovski did win the election, Clinton’s officials attributed the win to
economic hardship under reform, never questioning the principal appli-
cability of pro-­Western democratization and marketization to Russia’s
14 Chapter 1

inherent conditions. Even after Russia’s financial default to the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund (IMF) in August 1998, Washington did not believe
in the failure of Russia’s liberal experiment and pointed instead to the
“imperatives of the global marketplace.” Rather than try to understand
Russia’s specific conditions, the Clinton team explained the nation’s shift
“away from the unabashedly pro-­Western reformers and toward nation-
alistic bureaucrats who had been waiting in the shadow” in terms of
insufficient financial aid for the Russian reform.23 Just as realists view
Russia’s liberal shifts as an anomaly, liberals consider the country’s con-
servative shifts as tenuous and short term. Some larger assumptions seem
to be in play here: while realists study zero-­sum interactions, liberals are
interested primarily in positive-­sum changes. It seems symptomatic and
hardly accidental that liberals, who devoted so much energy to explain-
ing the New Thinking and Russia’s liberal “revolution,” have produced
no systematic accounts of Russia’s return to great power thinking in the
post-­Soviet era. As a result, liberals have failed to fully understand the
changes that Yevgeni Primakov and Vladimir Putin brought to Russia’s
foreign policy.

Social Constructivism and Its Promise

Overall, there are two problems with realist and liberal accounts of for-
eign policy. First, both theories tend to emphasize one aspect of the
international system at the expense of others. Rather than acknowledging
the validity of both power and modernization/democratization impera-
tives in foreign policy formation, they choose to highlight one or the
other. In so doing, the two approaches refrain from developing a compre-
hensive and complex explanatory framework. In such a framework,
realism would need to be modified to account for liberal changes in
Russia’s foreign policy, whereas liberalism should be revised to explain
Russia’s periodic retreats to great power thinking. The second problem is
that both realism and liberalism are ethnocentric in the sense that they
view Russia’s foreign policy through similar Western cultural lenses and
do not pay sufficient attention to Russia’s indigenous history and system
of perceptions. While realists are committed to the notion of Western
power and dominance in the world, liberals advocate economic and
political modernization by making little effort to apply any but the West-
ern definition of the notion. Developed in the West, by the West, and for
the West, these two approaches are increasingly problematic in a world
that is multicultural and multimeaningful. In order to address their limi-
tations, they both need to be sensitized to social conditions in which the
various changes in Russia’s foreign policy take place. If we are to under-
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 15

stand the diversity of national foreign policies, we ought to first under-

stand what “national” is.
In the field of international relations, the perspective that begins the
analysis by asking what “national” is and that exposes the “nation” to
various meanings and interpretations is called social constructivism.
Constructivists are different from realists and liberals in viewing the
international system as a social or cultural phenomenon. In addition to
military and institutional constraints or facilitators of state actions, as
emphasized by the other two theories, constructivists concentrate on the
cultural contexts and meanings in which these actions take place. From
this perspective, the international system is not merely a terrain for apply-
ing available military, economic, and diplomatic instruments; rather, the
role of the international system is in assisting states in their socialization
and understanding of interests in world politics. The international envi-
ronment constructs state actions and interests. Such actions and interests
are not rationally uniform, and they differ depending on individual states’
experiences with the international system and its parts. Constructivists
argue that because particular social contexts define national interests, the
formation of such interests should be carefully studied, rather than merely
assumed to be rational or irrational. In the words of a leading constructiv-
ist, “It is striking how little empirical research has been done investigating
what kind of interests state actors actually have.”24
The central category of the constructivist theory of international politics
is identity. Before nations figure out how to best defend their interests
with available material and diplomatic means, they first seek to under-
stand what these interests in the international society are. By interacting
with other members of international society, nations develop affiliations,
attachments, and—ultimately—their own identities. Historically, some
nations or cultural communities emerge as more important than others,
and it is through these significant Others that national Selves define their
appropriate character and types of actions. The very existence of the Self
becomes difficult without recognition from the Other. National identity
therefore is a system of meanings that expresses the Self’s emotional,
cognitive, and evaluative orientations toward its significant Other. The
significant Other establishes the meaningful context for the Self’s exis-
tence and development and therefore exerts decisive influence on the Self.
Through its actions, the Other may reinforce or erode the earlier estab-
lished sense of national identity. Depending on whether these influences
are read by the Self as extending or denying it recognition, they may
either encourage or discourage the Self to act cooperatively. (Table 1.2
summarizes the constructivist perspective on foreign policy, relative to
those of realism and liberalism.)
16 Chapter 1

Table 1.2. International Relations Theories and Their Perspectives on Foreign Policy
International Foreign Policy
Influences Foreign Policy Actor Objective
Realism Anarchy State State power
Liberalism Western economic and Individuals, groups Modernization and
political progress democratization
Constructivism Significant Other National Self Self’s acceptance by
the Other

At the same time, one must not privilege international social practices
at the expense of those of local origins. Local conditions, such as the state
of the economy, relations among different social groups, or the type of
political regime, are just as important in shaping national perceptions.
These and other conditions have long been part of foreign policy analysis,
and the initially international system–oriented constructivism is now
moving toward incorporating domestic-­level variables.25 Foreign policy
begins when a state manages to transcend the dichotomy of internal/
external pressures and develops multiple strategies for responding to
world challenges.26 With distinct social conditions in place, nations have
distinct concerns and therefore view the world in their own ways. For
instance, perceptions of reality by rich nations will differ from percep-
tions of reality by those that are considered poor. Some local concerns are
more historically stable and are formed across a relatively long time,
while others are more immediate and emerge in response to short-­term
developments. But in both cases, they serve as cultural lenses through
which a nation views the outside world.
A nation, however, is not a homogenous entity. Different traditions or
schools of thinking about the world develop in response to international
and local conditions, and these schools compete for political influence.
They hold different images regarding a nation’s identity, the nature of
the external world, and appropriate policy response. In a relatively open
society, they compete openly for the dominant position and are sup-
ported by various social groups or coalitions. Constructivists do not
view foreign policy as a product of a unitary state’s advancing power,
as in realism, or as a particular group pursuing modernization interests,
as in liberalism. Rather, the role of a coalition is to put forward a par-
ticular image of national identity that will speak to the existing local
conditions and be recognized by the significant Other. Identity coali-
tions are broader and more fundamental than interest coalitions, and
they seek to achieve social recognition, rather than to maximize wealth
or power.
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 17

To summarize, both international influences and local conditions are

critical in understanding the processes of foreign policy formation and
change. International influences by the Other create the meaningful
context in which the national Self evolves and then shapes foreign policy.
Past interactions with the external environment, as well as local condi-
tions, establish identity as a relatively stable system of meanings with a
well-­consolidated context in which to act. Therefore, a nation has relative
autonomy in influencing foreign policy, and that autonomy is histori-
cally established. On a more contemporary level, however, identity is a
product of discursive competition among different groups and coali-
tions, drawing on different actions of the Other and interpreting contem-
porary international and local influences in a way that suits the groups’
interests. The process that links international and local conditions,
national identity and foreign policy, is a complex one, and it includes
vigorous debates over the nature of national identity and national inter-
ests. Because international society contains multiple norms and influ-
ences, some of them may conflict in influencing the Self. For instance,
realists emphasize the need to be strong, while liberals insist that the
world revolves around values of free economy and society. Both strength
and liberty can serve as powerful normative messages the modern West
sends to the outside world. However, just as realists and liberals disagree,
the norms of strength and liberty can conflict in shaping the identity of
the Self.
At this point, identity becomes highly contested. Different identity
coalitions form to promote their visions. Promoted by various identity
groups in both public and private spaces, identity contestation is espe-
cially intense until one of the available visions becomes predominant.
Activities of political entrepreneurs, appropriate material and ideational
resources, conducive institutional arrangements, and historical practices
can considerably facilitate this process of persuading the general public
and elites. When this persuasion part of the process is complete, the state
appropriates the dominant national identity vision as a guide in policy-
making (national interest). Foreign policy, then, is a highly political phe-
nomenon. It evolves with the rise and fall of various identity visions, as
advocated by different social and political groups. Individual leaders’
views and ideologies, as creative and autonomous they may be, too fre-
quently reflect group visions of national identity. Other factors and
influences may interfere with a decision-­making process, yet if all the
other factors are equal, one can expect a reasonable degree of foreign
policy consistency based on an adopted image of national identity. (Table
1.3 spells out the causal influences on foreign policy as viewed from the
constructivist perspective.)
18 Chapter 1

Table 1.3. Constructivist Explanation of Foreign Policy: A Causal Process

The Social Construction of Russia’s Foreign Policy

In Russia’s case, Europe and the West in general played the role of the
significant Other and prominently figured in debates about national
identity. It was Europe and the West that created the meaningful environ-
ment in which Russia’s rulers defended their visions of national identity
and national interest. Russia has historically sought to be recognized by
the Western Other and to modernize after the manner of the West. In
1917—partly because of the West’s own agonizing split between autoc-
racy and liberalism and partly because of the special local conditions and
the leadership’s errors—Russia went through the experience of a social
revolution and ceased experimenting with liberal reforms. The liberal
West therefore rejected Russia as its own, and Bolshevik leaders sought to
be recognized for their strength, rather than for the nature of their domes-
tic institutions. Statist thinking prevailed in the Soviet discourse, reflect-
ing the desire to maintain the balance of power with the West. As the
West consolidated its liberal institutions after World War II, liberal
thinking returned to the Soviet Union, paving the way for possible future
changes. Gorbachev’s arrival signaled that Soviet liberalism had grown
strong enough to challenge the tenets of the old Statist and Civilizationist
thinking.
However, Gorbachev was unable to stay his course. Under the condi-
tions of extreme polarization between the old Statists and Civilizationists
and the new liberal Westernizers, Gorbachev lost his initial support
among elites and the general populace and subsequently had to resign.
Although he never meant for Russia’s socialist identity to be replaced by
that of pro-­Western liberalism, Gorbachev undoubtedly greatly contrib-
uted to the rise of domestic Westernizers. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet
Union presented Russia’s new liberals with an opportunity to fashion a
pro-­Western course of foreign policy. President Boris Yeltsin and his for-
eign minister Andrei Kozyrev pursued policies of strategic partnership
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 19

and Integration with the West and its institutions. Externally, they were
inspired by the Western promises of support, and they expected to “join”
the West within a few years. They saw the West’s victory in the Cold War
as the promise and the opportunity of the new liberal era. Domestically,
the Westernizing coalition included—in addition to liberal-­ minded
leadership—intellectuals, human rights activists, and new procapitalist
elites, particularly those with export interests in the West. The new iden-
tity coalition pursued a revolutionary agenda of transforming the old
Soviet institutions into those of a pro-­Western nation-­state. It seemed as if
the new liberal identity was finally to be established in Russia.
But Soviet disintegration did not end the old identity debates. In fact—
partly because of the Soviet breakup—the new post-­Soviet identity became
deeply contested, and the liberal momentum did not last. Soon the pro-­
Western policies were met with a formidable opposition, in which the
new Statists played the key role. The new Statists were different from
their Soviet counterparts in acknowledging the necessity of building a
market economy and democratic institutions. At the same time, they
shared the old line of Statist reasoning, according to which all reforms
had to be subjected to the main objective of strengthening the state. The
new Statist coalition included military industrialists, the army, and the
security services—those who saw only marginal benefits in adopting
the Western model. Led by presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich and
then the chief of foreign intelligence Yevgeni Primakov, the new Statists
insisted that the national interest had not changed significantly and still
had to do with defending Russia’s great power status. Over time, this
reasoning proved to win the support of the elites and masses, and the
state had to adopt the Statist concept of national interest. Primakov—now
Russia’s newly appointed foreign minister—argued for more restrained
relations with the West and for a more “balanced” and “diverse” foreign
policy. Primakov believed that Russia’s new liberal values did not erase
the need to maintain the status of a distinct Eurasianist great power and
to balance Western influences. One of his prominent proposals was that
Russia develop a strategic alliance with China and India.
Statists were able to defeat Westernizers because of the power of the old
Statist identity, the establishment of which could be traced as far back as
the 1920s. The Statists were also successful in using the weakness of the
new liberal state and mobilizing various informal channels for influenc-
ing policymaking. In particular, they benefited politically from the failure
of Westernist radical economic reform. Externally, the identity struggle
between Statists and Westernizers took place in the changed context.
Looking to protect Russia’s security, Statists were soon able to identify
several threatening developments. Newly emerged instabilities and con-
flicts in the former Soviet republics and inside the country (Chechnya) in
the early to mid-­1990s made it extremely difficult for Westernizers to
20 Chapter 1

sustain their policies of disengagement from the periphery. Importantly,

the West—Russia’s significant Other—greatly strengthened the Statist
discourse by making a decision to expand the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) eastward and exclude Russia from the process.
This strengthened the sense that the West was not accepting Russia as one
of its own. All these developments provided the context for constructing
the sought image of external threat and solidified the influence of the new
identity coalition. On the other hand, Westernism did not have sufficient
public support to be able to reduce the power of the Statists.
The arrival of Vladimir Putin as the new president signaled yet another
change in policies and a renewed interest in engaging the West. In a stun-
ning strategic reversal, the state adopted another distinct view of national
interest—different from those of Westernizers and Primakovites. Although
Putin insisted on Russia’s priority of preserving great power status, his
strategy for achieving this objective differed considerably from Prima-
kov’s. Instead of continuing the policy of balancing against the West, Putin
explicitly sided with Europe and the United States and insisted that Russia
was a country of European and Western, rather than Asian, identity.
Why such a modification in the previous Statist thinking? The unre-
solved identity question, the shifting balance in the Statists-­Westernizers
debate, and the new international context help to explain Putin’s strategic
innovation. Domestically, Putin’s course of “pragmatic cooperation”
with the West was the project of a mixed-­identity coalition that included
both Westernist and Statist interests. Sometimes referred to as the alli-
ance of oligarchs and chekists,27 the new domestic coalition brought Putin
to power and gained strength in the new world context, which held both
threats and opportunities for Russia. Opportunities came from domestic
economic stabilization and cooperation with the United States after the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and threats were defined by the new
leadership as being of a terrorist nature and emanating from both inside
and outside of Russia. The public strongly supported Putin’s approach.
His vision of the national interests, which included the preservation of
Russia’s security and identity, socioeconomic development, and the
strengthening of political institutions,28 resonated with the domestic public
better than the security-­ underplayed Westernism of Kozyrev or the
security-­overplayed Eurasianism of Primakov. In response to the colored
revolutions and perceived Western pressures, Russia’s policy obtained a
more assertive dimension. The Kremlin sought to consolidate Russia’s
position by challenging the Western nations to open their markets to
Russian business and not expand their military infrastructure closer to
Russia’s borders.
Once the international context began to change, Russia’s identity com-
petition resumed. With the global financial crisis severely undermining
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 21

the country’s economy, the liberal Westernizers reemerged to promote

Russia’s modernization according to Western standards of free market
competition, political pluralism, and transparency. They embraced Med-
vedev’s vision of a cautious modernization and sought to push it toward
a radical revision of Putin’s Statist model and assertive relations with the
West. Medvedev’s foreign policy was based on the notion of international
alliances for modernization and served to bring Russia closer to Europe
and the United States. Although a number of serious issues remained
unresolved, Russia and the West signed a new START (Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty) treaty, cooperated on securing Afghanistan, and occa-
sionally coordinated their policies toward the Middle Eastern region. In
2012, Russia also joined the WTO (World Trade Organization).
However, the international context continued to encourage Statist
thinking inside Russia. The Western expansion of military infrastructure
such as the Missile Defense System in Europe, attempts to limit Moscow’s
influence in the former Soviet region, and promotion of Western values
contributed to Putin’s perception of the West as seeking to internally
weaken Russia. The Ukraine crisis further exacerbated Russia’s sense of
strategic vulnerability by pushing it further away from the West toward
non-­Western nations, especially China.
Neither realism nor liberalism is fully satisfactory in explaining the
identified changes and continuity in Russia’s foreign policy. For example,
realist arguments that post-­Soviet Russia was merely looking to consoli-
date its great power capabilities fail to acknowledge the socialist Wester-
nist nature of Gorbachev’s policies and the liberal Westernist vision of
Russia’s first post-­Soviet foreign minister. Both Gorbachev and Kozyrev
were thinking in terms of the priority of cooperation and engagement
with the world, rather than preserving or reviving Russia’s material
power. They had roots in domestic international thinking, but were also
motivated and encouraged by the West’s liberal developments. Because
of the failure to acknowledge the true origins of the identified liberal
foreign policy developments, realists also misrepresented the scope of
changes resulting from these developments. Both changes implied funda-
mental breaks with the Statist past and went far beyond strategic adapta-
tion to the growing military power of the West. Liberals, on the other
hand, have difficulty with making sense of Russia’s retreat to great power
thinking. To them, this retreat does not seem rational, since in the world
of globalization, preoccupation with great power status may be an
impediment to development and, ultimately, the survival of the country.
Indeed, it is all too common to see Western politicians’ references to Putin
as a paranoid and irrational thinker.29
Ultimately, both realism and liberalism are inadequate in identifying
the genuine nature and origins of various concepts of national interest
22 Chapter 1

guiding Russia’s international behavior. In particular, they miss the fact

that national interest is not about power or modernization. Instead, it is
about social adaptation to the constantly changing international and local
conditions, and it is about recognition by the identified significant Other.
For both Westernizers and Statists, the West is a key point of reference,
although each school understands its nature differently. Even Civiliza-
tionists, who rarely held a prominent position in domestic discourse,
aspired to be respected by the West. What matters in national-­interest
formation is how debate about national identity is shaped by (1) a popu-
lation’s most pressing local concerns and (2) contemporary behavior of
Western nations toward Russia that vindicates or erodes the earlier
established images of the West. In addition, as I try to show in the follow-
ing chapters, each school must work hard to make use of available mate-
rial and institutional resources in the society. Ultimately, it is the described
local conditions combined with considerations of international recogni-
tion and respect, rather than a position in the international economy or
the balance of power, that determine the concept of national interest
adopted by the state as a foreign policy guide. Russia’s post-­Soviet con-
cepts of national interest and their formation are summarized in table 1.4
(see facing page). The remaining chapters of the book further develop the
above-­suggested explanation of Russia’s foreign policy.

EVALUATING RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

In addition to describing and explaining Russia’s foreign policy, one should

also attempt to evaluate the record of its efficiency. This section introduces
the evaluative standards adopted in this book and briefly illustrates their
application with examples from the post-­Soviet era. The remaining chap-
ters offer a more detailed assessment of the accomplishments and losses of
each of the described foreign policy courses.

Evaluative Standards

Four criteria deserve to be carefully considered in evaluating foreign

policy record—security, welfare, autonomy, and identity. Security typi-
cally refers to the absence of military threats to the nation, particularly
(but not limited to) from outside. The welfare criterion implies that foreign
policy assists the nation in creating external conditions for the improve-
ment of standards of living that may have to do with economic growth,
new jobs, and social services. Autonomy has to do with the state’s ability
to make decisions by withstanding possible pressures of special interests
from inside and outside the country. Finally, a successful foreign policy is
Table 1.4. Explaining Russia’s Foreign Policy after Communism
Local Conditions
National- Economic Economic Decline;
Democratic Depression; Economic Recovery; Remaining Security Ongoing
Revolution Political Instability New Security Threats Threats Domestic Crisis
Support INTEGRATION
WITH THE
WEST
Behavior of NATO expansion BALANCING
Europe/ West Renewed support PRAGMATIC
COOPERATION
Regime change ASSERTIVENESS
Engagement ALLIANCES FOR
MODERNIZATION
Expansion CIVILIZATION
24 Chapter 1

not fundamentally disruptive to the existing system of cultural values.

Rather, such a policy relies on these values by reshaping and mobilizing
them in a manner that would further the nation’s interests and assist the
nation in accomplishing its principal goals.
In general, a foreign policy is about protection of a nation’s external
security, economy, and social lifestyle. Each of these criteria or objectives
can be measured by a variety of indicators. A more secure nation, for
example, is one that has relatively few military threats from outside and
therefore can afford to reduce its military expenditures. A more prosper-
ous nation has stable growth and improving living standards for the gen-
eral population. A more autonomous nation has a state that is capable of
defending the interests of the people as a whole and is not hostage to some
powerful influences at home, such as big business or military, or from
abroad. Determining the state’s foreign policy autonomy requires compar-
ing how the proclaimed goals of defending the interests of the national
majority stand against specific international actions of the state, as well as
to what extent these actions represent interest groups at the expense of the
rest of the society. Finally, a culturally sensitive foreign policy reflects the
already-­established historical patterns and usually has the population’s
support with regard to the asserted relationships with the nation’s signifi-
cant Other. Approval of the society in each of these categories expressed
through public opinion polls (should such polls be available) may serve as
additional evidence for evaluating a foreign policy record.
The foreign policy of each time period can be evaluated using these
criteria as they apply during a specified period. Foreign policy is success-
ful if at a given time it has provided a balanced defense of all the listed
objectives using the available resources.

From New Thinking to Pragmatic Cooperation

Russia’s foreign policy record is complex. Overall, the country’s leader-

ship has tried to defend its security by relying on limited resources
available and without resorting to an imperialist course. After the col-
lapse of the economy in the early 1990s, it began a difficult process of
recovery, and the society on the whole has begun to feel the difference of
the post-­Yeltsin era. Under Putin, during the 2000s the state has restored
a good measure of policy autonomy, and key international decisions have
become more reflective of the social consensus than those of the early to
mid-­1990s. Polls of the general public on some pressing international
issues during the past two years or so consistently demonstrate that people
on the whole are satisfied with the country’s foreign policy. Finally, as a
result of a more moderate foreign policy course, Russia has been able to
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 25

strike a better cultural balance between the necessity to rethink the old
Soviet legacy and the need to respect some traditional values, such as
the defense of Russian-­language speakers abroad. Geopolitically, Russia’s
foreign policy reflects the nation’s desire to have strong ties with European,
or Western, civilization, while preserving special relations with Muslim
and Asian neighbors.
In none of the specified areas, however, has Russia’s foreign policy
been perfectly efficient. For instance, terrorism continues to pose a serious
challenge to the nation’s internal and external security. The economic
improvement is still more of a product of the 1998 currency devaluation
and favorable world oil prices than of competitive domestic restructuring.
In a number of areas, interest groups have preserved their influence on
state policy. And the crisis of Russia’s post-­Soviet identity has not yet
been fully resolved. The transition to a relatively balanced foreign policy
course has also not been easy or straightforward. Rather, it has emerged
as a result of zigs and zags of different strategies different leaders pursue
in concert with their views of Russia’s national interest. Nevertheless, the
overall improvement in foreign policy efficiency has been evident if one
examines the record over the past twenty years. Polls of the general
public on some pressing international issues during the past two years or
so consistently demonstrate that people on the whole are satisfied with
the country’s foreign policy. What follows is a brief assessment of four
distinct periods in Russia’s international activities.
Gorbachev’s foreign policy course was based on an innovative under-
standing of national interest that called for rethinking the Soviet system
and its international environment (New Thinking). Its most important
accomplishment was a radical improvement of Russia’s national security,
which resulted mainly from fundamentally changed relationships with
the West. Thanks largely to Gorbachev’s personal leadership and commit-
ment, several key arms-­ control agreements were concluded, and the
whole era of highly adventurous arms races was gone forever. The disap-
pearance of the threat from the West liberated a great deal of resources
that had been previously spent to feed one of the most powerful military
machines in the world.
The New Thinking record is not as impressive in areas outside security.
Gorbachev’s preoccupation with matters of arms control did not assist
him in reforming the Soviet economy or improving people’s standards of
living. From 1988 to 1989, polls began to register growing disappointment
with reforms and a lack of trust in the central leadership. While Moscow
was busy negotiating with Western nations over security matters, such
as thresholds of nuclear sufficiency and withdrawals of troops from the
third world and Eastern Europe, the economy was increasingly losing
26 Chapter 1

control, eventually collapsing in 1990. This development severely handi-

capped Gorbachev in his ability to pursue the originally designed inter-
national course. Already in 1990, this course was on its way to changing
from the Soviet one in terms of initiative and design into a largely West-­
controlled one. The leader of New Thinking was weakened and had to
make many more concessions to Western leaders than he had envisioned.
He no longer had the initiative or policy autonomy required for sustain-
ing his course, and U.S. president George H. W. Bush was therefore cor-
rect to proclaim the West’s “victory” in the Cold War in his 1992 State of
the Union address. In addition, Gorbachev’s foreign policy failed to
mobilize Russian cultural identity. Introduced to reinvigorate the coun-
try’s social energy and initiative, New Thinking left the nation’s citizens
deeply divided and unsure about their future. Already in 1989, 34 percent
of the public felt that the Soviet Union could not serve as an example to
the outside world, compared with only 5 percent in 1988.30
The course of Integration with the West, pursued by President Yeltsin
and his foreign minister Kozyrev, was meant to capitalize on the already-­
achieved security and improved relations with Western nations. The
post-­Soviet leaders went much further than Gorbachev in their proclaimed
convergence of the interests of new Russia with those of the West. Whereas
Gorbachev saw the Soviet Union and the West as culturally distinct enti-
ties, the new leadership proposed that Russia become a full-­ fledged
member of Western civilization by borrowing key Western values, such as
individualism, the market economy, and political democracy. Partly, the
new concept of national interest, which emphasized rapid economic and
political modernization, was designed to attract Western economic assis-
tance and therefore address the welfare criterion of foreign policy. Yeltsin
and Kozyrev hoped that after proclaiming their commitment to Western
values and adopting principles of rapid marketization, or the so-­called
shock therapy, private investments and financial assistance would quickly
revive the half-­alive and continuously deteriorating economy.
The reality was different. Western investments remained scarce. Through
the use of IMF and World Bank loans, the economy was stabilized, but at
the heavy price of stagnation, collapsed social services, and skyrocketing
poverty. The failure of shock therapy to bring Russia into the family of
rich Western nations alienated a considerable portion of the elites and
general public, making it difficult to defend the foreign policy record of
the pro-­Western leadership. Increasingly, the populace felt that strategic
partnership with the West was not working, and many developed resent-
ment toward Western nations, particularly the United States. For instance,
during 1993–1995, the number of those viewing the United States as a threat
increased from 26 to 44 percent among the general public and from 27 to
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 27

53 percent among the elites.31 In addition, many judged that Russia was
effectively ceding its policy autonomy to the West in economic and other
affairs. In 1995, 75 percent of the population believed that the economy
was essentially in foreign hands.32 The number of those perceiving the
West as seeking to weaken Russia also increased. The increased depen-
dency on the West in economic affairs went hand in hand with loss of
autonomy in security affairs, as Washington was often dictating Mos-
cow’s foreign policy in such critical areas as the Balkans and Iraq.
Perhaps worst of all, security issues returned to the agenda. Partly the
result of Kozyrev’s overconcentration on the Western direction, the
security threats reemerged in the form of ethnic and military conflicts in
the former Soviet Union and even inside Russia (Chechnya). All these
developments further exacerbated the sense of Russian hurt pride and
identity. The pro-­Western foreign policy course did little to address those
feelings. Accompanied by failures to protect the nation’s security, econ-
omy, and policy autonomy, this course in fact deepened the sense of cul-
tural loneliness among Russians. Shrunken in size after the Soviet Union’s
disintegration and confronted with NATO’s decision to expand eastward,
Russia was bound to seriously rethink the assumptions of its pro-­Western
foreign policy.
When the leading critic of the West-­oriented course, Yevgeni Prima-
kov, replaced Kozyrev as foreign minister, Russia’s foreign policy
changed greatly. As much as was possible under Yeltsin’s leadership,
the new foreign minister pursued policies of restoring great power sta-
tus. He addressed the new security threats through intense diplomatic
involvement in the former Soviet region, particularly in the areas of
military confrontations and civil wars (Tajikistan, Moldova), and
through the initiation of economic and security projects aimed at tight-
ening the ties among the former Soviet republics under the leadership
of Russia. Primakov was also successful in restoring some measure of
foreign policy autonomy. While Russia’s dependence on Western lend-
ing agencies continued, the new course was pursued with greater respect
for public perception of the national interest, and it was considerably
less tolerant of Washington’s attempts to shape Russia’s policies toward
the Balkans, Iraq, and the former Soviet region. Both elites and the
general public expressed their strong support for the new course, wel-
coming its greater independence and concentration on solving security
issues in the former Soviet Union. In line with the new course, the
public was supportive of strengthening the army and relations with the
former republics.33
The strategy of Great Power Balancing was not as successful in improv-
ing the welfare of Russians. The project of integrating the former Soviet
28 Chapter 1

region proved to be excessively geopolitically driven and not as founded

on economic grounds. The economy continued to stagnate, not bringing
any foreign investments and increasing the burden of foreign debt. The
new foreign policy strategy was also dubious with respect to the crite-
rion of identity. Primakov addressed the new cultural fear of the West
by attempting to pragmatically defuse the crisis in relations with NATO
and by proposing to build a strategic triangle of Russia, China, and
India to balance American hegemonic growth in world politics. NATO’s
military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 further pushed Russia away
from the West. Yet the Westernist component of Russia’s cultural iden-
tity is a well-­established reality, and the strategy of Eurasia-­oriented
Great Power Balancing failed to address this part of the Russian national
psyche.
Vladimir Putin’s course of Pragmatic Cooperation has been more suc-
cessful in terms of meeting the criteria of security, welfare, autonomy,
and identity. Creatively borrowing from both Westernist and Statist
thinking of the post-­Soviet era, the president forcefully responded to the
new security challenge of terrorism in Chechnya, the Caucasus, and
central Asia, simultaneously improving somewhat damaged relations
with the West. Dmitri Medvedev’s policy of modernization continued the
effort to pragmatically engage the West in order to strengthen ties with
most advanced economies, while preserving a good measure of state
autonomy. As a result, the economy and social welfare have improved.
Russia finally gained membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO)—in part to continue with the country’s efforts of economic
modernization. Finally, Pragmatic Cooperation helped to preserve both
Westernist and Statist components of Russia’s identity by orienting Rus-
sians to adjust to the West while preserving their own cultural legacy
and long-­standing relations with non-­Western nations in Asia and the
Muslim world.
However, since the early 2010s, the course of Pragmatic Cooperation
has demonstrated limitations, as Western nations declined to recognize
Russia’s distinct security interests and values. Following the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, Russia sought to consolidate its political system in
order to prevent the Ukraine-­like destabilization and the West’s potential
interference in Russia’s internal affairs. Putin’s new vision of Russia as a
state-­civilization with distinct interests and values since 2012 sought to
compensate for weaknesses of Medvedev’s cooperative and West-­centric
approach. The new course has aimed to stand the ground on security
issues by not allowing Ukraine to be absorbed by the West’s political and
military institutions. Russia also wanted to take advantage of new oppor-
tunities presented by rise of non-­Western powers. It remains to be seen
how successful the overall record of the new course will be.
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 29

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK

This study combines two methods. In order to explore the indigenous

system of Russian perceptions, I explore the content and intensity of Rus-
sian foreign policy debates by comparing arguments made by the identi-
fied schools of thinking. For understanding the process of contestation of
national interests, I employ the method of “schools of thought” analysis.
Following Martin Wight’s conceptualization,34 I identify three distinct
schools of thinking about national interest that existed in Russia before
and after Gorbachev’s perestroika (Westernism, Statism, and Civilization-
ism). Careful exploration of the arguments made by various schools and
participants in Russian discourse allows me to identify existing foreign
policy alternatives and to present a comprehensive picture of the coun-
try’s international thinking.
For understanding changes in Russia’s post-­Soviet foreign policy, I
employ a method of “over time comparison.” Beginning with the next
chapter, I offer a detailed analysis of the rise and fall of several distinct
concepts of national interests—New Thinking, Integration with the West,
Great Power Balancing, Pragmatic Cooperation, Assertiveness, Alliances
for Modernization, and Civilization—as well as policies that stemmed
from each of these concepts. I trace how each of these visions first
emerged outside the state and the process through which it then came to
define leadership’s perceptions and adopted international policies. The
book’s central argument is that it is these visions of national interest,
rather than Russia’s position in the international economy or balance of
power that have determined the country’s foreign policy after commu-
nism. During the 1990s through the early 2000s, neither structural power
conditions nor the international economic position of Russia has changed
sufficiently to fully account for its foreign policy choices.
The book’s organization is straightforward. The chapters that follow
study national interests and foreign policy formation through four dis-
tinct periods from the late 1980s until mid-­2012. In each chapter, I describe
the international and local contexts in which Russian debates about
national interest took place. I analyze the process through which one of
the foreign policy visions prevailed and obtained the status of state
vision. I then review specific international policies pursued by leaders
toward the former Soviet Union and the outside world in attempting to
satisfy their visions of national interest. Finally, I attempt to evaluate the
accomplishments and losses of each of the pursued foreign policy courses.
The concluding chapters reflect on the future choices of Russia’s foreign
policy and summarize the analysis by comparing the diverse concepts of
national interest and evaluating their relative performance. The final
chapter also draws lessons for Russian and Western policymakers.
30 Chapter 1

NOTES

1. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Classics

of International Relations, 2nd ed., ed. John A. Vasques (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1990), 135.
2. Khrushchev’s Europeanism was limited, and it pursued the objective of
greater European independence in the context of a power struggle with the
Americans. Yet his position that the European Economic Community become a
reality emboldened those in domestic politics who wanted to improve relation-
ships with Bonn and other European nations. See Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the
Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations (London: Routledge,
1996), 140–41.
3. As cited in Richard Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 1917–1991
(London: Routledge, 1999), 187–88.
4. See Yevgeni Primakov, “Rossiya v mirovoi politike,” Mezhdunarodnaya
zhizn’ 5 (1998); I. Ivanov, Vneshnyaya politika Rossiyi (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye
otnosheniya, 2001) 313–30; Strategiya dlya Rossiyi: Povestka dlya prezidenta—2000.
Russian Westernists, on the other hand, are often critical of Gorchakov’s diplo-
macy (see, for example, Yuri Fedorov, “Krizis vneshnei politiki Rossiyi,” Pro et
Contra 6, nos. 1–2 [2001]).
5. Aleksandr Dugin, Osnovy geopolitiki (Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997); Aleksandr
Mitrofanov, Shagi novoi geopolitiki (Moscow, 1998).
6. Interestingly enough, Yeltsin’s former privatization czar and current head
of Russia’s state electric company, Anatoli Chubais, recently wrote that Russia’s
main goal in the twenty-­first century should be to build up a “liberal empire”
through the strengthening of its position in the former Soviet Union. “EES Head
Calls for Russia to Become a ‘Liberal Empire,’” RFE/RL Newsline, September 26,
2003; Anatoli Chubais, “Missiya Rossiyi v XXI veke,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, October
1, 2003.
7. Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy of Russia
(Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 59.
8. Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-­
Hill, 1951), as cited in Celeste A. Wallander, “The Sources of Russian Conduct,”
in The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, ed. C. A. Wallander
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 5.
9. Sakwa, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union, 295.
10. Neil MacFarlane, “Realism and Russian Strategy after the Collapse of the
USSR,” in Unipolar Politics, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Allen Lynch, “Realism of Russian For-
eign Policy,” Europe-­Asia Studies 53, no. 1 (2001).
11. Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World
Politics 51, no. 1 (1998).
12. Robert English, “Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on the Cold War’s End,”
International Security 26, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 78–82.
13. In fact, both Primakov’s and Putin’s foreign policies can be understood in
terms of Russia’s responses to new domestic challenges, such as economic poverty
and insecure borders. As some scholars have argued, outside the Western Hemi-
 Understanding Change and Continuity in Russia’s Foreign Policy 31

sphere, states’ international responses often explain the need to stabilize political
regimes internally. See, for example, Mohammed Ayoob, Third World Security Pre-
dicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 1995).
14. For a more detailed overview of Russia’s foreign policy studies, see Wal-
lander, “The Sources of Russian Conduct.”
15. Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest (1989): 4.
16. See, especially, Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in
the Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991) and Thomas L. Fried-
man, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1999).
17. For overviews, see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-­Jones, and Steven E.
Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996); Fred
Chernoff, “The Study of Democratic Peace and Progress in International Rela-
tions,” International Studies Review 6 (2004).
18. George W. Breslauer and Philip E. Tetlock, eds., Learning in U.S. and Soviet
Foreign Policy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Peter Haas, “Introduction:
Epistemic Communities,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992); Thomas
Risse-­Kappen, ed., Bringing Transnational Relations Back In (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995); M. E. Keck and Katherine Sikkink, Activists beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1998).
19. Liberal scholars have linked Gorbachev’s policies to principal economic and
political changes in the West, as well as to activities of transnational expert com-
munities, ideas, and social movements. See, for example, Celeste A. Wallander,
“Opportunity, Incrementalism, and Learning in the Extension and Retraction of
Soviet Global Commitments,” Security Studies 1 (Spring 1992); Matthew Evange-
lista, Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movements to End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1999); Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West:
Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2000).
20. As cited in James N. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, Power and Purpose: U.S.
Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2003), 11.
21. Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 90.
22. Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Purpose, 11.
23. Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New
York: Random House, 2002), 367, 407–8; Goldgeier and McFaul, Power and Pur-
pose, 133–34.
24. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1999), 133.
25. As one scholar suggests, “Identity explanations are likely to become ‘foreign
policy-­ized’ by connecting identity to other factors and theories that have long
been part of the FPA agenda.” Juliet Kaarbo, “Foreign Policy Analysis in the
Twenty-­ First Century: Back to Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas,”
International Studies Review 5 (2003): 160. International relations scholars have rec-
ognized the internal/external bind by referring to it as a “two-­level game.” Robert
D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-­Level Games,”
International Organization 42, no. 2 (1988).
32 Chapter 1

26. For additional hypotheses about international influences and their interac-
tion with local conditions, see Jack Snyder, “International Leverage on Soviet
Domestic Change,” World Politics 42, no. 1 (1989); James Richter, Khrushchev’s
Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
27. Chekist originates from the Russian CheKa, the original name of the Bolshe-
viks’ security service. It was led by People’s Commissar Feliks Dzerzhinski. Oli-
garchs are, of course, superrich captains of Russia’s newly privatized economy.
28. See Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya na rubezhe tysyacheleti,” Nezavisimaya gazeta,
December 2, 1999.
29. Suffice it to recall German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s remarks to President
Barack Obama following Russia’s intervention in Crimea that Putin is living “in
another world” (Peter Baker, “Pressure Rising as Obama Works to Rein in Rus-
sia,” The New York Times, March 2, 2015 [Link]
03/world/europe/pressure-­rising-­as-­obama-­works-­to-­rein-­in-­[Link]?hp)
30. Yuri Levada, ed., Est’ mneniye! Itogi sotsiologicheskogo oprosa (Moscow: Prog-
ress, 1990), 284.
31. William Zimmerman, The Russian People and Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2002), 91.
32. Zimmerman, The Russian People, 92.
33. Zimmerman, The Russian People, 91; Fond Obschestvennoye Mneniye, at
[Link].
34. Martin Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions (Leicester, UK:
Leicester University Press, 1991).