Pak-US repair
BY FA H D H U M AY U N 2025-10-03
AMID the many geopolitical shifts underway, the turnaround in the Pak-US
relationship has struck some observers as particularly surprising. It has
also, understandably, prompted questions about the extent to which this
turnaround signals a genuine reset.
For at least two decades, Washington had largely adhered to a familiar
script on Pakistan. That script rested on two Western narratives: an alleged
double game on Afghanistan, and the country`s unfavourable closeness to
China. That script also became harder to rewrite as successive US
administrations made a hard pivot to the Indo-Pacific and
advancedacaseforIndiaasanetsecurity provider in the belief that it could
eventually erode New Delhi`s incentives for strategic autonomy.
But in recent months, a lot has changed.
After years, Islamabad seems to have some equity with a US administration.
The US has shown a growing willingness to rehyphenate Pakistan with
India. And the overarching US attitude towards the latter, borne, at least on
paper, over frustration over trade and immigration, but also over a lack of
acknowledgment of President Donald Trump`s role in ending the four-day
May conflict, has been much cooler.
To what extent then has Washington`s script on Pakistan undergone a
genuine rewrite? Examination of sentiment both up and down Washington
suggests some caution on this front might be wise. A generation of US
diplomats and officials, many of whom rose through the ranks in the Obama
years and had a front row seat to unattained US objectives in Afghanistan,
remain broadly pro-India. And years of close engagement with India`s
strategic community have also made American policymakers more attuned
to understanding India`s grievances vis-à-vis Pakistan, rather than
Pakistan`s vis-à-vis India.
This is worth bearing in mind for two reasons: One, given that the default
setting in Washington below the level of the executive is what it is, it may
be prudent to prepare for the contingency that, when the pendulum swings
back, there may be a scramble to overcompensate and placate New Delhi
for what will likely be viewed as the undue excesses of Trump-era policy on
South Asia.
Two, despite its newfound closeness with the Trump administration,
Pakistan`s own constraints make it unlikely for Islamabad to ever
exclusively be in a US camp. If the Trump administration presses Pakistan
to distance itself fromChina, Pakistan may likely experience friction of the
sort that India is currently experiencing over its ties with Russia. For these
reasons, Pakistan has an enormously high stake in continued Sino-US
cooperation.
That said, recent events still present three consequential openings that
policymakers in Islamabad could do well to take advantage of.
First, events in the Middle East have diverted much of Washington`s
attention away from the Indo-Pacific and back towards West Asia. This,
together with Pakistan`s recent agreement with Saudi Arabia and regional
efforts to end the war in Gaza, make Pakistan, more than India, the more
consequential regional protagonist in the quieter work of anchoring
geopolitical stability. That by default enhances America`s stakes in
reaffirming the Pak-US relationship and should strengthen Pakistan`s
imperative to remain an important interlocutor in the Middle [Link],
there is no denying that India`s confidence in its relationship with the US
has been [Link] when a trade agreement between the two countries
is reached, Indian strategists may be far more hesitant abo-ut attaching
weight to future overtures out of Washington. This presents a somewhat
rare window for Islamabad to strengthen its bid for a more balanced US
strategic posture in South Asia.
Third, if Pakistan can concertedly follow through on its proposed joint
investments in critical minerals, trade and energy during the remainder of
Trump`s time in office, the visibility and dividends of those enterprises
might incentivise political support for bilateral collaboration into the next
American administration. It is also likely that the longer the US rift with
New Delhi persists, the less likely it is that such collaborations with
Pakistan will be seen as cost prohibitive.
Finally, it is worth remembering for any truly meaningful reset with the US
to be sustainable and not linked to short-term gain, Pakistan must first be
able to credibly guarantee returns on democratic, social and economic
governance at home.
If it can, everything else will follow much more naturally. The wnter is an
assistant professor of political science at Tufts University, US.