IAEA Background Guide
WISMUN 2025
Committee: International Atomic Energy Agency
Agenda: Ensuring Nuclear Safety at Nuclear Power Plants During Armed Conflict
Introduction of the Agenda
A nuclear power plant uses controlled fission to heat water into steam and spin turbines. It
stores fuel assemblies that generate heat for years. Plant safety rests on reliable cooling,
intact containment and steady power. In war, shelling or sabotage can sever power lines,
damage cooling pumps and breach containment. Radiation can spread over wide areas.
This committee will set rules and measures to keep plants safe if fighting breaks out nearby.
History of the Committee
The idea of the International Atomic Energy Committee (IAEA) was planted by president
Eisenhower in december 1953 before the United Nations General Assembly and was later
established on 29th July 1957. The Agency was set up as the world’s “Atoms for Peace”
organization within the United Nations family. From the beginning, it was given the mandate
to help states share peaceful nuclear technology and to guard against weapons spread. The
objectives of the IAEA’s dual mission, to promote and control the Atom, are defined in Article
II of the IAEA Statute.
History of the Agenda
In 1977, Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions added special protection for works
“containing dangerous forces,” including power stations. In 1986, a flawed safety test at
Chernobyl led to a core meltdown and a graphite fire. The fallout reached thousands of
square kilometers. In 2011, a tsunami off Japan’s coast flooded backup generators at
Fukushima Daiichi. Three reactor cores melted. In 2022, armed forces from Russia entered
Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) and its staff worked under fire. That
operation turned a civilian plant into a combat zone and highlighted the real threat to
reactors in wartime.
International laws and norms you need to know
IAEA Statute (1957)
Article (I) Establishment :-
Sets up the IAEA as an independent international organization committed to the United
Nations’ principles
Article (II) Objectives :-
1.) Accelerates and expands the peaceful contribution of atomic energy for world peace,
health and prosperity
2.) Any nuclear materials given to a country by the International Atomic energy committee
should be used for peaceful purposes only, never for weapons or military purposes
Article (III) Functions :-
● Promote,aid and teach nuclear research and applications for peaceful goals
● Providing equipment and resources to under developed regions
● Foster knowledge, skills and practices of nuclear science and technical expertise
● Teach scientists and experts in peaceful nuclear technologies
● Start and deliver safe guard to prevent nuclear weapons being used by the military
● Broaden and pertain safety standards in collaboration with UN bodies
● Secure facilities needed to fulfill its mandates
The 7 Pillars of Nuclear Safety (IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi)
1. Physical integrity of facilities.
2. Functional safety and security systems.
3. Working staff under safe conditions.
4. Reliable off-site power supply.
5. Proper supply chains.
6. Radiation monitoring systems.
7. Emergency response and communication.
Geneva Conventions (Protocol I, Article 56)
1.) Absolute protection
Structures and building with dangerous forces (e.g :- dams and nuclear facilities) shall not be
targeted even if they qualify as military bases bec
Current Issues with Respect to the Agenda
1. Legal Gaps
Article 56 of Protocol I (1977) bars attacks on facilities that “contain dangerous
forces,” including NPPs. However, only 174 states have ratified it, and no dedicated
force enforces its rules. That leaves plants legally protected but practically vulnerable
in war.
2. Power Disruptions
Since mid-2022, Zaporizhzhia lost off-site power at least eight times. Each outage
forced diesel generators to run for days, raising the risk of coolant loss and extra
wear on backup pumps.
3. Staff Safety and Access
IAEA inspectors and plant operators must navigate checkpoints, curfews and nearby
fighting. In 2023, IAEA teams missed 20 planned visits, and Zaporizhzhia staff
logged 16-hour shifts under shelling threats.
4. Military Use of Sites
Forces have dug trenches within 200 m of reactor halls and deployed air defenses on
plant grounds. That practice turns civilian reactors into military targets and breaches
humanitarian-law safeguards.
5. Cyber Threats
The 2010 Stuxnet attack showed how malware can cripple reactor controls. Since
2022, analysts have found Turla malware in Ukraine’s grid software, highlighting
dangers of remote sabotage in conflict.
6. Energy Needs vs. Safety
Zaporizhzhia once supplied 20 percent of Ukraine’s power. A full shutdown would cut
5 GW, risking blackouts for millions. States under siege may keep reactors online
despite safety warnings.
Key Stakeholders and Positions
● United States: The U.S. demands legally binding no-strike zones to keep armed
forces away from reactor sites. It has supplied $50 million in generators and spare
parts to maintain cooling at Zaporizhzhia. Its diplomats also led IAEA workshops on
crisis planning and staff security.
● Russian Federation: Moscow claims its troops at Zaporizhzhia guard the plant from
sabotage rather than occupy it. It deployed air defenses and power-repair crews but
restricted some IAEA movements as a political move. Russia rejects calls for
withdrawal, calling them an attack on its energy security.
● France & United Kingdom: Paris and London jointly funded hardened generators and
water-filter units at Ukraine’s reactors. They backed Ukraine’s push for unfettered
IAEA access and helped draft the “Seven Pillars” safety criteria. Both also sent
technical experts to strengthen emergency drills in Eastern Europe.
● China & India: Beijing and New Delhi urge all sides to respect civilian infrastructure
under humanitarian law. They abstained on UN votes that singled out one party,
fearing politicization of safety norms. Both host IAEA training courses and stress
each state’s sovereign right to its energy mix.
● Iran: Tehran condemned strikes on Natanz and Fordow as breaches of the NPT and
the UN Charter. Under strict IAEA safeguards, it has added cameras, sensors and
armed guards to boost site security after past sabotage. Iran insists on broad legal
guarantees to prevent any future attack on its peaceful program.
● Germany & Japan: Germany shut down all civilian reactors by 2023, citing
Fukushima’s warning of layered risks. Japan restarted just nine of its reactors under
tighter safety rules and backup-power requirements. Both pressed the IAEA to
require peer reviews of national emergency procedures before any restart.
● Canada & Australia: Ottawa and Canberra back stronger IAEA authority to inspect
plants in conflict zones. Canada sent remote monitoring kits and drafted
amendments to the Physical Protection Convention. Australia funds UN studies on
grid resilience to keep reactors cool during power cuts.
● Austria & New Zealand: Vienna and Wellington co-sponsored a 2024 UN motion to
criminalize attacks on nuclear facilities. They press for binding bans on any military
use of plant grounds and for IAEA-led legal reviews. Both argue that war-time
protections must be as iron-clad as those for hospitals and schools.
Past Actions
● UNGA A/RES/ES-11/4 (11 July 2024): The General Assembly adopted resolution
A/78/L.90 by a vote of 99 in favour, 9 against and 60 abstentions, demanding that
Russia withdraw all military and unauthorized personnel from the Zaporizhzhia NPP
and grant the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission full access to safety-relevant
areas for inspections.
● IAEA Seven Pillars (March 2022): Director General Rafael Grossi outlined seven
indispensable pillars to protect nuclear power plants in conflict zones. These cover
uninterrupted off-site power, protected communication, staff access, security of
systems, information flow, cooperation and radiation monitoring.
● IAEA Support Missions (2022-Present): Since September 2022, the IAEA’s Support
and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ) has led over 15 expert visits to
Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl. Teams logged more than 2,350 staff-days on site and
delivered nearly €5 million in vital equipment to maintain reactor safety under
occupation.
● Draft CPPNM Amendment (2023): At the 2023 IAEA General Conference, several
states proposed amending the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material to explicitly ban wartime attacks on nuclear facilities. The amendment has
been adopted in resolution form but still awaits ratification to enter into force.
Possible Considerations for the Future
1. Demilitarized Safety Zones: A 5 km zone around each nuclear plant where no military
units may enter could be established. IAEA observers would patrol these areas,
report violations, and request immediate withdrawal of any forces. This buffer draws
on Article 56 of Protocol I and recent UN drafts calling for “nuclear safety barriers.”
2. IAEA Rapid-Response Unit: A standing team of 12 experts trained in conflict-zone
operations could be formed and would be equipped with armored vehicles and
satellite kits. They would deploy within 48 hours of a threat to inspect reactors, repair
vital systems, and advise local staff. Quick action could prevent a minor damage from
evolving into a major accident.
3. Hardened Infrastructure: Plants could add blast-resistant walls around reactor
buildings and bury key cables in reinforced tunnels. Fortified shelters for mobile
generators would kick in if the grid fails, and anti-drone nets could stop small UAVs
from striking critical areas. Ukraine’s emergency renovation at Zaporizhzhia shows
how these steps can work under fire.
4. Mutual Aid Agreements: Neighboring states could sign pacts to supply spare parts,
diesel fuel and trained crews if a plant loses its own resources. During Zaporizhzhia’s
2022 blackouts, EU members shared power across borders, as formal pacts would
trigger such aid automatically. Such pacts ensure no plant stands alone when conflict
disrupts its supply lines.
5. Liability and Compensation Fund: Member states and operators could pool $500
million to cover cleanup, medical care and temporary housing after war-related
nuclear incidents. A dedicated fund would speed relief to affected communities and
avoid drawn-out legal claims. Fast payments would reduce human suffering and help
restore public trust.
Conclusion / Summary
Armed conflicts add new threats to nuclear power plants. Existing laws and IAEA rules set
strong guardrails but lack on-site enforcement. The committee must craft clear, workable
steps, while having energy needs bridged with the urgent goal of preventing radiation
releases under fire.
Questions a Resolution Must Answer
1. How will the IAEA secure continuous cooling and power at NPPs during conflict?
2. What steps will enforce legal no-strike zones around reactors?
3. Should the IAEA field its own rapid-response team for emergencies?
4. How will states fund and build hardened defenses at vulnerable plants?
5. Who will pay for cleanup and health costs if war-related damage occurs?
Bibliography / References
1. [Link]
statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
2. [Link]
statement-on-situation-in-ukraine
3. [Link]
heard-repeated-rounds-gunfire-2025-06-05/
4. [Link]
nuclear-power-plant-ukraine-2024-07-11/
5. [Link]
two-years-2024-03-07/
6. [Link]
credibility-2025-06-22/
7. [Link]
strikes-iran-2025-06-22/
8. [Link]
condemns-us-strikes-iran-2025-06-23/
9. [Link]
10. [Link]