GROUP 2

Kinds of Special Agents under Article 2180, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code

1. Public officials with particular assigned tasks are specially commissioned to do such tasks
foreign to their usual assigned governmental function.
2. A private person is not a public official, commissioned to perform nongovernmental function. A
government commissioning a private person for a special task is acting through special agent
within the meaning of Art 2180 NCC.
3. The state assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable for the special agent’s
torts.

Fontanilla vs Maliaman

(GR 55963 and 61045, February 27, 1991)

Facts Hugo Garcia is a regular employee of National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a

government agency created by its charter RA 3601 amended by PD 552 for the purpose of
undertaking integrated irrigation project. Garcia driving the agency official pick-up bumped a
bicycle ridden by Fontanilla resulting to his death. The victim's parent filed a civil action against
NIA and its driver Garcia who was found guilty of driving recklessly. NIA was ordered to pay,
NIA appealed raising the issue that as government agency performing government function was
not liable as being a part of the state, cannot be sued.

Issue: Whether or not NIA is liable for damages

Ruling:

The state or government agency performing governmental function may be held liable for tort
committed by its employees when it acts through a special agent.

While NIA is a government agency performing governmental function, however, it is suable

because its charter provides that it may be sue or be sued, thus consent of the state for NIA to be
sued has already given, so that the rule on immunity from suit normally extended to government
agencies performing governmental functions is no longer available to NIA. By waiving that
immunity from suit in its charter, NIA open itself to suits.

HYPOTHETICAL CASE

BU was invited to dine in at the Bulaluhan Restaurant located along Manila Memorial Park as a
sign of gratitude for all the favor that the latter gave to the former. BU believed that the said
Bulaluhan is the best place to dine in since it was referred to him by her wife LOK.

BU and TO ordered bulalo which is the specialty of the said restaurant.

Unfortunately, the waiter accidentally poured the newly cooked bulalo in the head of TO which
caused the permanent baldness of the latter. Can the Bulaluhan be held liable for the accident
that occurred?

Doctrines in Negligence Cases

The following doctrines may be applied in most negligence cases involving hospitality
management:

1. Proximate Cause;
2. Contributory negligence;
3. Imputed negligence;
4. Last clear chance;
 5. Res ipsa loquitur (Latin: "the thing speaks for itself") is a doctrine in the Anglo-American
common law that says in a tort lawsuit a court can infer negligence from the very nature of an
accident or injury in the absence of direct evidence on how any defendant behaved.

Doctrine of Proximate Cause. This was defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which
the result would not have occurred. Article 2179 of the NCC states that when the plaintiff's own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. It
is important for the plaintiff to prove the relationship of cause and effect between the defendant's
negligence and the damage or injury which he has incurred in order that he can recover from the
defendant.

Contributory Negligence. If the negligence of the plaintiff was merely contributory to his
injury, the immediate and proximate cause of the accident causing the injury being the
defendant's negligence, such negligence would not be a bar to recovery, but the amount
recoverable shall be mitigated by the court. (Art 2179)

Doctrine of Imputed Negligence. It pertains to the rule whereby the negligence of a certain
person in a transaction or act which gave rise to the injury complained of is imputable or
chargeable against the person for whom he was acting or against his associates.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance. Otherwise known as the doctrine of discovered peril or the
humanitarian doctrine, may be stated as follows: Where both parties are negligent in such a way
that it would be impossible to determine whose negligence was the proximate cause of the
accident; whose party had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident by the use of
proper care but failed to do so. These tendencies are considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor. Under this doctrine, where a thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or of his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary
course of events does not happen if those who have management had used proper care; it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care.

PROXIMATE CAUSE

SABINIANO DUMAYAG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR No.172778,

November 26, 2012)

Facts

Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide for the deaths of Genayas, Orlando Alfanta (Alfanta), Grace Israel (Israel), and Julius
Amante (Amante); and with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained
by Crispin Cafieda, Jannette Bacalso, Carmela Lariosa, Fediliza Basco (Basco), and Nelfe Agad
(Agad) and damage to property.

On March 18, 1999, the MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide.

On appeal, the RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the MTC.

The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It found the petitioner and the tricycle
driver equally guilty of negligence, the former for failing to observe the precautionary measure
when approaching a blind curve and the latte" for unsuccessfully overtaking a vehicle. The CA
stated that the petitioner should have been more careful considering that the area had blind
curves and there could be oncoming vehicles from the other side. The fact that petitioner was
driving on the right side of the road did not relieve him of the obligation of exercising due and
ordinary care to prevent collision and avoid injury to persons or property, including others who
may be on the wrong side of the road.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a resolution, dated May 10,
2006.

Issues:

Whether or not negligence, imprudence, and recklessness was correctly attributed to petitioner
by the courts.

Ruling:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

After going the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and
conclusion reached by the is courts unable below. The totality of the evidence shows that the
proximate cause of the collision was the reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily
overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting
first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the Chain immediately effecting the injury as a
natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.

The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising
along its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved
and encroached on its lane. The accident would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle
driver, stayed on his lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to
drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it
should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle.
Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is
not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged
with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see
to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on
the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.

Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a total of eight (8)
passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of traffic rules and regulation. It was
likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle, Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver
violated the conditions specified in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel
along the national highway. In fact, he admitted that Cenayas was only the alternate driver of his
son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company driver because he
was a neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason, the award of damages to Bernabe by
the courts below has no justifiable basis.
 The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle
driver, petitioner should be acquitted. Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an
"acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.

Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the part of
petitioner. It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along the national highway. Having
travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was aware of the blind curves and should have taken
precaution in operating the passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he did

not exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed to have
stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear. According to SP02 Patalinghug, he
found skid marks produced by the passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had slammed
on the brake brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him.
Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was driving along his
rightful lane.

Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that
negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the amounts
of the civil liability imposed on the latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil
liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court allowed the reduction of
50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC and
LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA, and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA and Philippine
Bank of Commerce v. CA.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. L-65295 March 10,
1987

Facts

In the early morning of 15 November 1975, at about 1:30 a.m., private respondent
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home (he lived at 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati)
from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing
corporation. During the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken a "a shot or two" of
liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General
Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal' Makati, not far from his home, and was
proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly
failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming
some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of
petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right-hand side of General
Lacuna street (i.e., on the right-hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which
Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew
(not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were neither lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector
devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening
been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of
his employee Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning,
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by, swerving his car to the left but it was too
late and his car smashed into dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two
gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commended an action for damages in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and approximate cause of his injuries was the
negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his
employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause
of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also
sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the selection and supervision of the dump
truck driver. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
Carbonel.

Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-
G.r. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages. This
decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.

Issue

Whether or not the doctrine of contributory negligence is applicable in the case at bar.

Ruling

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private
respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night
and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck
that was parked askew and sticking out unto the road lane. Nonetheless, we agree with the Court
of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful of negligent manner in which the dump
truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand the accident
and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the
collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
truck driver's negligence. The court believed, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far
from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The
collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in a probability not have
occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an (unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this, risk, the truck driver
must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than
the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening
or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than
a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. In other
words, the petitioner truck driver owned a duty to private respondent Dionisio and other family
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisio's negligence
was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris
vinculum of liability. The court hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only
contributory' that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver
("jack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private
respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and phoenix upon the other hand, the
court believed that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the
damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court,
except the award of PI as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney’s fees and costs, shall
be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners
Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefore to the former. The award of
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.
Phoenix is, of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We see no sufficient reason for
distributing the reduced award of damages made the respondent appellate court.
IMPUTED CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

Yamada vs. The Manila Railroad Co. C.R. No. L-10073 December 24, 1915

Facts

On January 2, 1913, the plaintiffs, together with three companions, hired an automobile
from the defendant taxicab company for a trip to Cavite Viejo. The automobile was secured at a
certain price hour and was driven and controlled by a chauffeur supplied by the taxicab
company. The journey to Cavite Viejo was made without incident but, on the return trip, while
crossing the trucks of defendant railroad company in the barrio of San Juan, municipality of
Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs injured. The trial court
dismissed the complaint on the merits as to the Manila Railroad Company and held the defendant
taxicab company liable for damages to the plaintiffs in various amounts. The taxicab company
appealed.

Issue

The argument of the defendant railroad company that the plaintiffs cannot recover for the
reason that the negligence of the driver of the automobile, if any, was imputable to them, they
having permitted the driver to approach and pass over the railroad crossing without the use of
ordinary care and diligence to determine the proximity of train, and having made no effort to
caution or instruct him or compel him to take reasonable care in making the crossing.

Ruling

We think the better rule, and one more consonant with the weight of authority, is that a
person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver direction as to the place to which he
wishes to be conveyed, but exercise no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not
responsible for acts of negligence of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered
from a collision between the automobile and train, caused by the negligence either of the
locomotive engineer or the automobile driver, (Little vs. Hackett, 116 U.S., 366). The theory on
which the negligence of the driver has in some instances been imputed to the occupant of the
vehicle is that, having trusted the driver by selecting the particular conveyance, the plaintiff so
far identified himself with the owner and his servants that, in case of injury resulting from their
negligence, he was considered a party thereto. This was the theory upon which the case of
Thorogood vs. Bryan (8 C. B., 115) was decided, which is the leading case in favor of the
principle contended for by appellant. The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in Little
vs. Hackett (116 U.S., 366), had this to say concerning the ground on which the Thorogood case
was decided. "The truth is, the decision in Thorogood vs Bryan rests upon indefensible ground.
The identification of the passenger with the negligent driver or the owner, without his personal
cooperation or encouragement, is a gratuitous assumption. There is no such identity. The parties
are not in the same position. The owner of public conveyance is carrier, and the driver or the
servant of the passenger. And his asserted identity with them is contradicted by the daily
experience of the world. "The court is also in the opinion, therefore, that the rule is as we have
stated it. Ordinarily where one rides in public vehicle with the driver thereof and is injured by the
negligence of a third person, to which negligence that of the driver contributes his contributory
negligence is not imputed to the passenger unless said passenger has or it is in the position to
have and exercise some control over the driver with reference to the matter wherein, he was
negligent. Whether the person injured exercises any control over the conduct of the driver further
than to indicate the place to which he wishes to drive is a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court on all of the evidence in the case. (Duval vs. Railroad Co., 134 N.C., 331; Hampel vs.
Detroit etc. R.R. co., 110 Am. st. Rep.,275; Cotton vs. Willmar etc. [Link]., 99 Minn., 366;
Shultz vs. Old Colony Street Ry. Co., 193 Mass., 309; Wilson vs. Puget Sound Elec. Ry. Co., 52
Wash., 522; Johnson vs. Coey, 237 Ill., 88; Hindu vs. Steere, 209 Mass. 442.)

LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Picart vs. Smith

Facts

The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead, he improperly
pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however, guided
his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped
around and was killed by the passing car. Plaintiff Picart was thrown off his horse and suffered
contusions which required several days of medical attention. He sued the defendant Smith, for
the value of his animal, medical expenses and damage to his apparel.

Issue

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable in the case at bar.

Ruling

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty
of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to
discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent
acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the law plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the fair chance to avoid the impending harm
and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence
of the other party.