ECOWAS TOPIC GUIDE

Yale Model United Nations LI

January 23-36th, 2025
Chairs: Kelton Moorman and Maya Moseley

Organ: Regional Bodies

Committee Name: Economic Community of West African States

I. Letter From the Dias

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Dear Delegates,
Welcome to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)! This committee brings
together viewpoints from member states throughout West Africa. Within ECOWAS, it is our
responsibility to address some of the most pressing issues that threaten the committee’s future
strength. From economic integration and regional security to public health and environmental
sustainability, our discussions will focus on creating comprehensive and practical solutions to bolster
regional cohesion. Overall, we must further ECOWAS’s mission of promoting cooperation, raising
living standards, enhancing economic stability, and fostering relations among Member states to
contribute to the progress and development of West Africa and the African continent as a whole.
These issues require complex solutions, but with your creative ideas, we are confident that the
continent can enter a new economic and global development era.
Hey y’all! My name is Kelton Moorman, and I am a sophomore from Owensboro, Kentucky, and a
transfer student from NYU. I am majoring in Sociology and pursuing a Computer Programming
certificate. Outside of YMUN, I am part of Yale Amnesty International, Yale College Democrats,
and the Yale Transfer Student Alliance. I also work with the African American Studies department
to research Caribbean history, the Office of LGBTQ Resources, and Elena’s Light, a nonprofit
dedicated to advancing refugee and immigrant rights. In my free time, you can catch me spending
too much time at the Berkeley College buttery or watching the campus squirrels run around. This
will be my first time participating in a Model UN conference, so I am super excited to learn and grow
with you all! If you have any questions about literally anything, you can contact me at
[Link]@[Link].

Hi everyone! My name is Maya Moseley, and I am a junior from Sacramento, California. I

transferred to Yale from Sierra College and am majoring in Psychology and pursuing an Education
Studies certificate. Outside of YMUN, I am starting a Yale Transfer Student Alliance on campus and
am a part of the Yale College Democrats. I am so ecstatic to be involved in this year's conference and
am happy to help you with anything you may need. Contact me by email anytime at
[Link]@[Link].

Your ability to think critically, negotiate diplomatically, and build consensus will be essential to the
success of our committee. By the end of the conference, we aim for every delegate to leave with a
deeper understanding of the topics they previously came in with. As your dais team, we are here to
support and guide you throughout the conference. Please do not hesitate to reach out if you have
any questions, comments, or concerns before or after the conference. We are committed to creating a
respectful and inclusive environment where all delegates can thrive and make their voices heard. We
are so excited to greet you all on campus and hear your ideas and solutions in January!

See you soon,

Kelton Moorman & Maya Moseley
II. Introduction

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Committee History

Following post-colonial independence in the 1960s and 1970s, the region’s former French, British,
and Portuguese territories faced economic development challenges. As a result, the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established on May 28, 1975, after the signing
of the Treaty of Lagos. With a stated goal of achieving “collective self-sufficiency” for its member
states, ECOWAS was initially established to create a single large trading bloc by building a full
economic and trading union. However, the Community has since evolved to include a political and
military alliance.

Initially founded as a means to promote economic integration and cooperation among West African
states, ECOWAS has evolved to address a broader range of issues, including peacekeeping and
conflict resolution. This shift was necessary due to the political instability and civil conflicts that
have plagued the regions, and similar to other regional bodies, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990, a multilateral armed force dedicated to maintaining peace
and security within the member states.

Despite operating through several institutions, ECOWAS continues to face challenges, including
economic disparities, political instability, and security threats. For example, in 2011, ECOWAS
adopted Vision 2020 and the Policy on Science and Technology (ECOPOST), but it has struggled to
meet its goals due to the numerous coups that have plagued the region. Moreover, member states
have criticized ECOWAS for mild responses to coups in the early 2020s, and as of 2024, three
member states—Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali—have announced their withdrawal from the bloc.

Structure and Role of the Committee

The structure of ECOWAS is complex but collaborative and consists of three main arms of
governance: the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. The Chairman of ECOWAS is at the
top of the institutional framework and oversees all ECOWAS affairs for one year. The Heads of State
and Government form the ECOWAS Council, oversee the Community, and annually appoint the
Chairman. The Minister of ECOWAS is from the Chairman’s country and leads the Council of
Ministers, which includes ministers from national governments and presides over various ECOWAS
statutory meetings.

The President of the ECOWAS Commission is appointed for a non-renewable four-year term and
leads the Executive. A Vice President and 13 Commissioners support the President in their duties.
The Speaker of Parliament is the head of the Legislative branch of ECOWAS, which comprises the
Community Parliament. National parliaments second their members to gain membership into the
Community Parliament, who serve for four-year terms until direct elections are implemented. The
Secretary-General manages the Speaker of Parliament's administrative functions. The President of
the Community Court of Justice, staffed by judges decoded from the Supreme Courts of member
states, heads the Judicial arm of ECOWAS. The Court Registrar assists with the Court’s
administrative functions.

Understanding this structure is crucial; as representatives, delegates will act as members of these
different branches. Delegates will experience the collaborative approach necessary for regional
governance, and it will help them comprehend the importance of political stability, economic
integration, and peacekeeping in West Africa. By stimulating the ECOWAS framework, delegates
will better understand the complexities and rewards of regional cooperation.
III. Topic 1: Addressing the Withdrawal of Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali

On January 27, 2024, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali announced their withdrawal from ECOWAS,
creating challenges for regional stability and cooperation. This development requires analysis of the
reasons for their exit and the potential impact on both departing and remaining members. Delegates
are encouraged to consider diplomatic, economic, and legal solutions, as well as international
support, to address the consequences and maintain West African unity.

1. Glossary

● Sahel Region: The vast semi-arid region of Africa that separates the Sahara Desert to the
north and tropical savannas to the south, extending from Senegal eastward to Sudan.

● Sovereignty: A government that possesses full control over affairs within a territorial or
geographical area or limit.

● Democracy: A system of government where power is vested in the people, who rule directly
or through elected representatives. It ensures political equality, protects human rights and
freedoms, upholds the rule of law, and holds decision-makers accountable through fair and
free elections.

● Political Instability: A condition characterized by uncertain or volatile political

circumstances, such as conflicts, governance issues, or changes in government.

● Coup d’état: Often referred to as a coup, a coup d’état is an illegal and overt attempt by a
military organization or other government elites to abruptly unseat an incumbent
leadership. Many factors lead to the occurrence of a coup and determine whether or not it
will succeed. However, once it is underway, a coup typically involves the threat of force and
can turn violent.

● Military junta: A type of leadership structure in a military dictatorship where a group of

military officers rules together. A military junta often comes to power due to a coup d’état,
and it may either formally take power as the nation’s governing body or wield power by
exercising binding control over a nominally civilian government.

● Sanction: Political and economic decisions that are part of diplomatic efforts by countries
and multilateral or regional institutions against states or organizations. They aim to defend
national or international security interests or protect international law. In regards to Burkina
 Faso, Mali, and Niger, ECOWAS imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions on the
countries in response to their respective military coups.

2. Topic History

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Throughout the years, ECOWAS has played an important role in facilitating economic cooperation
between member states, ensuring regional stability, and addressing political crises through
interventions and peacekeeping missions. However, January 27, 2024, marks a significant turning
point, as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger collectively decided to withdraw from this regional bloc.
Although this development presents considerable challenges to regional stability, economic
collaboration, and political unity, it did not occur in isolation: it was the culmination of growing
tensions and divergences. Truly understanding the current state of ECOWAS and why the three
aforementioned countries decided to withdraw requires examining key events that have occurred
throughout the years since its inception.

Over the past decade, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have been significantly destabilized by a series of
military coups and chronic political turmoil, which have impacted the three countries’ relationship
with ECOWAS. In 1987, in Burkina Faso, for example, Blaise Compaoré assassinated Thomas
Sankara in a coup. During Sankara’s time, he implemented progressive agendas, such as vaccinating
2.5 million children against meningitis, appointing women to high government positions,
redistributing land from the feudal landlords and giving it directly to the peasants, etc. While
Compaoré was in power between 1987 and 2014, political unrest was common. In 2014, 19 people
were killed, and over 500 were injured in a protest to have democratic elections.
Moreover, the Sahel region, a geopolitically complex area that includes parts of Burkina Faso, Mali,
and Niger, has been a hotspot for extremist violence, with groups such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Greater Sahara operating with increasing boldness. The frequency
and the severity of attacks have escalated, causing significant loss of life and displacement of
communities. For example, after ethnic tensions grew in Mali in 2012, the country fell to AQIM,
which exacerbated ongoing humanitarian crises. Since then, 7.1 million Malians have needed aid,
and over 390,000 have been internally displaced. While ECOWAS has been reacting to such attacks,
its response has often been perceived as inadequate, too slow, or ineffectively implemented by
affected countries.

Additionally, while ECOWAS was envisioned as a union that would foster economic integration and
development across West Africa, the economic benefits of memberships have been unevenly
distributed. Coastal states—such as Nigeria, Ghana, and Côte d'Ivoire—have experienced significant
economic growth and development, partially attributed to better access to maritime trade and
investment flow. In contrast, landlocked Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have felt marginalized within
the economic framework of ECOWAS. While ECOWAS has attempted to address these disparities,
such as the West African Power Pool, the Regional Agency for Agriculture and Food, and the
Trans-Sahara Highway, these states have been criticized for not addressing these disparities, leading to
economic neglect and fueling discontent among these nations.

The UN and ECOWAS have engaged in various interventions to address ongoing conflicts, with
efforts focusing on peacekeeping, mediation, and support for democratic governance. In 2023, for
example, ECOWAS imposed sanctions on Niger and issued an ultimatum to the junta to restore
constitutional order. These sanctions, however, increased the estimated incidence of poverty by 1.9
percentage points to 43.9% at the end of 2023. Because of this, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger
formed a confederation called The Alliance of the Sahel States on September 16, 2023. Each of them
ultimately withdrew from ECOWAS, citing the regional bloc’s failed support to fight “terrorism and
insecurity…[and its imposition of] illegal, illegitimate, inhumane, and irresponsible sanctions”
following military coups.

3. Current Situation

The recent withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger from ECOWAS marks a significant turning
point in the region, as this move by three key members has far-reaching implications, not only for the
political and economic landscape of West Africa but also for the broader international community.
Additionally, the decision to exit ECOWAS raises critical questions about the organization's future
and the region's stability. Following the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the ECOWAS
Mediation & Security Council held an emergency session on February 8, 2024, in Abuja, Nigeria, to
discuss the withdrawal of these countries from the regional bloc, as well as other pressing matters.
During the meeting, H.E. Dr. Omar Alieu Touray, the President of the ECOWAS Commission,
stated that the withdrawal of these three nations threatens the peace and political stability of the
West African Community.

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The region's political stability is something that delegates might want to center their debate around,
as this has already become apparent in Mali, where elections were to be held by March 26, 2024.
However, Colonel Assimi Goïta, junta chief and interim President, suspended all political activities
on public-order grounds, stating that national elections would not be held until the country's
security had been “stabilized.” Moreover, anti-French and anti-West sentiments were crucial in these
countries’ decision to withdraw from ECOWAS. This has already become apparent in Niger, where
the current self-proclaimed president General Abdourahamane Tchiani ordered all U.S. troops to
exit the country by September 2024. Because the U.S. has relied on Niger as a primary base to
monitor regional jihadist activity, there are concerns as to how the country’s security will be
impacted. Similarly, on July 18, 2024, Niger revoked the operating license of Orano, a French
nuclear fuel producer, thereby further symbolizing the three countries anti-West sentiments.

As these sentiments grow, the three countries continue to look toward political allies that align with
their anti-Western stance and are willing to support their regimes. As of July 6, 2024, the three
countries signed a confederation that strengthened their mutual defense pact, the Alliance of Sahel
States. This move solidifies the growing political connection among the three nations and marks a
significant shift away from ECOWAS and towards a more unified anti-Western front. Furthermore,
since Burkina Faso began cutting ties with and booting out French troops in early 2023, the
junta-led country’s relations with Moscow have been increasing, which raises concerns about
Russia’s growing influence in the Sahel region. Furthermore, on December 4, 2023, Niger
announced that it would continue to strengthen its military cooperation with Russia and further
declared that it would cut diplomatic ties with Ukraine on August 7, 2024. Because the Sahel region
is a geopolitical strategic region, these developments reflect a broader trend of Russian influence
expanding in areas where traditional Western powers are being pushed out, raising questions about
the region's future political stability and alignment.

Additionally, delegates might center their debate around these countries' economic contributions
towards ECOWAS, the Sahel Region, and the African continent. In 2019, for example, ECOWAS
represented almost 26% of Africa’s entire economy, with a GDP of US$633.1 billion. These
countries accounted for approximately 7.3% of ECOWAS’s total GDP of that year. Therefore, the
departure of these countries removes nearly US$46.2 billion from ECOWAS’s overall GDP, and this
reduction weakens the bloc's economic power and financial stability, as it diminishes its ability to
fund regional initiatives, infrastructure projects, and other development programs. The
Trans-Saharan Highway project, which aims to connect several West African countries to North
African countries, would be impacted by the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali and could
lead to delays in construction and maintenance due to the loss of financial contributions and
logistical support from these countries.

Moreover, in May 1979, ECOWAS adopted its first protocol relating to the Free Movement of
Persons, Residence, and Establishments, which stipulated the right of ECOWAS citizens to enter,
reside, and establish economic activities in the territory of other member states. The withdrawal of
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger significantly impacts all of the five million citizens that work in Côte
d’Ivoire from these three countries. With this withdrawal, these citizens’ right to reside and work in
Côte d’Ivoire may be jeopardized, leading to potential legal challenges, deportations, or forced
returns. Additionally, the sudden departure or restriction of these migrant workers could also have
adverse effects on Côte d’Ivoire’s economy, as the country’s workforce would experience a reduction,
thereby leading to lower production levels, affecting the country’s export revenues and economic
stability. Similarly, Niger does 80% of its trade with Nigeria, and withdrawal from ECOWAS could
disrupt regional flow worth nearly US$150 billion a year.
The withdrawal of these countries further threatens the security of this region from militant jihadist
activity, something that delegates should explore more. Since the 2022 coups in Burkina Faso that
put interim President Ibrahim Traoré into power, deaths caused by militant Islamist violence have
tripled. Despite ECOWAS planning to deploy its Standby Force on June 27, 2024, to combat such
violence, it has the chance of being unsuccessful if ECOWAS cannot get the commitment of all
member states, including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Additionally, Burkina Faso will need
US$877 million to provide essential aid, shelter, healthcare, and support for the nearly two million
internally displaced and 36,000 refugees. However, this will be difficult considering the country’s
continual alignment away from ECOWAS and Western powers.

The leaders of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger’s announced their withdrawal with “immediate effect;”
however, as seen in the case of Mauritania’s withdrawal in 1999, such decisions are rarely
instantaneous and typically require a formal process that takes time to ratify. Mauritania’s exit from
ECOWAS, formally concluded in 2000, was driven by its geopolitical orientation, economic
interests, and political considerations. As a country situated between North Africa and sub-Saharan
Africa, Mauritania found itself out of sync with the West African focus of ECOWAS. The country’s
decision was also influenced by its stronger economic ties with the Maghreb region and Europe and
its discomfort with ECOWAS’s push for deeper political integration, which it viewed as an
infringement on national sovereignty. While Mauritania did not have a significant economic impact
on ECOWAS, as its economy was more aligned with the Maghreb region, the country’s departure
resulted in a loss of political influence within West Africa and potentially weakened the overall
cohesion and effectiveness of regional security efforts despite maintaining bilateral security
agreements with neighboring countries, as it was no longer a participant in collective security
initiatives under ECOWAS’s umbrella. As of 2017, Mauritania maintains diplomatic engagement
with ECOWAS, as it signed an associate membership agreement in August of that year.

This precedent underscores the importance of carefully considering the geopolitical, economic, and
political factors that drive such decisions. Delegates can use Mauritania’s exit as a lens to better
understand the current situation with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. By analyzing Mauritania’s
alignment towards North Africa because of its Arab identity, and the country’s concerns with deeper
political integration due to ECOWAS talks about a West African currency, delegates can better
understand the process of leaving ECOWAS and explore peaceful and diplomatic strategies for
ECOWAS to address the challenges that Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger are facing.
While ECOWAS as a whole has expressed concerns about the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Niger, delegates might want to explore the various member states and their vested interest in these
countries’ decision. For example, Nigeria holds the largest economy in ECOWAS, representing
almost 75% of the regional bloc’s US$633.1 billion GDP in 2019. Additionally, Nigeria is a key
political country in ECOWAS, West Africa, and the continent as a whole. For example, The
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to ECOWAS is considered one of the country’s most strategic and
diplomatic outposts, as it engages with other member states to shape ECOWAS’s policies and
ensures that Nigeria’s interests are presented in regional decision-making processes. Therefore,
Nigeria is likely to advocate for a firm but diplomatic approach, pushing for sanctions against the
three departing countries and seeking dialogue to further prevent ECOWAS fragmentation.
Similarly, Côte d’Ivoire plays a significant role in ECOWAS's labor migration. Because there are five
million citizens from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger that work in Côte d’Ivoire, delegates may want
to look for how the country might push for policies that protect the rights of migrant workers while
expressing concern about the economic impact of the withdrawal on regional trade and investment.
Delegates may also want to explore various countries, such as Senegal, Benin, and Togo’s stances on
the three countries' departure from ECOWAS. Because parts of Senegal are located in the Sahel
Region, and Benin and Togo are close to Burkina Faso, each country may be concerned about a
security spillover. Therefore, these countries may support stronger regional security measures amidst
growing jihadist activity and might advocate for the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force to
address future threats to security. Throughout all of this, delegates should consider Burkina Faso,
Mali, and Niger’s alignment towards anti-Western sentiments and the growing diplomatic influence
that Russia is gaining, and how this may impact ECOWAS’s efforts to manage the solution.

4. Questions to Consider

1. What are some solutions to reintegrate Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger back into ECOWAS?

2. How can ECOWAS further address growing security challenges in the Sahel region?

3. What are the implications of the departing countries' growing anti-West sentiments for
ECOWAS’s relationships with international partners?

4. How can ECOWAS enhance its conflict resolution mechanisms to better address the
concerns of member states and prevent future withdrawals?
5. How should ECOWAS navigate tensions between promoting regional integration and
respecting the sovereignty of its member states?

6. How should ECOWAS balance the need for immediate action with the long-term goal of
regional stability and integration?

7. What challenges could go unresolved? Are there any issues and solutions that are most likely
to be contended?

5. Resources

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IV. Topic 2: Reducing Child Labor in West African Economies

Child labor remains a significant issue in West Africa, driven by economic hardships and cultural
norms, challenging international efforts to eradicate it. ECOWAS delegates will focus on
strengthening legislative frameworks, improving enforcement, and collaborating with international
partners to protect children's rights. Discussions will explore policy reforms, economic initiatives,
and education programs to provide sustainable alternatives to child labor and improve the region’s
overall development.

1. Glossary

● Exploitation: Taking advantage and/or treating someone unfairly in order to benefit from
their work.

● Child Trafficking: The illegal recruitment, transportation, harboring, and/or kidnapping

of children, typically for the purposes of forced labor or sexual exploitation.

● NGO: Also known as non-governmental organizations, they are (usually) nonprofit entities
that operate independently of any government, typically to address a social or political issue.

● Poverty: An economic-related state or condition in which an individual lacks the financial

assets for a certain standard of living.

● Child Labor: Work that is performed by a child who is under the minimum age for that
kind of labor (as defined by national legislation, in accordance with accepted international
standards) and that may impede a child’s personal, social, intellectual, and physical
development.

● WFCL: “Worst Forms of Child Labor,” meaning all forms of child slavery or related
practices, including but not limited to the sale or trafficking of children, debt bondage,
forced or compulsory labor. Such labor may include forced or compulsory recruitment of
children for use in armed conflict, the use of a child for prostitution, pornography, and other
illicit activities, in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs, and work that is
harmful to the health, safety, or morals of children.
 2. Topic History

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In West Africa, there are prominent issues related to the exploitation of children, including for labor
and commercial purposes. As farming industries, especially within the cocoa, coffee, mining, tilapia
fishing, and domestic service sectors, have rapidly commercialized and increased in scale, within the
past 30 years, children have increasingly been trafficked and forced into related harmful labor
practices. As of 2022, 23% of West African children are being forced into child labor, and over 80%
of those children live in rural areas and work in agriculture. Hazardous activities children have been
forced to partake in include but are not limited to using machetes to clear fields, applying pesticides,
and being forced into degrading, low-to-no pay, domestic servitude. Additionally, there continue to
be issues with the continued involvement of children in armed conflicts, child trafficking, and
commercial sexual exploitation. The primary reason for child labor is poverty.

A massive spotlight was put on this issue after a 2002 news report reported that nearly half the
chocolate produced in the United States was linked to child laborers in Côte d’Ivoire, with many of
whom having been trafficked from neighboring countries like Mali and Burkina Faso. In December
2008, the heads of state and government of ECOWAS adopted the Child Policy and Strategic Plan
of Action, which included measures to combat the WFCL, with a particular focus on taking action
against child trafficking. There was a significant project by ECOWAS that was launched in 2009
with the intention of making rapid progress towards eliminating the WFCL in Cote d’Ivoire,
Ghana, and Nigeria. The goal was to withdraw 4,800 children from exploitative work in Cote
d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Nigeria, and by the time the project was withdrawn in 2009, it had prevented
10,851 children from the worst forms of child labor. However, although there have been many
significant individual government and NGO measures in countries throughout West Africa to
combat the issue, even as early as the late 80s in countries like Togo, the problem remains primarily
unresolved.

3. Current Situation

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As part of a broader agenda, in 2015, world leaders, including member states of the Economic
Community of West African States, committed in 2017 to the Sustainable Development Goals.
These goals included Goal #8, which outlined the hope of eliminating all forms of child labor by
2025. Though the world has not accomplished this goal, ECOWAS, since 2019, has additionally
been working under a revised 2019-2030 Child Policy. Within this Child Policy are many different
measures to protect and promote children's rights and their social, physical, and emotional
well-being.

The International Labor Organization (ILO), which is a specialized agency under the United
Nations, launched an initiative a few years ago called the Action against Child Labor in Agriculture
in West Africa (ACLAWA) project (December 2022- February 2026). The ACLAWA project aims to
support the child labor elimination efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and
the Nigerian government. Specifically for ECOWAS, the ACLAWA project will help support
ECOWAS’s effort to implement something called the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan (2021-2030)
to eliminate child labor.
The main purpose of the Regional Action Plan is to ensure children are protected from all activities
that could possibly be detrimental to their social, physical, and emotional well-being. The Regional
Action Plan was birthed out of a need for a coherent framework across participating West African
states to coordinate regional and national scale initiatives to work towards eliminating child labor.
Additionally, a focus has been put on strengthening coordination systems, building capacities,
ensuring effective monitoring and evaluation, and working on implementing and utilizing a
peer-reviewed system for responding to child labor issues between ECOWAS Member States.

Further, the ACLAWA project, funded by the United States Department of Labor, aims to support
the development of an ECOWAS Child Labor/Forced Labor accountability tool outlined in the
Regional Action Plan to monitor and report on the implementation of the Regional Action Plan.
Relatedly, the ACLAWA project also intends to support more widespread utilization of the
ECOWAS Peer Review mechanism. The project aims to improve the lives of 23% of children
estimated to be engaged in child labor in West Africa, with the focus being on the Agricultural
sector. So far, the ACLAWA project has located ten communities with a notable prevalence of child
labor in the cocoa sector for the project missions to be implemented. In recent years, a more
streamlined focus has been put on issues with child labor in West Africa as a result of the cocoa
industry.

Over 70% of the world’s cocoa is sourced from West African countries, especially Ghana and the
Ivory Coast. Cocoa was originally brought to West Africa by European chocolate companies looking
for a cheap place to grow it. This stain of colonialism still has ramifications on the chocolate industry
today. Because of the evident magnitude of this $130 billion industry, child labor has been utilized to
adhere to commercialism, forcing prices to be continuously competitive. Most cocoa farmers earn
less than $1 per day, and some of the WFCL and trafficking have transpired as a result of the
industry. There have been endless horrific instances that have been reported in the last few years of
child trafficking and labor being utilized in the cocoa industry—trafficked children in Ghana being
sold for $34, a village in Burkina Faso where almost every residing mother has had a child sold to
cocoa farms, and more absolutely horrendous practice. Child laborers in the cocoa industry have had
extensive physical injuries because of a lack of safety equipment that would prevent bodily harm that
happens from labor-related activities like the machete opening of beans and the usage of agricultural
chemicals. Beyond these, more surface-level harms to one’s health because of the cheapness of the
farms; children are provided hazardous living conditions with unsanitary sleeping quarters and
cheap, non-nutritious scraps to eat. There was a Supreme Court case, Nestlé USA and Cargill v. Doe,
which included six people who were trafficked into the Ivory Coast as children to work on the cocoa
farms those companies source. Within this court case, further atrocities were revealed as the plaintiffs
described the cruel punishments that child workers would receive for unsatisfactory work or for
trying to leave, like being forced to drink urine, having their feet cut, and being beaten with tree
branches.

To take a step towards combatting this issue, in 2019, some chocolate companies and the
governments of the Ivory Coast and Ghana started policies for premiums to be charged to help pay
cocoa farmers a livable income. Unfortunately, this extra $400 per ton of cocoa being charged by the
countries’ governments, coined as the “Living Income Differential” or LID, is simply not enough to
pay farmers a living wage. And some companies went as far as paying for extra supply just to avoid
this price. For example, in 2020, Hershey bought around 30,000 tons of cocoa to avoid paying the
LID. After backlash, the Hershey’s company reported they were paying the LID in 2023. Note that
some NGOs and newer chocolate companies, like Tony’s Chocolates, have specific measures to
reduce child labor. A non-profit organization has even filed a federal lawsuit to block imports of
cocoa harvested by children in West Africa. Still, approximately 1 million children, some as young as
five years old, are working on cocoa plantations in West Africa, specifically in the Ivory Coast and
Ghana.

With multiple projects in place directed at reducing child labor, ECOWAS hopes that one of these
initiatives will effectively reduce the rapid expansion of child labor for commercial reasons.
Currently, though, one of the major lifelong effects of child labor for its victims is that it impedes
children’s educational opportunities. For example, in Nigeria, a country without a welfare system,
over 70% of its citizens are affected by poverty. As a result of this, children are being forced into labor
to help support their families, which in turn means they have had to drop out of school. While
education in Nigeria is free and compulsory (federally mandated by the Education Act) between the
ages of 6 and 15, it is obviously not particularly enforced—there are still approximately 10.5 million
Nigerian children within this age range who are not in school.

Proponents of ensuring children in Nigeria have their education prioritized and avoiding
inappropriate labor practices are demanding that laws to protect children are not just created or
implemented but actually strictly enforced. One of the things that actually led to an increase in child
labor in Nigeria and a decrease in educational engagement was the closing of schools as a result of the
COVID-19 pandemic. This, in turn, perhaps because the idea that the closures of these schools may
have been seen as a de-emphasis on education, then obviously led many parents to become skeptical
and many children to lose their educational opportunities.

On a broader scale, working children in almost all of the ECOWAS participating countries are
significantly less likely to attend school than their non-working peers. There is an especially notable
attendance gap between working and non-working children in Guinea (22 percentage points), Côte
d’Ivoire, Senegal (17 percentage points), and Burkina Faso (16 percentage points).

Note that in all 15 ECOWAS countries, a large proportion of working children actually attend
school. However, working children are more likely to drop out after primary school and end up
having a significantly hindered ability to progress in their education compared to their non-working
counterparts. The International Labor Organization has provided quite a few suggestions for
reducing child labor, some of which are related to this parallel issue of child labor and children of the
ECOWAS states not getting a proper education. For example, raising awareness through media and
other channels, such as with the help of NGOs. An idea related to education and child labor is for
ECOWAS countries to work towards ensuring that school quality is up to par so that parents could
see schooling as a meaningful investment of time rather than working. And rather than closing
schools, increasing school resources like free meals, ensuring appropriate hygiene facilities and
products for children, and promoting education for female students by addressing gender-specific
barriers they may face to accessing education in the first place.

Beyond ideas, direct actions are being emphasized. There are many instances where children need to
be completely removed from child labor, and projects and initiatives won’t be directly impactful on
those individuals. In all, there are many incredible ideas, in theory, to help protect and prevent
children from the labor industry in West Africa, but ideas will only be ideas unless actions are taken
toward actually implementing them. If the government is key to making a change on this problem,
then there is a need for strict supervision over the implementation of these projects. Otherwise,
without continuous and more specific oversight, the use of child labor in West Africa will have no
source to prevent the issue from progressing.

4. Questions to Consider

1. What challenges have the ECOWAS Child Labor/Forced Labor accountability tool faced in
monitoring and reporting, and how can these challenges be overcome?
2. What initiatives, beyond those already in place, could your country propose to strengthen
regional cooperation in combating child labor in West Africa? Should there be more
collaboration with commercial industries on the issue?

3. What specific actions could your country take to support the implementation of the
ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on child labor?

4. How can your country ensure that measures taken to eliminate child labor do not
unintentionally harm the economic stability of vulnerable communities?

5. How can your country promote sustainable agricultural practices that do not rely on child
labor, and what role could international support play in this effort?

6. What challenges could go unresolved? Are there any issues and solutions that are most likely
to be contended?

5. Resources

● [Link]
023-04-04/#:~:text=Nestle%20
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nd-forced-labour
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ening-sub-regional
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uman%20Trafficking%20is%20the%20recruitment,every%20region%20of%20the%20world.
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e&def_id=19-USC-1943448057-1611416497&term_occur=999&term_src=title:19:chapte
r:12:subchapter:V:section:2462#:~:text=(6)%20Worst%20forms%20of%20child,use%20in%2
0armed%20conflict%3B%20
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ove-farmers-incomes-ring-hollow
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demand-an-end-to-child-labour-in-africa
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on%20is,years%20are%20not%20in%20school.
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effects-covid-19-shocks-nigeria
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