MODULE 5

• Module V (Hazard identification and analysis- 8 hrs)

• Hazard and risk, Types of hazards –Classification of Fire, Types of
Fire extinguishers, fire explosion and toxic gas release, Structure of
hazard identification and risk assessment.
• Identification of hazards: Inventory analysis, Fire and explosion
hazard rating of process plants - The Dow Fire and Explosion Hazard
Index, Preliminary hazard analysis, Hazard and Operability study
(HAZOP)) – methodology, criticality analysis, corrective action and
follow-up.
• Control of Chemical Hazards, Hazardous properties of chemicals,
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS).
 Water Based Fire Extinguisher

• Water is the primary liquid used in these extinguishers, although sometimes other additives are also included.
• A drawback for pure water fire extinguishers is that it is not suitable for use in freezing conditions since the
water inside will freeze and render the extinguisher unusable. Certain types of water fire extinguishers contain
antifreeze which will allow the extinguisher to be used in freezing conditions.
• Water type fire extinguishers can also sometimes contain wetting agents which are designed to help increase
its effectiveness against fire.
• These extinguishers are intended primarily for use on Class A fires.
• Water mist extinguishers are a type of water fire extinguisher that uses distilled water and discharges it as a
fine spray instead of a solid stream. Water mist extinguishers are used where contaminants in unregulated
water sources can cause excessive damage to personnel or equipment.
• Typical applications include operating rooms, museums, and book collections.
 Carbon Dioxide type
Fire Extinguisher
• The principal advantage of Carbon Dioxide (CO2) fire extinguishers is that the agent does not leave a residue
after use.
• This can be a significant factor where protection is needed for delicate and costly electronic equipment.
• Other typical applications are food preparation areas, laboratories, and printing or duplicating areas.
• Carbon dioxide extinguishers are listed for use on Class B and Class C fires.
• This type of fire extinguisher is not recommended for outdoor use where windy conditions prevail or for
indoor use in locations that are subject to strong air currents, because the agent can rapidly dissipate and
prevent extinguishment.
• The concentration needed for fire extinguishment reduces the amount of oxygen in the vicinity of the fire and
should be used with caution when discharged in confined spaces.
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Summary

 Originated due to poor loss (accident)

record in 1966
 One of the first “chemical plant” hazard
analysis systems
 Unique Features
– Maximum Probable Property Damage
– Maximum Probable Days Outage
 Continues to be upgraded in use and
application
 Fill out like a “Tax Form”
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

F & EI
 Uses material factors that relate to reactivity
and flammability
 Identifies equipment that can present a
flammable or explosive hazard
 Suggests approaches to control a hazard
 Useful in determining plant layout and
separation between vessels
 Requires engineering judgement
 Is not a perfect tool
 Is a useful tool
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

The expected damage of

QUANTIFY
potential fire &
explosion incidents in
realistic terms

Equipment that would

IDENTIFY likely contribute to the
creation or escalation
of an incident

The fire & explosion

COMMUNICATE potential to design
teams and plant
personnel
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

 Material Factor
– Measure of Reactivity and
Flammability
 General Process Hazards
– Play a primary role in
determining the magnitude of
a loss incident
 Special Process Hazards
– Contribute to the probability of
a loss incident
 Fire & Explosion Index
– A measure of the relative
hazard and relates to an
exposure radius
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDITS

Are features that have proved

beneficial in preventing
serious incidents and
reducing the magnitude of a
particular incident

* Process Control
* Material Isolation
* Fire Protection
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Actual Maximum Probable Property

Damage
Represents the property damage that
could result from an incident of
reasonable magnitude with adequate
functioning of protective equipment

Maximum Probable Days Outage

Time required to rebuild the plant to
its original capacity

Business Interruption
The lost profit to the company due to
an incident
 DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Items Required to Develop an F & EI

1. Accurate Plot Plan for an existing plant
2. Preliminary Plot Plan for a new plant
3. Process Flow Sheet
4. F & EI Hazard classification guide
5. F & EI form
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
IDENTIFY PERTINENT PROCESS UNIT

(An item of equipment that could impact the process

from a safety & loss prevention standpoint)

* Chemical Energy Potential (Material

Factor)
* Quantity of hazardous materials in
the process unit
* Capital density
* Process pressure and temperature
* Past history of problems

Not all unit operation need to be analyzed.

Knowledge of the process is essential
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
MATERIAL FACTOR

* Measure of the flammability

(NF) and reactivity (NR) of a
material

* Material factor adjusted for

process conditions
- Flash Point
- Boiling Point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
CONTRIBUTING HAZARD
FACTORS

Evaluate the process unit to

eliminate over estimating
penalties

* General Process Hazards (F1)

* Special Process Hazards (F2)

DOW Fire & Explosion Index
GENERAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F1

Penalties for:

Exothermic/Endothermic
Material Handling & Transfer
Enclosed processes
Access
Drainage and spill control

F & EI workbook has various penalties

DOW Fire & Explosion Index

SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS

F2
Penalties for:
Toxic materials (0.2 x NH)
Sub-atmospheric pressure
(P<500mHg, 0.5)
Dust explosions
Operating in flammable range
Low temperature operation
Corrosion & Erosion
Leakage
Rotating equipment

F & EI workbook has various penalties

DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Pressure Penalty
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Quantity of Flammable/Unstable
material

Separate figures for process, storage and solids

DOW Fire & Explosion Index
SPECIAL PROCESS HAZARDS
F2
Use of fired equipment

Curve A-1 Release above flash point or combustible

dust
Curve A-2 Released above boiling point
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

UNIT HAZARD FACTOR (F3)

F3 = F1 X F2

F & EI = Material Factor X F3

 DOW Fire & Explosion Index

F & EI USED TO DETERMINE

An area having a potential for impact from a flammable or over pressure

event
 DOW Fire & Explosion Index

Degree of
F & EI Hazard

1 - 60 Light

61 - 96 Moderate

97 - 127 Intermediate

128* - 158 Heavy

159+ Severe

* Trigger for more detailed PHA

DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Area of Exposure

Exposure radius from empirical

relationship

Determined from spills of flammable materials 3 in.

deep as well as potential vapor air mixtures
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Volume of Exposure

Calculate volume as a cylinder with

height equal to radius

Determine replacement value of

equipment in the area (volume)
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
Damage Factor

Determine damage factor from

empirical relationship of Unit
Hazard (F3) and Material Factor
(MF)
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

BASE MAXIMUM PROBABLE

PROPERTY DAMAGE

Base Maximum Probable Property

Damage (Base MPPD)

Value of the area of exposure

Damage Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
LOSS CONTROL CREDIT
FACTORS

F & EI workbook has various credits

DOW Fire & Explosion Index
ACTUAL MAXIMUM PROBABLE
PROPERTY DAMAGE

Actual Maximum Probable Property

Damage (Actual MPPD)

Base MPPD

Credit Factor
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
MAXIMUM PROBABLE DAYS
OUTAGE (MPDO)
Maximum Probable Days Outage
(MPDO) determined empirically
from actual MPPD
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION

Business Interruption (BI)

Maximum Probable Days Outage

(MPDO)

{Lost Profit before tax/day

+
Fixed Cost/day}
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
RISK ANALYSIS
DOW Fire & Explosion Index
WHAT CAN I DO TO LOWER
THE RISK?

* Reduce the Hazards (most impact)

* Add Loss Control Features (Least

impact)

* Increase spacing (plant layout)

It is more effective to reduce the hazards

early in the project than to add loss
control features late in the project

The system makes us quantify the risk

and suggests ways to reduce the risk
DOW Fire & Explosion Index

The DOW F & EI system

challenges you to
determine how much risk
you are willing to accept.
 What Is Preliminary Hazard Analysis

 Preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) is usually the first attempt in the system safety
process to identify and categorize hazards or potential hazards associated with the
operation of a proposed system, process, or procedure; it is used in the early stages of
system design.

 It is a semi-quantitative analysis that is performed to identify all potential hazards and

accidental events that may lead to an accident, rank the identified accidental events
according to their severity and identify required hazard controls and follow-up actions.

 Preliminary hazard analysis that can be used under different names, such as Rapid Risk
Ranking and Hazard Identification (HAZID).
 Characteristics Of PHA

• It relies on brainstorming and expert judgment to assess the significance of hazards and
assign a ranking to each situation.
• It is typically performed by one or two people who are knowledgeable about the type of
activity in question.
• It is applicable to any activity or system
• It can be used as a high-level analysis early in the life of a process.
• It is used to generates qualitative descriptions of the hazards related to a process.
Provides a qualitative ranking of the hazardous situations; this ranking can be used to
prioritize recommendations for reducing or eliminating hazards in subsequent phases of
the life cycle.
• Quality of the evaluation depends on the quality and availability of documentation, the
training of the review team leader with respect to the various analysis techniques
employed, and the experience of the review teams.
 Advantages And Disadvantages Of PHA

 Advantages
• Helps ensure that the system is safe
• Modifications are less expensive and easier to implement in
the earlier stages of design
• Decreases design time by reducing the number of surprises
 Disadvantages
• Hazards must be foreseen by the analysts
• The effects of interactions between hazards are not easily
recognized
Steps To Carrying Out Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA)

1. PHA prerequisites: This involves, establishing a PHA team, description of

the system to be analysed, and collection of risk information from previous

system.

2. Hazard identification: This is where all hazards and possible accidental

events must be identified. All part of the system should be considered at

this stage. All findings should be recorded.

 Note: No hazards are too insignificant to be recorded.

3. Consequence and frequency estimation: To determine the risk level, we have to
estimate the frequency and the severity of each accidental event. At this stage, the
consequence and frequency of every hazard is considered.

4. Risk ranking and follow-up actions: Risk is established as a combination of a given

event/consequence and a severity of the same event/consequence. This will enable a
ranking of the
events/consequences in a risk matrix. This ranking level will determine the follow up
actions necessary for the risk.
 Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP)

 Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a structured and systematic

technique for system examination and risk management.
 In particular, HAZOP is often used as a technique for identifying potential
hazards in a system and identifying operability problems likely to lead to
nonconforming products.
 HAZOP is based on a theory that assumes risk events are caused by
deviations from design or operating intentions.
 Identification of such deviations is facilitated by using sets of “guide
words” as a systematic list of deviation perspectives.
 This approach is a unique feature of the HAZOP methodology that helps
stimulate the imagination of team members when exploring potential
deviations.
 HAZOP Methodology

 The HAZOP analysis

process is executed
in four phases as
illustrated below:
 Definition Phase

 The Definition Phase typically begins with preliminary identification of risk

assessment team members.
 HAZOP is intended to be a cross-functional team effort, and relies on
specialists (SMEs) from various disciplines with appropriate skills and
experience who display intuition and good judgment.
 SMEs should be carefully chosen to include those with a broad and
current knowledge of system deviations.
 HAZOP should always be carried out in a climate of positive thinking and
frank discussion.
 During the Definition Phase, the risk assessment team must identify the
assessment scope carefully in order to focus effort.
 This includes defining study boundaries and key interfaces as well as key
assumptions that the assessment will be performed under
 Preparation Phase

 The Preparation Phase typically includes the following activities:

Identifying and locating supporting data and information
 Identification of the audience and users of the study outputs
 Project management preparations (ex: scheduling meetings,
transcribing proceedings, etc.)
 Consensus on template format for recording study outputs
 Consensus on HAZOP guide words to be used during the study
 Risk assessment teams are responsible for identifying the guide words
that will best suit the scope and problem statement for their analysis.
Some common HAZOP guide words include:
 Examination Phase

 The Examination Phase begins with identification of all elements (parts or

steps) of the system or process to be examined. For example:

 Physical systems may be broken down into smaller parts as necessary

 Processes may be broken down into discrete steps or phases

 Similar parts or steps may be grouped together to facilitate assessment

 The HAZOP guide words are then applied to each of the elements.
 In this fashion a thorough search for deviations is carried out in a
systematic manner.
 It must be noted that not all combinations of guide words and elements
are expected to yield sensible or credible deviation possibilities.
 As a general rule, all reasonable use and misuse conditions which are
expected by the user should be identified and subsequently challenged to
determine if they are “credible” and whether they should be assessed
any further.
 There is no need to explicitly document the instances when combinations
of elements and guide words do not yield any credible deviations
 Documentation & Follow-up Phase

 The documentation of HAZOP analyses is often facilitated by utilizing a

template recording form as detailed in IEC Standard 61882.
 Risk assessment teams may modify the template as necessary based on
factors such as:
 Regulatory requirements
 Need for more explicit risk rating or prioritization (ex: rating deviation
probabilities, severities, and/or detection)
 Company documentation policies
 Needs for traceability or audit readiness
 Other factors
 Risk Review

 On a long-term basis, operational feedback should confirm that the

assessment and control steps are adequately addressing the risk
question.

 It is also important to note that new risks may arise from risk control
practices.

 Sometimes risks that were not originally identified or may have been
filtered out during the initial risk assessment can become aggravating
factors due to the implementation of risk control measures.
 Risk Communication

 HAZOP is a powerful communication tool.

 The output of the tool should always be presented at a level of detail

appropriate for the various stakeholders.

 This is important not just for presenting results, but also for obtaining

early buy-in on the approach.

 das

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 Controlling Chemical Hazards
 Controlling exposures to chemical hazards and toxic substances is the fundamental method of protecting
workers.
 A hierarchy of controls is used as a means of determining how to implement feasible and effective
controls.
 Engineering and work practice controls must be the primary means used to reduce employee exposure
to toxic chemicals, as far as feasible, and that respiratory protection is required to be used when
engineering or work practice controls are infeasible or while they are being implemented.
 Where possible, elimination or substitution is the most desirable followed by engineering controls.
 Administrative or work practice controls may be appropriate in some cases where engineering controls
cannot be implemented or when different procedures are needed after implementation of the new
engineering controls.
 Personal protection equipment is the least desirable but may still be effective.
Hazardous Properties of Chemicals
Sometimes they can explode and cause burns, vomiting, drowsiness, etc