THIRD DIVISION public, and in the concept of an owner.

The RTC thus decreed the registration of

the three (3) lots in the name of Martinez.
JOSE R. MARTINEZ, Petitioner, G. R. No. 160895
- versus - Promulgated: From this Decision, the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal dated 28 August
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. October 30, 2006 2000,[5] which was approved by the RTC. However, after the records had been
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x transmitted to the Court of Appeals, the RTC received a letter dated 21 February
DECISION 2001[6] from the Land Registration Authority (LRA) stating that only Lot Nos. 464-
TINGA, J.: A and 464-B were referred to in the Notice of Hearing published in the Official
The central issue presented in this Petition for Review is whether an Gazette; and that Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597 had been deliberately omitted due to
order of general default issued by a trial court in a land registration case bars the the lack of an approved survey plan for that property. Accordingly, the LRA
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, from manifested that this lot should not have been adjudicated to Martinez for lack of
interposing an appeal from the trial courts subsequent decision in favor of the jurisdiction. This letter was referred by the RTC to the Court of Appeals for
applicant. appropriate action.[7]

The antecedent facts follow. On 10 October 2003, the Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed
On 24 February 1999, petitioner Jose R. Martinez (Martinez) filed a Decision,[8] reversing the RTC and instead ordering the dismissal of the petition
petition for the registration in his name of three (3) parcels of land included in the for registration. In light of the opposition filed by the OSG, the appellate court
Cortes, Surigao del Sur Cadastre. The lots, individually identified as Lot No. 464- found the evidence presented by Martinez as insufficient to support the
A, Lot No. 464-B, and Lot No. 370, Cad No. 597, collectively comprised around registration of the subject lots. The Court of Appeals concluded that the oral
3,700 square meters. Martinezalleged that he had purchased lots in 1952 from evidence presented by Martinez merely consisted of general declarations of
his uncle, whose predecessors-in-interest were traceable up to the 1870s. It was ownership, without alluding to specific acts of ownership performed by him or his
claimed that Martinez had remained in continuous possession of the lots; that the predecessors-in-interest. It likewise debunked the documentary evidence
lots had remained unencumbered; and that they became private property through presented by Martinez, adjudging the same as either inadmissible or ineffective
prescription pursuant to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. to establish proof of ownership.
141. Martinez further claimed that he had been constrained to initiate the
proceedings because the Director of the Land Management Services had failed No motion for reconsideration appears to have been filed with the Court
to do so despite the completion of the cadastral survey of Cortes, Surigao del of Appeals by Martinez, who instead directly assailed its Decision before this
Sur.[1] Court through the present petition.

The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-30 and raffled We cannot help but observe that the petition, eight (8) pages in all, was
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao del Sur, Branch 27. The Office of the apparently prepared with all deliberate effort to attain nothing more but the
Solicitor General (OSG) was furnished a copy of the petition. The trial court set perfunctory. The arguments raised center almost exclusively on the claim that the
the case for hearing and directed the publication of the corresponding Notice of OSG no longer had personality to oppose the petition, or appeal its allowance by
Hearing in the Official Gazette. On 30 September 1999, the OSG, in behalf of the the RTC, following the order of general default. Starkly put, the [OSG] has no
Republic of the Philippines, opposed the petition on the grounds that appellees personality to raise any issue at all under the circumstances pointed out
possession was not in accordance with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. hereinabove.[9] Otherwise, it is content in alleging that [Martinez] presented
141; that his muniments of title were insufficient to prove bona-fide acquisition sufficient and persuasive proof to substantiate the fact that his title to Lot Nos.
and possession of the subject parcels; and that the properties formed part of the 464-A and 464-B is worth the confirmation he seeks to be done in this
public domain and thus not susceptible to private appropriation.[2] registration case;[10] and that the RTC had since issued a new Order dated 1
September 2003, confirming Martinezs title over Lot No. 370.
Despite the opposition filed by the OSG, the RTC issued an order of
general default, even against the Republic of the Philippines, on 29 March 2000. In its Comment dated 24 May 2004, [11] the OSG raises several
This ensued when during the hearing of even date, no party appeared before the substantial points, including the fact that it had duly opposed Martinezs
Court to oppose Martinezs petition.[3] application for registration before the RTC; that jurisprudence and the Rules of
Court acknowledge that a party in default is not precluded from appealing the
Afterwards, the trial court proceeded to receive Martinezs oral and unfavorable judgment; that the RTC had no jurisdiction over Lot No. 370 since its
documentary evidence in support of his petition. On 1 August 2000, the RTC technical description was not published in the Official Gazette; and that as found
rendered a Decision[4]concluding that Martinez and his predecessors-in-interest by the Court of Appeals the evidence presented by Martinez is insufficient for
had been for over 100 years in possession characterized as continuous, open, registering the lots in his name.[12] Despite an order from the Court requiring him
to file a Reply to the Comment, counsel for Martinez declined to do so, received the applicant's evidence and set another date for the
explaining, among others, that he felt he would only be taxing the collective reception of the oppositor's evidence. The oppositor in the Court
patience of this [Court] if he merely repeats x x x what petitioner had succinctly below and petitioner herein should have been accorded ample
stated x x x on pages four (4) to seven (7) of his said petition. Counsel for opportunity to establish the government's claim.[17]
petitioner was accordingly fined by the Court.[13]
The Courts patience is taxed less by redundant pleadings than by Strangely, the OSG did not challenge the propriety of the default order,
insubstantial arguments. The inability of Martinez to offer an effective rebuttal to whether in its appeal before the Court of Appeals or in its petition before this
the arguments of the OSG further debilitates what is an already weak petition. Court. It would thus be improper for the Court to make a pronouncement on the
validity of the default order since the same has not been put into issue.
The central question, as posed by Martinez, is whether the OSG could Nonetheless, we can, with comfort, proceed from same apparent premise of the
have still appealed the RTC decision after it had been declared in default. The OSG that the default order was proper or regular.
OSG argues that a party in default is not precluded from filing an appeal,
citing Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals,[14] and asserts that [t]he The juridical utility of a declaration of default cannot be disputed. By
Rules of Court expressly provides that a party who has been declared in default forgoing the need for adversarial proceedings, it affords the opportunity for the
may appeal from the judgment rendered against him.[15] speedy resolution of cases even as it penalizes parties who fail to give regard or
obedience to the judicial processes.
There is error in that latter, unequivocal averment, though one which
does not deter from the ultimate correctness of the general postulate that a party The extent to which a party in default loses standing in court has been
declared in default is allowed to pose an appeal. Elaboration is in order. the subject of considerable jurisprudential debate. Way back in 1920, in Velez v.
Ramas,[18] we declared that the defaulting defendant loses his standing in court,
We note at the onset that the OSG does not impute before this Court he not being entitled to the service of notices in the case, nor to appear in the suit
that the RTC acted improperly in declaring public respondent in default, even in any way. He cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the final hearing.
[19]
though an opposition had been filed to Martinezs petition. Under Section 26 of These restrictions were controversially expanded in Lim Toco v. Go Fay,
[20]
Presidential Decree No. 1529, as amended, the order of default may be issued decided in 1948, where a divided Court pronounced that a defendant in default
[i]f no person appears and answers within the time allowed. The RTC appears to had no right to appeal the judgment rendered by the trial court, except where a
have issued the order of general default simply on the premise that no oppositor motion to set aside the order of default had been filed. This, despite the point
appeared before it on the hearing of 29 March 2000. But it cannot be denied that raised by Justice Perfecto in dissent that there was no provision in the then Rules
the OSG had already duly filed its Opposition to Martinezs petition long before of Court or any law depriving a defaulted defendant of the right to be heard on
the said hearing. As we held in Director of Lands v. Santiago:[16] appeal.[21]

[The] opposition or answer, which is based on The enactment of the 1964 Rules of Court incontestably countermanded
substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it was improper the Lim Toco ruling. Section 2, Rule 41 therein expressly stated that [a] party
for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment
case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The pertinent for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in
provision of law which states: "If no person appears and accordance with Rule 38.[22] By clearly specifying that the right to appeal was
answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon available even if no petition for relief to set aside the order of default had been
motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary appearing, filed, the then fresh Rules clearly rendered the Lim Toco ruling as moot.
order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be
interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer Another provision in the 1964 Rules concerning the effect of an order of
before it, which has long been filed, for such an interpretation default acknowledged that a party declared in default shall not be entitled to
would be nothing less than illogical, unwarranted, and unjust. notice of subsequent proceedings, nor to take part in the trial.[23] Though it might
Had the law intended that failure of the oppositor to appear on be argued that appellate proceedings fall part of the trial since there is no final
the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default termination of the case as of then, the clear intent of the 1964 Rules was to
despite his having filed an answer, it would have been so stated nonetheless allow the defaulted defendant to file an appeal from the trial court
in unmistakable terms, considering the serious consequences of decision. Indeed, jurisprudence applying the 1964 Rules was unhesitant to affirm
an order of default. Especially in this case where the greater a defaulted defendants right to appeal, as guaranteed under Section 2 of Rule
public interest is involved as the land sought to be registered is 41, even as Lim Toco was not explicitly abandoned.
alleged to be public land, the respondent Judge should have
 In the 1965 case of Antonio, et al. v. Jacinto,[24] the Court acknowledged cross-claims and third-party complaints, while the main case is
that the prior necessity of a ruling setting aside the order of default however, was pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; and
changed by the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 41, section 2, paragraph 3, a
party who has been declared in default may likewise appeal from the judgment (h) An order dismissing an action without prejudice.
rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition
for relief to set aside the order of default has been presented by him in In all the above instances where the judgment or final
accordance with Rule 38.[25] It was further qualified in Matute v. Court of order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an
Appeals[26] that the new availability of a defaulted defendants right to appeal did appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
not preclude a defendant who has been illegally declared in default from pursuing
a more speedy and efficacious remedy, like a petition for certiorari to have the Evidently, the prior warrant that a defaulted defendant had the right to
judgment by default set aside as a nullity.[27] appeal was removed from Section 2, Rule 41. On the other hand, Section 3 of
Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules incorporated the particular effects on the parties of an
In Tanhu v. Ramolete,[28] the Court cited with approval the commentaries order of default:
of Chief Justice Moran, expressing the reformulated doctrine that following Lim
Toco, a defaulted defendant cannot adduce evidence; nor can he be heard at the Sec. 3. Default; declaration [Link] the defending party
final hearing, although [under Section 2, Rule 41,] he may appeal the judgment fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall,
rendered against him on the merits.[29] upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending
party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in
Thus, for around thirty-odd years, there was no cause to doubt that a default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment
defaulted defendant had the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
even without seeking to set aside the order of default. Then, in 1997, the Rules of unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit
Civil Procedure were amended, providing for a new Section 2, Rule 41. The new evidence. Such reception of evidence may be delegated to the
provision reads: clerk of court.

SECTION 1. Subject of [Link] appeal may be taken (a) Effect of order of default.A party in default shall be
from a judgment or final order that completely disposes of the entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but shall not take
case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these part in the trial.
Rules to be appealable.
(b) Relief from order of default.A party declared in
No appeal may be taken from: default may any time after notice thereof and before judgment
file a motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon
(a) An order denying a motion for new trial or proper showing that his failure to answer was due to fraud,
reconsideration; accident, mistake or excusable negligence and that he has a
meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default may be
(b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may
motion seeking relief from judgment; impose in the interest of justice.

(c) An interlocutory order; (c) Effect of partial [Link] a pleading asserting a

claim states a common cause of action against several
(d) An order disallowing or dismissing an appeal; defending parties, some of whom answer and the others fail to
do so, the court shall try the case against all upon the answers
(e) An order denying a motion to set aside a judgment thus filed and render judgment upon the evidence presented.
by consent, confession or compromise on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiating consent; (d) Extent of relief to be awarded.A judgment rendered
against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
(f) An order of execution; different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.
(g) A judgment or final order for or against or one or xxx
more of several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims,
 It cannot be escaped that the old provision expressly guaranteeing the the Lina doctrine, including the remedy that a defaulted defendant may also
right of a defendant declared in default to appeal the adverse decision was not appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to
replicated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Should this be taken as a sign the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented
that under the 1997 Rules a defaulted defendant no longer has the right to by him.[35] Justice Regalado also restates the Lina rule in his textbook on Civil
appeal the trial court decision, or that the Lim Toco doctrine has been reinstated? Procedure, opining that the remedies enumerated therein, even if under the
former Rules of Procedure, would hold true under the present amended Rules.
[36]
If post-1997 jurisprudence and the published commentaries to the 1997 Former Court of Appeals Justice Herrerra likewise reiterates the Lina doctrine,
Rules were taken as an indication, the answer should be in the negative. The though with the caveat that an appeal from an order denying a petition for relief
right of a defaulted defendant to appeal remains extant. from judgment was no longer appealable under Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules.[37] Herrera further adds:
By 1997, the doctrinal rule concerning the remedies of a party declared
in default had evolved into a fairly comprehensive restatement as offered in Lina Section 2, paragraph [2] of the former Rule 41, which
v. Court of Appeals:[30] allows an appeal from a denial of a petition for relief, was
deleted from the present Rule, and confined appeals to cases
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after from a final judgment or final order that completely disposes of
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under the case, or of a particular matter therein, when declared by
oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his these rules to be appealable. A judgment by default may be
failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or considered as one that completely disposes of the case.[38]
excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec
3, Rule 18) We are hard-pressed to find a published view that the enactment of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure accordingly withdrew the right, previously granted
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the under the 1964 Rules, of a defaulted defendant to appeal the judgment by default
defendant discovered the default, but before the same has against him. Neither is there any provision under the 1997 Rules which expressly
become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial denies the defaulted defendant such a right. If it is perplexing why the 1997 Rules
under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; deleted the previous authorization under the old Section 2, Rule 41 (on subject of
appeal), it is perhaps worth noting that its counterpart provision in the 1997
c) If the defendant discovered the default after the Rules, now Section 1, Rule 41, is different in orientation even as it also covers
judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition subject of appeal. Unlike in the old provision, the bulk of the new provision is
for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and devoted to enumerating the various rulings from which no appeal may be
taken, and nowhere therein is a judgment by default included. A declaration
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered therein that a defaulted defendant may still appeal the judgment by default would
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no have seemed out of place.
petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by
him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)[31] Yet even if it were to assume the doubtful proposition that this contested
right of appeal finds no anchor in the 1997 Rules, the doctrine still exists,
applying the principle of stare decisis. Jurisprudence applying the 1997 Rules
The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of has continued to acknowledge the Lina doctrine which embodies this right to
the 1964 Rules. Yet even after that provisions deletion under the 1997 Rules, the appeal as among the remedies of a defendant, and no argument in this petition
Court did not hesitate to expressly rely again on the Lina doctrine, including the persuades the Court to rule otherwise.
pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment
rendered against him. This can be seen in the cases In Rural Bank of Sta. Catalina v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[39] the
of Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education,[32] Tan v. Court, through Justice Callejo, Sr., again provided a comprehensive restatement
Dumarpa,[33] and Crisologo v. Globe Telecom, Inc.[34] of the remedies of the defending party declared in default, which we adopt for
purposes of this decision:
Annotated textbooks on the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure similarly
acknowledge that even under the new rules, a defaulted defendant retains the It bears stressing that a defending party declared in
right to appeal as previously confirmed under the old Section 2, Rule 41. In his default loses his standing in court and his right to adduce
textbook on Civil Procedure, Justice Francisco answers the question What are evidence and to present his defense. He, however, has the right
the remedies available to a defending party in default? with a reiteration of to appeal from the judgment by default and assail said judgment
 on the ground, inter alia, that the amount of the judgment is Considered in the light of the opposition filed by the
excessive or is different in kind from that prayed for, or that the Office of the Solicitor General, we find the evidence adduced by
plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint, appellee, on the whole, insufficient to support the registration of
or that the decision is contrary to law. Such party declared in the subject parcels in his name. To prove the provenance of the
default is proscribed from seeking a modification or reversal of land, for one, all that appellee proffered by way of oral evidence
the assailed decision on the basis of the evidence submitted by is the following cursory testimony during his direct
him in the Court of Appeals, for if it were otherwise, he would examination, viz:
thereby be allowed to regain his right to adduce evidence, a xxxx
right which he lost in the trial court when he was declared in
default, and which he failed to have vacated. In this case, the Q You mentioned that you are the owner of these three (3)
petitioner sought the modification of the decision of the trial parcels of land. How did you begin the ownership of the
court based on the evidence submitted by it only in the Court of same?
Appeals.[40] A I bought it from my uncles Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez.
xxxx
If it cannot be made any clearer, we hold that a defendant party declared
in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground Q x x x x Who took possession of these parcels of land from
that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that then on?
the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to A I took possession, sir
set aside the order of default. We reaffirm that the Lim Toco doctrine, denying
such right to appeal unless the order of default has been set aside, was no longer Q As owner?
controlling in this jurisdiction upon the effectivity of the 1964 Rules of Court, and A Yes, as owner.
up to this day.
Q Up to the present who is in possession as owner of these
Turning to the other issues, we affirm the conclusion of the Court of parcels of land?
Appeals that Martinez failed to adduce the evidence needed to secure the A I took possession.
registration of the subject lots in his name.
Q Before Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez sold these parcels
It should be noted that the OSG, in appealing the case to the Court of of land before you took possession who were the
Appeals, did not introduce any new evidence, but simply pointed to the owners and in possession of these?
insufficiency of the evidence presented by Martinez before the trial court. The A Hilarion Martinez, the father of my predecessors-in-interest
Court of Appeals was careful to point out that the case against Martinez was and also my grandfather.
established not by the OSGs evidence, but by petitioners own insufficient xxxx
evidence. We adopt with approval the following findings arrived at by the Court of
Appeals, thus: Court:

The burden of proof in land registration cases is Q Of your own knowledge[,] where [sic] did your grandfather
incumbent on the applicant who must show that he is the real Hilarion Martinez acquire these lands?
and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. Unless A According to my grandfather he bought that land from a
the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing certain Juan Casano in the year 1870s[,] I think.
evidence that the property involved was acquired by him or his xxxx
ancestors by any of the means provided for the proper
acquisition of public lands, the rule is settled that the property Q By the way[,] when did your grandfather Hilarion Martinez
must be held to be a part of the public domain. The applicant die?
must, therefore, present competent and persuasive proof to A Either in 1920 or 1921.
substantiate his claim. He may not rely on general statements,
or mere conclusions of law other than factual evidence of Q Since you said your immediate predecessors-in-interest
possession and title. Julian Martinez and Juan Martinez inherited the same
from your grandfather. Can you say it the same that
your predecessors-in-interest were the owners and
 possessors of the same since 1921 up to the time they WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
sold the land to you in 1952? SO ORDERED.
A Yes, sir.
xxxx

In the dreary tradition of most land registration

cases, appellee has apparently taken the absence of
representation for appellant at the hearing of his petition as
license to be perfunctory in the presentation of his
evidence. Actual possession of land, however, consists in
the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a
nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. It is not enough for an applicant to declare
himself or his predecessors-in-interest the possessors and
owners of the land for which registration is sought. He
must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim and cannot just offer general statements which are
mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and
substantiation.

The record shows that appellee did not fare any better
with the documentary evidence he adduced before the trial
court. The October 20, 1952 Deed of Sale by which appellee
claims to have purchased the subject parcels from his
uncle, Julian Martinez, was not translated from the
vernacular in which it was executed and, by said token,
was inadmissible in evidence. Having submitted a white
print copy of the survey plan for Lot Nos. 464-A and 464-B,
appellee also submitted the tracing cloth plan for Lot No.
370 which does not, however, appear to be approved by the
Director of Lands. In much the same manner that the
submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a mandatory
statutory requirement which cannot be waived, the rule is
settled that a survey plan not approved by the Director of Lands
is not admissible in evidence.[41]

These findings of the Court of Appeals, arrived at after a sufficiently

extensive evaluation of the evidence, stand in contrast to that contained in the
RTC decision, encapsulated in a one-paragraph prcis of the factual allegations of
Martinez concerning how he acquired possession of the subject properties. The
Court of Appeals, of course, is an appropriate trier of facts, and a comparison
between the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and that of the RTC clearly
demonstrates that it was the appellate court which reached a more thorough and
considered evaluation of the evidence.

As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the burden of proof expected

of the petitioner in a land registration case has not been matched in this case.
 other than the herein petitioners were likewise denied for various reasons
including failure to present their evidence.

After trial, in a decision dated April 23, 1956, the lower court disposed of the
application for registration as follows:
FIRST DIVISION
In view of all the foregoing, the applicant Rosario Valera married
to Juan Valera, a resident of Bangued, Abra, has proven that
[G.R. No. 76371. January 20, 2000] she has a registerable title to Lot 1, Psu-119561, with an area of
210,767 square meters as her exclusive property, subject to the
MARIANO TURQUESA, ABRAHAM LALUGAN and LAYAO, MANUEL encumbrance in favor of the Philippine National Bank in the sum
MAGALA substituted by his Heirs, OTILIO DAMASEN and SEGUNDINA of P1,000.00; and to Lot 2 in the same plan, with an area of
DAMASEN, ANTONIO ESCALANTE, METODIO TULLAS, FLORA LABUGUEN 22,141 square meters, without liens or encumbrances, as
and JUANA LABUGUEN, LOURDES SINDON BAYUBAY, MANUEL conjugal partnership property with her husband, Juan Valera.
MEDRANO and JOSE MEDRANO,** petitioners, vs., ROSARIO VALERA and
the HONORABLE COURT of APPEALS, respondents. Misj uris After this decision has become final, let the corresponding
decree be entered and the corresponding title issue in
DECISION accordance with law.[4]

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.: Oppositors appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar only as Lot 1 is
More than half a century ago,[1] private respondent applied for the registration of concerned, arguing, among others, that the trial court erred in not granting their
two parcels of land located in Barrio Pulot, Laguyan, Abra described in Plan motion for new trial and their demand for ocular inspection. On March 15, 1966,
PSU-119561 with a total land area of 232,908 square meters. The first lot the Court of Appeals set aside the appealed decision and remanded the case to
(hereinafter referred to as Lot 1) has an area of 210,767 square meters whereas the lower court for further proceedings, and ordered the conduct of an ocular
the other lot (Lot 2) has an area of 22,141 square meters. In support of her inspection. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
application, private respondent presented documents showing that when she was
still single, she bought Lot 1 during the years 1929-1932 from Cristeta Trangued WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set
and the heirs of Juan Valera Rufino who were allegedly in possession thereof aside. This case shall be remanded to the trial court for further
since the Spanish regime in the concept of owners and who declared it in their proceedings which shall include an ocular inspection of the land
name for taxation purposes. From 1929, she continued possession of said land in applied with a view to determine its identity, location and
the concept of owner and continued to pay the tax thereon in her name. Notices boundary limits whether the latter have been included in Lot 1 of
of the application for registration were published in the Official Gazette, with the applicants plan to warrant their exclusion from the plan, or
copies thereof sent to persons mentioned therein and posted in the proper their registration in the names of the oppositors who have
places. presented evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter
judgment shall be accordingly rendered.[5]
The Director of Lands together with petitioners and other persons [2] opposed the
application of private respondent. These oppositors were excluded from the order In accordance with the CA directive, three commissioners were appointed by the
of general default issued by the lower court on June 16, 1950. [3] In the course of trial court to conduct the ocular inspection. The commissioners found:
the hearing, the oppositors (except the Director of Lands) aver that their lands
were included in Lot 1 which private respondent sought to register in her name.
In support thereof, they contend that the land embraced by Lot 1 at the time it That the property sought to be registered under survey plan
was bought by private respondent is not the same land covered in her application Psu-119561 was relocated and the extent and bounds of the
for registration. To avoid confusion, oppositors moved for an ocular inspection in portions claimed by the oppositors were pointed to by them
order to determine the correct boundary limits of the lands they respectively personally or by their supposed representative, the results of
claim, however, the same was not allowed by the court a quo. For his part, the which are clearly shown in the accompanying sketch plan
Director of Lands opposition was denied for failure to substantiate his claim that marked as Annex "A" of their report by the corresponding
the subject lands were part of the public domain. The opposition of the oppositors names, area and dimensions.
 That the survey of the claims was continued the following day, the opinion of the Court, is the extension of the "Calle para
January 29, 1967. Collago" referred to by the applicant Rosario Valera as
boundary exactly on the South but which was converted into
OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS ricefields by Francisco Santua. This circumstance now could
explain the presence of Francisco Santua as boundary owner
on the South which the parties stoutly maintained in the former
1. The claims of Manuel Magala, Abraham Lalugan, and Layao, proceedings that the "Calle para Collago" was on the South but
Juan Medrano and Eugenio Medrano as shown now in the which oppositors now repudiate claiming that the "Calle para
sketch plan Annex "A" are not shown in the original survey plan Collago" is on the East. Taking a good view over Lot 1, it could
Psu-119561; safely be concluded that the existing "Calle para Collago" is
more to the South than to the East.
2. That claims of Otilio Damasen, Nicolas Bigornia, Ricardo
Bersamira, Bonifacio Brangan, Cristeta Medrano, Matias Turdil, With respect to the claim of the Damasens over Lot A
Mariano Turqueza, Flora Labuguen, Cornelio Bayubay, Ponce mentioned in Exh. D which the Court inadvertently failed to pass
Talape, and Metodio Tullar, appeared in the original survey plan upon, the Court has found that it is within the property of the
Psu-119561 and likewise in sketch plan Annex "A" although applicant.[8]
three of these claims bear different identifying names in the
sketch Annex "A";
The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:
3. That out of the original area of 210,767 square meters in
original survey plan Psu-119561, the remaining portion not WHEREFORE, this Court reiterates its former decision ordering
subject of opposition as appearing in sketch plan Annex "A" is the registration of Lot 1 of Plan Psu-119561, Exh. D, with an
69,683 square meters; area of 210,767 square meters in the name of applicant
ROSARIO VALERA of Bangued, Abra, and a conjugal property
with her husband Juan Valera of the same municipality. The
4. That the "Calle para Collago" which according to the decision encumbrance with the Philippine National Bank in the amount of
of the Court of Appeals and is stoutly maintained until the P1,000.00 having already been settled (Exh. JJ-1) same shall
present by the oppositors to be the extent or boundary of the no longer be annotated on the title henceforth to be issued.
property of the applicant on the South side is existing and still is
the boundary on the South and on the Southeast side, as
shown in the Sketch Plan, Exh. "A"; Upon this decision becoming final, let the corresponding decree
issue. Acct mis
That the property of Francisco Santua abound also the
applicants property sought to be registered on the South sides, The applicant Rosario Valera is hereby directed to pay within
at present as was the case during the original survey.[6] seventy two hours from notice hereof the sum of P182.00 as
fees for the commissioner Santiago Alejandre who made the
relocation survey.[9]
The oppositors filed an opposition to the commissioners report, whereupon a
second ocular inspection was ordered by the trial court. After the second
inspection, the trial court, on August 28, 1967 again rendered judgment The case was again appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR. 40796-R) by the
reiterating its original decision ordering the registration of the aforesaid Lot 1 of oppositors, some of whom are now the petitioners in this case. [10] They argue that
PSU 119561 with an area of 210,767[7] square meters in the name of private the lower court erred in not excluding the areas they claimed as their own which
respondent. The judge made the following observations based on the ocular were wrongfully included in Lot 1 but was ordered registered in private
inspection: respondents name. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled:

The Commissioners and the Presiding Judge, upon their ocular WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, with the modification
inspection, found out a visible boundary on the South-east side that the registration of Lot 1 of appellees (private respondent
of Lot 1 known as "Calle para Collago" which is represented in herein) should be confined to the extent only as indicated in the
the relocation plan Exh. HH running from the intersection to sketch annexed to the Commissioners report, Exhibit HH, and
Lagayan between points 22 and 21 down to point 18. This, in excluding therefrom the landholding of the oppositors, as
 indicated in the same sketch, the judgment of the trial court is the burden to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered
hereby AFFIRMED. Without costs. SO ORDERED.[11] forms part of the public domain[22] considering that the inclusion in a title of a part
of the public domain nullifies the title.[23] Undoubtedly, a land registration
This decision became final and executory for which a corresponding entry of proceeding is one which is in rem in character, so that the default order issued by
judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.[12] Later, private respondent filed the court binds the whole world and all persons whether known or unknown,
[24]
with the trial court a motion for the issuance of writ of possession over two lots except those who have appeared and filed their pleadings in the registration
respectively tenanted by Trium Donato and Rudy Donato which were likewise case.[25] In the case at bar, those exempted from the order of general default are
respectively claimed by Santiago Partolan (not an oppositor in the land the petitioners and the other oppositors mentioned in footnote number 2.
registration case) and Crispin Baltar (one of the oppositors). [13] In an Order issued
on September 14, 1981, the court a quo denied the motion.[14] When her There is no dispute that the lands occupied and claimed by oppositors-petitioners
subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied in another Order dated Segundina and Otilio Damasen were already finally adjudged excluded from Lot
November 25, 1981,[15] private respondent appealed to the then Intermediate 1 and cannot be registered in private respondents name. In other words, the
Appellate Court (IAC) which reversed the said two orders and forthwith issued a Damasens were declared to have a rightful and registrable right over their claims
decision with the following disposition: of specific portions of Lot 1. What private respondent wants is that she be
installed in possession of the area claimed by Santiago Partolan and Crispin
WHEREFORE, PREMISES, CONSIDERED, the ORDERS Baltar. Of these two, only Baltar entered his opposition to private respondents
appealed from are hereby REVERSED and judgment is hereby application for land registration. Being a proceeding in rem, Partolan is charged
entered ordering: with knowledge of the application of private respondent since the notice was
published in accordance with law.
1. The issuance of a WRIT OF POSSESSION in favor of
applicant-appellant covering the landholding claimed by Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, private respondent is not entitled to a
oppositor Crispin Baltar and tenanted by Rudy Donato; writ of possession of that portion of Lot I occupied by Partolan and Baltar. No
evidence was shown that private respondent had a rightful claim whether
possessory or proprietary with respect to those areas. Even if Partolan was
2. Confirming the word "Landholding" in the dispositive portion excluded by the order of general default and Baltar did not appeal from the trial
of the decision in CA-G.R. No. 40796-R as singular and courts decision of April 23, 1956, the applicant must still prove and establish that
referring only to the landholding opposed by oppositors she has registrable rights over the land which must be grounded on
Segundina and Otilio Damasen as the only landholding incontrovertible evidence and based on positive and absolute proof. The
excluded from lot 1; and declaration by the applicant that the land applied for has been in the possession
of her predecessor-in-interest for a certain period, does not constitute the "well-
3. Ordering the issuance of the WRIT OF POSSESSION in nigh incontrovertible" and "conclusive" evidence required in land registration.
favor of the applicant-appellant covering the landholdings [26]
Allegations of her predecessors ownership of the lot during the Spanish period
opposed by the other oppositors who did not appeal the is self-serving[27] and the declaration of ownership for purposes of assessment on
decision of the lower court dated August 28, 1967. the payment of tax is not sufficient evidence to prove ownership. [28] It should be
noted that tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
Without any special pronouncement as to cost. SO ORDERED. ownership in land registration cases.[29] Private respondent should have
substantiated her claim with clear and convincing evidence specifically showing
Oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the the nature of her claim. Her description of the circumstances of her own
Court of Appeals.[17] Hence this petition for review initiated by some of the possession in relation to that of her predecessor-in-interest are mere conclusions
oppositors in the trial court. The petition was initially denied by the Court. On of law which require further factual support and substantiation. If an applicant
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, the case was reinstated and does not have any rightful claim over real property, the Torrens system of
respondent was required to submit her comment to the petition.[18] registration can confirm or record nothing.[30]

After a painstaking review of the vintage records of this case and after Private respondent, being the applicant for registration of land and one who relies
deciphering the ambiguous discussions in the petition,[19] the assailed ruling of on some documents enforcing her alleged title thereto, must prove not only the
the respondent court cannot be sustained. The burden of proof in land genuineness of said title but also the identityof the land therein referred to,
[31]
registration cases is incumbent on the applicant[20] who must show that he is the inasmuch as this is required by law. The dispute in this case pertains to the
real and absolute owner in fee simple of the land applied for. [21] On him also rests correctness of the survey of specific areas of lands. It must be borne in mind that
what defines a piece of land is not the size or area mentioned in its description,
but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its
limits.[32] Considering that the writ of possession was sought by private
respondent against persons who were in "actual possession under claim of
ownership," the latters possession raises a disputable presumption of ownership.
[33]
This unrebutted presumption militates against the claim of private respondent,
especially considering the evidentiary rule under Article 434 of the Civil Code that
a claimant of a parcel of land, such as private respondent, must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendants claim.[34]

Private respondents contention that the dispositive portion of the CA decision on

April 30, 1979 in CA GR 40796-R which mentioned only "landholding" and not
"landholdings", thus referring only to that area claimed by the Damasen spouses,
is too trivial. A reading of the said decision and the foregoing discussions clearly
indicates that the land to be registered in private respondents name is limited to a
certain area stated in the sketch annexed to the Commissioners report. It
categorically excluded those portions pertaining to the oppositors. Since private
respondent failed to show that she has a proprietary right over the excluded
areas, such as the portions occupied by those against whom the writ of
possession was sought for, then the trial court was correct in refusing to grant the
writ as the same has no basis.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the two orders of the trial court dated
September 14, 1981 and November 25, 1981 are REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the respective shares on the property
of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo
who, together with Luisa, had derived the same from Romulado Guinto.
[8]
Respondents also alleged that until the time of the application, they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive
and continuous possession of these lots in the concept of owner and that they
had consistently declared the property in their name for purposes of real estate
taxation.[9]

In support of their application, respondents submitted to the court the

blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[10] as well as copies of the technical
SECOND DIVISION descriptions of each lot,[11] a certification from the geodetic engineer [12] and the
pertinent tax declarations,[13] together with the receipts of payment therefor.
G.R. No. 175578 [14]
Expressly, they averred that the propertys original tracing cloth plan had
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, previously been submitted to the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 255 (Las Pias
- versus - RTC) in connection with the proceedings in LRC Case No. LP-128a previous
ZENAIDA GUINTO-ALDANA, in her own behalf as registration case involving the subject property which, however, had been
Attorney-in-fact of MA. AURORA GUINTO- Promulgated: dismissed without prejudice.[15]
COMISO, MA. LUISA GUINTO-DIONISIO, August 11, 2010
ALFREDO GUINTO, JR., PACITA R. GUINTO, The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and
ERNESTO R. GUINTO, NATIVIDAD R. GUINTO substance; hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the
and ALBERTO R. GUINTO, Respondents. publication and notification requirements of the law.[16]
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION Opposing the application, petitioner, through the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Pias City, advanced that the lots sought to be registered were
PERALTA, J.: inalienable lands of the public domain; that neither respondents nor their
In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the predecessors-in-interest had been in prior possession thereof; and that the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assails the March 30, muniment of title and the tax declaration submitted to the court did not constitute
2006 Decision[1]and the November 20, 2006 Resolution,[2] both of the Court of competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition or of prior possession
Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 80500. The assailed decision reversed and set in the concept of owner.[17]
aside the July 10, 2003 judgment[3]of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
Branch 199 in LRC Case No. 02-0036, one for original registration of title, At the hearing, Zenaida identified her herein co-respondents to be her
whereas the assailed Resolution denied reconsideration. siblings, nephews and nieces. She likewise identified the adjoining lot owners
named in the application and the supporting documents attached to the
The facts follow. application as well. She testified that the subject lots had been surveyed at the
instance of her family sometime between 1994 and 1995, and that said survey
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana[4] (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora was documented in Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and in the geodetic engineers
Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa Guinto-Dionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R. Guinto, technical description of the lots. She implied that they did obtain the original
Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed with the tracing cloth plan of the property, but it was forwarded to the Land Registration
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 199 an Application for Authority (LRA) by the Las Pias RTC in connection with the proceedings in LRC
Registration of Title[5] over two pieces of land in Talango, Pamplona Uno, Las Case No. LP-128. Notwithstanding this admission, and without objection from the
Pias City. These lands, identified as Lot No. 4 and Lot No. 5 in Conversion oppositor, the blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D and the technical
Consolidation Subdivision Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D,[6] measure 1,509 square description of the property were provisionally marked in evidence.[18]
meters and 4,640 square meters, respectively.[7] Respondents professed
themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having acquired them by succession Furthermore, Zenaida61 years old at the time of her testimonydeclared
from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio) and Lucia Rivera-Guinto that she has known that the subject lots were owned by her family since she was
(Lucia)Zenaidas parentswho, in turn, had acquired the property under a 1969 5 years old and from her earliest recollection, she narrated that her grandparents
document denominated as Kasulatan sa Paghahati ng Lupa na Labas sa had lived in the subject lots until the death of her grandmother in 1961. She
Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan. Under this document, Sergio and implied that aside from her predecessors there were other persons, caretakers
supposedly, who had tilled the land and who had lived until sometime between Petitioner principally posits that under Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, the
1980 and 1990. She remembered her grandmother having constructed a house submission in court of the original tracing cloth plan of the property sought to be
on the property, but the same had already been destroyed. Also, sometime in registered is a mandatory requirement in registration proceedings in order to
1970, her family built an adobe fence around the perimeter of the lots and later, establish the exact identity of the property. While respondents admitted that the
in the 1990s, they reinforced it with hollow blocks and concrete after an original tracing cloth plan of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 in this case was in the custody of
inundation caused by the flood. [19] She claimed that she and her father, Sergio, the LRA as a consequence of their first attempt to have the property registered,
had been religious in the payment of real estate taxes as shown by the tax petitioner, invoking Del Rosario v. Republic of the Philippines, [27] believes that
declarations and tax receipts which she submitted to the court and which, respondents, on that score alone, are not relieved of their procedural obligation to
following identification, were forthwith marked in evidence.[20] adduce in evidence the original copy of the plan, because they could have easily
retrieved it from the LRA and presented it in court.[28]
Zenaidas claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of
the land was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot Furthermore, petitioner suggests that the blueprint of the subdivision
owners. Josefina, then 73 years old, strongly declared that the subject lots were plan submitted by respondents cannot approximate substantial compliance with
owned by Zenaidas parents, Sergio Guinto and Lucia Rivera, since she reached the requirement of Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529. Again, relying on the
the age of understanding, and that she had not come to know of any instance aforementioned Del Rosario case, petitioner observes that the blueprint in this
where a third party had placed a claim on the property. When asked whether case, allegedly illegible and unreadable, does not even bear the certification of
there was anyone residing in the property and whether there were improvements the Lands Management Bureau.[29] Lastly, petitioner attacks respondents claim of
made thereon, she said there was no one residing therein and that there was prior possession. It notes that there is no clear and convincing evidence that
nothing standing thereon except for a nipa hut. [21] respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 for 30 years.[30]
At the close of Josefinas testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto. [22] After weighing the Commenting on the petition, respondents observe that petitioners
evidence, the trial court, on July 10, 2003, rendered its Decision denying the arguments are mere reiterative theses on the issues that have already been
application for registration. It found that respondents were unable to establish addressed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed Decision and Resolution, and
with certainty the identity of the lots applied for registration, because of failure to that there are no new matters raised which have not yet been previously passed
submit to the court the original tracing cloth plan as mandated by Presidential upon. Accordingly, they prayed that the petition be denied.[31]
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. It likewise noted that the fact of adverse, continuous,
open, public and peaceful possession in the concept of owner has not been We find the petition to be unmeritorious.
proved by the evidence as Zenaidas and Josefinas respective testimonies did not
establish the nature of the possession of respondents predecessors.[23] The Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as The Property
dispositive portion of the Decision reads: Registration Decree of 1978, materially provides:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the applicants to comply Section 17. What and where to [Link] application for
with the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the land registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of
Application for Original Registration of Title is hereby DENIED. the province or city where the land is situated. The applicant
SO ORDERED.[24] shall file, together with the application, all original muniments of
titles or copies thereof and a survey plan of the land approved
by the Bureau of Lands.
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on
March 30, 2006, issued the assailed Decision reversing the trial court as follows: The clerk of court shall not accept any application
unless it is shown that the applicant has furnished the Director
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed of Lands with a copy of the application and all annexes.
decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. SO ORDERED.[25]
The provision denotes that it is imperative in an application for original
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.[26] Hence, it filed the registration that the applicant submit to the court, aside from the original or
instant petition which attributes error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial duplicate copies of the muniments of title, a copy of a duly approved survey plan
courts July 10, 2003 decision. of the land sought to be registered. The survey plan is indispensable as it
provides a reference on the exact identity of the property. This begs the question
in the instant case: Does the blueprint copy of the survey plan suffice for [DENR]), blueprint copies and other evidence could also provide sufficient
compliance with the requirement? In not so many cases,[32] it was held that the identification. Pertinently, the Court in Hubilla, citing Recto, pronounced:
non-submission, for any reason, of the original tracing cloth plan is fatal to the
registration application, since the same is mandatory in original registration of While the petitioner correctly asserts that the
title. For instance, in the Del Rosario case relied on by petitioner, the Court ruled submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
that the submission of the original copy of the duly approved tracing cloth plan is approved by the Bureau of Lands, is a mandatory requirement,
a mandatory condition for land registration as it supplies the means by which to this Court has recognized instances of substantial compliance
determine the exact metes and bounds of the property. The applicant in that case with this rule. In previous cases, this Court ruled that blueprint
was unable to submit the original tracing cloth plan of the land he was claiming copies of the original tracing cloth plan from the Bureau of
because apparently, as in the present case, it was previously transmitted by the Lands and other evidence could also provide sufficient
clerk of court to the LRA. Yet the Court, deeming it the applicants obligation to identification to identify a piece of land for registration
retrieve the plan himself and present it in evidence, denied the application, to wit: purposes. x x x[37]

The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth

plan, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for In the case at bar, we find that the submission of the blueprint of Plan
application of original registration of land is a mandatory Ccs-007601-000040-D, together with the technical description of the property,
[Link] reason for this rule is to establish the true operates as substantial compliance with the legal requirement of ascertaining the
identity of the land to ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 applied for registration. The blueprint, which is shown
land or a portion thereof already covered by a previous land to have been duly executed by Geodetic Engineer Rolando Roxas (Roxas),
registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be attached to the application and subsequently identified, marked, and offered in
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining evidence, shows that it proceeded officially from the Lands Management
land. The failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to Services and, in fact, bears the approval of Surveys Division Chief Ernesto
petitioners application for registration. Erive. It also shows on its face that the survey of the property was endorsed by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR. [38] This,
Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted compounded by the accompanying technical description of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 duly
the original tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but executed and verified also by Roxas,[39] should substantially supply as it did the
the latter submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no means by which the identity of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 may be ascertained.
merit. Petitioner is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan
from the LRA and to present it in evidence in the trial court. x x Verily, no error can be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it ruled
x[33] that respondents were able to approximate compliance with Section 17 of P.D.
No. 1529. Also telling is the observation made by the Court of Appeals that there
Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the was no objection raised by the oppositor or by the LRA to the admission of the
original tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means blueprint of Plan Ccs-007601-000040-D despite the fact that they were well-
to afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration informed of the present proceedings, to wit:
and to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the
adjoining lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must In the instant case, the plaintiffs-appellants do not deny
be denied for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it that only the blueprint copy of the plan of the subject lands (Exh.
is accompanied by pieces of evidencesuch as a duly executed blueprint of the J) and not the original tracing cloth plan thereof was submitted
survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the propertywhich may to the court a quo since they had previously submitted the
likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent of original tracing cloth plan to the Land Registration
the property sought to be registered. Authority. However, despite the failure of the plaintiffs-
appellants to present the original tracing cloth plan, neither the
Thus, sound is the doctrinal precept laid down in Republic of the Land Registration Authority nor the oppositor-appellee
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[34] and in the later cases of Spouses Recto v. question[ed] this deficiency. Likewise, when the blueprint copy
Republic of the Philippines[35] and Republic of the Philippines v. Hubilla,[36] that of the plan (Exh. J) was offered in evidence, the oppositor-
while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for registration purposes is the apellee did not raise any objection thereto. Such silence on the
original tracing cloth plan issued by the Bureau of Lands (now the Lands part of the Land Registration [Authority] and the oppositor-
Management Services of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources appellee can be deemed as an implied admission that the
original tracing cloth plan and the blueprint copy thereof (Exh. J)
 are one and the same, free from all defects and clearly identify property was again declared in 1979, [48] 1985[49] and 1994[50] by Sergio, Toribia
the lands sought to be registered. In this regard x x x, the and by Romualdo.
blueprint copy of the plan (Exh. J), together with its technical
descriptions (Exhs. K and L), is deemed tantamount to Certainly, respondents could have produced more proof of this kind had it not
substantial compliance with the requirements of law.[40] been for the fact that, as certified by the Office of the Rizal Provincial Assessor,
the relevant portions of the tax records on file with it had been burned when the
assessors office was razed by fire in 1997. [51] Of equal relevance is the fact that
We now proceed to the issue of possession. Petitioner theorizes that not only with these tax assessments, there came next tax payments. Respondents
were respondents unable to identify the lots applied for registration; it also claims receipts for tax expenditures on Lot Nos. 4 and 5 between 1977 and 2001 are
that they have no credible evidence tending to establish that for at least 30 years likewise fleshed out in the records and in these documents, Sergio, Toribia and
they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied and possessed the Romualdo are the named owners of the property with Zenaida being identified as
property openly, continuously, exclusively and notoriously under a bona the one who delivered the payment in the 1994 receipts.[52]
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[41] We do not agree.
The foregoing evidentiary matters and muniments clearly show that Zenaidas
In an original registration of title under Section 14(1) [42] P.D. No. 1529, the testimony in this respect is no less believable. And the unbroken chain of positive
applicant for registration must be able to establish by evidence that he and his acts exercised by respondents predecessors, as demonstrated by these pieces
predecessor-in-interest have exercised acts of dominion over the lot under of evidence, yields no other conclusion than that as early as 1937, they had
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[43] He must prove already demonstrated an unmistakable claim to the property. Not only do they
that for at least 30 years, he and his predecessor have been in open, continuous, show that they had excluded all others in their claim but also, that such claim is in
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land. Republic v. all good faith.
Alconaba[44] well explains possession and occupation of this character, thus:
Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since declarations and realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear nevertheless, they are a good indication of possession in the concept of
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the owner. These documents constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all- declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and adverse claim against the state and all other parties who may be in conflict with
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact his interest. More importantly, it signifies an unfeigned intention to contribute to
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be government revenuesan act that strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the of ownership.[53]
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature
as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
[45]
concept of owneropen, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individualitself makes their
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection under the
have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona law.
fide claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is
primarily factual. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 30, 2006 Decision and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
From the records, it is clear that respondents possession through their 80500, are AFFIRMED.
predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that year, the subject
property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaidas father, Sergio, SO ORDERED.
jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). [46] Yet, it also can be safely inferred
that Sergio and Toribia had declared the land for taxation even earlier because
the 1937 tax declaration shows that it offsets a previous tax number. [47] The
 encumbrance of any kind affects the property, and that no person has any claim,
legal or equitable, on the property.

The RCAM attached the following documents to support its application: amended
plan Psu-223919; technical description of Lots 1 and 2; 9 surveyor s
certificate;10 and Tax Declaration No. 9551 issued on September 6, 1966.11

On May 22, 1992, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Director
of Lands, filed an opposition12 to the application. The Republic claimed that the
property is part of the public domain and cannot be subject to private
appropriation.

On August 18, 1992, respondent Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos, through her
SECOND DIVISION husband Ponciano Francisco, filed her opposition13 to the RCAM's application.
She alleged that the property formed part of the entire property that her family
G.R. No. 179181 November 18, 2013 owns and has continuously possessed and occupied from the time of her
grandparents, during the Spanish time, up to the present. Cresencia submitted
the following documents,14 among others, to support her requested confirmation
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, Petitioner, vs.
of imperfect title:
[Link] RAMOS, assisted by her husband PONCIANO
FRANCISCO, Respondent.
1.) the death certificates of Cipriano Sta. Teresa and Eulogia Sta.
Teresa Vda. de Ramos (Cresencia's parents);
DECISION

2.) her marriage certificate;

BRION, J.:
We resolve in this petition for review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court the challenge to the April 10 2007 decision 2 and the August 9, 2007 3.) their children's birth certificates;
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84646. This CA
decision affirmed, with modification, the January 17, 2005 decision 4 of the 4.) certificates of ownership covering two bancas;
Regional Trial Court, Branch 156 of Pasig City (RTC), in LRC Case No. N-5811
that denied the application for confirmation and registration of title filed by the 5.) photographs of these two bane as with her youngest child while
petitioner, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM). standing on the property and showing the location of the RCAM' s
church relative to the location of the property;
The Factual Antecedents
At the core of the controversy in the present petition are two parcels of land – Lot
1 with an area of 34 square meters and Lot 2 with an area of 760 square meters- 6.) photographs of a pile of gravel and sand (allegedly for their gravel
covered by amended Plan PSU-2239195 property), both located in what used to and sand business) on the property;
be Barrio Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. On September 15, 1966, the RCAM filed
before the R TC, (then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 11, acting as a 7.) photographs of the RCAM's bahay ni Maria standing on the property;
land registration court, an application for registration of title 6 (application) of
property, pursuant to Commonwealth Act C.A.) No. 141 (the Public Land Act). 7On 8.) a photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by ESSO Standard
October 4, 1974, the RCAM amended its application8 by reducing Lot 2 to 760 Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products in Bagumbayan,
square meters (from 1,832 square meters). Taguig, Rizal;

In its amended application, the RCAM claimed that it owned the property; that it 9.) a photograph of their La Compania Refreshment Store standing on
acquired the property during the Spanish time; and that since then, it has been in their titled lot adjacent to the property;
open, public, continuous and peaceful possession of it in the concept of an
owner. It added that to the best of its knowledge and belief, no mortgage or
 10.) a photograph of the certificate of dealership given to Ponciano by a interest), as confirmed by the RCAM s witnesses, clearly demonstrated her
Tobacco company for his dealership in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal; and dominion over the property. Thus, while she failed to register the property in her
name or declare it for taxation purposes as pointed out by the RCAM, the CA did
11.) the registration certificate for their family's sheet manufacturing not consider this non-declaration significant to defeat her claim. To the CA,
business situated m Bagumbayan, Taguig,15 Rizal. Cresencia merely tolerated the RCAM s temporary use of the property for lack of
any urgent need for it and only acted to protect her right when the RCAM applied
for registration in its name. Thus, the CA declared that Cresencia correctly waited
The RCAM presented in evidence the following documents, in addition to those until her possession was disturbed before she took action to vindicate her right.
already on record:16 tax declarations issued in its name in 1948, 1973, 1981,
1990, 1993, and 1999;17 the certified true copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
0082 covering the lot in the name of Garcia, which adjoins the property on the The CA similarly disregarded the additional tax declarations that the RCAM
south; and the affidavit of Garcia confirming the RCAM's ownership of the presented in support of its application. The CA pointed out that these documents
property.18 It likewise submitted several testimonial evidence to corroborate its hardly proved the RCAM s alleged ownership of or right to possess the property
ownership and claim of possession of the property. as it failed to prove actual possession. Lastly, the CA held that it was bound by
the findings of facts and the conclusions arrived at by the RTC as they were
amply supported by the evidence.
The ruling of the RTC
In its decision of January 17, 2005, 19 the RTC denied the RCAM's application for
registration of title. The RTC held that the RCAM failed to prove actual The RCAM filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for
possession and ownership of the property applied for. The RTC pointed out that reconsideration.21
the RCAM's only overt act on the property that could be regarded as evidence of
actual possession was its construction of the bahay ni Maria in 1991. Even this Assignment of Errors
act, according to the RTC, did not sufficiently satisfy the actual possession The RCAM argues before us that the CA erred and gravely abused its discretion
requirement of the law as the RCAM did not show how and in what manner it in:22
possessed the property prior to 1991. The RCAM's tax declarations were also
inconclusive since they failed to prove actual possession. 1. confirming the incomplete and imperfect title of the oppositor when the
magnitude of the parties evidence shows that the oppositors merely had
In contrast, the numerous businesses allegedly conducted by Cresencia and her pretended possession that could not ripen into ownership;
family on the property, the various pieces of documentary evidence that she
presented, and the testimony of the RCAM' s own witnesses convinced the RTC 2. failing to consider that the RCAM had continuous, open and notorious
that she and her family actually possessed the property in the manner and for the possession of the property in the concept of an owner for a period of
period required by law. thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application; and

This notwithstanding, the RTC refused to order the issuance of the title in 3. confirming the oppositor’s incomplete and imperfect title despite her
Cresencia's name. The RTC held that Cresencia failed to include in her failure to comply with the substantial and procedural requirements of the
opposition a prayer for issuance of title. Public Land Act.

The RCAM assailed the R TC' s decision before the CA. The Issue
In sum, the core issue for our resolution is who -between the RCAM and
The CA ruling Cresencia -is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and Presidential Decree
In its April 10, 2007 decision,20 the CA affirmed with modification the RTC's (P.D.) No. 1529 for confirmation and registration of imperfect title.
January 17, 2005 ruling. The CA confirmed Cresencia's incomplete and imperfect
title to the property, subject to her compliance with the requisites for registration The Court s Ruling
of title. Preliminary considerations: nature of he issues; factual-issue-bar rule

The CA agreed with the RTC that the totality of the evidence on record In her comment,23 Cresencia primarily points out that the present petition
unquestionably showed that Cresencia was the actual possessor and occupant, essentially questions the CA’s appreciation of the evidence and the credibility of
in the concept of an owner, of the disputed property. The CA held that Cresencia the witnesses who attested to her actual, public and notorious possession of the
s use of the property since the Spanish time (through her predecessors-in- property. She argues that these are questions of fact that are not proper for a
Rule 45 petition. In addition, the findings of the RTC were well supported by the and, therefore, entitled to confirmation and registration under the Land
evidence, had been affirmed by the CA, and are thus binding on this Court. Registration Act.

We are not entirely convinced of the merits of what Cresencia pointed out. The RCAM did not specify the particular provision of C.A. No. 141 under which it
anchored its application for confirmation and registration of title. Nevertheless,
The settled rule is that the jurisdiction of this Court over petitions for review on the allegations in its application and amended application readily show that it
certiorari is limited to the review of questions of law and not of fact. "A question of based its claim of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141. As
law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law amended by P.D. No. 1073 on January 25, 1977, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141
or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an currently provides:
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of the facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when a doubt or Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
calibration of the whole evidence x x x as well as their relation to each other and whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
to the whole, and the probability of the situation."24 First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located
for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
An examination of the RCAM's issues shows that the claimed errors indeed under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
primarily question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the lower courts' xxxx
conclusion that Cresencia, and not the RCAM, had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the period required by law. When the presented (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
question centers on the sufficiency of the evidence, it is a question of fact 25 and is been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
barred in a Rule 45 petition. agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
Nevertheless, jurisprudence recognizes certain exceptions to the settled rule. application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
When the lower courts grossly misunderstood the facts and circumstances that, majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
when correctly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion, a review of the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
lower courts' findings may be made. 26 This, in our view, is the exact situation in title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
the case as our discussions below will show.
Prior to the amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1073, Section 48(b) of C.A. No.
Moreover, the RCAM also questions the propriety of the CA s confirmation of 141, then operated under the Republic Act R.A.) No. 1942 (June 22, 1957)
Cresencia's title over the property although she was not the applicant and was amendment which reads:
merely the oppositor in the present confirmation and registration proceedings.
Stated in question form -was the CA justified under the law and jurisprudence in (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
its confirmation of the oppositor's title over the property? This, in part, is a been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
question of law as it concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
recognized facts. ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
Hence, we find it imperative to resolve the petition on the merits. majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphases and italics ours]
Requirements for confirmation and registration of imperfect and incomplete title
under C.A. No. 141 and P.D. No. 1529
Since the RCAM filed its application on September 15, 1966 and its amended
application on October 4, 1974, Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by
C.A. No. 141 governs the classification and disposition of lands of the public R.A. No. 1942 (which then required possession of thirty years), governs.
domain. Section 11 of C.A. No. 141 provides, as one of the modes of disposing
public lands that are suitable for agriculture, the "confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles." Section 48, on the other hand, enumerates those who are In relation to C.A. No. 141, Section 14 of Presidential Decree P.D.) No. 1529 or
considered to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over public lands the Property Registration Decree specifies those who are qualified to register
their incomplete title over an alienable and disposable public land under the
Torrens system. P.D. No. 1529, which was approved on June 11, 1978, The RTC and the CA as it affirmed the RTC, dismissed the RCAM s application
superseded and codified all laws relative to the registration of property. for its failure to comply with the second requirement – possession of the property
in the manner and for the period required by law.
The pertinent portion of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 reads:
We find no reason to disturb the RTC and the CA findings on this point. They had
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of carefully analyzed and weighed each piece of the RCAM s evidence to support
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to its application and had extensively explained in their respective decisions why
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: they could not give weight to these pieces of evidence. Hence, we affirm their
denial of the RCAM' s application. For greater certainty, we expound on the
reasons below.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of a. The RC M failed to prove possession of the property in the manner and for the
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. [italics ours] period required by law

Under these legal parameters, applicants in a judicial confirmation of imperfect The possession contemplated by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 is actual, not
title may register their titles upon a showing that they or their predecessors-in- fictional or constructive. In Carlos v Republic of the Philippines, 29 the Court
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and explained the character of the required possession, as follows:
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, 27 since June 12, 1945, or earlier (or for at The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated
least 30 years in the case of the RCAM) immediately preceding the filing of the by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one
application for confirmation of title. The burden of proof in these cases rests on synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
the applicants who must demonstrate clear, positive and convincing evidence includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
that: (1) the property subject of their application is alienable and disposable land occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive
of the public domain; and (2) their alleged possession and occupation of the possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
property were of the length and of the character required by law.28 notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land
On the issue of whether the RC M is entitled to the benefits of C A No. 141 and consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
P.D. No. 1529 party would naturally exercise over his own property.

Reiterating its position before the RTC and the CA, the RCAM now argues that it Accordingly, to prove its compliance with Section 48(b)' s possession
actually, continuously, openly and notoriously possessed the property since time requirement, the RCAM had to show that it performed specific overt acts in the
immemorial. It points out that its tax declarations covering the property, while not character an owner would naturally exercise over his own property. Proof of
conclusive evidence of ownership, are proof of its claim of title and constitute as actual possession of the property at the time of the filing of the application is
sufficient basis for inferring possession. required because the phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept
of owner," the RCAM used to describe its alleged possession, is a conclusion of
law,30 not an allegation of fact. Possession is open when it is patent, visible,
For her part, Cresencia counters that the RCAM failed to discharge its burden of apparent [and] notorious x x x continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not
proving possession in the concept of an owner. She argues that the testimonies intermittent or occasional; exclusive when [the possession is characterized by
of the RCAM s witnesses were replete with inconsistencies and betray the acts manifesting] exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to
weakness of its claimed possession. Cresencia adds that at most, the RCAM s [the applicant's] own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous
possession was by her mere tolerance which, no matter how long, can never that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
ripen into ownership. She also points out that the RCAM s tax declarations are neighborhood."31
insufficient proof of possession as they are not, by themselves, conclusive
evidence of ownership.
Very noticeably, the RCAM failed to show or point to any specific act
characterizing its claimed possession in the manner described above. The
We do not see any merit in the RCAM s contentions. various documents that it submitted, as well as the bare assertions it made and
those of its witnesses, that it had been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the property, hardly constitute the "well-nigh fact, the RCAM seemed to be uncertain of the exact area it allegedly possesses
incontrovertible evidence required in cases of this nature. 32 We elaborate below and over which it claims ownership. The total area that the RCAM applied for, as
on these points. stated in its amended application and the amended survey plan, was 794 square
meters (34 square meters for Lot 1 and 760 square meters for Lot 2). Yet, in its
First, the tax declarations issued in the RCAM's name in 1948, 1966, 1977, 1984, various tax declarations issued even after it filed its amended application, the
1990, 1993 and 1999 did not in any way prove the character of its possession total area declared under its name was still 1,832 square meters. Notably, the
over the property. Note that the settled rule is that tax declarations are not area stated in its 1948 tax declaration was only 132.30 square meters, while the
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when not area stated in the subsequently issued tax declaration (1966) was 1,832 square
supported by any other evidence showing actual, public and adverse meters. Significantly, the RCAM did not account for or provide sufficient
possession.33 The declaration for taxation purposes of property in the names of explanation for this increase in the area; thus, it appeared uncertain on the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest may constitute specific area claimed.
collaborating evidence only when coupled with other acts of possession and
ownership;34 standing alone, it is inconclusive. Fourth, the RCAM did not build any permanent structure or any other
improvement that clearly announces its claim of ownership over the property.
This rule applies even more strongly in this case since the RCAM's payments of Neither did it account for any act of occupation, development, maintenance or
taxes due on the property were inconsistent and random. Interestingly, while the cultivation for the duration of time it was allegedly in possession of it. The "bahay
RCAM asserts that it had been in possession of the property since the Spanish ni Maria" where the RCAM conducts its fiesta-related and Lenten activities could
time, the earliest tax declaration that it could present was that issued in 1948. hardly satisfy the possession requirement of C.A. No. 141. As found out by the
Also, when it filed its application in 1966 and its amended application in 197 4, CA, this structure was constructed only in 1991 and not at the time of, or prior to,
the RCAM presented only two tax declarations (issued in 1948 and 1966) the filing of its application in 1966.
covering the property. And since then, up to the issuance of the January 1 7,
2005 decision of the R TC, the RCAM presented only five other tax declarations - Last, the RCAM s testimonial evidence hardly supplemented the inherent
those issued in 1977, 1984, 1990, 1993 and 1999. The case of Tan v. inadequacy of its documentary evidence. While apparently confirming the RCAM
Republic35 teaches us that this type of intermittent and sporadic assertion of s claim, the testimonies were undoubtedly hearsay and were not based on
alleged ownership does not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the RCAM’s claimed
possession and occupation. actual, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession.

Second, even if we were to consider the RCAM' s tax declarations as basis for b. The RC M failed to prove that the property is alienable and disposable land of
inferring possession, 36 the RCAM still failed to prove actual possession of the he public domain
property for the required duration. As already noted, the earliest tax declaration
that it presented was for 1948. We are in fact inclined to believe that the RCAM Most importantly, we find the RCAM s evidence to be insufficient since it failed to
first declared the property in its name only in 1948 as this tax declaration does comply with the first and most basic requirement – proof of the alienable and
not appear to have cancelled any previously-issued tax declaration. Thus, when it disposable character of the property. Surprisingly, no finding or pronouncement
filed its application in 1966, it was in possession of the property for only eighteen referring to this requirement was ever made in the decisions of the R TC and the
years, counted from 1948. Even if we were to count the possession period from CA.
the filing of its amended application in 1974, its alleged possession (which was
only for twenty-six years counted from 1948) would still be short of the thirty-year
period required by Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by RA No. 1942. To prove that the property is alienable and disposable, the RCAM was bound to
The situation would be worse if we were to consider the amendment introduced establish "the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
by P.D. No. 1073 to Section 48(b) where, for the RCAM's claimed possession of proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports
the property to give rise to an imperfect title, this possession should have of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute." 38 It could
commenced on June 12, 1945 or earlier. have also secured a certification from the government that the property applied
for was alienable and disposable.39 Our review of the records shows that this
evidence is fatally absent and we are in fact disappointed to note that both the
Third, the amended plan Psu-223919, technical description for Lots 1 and 2, and RTC and the CA appeared to have simply assumed that the property was
surveyor s certificate only prove the identity of the property that the RCAM sought alienable and disposable.
to register in its name.37 While these documents plot the location, the area and
the boundaries of the property, they hardly prove that the RCAM actually
possessed the property in the concept of an owner for the required duration. In
We cannot tolerate this kind of approach for two basic reasons. One, in this The RCAM lastly argues that the evidence belies Cresencia's claim of
jurisdiction, all lands belong to the State regardless of their classification. 40 This continuous, open and notorious possession since the Spanish time. The RCAM
rule, more commonly known as the Regalian doctrine, applies with equal force points out that, first, Cresencia failed to declare for taxation purposes the
even to private unregistered lands, unless the contrary is satisfactorily shown. property in her name, thus effectively indicating that she did not believe herself to
Second, unless the date when the property became alienable and disposable is be its owner. Second, Cresencia did not have the property surveyed in her name
specifically identified, any determination on the RCAM' s compliance with the so that she could assert her claim over it and show its metes and bounds. Third,
second requirement is rendered useless as any alleged period of possession Cresencia did not register the property in her name although she previously
prior to the date the property became alienable and disposable can never be registered the adjoining lot in her name. Fourth, Cresencia did not construct any
counted in its favor as any period of possession and occupation of public lands in permanent structure on the property and no traces of the businesses allegedly
the concept of owner, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.41 conducted by her and by her family on it could be seen at the time it filed its
application. And fifth, Cresencia did not perform any act of dominion that, by the
On this ground alone, the R TC could have outrightly denied the RCAM' s established jurisprudential definition, could be sufficiently considered as actual
application. possession.

On the CA’s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in land registration We agree with the RCAM on most of these points.
proceedings
While we uphold the CA' s authority to confirm the title of the oppositor in a
The RCAM next argues that the CA’s act of confirming Cresencia's title over the confirmation and registration proceedings, we cannot agree, however, with the
property is contrary to law and jurisprudence. The RCAM points out that it filed conclusion the CA reached on the nature of Cresencia's possession of the
the application for registration of title under the provisions of C.A. No. 141 or property.
alternatively under P.D. No. 1529; both statutes dictate several substantive and
procedural requirements that must first be complied with before title to the Under the same legal parameters we used to affirm the RTC's denial of the
property is confirmed and registered. In affirming Cresencia's title without any RCAM' s application, we also find insufficient the evidence that Cresencia
evidence showing her compliance with these requirements, it claims that the CA, presented to prove her claimed possession of the property in the manner and for
in effect, made Cresencia the applicant entitled to the benefits of the land the period required by C.A. No. 141. Like the RCAM, Cresencia was bound to
registration proceedings that it initiated before the lower court. adduce evidence that irrefutably proves her compliance with the requirements for
confirmation of title. To our mind, she also failed to discharge this burden of
We differ with this view. proof; thus, the CA erred when it affirmed the contrary findings of the RTC and
confirmed Cresencia’s title over the property.
Section 29 of P.D. No. 1529 gives the court the authority to confirm the title of
either the applicant or the oppositor in a land registration proceeding depending We arrive at this conclusion for the reasons outlined below.
on the conclusion that the evidence calls for. Specifically, Section 29 provides
that the court "x x x after considering the evidence x x x finds that the applicant or First, the various pieces of documentary evidence that Cresencia presented to
the oppositor has sufficient title proper for registration, judgment shall be support her own claim of imperfect title hardly proved her alleged actual
rendered confirming the title of the applicant, or the oppositor, to the land x x x x." possession of the property. Specifically, the certificates of marriage, birth and
(emphases and italics ours) death did not particularly state that each of these certified events, i.e. marriage,
birth and death, in fact transpired on the claimed property; at best, the certificates
Thus, contrary to the RCAM's contention, the CA has the authority to confirm the proved the occurrence of these events in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal and on the
title of Cresencia, as the oppositor, over the property. This, of course, is subject stated dates, respectively.
to Cresencia's satisfaction of the evidentiary requirement of P D No. 1529, in
relation with C.A. No. 141 in support of her own claim of imperfect title over the Similarly, the certificate of ownership of two bancas in the name of Ponciano, the
property. registration certificate for their family s sheet manufacturing business, the
photograph of the certificate of dealership in the name of Ponciano given by a
The issue of whether Cresencia is entitled to the benefits of C.A. No. 141 and tobacco company, and the photograph of the plaque awarded to Ponciano by
P.D. No. 1529 ESSO Standard Philippines as sole dealer of its gasoline products did not prove
that Cresencia and her family conducted these businesses on the disputed
property itself. Rather, they simply showed that at one point in time, Cresencia
and her family conducted these businesses in Bagumbayan, Taguig, Rizal. In For all these reasons, we find that the CA erred when it affirmed the RTC's ruling
fact, Cresencia s claim that they conducted their gasoline dealership business on on this matter and confirmed Cresencia's imperfect title to the
the property is belied by the testimony of a witness who stated that the gas [Link], in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the
station was located north (or the other side) of Cresencia s titled lot and not on petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the decision dated April 10, 2007 and
the property.42 the resolution dated August 9, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84646 to the extent described below:
The presence on the property, as shown by photographs, of Cresencia s
daughter, of the two bancas owned by her family, and of the pile of gravel and 1. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals as it affirmed the
sand they allegedly used in their gravel and sand business also hardly count as January 17 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
acts of occupation, development or maintenance that could have been sufficient Branch 156, in LRC Case No. N-5811 that DENIED the application for
as proof of actual possession. The presence of these objects and of Cresencia s confirmation and registration of title filed by the petitioner, Roman
daughter on the property was obviously transient and impermanent; at most, they Catholic Archbishop of Manila; and
proved that Cresencia and her family used the property for a certain period of
time, albeit, briefly and temporarily. 2. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the confirmation made by the Court of
Appeals of the title over the property in the name of respondent
Finally, the records show that the La Compania Refreshment Store business Cresencia Sta. Teresa Ramos for lack of sufficient evidentiary basis.
(that they allegedly conducted on the property) actually stood on their titled lot
adjoining the property. Costs against the petitioner.

Second, while Cresencia registered in her name the adjoining lot (which they had SO ORDERED.
been occupying at the time the RCAM filed its application and where their La
Compania Refreshment Store stood), she never had the property registered in
her name. Neither did Cresencia or her predecessors-in-interest declare the
property for taxation purposes nor had the property surveyed in their names to
properly identify it and to specifically determine its metes and bounds. The
declaration for taxation purposes of property in their names would have at least
served as proof that she or her predecessors-in-interest had a claim over the
property43 that could be labeled as "possession" if coupled with proof of actual
possession.

Finally, the testimonies of Ponciano and Florencia Francisco Mariano

(Cresencia's daughter) on the nature and duration of their family's alleged
possession of the property, other than being self-serving, were mere general
statements and could not have constituted the factual evidence of possession
that the law requires. They also failed to point out specific acts of dominion or
ownership that were performed on the property by the parents of Cresencia, their
predecessors-in-interest. They likewise failed to present any evidence that could
have corroborated their alleged possession of the property from the time of their
grandfather, Cipriano, who acquired the property from its previous owner,
Petrona Sta. Teresa. Interestingly, other than Ponciano and Florencia, none of
the witnesses on record seemed to have known that Cresencia owns or at least
claims ownership of the property.

At any rate, even if we were to consider these pieces of evidence to be sufficient,

which we do not, confirmation and registration of title over the property in
Cresencia' s name was still improper in the absence of competent and
persuasive evidence on record proving that the property is alienable and
disposable.
 is public land. The brothers Felipe, Jose and Salvador, all surnamed Narag, who
are first cousin to the applicant Lasam, also filed opposition on the ground that
they are the owners of parcels No. 9. Opposition were also filed by Tomas
Furigay and 35 other persons as homesteaders; by the provincial fiscal,
representing the Directors of Forestry, on the ground that portions thereof are
public forest; by Francisco Caronan and some 71 others parties, claiming the
parcels occupied by them as their exclusive properties; by Jose Chan Hong Hin,
on the ground that the applicant includes his property of about 22 hectares and
50 ares; and by Mauro Antonio, on the ground that the applicant includes the
portion occupied by him and belonging to him. Pablo Soriano succeeded in
having the order of general default set aside as to him and was allowed to
registered his opposition at a latter date. Amendede applications and oppositions
by the parties were subsequently permitted to be filed.

After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the oppositions filed,
declaring the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9 as indicated in
the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in his
favor.

On September 10, 1934, counsel for various oppositors, after excepting to the
decision, filed a motion for new trial which was denied, and the case was brought
before this court by bill of exceptions.

The Narag brothers and the Directors of Forestry appear to have abandoned
EN BANC their opposition. They made no attempt to substantiate their claims at the trial.

G.R. No. L-42859 March 17, 1938 Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al. make
various assignments of error in their respective briefs. It is not believe necessary
however, to consider each and every assignment made as the questions
GABRIEL LASAM, applicant-appellee, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and
presented may, in our opinion, be reduced to the following propositions: (a)
JOSE CHAN HONG HIN, ET AL., opponents-appellants.
Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to the registered of parcel
No. 9 on the basis of the document presented as Exhibit L, hereinafter to be
LAUREL, J.: referred to, or in the alternative, whether or not he is entitled to registered on the
On January 24, 1930, Gabriel Lasam filed with the Court of First Instance of basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership
Cagayan an application for the registration of 152 parcels of land containing a during the time prescribed by law (par. 9, application); and the negative, (b)
total area of 24,723,436 square meters, situated in the municipality of Solana, whether or not the numerous oppositors — excluding the homesteader — are
Province of Cagayan, described in the plan Exhibit K attached to the application. entitled to the parcels which they allege are included in the controverted parcel
These 152 parcels include the parcel No. 9 here involved. No. 9. The rights of the homesteader necessarily depend on the resolution of
these two propositions.
According to the lower court, the portions of said parcel No. 9 which opposed
during the time of survey were delimited and marked on its plan Psu-67516 Exhibit L purports to be an application dated June 27, 1873 addressed by
attached to the record as lots A to Z, AA to HH, MM to ZZ, AAA to ZZZ, AAAA to Domingo Narag 1.º to the Alcalde Mayor, in which the former stated that he had
ZZZZ, AAAAA, to FFFFF, NNNNN, 35 to 38, and 111 to 143, all inclusive. been in possession of the land above described and asked that informacion
(Decision of the lower court, Bill of Exception of the Government, p. 35.) testifical be admitted. The informacion testifical was had before the Alcalde
Mayor and appears to have been approved by the Judge of the Court of First
The Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that it is not Instance without objection on the part of the fiscal. It is the theory of the applicant
supported by any title fit for registration and that the land sought to be registered that Domingo Narag 1.º the original owner of parcel No. 5, described in Exhibit L,
owned P1,000 from the applicant's which amount Narag needed for his
candidacy gobernadorcillo of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in 1880; that the original of the land, and on the south side he indicated to me the provincial road. I
Exhibit L was turned over by the applicant to his lawyer, Vicente Marasigan, who asked why he should not take the actual land indicated by this title and
lost it, and for this reason, only a certificate copy of the document marked Exhibit he told me that he was not occupying that portion . That is the reason
L presented; and that the fifth parcel mentioned in the document, Exhibit L, is the why I took up the boundary on the south as provincial road. On the east
parcel No. 9 described in the plan, Exhibit K. The Government contends that side he indicated to me the center of the municipality of Solana, barrios
Exhibit L is not a valid titled and does not confer ownership that even if it were of Basi, Nangalisan and Lanna, and on the west is a public land party
valid, it does not cover so extensive an area as that appearing on the plan, bounded by the barrios of Maguirig, and Cagguban and estero Pangul.
Exhibit K.
An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title
The land designated as the fifth parcel is described in Exhibit L as follows: thereto, must prove not only the genuiness of his title but the indentity of the land
therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for
5.ª Un terreno o pasto de ganados vacunos llamado Marguirig o registration or not at all. If as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is
Cagguban que linda al poniente con el estero Pagul, oriente con el included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be
pueblo de la Solana al norte con el sitio llamado y Calabbacao y al sur registered is included in that title. The surveyor, Jose Mallannao, did not actually
con el sitio llamado Atayo el cual tiene un cabida de siete mil brazaz y check up the boundaries of parcel No. 5, as described in Exhibit L, and in
herede de mis Padres hace viente y dos años y en la actualidad es testifying that parcel No. 9, in Exhibit K, is smaller than that described as parcel
donde mis granados de procreacion. No. 5 in Exhibit L, he relied on hearsay. For instance, when asked whether north
of barrios Iraga, Bauan and Bangag of the land described in plan Exhibit K, he
would locate the sitios of Maasin and Calabacao, he replied: "They said that
Parcel No. 9, the registration of which is applied for in these proceedings, is Calabbacao is north of that barrio Iraga yet." (Emphasis ours.)
described thus (brief of claimant-appellee p. 61):
Aside from what has been said with reference to discrepanies in the boundaries,
Por el norte con barrios de Iraga, Bauan y Bangag; we cannot overlook the fact that the area in Exhibit L is vaguely given as 7,000
Por el este con el Centro y los barrios de Basi, Natapian y Lanna; brazas. The surveyor for the applicant, Jose Mallannao, calculated the area of
Por el sur con la carretera provincial; y the property described in paragraph 5 of Exhibit L on the basis of 7,000 square
Por el oeste barrios de Maguirig, Cagguban y estero Pangul. brazas or 49,000,00 square as 15,695,500 hectares more or less (s.n. pp. 820-
822). The area claimed here according to the amended application of February
We are of the opinion that the court below committed no error in receiving Exhibit 26, 1930, and the plan Exhibit K is 24,723,437 square meters. According to the
L as evidence for the claimant, but its admission by the court does not applicant before his occupation of the land ceded by Domingo Narag 1.º, only
necessarily entitled the applicant Gabriel Lasam, to the registration of the parcel about 2 hectares were cultivated. (s.n. p. 56, Gabriel Lasam.) And, with
claimed by him in these proceedings. It is apparent that parcel No. 9, as indicated reference to the payment of the land tax, the Solicitor-General in his brief (p. 12)
in the plan, Exhibit K, is not the same parcel No. 5 described in document Exhibit makes the following observation:
L. Whereas Exhibit L gives as boundaries on the north the sitios of Maasin and
Calabbacao, Exhibit K gives the barrios of Iraga, Bauan, and Bangag; on the east The property appears to have been declared for taxation purposes as
Exhibit L gives the pueblo of Solana, whereas Exhibit K gives "el Centro y los evidenced by revisions of tax declarations, Exhibit G-20 and G-21 (pp.
barrios de Basi, Natappian y Lanna"; on the west Exhibit L gives estero Pangul, 136, 137, record). There had been previous declarations with an area of
whereas Exhibit K gives the barrios of Maguirig, Cagguban and estero Pangul; about 294 hectares (id.) but, according to Exhibit G-22 (p. 138, record),
on the south Exhibit L gives the sitio of Atayao, whereas Exhibit K gives the area which was not previously declared contains 1,685 hectares.
the carretera provincial. While there may be partial indentity as to boundaries on
the east and west, such indentity is lacking as to the boundaries on the north and
south. This discrepancy is accentuated by the admmission of the applicant that With the exception of a statement in which it appears that tax was paid
the parcel whose registered is sought is much smaller than that described in in 1902 (p. 140, id.) there appears in the record no tax receipts
paragraph 5 of Exhibit L. The explanation given by the surveyors Jose Mallanao, evidencing the payment of taxes continuously from 1902 up to this time.
presented as witness by the claimant, is a follows:
It is not necessary to pass upon the contention of the Solicitor-General that the
Because on the north side when we went around the lot and I asked for informacion testifical (Exhibit L) is no legal effect because of failure subsequently
the barrios of Maasin and Calabacao the applicant pointed to me a place to solicit composition title pursuant to the Royal Decree of June 25, 19880
very far from where he was at the time and where he actually occupied (Fuster vs. Director of Lands, G.R. No. 40129, Dec. 29, 1934), or to convert
possession into a registration of ownership in accordance with article 393 of the
Mortgage law (Fernandez Hermanos vs. Director of Lands, 57 Phil., 929), for proven to be the exclusive property of the husband Gabriel Lasam". This court
even if we were to accord all the legal force to this document (Exhibit L), it would not have passed upon the question whether parcel No. 7 was the same parcel
not serve as a basis for the registration of 24,723,437 square meters. No. 9 in these proceedings; nor could it have passed upon the conflicting claims
with reference to parcel No. 9, now sought to be registered. Whatever was said in
Having arrived at this conclusion as to Exhibit L, is the applicant entitled to that case could not bind the oppositors in the present case, who were not parties
registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by thereto.
law? We have examined the evidence on this point both testimonial and
documentary, and while there is evidence showing that the claimant might have The grounds for opposition of the various oppositors are divergent and are based
possessed a portion of the parcel claimed by him and the registration of which is on (a) possession from time immemorial: (b) acquisition by inheritance, purchase
sought, we find the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular portion and donations propters nuptias and inter vivos; (c) payment of land taxes from
occupied and the extend thereof. Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine 1906, 1915 and 1918 up to the filing of oppositions; and (d) acquisition "a titulo
laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil., 175, 180). (See also de composicion" with the State. These oppositors denied tenants of the applicant
Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil., 302, 304.) But it should be observed that Lasam. After persual of the evidence presented by them, we are constrained to
the applicant of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to accept the conclusion of the lower court that none of the portions or lots claimed
certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe that among these by them or any one of them has been sufficiently identified, either by the oral or
qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy documentary evidence which they presented. In view thereof, and because of the
with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant." While, insufficiency of the evidence presented, we are of the opinion that the lower court
therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to committed no error in dismissing their oppositions.
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession", possession under paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as In view of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court is reserved, without
amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere prejudice to the filing by the applicant. Gabriel Lasam, of a new application and
nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify plan covering the portion of the land actually occupied by him since July 25,
a Magellan like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession 1894. Upon the determination of that portion by the lower court, let judgement be
as a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere rendered accordingly. The remaining portion or portions of lot No. 9 as indicated
fiction. In the present case, upon the description of 7,000 brazas as the area of on plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K) are hereby declared public lands, to be disposed
the land said have been originally possessed by Domingo Narag 1.º and of or otherwise death with in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to
conveyed to the applicant, only two hectares of which were according to the costs. So ordered.
applicant cultivated at the time of such transfer, the applicant would on the basis
of the computation hereinabove referred to and given at the trial by surveyor Jose
Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 13,000 hectares, although
only 2,432 odd hectares are now being sought for registration in these
proceedings. The fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the land
claimed by him to be included in his title, the further fact that according to his own
testimony he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of Forestry,
the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax declarations, and the existence of
numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant and tend to show that his
possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be registered is not "such
as to apprise the community and the world that the entire land was for his
enjoyment." (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

Our attention is next directed to the decision of this court in Pamittan vs. Lasam
and Mallonga (60 Phil., 908) which according to counsel for the claimant Lasam,
is determinative of the ownership of the property now sought to be registered.
Said case refers to an action for partition between the heirs of Sofia Pamittan,
wife of Gabriel Lasam, originally brought in the Court of First Instance and
appealed to this court. The trial court in that case found that parcel No. 7 —
which is said to correspond to parcel No. 9 sought to be registered in these
proceedings — "although during the existence of the conjugal partnership, was
 No. N-11379, which granted the petitioner's application for land registration of
three (3) parcels of land situated in Taguig, Metro Manila (subject properties).

The petitioner, through its authorized representative Ronnie P. Inocencio

(Inocencio), filed with the RTC on June 4, 1998 an application for registration of
the subject properties situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, with
an area of 27,477 square meters, 23,179 sq m and 45,636 sq m, more
particularly described as follows:

SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-D, containing an

area of Twenty[-]Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy[-] Seven (27,477)
square meters, more or less; SWO-00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071,
Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Twenty[-] Three Thousand One Hundred
Seventy[-]Nine (23,179) square meters, more or less; and SWO-00-001773,
being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D, containing an area of Forty[-]Five
Thousand Six Hundred Thirty[-]Six (45,636) square meters, more or less, all
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) or
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended x x x.5

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, interposed its opposition to
the application.1avvphi1 During the initial hearing of the case on May 4, 1999,
the petitioner presented and marked documentary evidence6 to prove its
compliance with jurisdictional requirements.7

On October 25, 1999, the petitioner was allowed to present its evidence before
the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC. Inocencio, the petitioner’s sales manager,
testified that the subject properties were purchased on August 28, 1989 by the
petitioner from sellers Magdalena Samonte, Jaime Aldana and Virgilio Navarro.
The properties were declared for taxation purposes on August 9, [Link] the
sale, the petitioner occupied the properties and planted thereon crops like rice,
corn and vegetables.8
THIRD DIVISION
Witness Cenon Serquiña (Serquiña) supported the application for registration by
G.R. No. 188494 November 26, 2014 claiming that he had been the caretaker of the subject properties since 1957,
long before the lots were purchased by the petitioner. Serquiña alleged that no
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE person other than the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had claimed
PHILIPPINES, Respondent. ownership or rights over the subject properties.9

DECISION On November 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision10 granting the petitioner’s
application. The decretal portion of its decision reads:
REYES, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by Remman Enterprises, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the Applicant, Remman
Inc. (petitioner) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to assail the Decision 2 dated Enterprises, Inc., represented in this matter by its representative, Ronnie P.
May 23, 2008 and Resolution3 dated June 22, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) Inocencio, the absolute owner in fee simple of three (3) parcels of land, all
in CA-G.R. CV No. 74418. The CA reversed the Decision 4 dated November 27, located at Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, more particularly described
2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in LR Case as follows:
1.) SWO-00-001771, being a conversion of Lot 3079, Mcadm-590-D;
 2.) SWO-00-001768, being a conversion of Lot 3071, Mcadm-590-D; subject however to certain conditions. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the
and original clothing plans that cover the subject properties do not form part of the
3.) SWO-00-001773, being a conversion of Lot 3082, Mcadm-590-D case records. The Court has nonetheless held in Republic v. Espinosa:16

together with their corresponding technical descriptions. As ruled in Republic v. Guinto-Aldana, the identity of the land, its boundaries and
location can be established by other competent evidence apart from the original
Once the foregoing Decision has become final, let the corresponding decree of tracing cloth such as a duly executed blueprint of the survey plan and technical
registration issue. SO ORDERED.11 description:

Dissatisfied, the State appealed to the CA by alleging substantive and procedural "Yet if the reason for requiring an applicant to adduce in evidence the original
defects in the petitioner’s application. It argued that the identity of the subject tracing cloth plan is merely to provide a convenient and necessary means to
properties was not sufficiently established. The State further claimed that the afford certainty as to the exact identity of the property applied for registration and
character and length of possession required by law in land registration cases to ensure that the same does not overlap with the boundaries of the adjoining
were not satisfied by the petitioner. lots, there stands to be no reason why a registration application must be denied
for failure to present the original tracing cloth plan, especially where it is
accompanied by piecesof evidence—such as a duly executed blueprint of the
Finding merit in the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision. The dispositive survey plan and a duly executed technical description of the property—which
portion of the CA Decision dated May 23, 2008 reads: may likewise substantially and with as much certainty prove the limits and extent
of the property sought to be registered."17 (Citations omitted)
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED NOVEMBER 27, 2001is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and this case is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.12 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the CA’s dismissal of the petitioner’s application
for original registration was proper considering the latter’s failure to sufficiently
The CA explained that the survey plans and technical descriptions submitted by establish that the subject properties were already declared alienable and
the petitioner failed to establish the true identity of the subject properties. The disposable by the government. Its reliance on a Report, 18 issued by the CENRO,
application should have been accompanied by the original tracing cloth plan duly DENR National Capital Region, West Sector, was misplaced. The Court ruled in
approved by the Director of Lands.13 The petitioner should have also submitted a Republic v. Medida:19
certification from the proper government office stating that the properties were
already declared alienable and disposable.14 The CA further cited a failure to In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,this Court explained that a Provincial
establish that the petitioner and its predecessors-in-interest possessed the Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by
subject parcels of land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 itself, fails toprove the alienable and disposable character of a parcel of land. We
or earlier.15 ruled:

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioner to assail the [I]t is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
CA’s dismissal of its application for land registration. The petitioner argues that disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR
the identity of the subject properties was sufficiently established through the Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
submission of the original tracing cloth plans, survey plans and technical domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
descriptions. The alienable and disposable character of the properties was also for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by
duly established via a certification issued by the Community Environment and the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
Natural Resources (DENR). Further, it claims that it and its predecessors-in- certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official [Link] facts
interest possessed the parcels of land in the nature and within the length of time must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
required by law. Respondents failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent
do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. x x x.
The petition is dismissible. xxxx

On the matter of proof of the subject property’s identity, jurisprudence provides The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original
that the presentation of the original tracing cloth plan may be dispensed with, registration be accompanied by: (1) CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. x x x. 20 (Citations
omitted and emphasis in the original)

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must
provethat the properties subject of the application are alienable and
disposable.21 Even the notations on the survey plans submitted by the petitioner
cannot be admitted asevidence of the subject properties’ alienability and
disposability. Such notations do not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that the subject properties remain part of the
inalienable public domain.22

Given the foregoing, the dismissal of the petitioner's application for registration
was proper. Under pertinent laws and jurisprudence, the petitioner had to
sufficiently establish that: first, the subject properties form part of the disposable
and alienable lands of the public domain; second, the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession anq occupation of the same; and third, the possession is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.23

Without sufficient proof that the subject properties had been declared alienable
and disposable, the Court finqs no reason to look further into the petitioner's
claim that the CA erred in' finding that it failed to satisfy the nature and length of
possession that could qualify for land registration. WHEREFORE, the petition if
DENIED. The Decision dated May 23, 2008 and Resolution dated Jun~ 22, 2009
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74418 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.