Intoxication

The intoxication defense in English introduces doubt over whether the defendant had the required
mens rea. Such is carried out to persuade the magistrates or jury. The legal status of this area is
primarily determined by case law, especially in its first stages. Although quite a few of these cases refer
to consuming alcohol, it is essential to keep in mind that the concerned defense may apply to any case
where the defendant has consumed substances, or a combination of such, that have the potential to
hinder their ability to form motive or foresee the outcomes resulting from their conduct. It can be
concluded that if, regardless of the state of intoxication, individual D shows the required mens rea
needed for the particular crime (whether it entails intention, recklessness, or a different mental state,
such as dishonesty), then the defense becomes inapplicable. In the event that the prosecution was
unable to prove mens rea and D was involuntarily intoxicated, they would surely be allowed an
acquittal.

Intoxication becomes invalid if the defendant still has the required mental element. In the leading case
of Sheehan, according to the judgment of the Court of Appeal, if the defendant claims intoxication to
prove the lack of mens rea, the jury needs to be guided that: “the mere fact that the defendant’s mind
was affected by drink so that he acted in way in which he would not have done had he been sober
does not assist him at all, provided that the necessary intention was there. A drunken intent is
nevertheless an intent”.

At present, Kingston stands as the preeminent case in this regard. The jury found D culpable of sexual
assault in this case. The prosecution had successfully convinced the jury that D had sufficient
awareness of the events happening at the time of the offence, despite his involuntary intoxication, in
order to establish mens rea. However, the Court of Appeals approved D's appeal because D's primary
intoxication was not his fault. Lord Taylor CJ stated, “If a drink or drug, surreptitiously administered,
causes a person to lose his self-control and for that reason to form an intent which he would not
otherwise have formed.... the law should exculpate him because the operative fault is not his”. By
allowing the prosecution's appeal against this decision, the House of Lords restored D's culpability.

Involuntary Intoxication

If D's non-alcoholic drink is intoxicated or laced without being told, he gets involuntarily intoxicated. The
above case of Kingston's (1995) drugging of D's coffee is a prime instance. However, D needs to
assume that he was drinking non-alcoholic. The fact that D's drink or drug has a higher impact than
predicted doesn't make intoxication involuntary. In the case of Allen [1988], D was offered organic wine.
He wasn’t aware of the intense nature of the wine. Because of his intoxication, he committed a severe
sexual assault. His convictions for buggery and sexual assault were upheld by the Court of Appeal. No
proof showed D drank intentionally. He was aware of his consuming alcohol and risked its strength.
Home-made liquor tends to be stronger than pub-bought, so D should have known if intoxication was
voluntary only if D knew what he was consuming. Its strength, the public policy argument in Majewski
(1977), would be comprised. D could attempt to prevent blame just because he did not realize the
strength of his drinks. In the case of Eatch [1980] Crim LR 650, the defendant, referred to as D,
consumed beer at a social gathering that included an undisclosed, more potent substance. The
responsibility of determining whether the defendant's condition was mainly due to voluntary intoxication
was emphasised in the jury instructions delivered by the presiding judge.

In Majewski, Lord Elwyn-Jones LC notably included people taking drugs not recommended by a
physician within voluntary intoxication; therefore, those who take drugs authorized by a doctor will be
considered involuntarily intoxicated. In the case of Bailey, D was indicted with willful injury. His defense
was that he had diabetes and took insulin (which was prescribed by the doctor). But, since he failed to
take insulin afterward, it caused a hypoglycemic phase, which stopped him from acknowledging his
actions to their fullest extent.

The Court of Appeal issued a decision highlighting the need to distinguish between intoxication caused
by alcohol consumption and excessive use of specific drugs, and the unforeseen adverse effects of
medicinal chemicals. The fact was “common knowledge” that alcoholics and drug users might turn
aggressive or indulge in dangerous or unpredictable behavior. Judge Griffiths stated, “The question in
each case will be whether the prosecution has proved the necessary element of recklessness. In
cases of assault, if [D] knows that his actions or inaction are likely to make him aggressive,
unpredictable, or uncontrolled with the result that he may cause some injury to others and he persists in
the action or takes no remedial action when he knows it is required, it will be open to the jury to find that
he was reckless”.

A further type of involuntary intoxication includes drugs that induce sedative or hypnotic effects, as
opposed to drugs that decrease inhibition or enhance mental capabilities. D took morphine tablets (not
medically recommended) for an upset stomach before committing an offense in Burns (1974). The
Court of Appeal quashed his conviction. If the jury found that Burns was ignorant of the dangers of
morphine, they should have been advised to acquit. Hardie [1985] serves as the primary instance in
which D used Valium tablets (not medically prescribed) before conducting an offense. After a while, he
lit a fire in the bedroom's closet. He argued that he was under the influence of Valium and was unaware
of what he was doing. The jury declared the defendant guilty of arson after being told to ignore the
impacts of the Valium. However, D's conviction was overruled. It was stated by Parker LJ that “there
was no evidence that it was known to [D] or even generally known that the taking of valium in the
quantity taken would be liable to render a person aggressive or incapable of appreciating risks or have
other side effects such that its self-administration would itself have an element of recklessness ...”
One obstacle in this area is differentiating between ‘dangerous’ and ‘soporific and sedative’ drugs.
According to the situation, marijuana can be soothing or hallucinogenic. Heroin can be ‘dangerous’ and
still ‘soporific.’ Much varies based on factors such as user, amount taken, previous use, method of
administration (injections have more potent effects than smoking or eating), environment, and
expectations. The results may vary significantly when a person takes the same medicine at different
times. When many medications are used together, predicting their effects becomes more challenging
due to the possibility of interactions. Alcohol often enhances the sedative effects of tranquilizers. While
the courts in England have not yet addressed these concerns, the House of Lords emphasized the
significance of public policy in Majewski (1977). When determining whether a drug is ‘dangerous’ or
‘soporific,’ such as heroin, courts may consider it both, making consumption voluntary.

Voluntary intoxication

The current intoxication legislation was developed through a series of amendments resulting from the
seminal case of Majewski. It was in this case that the notion of "specific purpose" was first addressed in
detail. In one instance, D, who was inebriated, raped his victim by covering her mouth with his hand.
Asphyxia was the cause of her death. Because the murder was a felony and the prosecution had to
establish a specific intent to kill or seriously hurt someone, his murder conviction was overturned. They
were unable to achieve this. They could merely show a motive to rape.

In the landmark case of Majewski, the House of Lords argued on the significance of voluntary
intoxication as evidential backing for mens rea. The defendant, under the influence of alcohol and
narcotics, assaulted a police officer in a tavern. While confronting an indictment for assaulting a police
officer, he attempted to establish mens rea by pleading self-intoxication. The House of Lords, in
upholding his conviction, ruled that testimony regarding voluntary intoxication could only be admitted as
evidence against mens rea for offences that required proof of specific intent, such as murder. It was
inapplicable to crimes that did not need proving of mens rea or crimes of "basic intent." It was an
assault with basic intent. A number of tests were created to determine the traits of a crime with a
particular intent. According to one interpretation, a crime of specific intent is also a crime of ulterior
intent, meaning that the accused must show that their intentions were different from fulfilling the actus
reus of offense. This test has a fault in that it does not take into account crimes like murder, which are
legally referred to as crimes of specified intent because the prosecution simply needs to show that the
crime's action was intended, mainly. Another view is that recklessly performed crimes may have
primary purpose. “A crime of specific intent is simply a crime in which the mens rea element is
(specifically) intention and nothing less” (Lord Elwyn-Jones at 474–5).

This last approach was favored in Caldwell. The concept that "self-induced intoxication is no defense to
a crime where recklessness is sufficient to constitute the men's rea" was seen as supported by
Majewski. In general, a crime can be defined as specific intent if the prosecution must show that the
accused has the purpose to cause the actus reus that led to the offense or a different consequence. If
Majewski had been charged with wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (ulterior intent) or
causing grievous physical harm with intent to cause grievous bodily harm (specific intent, appropriately
termed), his intoxication would have been relevant in determining whether he had formed this intention.
Because the only charge against him was assault, which is an offence of (subjective) recklessness, his
intoxication had no bearing on the mens rea problem.

In R v Aidid (Kinse), the defendant was found guilty of murdering V through sustained violence
following a heavy drinking session. The defendant admitted guilt of manslaughter on appeal but argued
that the judge misled the jury on the impact of alcohol on intent. In rejecting the appeal, the judge
questioned the jury if the defendant intended to cause significant physical damage to [J]. Also,
considering the defendant's intent, they should evaluate her alcohol-related impairment but must
remember that drunk intent is still intended. He argued that A's inability to sleep due to alcoholism may
have prevented the prosecution from proving her intention to murder. The Court considered this
approach consistent with the authoritative guidance in Sheehan and Moore (according to Lane LJ),
“the mere fact that the defendant’s mind was affected by the drink so that he acted in a way in which he
would not have done if he had been sober does not assist him at all, provided that the necessary intent
was there, for a drunken intent is nevertheless an intent; secondly, the jury should be instructed to have
regard to all the evidence, including the evidence relating to drink, to draw such inferences as they think
proper from the evidence, and on that basis to ask themselves whether they feel sure that at the
material time the defendant had the requisite intent.”

Therefore, murder, Section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act of 1861, criminal attempt,
burglary, theft, and robbery are crimes with a specific purpose. If the accused fails to create the
required intention due to intoxication during any of the above instances, the prosecution cannot meet its
burden of proof. The exception to this rule occurs when a defendant intoxicates himself to carry out a
crime of a particular purpose, such as in Gallagher, where murder was the charged felony. Reckless
crimes, including those needing discussion or understanding, are classified as main intent crimes.
Assault, malicious wounding, sexual assault, manslaughter, rape, criminal damage, and theft of a
motor vehicle are all examples of basic crimes. Committing an offence when intoxicated absolves the
prosecution of the burden of proving recklessness. He will be considered conscious of any matter he
would have known if sober. A possible exemption is when the defendant accidently affects the victim,
such as when D slips off a fence and hits the victim, which would not have happened if the defendant
had not been intoxicated. The defendant's absence of mens rea precludes allegations of assault or
severe bodily harm, both of which require primary purpose. Similarly, intoxicated tripping and knocking
down pottery would be fatal to a criminal damage allegation. Accidents are accidents, even intoxicated
ones.

The above list of primary purpose offenses is not exhaustive, and any supportive authority must be
qualified before Majewski and Caldwell. Section 3(1)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 includes a
new fundamental intent offense. It applies when a person knowingly contacts another person (B) and
the touching is sexual. This appears to be a particular purpose felony, as proof of intentional sexual
contact with the victim is required. In the Heard case, the defendant was drunk when he brushed his
penis against the leg of a police officer. He said he was intoxicated and had no intention of laying hands
on another person sexually. The Court of Appeal ruled that this was an essential intent violation and
that his intoxication did not prohibit him from establishing mens rea. He rubbed intentionally, which was
enough. It was not necessary to demonstrate that the rubbing was sexually intended.

It is evident from these lists that, apart from property offenses and attempts, each particular intent crime
has a basic intent counterpart that carries a lesser degree of guilt. This effectively means that an
individual who provides convincing evidence of intoxication that refutes a charge of special intent, such
as murder, can still face a conviction for a charge of basic intent, such as manslaughter. In this way, a
peaceful reconciliation between the social defence programme and the mens rea notion is established.