Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr.

, and registered with the

THIRD DIVISION Registry of Deeds for the province of La Union on November
16, 1988;
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION OF G.R. No. 147359
TITLE c) Lot No. 47030 covered by Tax Declaration No. 21971 was
Promulgated: acquired by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and between
FIELDMAN AGRICULTURAL TRADING CORPORATION, March 28, 2008 Ernesto Adman, Amparo Carino Adman, and the applicant at
represented by KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., Petitioner, San Fernando, La Union, on August 27, 1990 appearing as
- versus - Doc. No. 235, Page No. 47, Book No. II, Series of 1990, in the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. notarial register of Notary Public Roman R. Villalon, Jr., and
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x registered with the Register of Deeds for the Province of La
Union on September 25, 1990.[4]
DECISION
FATCO, thus, prayed for the registration or confirmation of its title over these
NACHURA, J.: parcels of land.
Petitioner Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corp. (FATCO), through Kam Biak Y.
Chan, Jr., appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the October On December 1, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 52366, and appearance, as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and
the March 7, 2001 Resolution[2]denying its reconsideration. deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, La Union to appear in the
On October 19, 1993, FATCO filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La case.[5]
Union an application for confirmation of title to parcels of land, described as Lots
No. 1505, No. 1234 and No. 47030,[3] with an aggregate area of 8,463 square On November 11, 1994, the RTC issued an Order setting the application for initial
meters, situated in Barrio Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union. The application was hearing on February 28, 1995. The Order was published in the January 23, 1995
docketed as LRA REC. No. N-63835. issue of the Official Gazette,[6] and the February 18-24, 1995 issue of
the Guardian.[7] The notice of hearing was, likewise, posted in a conspicuous
FATCO alleged, among others, that it is the owner of the subject parcels place in each parcel of land included in the application, and on the bulletin board
of land which it openly, exclusively and notoriously possessed and occupied for of the municipal building of Bacnotan, La Union.[8] The Provincial Prosecutor of
more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim of ownership, tacking its La Union was furnished with a copy of notice of hearing on November 18, 1994.[9]
possession with that of its predecessors-in-interest. It allegedly acquired these
lots in the following manner: At the scheduled initial hearing on February 28, 1995, Atty. Marita
Balloguing entered her appearance as collaborating counsel for FATCO, and
a) Lot No. 1505 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20304 was requested the resetting of the marking of exhibits. [10] The RTC granted the
acquired by a Deed of Exchange executed by and between the request and issued an Order resetting the hearing to April 19, 1995, viz.:
Brgy. Council of Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union, represented by
its Brgy. Capt. Honesto Alcid and Brgy. Sec. Teofilo Descargar, As prayed for by Atty. Balloguing, who entered her appearance
and the applicant, at San Fernando, La Union, on October 19, in collaboration with Atty. Ungria as counsel for the applicant,
1988 appearing as Doc. No. 415, Page No. 84, Book No. I, this case is reset to April 19, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. for the purpose
Series of 1988 in the notarial register of Notary Public Roman of establishing jurisdictional facts. SO ORDERED.[11]
R. Villalon, Jr., and registered with the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of La Union on November 16, 1988;
The Republic, through the Provincial Prosecutor, was duly informed of the
b) Lot No. 1234 covered by Tax Declaration No. 20305 was resetting.[12]
acquired by a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by and between Ceferino Bucago, On March 2, 1995, the OSG again entered its appearance as counsel for
Ildefonso Bucago, Victoria Bucago, Felomina B. Higoy, the Republic and once more deputized the Provincial Fiscal of San Fernando, La
Elizabeth B. Espejo, Ernesto B. Dacanay, Maria Bucago, Union to appear in the case.[13]On the same date, the Republic filed its Opposition
Reinerio P. Dacanay and the applicant at San Fernando, La to FATCOs application for registration on the following grounds: (1) neither
Union, on October 19, 1988 appearing as Doc. No. 411, Page FATCO nor its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
No. 84, Book No. I, Series of 1988 in the notarial register of exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title and tax declarations of WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court
the applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) do not constitute competent and hereby approves the application and orders that the parcels of
sufficient evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the land applied for, and do not land identified as Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030, Bacnotan
appear to be genuine; (3) applicant (and its predecessors-in-interest) can no Cadastre Pls-1050-D, containing an area of EIGHT
longer claim ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant, since THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY-THREE (8,463) square
they failed to file the appropriate application for registration within the period of meters, more or less, located at Poblacion, Bacnotan, La Union,
six months from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) covered by Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 (Exh. A),
No. 892; (4) the parcels of land applied for forms part of the public domain and and more particularly described in the technical description,
are not subject to privateappropriation; and (5) the application was belatedly filed Exh. B shall be registered in the name of the applicant Fieldman
as it was filed beyond December 31, 1987, the period set forth under Sec. 2, P.D. Agricultural Trading Corporation, with address at Poblacion,
No. 1073.[14] Bacnotan, La Union, under the provisions of the Property
Registration Decree.
During the hearing on April 19, 1995, Prosecutor Gloria D. Catbagan
appeared for the Republic. FATCO, through counsel, offered in evidence the The encumbrance/mortgage of the property to the Far East
following documents to establish jurisdictional facts: Bank and Trust Company, San Fernando, La Union Branch in
the amount of Seventeen Million (P17,000,000.00) Pesos, shall
Exhibit A - Consolidated Plan Ccn-013303-000129 of accordingly be annotated at the back of the title to be issued in
Lots 1505, 1234 and 47030 the name of the applicant.
Exhibit B - Technical Description
Exhibit B-1 - Certification in lieu of Lost Surveyors Once this decision shall become final, let a decree of
Certificate registration be issued.[17]
Exhibit C - Notice of Initial Hearing from LRA
Exhibit D - Affidavit of Publication by publisher of The
Guardian From the aforesaid decision, the Republic went to the CA. It faulted the RTC for
Exhibit D-1 - Clipping of Publication giving due course to FATCOs application arguing that it did not acquire
Exhibit E - Whole issue of The Guardian for February jurisdiction over the same in view of the non-publication of the notice of actual
18 to 24, 1995; initial hearing. It also claimed that FATCO failed to prove open, continuous and
Exhibit E-1 - Section A of publication of said issue; notorious possession of the subject properties for more than thirty (30) years, as
Exhibit F - Certificate of Publication from the Official required by law.
Gazette/ National Printing Office;
Exhibit G - Certificate of Notification sent to Adjoining On October 23, 2000, the CA reversed the RTC Decision. The CA
Owners (Reserved); agreed with the Republic that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over FATCOs
Exhibit H - Certificate of Publication from LRA application because the publication of initial hearing was fatally defective. The
Exhibit I - Sheriffs Certificate of Posting notice that was published in the Official Gazette and in the Guardian was the
Exhibit J - Certificate of Assessment[15] hearing set on February 28, 1995, but no hearing was conducted on the said
date. The actual initial hearing was held on April 19, 1995, a date different from
what was stated in the notice, thereby defeating the very purpose of the
The RTC then issued an Order[16] setting the case for the reception of publication requirement.
evidence on May 25, 1995 at 8:30 in the morning.
The CA disposed, thus:
In the ensuing trial, FATCO offered other documents and testimonial
evidence to prove its title to the parcels of land applied for. The Republic, on the WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
other hand, did not submit evidence to controvert FATCOs assertion. hereby GRANTED and the Decision dated February 5, 1996 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the application for
In a Decision dated February 5, 1996, the RTC, upon a finding that FATCO had registration is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[18]
sufficiently established its ownership of the lands in question, ordered the
registration thereof in its name, thus:
FATCO filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied it on March 7, 2001.
Hence, this petition for certiorari by FATCO theorizing that: hearing. Hence, re-publication of the new notice of hearing was necessary, but
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED FATCO failed to publish the notice of hearing set on April 19, 1995, thus,
WHEN IT HELD THAT THE COURT A QUO DID NOT preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the application.
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONERS
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.[19] The Republic is correct that in land registration case, publication of the
notice of initial hearing is a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance
In its Comment on the petition, the Republic, through the OSG, argues that: therewith affects the jurisdiction of the court. The purpose of publication of the
notice is to require all persons concerned, who may have any rights or interests
I in the property applied for, to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
NO ACTUAL HEARING WAS HELD BY THE TRIAL cause why the application should not be granted.[22]
COURT ON FEBRUARY 28, 1995 WHICH WAS THE
PUBLISHED DATE OF INITIAL HEARING; It is not disputed that there was publication, mailing, and posting of the
notice of the initial hearing set on February 28, 1995. FATCO, thus, complied
II with the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE registration proceedings. Accordingly, as of that date, the RTC acquired
JURISDICTION TO HEAR PETITIONERS APPLICATION FOR jurisdiction over FATCOs application.
REGISTRATION DUE TO PETITIONERS FAILURE TO
PUBLISH THE NOTICE OF ACTUAL Even if, at the February 28, 1995 hearing, FATCOs counsel requested a
HEARING SET ON APRIL 19, 1995 AND TO POST SAID resetting, and the RTC granted said request, the Republic and all interested
NOTICE IN CONSPICUOUS PLACES AND TO SERVE THE parties were already fully apprised of the pendency of the application. When the
SAME TO ADJOINING OWNERS. hearing was reset to April 19, 1995, interested parties, the Republic included,
may be deemed to have been given notice thereof. [23] There was, thus, no need
III for the re-publication of notice of hearing, for clearly, the avowed purpose of
NO TRACING CLOTH PLAN WAS OFFERED IN Section 23 had already been accomplished. We, therefore, find that the
EVIDENCE IN THE COURT AQUO. application for registration was rightfully given due course by the RTC. The CA,
thus, committed reversible error in holding otherwise.
IV
PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE ITS OPEN, Be that as it may, we cannot grant FATCOs plea for the reinstatement of
CONTINUOUS, ADVERSE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION the RTC Decision granting its application for registration or confirmation of its
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IN THE CONCEPT OF AN imperfect title.
OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.[20]
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree explicitly states:
We will deal first with the jurisdictional issue.
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
Section 23[21] of P.D. No. 1529, or the Property Registration Decree, proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
explicitly provides that before the court can act on the application for land title to the land, whether personally or through their authorized
registration, the public shall be given notice of the initial hearing thereof by representatives.
means of publication, mailing, and posting.
(a) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
FATCO insists that it complied with all the jurisdictional requirements, interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
specifically the publication of the notice of initial hearing. It, therefore, faulted the possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
CA for reversing the RTC and, accordingly, dismissing its application for the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
registration. June 12, 1945.

The Republic, on the other hand, asserts that the RTC never acquired Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, he must show
jurisdiction over FATCOs application because the publication of initial hearing that: first, he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in
was fatally defective. It points out that the initial hearing set on February 28, 1995 open, continuous, exclusive possession and occupation thereof under a bona
was reset to April 19, 1995. The actual initial hearing, therefore, took place on a fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, and second, the land
date different from what was stated in the published notice of initial subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.[24]
 claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
To prove its length of possession, FATCO offered the testimonies of the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Antonio Casugay, its division manager, Emilio Paz, owner of the adjacent lot, and
of Ernesto Adman and Cifirino Bucago, its predecessors-in-interest. It also xxxx
presented deeds of conveyance and several tax declarations covering the lands
in question. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
Unfortunately for FATCO, the testimonies of its witnesses do not serve notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
to prove the validity of its cause. Antonio Casugay and Emilio Paz merely stated public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
that FATCO acquired the subject lots and had taken possession of the same in ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
1988 or 1989.[25] FATCOs predecessor-in-interest, Ernesto Adman, on the other preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
hand, testified that he acquired ownership and possession of Lot No. 4703, also except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
described as Lot No. 1504-A, from Victor Dacanay only in 1983 or 1984. conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
[26]
Similarly, Cifirino Bucagos testimony[27] did not establish the period of essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
possession required by law over Lot No. 1234. His testimony consists merely of certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
general statements with no specifics as to when he began occupying the supplied.)
land. He did not introduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
he possessed Lot No. 1234 for the length of time prescribed by law.
Thus, even if FATCOs case is considered as one for confirmation of imperfect
Neither do the tax declarations prove FATCOs assertion. The earliest tax title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, it would still meet the
declarations presented for Lot No. 1505 and Lot No. 47030 were issued only in same fate.
1948,[28] while the earliest tax declaration for Lot No. 1234 was issued in 1970.
[29]
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The petition for registration of title filed by
ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[30] Fieldman Agricultural Trading Corporation is DISMISSED.

Basic is the rule that an applicant in a land registration case must prove SO ORDERED.
the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied
for. General statements which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof
of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[31]

In this case, FATCO did not present sufficient proof that its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and adverse possession
of the subject lots since June 12, 1945. At best, FATCO can only prove
possession of Lots No. 1505 and No. 47030 since 1948, and of Lot No. 1234
since 1970. But as the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty
(30) years or more is not sufficient. It must be shown too that possession and
occupation had started on June 12, 1945 or earlier.

It is clear that FATCO failed to comply with the prescribed period and
occupation not only as required by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree but also by Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act, which
states:

Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,

occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
 complete postal addresses of the adjoining owners of Lots 9514 and 9516. On
December 14, 1994, the applicant filed its compliance, which was forwarded to
the Land Registration Authority on December 22, 1994 together with the notice of
the Initial Hearing, which was reset to April 13, 1995.

FIRST DIVISION On January 31, 1995, the Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting
of the initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a non-working
[G.R. No. 146527. January 31, 2005] day to a date consistent with LRC Circular No. 353 or ninety (90) days from date
of the Order to allow reasonable time for possible mail delays and to enable them
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MANNA PROPERTIES, to cause the timely publication of the notice in the Official Gazette.
INC., Represented by its President, JOSE TANYAO, respondent.
The initial hearing was, accordingly, reset to April 20, 1995 by the court a quo.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.: On March 14, 1995, the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from
the LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be published in the
The Case Official Gazette for lack of material time since the National Printing Office
required submission of the printing materials 75 days before the date of the
This is a petition for review [1] seeking to set aside the Court of Appeals hearing. It was again requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date
Decision[2] dated 20 December 2000. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision consistent with LRC Circular No. 353.
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union (trial court)
dated 21 February 1996 in Land Registration Case No. N-2352 (LRC No. N-
Per Order dated March 15, 1995, the initial hearing was reset to July 18, 1995.
2352) approving the application of respondent Manna Properties, Inc. (Manna
Properties) for the registration in its name of a parcel of land located in Barangay
Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union. The Opposition to the application stated, among others, that the applicant is a
private corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold
Antecedent Facts alienable lands of public domain.
As culled by the Court of Appeals from the evidence, the facts of the case
are as follows: Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National Printing Office,
the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the June 12, 1995 issue of the
On September 29, 1994, applicant-appellee filed an Application for the Official Gazette officially released on June 19, 1995. The same notice was
registration of title of two (2) parcels of land, specifically: published in the July 12, 1995 issue of the The Ilocos Herald.

a) Lot No. 9515, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434; and Applicant-appellee presented its president Jose [Tanyao], who testified on the
acquisition of the subject property as well as Manuel Sobrepea, co-owner of the
b) Lot No. 1006, Cad. 539-D of As-013314-001434, located in
subject property, who testified on the possession of the applicant-appellees
Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union measuring around
predecessors-in-interest.
1,480 square meters.

The [documentary] evidence presented were:

Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995 by the court a quo.

1. Plan AS-013314-001434 of Lots No. 9515 and 1006;

Copies of the application, postal money orders for publication purposes and
2. Technical Description of Lot No. 9515;
record were forwarded to the Land Registration Authority by the Court a quo on
3. Technical Description of Lot No. 1006;
October 7, 1994.
4. Certificate in lieu of Lost Surveyors Certificate;
5. Certificate of Latest Assessment;
However, per Report dated November 21, 1994 of the Land Registration 6. Notice of Initial Hearing;
Authority, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining lot 7. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the
owners were not stated for notification purposes. As a result thereto, per Order LRA;
dated December 5, 1994, the applicant was directed to submit the names and
 8. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the possession of the land in question as early as 1953. The Court of Appeals added
National Printing Office; that while tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership, they are the
9. Certificate of Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing by the best indicia of possession.
Circulation Manager of the Ilocos Herald; The Issues
10. Clipping of the Notice of Initial Hearing; Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
11. Whole Issue of the Ilocos Herald dated July 12, 1995;
12. Page 3 of Ilocos Herald dated January 12, 1995; 1. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE
13. Sheriffs Return of Posting; JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ORIGINAL
14. Certificate of Notification of all adjoining owners of the Notice REGISTRATION; and
of Initial Hearing on July 18, 1995.
2. WHETHER MANNA PROPERTIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN
Thereafter, the court a quo rendered a Decision dated February 21, 1996 POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE REQUISITE
granting the application. (sic)[3] PERIOD.

The Office of the Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of petitioner The Ruling of the Court
Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), promptly appealed the trial courts
decision to the Court of Appeals. On 20 December 2000, the Court of Appeals On Whether Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional
dismissed petitioners appeal. Requirements for Original Registration
Petitioner contends that PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between
Hence, this petition. the court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing itself. Petitioner
The Regional Trial Courts Ruling points out that in this case, the trial court issued the order setting the date of the
initial hearing on 15 March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date itself on
The trial court found that Manna Properties has substantiated by clear and 18 July 1995. Considering that there are 125 days in between the two dates,
competent evidence all its allegations in the application for original land petitioner argues that the trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529.
registration. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) did not present any evidence Thus, petitioner concludes the applicant [Manna Properties] failed to comply with
in opposition to the application. The trial court ruled in this wise: the jurisdictional requirements for original registration.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby approves the application, The petitioner is mistaken.
and orders that the parcels of land identified as Lots 9515 and 1006 of Cad.
5[3]9-D San Fernando Cadastre with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred The pertinent portion of Section 23 of PD 1529 reads:
Eighty (1,480) square meters, situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. The court shall, within five days
La Union and embraced in Plan AS-1331434 (Exh. A and the technical from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of initial
description described in Exhibit B and B-1) shall be registered in accordance with hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration from the date of the order.
Decree in the name of the applicant Manna Properties, Inc., represented by its Xxx
President Jose [Tanyao], Filipino citizen, of legal age, married to Marry [Tanyao]
with residence and postal address at Jackivi Enterprises, Pagdaraoan, San The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land registration
Fernando, La Union, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529. court. After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the issuance of
[4]
a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice of initial hearing is a court
document. The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the
The Court of Appeals Ruling notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a process to which
The Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts ruling and dismissed petitioners the party applicant absolutely has no participation.
argument that the applicant failed to comply with the jurisdictional requirements
of Presidential Decree No. 1529[5] (PD 1529). The Court of Appeals pointed out Petitioner is correct that in land registration cases, the applicant must strictly
that the 90-day period for setting the initial hearing under Section 23 of PD 1529 comply with the jurisdictional requirements. In this case, the applicant complied
is merely directory and that it is the publication of the notice of hearing itself that with the jurisdictional requirements.
confers jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals stated that the records of the case The facts reveal that Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing
reveal that the testimony of Manuel Sobrepea was not the sole basis for the trial date was set beyond the 90-day maximum period. The records show that the
courts finding that Manna Propertiess predecessors-in-interest had been in Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial court to reset the initial
hearing date because of printing problems with the National Printing Office, which Petitioner claimed in its opposition to the application of Manna Properties
could affect the timely publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. that, as a private corporation, Manna Properties is disqualified from holding
Indeed, nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to perform alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease. Petitioner cites the
the acts required of it by law. constitutional prohibition in Section 3 of Article XII in the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner also claims that the land in question is still part of the public domain.
We have held that a party to an action has no control over the Administrator
or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly with On the other hand, Manna Properties claims that it has established that the
the business of such official in the performance of his duties. [6] A party cannot land in question has been in the open and exclusive possession of its
intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is predecessors-in-interest since the 1940s. Thus, the land was already private land
attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within its sole power. It when Manna Properties acquired it from its predecessors-in-interest.
is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which the applicant
has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the applicant has complied with The governing law is Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) otherwise
all the requirements of the law. known as the Public Land Act. Section 48(b) of the said law, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
Petitioner limited itself to assailing the lapse of time between the issuance of
the order setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself. (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
Petitioner does not raise any other issue with respect to the sufficiency of the been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
application. Petitioner does not also question the sufficiency of the publication of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
the required notice of hearing. Consequently, petitioner does not dispute the real ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
jurisdictional issue involved in land registration cases compliance with the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
publication requirement under PD 1529. As the records show, the notice of majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with the legal title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of the registration
proceedings.
Lands that fall under Section 48 of CA 141 are effectively segregated from
the public domain by virtue of acquisitive prescription. We have held that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
On Whether Manna Properties Sufficiently Established Possession of the prescribed by CA 141 ipso jure converts such land into private land. [10] Judicial
Land For the Period Required by Law confirmation in such cases is only a formality that merely confirms the earlier
conversion of the land into private land, the conversion having occurred in law
Petitioner asserts that Manna Properties has failed to prove its possession from the moment the required period of possession became complete.[11]
of the land for the period of time required by law. Petitioner alleges that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals based their findings solely on their evaluation of Under CA 141, the reckoning point is June 12, 1945. If the predecessors-in-
the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties. interest of Manna Properties have been in possession of the land in question
since this date, or earlier, Manna Properties may rightfully apply for confirmation
The jurisdiction of this Court under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil of title to the land. Following our ruling in Director of Lands v. IAC,[12] Manna
Procedure is limited to the review and revision of errors of law. [7] This Court is not Properties, a private corporation, may apply for judicial confirmation of the land
bound to analyze and weigh evidence already considered in prior proceedings. without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-
Absent any of the established grounds for exception, this Court is bound by the interest first.
findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts.
We rule, however, that the land in question has not become private land and
The issue of whether Manna Properties has presented sufficient proof of the remains part of the public domain.
required possession, under a bona fide claim of ownership, raises a question of
fact.[8] It invites an evaluation of the evidentiary record. Petitioner invites us to re- Under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to
evaluate the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the trial and ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not
appellate courts. Generally, Rule 45 does not allow this. Matters of proof and otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
evidence are beyond the power of this Court to review under a Rule 45 petition, belong to the State.[13] Any applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the
except in the presence of some meritorious circumstances. [9] We find one such burden of proving that he is qualified to have the land titled in his name.
[14]
circumstance in this case. The evidence on record does not support the Although Section 48 of CA 141 gives rise to a right that is only subject to
conclusions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. formal recognition, it is still incumbent upon any claimant to first prove open,
continuous and adverse possession for the requisite period of time. [15] It is only conclude that Exhibit Q-16 was fabricated for the sole purpose of making it
when the applicant complies with this condition that he may invoke the rights appear that Manna Properties predecessors-in-interest have been in possession
given by CA 141. of the land in question since 12 June 1945.
The evidence submitted by Manna Properties to prove the required length of The earliest of the un-cancelled tax declarations presented by Manna
possession consists of the testimony of one of its predecessors-in-interest, Properties is dated 1950. This is clearly insufficient to prove possession of the
Manuel Sobrepea (Manuel),[16] transferees affidavits, and several tax declarations land since 12 June 1945. The same can be said of the transferees affidavit,
covering the land in question. which was dated 1955. Manna Properties reliance on Manuels testimony is
similarly misplaced. Not only is such evidence insufficient and self-serving on its
We have ruled that while a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove own but, Manuel did not also specifically testify that he, or his parents or
ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.[17] However, predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or
the tax declarations presented by Manna Properties do not serve to prove their earlier. The only clear assertion of possession made by Manuel was that his
cause. Although Manna Properties claimed during trial that they were presenting family used to plant rice on that piece of land.20
the tax declaration proving possession since 12 June 1945, [18] a scrutiny of the
tax declaration reveals that it is not the tax declaration Manna Properties claimed Other than the mentioned pieces of evidence, Manna Properties did not
it to be. Exhibit Q-16 was in fact a substitute tax declaration allegedly issued present sufficient proof that its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
on 28 November 1950. The annotation at the back of this tax declaration continuous and adverse possession of the land in question since 12 June 1945.
indicates that it was issued to replace the 1945 tax declaration covering the At best, Manna Properties can only prove possession since 1952. Manna
land in question. A substitute is not enough. Properties relied on shaky secondary evidence like the testimony of Manuel and
substitute tax declarations. We have previously cautioned against the reliance on
The 1945 tax declaration must be presented considering that the date, 12 such secondary evidence in cases involving the confirmation of an imperfect title
June 1945, is material to this case. CA 141 specifically fixes the date to 12 June over public land.21 Manna Properties evidence hardly constitutes the well-nigh
1945 or earlier. A tax declaration simply stating that it replaces a previous tax incontrovertible evidence necessary to acquire title through adverse occupation
declaration issued in 1945 does not meet this standard. It is unascertainable under CA 141.22
whether the 1945 tax declaration was issued on, before or after 12 June
1945. Tax declarations are issued any time of the year. A tax declaration issued WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the Decision
in 1945 may have been issued in December 1945. Unless the date and month of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No. 52562. The
of issuance in 1945 is stated, compliance with the reckoning date in CA 141 Application for Registration filed by Manna Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515
cannot be established. and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty
(1,480) square meters situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La
There is another reason why the application for registration of Manna Union, is DENIED.
Properties must fail. The tax declaration allegedly executed in 1950 and marked
as Exhibit Q-16 bears several irregularities. A small annotation found at the SO ORDERED.
bottom of the back page of Exhibit Q-16 states it cancels a previous tax
declaration. Beyond stating that the cancelled tax declaration was issued in 1945,
Exhibit Q-16 does not provide any of the required information that will enable this
Court or any interested party to check whether the original 1945 tax declaration
ever existed.19 The blanks left by Exhibit Q-16 render any attempt to trace the
original tax declaration futile. Moreover, on its face Exhibit Q-16 lacks any
indication that it is only a substitute or reconstituted tax declaration. The net
effect is an attempt to pass off Exhibit Q-16 as the original tax declaration.
The form used to prepare the tax declaration marked as Exhibit Q-16 states
that it was FILED UNDER SECTION 202 OF R.A. 7160. Republic Act No. 7160 is
the Local Government Code of 1991. The sworn undertaking by the Deputy
Assessor who allegedly prepared the tax declaration reads, Subscribed and
sworn before me this 28 (sic) day of Nov. 1950 This means that the tax
declaration was issued more than forty (40) years before the form used
came into existence. Manna Properties gave no explanation why its tax
declaration used a form that did not exist at the time of the alleged issuance of
the tax declaration. The totality of these circumstances leads this Court to
 Government, although subordinate to this public interest; but from the moment
when such public interest has disappeared, by reason of proof of private
ownership, cooperation in such an action can no longer be insisted upon, nor can
the coadjuvant claim to have better rights than the principal plaintiff himself.

DECISION
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-3637. August 31, 1907. ] ARELLANO, C.J. :

The judgment appealed from contains the following statements:
PEDRO P. ROXAS, ET AL., Petitioners-Appellees, v. ANASTASIO CUEVAS, "That on the 22d of December, 1904, application was filed with the Court of Land
ET AL., Respondents-Appellants. Registration, whereby the applicants asked for the registration in their name of
certain land situated in the Province of La Laguna, known as Hacienda of
SYLLABUS Calauang, having an area of 7,813 hectares and 87 ares, valued according to the
1. APPEAL OF RESPONDENTS IN LAND ADJUDICATION CASES. — If it is the last assessment at $525,000 in money of the United States; that the following
opinion of the appellants that the land awarded to the petitioners does not belong parties opposed the application: The Government of the Philippine Islands
to private individuals but to the Government, it follows that they can have no through the Attorney-General; 367 residents of the town of Calauang, Province of
interest in such land since they do not represent the Government, being private La Laguna, represented by Jose Santiago; 136 residents of the ancient town of
citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, being private Alaminos, now a barrio of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of La Laguna,
citizens only. Since the property belongs to the Government, although the lower and three residents of Santo Tomas, in the Province of Batangas, represented by
court has not so held it in its judgment, the prejudiced party would be the Juan Alvarez; and 80 residents of the municipality of San Pablo, Province of La
Government, not a private individual, and the right to appeal rests with the Laguna, represented by Julian Gerona and Gregorio Pineda.
Government, not with the respondents nor any other private individual to whom
the representation of the State or Government has not been intrusted. "That the lands in question were originally Crown lands of the Kingdom of Spain,
and were conveyed to one Francisco Xavier Salgado by royal grant dated
2. SCOPE OF THE RESPONDENTS’ APPEAL. — In order that an application for February 2, 1777, Salgado being already in possession on the 5th day of March,
registration of the title in the Court of Land Registration may be objected to, 1776. That after the death of Salgado his estate was taken in administration by
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496, the opposition have been injured the the ’Auditoria de Guerra,’ and on the 7th day of February, 1829, the Hacienda of
latter can have no right to appeal from the judgment, whatever it may have been; Calauang was sold at auction, one Benito Machado becoming the purchaser for
neither the said act nor any other law grants to anyone the right to appeal on the sum of 16,000 pesos, one-half of which was paid in cash, the purchaser
behalf of another party, and not in his own name and by reason of his own agreeing to pay the balance in three years, giving a mortgage upon the hacienda
interest. It is only the legal personal right of the respondent prejudiced by the to secure the satisfaction of the deferred payment. That the purchase by said
judgment of the lower court that can be considered by this court upon appeal. As Machado was made with the funds, in the name, and for the use of one Domingo
no claim was made by the respondents in their own name, and as the decision Roxas; that the latter performed the conditions as to the payment of the
which they seek from this court is that it be held that the land adjudicated by the remaining one-half of the purchase price and thereupon became the owner in fee
judgment appealed from is the property of the Government, there is no possible of the hacienda, free and clear of any incumbrance; that by various mesne
way for this court to consider and decide as to a right which has not been claimed conveyances and in regular order of succession the title to the Hacienda of
on appeal by the party really prejudiced. In the present case the proper party Calauang became vested in the applicants in this case, who are now the owners
would be the Insular Government, represented by the Attorney-General, and the of the same in fee, free and clear of all incumbrance, except the lien of a "censo"
latter has not appealed from the judgment. in favor of "Las Cajas de Comunidad," dated February 26, 1834, for the sum of
twelve thousand pesos, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum. That
3. HOMESTEAD RIGHT SUBORDINATE TO RIGHTS OF THE GOVERNMENT. in certain proceedings held in the years 1847, 1848, 1878, and 1880, before the
— An application for the grant of a homestead can only be considered when it courts of the Spanish sovereignty, with the assistance of the inspector general de
refers to public lands, not when private property is concerned. Wile it remained montes in representation of the Government, various questions disputes
doubtful, in the course of a litigation, whether a portion of land claimed to be concerning the boundaries and limits of the hacienda with adjoining lands and
private property does or does not belong to the Government, the applicants for towns were heard and determined. That pursuant to these proceedings surveys
homesteads might be allowed to appear in the suit as coadjuvants, though it may were made by the said inspector general de montes and a plan was prepared by
have been the initial right that induced them to defend the public rights of the him showing the true boundaries of the hacienda as established by the decision
of the court and recognized by the Government. The said plan was introduced in persons occupying lands within the limits of the Hacienda of Calauang were
evidence and forms part of the record herein, marked ’Exhibit U.’" carried upon the books, kept by the administratory of the hacienda, as tenants,
and recognized the title of its proprietors . . .
In reviewing the case, the court stated the following conclusions of facts:
"For the reason given (so ends the judgment) the oppositions herein must be
"(1) That at the time of the entry by respondents upon the lands in question the overruled; and it is ordered that the record of the above-mentioned documents in
same were lawfully possessed by another under a good and sufficient title; the registry of property of the Province of La Laguna be canceled."
And the findings in said judgment are of this tenor:
"(2) That contained and uninterrupted possession has been maintained by the
original owner of the lands and his successors down to the present date; and "The court finds that the appellants have legally acquired title to and are the
owners in fee of the lands hereinafter described, and that they are entitled to a
"(3) That both prior and subsequent to the entry aforesaid, by respondents and decree of registration for the same as provided by law.
their predecessors, knowledge of the title and legal possession of the true owner
was repeatedly brought home to them by means of judicial decrees and official "The court surveyor will prepare a new plan in accordance with this decision,
surveys of the land in questions." showing therein the following described land, title to which is hereby confirmed to
and ordered registered in the name of the applicants in the manner in which the
And further on: interest of such of the applicants is set forth in the petition."

"The testimony shows that Francisco Xavier Salgado, the original owner of the This judgment was rendered on the 17th of February, 1906. On the 26th of the
lands in question, entered into immediate possession of the same under his grant same month the respondents residing in the town of Calauang, by their attorney,
from the Spanish Crown in 1777; that he contained in such possession in during Jose Santiago, duly excepted to said judgment, and announced their intention to
his lifetime and that after his death the possession was continued by his legal present a bill of exceptions. On the same date they also filed an application for a
successors, and has been continued by them without interruption down to the new trial to be held on March 1, alleging as reason "that the exceptions submitted
present day, for a period of one hundred and thirty years. This possession was to this court the appellants state that "on the first instant (March, 1906) the new
not a purely constructive but a very active one, exercised by Salgado and his trial was denied."
successors by means of actual occupancy, construction of valuable buildings,
cultivation, appointment of administrators, collection of rents, measurements, The record does not show that the motion was considered or that the petition for
surveys, placing of boundary monuments, and the employment of persons whose new trial was denied, nor that exception was taken in consequence of such
duty it was to, and who actually did at stated intervals, inspect the said denial.
monuments and attend to their proper maintenance. It further appears that upon
two occasions, when infringements upon the rights of the owners were In accordance with paragraph 3 of section 497 of the Code of Procedure in Civil
attempted, the aggressors were met by legal proceedings in the courts, resulting Actions, if the excepting partly filed a motion in the Court of First Instance for a
in judgments confirming the ancient title and possession. In contemplation of law, new trial, and the judge overruled the motion, and due exception was taken, the
applicants have never been out of possession. Supreme Court may "review the evidence and make such findings upon the
facts, and render such final judgment, as justice and equity require."
"Respondents allege in their answers possession by themselves and their
predecessors for periods of from thirty to one hundred years, but their testimony Therefore, in this case, there is no basis provided for a review of the evidence,
was limited, in most cases, to showing possession by themselves alone. Some and the findings upon the facts, as set down by the trial court in its decision, must
went a little further and introduced testimony tending to show possession by their stand.
immediate grantors; but that this possession was at best a precarious and
doubtful one is clear from the testimony, which shows that in most cases the Under the bill of exceptions presented, this court, in accordance with the said
respondents resided at considerable distances from the lands claimed, having section 497, can only decide the questions of law therein contained.
merely made use of the same for agricultural purposes from time to time, under
circumstances from which it is fair to infer that their possession was nothing more The questions of law presented in the statements of errors, in which, according to
than a permissive one." the appellants, the trial court has incurred, are the following:

And, lastly: 1. For having admitted "Exhibits C" and "D" as evidence from the applicants, the
first of which is the instrument whereby the Hacienda of Calauang was acquired
"There is evidence in the record tending strongly to show that many of the by Benito Machado, at public auction, in February, 1829, and the second a
statement made by the same party interested in the hacienda, which does not said land, as they are not the Government but mere citizens.
invalidate the deed of sale in favor of Machado. (I and II.)
Since the land belongs to the State, and since the lower court has not so held it
2. For having admitted from the applicants, as counter- proofs and additional in its judgment, the aggrieved party would be the State and not a mere citizen,
evidence, the exhibits stated above, which do not justify the right or dominion of and it is the State that would have been entitled to appeal from the judgment and
the petitioners on the Hacienda of Calauang, and for having accepted as not the respondents of Calauang or any other private individual to whom the
sufficient proof of dominion the documents offered by the petitioners when the representation of the State or the Insular Government has not been entrusted.
same are not deeds of successive conveyances from the first holder to the
petitioners. (III, IV, V, and VI.) The Insular Government, duly represented at the trial by the Attorney-General,
has not appealed before us, nor have we to decide any question connected with
3. For not having considered that the land in question belongs to the Government the rights of the State or of the Insular Government.
when, as a matter of fact, the exclusion of a parcel thereof, as such Government
land, had been ordered; for having included in the judgment land the title to which In order that an application for registration of the title of ownership in the Court of
is recorded in the Court of Land Registration in favor of persons other than the Land Registration may be objected to, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 496,
petitioners, said title having been issued by the Government; in view of the fact the opposition must be based on the right of dominion or some other real right
that the chief of the Bureau of Public Lands had approved several applications for opposed to the adjudication or recognition of the ownership of the petitioner,
homesteads; according to "Exhibits 1" to "10" of the respondents; since one of whether it be limited or absolute; and if none such rights of the respondent have
the very same petitioners had himself applied for a permit to cut timber within the been injured by the judgment, he can not have, on his part, the right to appeal
land in question. (VII, VIII and IX.) from the said judgment, whatever it may be, as neither the said act nor any other
law on this matter grants any one the right to appeal on behalf of another party
4. For not having considered that the petitioner have exhibited only a title by and not in his own name and by reason of his own interest.
mere possession, a right which was forfeited for having failed to possess the
property during more than eight years; and for having failed to consider the It is only the legal personal right of the respondent, prejudiced by the judgment of
preferential rights of the respondents to the land occupied by them, when the the lower court, that can be considered by this court upon appeal. No right of
evidence of the latter had not been objected to by the petitioners, in accordance their own being claimed by the respondent, and inasmuch as the decision they
with the agreement entered into by both parties on page 8 of the bill of seek from this court is one declaring that the land adjudicated by the lower court
exceptions. (X and XI.) is the property of the Government, there is no way for his court to consider and
decide as to a right which has not been claimed in the appeal by the party
This last point touched by the appellants, and by the appellees as well, is prejudiced, which in the present case would be the Insular Government,
extremely important on account of its significance and decisiveness. In fact, it has represented by the Attorney-General, who has not appealed from the said
been agreed between the parties herein that the contents of the answers filed by judgment.
the respondents may be taken as confirmed.
Therefore the assignment of errors filed by the appellants is overruled as being
And it is because the respondents of Calauang have maintained in all their absolutely contrary to law and worthless, and the appeal filed by the respondents
pleadings "that the land claimed and a portion thereof is occupied by the of Calauang, from the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, of the Court of
respondents." (Bill of exceptions, 6.) And in the brief filed before this court they Land Registration, is dismissed, with the cost of this instance.
maintain "that the Roxas people have alleged, as applicants, that they were the
owners of the land in question, and that the respondents residing in the town of But there is yet another judgment by the same court in this same action, bearing
Calauang said that the land belonged to the Government . . ." And they date of the 20th of July, 1906, rendered upon the following facts:chanrob1es
reproduce the essential parts of their answer in opposition, wherein the first thing virtual 1aw library
that they state is that the land in question is the property of the Government. And
when referring to the documents offered by them as evidence, they said "that the 1. On account of the opposition to the application in question, filed by the
same clearly established that the land in question is owned by the Government Attorney-General, with regard to a certain tract of land in the Hacienda of
and not by private individuals." This statement is repeated in several parts of the Calauang, the Court of Land Registration, in its judgment above referred to, of
brief. February 17, 1906, made also this statement:

If it is the opinion of the appellant that the land awarded by the judgment to the "That portion of the application which refers to lands not included in the above
petitioners does not belong to private individuals but to the Government, it follows description is hereby denied, reserving, nevertheless, the right of the petitioners
that the appellants, as respondents residing in Calauang, can have no interest in to file an amended application asking for the registration of the land thus
excluded, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Act and in the manner Be that as it may, the fact is that in connection with the judgment of the 20th of
therein provided." July, 1906, although the aforesaid thirteen respondents excepted thereto, the bill
of exceptions announced by them at the time has not been brought before us.
2. Although the applicants excepted to this part of the decision, they, however, Consequently the evidence expressly stated as forming part of the bill of
subsequently availed themselves of the benefits of the said act, and the action exception can not be reviewed, for the reason that the bill has not been submitted
was reopened in view of the amended application. with or without the evidence.

3. In his opposition the Attorney-General asked that certain persons who had And even if submitted, they could not have been reviewed by this court, in view of
applied for homesteads be notified in order that their rights might be protected; the fact that the motion for a new trial was made on the ground that the judgment
these persons appeared with Santiago and ratified their former answers in this was contrary to the law, a basis which does not authorize the reviewing of
case. (Minutes of proceedings.) evidence taken before a lower court. The motion for a new trial was neither heard
nor denied, and no exception was taken as to any ruling denying the same.
The court rendered its aforementioned judgment of the 20th of July, 1906,
whereby, with the exception of about 213 hectares held to be public forest, it The jurisdiction of this court being thus limited to deciding mere question of law,
adjudged to the applicants the remainder of the lands which had been excluded none of which, except those already set forth in the bill of exceptions to the
by the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, announced his appeal. judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, have been offered in connection with the
judgment of the 20th of July following, yet, and in order to avoid confusion, the
On the same date a petition for new trial was filed on the ground that the decision foregoing remarks are made on points of law that might have arisen on the
was contrary to law, and on the 28th of September of the same year he stated second appeal.
who were the respondents to the amended application, on account of their
respective homesteads, to wit: Jose Antillon, Maria Salvador, Mariano Marfori, For the reasons above set forth, the judgments of the 17th of February and 20th
Gabino Quincaco, Juan Palejon, Domingo Ramos, Brigido Pascual, Leopoldo of July, 1906, appealed from, are affirmed with the costs of this instance against
Atienza, Regino Martinez, Vicenta Jazmin, Magdalena Avapo, Mariano Medel, the appellants. So ordered.
and Catalino Marfori, on whose behalf the defense excepted to the decision
rendered in connection with the amended application. (Petition on p. 188, part
12.)

In the aforesaid petition, as well as in their previous one, the petitioner asked that
the last proofs produced by both parties in support of and against the amended
application, in connection with the tract of land excluded by the first decision, be
included in the bill of exceptions. And upon this basis the appeal was heard
together with the former one.

Out of the 1,000 hectares, more or less, excluded from the adjudication, under
the judgment of the 17th of February, 1906, the court in its last decision,
rendered on the 20th of July of the same year, finally excluded but 213 hectares,
and adjudicated to the petitioners the remaining 787 hectares, more or less.

If the land claimed by the respondents of Calauang is included within the 213
hectares which have been excluded, and are not adjudged to the petitioners,
their is no object in the appeal and the same should be dismissed. If, on the other
hand, the same is included in the 787 hectares, more or less, transferred by the
judgment of the 20th of July, 1906, the appeal can not prosper because in the
last decision the court found as a fact that the petitioners, and not the
respondents, have been and are not in possession of the 787 hectares. The
thirteen respondents are not, therefore, entitled to the homestead for the reason
that they have not been, nor are they at the present time, in possession of the
land included therein.
 Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529.[5] The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial
Court of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.[6] However, during the pendency of his
petition, applicant died. Hence, his heirs -- Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold
and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado -- represented by their aunt Josefa
Abistado, who was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as
applicants.
THIRD DIVISION
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the
[G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997] petition for want of jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and possession of the subject land since 1938.
TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by MARGARITA, MARISSA,
MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all surnamed In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:[7]
ABISTADO, respondents.
"x x x. However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the
DECISION provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to publish the
notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. `E') in a newspaper of general circulation in the
PANGANIBAN, J.: Philippines. Exhibit `E' was only published in the Official Gazette (Exhibits `F' and
Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land `G').Consequently, the Court is of the well considered view that it has not legally
registration case mandatory or directory? acquired jurisdiction over the instant application for want of compliance with the
mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
Statement of the Case newspaper of general circulation."
The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure
to cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,
application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set which in its pertinent portion provides:[8]
aside the Decision[1] promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent
Resolution[2] promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of
It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of PD 1529]
Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged
has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the provision of the
Decision reads:[4]
aforequoted provision refers to publication in the Official Gazette, and is
jurisdictional; while the second, which is mentioned in the opening clause of the
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal appealed from same paragraph, refers to publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a
is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the registration and title of newspaper of general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is
applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident of Barangay 7, Poblacion dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is indispensably
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now deceased and substituted by Margarita, necessary because without it, the court would be powerless to assume
Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by jurisdiction over a particular land registration case. As to the second, publication
their aunt, Miss Josefa Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, of the notice of initial hearing also in a newspaper of general circulation is
Occidental Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D indispensably necessary as a requirement of procedural due process; otherwise,
located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro. any decision that the court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private oppositor are Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals
hereby dismissed for want of evidence. which, as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered
the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding taxes due on
this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued." The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged
CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
The Facts The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a this recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioners counsel anchored his
petition for original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under
petition on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. -- The court shall, within five
because he is appealing a final disposition of the Court of [Link], we days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the
shall treat his petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorari initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety
under Rule 65.[9] days from the date of the order.

The Issue The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
Petitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
of discretion[10] in holding
1. By publication. --
x x x that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86
need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and in not
dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication. Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
hearing shall be published both in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
general circulation. According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and xxx in xxx a newspaper involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and `to all whom it may
of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process.[11] concern.'Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court
Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
the requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere not be granted.
procedural defect. They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to xxx xxx xxx
confer jurisdiction.[12]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that
ruled:[13] publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land
registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any
publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can
x x x although the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette and in a validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.
newspaper of general circulation is couched in mandatory terms, it cannot be
gainsaid that the law also mandates with equal force that publication in the We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. demands of statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the
publication requirement.
Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the The law used the term shall in prescribing the work to be done by the
opportunity to explain matters fully and present their side. Thus, it justified its Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latters receipt of the court order
disposition in this wise:[14] setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus
x x x We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required procedure indicates the mandatory character of a statute. [15] While concededly such literal
prejudiced them in any [Link], the other requirements of: publication in mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately
the Official Gazette, personal notice by mailing, and posting at the site and other depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case
conspicuous places, were complied with and these are sufficient to notify any the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic vs.
party who is minded to make any objection of the application for registration. Marasigan,[16] the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that
Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)
The Courts Ruling publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. If the
We find for petitioner. intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in detail
the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition who,
Newspaper Publication Mandatory per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and
occupants of the land. Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise imperative
publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows: since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.
 It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.
[17]
Being in rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as
against all persons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. This
being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who
may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred
from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been
ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration
court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership
thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who
institutes an action for recovery of realty.[18] He must prove his title against the
whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved
when all persons concerned -- nay, the whole world -- who have rights to or
interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to
court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary
norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must
be given notice and opportunity to oppose.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation
should be deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by
publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which
have already been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process
and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as
newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in
rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued
against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for
publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if
they had, it would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no
excuses. Ineludibly, this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory
requirement. The law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this
Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language,
there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only
for application.[19] There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly
complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private
respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 3. She and her predecessors in interest have been in
continuous, open, adverse, peaceful and uninterrupted
possession of the land in dispute since time immemorial.

4. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained a

Decree of Registration No. N-99332 for the parcel of land in
question through fraud. In their application dated October 29,
1963, they claimed to be the owners of this parcel of land by
possession. This is not true. Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona
SECOND DIVISION Francisco have never been in possession of the parcel of land
in question.
G.R. No. L-35787 April 11, 1980
5. Petitioner and her five (5) brothers and sisters namely,
FAUSTA FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO F. Anastacia, Leoncio, Paula, Perfecta, all surnamed Francisco,
SANTOS and RAMONA FRANCISCO (Substituted by JOSE SAN DIEGO; with residence in Morong, Rizal and Venancia Francisco
CELSO GARROVILLAS, HONORIO GARROVILLAS, EDILBERTO Nepomuceno, residing in Calumpang, Marikina, Rizal, who are
GARROVILLAS, AMALIA GARROVILLAS; VIRGINIA GARROVILLAS, the adjacent registered owners of the land in question, were not
PACITA GARROVILLAS and LOPE GARROVILLAS), respondents. notified of any alleged survey of this land nor of the present
application for registration.
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for review of the judgment rendered by a vote of 3 to 2 of the Court of 6. Neither petitioner nor her tenant was notified of the alleged
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 37818-R, entitled Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona survey nor of the present application for registration as actual
Francisco, applicants-respondents, vs. Fausta Francisco, petitioner-appellee, occupant and possession of the land in question.
reversing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Land Registration
Case No. N-4383, L.R.C. Record No. N-25140, wherein said trial court granted 7. Notice of this land registration proceedings was published in
the petition for review of the decree of registration earlier issued by it, after a The Official Gazzette but herein petitioner does not read it.
virtually ex-parte hearing and judgment, and ordered said previous decision and
decree set aside and the land in question registered instead in the name of now 8. The land in question was never actually surveyed by or for
herein petitioner Fausta Francisco. the applicants for reason among others that when petitioner
caused the recent survey of the same there were no
As recounted in the original decision of the Court of Appeals, on May 23, 1964, monuments found on this land.
the aforementioned trial court rendered a decision ordering the registration of the
land in dispute situated in Barrio Singalong, Antipolo, Rizal, in the names of Herein private respondents opposed the above petition for review maintaining
herein private respondents Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco, which principally that:
decision became final and executory, and on June 27, 1964 the order was issued
to the Land Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree, which it
did, No. N-99323 on July 13, 1964, followed by the issuance of Original 4. That in her petition for review, petitioner claims to be the
Certificate of Title No. 4064 in their names. owner of the land covered by the decree of registration but
failed to state in said petition how she became the owner
thereof and under what color of title does she claim to be owner
According to the Record on APPEAL on July 31, 1964, herein petitioner Fausta of the land; neither did petitioner attached any instrument
Francisco, filed a petition for review alleging under oath inter alia that: supporting her claim other than a supposed affidavit of merit
signed by her alone containing allegations amounting to the
2. She is the absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for existence of intrinsic fraud only; that assuming without admitting
in this case, which is situated in Barrio Singalong, Municipality that there was indeed intrinsic fraud, nevertheless said
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and covered by Plan Psu-1992781 allegations even if true is not sufficient ground for reopening and
and now embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 4064 of review of the corresponding decree of registration;
the Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal.
 5. That petitioner's petition is not sufficient in form and In reversing himself in the 'light of the evidence he himself had subsequently
substance and therefore should be dismissed by the Honorable heard, instead of his clerk of court, unlike in the original proceeding, Judge
Court. In support of this contention, we most respectfully quote Torres reasoned out and made 'his findings thus:
the following doctrine:
Petitioner alleges in her petition for review that applicants
The essential requisite for a valid petition for the reopening and Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco obtained through
review of a decree under Sec. 38 of Act 496 is that it be made fraud Decree No. N-99332; that she is the absolute owner in fee
only by a person who has been deprived of land or of any simple of that parcel of land in question situated in Barrio
interest therein by virtue of the decree sought to be Singalong, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal described
reconsidered. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient and in Plan Psu-1992791 and embraced in Original Certificate of
the petition of any person whose interest in the land is short of Title No. 4064 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal;
absolute ownership, lacks the essential requisite, and for that that she has been in possession of said land, together with her
reason should not be considered. Thus in the case of Broce vs. father who is her predecessor in interest, openly, peacefully,
Apurado, 26 Phil. 581, 586, the Supreme Court clearly and adversely and continuously since time immemorial On the other
unequivocably said: "In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 hand, applicants-respondents contend in their application for
the applicant (1) must have an estate or interest in the land, and registration that the land in question was owned by applicant
(2) must show fraud in the procurement of the decree of Alejandro Santos' father, Toribio Santos, and that upon the
registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid latter's death in 1922, he inherited the said parcel of land.
a certificate of title obtained under the Land Registration Act.' However in the presentation of his evidence in this petition for
(Philippine Land Registration Law, Vargas, Mañalac & Manalac review, Alejandro F. Santos testified that this land had no
p. 284). (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 20-22.) previous owner; that he merely occupied this land sometime in
1920 and had been in possession of the same for more than
It may be noted at this point that because the Bureau of Lands withdrew its thirty years.
opposition to herein respondents' application, Judge Guillermo Torres, the trial
judge, commissioned the clerk of court to receive their evidence and The main issues in this case are: (a) Whether or not the
subsequently rendered his original favorable decision. In contrast, when Judge applicant secured thru fraud Decree No. N-99332 and (b) Who
Torres gave due course to herein petitioner's petition for review, he held a trial is the true and absolute owner of the land in question.
and heard the evidence of the parties himself, with private respondent Alejandro
F. Santos and his former witnesses Lauro Cruz and Eugenio Francisco as well as It appears clearly from the evidence that since 1918, Diego
petitioners and her witnesses testifying in open court. After such trial, on April 5, Francisco, father of petitioner, had occupied the parcel of land
1966, the same judge, the Honorable Guillermo Torres, rendered the new in question; that this land is a portion of a bigger parcel of land
decision now in dispute reversing that of May 23, 1964, thus setting aside the with an area of fifty hectares which was occupied and
latter, the decree of registration and original certificate of title of private possessed by Diego Francisco since 1918. Comprising this fifty-
respondents issued pursuant thereto and ordering in stead that the land under hectare parcel of land are the land in question described in Plan
litigation be registered in the name of petitioner. When Justice Mateo Canonoy Psu-199278, Exhibit A, the land described in Plan Psu-199277,
prepared the first draft of the decision, the other two members of the Division, Exhibit B, and the land described in plan H-1 14240, Exhibit C,
Justices Antonio Lucero and Eulogio Serrano disagreed with him. Justices Juan embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J,
F. Enriquez and Manuel P. Barcelona were designated to join to form the division formerly the homestead patent of Diego Francisco. The whole
of five required by law, and on March 17, 1972, with Justice Canonoy as ponente area of fifty hectares is fenced with barbed wire and planted
and Justices Enriquez and Barcelona concurring, the decision favorable to herein with mango trees, a portion planted to palay and a bigger
private respondents was promulgated. Justice Serrano dissented in-art extended portion devoted to pasturing of carabaos. All these
opinion pointing out the existence of actual fraud committed by private improvements were introduced by petitioner's father, Diego
respondents in securing the judgment in their favor and sustaining, with a careful Francisco, during his lifetime. In 1940, Diego Francisco, was
analysis of the relevant and material evidence, the contention of petitioner that able to obtain a title on a portion of this big parcel of land, now
she, by herself and thru her predecessor in interest has been the one, instead of embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23434, Exhibit J, in
respondents, in continuous, open, adverse possession of the land in issue, under the names of petitioner Fausta Francisco and her sister and
a claim of title. In due time, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. which brother, Anastacia, Leoncio, Venancia, Perfecta and Paula, all
was denied with the same votation. surnamed Francisco.
The petitioner's father, Diego Francisco, died in the year 1941 land in question and that it was Diego Francisco who was the
and after his death, petitioner continued to possess the land in one in possession of this parcel of land during his lifetime and
question which was not embraced in Transfer Certificate of Title after his death, his heirs. By virtue of this continuous, adverse,
No. 23434, Exhibit J, and her possession over said portion of and open possession of the land in question for forty-seven (47)
the land is open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse against years now, Fausta Francisco has become the absolute owner of
the whole world, and in the concept of an owner. In 1964, this parcel of land. (Pp. 26-31, Record on Appeal.)
petitioner had the land in question surveyed by a private land
surveyor, Jose de Guzman, who, upon inquiry from the Bureau To the foregoing, We only need to add by adoption the following well taken
of Lands, discovered that there was already a survey plan in the discussion by distinguished counsel of petitioner in his memorandum of
name of the applicant in this case, Alejandro F. Santos. December 13, 1973:
Petitioner likewise discovered that this land is already titled in
the name of the said Alejandro F. Santos.
The true adjoining owners at the time of the filing of application
It was clearly established that petitioner, as adjacent owner of
the land in question was not notified of the alleged survey. The When the applicants, the spouses Alejandro Santos and
Surveyor's Certificate, Exhibit 6, with respect to notices of Ramona Francisco, filed their application for registration on
adjoining owners cannot be given any credence. It could be October 29, 1963, they did not state the true adjoining owners
seen from Exhibit 6 that Jose P. Cruz, who is no longer the at the North, East, and West, of the land in question.
adjoining owner of the land in litigation and who is admittedly
dead was notified on October 29, 1962 and that said Jose P. At the North, they stated that the adjoining owner was Diego
Cruz appeared on the date of the survey, although being dead, Francisco, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full well,
it was, impossible for him to appear on the date of the survey. Diego Francisco died in 1942 and his homestead patent title
The Santol Creek was also allegedly notified but that it did not over the land at the North had been cancelled and transferred to
appear. This is ridiculous. The Santol Creek is not a person or his children-heirs namely Fausta (petitioner herein), Anastacia,
entity, and the one notified should have been the proper Paula, Perfects, Venancia, and Leoncio, all surnamed Francisco
government official or office. Similarly, it was made to appear by (see TCT No. 23434 issued to the latter and marked as Exh.
applicants-respondents that Diego Francisco, petitioner's father, 'J').
an adjoining owner, was notified of the survey. Diego Francisco
has been long dead, since 1941, and neither petitioner nor any At the East, they stated that the adjoining owner was Jose P.
of her brother or sisters received the purported notice. By thus Cruz, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full well, Jose P.
avoiding the sending of actual notices to the petitioner and other Cruz died in 1952 and his homestead patent title over the land
interested parties, applicants were able to have the land in at the East had been cancelled and transferred to Estela
question surveyed, Plan Psu-1992791. It is likewise admitted Angeles to whom his children (Lauro Cruz and two others sold
that neither petitioner nor any of her brother or sisters as on January 1, 1954 (see TCT No. 32697 issued to Estela
adjacent owners were notified of the registration proceedings in Angeles marked as Exh. 'L-2'). On November 7, 1957, Estela
this case. It was established thru the testimony of the petitioner Angeles sold the land to Vicente Antonio who issued T. C. T.
that she does not read the Official Gazzette, the publication No. 32697 (Exh. 'L-3'). On August 31, 1959, Vicente Antonio
where the notice of initial hearing was published. By thus sold the land in favor of Antonio Astudillo (TCT No. 96527 (Exh.
avoiding the sending of actual notice of initial hearing to 'L-4'), who in turn sold the land to Arturo Rojas (TCT No.
petitioner as adjoining owner and as actual owner and 100145 (Exh. 'L-5') who on May 22, 1962 sold the land to Pilar
possessor of the land in question, the applicants were able to v. Romack who was issued T. C. T. No. 100146 on June 7,
obtain the decision dated May 23, 1964 in their favor. 1962.
Furthermore, the Court is convinced by the evidence that it is
petitioner and her father before her, who have actually At the West, they stated that the adjoining owner was Eugenio
possessed and occupied the land in question, and not the Francisco, when in truth and in fact, as they knew full well, at
applicants Alejandro F. Santos and Ramona Francisco. It was the time of the filing of their application, Paula Francisco (sister
shown thru the testimony of Quiterio San Jose, former Mayor of of petitioner Fausta Francisco) was the actual occupant and
Teresa, Rizal, who is an adjacent owner across the Santol possessor of the said parcel of land. The application for
Creek, that Alejandro F. Santos was never in possession of this
registration of the said land filed by Eugenio Francisco in the It will thus be seen that the applicants did not state the true
Court of First Instance of Rizal was opposed by Paula Francisco adjoining owners with the deliberate intention of preventing
and is to be noted that Eugenio Francisco was not even present notices of their application for registration to be sent to petitioner
during the hearing and did not continue presenting evidence. Fausta Francisco and to her sister Paula Francisco, and in that
After Pauli Francisco had presented her evidence, the Court of way prevent petitioner from appearing in the land registration
First Instance decided that the said land at the West should be case and file an opposition to their application for registration.
registered and decreed in the name of Paula Francisco, which (Pp. 198-201, Record.)
decision became final as Eugenio Francisco did not appeal
therefrom, resulting in the issuance of decree and OCT No. Indeed, how could two dead persons and a creek be legally upheld as having
6945 to Paula Francisco (see the said decision of the CFI Rizal been separately properly notified of the application here under discussion? It is
attached to our motion for reconsideration dated August 26, high time, the Court made it patently clear and emphasized that it is the
1966 filed with the respondent Court of Appeals, Annex 'B' of inescapable duty of surveyors to find out by themselves who are the occupants
Petition). and boundary owners of any land being surveyed by them for purposes of
registration. Beyond doubt, had the surveyors of respondents complied with this
Motive of the Applicants in not stating the true adjoining owners simple and logical obligation imposed by the very nature of their professional
undertaking, the obvious anomalies extant in the instant case would not have
The intent and motive of applicants in not stating that the true happened. No dead persons nor a creek could have been certified as duly
adjoining co-owners at the North were Fausta Francisco and notified by the Land Registration Office of the application!
her sisters and brother, was because they knew that Fausta
was the one occupying the land in question or at least that Besides, as pointed out in the above-quoted portions of petitioner's
Fausta was claiming the land in question to be hers, so if notice memorandum, the boundary owner at the north in 1963 when the application of
of their application for registration were sent to her as an respondents was filed could not have been Diego Francisco, for the simple
adjoining co-owner at the North, she would surely oppose their reason that said person had died twenty-one years before or in 1942. Factually,
application for registration. under ordinary circumstances, if respondents were indeed in possession of the
land in dispute, it stands to reason they would have known of their neighbor's
The intent and motive of the applicants in making it appear that long demise. More, legally speaking, Diego Francisco had a Torrens Title which
the adjoining owner at the East was still Jose P. Cruz, when in was duly transferred subsequently in TCT 23434 (Exh. J) to the name of his
truth it was already Estela Angeles, was because they were children. Registration under the Torrens System constitutes, at the very least,
intending to utilize Lauro Cruz (son of Jose P. Cruz) as their constructive notice to any boundary owner of who is his neighbor.
witness to testify, as he did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of
Court that he was the boundary owner at the East and as such The same observations may be made insofar as Jose P. Cruz, the alleged former
knew that applicant Alejandro Santos had been in possession of boundary owner in the east. He had died in 1952, eleven years before the
the land in question since 1929 when the latter's father died. application, and the title he had acquired over his land had been transferred
several times in the Office of the Register of Deeds to Estela Angeles, T. C. T.
The intent and motive of the applicants in not stating the true 32697, Exh. L-2; to Vicente Antonio, T. C. T. No. 32697 (sic) Exh. L-3; to Antonio
fact that both Eugenio Francisco and Paula Francisco were Astudillo, T. C. T. 96527, Exh. L-4; to Arturo Rojas, T. C. T. 100145, E Exh. L-5;
claiming to be the owners of the land at the West, was because to Pilar V. Romack, T. C. T. 100146 on June 7, 1962. (See Petitioner's memo pp.
they knew that Paula was the sister of petitioner Fausta 1-2.) These facts have never been denied in any pleading of respondents.
Francisco, so if notice of their application for registration were
sent to Paula as one of the claimants to the land at the West, Again, respondents knew or ought to have known that the boundary owner in the
Paula would surely tell her sister Fausta about it, and the latter west could not have been Eugenio Francisco, because it is judicial record that
would surely oppose their application for registration. Moreover, OCT No. 6945 was actually issued to Paula Francisco who had opposed
applicants were intending to utilize Eugenio Francisco as their Eugenio's attempt to have the land registered in his name. (See Annex B of the
witness to testify, as he did testify, before the Deputy Clerk of petition.)
Court that he was the boundary owner at the West and as such
knew that the applicant Alejandro Santos had been in In addition, it is admitted that petitioner was never notified of the application, let
possession of the land in question since 1929 when the latter's alone her not having had any chance to read or perhaps even know the Official
father died. Gazzette.
In the light of the foregoing, the matters that require Our resolution in the instant known, it shall state what search has been made to find them. It
case may be said to be one of mixed fact and law, but apparently more legal than may be in form as follows:
factual. Did respondents commit fraud of the nature contemplated in Section 38
of the Land Registration Act, (Act 496) that would warrant the cancellation of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
decree of registration and Torrens Title already issued to them? The pole star
jurisprudential pronouncements in this respect are found, as every student of
Land Registration knows, in Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, by Justice To the Honorable Judge of the Court of Land Registration:
Trent. Therein, it was declared definitely that a land registration proceeding is
one in rem and notice thereof by publication binds the whole world, inclusive of I (or we) the undersigned, hereby apply to have the land
those who may be adversely affected thereby, innocent factually as they might hereinafter described brought under the operation of the Land
have been of such publication. Understandably, such a rule could be the only Registration Act, and to have my (or our) title therein registered
way to give meaning to the finality and indisputability of the Torrens title to be and confirmed. And I (or we) declare: (1) That I am (or we are)
issued. It may be said that to a certain degree such a strict rule could result in the owner (or owners) in fee simple (or by possessory
actual injustice, considering not only the rather irregular publication of the Official information title) of a certain parcel of land with the buildings (if
Gazzette and other publications, and, of course, the illiteracy, not to speak, of the any, if not, strike out the words 'with the buildings'), situated in
inaccessability to those concerned of such publications. (here insert accurate description). (2) That said land at the last
assessment for taxation was assessed at ... dollars. (3) That I
Thus, Grey Alba should not be read, as the majority in the Court of Appeals (or we) do not know of any mortgage or encumbrance affecting
decision under review, did as entirely depriving victims of obvious fraudulent said land, or that any other person has any estate or interest
intent of the remedy of having a decree reopened. This is clear in that decision therein, legal or equitable in possession remainder, reversion,
itself. As the present Chief Justice, Hon. Enrique M. Fernando, pointed out in or expectancy (if any, add 'other than as follows,' and set forth
Minlay vs. Sandoval 53 SCRA 1, "all that is required is a showing according to each clearly). (4) That I (or we) obtained title (if by deed, state
this leading Grey Alba decision" of intention to deprive another of (his) just rights, name of grantor, date and place of record, and file the deed or
which constitutes the essential characteristic of actual fraud." And in this state reason for not filing. If any other way, state it (5) That said
connection, the Chief Justice went on thus: "It is to be stressed likewise that the land is ... occupied (if occupied, state name in full and place of
Land Registration Act commands that the applicant 'shall also state the name in residence and post office address of occupant and the nature of
full and the address of the applicant, and also the names and addresses of all this occupancy. If unoccupied, insert 'not'). (6) That the names
occupants of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not known, it and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of
shall state what search has been made to find them (Section 21 of Act No. 496 all lands adjoining the above land are as follows (same
[1902].) What can be clearer, therefore, than that the lower court was not directions as above.) (7) That I am (or we are) married. (Follows
sufficiently mindful of what the law ordains when it refused to hear petition literally the directions given in the prior portions of this section.)
petitioner on his claim that appellee Sandoval was guilty of fraud in including in (8) That my (or our) full name (or names), residence, and post
his application the disputed lot." The pertinent statutory provision reads thus: office address is (or are) as follows:

SEC. 21. The application shall be in writing, signed and sworn .......................…………Dated this day ......... of ................... in
to by the applicant, or by some person duly authorized in his the year nineteen hundred and .........................
behalf. All oaths required by this Act may be administered by
any officer authorized to administer oaths in the Philippine (Signature).............................
Islands. If there is more than one applicant, the application shall
be signed and sworn to by and in behalf of each. It shall contain (SCHEDULE OF DOCUMENTS)
a description of the land and shall state whether the applicant is
married; and, if married, the name of the wife or husband; and, UNITED STATES OF
if unmarried, whether he or she has been married, and, if so, AMERICA PHILIPPINE
when and how the married relation terminated. If by divorce, ISLANDS
when, where, and by what court the divorce was granted. It
shall also state the name in full and the address of the
applicant, and also the names and addresses of all occupants Province (or city) of.................................. ...........................(date.
of the land and of all adjoining owners, if known; and, if not
 There personally appeared the above-named....................... intended to deceive and deprive another of his right, or to in some manner injure
known to me to be the signer (or signers) of the foregoing him must be alleged and prove'.
application, and made oath that the statements therein, so far
as made of his (or their) own knowledge, are true and so far as We hold that as above discussed, the majority decision of the Court of Appeals
made upon information and belief, that he (or they) believe them under review, cannot be reconciled even with Grey Alba. The emphasis given in
to be true. The residence certificate................ of the applicant that decision to the in rem character of land registration proceedings and the
(or applicants, or representative) was exhibited (or applicants, broad legal significance of such kind of proceeding could not have by any degree
or representative) was exhibited to me being No. ............... minimized the paramouncy of truth and justice itself in any actual case before the
issued at.................. dated....................., 19 .... court. As Our Chief Justice quoted from Justice Torres "The registration of (land)
cannot serve as a protecting mantle to cover and shelter bad faith" (p. 12, 53
BEFORE ME: SCRA), just as it is reiterated therein what We said in Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil.
498, "it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is
(Notary Public or other official authorized to administer oaths) obtained to the prejudice of a third person." (taken from Nicolas vs. Director of
Lands, 9 SCRA 934, at p. 938.) Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion that in
law, the better view is that of the distinguished dissenters in the Court of Appeals,
and We find no alternative but to uphold the same. Incidentally, the binding force
of a finding of fact of the Court of Appeals, assuming the instant case were in any
As maybe readily noted, No. (6) of the suggested sufficient form says: "That the degree factual in nature, diminishes correspondingly according to the number
names and addresses so far as known to me (or us) of the owners of all lands and content of the dissent, when there is or are any. In the case at bar, it is Our
adjoining the above land are as follows (same directions as above But more conclusion that the majority's bases, much more its reliance in their purely literal
importantly, it should be borne in mind, the text of the law requires not mere understanding of Grey Alba do not conform with the dictates of truth and justice.
statement of the lack of knowledge of the names of the occupants and adjoining
owners by also "what search has been made to find them." As earlier indicated, WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is reversed,
respondents could not have escaped, if they had "search(es)" as the law and the second decision of Judge Guillermo Torres of April 5, 1966 is affirmed,
definitely mandates, the names of their "colindantes.", it being a fact that the without prejudice to petitioner and the trial court complying with the additional
latter's lands were duly registered. Surely, they would have known, as it can be requirements for the issuance of the corresponding title in favor of petitioner.
presumed they did, that Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz, whom they would Costs against private respondents.
name as boundary owners in their application in 1963 had already been long
dead and buried. In Grey Alba, the reason found by the Court for the failure of the
applicant to notify the acknowledged occupant of the land applied for was
because, from the circumstances known to them, it was evident that they were no
more than their lessees and could have had no registerable interest at all in the
property, which is far from what happened in the instant case. Here, We cannot
bring Ourselves to believe that the naming of Diego Francisco and Jose P. Cruz,
two persons long dead, as boundary owners in their application, not to speak of
the "creek", (who was also "proven" to have been notified) does not constitute
actual fraud. Petitioner's evidence of her own occupancy, considering it is
contradicted by respondents' evidence, need not be mentioned anymore.
Anyway, the unrebuttable proof alone is to Us sufficient by and large, to uphold
not only the dissenters in the Court of Appeals but also the trial judge who had
heard the respondent Alejandro Santos and his witness Lauro Cruz somehow
deviate substantially and materially from their testimonies given before the clerk
of court in the original proceeding.

In Grey Alba itself, We find the following significant pronouncements at p. 50,

(Vol. 17, Phil.) "By fraud is meant actual fraud, dishonesty of some sort. This
meaning should be given to the word 'fraud' in section 38 of the Land
Registration Act. Proof of constructive fraud is not sufficient to authorize the
Court of Land Registration to reopen a case and modify its decree. Specific acts
 Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default [8] and commenced with
the reception of evidence.[9] Among the documents presented by respondent in
support of its application are Tax Declarations, [10] a Deed of Absolute Sale in its
favor,[11] and a Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in question is within the alienable and
disposable zone.[12] Thereafter, it awarded the land to respondent Corporation.[13]
SECOND DIVISION
Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic,[14] the CA ruled that since the former
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, G. R. No. 162322 had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to
- versus - raise the jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from
BANTIGUE POINT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Promulgated: questioning the jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal. [15] The CA further found
Respondent. March 14, 2012 that respondent Corporation had sufficiently established the latters registrable
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x title over the subject property after having proven open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by itself and its
DECISION predecessors-in-interest even before the outbreak of World War II.[16]
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition requires this Court to address the issue of the proper scope
of the delegated jurisdiction of municipal trial courts in land registration cases. Dissatisfied with the CAs ruling, petitioner Republic filed this instant Rule 45
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) assails the Decision of the Court Petition and raised the following arguments in support of its appeal:
of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 70349, which affirmed the Decision of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan, Batangas[2] in LRC Case No. N-98-20, I.
LRA Record No. 68329, granting respondent Bantigue Point Development THE REPUBLIC CANNOT BE ESTOPPED FROM
Corporations (Corporation) application for original registration of a parcel of land. QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
Since only questions of law have been raised, petitioner need not have filed a TRIAL COURT OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision before filing this Petition REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE EVEN FOR THE FIRST
for Review. TIME ON APPEAL

The Facts II.

On 17 July 1997, respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed with THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACQUIRE
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an application for original JURISDICTION OVER THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLE.[17]
of ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value of ₱14,920 for the
entire property, more particularly described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan The Courts Ruling
Cadastre, with an area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at We uphold the jurisdiction of the MTC, but remand the case to the court a quo for
Barangay Barualte, San Juan, Batangas. [3] further proceedings in order to determine if the property in question forms part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on I
22 October 1997.[4] On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of
hearing on 4 November 1997.[5] jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional
Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for registration on 8
question only on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the
January 1998 while the records were still with the RTC.[6]
subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. [19] It cannot be
On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu proprio the records
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred
of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property
by the acquiescence of the court. [20] Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may
was allegedly less than ₱100,000.[7]
be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal.[21]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising The Property Registration Decree provides:
such [jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding
which he questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that
the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him [22] is based on the Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. - The
doctrine of estoppel by laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
this Court in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall
participated in the proceedings before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from
Only 15 years thereafter, and after receiving an adverse Decision on the merits the date of the order. x x x.
from the appellate court, did the party-litigant question the lower courts
jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case, we held that estoppel by In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17 July 1997.
[29]
laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the question of lack of On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the application, the RTC
jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned that Tijam must be immediately issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the most 1997, which was 96 days from the Order. [30] While the date set by the RTC was
exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case. beyond the 90-day period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc.,[31] petitioner
Republic therein contended that there was failure to comply with the jurisdictional
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule requirements for original registration, because there were 125 days between the
in Tijaminapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the Order setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself. We ruled
application for registration when the records were still with the RTC. [25] At that that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order setting the date of initial
point, petitioner could not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, hearing and the date of the initial hearing itself was not fatal to the
simply because the case was not yet with that court. When the records were application. Thus, we held:
transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither filed pleadings nor requested
affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner immediately raised the
jurisdictional question in its Brief. [26] Clearly, the exceptional doctrine of estoppel x x x [A] party to an action has no control over the
by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal. Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he
has no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official
in the performance of his duties. A party cannot intervene in
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable matters within the exclusive power of the trial court. No fault is
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, attributable to such party if the trial court errs on matters within
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or
right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. [27] In this case, petitioner control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
Republic has not displayed such unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead requirements of the law.[32]
us to conclude that it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the
lower court's jurisdiction.
Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize
II respondent Corporation by dismissing its application for registration on account
The Municipal Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction of events beyond its control.
over the case.
In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic raised two
points of contention: (a) the period for setting the date and hour of the initial Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997 setting the
hearing; and (b) the value of the land to be registered. initial hearing on 4 November 1997,[33] within the 90-day period provided by law,
petitioner Republic argued that the jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the
First, petitioner argued that the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction second Order was issued more than five days from the filing of the application,
over the application, because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing again contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration Decree.
[34]
beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.[28]

We disagree. Petitioner is incorrect.

The RTCs failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the initial Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration cases
hearing within five days from the filing of the application for registration, as in two instances: first, where there is no controversy or opposition; or, second,
provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not affect the courts its over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed ₱100,000.
jurisdiction. Observance of the five-day period was merely directory, and failure
to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because petitioner opposed
over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day period is mandatory respondent Corporations application for registration on 8 January 1998.[41]
would make jurisdiction over the subject matter dependent upon the trial court.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law.[35] It cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court. However, the MTC had jurisdiction under the second instance, because the value
of the lot in this case does not exceed ₱100,000.

This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods with impunity.
We cannot assume that the law deliberately meant the provision to become Contrary to petitioners contention, the value of the land should not be determined
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter. [36] However, the records of this with reference to its selling price. Rather, Section 34 of the Judiciary
case do not show such blatant disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately Reorganization Act provides that the value of the property sought to be registered
set the case for initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for may be ascertained in three ways: first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second,
registration,[37] except that it had to issue a second Order because the initial by agreement of the respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third,
hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by law. from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.[42]

Second, petitioner contended[38] that since the selling price of the In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using the first
property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to respondents application for method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit executed by respondent
original registration was ₱160,000,[39] the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the as to the value of the property. Likewise, valuation cannot be done through the
case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended, [40] the second method, because this method finds application only where there are
MTCs delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is limited multiple claimants who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of
to lands, the value of which should not exceed ₱100,000. the property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development Corporation
claims the property.

We are not persuaded.

The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with reference to the
corresponding Tax Declarations submitted by respondent Corporation together
The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land registration cases with its application for registration. From the records, we find that the assessed
is indeed set forth in the Judiciary Reorganization Act, which provides: value of the property is ₱4,330, ₱1,920 and ₱8,670, or a total assessed value
of ₱14,920 for the entire property. [43] Based on these Tax Declarations, it is
Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land evident that the total value of the land in question does not exceed ₱100,000.
Registration Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by Reorganization Act, as amended.
the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land
registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or III
opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that
not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00), the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or the public domain.
by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than
one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTCs exercise of its delegated
property. Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in granting respondent
the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As Corporations application for original registration in the absence of sufficient proof
amended by R.A. No. 7691) (Emphasis supplied.) that the property in question was alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
 The Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State.[44]The applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming
the presumption of State ownership by establishing through incontrovertible
evidence that the land sought to be registered is alienable or disposable based
on a positive act of the government. [45] We held in Republic v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc. that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable
and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. [46] The applicant
must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land
classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.[47]

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must
be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO [48] Certification; and (2) a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.[49]

Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO certification in

support of its application.[50] Clearly, this falls short of the requirements for original
registration.

We therefore remand this case to the court a quo for reception of further
evidence to prove that the property in question forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. If respondent Bantigue Point Development
Corporation presents a certified true copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary, the application for original registration should be
granted. If it fails to present sufficient proof that the land in question is alienable
and disposable based on a positive act of the government, the application should
be denied.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED.

Let this case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of San Juan, Batangas,
for reception of evidence to prove that the property sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.