Disarmament and International

Securit y Committee
Background Guide

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Table of Contents
Committee Description ........................................................................................... 4

Monitoring the Use of Private Military Contractors ........................................... 5

Topic Overview ..................................................................................................... 5
Timeline ................................................................................................................. 6
Historical Analysis ................................................................................................. 8
Post-Cold War .................................................................................................... 8
The Iraq War....................................................................................................... 9
The War in Afghanistan ................................................................................... 10
The Russo-Ukrainian War ................................................................................ 10
Current Situation .................................................................................................. 11
Usages of PMC Services .................................................................................. 11
Incentives for Nations to Contract PMCs ......................................................... 11
Mistreatment of Foreign Workers .................................................................... 12
Inflated Pricing ................................................................................................. 12
Ongoing PMC Misconduct ............................................................................... 13
UN/International Involvement ............................................................................. 13
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.............................................................. 13
The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries ....................................... 14
The United Nations Mercenary Convention..................................................... 14
The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers ................. 15
Possible Solutions ................................................................................................ 15
PMC Oversight Committee .............................................................................. 15
Legal Regulation .............................................................................................. 16
Registration and Licensing ............................................................................... 16
Bloc Positions ...................................................................................................... 17
Nations with Minimal PMC Involvement ........................................................ 17
Nations with Significant PMC Involvement .................................................... 17
Nations Strongly Opposing PMC Use .............................................................. 18
Discussion Questions ........................................................................................... 19
Additional Sources ............................................................................................... 19
Works Cited ......................................................................................................... 20

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Targeting Illicit Arms Trade on the Dark Web.................................................. 23
Topic Overview ................................................................................................... 23
Timeline ............................................................................................................... 24
Historical Analysis ............................................................................................... 25
Origins of the Dark Web .................................................................................. 25
The International Rise of Illicit Arms Trafficking ........................................... 26
Current Situation .................................................................................................. 27
Types of Marketplaces ..................................................................................... 27
Removal of Marketplaces ................................................................................. 28
Access to Dark Web Markets ........................................................................... 28
Payment on Dark Web Markets ....................................................................... 28
Shipping and Receiving Arms .......................................................................... 29
UN/International Involvement ............................................................................. 29
UN Frameworks ............................................................................................... 29
International Law Enforcement Operations ..................................................... 30
Possible Solutions ................................................................................................ 31
Postal Security .................................................................................................. 31
Deanonymizing the Dark Web ......................................................................... 31
Creation of an International Database .............................................................. 32
Bloc Positions ...................................................................................................... 32
United States of America.................................................................................. 32
European Union (EU) ....................................................................................... 32
Arms Export-Heavy Nations ............................................................................ 33
Countries With High Dark Web Usage Rates .................................................. 33
Discussion Questions ........................................................................................... 34
Works Cited ......................................................................................................... 35

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Committee Description
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC), also known as the First
Committee, was established in 1945 in accordance with Chapter IV of the United Nations
Charter. The original purpose of the committee was to ease the various political tensions and
security threats that had arisen following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the
end of the Second World War. 1 Since then, the nature of DISEC’s mandate has undergone a
variety of alterations and adjustments. Currently, DISEC’s primary goal is to address issues and
conflicts hindering global peace efforts and threatening the stability of the global community. To
accomplish this, the committee works to formulate solutions that counteract challenges found in
the international security regime. DISEC considers all disarmament and international security
matters within the Charter’s scope, and it operates in alignment with the general principles of
cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security. 2

Although DISEC’s 193 member states have the power to discuss any threats to international
security, the committee cannot pass any legally binding resolutions, impose sanctions, or directly
intervene in conflicts abroad. 3 In other words, resolutions passed by DISEC can only take the
form of recommendations. Despite this, DISEC has two distinct powers. The first of these
powers is the committee’s ability to pass resolutions to the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) to be further discussed and evaluated. In a sense, this allows DISEC to directly
influence what may become binding international law. The second of these powers, under the
Uniting for Peace Resolution passed in 1950, mandates that DISEC has permission to take action
if the Security Council fails to pass a resolution as a result of a veto. Furthermore, in the case of
an immediate threat to international security, the Secretary-General is required to grant an
Emergency Special Session on the given topic if a majority of DISEC member states request it. 4

1 [Link]
2 Ibid.
3 [Link]
4 [Link]

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Monitoring the Use of Private Military Contractors

Topic Overview
Private military contractors (PMCs), or private military companies, are private corporate entities
that provide combat services for hire. 5 While individuals, corporations, and non-governmental
organizations may employ the services of PMCs, PMCs are most often employed by
governments and their militaries in conflicts that require additional combat personnel and
resources. As such, those hired by PMCs are former or retired armed forces and law enforcement
personnel.6

The primary concern with government-employed PMCs is their scope of duty. In many cases,
PMCs are contracted as a means for governments to perform offensive operations that are
considered legally ambiguous, and in some cases, in blatant violation of the Geneva
Conventions.7 Although the UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, or the United Nations Mercenary Convention, prohibits
governments from employing PMCs, only 46 states have ratified the Convention. 8 This leaves
the vast majority of nations—including China, France, India, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States—legally permitted to contract PMCs.

The increasing demand for and reliance on PMCs is attributed to their relatively low cost and
obscurity in which PMCs are able to operate. 9 As of 2003, there is at least one PMC personnel
for every ten state military personnel, and, according to a 2008 internal report, PMCs make up
29% of the United States Intelligence Community (IC)—the collective term for all United States
military and intelligence agencies—costing 49% of the collective IC personnel budget. 10

Given the lack of substantial, internationally standardized regulation for PMCs and the high
unlikelihood of their abolition, it is DISEC’s responsibility to establish a clear and vigorous
accountability framework for those wishing to employ PMCs.

5 [Link]
6 Ibid.
7 [Link]
8 [Link]
9
[Link]
10 [Link]

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Timeline
1669 — The United East India Company, a multinational trade and production corporation more
commonly known as the Dutch East India Company, acquires a private army of 10 000 soldiers
and 40 warships. It is widely regarded as the largest and wealthiest company in history.11

1803 — Some 260 000 soldiers serve in the East India Company’s three Presidency armies—
twice the size of the British Army at that time. 12

October 24, 1945 — The United Nations begins operations after the end of World War II,
succeeding the League of Nations. The Disarmament and International Security Committee, the
First Committee of the General Assembly, is established.13

1949 — The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are signed, establishing international standards for the
wartime treatment of the wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians. The Geneva
Conventions have been ratified by 196 states. 14

1965 — The first private military company, WatchGuard International, is founded by a group of
former British Special Air Service veterans. Advertising its provisions as by-contract security
and military services, WatchGuard International begins operations in Yemen, Zambia, Sierra
Leone, and the Gulf States. 15

1971 — WatchGuard International fails in an attempt to overthrow Colonel Muammar Gaddafi,

Libya’s de facto leader. 16

December 4, 2001 — The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing,
and Training of Mercenaries, also known as the United Nations Mercenary Convention, becomes
an official treaty prohibiting its namesake. Forty-six states have ratified the Convention, while
nations including China, France, India, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
abstained from signing the treaty. 17

2003–2004 — Through a series of articles, broadcasts, and images published by the media,
human rights abuses committed by the US military, CIA, and PMCs CACI and Titan
Corporation in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq are revealed. While a select few military personnel
are held responsible, no private contractors are charged, despite documented crimes of
starvation, rape, torture, and murder. 18

11 [Link]
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 [Link]
15 [Link]
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 [Link]

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September 16, 2007 — The Nisour Square massacre takes place in Iraq. Employees of
Blackwater Worldwide (now Academi), a PMC contracted by the US government in Iraq, killed
17 and wounded 20 Iraqi civilians. While the Blackwater employees maintain that they engaged
in self-defence, witnesses and further investigation by the US and Iraqi governments determined
that the actions were unprovoked, with an FBI investigation finding that 14 of the 17 killed were
shot without cause.19

December 2009 — The United States Congress’ Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports
the number of US-employed PMC personnel in Afghanistan to be 130 000 to 160 000,
comprising 69% of all US-affiliated personnel in the country. 20

2014 — Four Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour Square massacre are tried and
convicted; one of first-degree murder and three of manslaughter and weapons charges. 21

September 2010 — The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) is
drafted with the goal of developing PMC oversight mechanisms.22 While its organizing entity,
the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), has 108 PMC members (including
Academi, then-Blackwater) and seven state members (including Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States), among others, the ICoC and ICoCA is largely criticized for further
decreasing the authority that the UN has over PMCs, as it encourages the use of private
mercenaries and obstructs UN supervision over possible hostile activity. 23

June 27, 2011 — The United States Supreme Court declines an appeal for lawsuits against
PMCs CACI and Titan Corporation. 24

April 2014 — The Wagner Group, a Russian state-funded PMC, commences during the Donbas
War in Ukraine, aiding Russian forces in the full invasion of Ukraine. 25

December 2020 — President Donald Trump pardons the four former Blackwater employees
convicted of charges relating to the Nisour Square massacre. 26

February 28, 2022 — It was reported that over 400 mercenaries of the Wagner Group were sent
to Kyiv and tasked with assassinating Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky. 27 The attempt
failed; however, there is a lack of explanation as to why exactly it did.

19 [Link]
20 [Link]
21 [Link]
22 [Link]
23 [Link]
24 [Link]
25 [Link]
26 Ibid.
27 [Link]

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September 2022 — Yevgeny Prigozhin, a previous Russian mercenary leader and oligarch,
publicly announces his affiliation with the creation of the Wagner Group. 28 He expresses his
disapproval of the way the war against Ukraine transpired and accuses the military of concealing
the actual reason they began invasions. 29

January 2023 — The USA officially labelled the Wagner Group a “Transnational Criminal
Organization”.30

June 2023 — Prigozhin accuses the Defence Ministry of opening fire on Wagner soldiers and
launches an armed rebellion. Wagner fighters enter the southern Russian city Rostov-on-Don and
are announced to be prepared for a full insurgency against the Russian government. 31

December 2023 — The Chinese government continues to use PMCs to protect the expansion
and continuation of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ensuring that their investments in Africa
for various materials and technologies are beneficial and that the personnel working there are
guarded.32

Historical Analysis

Case Study: Post-Cold War

The Cold War was a period of tense geopolitical rivalry that saw unprecedented military
spending and the rapid military expansion of many nations. The United States, for example, had
military expenditures totalling over 13 trillion USD during the half-century.33 After the
dissolution of the Soviet Union which signalled the end of the Cold War, several nations began
downsizing their militaries as the budget and public demand for defence shrank. Throughout the
1990s, the United States military reduced its number of personnel from 2.1 million to 1.4
million, and its budget fell from an annual average of 6.9% to 3.1% of its national GDP in
2001.34 Military spending among Western European nations, including the United Kingdom,
France, Germany, and Italy, fell from 2.4% to 1.6% of GDP.35

PMCs seized this opportunity to grow as millions of former Western military personnel entered
the private workforce, having had extensive training and experience needed for the industry. As
the demand for PMCs grew, the scope of their contracted services expanded to include personnel
training, weapons supply, and offensive operations.

28 [Link]
29 Ibid.
30 [Link]
31 [Link]
32 [Link]
33 [Link]
34 [Link]
35 Ibid.

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Case Study: The Iraq War
The recent popularization and ever-growing demand for PMCs can be attributed to the Iraq War
(2003–2011), in which the United States and allied nations contracted numerous PMCs for
translation, interrogation, and operations services. In 2007, US-contracted PMC personnel
outnumbered the US military presence in Iraq at 180 000 to 160 000.36 However, countless
criminal offences were committed by PMCs, including Blackwater Worldwide, CACI, and Titan
Corporation.

Despite evidence of CACI and Titan Corporation’s involvement in the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal, in which prisoners were subject to starvation, rape, torture, and murder, the PMCs were
not held responsible. Alongside widespread public outrage, nations with past and existing
contracts with PMCs were criticized for lacking the necessary framework to regulate PMC
activity abroad. In 2011, the United States Supreme Court declined to review a lawsuit filed by
250 former Abu Ghraib detainees or relatives of detainees against the PMCs CACI and Titan
Corporation.37

The PMC Blackwater Worldwide gained international infamy from the Nisour Square massacre
of September 16, 2007, when Blackwater employees opened fire on Iraqi civilians, killing 17 and
injuring 20.38 The Blackwater contractors involved, who were escorting a US embassy convoy in
Baghdad, Iraq, claimed that assailants ambushed the convoy. However, witnesses and further
investigation by the US and Iraqi governments determined that their actions were unprovoked
with an FBI investigation finding that 14 of the 17 killed were shot without cause. 39 Seven years
later, four Blackwater employees involved in the Nisour Square massacre are tried and
convicted, one of first-degree murder and three of manslaughter and weapons charges. 40

A 2010 report by the United States Department of Defense Inspector General found that
contractors in Iraq billed the US government for “12 hours of truck maintenance work, but in
reality only work[ed] an average of 1.3 hours.”41 Among the PMCs involved was KBR, a
defence company with, as of 2010, 38 billion USD of contracts with the United States
government.

36 [Link]
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 [Link]
40 Ibid.
41 [Link]

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Case Study: The War in Afghanistan
In Afghanistan, PMCs employed by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France,
Germany, and other NATO allies provided numerous services. Of note is the myriad of
personnel and military technology used, including munitions, drones, trucks, helicopters, ships,
and planes. As of December 2009, the number of US-employed PMC personnel in Afghanistan
is reported to be 130 000 to 160 000 people, comprising 69% of all US-affiliated personnel in the
country.42 The United States has spent over 108 billion USD on PMC contracts in Afghanistan
out of its 2.313 trillion USD total expenditure. 43

In December 2009, the United States House Oversight Subcommittee on National Security
investigated the role of PMCs in the United States government’s unintentional funding of the
Taliban and Afghan insurgents. Specifically, PMCs were alleged to have paid off the Taliban and
Afghan warlords for protection and the assurance of safe passage while delivering supplies by
truck.44 Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified and explained the possibility of these
allegations before the Senate Armed Services Committee. 45

Case Study: The Russo-Ukrainian War

PMC Wagner, better known as the Wagner Group, emerged in Russia during the War in Donbas.
From its establishment in 2014 up until 2023, it worked closely alongside the Russian
government, playing a significant role in the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 46 It was reported to
be the principal assault unit during the Battle of Bakhmut. 47 Through recruitment of personnel
from prisons, by 2022, Wagner numbers in Ukraine have soared from 1,000 to around 20,000,
which makes up just below 10% of total Russian forces in Ukraine. 48 It was suspected that the
Wagner Group served as a proxy for the Russian government and was used to give the Russian
Armed Forces plausible deniability for international military movements.49

Despite its working with Russia for the better part of a decade, then-chief of the Wagner Group
Yevgeny Prigozhin organized a rebellion in June of 2023.50 Initiated in Rostov-on-Don,
Prigozhin’s forces seized the southern Russian city and took to Moscow. During this time, as
Russian security forces opened fire on a troop of mercenaries who were more than halfway to
Moscow, Putin delivered a televised address declaring that the movement was an act of treason
and “necessary orders have been given [to defend Russia]”.51 Later that day, Prigozhin gave
orders to retreat from the march on Moscow. After Russia marks the rebellion a criminal case

42
Ibid.
43 [Link]
44 [Link]
45 Ibid.
46 [Link]
47 Ibid.
48 [Link]
49 [Link]
50 [Link]
51 [Link]

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and a meeting transpires between Putin and the leaders of the Wagner Group, Prigozhin was
exiled to Belarus.52 2 months later, in August, he passed away due to a plane crash in Russia. 53

As a counter to the Wagner group, during the invasion, a small-scale Ukrainian PMC known as
the Mozart Group was co-founded by Andrew Milburn and Andrew Bain, both former U.S.
marine colonels. The Mozart Group involved Western participants with military expertise and
aided in the escape and relocation of civilians as well as military development. 54 Those in the
Mozart Group were prohibited from participating in combat. 55

Current Situation

Usages of PMC Services

While PMCs are most often affiliated with the deployment of personnel into conflict zones,
companies may provide a number of additional services ranging from training services for
national military personnel to the production and supply of military technology such as
munitions, drones, vehicles, and aircraft. In an age of digital technology, PMCs with information
technology (IT) and cybersecurity services are increasing in demand as well. Governments and
private-sector employers benefit from data security consulting and integration solutions, both for
domestic applications and IT support in conflict zones. Various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) employ PMCs for their humanitarian ventures, relying extensively on their protective
and transport services to safely deliver and distribute humanitarian aid in dangerous conflict
zones. As NGOs often lack alternatives to PMC contracting and may be unaware of a particular
PMC’s history of misconduct, they may unwittingly employ—and indirectly support—PMCs
engaging in illicit activities. 56

Incentives for Nations to Contract PMCs

Nations have numerous incentives to employ PMCs instead of investing capital in their state
militaries. In the long term, nations are incentivized to contract with PMCs for personnel rather
than grow domestic militaries because they are not official, full-time employees of the state.
Specifically, PMC personnel do not receive the vast benefits that service members and veterans
receive which can include comprehensive healthcare coverage, housing, fully funded post-
secondary education, and family services. Given that medical care for US veterans of
Afghanistan and Iraq, not including the cost of other veterans' benefits or benefits for existing
service members, is projected to be 2.5 trillion USD, contracting PMCs provides substantial
long-term expenditure savings.57

52 Ibid.
53 [Link]
54 [Link]
55 Ibid.
56 [Link]
57 [Link]

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Perhaps governments’ most prominent incentive for contracting PMCs is superficially deflating
the human cost of conflicts statistically. 58 While governments are obligated to report casualties
among domestic military personnel, many governments choose not to record fatalities among
PMC personnel. As a result, government statistics about casualties in any conflict are not
representative of the actual death toll—assuaging the public’s perception of the cost of conflicts
and wars. For example, while the US government reports the War in Afghanistan to have 2,434
US military fatalities, experts estimate that, in addition, 3,814 US-employed contractors have
died as a result of war violence, over 50% more fatalities than that of the US military itself. 59 60

Mistreatment of Foreign Workers

PMCs will frequently hire citizens who are former military and law enforcement personnel of the
host country or a third-party nation. In several conflicts, PMCs have evaded standard
employment laws by outsourcing labour to nations with weak labour laws. 61 Although this
allows for higher profit margins for domestic PMCs and lower contract costs for employing
nations, foreign workers are frequently paid a fraction of standard wages, subject to poor
working conditions, and abused. 62

Inflated Pricing
Government contracts remain lucrative for PMCs, who continue to charge governments high
prices despite low costs. According to a 2020 study, the United States Department of Defense
spent 370 billion USD—over half of its total budget of 676 billion USD—on contracts with
PMCs.63 PMCs lack necessary competitive pressures that force price reductions, often being
awarded contracts without competitive bidding. 64 Specific varieties of contracts, including
lifetime service agreements and exclusive supplier contracts, create artificial monopolies in
which PMCs can inflate prices.65 In the same realm, private-sector workers are paid 20% to
166%, more than their public-sector government counterparts. 66 PMCs are also able to evade
demands for reform and proposed price cuts through political lobbying.

58 [Link]
59 [Link]
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 [Link]
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.

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Ongoing PMC Misconduct
Even after the end of the Iraq War and the war in Afghanistan, PMCs are presented with
profitable opportunities in the form of the Syrian Civil War, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the
Yemeni Civil War, and numerous other conflicts. In each deployment of PMCs, contracting
nations lack the substantial regulation required to monitor the actions of PMC personnel and
ensure accountability. While the media and the broader public have been made aware of a select
few PMC misconduct incidents, the international community can suspect that countless more
have taken place, only to be suppressed and buried by PMCs and contracting nations or simply
unbeknownst to the media and public. To combat this, multiple countries have banned the use of
PMCs altogether. In 2013, Switzerland enacted legislation stating that any company wishing to
partake in private security endeavours must file for registration and have it granted by authorized
personnel.67 Even then, the use of violence is strictly prohibited to prevent companies from
violating human rights.68 During the Russo-Ukrainian War, due to a lack of proper monitoring,
the Wagner Group gained fighters by recruiting men from jails across Russia— a risk to the
ethicality of the soldiers and decreasing their overall capability. In one case, two ex-convicts
ruthlessly took the lives of many uninvolved children and civilians because they were instructed
to “kill anything in their way”. 69

The exploitation of PMCs heavily impacts the security that citizens have for their governments.
While protection offered by private companies may be beneficial to the targeted demographic,
the idea of national safety and equal access to security is destroyed, causing unnecessary divides
in society.70 Also, advertising and overusing private services as more affordable and more
efficient than the general military decreases the trust that residents have in their government. 71

UN/International Involvement

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions

Part III, Section II, Article 47 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions—officially,
the “Protocol Addition to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977”—reads:

1. “A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.

2. A mercenary is any person who:
a. is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
b. does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
c. is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material

67 [Link]
68 Ibid.
69 [Link]
70 [Link]
71 Ibid.

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 compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
d. is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled
by a Party to the conflict;
e. is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
f. has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as
a member of its armed forces.”72

PMC personnel, if legally recognized as mercenaries, risk losing the protection of the Geneva
Conventions as a combatant or a prisoner of war. Thus, contracting nations and PMCs
themselves claim that they do not fit the criteria for mercenaries, with many nations legally
employing PMCs as “security guards.”

The UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries

In July 2005, The United Nations Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, a subsidiary body
of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), was established to monitor mercenary
activity, identify mercenaries’ impact on human rights, and help strengthen the international
regulatory framework for the solicitation of mercenaries.73 The Working Group may only make
formal recommendations and submit annual reports to the UNHRC and the General Assembly.
The group conducts international investigations and visits different countries to assess the
condition and effectiveness of human rights legislation to suggest improvements. 74 They also
create overviews of the impacts mercenary use has made and encourage change through
advocating and educating nations on risks and trends relating to PMC misregulation. 75 However,
there is a lack of direct involvement of the Working Group on illegal PMC establishments.

The United Nations Mercenary Convention

The United Nations Mercenary Convention, officially The International Convention against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries, is an official UN treaty prohibiting
its namesake. Since its introduction in 2001, 46 states have ratified the Convention, including
Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and Saudi Arabia. A majority of UN member states,
including China, France, India, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have
abstained from signing the treaty. 76

72 [Link]
73 [Link]
74 [Link]
75 [Link]
76 Ibid.

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The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers
Formalized in 2010, the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC)
aims to clarify the responsibilities and obligations of PMCs within the context of international
human rights law. Widely regarded as an abysmal failure, the ICoCA, its organizing entity, has
108 PMC members (including Academi, then-Blackwater) and seven state members (including
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States).77 The primary concerns with the ICoC are
its optional nature, its limited ability to observe PMCs for possible violations, and the fact that
ICoCA leadership positions are held by PMC representatives. Another concern is that the ICoC
provides PMCs false legitimacy, where contractors are protected under the guise of existing
regulation and accountability.

Possible Solutions

PMC Oversight Committee

The first goal of the UN should be establishing a centralized, internationally recognized body
with the authority to monitor and revoke the privileges of PMCs and contracting nations. In the
past, authorities like the Working Group have been established and have written many reports
relating to PMC misuse.78 However, their mandates were postponed multiple times (2 years the
first and 2 and a half years the second), and as such a small group, there has been little direct
action taken against PMC manipulation. 79 The downfall of previous attempts to regulate PMCs
was their small scale and lack of authority; while ambitious, this international PMC oversight
committee is necessary to standardize PMC regulation across the board. One of the oversight
committee’s chief responsibilities will be to navigate the balance between strict, systematic
policy and buy-in from PMCs and employers—PMCs and nations will simply abstain from
ratifying the undermentioned PMC convention and licensing systems, just as most nations
refrained from ratifying the United Nations Mercenary Convention. In the past, PMCs like
Blackwater (now known as Academi) have used its founder, a former Navy SEAL, as a way to
assert military influence and impact the decision-making of laws relating to private security
companies.80 If the PMC convention and licensing system were to be a legal requirement prior to
PMC operation and contracting, the efficacy of the oversight committee would grow
exponentially.

77 Ibid.
78 [Link]
79 Ibid.
80 [Link]

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Legal Regulation
As the definition of PMCs is contentious, with many nations contracting PMCs with the title of
“security guard,” it is important to clarify and define the scope of PMC services. While PMCs
are occasionally and interchangeably referred to as PSCs—private security contractors or private
security companies—the distinction is critical to the development of regulation. PSCs, as the
name suggests, provide security services, often to non-state clients including corporations and
NGOs.81 Their role most commonly entails non-combative work, guarding valuable assets,
including oil fields, domestic banks, and other infrastructure. While PMCs may engage in the
activities of a PSC, they additionally provide extensive combat services. PMCs are the primary
subject of long-overdue regulation, as misconduct often occurs amid foreign combat operations.
Whether PMC personnel are mercenaries is an entirely different question itself, the answer to
which will decide if PMC-specific regulation is required or if overhauled mercenary regulation is
adequate. While some may consider the two in the same category, such as the European
Parliament, China, which uses PSCs specifically in certain cases, has restricted those in PSCs
from carrying firearms.82

If the creation of a new PMC convention, additional to the United Nations Mercenary
Convention, is deemed necessary, the UN and DISEC will need to decide the extent of a PMC
employer’s legal culpability. Whether nations are entirely exempt, partially liable, or wholly
responsible for the misconduct of PMCs, the mechanism of responsibility—fines, temporary
preclusion of PMC contracting, prosecution, or others—must be considered.

Registration and Licensing

The creation of an international PMC registration and licensing system, under the purview of the
aforementioned PMC convention and oversight committee, could pave the way for transparency
and accountability in the industry. Licensing may entail one-time registration, where PMCs
obtain national licenses allowing PMCs to contract and operate in specific nations, or by-contract
licenses where authorization to contract and operate is granted on a case-by-case basis.83 While
broader licensing options offer convenience and a greater likelihood that PMCs and contracting
nations ratify the Convention, systematic, case-by-case licensing could be necessary to
effectively regulate PMC use, particularly as the demand for PMCs rises among non-state actors
including criminal organizations. In the event of serious misconduct committed by PMC
personnel, a PMC’s license to operate within the nation in question, or in all nations, may be
temporarily revoked. The issue remains, however, that PMCs remain inadequately monitored,
allowing cases of misconduct to go unreported. 84

81 [Link]
82 [Link]
83 [Link]
84 [Link]

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Bloc Positions

Nations with Minimal PMC Involvement

These nations, many of which have ratified the United Nations Mercenary Convention, maintain
very minimal, if any, PMC contracting. Few members of this bloc actively oppose the use of
PMCs. Instead, many find that they do not require the services of PMCs because of their nation’s
infrequent and sparse participation in conflicts. In other cases, these nations find that the
exclusive deployment of domestic military personnel is sufficient.

Further, it is important to note that these nations’ ratification of the Mercenary Convention does
not exclude them from the use of PMCs in all scenarios; while their employment under the
context of mercenary work is prohibited, PMCs may be employed for security, consulting, and a
variety of other purposes.

Regardless of whether these nations contract PMCs in the future, their focus is to address
ongoing issues with PMCs. Thus, they seek the establishment of standardized PMC regulations
and clarification of whether the term “mercenary” encompasses PMCs.

Nations with Significant PMC Involvement

Most nations—including China, France, India, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—that regularly employ PMCs in military operations and conflicts have refrained from
ratifying the United Nations Mercenary Convention. In the aftermath of the Nisour Square
massacre in Iraq and a UN report, the United States government addressed allegations of
mercenary use:

“Accusations that U.S. government-contracted security guards, of whatever nationality, are

mercenaries is inaccurate and demeaning to men and women who put their lives on the line to
protect people and facilities every day… The security guards working for U.S. government
contractors in Iraq and elsewhere protect clearly defined United States government areas and
their work is defensive in nature.”85

This statement is indicative of a larger phenomenon with PSC (private security contractor),
PMC, and mercenary definitions. As it is in the best interests of both contracting nations and
PMCs to maintain the distinction between PMCs and mercenaries, nations have adamantly
maintained the stance that PMCs are not mercenaries. Instead, a number of nations employ
PMCs and alleged mercenaries under the pretence of a PSC or “security guard,” even when those
personnel engage in overtly offensive operations.

However, allowing and supporting the use of PMCs poses the risk of exploitation of power by
private companies. If there is no well-maintained legislation to enforce necessary restrictions,
issues such as abusing funds and committing national and international crimes may arise, posing
a threat to global relations and creating internal conflicts. To combat this, there will have to be
clear, unfailing boundaries and thorough monitoring of private activities, like those set by

85 [Link]

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Switzerland. The government should also be quick to address any misconduct, avoiding
instances like the Wagner Group and the scandals revolving around the Russian government’s
exploitation of PMCs to avoid the consequences of their actions.

Nations Strongly Opposing PMC Use

Among nations without PMC involvement, there are some which have taken actions to
strengthen restrictions for PMCs in their country and urge other countries to take more
precautionary measures when authorizing PMCs. Oftentimes, these nations have had past
controversies relating to PMCs or are concerned that they will interfere with internal affairs.
Some may view non-governmental military organizations as potential threats to human rights
during conflicts or to the control that a government has over organizations under their command;
for example, the Wagner Group alone has resulted in many cases where civilians have been
directly and unfairly harmed or violated by these personnel, and the march on Moscow has led to
many other nations questioning the stability of the Russian government.86

Most of these nations would be those who have signed the United Nations Mercenary
Convention or those who have taken action against PMC misconduct in the past. As a complete
ban on PMCs would be unrealistic, a possible goal for countries in this bloc is to reach an
international consensus to heavily monitor PMCs as well as construct a more defined legislature
regarding the relationship between a PMC and the country it operates in, which would prevent
private mercenaries from defiling the reputation of a nation. Overall, those who are against PMC
use believe that private militaries will have more negative impacts than positive ones and are
difficult to manage, in action and in morality.

86 [Link]

CAHSMUN 2024 18
Discussion Questions
1. When are PMCs typically contracted, and for what purpose? What can governments do to
grow that sector of their military operations, alleviating the need for PMCs?

2. How can the United Nations hold PMCs accountable for human rights abuses and other
offences?

3. Should contracting nations be held responsible for the actions of PMCs under their
employment?

4. How can the United Nations ensure that foreign PMC employees are treated fairly?

5. How will the role of PMCs evolve in the future? How can legal frameworks adapt to the
changing landscape of modern warfare?

Additional Sources
Becoming Legitimate: How PMSCs are Seeking Legitimacy in the International System
[Link]

The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law

[Link]

The Case for a Much Smaller Military

[Link]/commentary/case-much-smaller-military

Western European Armies Have Shrunk Dramatically

[Link]/graphic-detail/western-european-armies-have-shrunk-dramatically

Use of Military Contractors Shrouds True Costs of War

[Link]/national-security/2020/06/30/military-contractor-study

The Role of Private Military Contractors in Changing the Dimensions of Fighting Wars
[Link]
dimensionsof-fighting-wars

CAHSMUN 2024 19
Learn Today, Lead Tomorrow.

CAHSMUN XX