Introduction

Regional organizations emerged in the context of post-Second World War with the formation of the
United Nations in 1945 emphasizing multilateral cooperation for peace and development at a global
scale. The Cold War era also saw the expansion and prominence of regionalism as states sought political
coherence, economic growth, and security, particularly in the Global South, where issues of poverty and
instability were ubiquitous (Fawcett, 2013). In 1985, in Dhaka, the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) was founded with eight member countries to advance the socio-economic welfare,
full regional development, and mutual understanding followed by trust among South Asia’s peoples.
Although SAARC made some contributions toward cooperation in the areas of agriculture, education,
and disaster management, political rivalries among the members notably between India and Pakistan
limited its overall effectiveness (SAARC Secretariat, 2020; Hussain, 2017). In the same year as SAARC’s
founding, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) began from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, later
joined by Afghanistan and other Central Asian states, to utilize the Silk Road as a trade, energy, and
communications route. However, despite its purported strategic vision, the ECO has not been as
successful as a regional association due to inadequate infrastructure and geopolitical hindrances (ECO
Secretariat, 2017; Kiani, 2011).

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was created in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five” consisting of
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, with a primary goal of resolving border problems
and establishing trust (Aris, 2011). Uzbekistan joined in 2001, and the organization was renamed the
SCO, which added to the goals of regional security and counter-terrorism, separatism and extremism,
laid out under the Shanghai Conventions. The SCO eventually expanded its agenda to include economic
cooperation and energy security, as well as cultural exchange, transforming itself into a broad-based
regional organization (Weitz, 2019). It now has several key bodies, including the Council of Heads of
State, Council of Heads of Government and the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent,
which manage coordination of intelligence and counter-terrorism activities (Lo, 2019). In 2017, a key
turning point occurred when India and Pakistan joined as full member states, broadening the
organization’s scope in South Asia and representing nearly half of the world’s population, but also
bringing more concerns of political and strategic challenges due to their longstanding bilateral tensions
that could threaten organizational unity and effectiveness (Aris, 2011).
Joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provides Pakistan with new opportunities to
enhance its regional presence, improve economic prospects, and advance its diplomatic and security
role across Eurasia. Being a member of the SCO provides Pakistan with the opportunity to develop closer
ties with Central Asian states that are rich in energy resources and will undoubtedly be critical to
Pakistan’s attempts to deal with chronic energy shortages and to fulfil its industrial needs. Pakistan now
has access to energy projects across the region through the SCO and can even take advantage of energy-
sharing agreements, such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, which to will
diversify its energy supply. Pakistan’s location also makes the country a natural transit hub facilitating
connections between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. By working to combine projects like
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Gwadar Port into broader regional connectivity
schemes via the SCO, Pakistan has the potential to become a strategically placed hub in regional trade
routes and serve as a link between regional logistics networks (Weitz, 2019). This potential outcome can
also result in new export markets for Pakistan’s products, an influx of foreign direct investment (FDI),
and greater access to affordable energy supplies—each of which is essential to stimulating national
economic growth.

In terms of diplomacy and security, being a member of the SCO has made it possible for Pakistan to
engage in regional security dialogues. Through this mechanism, Pakistan can engage and share
intelligence and take part in counter terrorist exercises and strategies with member states via the SCO’s
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent (Lo, 2019). This mechanism increases
Pakistan’s ability to confront internal security challenges, including across-border terrorism and
militancy, while fostering confidence with its neighboring states. The SCO has allowed Pakistan to
demonstrate to other countries that it can be responsible and cooperative member of the global
community committed to peace and stability in its region. The SCO provides Pakistan with the
opportunity to strengthen its key strategic relationships with Russia and China, both global strategic
powers. These relationships provide alternatives to Pakistani foreign policy while decreasing Pakistan’s
over-reliance on Western alliances and liberalizing its foreign policy (Aris, 2011). From participating in
SCO military exercises to economic forums to cultural exchanges, Pakistan now has a platform by which
to engage its soft power influence to pursue people’s to people’s cooperation with its neighbors and
governments throughout the Eurasian region.
Despite these promising opportunities, Pakistan encounters multiple challenges within the auspices of
the SCO. First and foremost, Pakistan’s relationship with India, which became a full member of the SCO
in 2017, poses a significant hurdle. Historical animosities and political distrust between the two nuclear
neighbors often impede the multilateral discussions and hinder the spirit of cooperation the
organization seeks to espouse. Secondly, Pakistan must negotiate the divergent agendas of the major
member states of the organization, notably China, Russia, and the Central Asian republics. While China
stresses economic connectivity and development, as exemplified by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),
Russia is more concerned with security and geopolitical ambitions in Central Asia. The ability to reconcile
differences between these competing interests presents a significant policy incoherence for Pakistan
and requires a certain degree of diplomatic agility, something that Pakistan continues to struggle with
due to wrapping bureaucratic inefficiency and a lack of strategic foresight. (Weitz, 2019)

At home, weak infrastructure, an unstable political climate, energy crises, and a fragile economy prevent
Pakistan from fully capitalizing on SCO-led economic and development initiatives. Institutional
coordination has further eroded Pakistan’s legitimacy and capacity to fulfill international obligations
through corruption and inconsistent governance. Geopolitical pressures from abroad, especially
regarding Western states that see the SCO as a potential counterbalance to NATO, are challenging for
Pakistan as it seeks to maintain a relationship with both Eastern and Western blocs. Pakistan’s efforts to
balance its relationships often complicate foreign policy choices. (Lo, 2019).

In order to convert these possibilities into substantive national dividends, Pakistan would need to
embrace a more engaged and coherent foreign policy with regards to the SCO, including strengthening
domestic governance, committing to infrastructure development, advancing economic stability, and
enhancing diplomatic ties with relevant OIC member states. Pakistan must also work to position itself as
a constructive contributor versus a passive observer. Participation in SCO projects, a consistent policy
direction, and working with China, Russia, and Central Asian states will help put Pakistan in an
advantageous position, thereby improving its possibilities with the SCO. Although Pakistan’s
involvement in the SCO holds tremendous possibility for economic development, energy cooperation,
and regional prominence, the full extent of development possibilities hinges upon Pakistan’s ability to
address some of its internal weaknesses, navigate external geopolitical complexities, and demonstrate a
sustained commitment to ongoing diplomacy and policy reform (Aris, 2011).